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THE
CAMBRIDGE
MODERN HISTORY

PLANNED BY
LORD ACTON

EDITED BY
SIR A. W. WARD
SIR G. W. PROTHERO
AND
SIR STANLEY LEATHES, K.C.B.

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THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV

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PREFACE

THE Age of Louis XIV, though the traditional use of the phrase may warrant the adoption of it as the title of a volume covering a period of European history closely coinciding in date with his personal rule, cannot be held to possess the organic unity which belongs to the theme of our Napoleon volume. Louis XIV, though endowed with some truly royal qualities, and above all with that of knowing how to choose the chief agents of his policy at home and abroad, was himself no great statesman and nothing of a general; his monarchy was not his creation, he was without real initiative, and no intellectual effort associated with his reign was due to his personal inspiration. On the other hand, the system of absolute government, which he steadily carried on during more than half a century, and to which all the activities of the French nation were consistently, though not without struggles, accommodated, was characteristic of the whole age of which he is the most conspicuous figure. To the perfection of this system the State with which he was identified had been long advancing by what may be termed a logical process of development; and to it the large majority of rulers contemporary with himself were desirous of adhering or attaining. In the dominions of both branches of the House of Habsburg the alliance of dynastic interests with those of the Church of Rome had at different periods prevailed in the contention against what had come to be mere provincial liberties. But Spain had fallen into political as well as social decay; and the House of Austria was only gradually recovering from the disappointment of its revived dynastic ambition. Among the Princes of the Empire, however, the enfeeblement of the Imperial authority had called forth a widespread ambition to exalt their territorial power at the expense of the claim of their Estates, while in several instances, and more especially in that of Brandenburg-Prussia, they sought to mark their advance by the assumption of a royal Crown. Nor was it

in Central Europe alone that open imitation flattered the absolutism of Louis XIV. In the Scandinavian kingdom the peoples made common cause with the throne in permanently overthrowing in its favour the sway of the nobles; while in Russia, the distinctive features of whose earlier history are traced in this volume, the autocracy of Peter the Great, strengthened by his contact with Western civilisation, broke the resistance of boiars and Church, and stimulated the lethargy of his people. In three important European States only no absolute system of government was established in this age. In Poland, notwithstanding the chronic pressure of the Eastern peril, faction—consuming its energies from time to time in the process of choosing a king—could not have tolerated the establishment of a strong regal authority, even had a fitting personality been forthcoming to make the attempt. The Dutch Republic, though the oligarchy of its leading State had to surrender the control of affairs to a hereditary presidency, preserved the free constitution which it had won for itself with its independence. In Great Britain, religious convictions, menaced together with the traditions of parliamentary self-government, combined with them to preserve the foundations of political freedom and to defend the religious convictions of the great body of the nation. Thus, the patriotic Dutchman whom the last English Revolution seated on the throne of the Stewarts was, reluctantly enough, forced to accept the limits of the royal authority with which he had been invested.

While, in the matter of government and of all the influences derived from it, the example of France more or less enduringly impressed itself in this period upon most of the States of Europe, the history of their international relations was determined by several causes, among which the foreign policy of Louis XIV was but one of the chief. The endeavour of France, in circumstances singularly propitious to the execution of her design, to constitute herself the arbitress of European affairs at large, unlike the Habsburg aspirations for a universal monarchy, lacked the glamour of Imperial tradition, while it could not claim the open approval of Rome. • The pretexts with which Louis XIV was

supplied for his long series of encroachments within the boundaries of the Empire, for his attempt to annex the Spanish, and for his subsequent invasion of the United, Netherlands, are discussed in different parts of this volume, together with the history of French intervention in the affairs of other European States; and the pacifications and other agreements and alliances, which mark the successive stages of alternating advance and retreat in the progress of the French schemes, necessarily call for exposition and comment. The height of the narrative seems to be reached in the negotiations which preceded, without being able to avert, the War of the Spanish Succession, or rather—inasmuch as these negotiations proved the unwillingness of Louis XIV to provoke the united resistance of Western and Central Europe against him—in his ultimate decision to accept the opportunity offered him by the last will of Charles II of Spain. The “balance of Europe” was now in actual danger of being unsettled—in other words, the preponderance of the power of France would have become irresistible had her King’s final challenge been left without a response. The Grand Alliance brought about by William III proved victorious; and though later events, and more especially the death of the Emperor and the accession to the Imperial throne of the Austrian claimant of the Spanish inheritance, once more modified the situation, the principle of a reestablished “balance” underlay all the negotiations which resulted in the Peace of Utrecht. Thus, at the close of the period treated in this volume, the political ascendancy of France in Europe was a thing of the past; though her ascendancy continued in literature, and in much besides.

The second of the causes determining the course of European history in this age has to be traced in the long, and seemingly remote, history of the Ottoman Power in Europe from the middle of the seventeenth century to the Peace of Carlowitz. Its significance for the Empire, Hungary, Poland, and the Venetian dominions, continued till nearly the end of the period treated in this volume. The policy of Louis XIV drew no small advantage from the Eastern question, and viewed its temporary settlement

as, in its turn, a menace to the balance of power in Europe; but for a large part of Europe it was to the close of the seventeenth century a question of life and death.

Finally, in this volume a large division of the canvas is filled by the great Swedish or "Northern" War. A new Thirty Years' War, absorbing all the conflicts of Europe, might have resulted, had the military genius of Charles XII been united to a political genius of the same order. But none of the high-spirited successors of Gustavus Adolphus, whose exploits are narrated in this volume, had inherited the comprehensiveness of his statesmanship. Thus the result of the Northern War—while incidentally proving the impotence of Poland and leaving the now important military Power, Prussia, to play a "waiting game"—was to transfer the *dominium maris Baltici* to the young Russian Power, and thus to prepare a new chapter in the history of Europe.

It seemed to us that an adequate historical survey of the latter half of the seventeenth and the early years of the eighteenth century was impossible without due regard to the moral and intellectual interests which this period inherited from its predecessors or bequeathed to ensuing ages. From the Reformation to the times of the Thirty Years' War the discussion and settlement of religious dogma had absorbed a wholly disproportionate share of the intellectual activity of Western Europe, where the toleration of religious opinion was even as a conception almost unknown. Yet, as is shown in this volume, the spiritual forces of religion were revived as men ceased to be chiefly concerned in the fixing of its doctrines and the enforcement of their acceptance; and the principle of toleration, while it became a factor in the prosperity of States, gained and imparted strength from its association with new developments of religious life and thought. At the same time literature adapted itself to the courtly order of things, except where, as in the later works of Milton, the issues for which a mightier age contended still dominated the poet's mind, or the universal sympathies of a great dramatist such as Molière claimed a European audience. And yet another influence was beginning in a more gradual and less widely perceptible

fashion to permeate the life of Europe. To Science—as our usage limits the term—kings and peoples had almost forgotten to lend an attentive ear, when, in the period of which this volume treats, it once more asserted its position among the moving forces of the world's history, and entered upon a new stage in its progress of which the continuity has since then been unbroken. The chapter in this volume on *French Literature under Louis XIV and its European Influence* was to have been written by the illustrious French critic, M. Ferdinand Brunetière; but, on his lamented death, only a few notes referring to his projected contribution were found among his papers. We were fortunate enough to be enabled to secure the consent of M. Émile Faguet that he should take the place of his *confrère*—a place which no other critic of literature could have filled so suitably and so well. The bibliography to his chapter has been kindly supplied, at very short notice, by Mr A. R. Waller, of Peterhouse, Assistant Secretary of the University Press. The late Sir Michael Foster, whose cooperation in the *Cambridge Modern History* will be a source of gratification to all our readers, had only a week or two before his death sent in to us the ms. of the second section of the chapter on *The Progress of European Science*, of which the earlier section has been written by Mr W. W. Rouse Ball. But Sir Michael had no opportunity of revising what he had written, or of furnishing us with more than a rough draft of his bibliography. We have to thank Dr Clifford Allbutt, Regius Professor of Physic, and Mr A. C. Seward, Professor of Botany, in this University, for their great kindness in revising their lamented friend's text, and adding suggestions for his section of the bibliography, which has been completed by Mr A. T. Bartholomew, of Peterhouse and the University Library.

The Index of this volume has been compiled by Mr H. G. Aldis, of Peterhouse, Secretary of the University Library, and the Chronological Table by Miss A. M. Cooke, whose services to the Acton Collection in the Library will long be held in remembrance.

In accordance with the rule previously followed in this *History*, the dates of events mentioned in this volume are in New Style,

except in the case of events in a country by which in this period New Style had not yet been adopted. Where, as in the instance of a battle by sea, doubts might arise as to which Style has been chosen, that actually used has been specially indicated. The dates of the years are throughout in New Style. A table of years in which New Style was severally adopted by the chief European countries will be found in Vol. III of this work.

A. W. W.

G. W. P.

S. L.

CAMBRIDGE

September, 1907

NOTE ON THE
PRESENT EDITION

THE reprint now offered to the public comprises the complete text and index of each of the twelve volumes, together with Volume XIII, which contains the genealogical tables and general index. The bibliographies and the atlas volume are not included in this edition.

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CHAPTER I.

THE GOVERNMENT OF LOUIS XIV.

(1661—1715.)

WHEN Mazarin's death left the government of France in the hands of the young King, the country seemed to be so happily situated, so free from dangerous rivals and pressing dangers, that it was capable of determining its own destiny. While France had triumphed over Europe, in France itself the monarchy had triumphed over all rival powers, classes and organisations. The futile struggle of the Fronde had discredited the *Parlements*, and had exhibited the egotism and the incapacity of the *noblesse*. France turned to her King with a loyal enthusiasm born of a sense that the monarchy alone could maintain order in the State and ensure its prosperity.

At the time of Mazarin's death Louis XIV was twenty-three years old. His character was as yet little known. If Mazarin had not kept the sovereign in ignorance, he had certainly kept him in the background; and hence it was that Louis XIV's declaration "that he intended to be his own first minister" and that "all ministers were to address themselves to him" was received with amusement and incredulity. His singular grace and dignity of manner were already apparent; his amorous temperament was familiar to those who had been brought into close contact with him; and these characteristics endured to the end. But the world had not yet suspected the persistent energy of the young King, or his fondness for "the business of reigning," or, again, the boundless pride and egotism which neutralised many of his best qualities. During the whole of his reign he maintained his habits of regularity and hard work. He was constant in attendance at the various councils by which the business of the State was transacted; and he was always attentive, eager to master the details of business, and confident in his own judgment whether in domestic or in foreign affairs. From the first he was the real ruler of the country, and his mastery increased as his reign advanced. The domestic and the foreign policy of France were at first largely controlled by his great Ministers—Colbert, Louvois, and Lionne—though the approval of the King was always a necessary condition of their action, and at each point his judgment had to be

convinced. But, before the end of the reign, the relative importance of the Ministers had greatly declined; they were at last the almost servile executors of the King's will; and he had grown intolerant of opposition and protest.

It is difficult to arrive at a judgment as to the abilities of Louis XIV. Lord Acton has called him "by far the ablest man who was born in modern times on the steps of a throne." Clearly, his was no commonplace character or intelligence. One who directed the policy of the first State in Europe for fifty-five years, who achieved many victories, and showed great tenacity and skill in the hour of defeat, must have had powers above the average. No historian has ever denied to him patience, industry, or method. "One must work hard to reign," he wrote, "and it is ingratitude and presumption towards God, injustice and tyranny towards man to wish to reign without hard work." He laboured at the task of reigning his whole life through, undeterred by ennui, uninterrupted by pleasures or domestic affliction. Montesquieu's judgment, that his character was more striking than his intelligence ("*il avait l'âme plus grande que l'esprit*"), is perhaps the fairest summing-up of the *Grand Monarque*. In what concerned foreign affairs and the organisation of the central government he exhibited real skill. But he did not show the same intelligence or the same patience in relation to social or religious problems or the organisation of local government. The extension of monarchical authority and of his own personal power was the predominant impulse with him; and where these were not concerned his attention and energy were apt to flag. His theory of life was theocratic through and through: the King is God's vicegerent, and is possessed of a sort of divine infallibility. The history of his reign passes judgment on this theory as to its effects both on the kingdom and on the King. In his reign the monarchy ceased to be the one principle of unity in the State; it ceased to justify itself as the protector of the people against the nobility and as the successful leader of the nation in war. It became something apart from the people and the nation. The way was thus prepared for the Revolution of the next century.

The authority of the Crown had triumphed over, without actually effacing, all rival authorities. *Parlements* and local Estates and municipalities still existed. The Church still held its assemblies; but, if they still exercised any power, it was by permission of the King. All power came from the King, and it was the fixed determination of Louis XIV that this fact should be recognised by all the officials of the State. When Voysin became Secretary of State, he apologised to the King for referring certain decisions to him, saying that he had not yet had sufficient experience of office to take on himself the responsibility of decision. Louis answered emphatically that it would never be his business to decide anything; that he must always take his orders from the King, and limit his activity to executing them.

The machinery of government developed by Richelieu and Mazarin was used by Louis XIV; but it was developed still further. The essential characteristic of the constitution of France during his reign consisted in its being a government through Councils, to which, with few exceptions, neither birth nor rank gave any right of admission. The nobility were excluded with jealous care; great ecclesiastics were no longer admitted; the Councils were filled chiefly with men of middle-class birth, usually lawyers (*gens de la robe*), who owed everything to the King and could not possibly regard themselves as independent of him. The exclusion of those above the accepted level was maintained even against members of the royal family.

There were four chief Councils: the *Conseil d'État*, the *Conseil des Dépêches*, the *Conseil des Finances*, and the *Conseil Privé*. The *Conseil d'État*, unofficially known as the *Conseil d'en haut*, was a small body of not more than four or five men, which met in the presence of the King. It assembled three times a week, and in it the great questions of State were considered and decided. All the members could take part in discussing these questions, but the decision rested with the King. This Council was the pivot of the State; but the King took care not to allow it to become apparent constitutionally. No minutes were taken of the proceedings of the Council, and no record was kept of its decisions. Its meetings were merely occasions on which the King chose to ask the advice of those whom he cared to consult. The *Conseil des Dépêches* was also held in his presence, and considered and decided on all questions relating to the internal condition of France. The *Conseil des Finances* had under its control all questions relating to taxation, and was also held in the royal presence. All these three Councils were held in the royal apartments. The fourth Council, the *Conseil Privé* or *Conseil des parties*, was a body quite different in kind. It was held in the palace, but not in the royal apartments, was not usually presided over by the King, and consisted of a large number of lawyers (*maîtres de requêtes*). It was not technically a supreme Court of appeal, for its functions were purposely left indefinite; but it was the highest judicial Court in the land, and represented the vague but supreme judicial authority belonging to the King. These were the chief Councils; but there were others, such for instance as those dealing with religion, with the Huguenots and with commerce. In any matter of importance the King was accustomed to seek the advice of persons whose opinion he valued and whom he had no reason to fear, and to decide after listening to their advice.

Thus, at the centre, the royal authority triumphed completely, and thrust the *Parlement* and the sovereign Courts into the shade. His aim was the same in the provinces; but in these the royal authority had to struggle to supremacy through the ruins of a vast number of provincial institutions, customs, and rights. There were the provincial Estates, or

what remained of them; there were the provincial *Parlements*; there were the municipal liberties, once so vigorous and important, and still general, though decadent and threatened with extinction. Wide differences still existed between province and province, not only in feeling and institutions, but even in language. Lavissee has asserted that in the year 1661 the greater number of Frenchmen were still ignorant of the French tongue. In consequence of these separatist tendencies the royal authority had a hard struggle to carry out its aim of centralised and unified government, in spite of the heavy blows which Richelieu had already struck in this direction. The ruins of the past were still left to cumber the ground, and often to prevent the rise of any more useful edifice; but in their midst there rose the power of the royal *intendants*. The *Parlements* were not abolished: they continued to sit and to give decisions at Toulouse, Grenoble, Bordeaux, Dijon, Rouen, Aix, Pau, Rennes, Metz; and later in the reign at Tournay and Besançon. The provincial Estates still met at intervals in Brittany, the Boulonnais, Artois, Burgundy, Provence, Languedoc, and Franche Comté. The Governors still held nominal power in the various provinces: they were usually men of aristocratic birth and they enjoyed a large income. But they were for the most part absentees, and, when they went to their provinces, it was for ceremonial purposes rather than for the performance of important business. *Parlements*, Estates and Governors were devoid of any real power. The real authority lay with the royal *intendants*, who in effect represented in the provinces the unlimited authority of the King, and who were placed there in order to maintain and increase it. The King informed his *intendants* that it was their business to see to "the observation of our edicts, the administration of civil and criminal justice and of police, and all other matters which concern the prosperity and security of our subjects." They were chosen from the ranks of the unprivileged classes, and the nobility saw in them their chief rivals and enemies. In the passage quoted above, the King speaks of "the prosperity and security of our subjects," and the relief of the poor figures occasionally in despatches. But it is the special weakness of the reign that so much was made of the royal authority for its own sake, while the condition of the people occupied a quite secondary place. Notwithstanding the great power of Louis XIV and the reforming energy of Colbert, little was done for the relief of the people even during the early and prosperous years of Louis XIV's rule; and the wars, successful and unsuccessful, of his later years heaped intolerable burdens on the shoulders of the poor and threw into further confusion the system of administration, which Colbert had done his utmost to regularise and simplify.

It was the effort of the King to keep the power in his own hands and to avoid the slightest appearance of a "mayor of the Palace." Without violently overthrowing the old machine of government, he reduced to

something like impotence the ministers of old and high-sounding titles, and gave the reality of power into the hands of other ministers and Secretaries of State who were immediately appointed by and dependent on himself. The Secretaries of State, despite their nominally dependent position, were elevated above the heads of the old nobility. They represented Royalty itself, and only Princes, Dukes, and Marshals, were exempted from the necessity of saluting them by the title of "*Monseigneur*." The Chancellor was in name the chief of the King's servants. He seemed the last survival of the Middle Ages. He was nominal president of all the Councils and head of all Courts and tribunals; he had the custody of the royal seal, so that all acts of the royal authority passed through his hands. He was irremovable and seemed therefore a very bulwark of aristocratic power against the monarchy. But, in truth, the treatment of the Chancellor is symbolic of the whole political condition of France. He remained in his splendour and wealth and nominal power. Earlier Kings had eluded his power by giving the actual custody of the seals to an official removable at pleasure; but in the reign of Louis XIV the prestige of the royal authority was so great that no such subterfuge was necessary. The Chancellors of Louis XIV were not the slightest check upon his authority. Next came the Controller-General of Finances and the Ministers of State, whose office under Louis XIV lasted just so long as they retained the confidence of the King. They were without accurately defined duties, and were in fact exactly what the King chose to make of them. After them came the Secretaries of State, in whose hands lay the real administration of the realm. Their duties in 1661 were the superintendence of (1) foreign affairs, (2) war, (3) the King's household and the Church, (4) the Protestants of France: but, in addition, the provinces were rather arbitrarily divided into four groups, and each group was placed under one of the four Secretaries. But these duties were not rigidly defined and were varied when new appointments were made.

Louis XIV was excellently served during the first part of his reign by men most of whom had received their training in statesmanship in the schools of Richelieu and Mazarin. Le Tellier, a man of humble origin, was Secretary of State for war and had shown great efficiency in that department. He was a servant such as Louis XIV loved to have—painstaking, efficient and incapable of any ambition except to rise in the favour and service of his royal master. His reputation has been effaced by his subordinate Colbert, and by his son, the notorious Louvois. Brienne, La Vrillière, and Guénégaud were the other secretaries in 1661; but the name of Lionne was greater than theirs. He had served as a diplomatist with great distinction under Mazarin, and was soon to show his skill under Louis XIV as Secretary of State for foreign affairs.

For the moment, however, it was not war or foreign affairs which claimed the King's chief attention, but rather the department of finances,

where Nicolas Fouquet still reigned as *surintendant*. It has been told in an earlier volume how Fouquet had used the troubles of the Fronde to amass for himself an enormous fortune by methods even more corrupt than the moral standard of the time allowed. Mazarin had known what he was doing, had winked at it, and had probably shared in the profits. But the new master of France had an authority and a spirit which placed him above such temptations; and the wealth and the position of Fouquet were such that he was the most real rival of the royal power. Colbert had already marked the dishonest gains of Fouquet and had reported them to Mazarin; but no action had been taken. His counsels had more weight with Louis XIV, and the overthrow and trial of Fouquet was the first serious measure of his reign. He was condemned to banishment and confiscation of property; but this was not enough for the King, who commuted the sentence into imprisonment for life. Fouquet was immured until his death in the prison of Pinerolo.

The chief agent in pressing on the trial of Fouquet had been Colbert. He was sprung from a family engaged in commerce, and had at first thought of commerce as his destined career. But he had then entered the service of Le Tellier, and had through him become acquainted with Mazarin, to whom he had rendered important services. His opposition to Fouquet was prompted by a detestation of the methods employed which animated his whole career; but personal ambition also played its part. The fall of Fouquet brought Colbert to the control of the finances, though the title of *surintendant* was not employed again. Finance was now relegated to the attention of a Council; but in this Council Colbert was henceforth the supreme influence, though he at first only held the title of *intendant des finances*, which was later changed to controller-general. His influence too extended far beyond the finances, and largely controlled the King's policy until the epoch of the great wars began. Charge after charge was accumulated upon him. In 1661 he was member of the Council of Finance and *chargé d'affaires* for the navy. In 1664 he became superintendent of buildings. He was raised to the post of Controller-General of Finance in 1667. He became Secretary of State for the King's household and Secretary of State for the navy in 1669.

Colbert was neither a philanthropist nor a philosopher. The relief of the poor is often mentioned in his projects, but it seems rather a conventional phrase than a deeply cherished aim. He has nothing to add to the economic or political theory of the State. He identified the wealth of a State with the amount of gold and silver which it contains. This was the common theory of his age. It was more individual to himself that he conceived the total volume of European commerce to be incapable of a material increase. What one nation gained, he concluded, another must lose. The idea of the fraternity of nations found no place in his scheme of thought. He was anxious that France should win

from the other nations the commerce which they at present possessed. Commerce with him was divided from war by its methods rather than by its spirit or its objects. The greatness of France, he declared on one occasion, was proved not merely by its own flourishing condition but by the poverty and general distress to which it had reduced its neighbours. Yet, while neither philanthropist nor philosopher, he was a man of business with a passionate enthusiasm for detail, industry, and efficiency. And, though not an original thinker, there is something revolutionary in his general objects: for he wished to make of France, in spite of all her feudal, aristocratic, and military traditions, a commercial State; to transfer her ambition from war to finance; to manage her policy, not with an eye to glory, but on sound business principles. But he failed to bend France to his will. Her traditions stood in his way, and Louis XIV cared nothing for commerce and much for military glory. Yet even the small measure of success to which he attained makes an epoch in French history.

The man himself is clearly revealed in his projects, his letters, and the correspondence and memoirs of the time. Madame de Sévigné calls him the "North Star," in allusion both to his fixity of purpose and the coldness of his temperament. Industry with him ceased to be an effort and became a passion. The labour which he so readily underwent himself he exacted from others. He loved to work his way into all the details of business; to determine the methods by which it could be simplified and improved; and then to carry out the reform in spite of all obstacles, thrown in his way by tradition, corruption, and the carelessness of the King. But a desire to paint Colbert as the King's good influence, while Louvois figures as the opposite, has sometimes led to the attribution of virtues to Colbert which are not really his. His life was not without very serious blemishes. He made himself the complacent instrument of the King's amours, and his passionate hatred of corruption did not prevent him from gaining titles, income, and offices for himself and his relatives by means which in another he would have bitterly condemned.

As a man of business Colbert, while he sought to open out new sources of income for the State, desired also to see the State managed on its present lines with economy and efficiency. For the present these qualities were the last that could be attributed to the political and economic system of France. There was confusion everywhere. A medal struck in Colbert's honour mentioned without exaggeration "*aerarii rationes perturbatas et hactenus inextricabiles*." But confusion was not the only trouble; there had been corruption and knavery too. And, so soon as Fouquet had been arrested, and long before his trial had reached its strange termination, Colbert set to work. A tribunal was established to deal with the fraudulent financiers, and sat from 1661 to 1665. There was no inclination to lean to mercy's side. Some were condemned

to death, though none were executed; more than four thousand were fined and compelled to disgorge large sums for the benefit of the treasury.

The debts of the State next demanded his attention. Through the mouth of the King he repudiated certain debts altogether, because only a small portion of the original capital had ever reached the treasury. Then he declared that other bonds were to be cancelled by paying off the original sum advanced, less the sum of the interest already received. Those who were chiefly injured by this measure were the *rentiers* of the city of Paris, and their protests were loud and long. The King supported Colbert in a declaration wherein he stated that the cancelling of the bonds was the only way of effecting "the relief of the people which we desire with so much ardour"; but subsequently the procedure was modified in deference to the outcries of the people of Paris. The net result was, however, a considerable reduction in the indebtedness of the State.

The assessment and collection of the taxes also called for immediate consideration. The chief of the taxes was the *taille*. The abuses connected with this most burdensome and long-lived impost were threefold, and may be summed up in the words privilege, arbitrary assessment and oppressive exaction. Nobility, clergy, court and government officials were exempt. Boisguillebert estimated, in 1697, that not more than a third part of the population contributed to the *taille*, and this third was the poorest and most wretched. In the *pays d'élection* the total sum was fixed by the Government, divided among the districts and parishes of the province by the *intendant*, and finally collected by prominent villagers, who were made responsible in their own property for the full payment. The payment of the tax was enforced by distraint and quartering of soldiers, often accompanied by acts of cruelty, and was frequently evaded by corruption. The collectors especially groaned under the burden of their responsibility. Failure to find the prescribed amount of taxes was punished by imprisonment. In 1679 we hear that there were 54 collectors imprisoned in Tours alone. Colbert's letters are full of the shifts to which the taxpayers had recourse in their efforts to escape, and of the misery caused by the government exactions. In the *pays d'état*, the taxes paid to the King were still called a *don gratuit* (or "benevolence"), and the *taille* was by no means so grievous a burden and did not discourage industry and the cultivation of the soil. The total amount was fixed by the *intendant*; but the provincial Estates had some influence in its assessment on districts and individuals, and it was reckoned, not on the general wealth of the taxpayer (*taille personnelle*), but upon his house and landed property (*taille réelle*). How was the situation to be remedied? Colbert did not propose or desire to anticipate the ideas of 1789 by the abolition of privilege; but he scrutinised all claims to exemption, and brought back into the ranks of the taxable

a large number who had escaped under various pretexts. But, above all, he insisted on a more careful supervision of the collection of the *taille* at each of its stages. He urged the *intendants* to keep a jealous watch on the receivers and collectors; he gave rewards to those who collected the tax with the least expense, and punished the most wasteful. Sometimes there breaks out in his instructions a feeling of pity for the misery of the people; but it is for the most part the man of business who speaks. Here, as in the case of all Colbert's schemes for reform, the Dutch war of 1672 exercised a fatal effect; and the need for much money at once brought back many of the worst abuses that he had striven to destroy.

A vast number of other taxes, usually in the nature of customs and excise, exhibited the same features of confusion, corruption, and oppression as those noticed in the case of the *taille*. The abuses arose chiefly out of the indirect method of collecting these taxes. They were sold to capitalists who usually undersold them, and thus a large number of intermediate profits were exacted from the taxpayer and were lost to the State. Here also Colbert exhibits his usual characteristics. His ideas do not rise above the existing system. He does not propose to institute the direct collection of these taxes by state officials. But he inspected the existing system with minute care; he punished fraud; he tried to establish greater simplicity of working. Yet even under the improved system introduced by Colbert the weight of the burden of the taxes is shown by frequent provincial disturbances. These provincial risings make little mark in the memoirs of the time (though Madame de Sévigné devotes some precious pages to the troubles in Brittany), and the society of Versailles cared little about them. But they were in many instances very serious, and a study of them shows how little the classic dignity of the Court of the *Grand Monarque* is truly representative of the condition of France during his reign. There was a serious rising in the Boulonnais in 1662 caused by the quartering of troops and the imposition of unpopular taxes. It was suppressed without difficulty, but was followed by cruel and unjust punishments. Two years later a much more dangerous movement broke out in the Landes of Gascony. Here it was a new tax on salt that raised the fury of the people. The nature of the country, and above all the skill and audacity of the leader, Audijos, prolonged the trouble for many months. In vain those who were caught were cruelly punished, and high rewards were offered for the head of Audijos. He escaped in spite of all, sometimes finding a refuge on the Spanish side of the frontier. In the end the Government had to come to terms with the audacious leader, and gave him the command of a regiment of dragoons. An equally serious revolt broke out in the Vivarais, where a report of absurd taxes exasperated the people beyond patience. It was reported that the peasants were to pay ten *livres* for each male child born and five for each female, three *livres* when they bought a new coat and five when they bought a new hat. The rising

was not suppressed until a force of nearly five thousand men had been despatched from headquarters. After the Dutch war of 1672, there were even more serious troubles. In 1674 Bordeaux broke out into rebellion to the cry of "*Vive le roi sans gabelle!*" The forces of the *intendant* were at first defeated, and it was only by great exertions that the rebellious city was reduced. The troubles in Brittany were perhaps the most serious of all, and they were supported by the *Parlement*. Before the province was quiet, the troops of the King had been guilty of horrible excesses, and their officers of broken promises. Thus it is clear that even at the zenith of the absolute monarchy the passions that inspired the peasantry in 1789 were not far below the surface.

While Colbert strove to improve the working of the actual machinery of France, and succeeded in diverting to the coffers of the State gains which had hitherto gone into the pockets of individuals, he was not contented with this. He desired also to add to the wealth of France by promoting her productive energies and by stimulating her industries. In all this he frankly takes the national point of view. The wealth of one country meant the poverty of her neighbour: such was his economic creed. And he desired to acquire for France the industries which her neighbours—especially England and Holland—enjoyed. False theory here led him into the one supreme mistake of his life—his promotion of the war against Holland. His eyes were never opened to his theoretic error; but he saw the war sweep away many of the reforms and improvements that had been the result of his passionate energy.

His general industrial scheme is easily summarised. He desired to turn France into a busy hive of industry, to promote and direct those industries by the action of the State, to protect them from the rivalry of foreign countries by high protective tariffs; and then to open up trade in the commodities produced by improving the internal communication of France, by establishing trade with distant lands and defending the country by an increased and remodelled fleet. He pursued this task with energy and gained as large a measure of success as his commercial theory, the lukewarmness of Louis XIV, and the condition of the country allowed.

In 1663 he drew up a statement of the various articles imported into France and declared that they ought to be produced on French soil. Some of them had formerly been produced in France, but had disappeared; others had always come from abroad. Domestic manufactures must be revived and stimulated, foreign manufactures must be planted in the land. Many industries he found in the exclusive possession of foreign countries. Colbert was determined to break through these monopolies and to transfer these industries to French soil. He offered rewards to foreign workmen—English, Dutch, German, Swedish, Venetian—to come and settle in France and establish a centre for the manufacture of their various articles on French territory. At the same time he

punished severely Frenchmen who tried to transfer their industrial knowledge to a foreign soil. For the rest, all France must work hard. The pauperising almsgiving of the monasteries must be limited; the admission of peasants into the Orders of the celibate Church must be discouraged. The King was to take the lead in the endeavour. Chief among the royal industries was the Gobelins factory, which soon gained a great celebrity for its tapestries; but there were more than a hundred other establishments that bore the title of Royal. The example thus given would, it was hoped, be widely followed. Religious establishments were encouraged to manufacture; municipalities were directed to turn their attention to industry; there were honours and State-aid for those who laboured, and the great Minister's bitterest opposition visited all idlers.

But it was not in Colbert's nature to trust for the development of industrial France to the effects of competition and the free impulses of the people. He could not believe that a thing was done, unless he did it himself or through his agents. He was alarmed and irritated to find that in certain markets the products of the French factories were not welcomed and were regarded as deficient in quality compared with those of the rivals of France. To alter this condition of things, the manufacturers must be schooled by the State. The industries of France were nearly all in the hands of trade-guilds, and it was through these that Colbert brought the influence of the State to bear on the manufacturers. Edicts and regulations followed one another by the score; methods of manufacture, with details as to the size, colour and quality of manufactured articles, were laid down. The tone adopted was that of a schoolmaster who alternates punishment with moral platitudes. Then inspectors were sent round the country to enforce these regulations. A famous edict of 1671 on the weaving and dyeing of cloth will show to what lengths he was ready to go. If bad cloth is produced specimens of it are to be exposed on a stake with a ticket attached giving the name of the delinquent. If the same fault is committed again, the master or the workman who is at fault shall be censured in the meeting of the guild. In the event of a third offence the guilty person shall himself be tied to the post for two hours with a specimen of the faulty product tied to him. The customs and traditions of France and the love of ease natural to all men resisted Colbert at every turn. His instructions show his growing anger with the *fainéantise* of the people. He closes the public-houses during working-hours. He uses irony and threats, and often confesses that his efforts are in vain. But much was done. Industrial France was slowly coming into being. Patient energy and a continuation of peace would have done more.

But Colbert had not succeeded in destroying or seriously injuring the industries of the neighbours of France; and his theory persuaded him that this was an indispensable sign of her prosperity. Holland, he

complained, possessed 15,000 or 16,000 of the 20,000 ships that carried on the commerce of the world, and France had only five or six hundred. His first system of tariffs (in 1664) contained nothing that went beyond the ideas and practices of the time. But three years later he was more eagerly bent on the development of French industries and more determined on the destruction of the rival industries of the Dutch. We have seen that by him commerce was always regarded as a sort of war, and he saw, without desiring to withdraw from the struggle, that this time the commercial struggle was likely to lead to a military one. In the tariff of 1667 the customs on goods entering the kingdom of France were in many instances doubled, in some considerably more than doubled. Thus worsted stockings were charged 8 *livres* instead of 3 *livres* 10 *sous*; fine cloth was rated 80 *livres* instead of 40; lace at 60 instead of 25. A little later an absolute prohibition was placed upon Venetian glass and lace. Heavy taxes had already been put upon the export of raw materials produced in France, and this was often extended so as to include corn. The Dutch answered with counter-tariffs; and this war of the tariffs leads directly up to the outbreak of war in 1672.

In Colbert's scheme industry and commerce were closely connected; and, while he desired to stimulate the productive energies of France, he desired also to increase her share in the interchange of the commodities of the world. French traders lagged far behind those of Holland and England. They had hitherto played a small part in exploiting the wealth of the Indies and the Americas. Holland and England employed the method of chartered companies for their distant over-sea traffic, and Colbert resolved to do the same. His dealing with this question reveals his invariable characteristics. France must have trade, and therefore she must have trading companies; the rich men of France, whether merchants or nobles, must be forced to invest in these companies; the companies, when formed, must be under direct State supervision at every point. All that energy and constant watchfulness could do for the promotion of trade would be done. Colbert's failure, in this instance as so often, was that he did not realise the part that liberty must of necessity play in the development of commerce. It was his habit to think of efficiency and liberty as rivals, not as partners. He reorganised the Company of the West Indies; he founded a Company for the East Indies; these were followed by Companies for the Levant, for the timber trade of the Pyrenees, for the Northern Seas. The development and the failure of all these Companies follows similar lines. We may take the East India Company as typical of all. It was founded by a royal edict of August, 1664. The capital was to be 15 million *livres*; and the King subscribed 3 million without asking for interest. The Company was to enjoy a monopoly of all trade between the Cape of Good Hope and the East Indies. It was to possess in its own right whatever it took from the natives or from European enemies, with full

mining rights. The only burdens imposed on it were that it should build churches and pay priests for the conversion of the natives, and that it should in all things comply with the laws of France and the *coutumier de Paris*. But this last stipulation proved ruinous to the prosperity of the Company. It forced upon the agents of the Company, and upon all future colonists the restrictions both religious and political of France—restrictions damaging at home, suicidal abroad. Nothing went well with the Company from the first. It was in vain that the rich and the noble were forced to subscribe. The record of the Company is a record of corruption, failure, and bankruptcy. In eleven years the Company lost six and a half millions of *livres*. And Colbert heard with impotent jealousy that during this period the corresponding Dutch Company had paid a dividend of 40 per cent. Some of Colbert's Companies did worse; some rather better; none succeeded in rivalling the great Companies of England and Holland.

The colonies of France were closely connected with the commercial companies; and their history during the administration of Colbert is much the same. France possessed excellent bases for colonisation in Canada, Louisiana, and the West Indian Islands, and made a promising beginning in Madagascar, Ceylon, and India. But, though Colbert realised to the full the possibilities of these colonial establishments, he interfered too much; and his interference was even more dangerous at so great a distance from France than it was in France itself. The spirit of religious intolerance, which was soon to strike a heavy blow against his enterprises at home, ruined those abroad. The only thing that could have served the French colonies was liberty; and of this Colbert with all his vast gifts and powers never knew the value.

The internal customs of France were an irrational medley of tradition and privilege; each province had a different system; and this system was guaranteed in many instances by the treaty whereby the province was incorporated with the Crown. It was impossible even for the ruthless will of Colbert to make a clean sweep of all the fetters which the past had placed upon the future; but by persuasion he brought the great central provinces of France under the same system, viz., Normandy, Poitou, Maine, Picardy, the Aunis, Thouars, Perche, Champagne, Berry, the Nivernais, Burgundy, the Bourbonnais, the Beaujolais, Touraine, Bresse, Anjou, and the Île de France. In this case he aimed at much more than he accomplished. "I am opposed," he wrote, "to all that interferes with commerce, which ought to be extremely free." He would have liked to see an uniform system of weights and measures and the almost complete abolition of interprovincial custom and dues. He was not sufficiently supported by the King's authority to realise more than a small part of his plan, though French commerce had acquired a more unrestricted movement before the Dutch War.

Colbert did much to facilitate the internal trade of France by the

construction of canals and the improvement of roads. The idea of the chief among these enterprises, the famous Canal of Languedoc, which joined the Mediterranean to the Bay of Biscay, was no new one, though the actual project suggested to Colbert was due to Pierre-Paul Riquet, who was employed in the administration of the *gabelle*. Colbert eagerly adopted the proposal, and at first thought of making a canal capable of carrying ships of war; but he had to be satisfied with a more modest scheme. The difficulties, financial and engineering, were very great, and towards the end Colbert and Riquet had ceased to be on good terms with each other. The canal was opened in May, 1681, a few months after the death of Riquet. It was, for the times, an extraordinary feat in engineering. The canal was 162 miles long, had 75 locks and was carried over a watershed 830 feet above the sea-level. But Colbert was far from resting satisfied with the one great enterprise. He directed the improvement of the waterways throughout France, the making of new canals, and above all the improvement of the roads. Since the time of the Romans there had been no such road-maker in France as he.

Colbert's vision of a France, colonial, industrial, and commercial, necessarily included a strong navy. What Richelieu had done in this respect had been undone in the period of Mazarin's domination. Colbert took up the work with more than his usual energy, and here all his great qualities were seen at their best. When he began, the warships of the French navy were, he tells us, only twenty in number; and of these not more than two or three were really serviceable. But by 1671 the number had risen to 196 effective vessels, and by 1677 the figure had risen to 270. Thus Colbert saw the King in a position to realise the object summed up by him in the phrase "*se passer des étrangers*." The old harbours and arsenals of France were repaired, and new ones created. A fresh life was infused into Toulon, Rochefort, Brest, Le Havre, Dunkirk; and ship-building rapidly developed. He gave as careful a consideration to the question of the crews as to that of the ships themselves; but here the hardness of his nature becomes painfully evident. He forced the maritime population of France into the service with a vigour not less brutal than that of the English press of later days. But the cruelties to which his system could descend are seen at their worst in relation to the galleys. These vessels had been of the greatest service in the naval warfare of the Mediterranean, and Colbert was passionately determined to build and equip them with the greatest possible rapidity. He succeeded in building them, and boasted that the French yards were capable of turning out a galley within the space of twenty-four hours. But the crews gave him endless trouble. The toil of the rowers was so terrible and their treatment so cruel that free men could not be induced in sufficient quantities to undertake the work. The galleys were a common form of punishment for the criminals of France; and the correspondence

of Colbert shows him to have urged upon the judges the sentencing of as large a number as possible to the galleys. The vagrants of France were forced wholesale into this living death; and those condemned for a short period were often detained for life. History has few more terrible chapters than that of the barbarous treatment of the French galley-slaves.

We stand amazed at the different subjects which came under the survey of Colbert and at the minute attention which he was able to bestow on them. There is assuredly no French statesman besides him whose energy flows through so many channels until we come to Napoleon. As Minister of Marine the fortifications of France were partly under his control, and, with Vauban, he laboured to make them impregnable. He was interested in the public works of Paris, and hoped to make the King concentrate his architectural ambitions on the Louvre; and he saw with despair that the royal inclination was turned wholly in the direction of Versailles. He protested against the expenses of Versailles with singular frankness, declaring that the new palace "would perhaps afford the King pleasure and amusement but would never increase his glory"; but all was in vain, and his projected improvements for the Louvre were never realised. In order to complete the survey of his manifold activities, we need here only mention that the creation of five new Academies was due to Colbert—the Academy of Inscriptions and Medals; the Academy of Science; the French Academy at Rome; the Academy of Architecture; the Academy of Music. Though with these royal protection and ministerial direction counted for much and sometimes hindered their free development, they all lived and flourished and were one of the most permanent effects of Colbert's genius. Of the pensions which he accorded to men of science and letters, the first list (1662) contained 60 names—45 French and 15 belonging to foreign countries. It must, however, be allowed that the list, and especially the order of names in it, suggest no very favourable idea of Colbert's literary tastes. His object was in point of fact mainly political, and, by acting as Maecenas under Louis XIV, he intended to control the men of letters and through them to influence public opinion.

In its ideals and its efforts, both political and literary, the age of Louis XIV typifies order and authority. But an enquiry into the actual condition of things reveals a striking contrast to the ideals of the age. The administration of justice was irregular and corrupt. The encroachments of the Crown had broken the independence of feudal justice, but it still subsisted in a most confused, arbitrary and corrupt form. Crimes were amazingly frequent even in the neighbourhood of Paris and were increased by the brutality of the punishments inflicted. The procedure both in civil and criminal cases was uncertain, dilatory, and embarrassed by the rival claims of innumerable feudal Courts as against the royal magistrates and one another. The corruption of the

provincial administration of justice is attested by innumerable complaints; and the rich and powerful among French criminals enjoyed a large measure of impunity. All that was best in Louis XIV and in the traditions of the French Crown fought against this state of things, and here also Colbert was the chief agent and stimulus to the royal will. A series of ordinances, of which the chief were the *ordonnance civile* (1667), the *ordonnance criminelle* (1670), the *ordonnance sur les eaux et forêts*, and the *édit sur le commerce* (1673) defined the procedure in various departments and controlled the legal system of France, until the *Code Louis* was replaced, a century and a half later, by the *Code Napoléon*. The general tendency and the general result of these ordinances was excellent; but in some points they stereotyped odious practices, and Colbert defended at every point the cause of monarchy rather than humanity. The use of torture was prescribed; counsel was denied to the accused in criminal cases; the treatment of bankrupts was severe in the extreme. But it was not enough to declare the royal authority by ordinance, it was also to be demonstrated in action. A royal commission under the presidency of the Sieur de Novion was sent down to Clermont-Auvergne in 1665 to repress disturbances there and assert the royal power against the presumption of the nobles. Fléchier, afterwards Bishop of Nîmes, has left us a brilliant and amusing description of the procedure of this commission. The chief incident was the trial and execution of the Vicomte de La Mothe de Canillac for the killing of a man of humble birth in the prosecution of a private quarrel. The peasantry, when they found the royal authority thrown on their side against their aristocratic oppressors, passed at once from servility to insolence, refused the usual acts of courtesy to the nobles, and would clearly have anticipated the violences of 1789, if the Government had not been strong enough to repress them. What was done in Auvergne was repeated in other parts of France. Novion reported to Louis XIV that a single official could now execute orders, which could not formerly have been carried out without the support of a body of soldiers. If all exaggerations are excluded we still see here the action of the monarchy in its most typical and beneficent aspect. The disorders of Paris and the neighbourhood, which at one time reached an incredible height, were largely remedied by the appointment of La Reynie as Lieutenant of Police.

The first eleven years of Louis XIV's personal government are so much influenced by the ideas of Colbert that the reign of the King and the biography of the Minister are almost identical. But before the end of that period Colbert had found a serious rival. The pacific designs of Colbert were opposed by the plans and influence of Louvois, the Minister of War. Louvois and Colbert were alike in their industry, and in their devotion to the service and glory of their King; but they were alike in nothing else. The causes of their personal hostility have been examined as if there were some secret to be revealed; but, in fact,

Louvois crossed Colbert's path at every turn. He urged Louis to spend money on Versailles, while Colbert wanted to make Paris the royal residence; he wanted to spend the revenues of France on military preparations, while Colbert wished to use them for the promotion of colonial and industrial enterprises; in short, he was for war, and Colbert, with one fatal exception, was for peace. The struggle between them for their master's support was very keen; but it was decided in favour of Louvois. For some years before his death Colbert had suffered from gout, and this decision seems to have overwhelmed him. He died in September, 1683, almost in disgrace. It was the supreme misfortune of France that Louis XIV, with all his great qualities of intelligence and character, had so imperfect a sympathy with Colbert's aims. What might not Colbert have done if he had served a Frederick the Great!

The year 1672 and the outbreak of the war with the United Netherlands mark the end of the pacific period of Louis XIV's reign, throughout which Colbert's had been the chief influence over the royal mind. During those first twelve years of the reign the prosperity of France was not unchequered nor her aims always right; but the chief effort of the Government was directed towards commercial and industrial development, the limitation of privilege and the unification of the State. The War of Devolution had been only a slight interruption to this progress, but the Dutch quarrel opened a continuous period of war lasting with little real interruption from 1672 to 1713. During this period the internal development of France was of little account. Colbert's influence had much declined even before his death. The King's mind was absorbed by military glory and religious orthodoxy; and these two tendencies were represented in his Court by Louvois and Madame de Maintenon.

Louvois was the son of Le Tellier, of whom mention was made above, and who in 1655 had procured for him the right of succession to his office, in accordance with the dangerous custom which established a sort of heredity in many of the highest positions in the State. In 1662 the King raised Louvois to the position of Secretary of State; and from that date he became one of the chief influences with the King and the rival of Colbert. He was a man exactly suited to win and to retain the favour of Louis XIV. To the rest of the world he was disdainful, arrogant, and violent; but in his dealings with the King he showed himself pliant and servilely deferential. It flattered the pride of the King to see his power over one who submitted to no other authority. Louvois did not, like Colbert, strive to thwart the King's natural disposition. Rather, he impelled him towards the goal to which his natural bent directed him. War, glory, dominion, and self-worship—these were the objects that Louvois held up before the eyes of Louis XIV, and to which he was by nature only too much inclined.

There are two sides to the work of Louvois, and our judgment on him will vary widely according as he is regarded as an administrator or a statesman. As a statesman he not only urged the King on to those military adventures which brought the "Age of Louis XIV" to so disastrous an end, but he also approved and cooperated in the tragic blunder of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. But as an administrator and organiser he deserves the very highest praise. He found the French army, famous indeed and victorious, but full of gross corruption and so bound by traditions, usually of feudal origin, that it was far from answering quickly to the wishes of the central Government. Louvois, acting in agreement with the whole tendency of the ideas and policy of Louis XIV, centralised the administration of the army, made the control of the King direct and paramount, and eliminated what remained of aristocratic influence. At the same time he improved its weapons, tightened its discipline, punished abuses and brought its different parts into organic connexion.

The abuses in the army were chiefly due to the power and influence which the nobility still held in the recruiting and organisation of the army. It was the nobles, not the Government, who collected and equipped the troops. They had themselves purchased the posts which they held, and they found various ways of making a profit out of their positions. The chief of these was to make a return of, and consequently to receive pay for, more men than were actually to be found in the ranks. On days of official inspection the gaps were filled up by paid substitutes (*passe-volants*), whom Louvois strove to suppress by the severest penalties. The scandals and corruptions in the provisioning of the army were also notorious.

Louvois sought to remedy this state of things, chiefly by bringing the army under more direct control of the Government. He was not prepared to revolutionise the whole system; but, by indefatigable attention to detail and by the strictest severity against proved malefactors, he succeeded in abolishing or diminishing the worst evils. The army was still recruited by the nobles; but Louvois appointed inspectors to ensure that the soldiers, for whom the Government paid, really existed, and to repress the licence and indiscipline of the noble officers. The cynical hardness of Louvois' nature—the *brutalité* that is so often attributed to him—here stood France in good stead; and he was excellently served by two inspectors, the famous Martinet for the infantry and de Fourilles for the cavalry.

But Louvois was not satisfied with the enforcement of honesty. Equipment and organisation both underwent important modifications. The bayonet was introduced; the *fusil* (flint-lock) took the place of the *mousquet*, which had been discharged by means of a match. The grenadiers were organised into an important force; the status of the engineers and of the infantry was raised; the artillery was brought into

closer relationship with the other parts of the army. An uniform was not yet insisted on for the whole army, but much was done to improve and regularise the appearance of the troops. Much thought also was devoted to the question of victualling. The slowness of the movements of earlier armies was often explained by the impossibility of procuring supplies. By Louvois' orders magazines were established, which greatly improved the mobility of the armies in the earlier wars of the reign. He carried on the work of Richelieu too by abolishing certain posts whose occupants held an almost independent position. The position of colonel-general of the infantry was suppressed; and, though the colonel-general of the cavalry and the *grand maître* of the artillery still remained, their powers were so reduced that they no longer conflicted with Louvois' chief aim of concentrating all military power in the hands of the King. A reform of a different kind must also be mentioned. He made generous provision for disabled soldiers by the establishment of the *Hôtel des Invalides*.

In sum, Louvois was efficient in the highest degree; as energetic as Colbert, and capable of infusing his own energy into his subordinates; ready to take responsibility and usually able to justify it by success. Without the efficiency of the French War Office under Louvois it is impossible to conceive of all the triumphs dating from the earlier part of Louis XIV's reign.

Before the death of Colbert another influence besides that of Louvois had begun to be strong with the King. Orthodox pietism had triumphed over him in the person of Madame de Maintenon. The political marriage, which had been arranged for him at the Peace of the Pyrenees, was not likely to retain exclusive control of his heart. The licence which had become traditional with the kings of France would not be checked by loyalty to Maria Teresa, who was a true and virtuous wife, but neither intellectual nor attractive. The King had been strongly attached in the first instance to Maria Mancini, the niece of Mazarin, and it needed all the power of the Cardinal to induce Louis XIV to carry out the stipulated treaty and marry Maria Teresa. Immediately after the marriage gossip was busy with the King's infidelities, and soon it was known that Louise de La Vallière was the chosen favourite. The King felt for her probably the purest passion of his life. She was only seventeen at the time of their first acquaintance, and her great beauty, charm of manner and sweetness of disposition sufficed to maintain her influence for many years. But she was in many ways singularly unfitted to maintain her position at Court. Her conscience was not easy; the religious life was always attractive to her; and, when at last she found her power waning and a rival preferred to herself, it was chiefly her genuine love for the King that made her regret the change. In 1674 she retired to a Carmelite nunnery. Her successor was Madame de Montespan, who had intrigued desperately against Mademoiselle de La Vallière and held the first place in the King's affections from 1670 to 1679,

though not without occasional rivals. She was in point of character and person almost the antithesis of her predecessor, haughty, domineering, proud of her position, striking and imperious in her type of beauty. She had innumerable enemies at Court, both among the nobles and the clergy; but she out-faced them and for nearly ten years she triumphed over them. Her eclipse came from a strange quarter. She had borne the King several children, and it was necessary to find a discreet person to attend to their education. She met Madame Scarron at the house of a friend, induced her to accept the charge of the children, and thus introduced to the King the woman who was destined to be her successful rival.

Madame Scarron, who soon received at the King's hands the title of Marquise de Maintenon, is perhaps the most interesting figure in the Court of Louis XIV. She was the grandchild of Agrippa d'Aubigné, the famous Protestant leader of the sixteenth century. Her father had been a worthless spendthrift, and she had passed through many remarkable changes in life before she came to be the unacknowledged wife of the most splendid of the French kings. She was born in the ante-chamber of a prison; had spent some portion of her early life in Martinique, had been left an orphan at the age of seven, and, following the tenets of her protectors, had passed from Catholicism to Protestantism and from Protestantism back to Catholicism. In her seventeenth year she had married Scarron, a comic dramatist of reputation in Paris, preferring, as she has told us, such a marriage to the cloister; at twenty-five years of age she was left a widow, and lived for some time an obscure life, until an accidental meeting with Madame de Montespan made her the governess of the King's children. In her new task she came into contact with the King and soon became a well-known figure in the Court. She played a part of extraordinary difficulty with the utmost adroitness. Though she was in name the servant of the King's mistress, she gained great influence with the King himself. It was partly due to her that he severed himself from Madame de Montespan and was reconciled to his much-injured wife. After the death of Maria Teresa in 1683, Madame de Maintenon was secretly married to the King in January, 1684, in the presence of Harlay, Archbishop of Paris, and Louvois. She was a woman of great charm and dignity of manner; demure, self-restrained, and even cold in temperament; loving sobriety and reason both in thought and action; a character apparently little fitted for so romantic a destiny. She was, too, a woman sincerely, if not passionately, religious, and it was the religious element in her mind and character which contributed much to her conquest of Louis XIV.

The religious vein had never been wanting in Louis XIV even in his careless and licentious youth, and his confessor had always been one of the chief influences upon him. But under Madame de Maintenon the whole tone of the Court had changed. The splendid gaiety of the early years was thrown aside, and the practices of religion became the

mode at Versailles. Madame de Maintenon's influence cooperated with this religious development and did much to make the once brilliant Court of Versailles decorous and dull. As Louis XIV drew near to the Church, his personal morality underwent a most welcome improvement; but the new influence was unfortunately answerable for the worst political mistake in his reign, which contained so many. For, unfortunately, the conversion of Louis XIV was one which "had no root in reason and bore no fruit of charity." The Church had never abandoned her desire for uniformity, or her belief that physical coercion might be legitimately used to enforce it. And thus Louis XIV was led on to the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.

The attack upon the Protestants of France which culminated in the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes was due, almost entirely, to religious intolerance, little complicated by the political and social motives which had intensified the religious struggles of the sixteenth century. The Huguenots of France had lost the political ambitions and aristocratic connexions which made them a serious danger in the days of the League and perhaps in the time of Richelieu. They had taken no part in the wars of the Fronde, and Louis XIV in 1666 publicly acknowledged the vigour and success with which they had resisted the party of rebellion during that period. They supported the commercial schemes of Colbert with a force out of proportion to their numbers. Nor did they threaten the Church any more than the State. There were fine orators and some scholars of distinction in their ranks, but their propagandist zeal had waned. They only needed to be left alone to provide France with a great source of strength both moral and material.

Two forces drove France down the fatal descent, from being the foremost representative of religious toleration to becoming a belated exponent of religious persecution in its most odious character. First, the King's personal feelings counted for something. Religion had come to be a strong and genuine motive with him, and, together with his vanity, impelled him towards the establishment of religious unity. But the Church in France was the strongest driving force. She was at the zenith of her power: her clergy were distinguished by sincerity, learning, and even by social sympathies. But they had always regarded the Edict of Nantes as an insult, and passionately desired its withdrawal, or, if that were not attainable, its restriction within the narrowest possible limits. The assemblies of the clergy, held every five years, continually demanded fresh measures of persecution. The fact that the clergy of France were about the same time engaged in a serious controversy with the Papacy as to the question of Gallican liberties made them all the more anxious to prove their orthodoxy by measures against the Protestants; and it is upon them that the chief responsibility must fall.

The end of the struggle was not foreseen. Neither King nor clergy had any intention of abolishing the Edict from the first. They desired

merely to harass the Protestants by the most rigid interpretation of the Edict and by the withdrawal of all royal favour from the despised sectaries. This course had been suggested so early as 1655 by Gondrin, Archbishop of Sens, and the King began to act on it in the first year of his personal reign; for, in 1661, commissioners were sent round France to enquire into the administration of the Edict, and henceforth the liberties of the Huguenots were curtailed at every point. Thus, in 1661, toleration was withdrawn from the Pays de Gex (conterminous with Geneva) on the ground that it had not been a part of French territory at the time of the issuing of the Edict. Yet in that territory there were 17,000 Protestants, while the Roman Catholics numbered only 400. During the following year the action of the State troubled the Huguenots in many ways; but in 1666 a notable and open attack upon their privileges ensued. The General Assembly of the Clergy in 1665 had drawn up an address to the King suggesting certain liberties of which it might be possible to deprive the Huguenots, while still maintaining the letter of the Edict. Most of the proposals of the clergy were accepted by Louis XIV in the Edict of 1666, which may be taken as opening the era of persecution. It professed to maintain the Edict of Nantes; but each of its sixty clauses embodied some unjust decision against the Huguenots.

Henceforth the liberties of the Huguenots were curtailed by a hundred different methods, open and secret. Two may be taken as representative. In 1666 those of the Huguenots who accepted Catholicism were allowed three years in which to pay their debts; and in 1669 the "Chambers of the Edict," established in 1598, were suppressed. The position of the Protestants became grievous in the extreme; but for the present Louis XIV was not prepared to go further. The Elector of Brandenburg had protested against the Edict of 1666, and in 1669 Louis XIV withdrew many of its clauses. The Protestants were still oppressed by indirect persecutions of every kind; but the years between 1669 and 1680 were a period of comparative peace. During much of it, foreign affairs were claiming the King's attention; Colbert's influence was still strong; and thus no positive legislative enactments of importance are recorded against the Huguenots. But signs of coming danger were not wanting. The clergy maintained a war of pamphlets against them, and demanded "the destruction of the hydra." Turenne's conversion was a serious blow; for, so long as the first soldier in France was one of them, his fellow-Huguenots felt secure from the worst. The Government, moreover, was rigorously excluding from its service, even from the lowest grades of it, all Protestants. Even Colbert had to bow to this policy, the danger of which he realised. But the most important move in these years of comparative peace was the institution, in 1677, by Pellisson, himself a renegade Huguenot, of the "treasury of conversions." A considerable sum of money was put at the disposal of the

agents of the Crown wherewith to purchase the adhesion of Huguenots. It was claimed that this means had been successful in procuring over 58,000 conversions by the year 1682.

The year 1681 marks the beginning of the end. The Peace of Nymegen had left the King's hands free to attend to domestic concerns. About the same time Madame de Montespan's influence with the King came to an end; and, though there is no evidence to connect Madame de Maintenon with the policy of the Revocation, her rise meant the strengthening of religion and the weakening of political interests in the King's mind. It is the special characteristic of the tragedy of the Revocation that so many good men and good impulses contributed to induce the King to commit his criminal and suicidal blunder. In June, 1681, was issued an Edict unsurpassed in the history of religious persecution for its mixture of hypocrisy and cruelty. It declared that children of Protestant parents might declare themselves converted to Catholicism at the age of seven. The Edict, which at first sight seemed merely ridiculous, proved in its working a terrible weapon of religious coercion. Any trivial acts or words could be interpreted as implying adhesion to Catholicism; then came the invasion of Protestant households and the forcible abduction of children. All appeals to the King were in vain. He had perhaps not yet determined on the revocation of the Edict; but he told Ruigny, "the deputy general of the Reformed Churches," that he was henceforth "indispensably bound to effect the conversion of all his subjects and the extirpation of heresy." The attack became hotter during the following years, and the violations of the words of the Edict itself grosser. In 1682 a pastoral from the leaders of the Church in France was ordered to be read in all places of Protestant worship, in which the continued obstinacy of the Huguenots was threatened "with evils incomparably more terrible and deadly" than they had suffered up to the present. Protestants were excluded from most trade-guilds, from the financial service of the State and from the King's household. Their places of worship were closed in great numbers, usually on the plea that they had received back converts to Catholicism. Their colleges and schools were abolished. When they attempted to meet on the sites of their ruined temples, this was interpreted as rebellion and punished with barbarous severity. It is reckoned that, by 1684, 570 out of the 815 French Protestant churches had been closed. Between 1665 and 1685 nearly 200 edicts were issued dealing with "*la religion prétendue réformée*," and nearly all of these curtail some liberty or impose some new constraint: here they destroy a church; there they compel midwives to baptise the children of Huguenots in the Catholic faith, if their life is uncertain. One edict orders that a seat shall be placed in all Protestant "temples" for the accommodation of Catholic officials; another, that no Protestant minister may reside for more than three years in the same place. Already the Huguenots had begun to

stream in thousands to foreign countries in search of the security and livelihood which France denied them.

But the Government was not satisfied with legal chicanery and indirect pressure. In 1681 Marillac invented the method of the *dragonnades*. The quartering of soldiers on private persons was habitually practised in France. It was a grievous burden to whomsoever it befel; but, when the soldiers were quartered specially on Protestants and received a hint that their excesses would be overlooked by their officers, it became, for the sufferers from it, a martyrdom. But in 1681 the Government was not ready to adopt as its own the procedure of Marillac, which raised difficulties with foreign Governments, and vastly increased the tide of emigration. When, therefore, Ruigny reported the iniquities which were being transacted in Poitou, the King disowned Marillac and shortly afterwards recalled him. But in 1685 Foucault was directed by Louvois to use the same methods in Béarn. Tens of thousands of Protestants saved themselves from outrage and torture by verbal adhesion to the religion of their persecutors. Then the same system was extended from Béarn to other provinces where Protestantism was strong. But the Edict of Nantes still remained on the statute-book, and the Government pretended to observe it.

The farce soon ceased. Every influence at Court was in favour of the Revocation. Chief among the King's counsellors in the matter were his confessor, the Jesuit Père La Chaise; Harlay, the Archbishop of Paris; Louvois, the Minister of War; and Le Tellier, the Chancellor, the father of Louvois. Madame de Maintenon was admitted to conferences on the treatment of the Huguenots, and found her position, as an ex-Huguenot, a difficult one. She tells us that her advice was always for moderation. "We must not hurry; we must convert, not persecute." There was a period of hesitation, in which the question of policy and legality was considered. The Court adopted the view that Protestantism in France had almost ceased to exist, and that the Protestants had, of their own free will and uncoerced, flocked to reunion with the Catholic Church. Père La Chaise promised that the completion of the work would not cost a drop of blood, and Louvois held the same opinion. The accession of James II to the English throne removed all danger on that side. Thus Revocation was determined on. The Edict was signed by the King on October 17, 1685.

The Edict of Revocation declares in its preamble that the best and largest part of the adherents of the Protestant faith have embraced Catholicism, and that, in consequence, the Edict of Nantes is no longer necessary. That Edict therefore and all other Edicts of Toleration were repealed. All meetings for public worship were henceforth interdicted to Protestants. Their ministers were exiled; their schools closed. No lay Protestants were to leave the kingdom; any attempt at departure was to be punished by sentence to the galleys for men, by "confiscation

of body and goods" for women. The last clause stated that all who still remained adherents of the Protestant faith should be allowed to dwell "in the towns and other places of the kingdom—without let or hindrance on account of their religion." But this provision, whatever meaning it was intended to bear, proved utterly futile. While the pulpits and the literature of the day were declaring that heresy had died down of its own weakness, won over by the beauty and the truth of Catholicism, the agents of the Government were well aware that it was still the faith of many thousands. The work of the *dragonnades* began again, and was conducted more ruthlessly than before. The emigration of Protestants, which had been going on for ten years, now assumed proportions still more alarming. In spite of all prohibitions and the condemnation of great numbers of Huguenots to the living death of the galleys, vast numbers streamed across every frontier. Certain districts, such as the Pays de Gex, were nearly depopulated; others, such as Normandy, where nearly the whole of the commerce and industry had been in the hands of the Huguenots, were reduced by the emigration to great poverty. Brandenburg, once so valuable an ally of the French King, was foremost in giving an asylum to the refugees. So strong was the feeling in England that even James II could not restrain it. He was compelled in March, 1686, to promote a public collection for the benefit of the French refugees: and a very large proportion of them found a home in England.

In France, the chorus of contemporary approval of the King's action was almost unbroken by criticism: though a little later Vauban and Saint-Simon both expressed their hearty abhorrence of the methods employed and their fear of the consequences. But among later historians no apologist has been found for these proceedings. The strength of France was diminished and the strength of her enemies increased. It made the Elector of Brandenburg a more determined opponent than he had been before; it contributed to the overthrow of James II three years later, whereby England became the most tenacious of all the enemies of France; it ruined the industrial and commercial projects of Colbert; and it added to the military and commercial efficiency of other countries, more especially of Brandenburg-Prussia and England. The King had said that he would complete the conversion of the Huguenots, "even if it cost him his right hand"; and the disaster was not smaller than what is implied by the metaphor. It was, moreover, soon obvious that the Revocation and its consequences had done nothing to strengthen the Church in whose cause it was undertaken. Rather, it contributed unmistakably to the rise of the anti-clerical movement of the next century, which made the repetition of such an incident for ever impossible in Europe.

Soon after the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession, a rising in the south-east of France revealed how complete had been the

failure of the Government to extirpate Protestantism. The hills and forests of the district of the Cevennes afforded shelter to a population which still cherished the Huguenot faith, in spite of all measures taken against them. Persecution deepened their faith into fanaticism and mysticism; voices were heard in the air; men and women were seized with convulsions, and prophesied of the iniquities of the Church of Rome and her coming overthrow. Such incidents had taken place during the War with the Grand Alliance; and they were intensified when the conclusion of peace in 1697 brought further sufferings on the district. When the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession again turned the attention and the resources of the Government to the frontiers, the exasperation of the peasants broke out into a rising which for four years (1702-5) proved an annoying and dangerous addition to the burdens of the foreign war. It began with the murder of the Abbé du Chayla—a notorious persecutor—in 1702. Immediately it assumed dangerous proportions. The peasants, nicknamed *Camisards* by their opponents (from their habit of wearing a shirt over their clothes in nocturnal attacks), found leaders, well suited to the nature of the country and the character of the people, in Roland and Cavalier. Roland's was the greater and nobler personality; but it was upon Cavalier that attention was riveted towards the end of the struggle. He was not more than eighteen years old at the beginning of the rising; but he showed extraordinary gifts, both for the simple strategy that the occasion required and for the maintenance of discipline. The struggle was conducted with great barbarity on both sides. The royal troops hunted down the *Camisards* like vermin, without regard to age or sex. Marshal Montrevel, who succeeded the Count de Broglie in command of the royal forces, destroyed houses, farms and crops, and reduced the population to the extreme of starvation. But, as the rebels did not surrender, Montrevel was withdrawn and the conduct of operations was entrusted to Marshal Villars, the most successful of the soldiers employed by France in the War of the Spanish Succession, and a man of great tact and diplomatic powers. He at once adopted a more conciliatory policy, and in May, 1704, secured an interview with Cavalier at Nîmes. Much to the indignation of his comrades, who still remained in arms, he was induced to surrender by the offer of command in the royal armies and promises vague and illusory of toleration for the Protestants. He actually entered the royal army: but, convinced of the bad faith of his King, he escaped and joined the allies. He died in 1740, Governor of the Isle of Jersey, and a major-general in the British service. After his surrender the resistance in the Cevennes soon collapsed. Roland was killed in a fight. Protestantism still lingered, and was still subject to cruel persecutions. It was not until 1710 that the last of the *Camisard* leaders was hunted down; but Protestantism was never really extirpated from the valleys of the Cevennes.

The remainder of the reign of Louis XIV exhibits little of general interest in the domestic policy and development of France. The long struggle of the Dutch War had thrown the finances into confusion ; and now, after a peace of only nine years, France entered upon what was practically twenty-five years (1688-1713) of warfare against a vast European coalition. War and diplomacy monopolised the attention of the Government during all the period, and the internal administration shows us little more than the reaction of the great struggle. One result of the War with the Grand Alliance was the utter destruction of the municipal liberties of France. Colbert had already interfered with the towns, but his interference had been directed against abuses and carried out in the interests of justice and efficiency. He found the municipal finances in confusion, the taxes often employed for the pleasures of the magistrates, the rich throwing a large part of their proper burdens on the shoulders of the poor. Colbert submitted the municipal accounts to the inspection of the royal *intendants* ; he scrutinised all claims to fiscal privilege, and forbade all improper employment of town revenues. Careless as he always was of popular liberties, and blind to the advantages of self-government, he often interfered in the elections, imposed candidates of his own, and annulled the popular choice where he disapproved of the result. But it was after Colbert's death that the decisive blow was struck, and for motives far lower than his. In 1692 the War with the Grand Alliance was straining the resources of France, and the Government had recourse to expedients of every kind. Chief among these was the sale of offices ; and this evil practice received an indefinite extension, when by the Edict of 1692 it was applied to municipal magistracies. The King declared that it was his intention to create mayors in all municipalities, whose offices should be for life and hereditary. His action was justified in a preamble of amusing sophistry by the explanation, that "having no longer any reason to fear successors, they would exercise their functions without passion and with the freedom which is necessary to secure equality in the assessment of the public burdens." The same process was carried still lower in the municipal scale by an Edict of January, 1704, which declared that aldermen and all other municipal magistracies should be brought under similar rules ; and again the change was justified on the ground that an annual tenure of office was insufficient to acquaint men with the duties of their office and to make them useful to their fellow-citizens. The real motive was financial. The sale of these offices was a valuable source of income to the Crown and a terrible burden on the population. The Government, which during the next century grew almost continuously weaker, could not renounce an expedient so easy and elastic. In 1706, "alternative mayors" were created that there might be two offices to sell. During the eighteenth century the right of free election was seven times sold to the municipalities of France and seven times taken away again.

Municipal government sank lower and lower in France until the Revolution came.

Colbert died in 1683; Louvois in 1691. After the deaths of these powerful men the King's government grew more and more personal, and his dislike of independence in his servants greater. Le Peletier was at the head of the finances from 1683 to 1689; Pontchartrain from 1689 to 1699 held the control of the finances as well as other posts; and by his position, though not by his abilities, recalled the situation of Colbert; Chamillart succeeded to the control of the finances in 1699, and was followed in 1708 by Desmarcts, a nephew of Colbert. The losing struggle which France fought against Europe during these years brought confusion on her finances and ruin on her manufactures. Yet the very pressure of her necessities made her look at times in the direction in which, at the time of the Revolution, she found at last an escape from her financial embarrassments. Thus in 1699 the *capitation* was imposed. This was in name an income-tax that should have been paid by the whole population of France, privileged and unprivileged. But the *régime* of privilege was too deeply rooted, not only in the laws but in the habits and ideas of the country. The *capitation* was arbitrarily assessed by the *intendants*, and in some districts of France they avowed that they made the tax press on the unprivileged with a weight nearly ten times as great as that which it brought to the nobility. For instance, in the Orléanais the noble paid only a hundredth part of his income, the unprivileged an eleventh part. The *capitation* was withdrawn at the time of the peace and reestablished during the War of the Spanish Succession. But it was not enough, and in 1710 the *dixième* was established; an income-tax which should have fallen on all incomes without exception. But, as before, the privileged managed in many instances to elude it, and the bankrupt Government of France supported existence by means of *affaires extraordinaires*—that is to say, temporary expedients such as the sale of offices, forced loans from the clergy, debasement of the coinage, loans, lotteries, anticipations of revenue. And, in spite of all, the balance during the Spanish War was increasingly against the State.

As the glory of the *Grand Monarque* passed under heavy clouds he became increasingly intolerant of criticism and opposition; but the situation was so serious that criticism made itself heard. Fénelon had been tutor to the Duke of Burgundy, and we may see from *Télémaque* what were the ideas with which he had tried to inspire his pupil. A warm spirit of humanity breathes through that and all Fénelon's writings; but his sympathies are with the aristocratic and feudal past, and his influence, if it had made itself felt in public affairs, would have told in favour of a restoration of the power of the nobility. His political ideas are expressed, not only in *Télémaque*, but also in *L'Examen de conscience sur les devoirs de royauté*, which he composed

for the Duke of Burgundy, and in the *Mémoires concernant la guerre de la succession d'Espagne*. But, though all his writings imply a criticism on the absolutist system of Louis XIV, it is in a letter which he wrote to the King, probably in 1691, that the most hostile judgment is expressed. The fate of the letter is somewhat mysterious, and it is improbable that so bitter an indictment ever reached the eyes or the ears of the great King. In this letter he denounced the Dutch War as the source of all the others; he derided the King's military preparations, and directly attacked the ideals and the character of the King. "You are praised to the skies," he wrote, "for having impoverished France, and you have built your throne on the ruin of all classes in the State."

Before the end of the reign men of practical knowledge attacked the King's government with even greater energy. Pierre Le Pesant, Sieur de Boisguillebert, was a magistrate at Rouen. He published in 1697 a book called the *Détail de la France* and another the *Factum de la France*, which is little more than a repetition of the conclusions of the first, in 1707. He writes with vigour and occasionally with humour. His books are occupied to a large extent with theoretic problems of political economy, as to which he shows himself in advance of Colbert. But historically the most valuable part of his book is the picture that he gives of the working of the actual financial system of France, its clumsiness, its inefficiency, its tendency to discourage industry. The Crown, he tells us, derives little advantage from the system and the people lose the whole value of their labour. He was not content with pointing out the evil; he also suggested remedies. His suggestions fall into line with the general tendency of economic thought during the eighteenth century, to which he gave a powerful impulse. He demanded the abolition of pecuniary privilege, the establishment of free trade in corn, the removal of custom houses to the frontiers. His proposal for immediate application in the *Détail de la France* was an extension of a reformed *taille* to the privileged classes. In the *Factum de la France* he goes further and suggests a *capitation*, which should amount to a tax of ten per cent. on all incomes, whether derived from land or other resources. The books were little read; but Boisguillebert procured an interview with Chamillart, who seemed inclined to accept some of his ideas. Yet, when the reforms were postponed on the ground that the war made them impracticable, Boisguillebert published a bitter ironic attack on the Minister under the title of a *Supplément* to the *Détail de la France*. This brought upon him the suppression of his books and his own exile from Rouen (1707).

But criticism of the methods of government could not be repressed, and in 1707 Vauban published his *Projet d'une dîme royale*. After Turenne and Louvois the military glory of Louis XIV's reign owed most to Vauban; and he showed a moral courage and a social feeling that rank him, in truth, much higher than either of the other two. The *Dîme royale* is, in fact, a treatise on taxation, proposing to make a clean sweep of the

whole existing arrangements and to substitute a simpler system, which, by abolishing privilege, should be less burdensome to the people and more useful to the King. The preface justifies the search for a new system by showing the effects of the present one and contains an often-quoted passage. "From all the researches that I have been able to make during several years of close application I have come to the clear conclusion that one-tenth of the people is reduced to beggary and does as a matter of fact live by begging; of the nine-tenths remaining, five cannot give alms to the first tenth because they are very little better off; of the other four-tenths three are in far from comfortable circumstances, in the tenth that still remains there cannot be more than 100,000 families." There is a good deal of confusion both in the arrangement and the style of the book; but its central contentions are placed beyond doubt. Vauban aimed at the destruction of the *régime* of privilege and the adoption of an income-tax on land and property, without privilege or exemption. He wished to sweep away the existing taxes, oppressive by reason of the exemptions allowed and the method of collecting them. He compared the ease with which the ecclesiastical tithe was realised and the absence of complaint against it with the vast expense and the constant irritation produced by the *taille*. He would, therefore, adapt the methods of the Church to the needs of the State and suggests the following taxes:—(1) a tax of from five to ten per cent. on all land, without regard to privilege; (2) a graduated tax on incomes not derived from land: the working-classes of France not to pay more than 3½ per cent.; the incomes of the clergy to be taxed equally with those of other classes; (3) a modified salt monopoly; (4) a remodelled system of customs, which should be collected only at the frontier. But Vauban's attempt to circulate the book privately among his friends aroused the anger of d'Argenson and Pontchartrain. The book was condemned by royal edict, and the shock of disgrace hastened Vauban's death (1707).

The end of the Spanish War brought to France some return of military glory; but her finances were hopelessly exhausted and her old King suffered from one shattering blow after another which fell on his domestic circle. No royal family could seem more firmly established than his. Maria Teresa had only borne one son to Louis XIV, who received the traditional name of Louis. But the King had three grandsons; Louis the Duke of Burgundy, Philip, Duke of Anjou (since 1700 Philip V of Spain); and Charles, Duke of Berry. The Duke of Burgundy was happily married to Maria Adelaide of Savoy, and had two children. Yet suddenly, in addition to all her other disasters, France was threatened by a difficult question of succession. The Dauphin died in April, 1711. He had been completely effaced by his father; and men welcomed the prospect of the accession of the Duke of Burgundy, who had been the pupil of Fénelon and had adopted many of his aristocratic liberal ideas. Men repeated with astonishment and hope his saying

“that a King is made for his subjects, not the subjects for the King.” Had he lived to inherit the throne there would have been an attempt made to alter the development of France, probably in a reactionary feudal direction. But, in 1712, the Duke of Burgundy and his charming wife and eldest son were all carried off by a mysterious disease which seems to have been smallpox, though it roused at the time suspicions of poison. The Duke of Berry, the third of the King’s grandsons, died in 1714. The second, Philip, was King of Spain, and his claim to the French throne was expressly renounced by the Treaty of Utrecht. Any attempt to revive this claim would be the signal for a renewal of war. The direct heir to the throne was Louis, Duke of Anjou, who was afterwards Louis XV. He was two years of age, and of feeble health. And if the boy were to live, according to all the traditions of France the Regency would come into the hands of the Duke of Orléans. All eyes were fixed on him; and his name awoke the wildest suspicions and fears. He had fought with distinction in Spain, and possessed a keen and inquisitive intellect. But he was of an indolent and self-indulgent nature, plunged in vice and drunkenness, openly opposed to the doctrines and neglectful of the practices of the Church. Louis XIV and Madame de Maintenon saw with alarm the prospect of power coming into his hands, for it would mean a complete reaction against the policy which the dying monarch had pursued in Church and State both at home and abroad. Hence arose the last intrigue of the reign. The King’s fondness for his illegitimate children had been manifested throughout the latter part of the reign. And now it was determined to give the reality of power to the Duke of Maine, the son of Madame de Montespan and the pupil of Madame de Maintenon. He had shown himself unsuccessful and incapable in war; but it was determined to make him master of France after the King’s death. Tradition made it impossible to deny to the Duke of Orléans the title of Regent; but the custody of the young King was to be in the hands of the Duke of Maine and a council of regency was to be established by the will of the King, so arranged that the present *régime* would be prolonged and Louis XIV would still rule France from his grave. But the King and his wife miscalculated the forces against them. The age was weary of the long and now disastrous reign; men were more attracted by the known opposition of the Duke of Orléans to the reigning policy than frightened by his reputation. Thus the King’s schemes were foredoomed to failure, when, after a reign of seventy-two years (the longest reign recorded in history) he died on September 1, 1715.

CHAPTER II.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF LOUIS XIV.

(1661-97.)

THE prominent position occupied in Europe by France under Louis XIV from the death of Mazarin in 1661 to the Treaty of Ryswyk in 1697 affected in a marked though varying degree the politics of the whole of Western Christendom. In examining the causes and results of the rise of France to this position, a distinction must be drawn between the earlier and the later portion of the period. Till 1688, Louis succeeded in many of his aims, and during these twenty-seven years he secured for France territorial acquisitions of enormous value. After 1688, he was opposed by a European Confederacy against which he barely managed to hold his own. Nevertheless, in 1697 France still stood forth not only as the nation most advanced in the arts of civilisation, but also as the most powerful of European States, and a danger to the balance of power among them.

The supremacy which France had thus attained in both arms and arts, and the partial success which had attended Louis' policy of territorial aggression were due to many causes, chief among which were the consistent internal policy of the two great Cardinal Ministers and the political condition of the chief European States. Richelieu and Mazarin had, after infinite labour, reduced the nobility to obedience and laid down the lines on which the development of France should proceed. At home, religious toleration, the reduction of provincial autonomy, and the subordination of the *Parlement* of Paris to the royal power; abroad, alliance with England and the United Provinces, and encouragement of the independence of the Princes of the Empire—such was the substance of the political legacy bequeathed by the two far-sighted Cardinals to the young King.

It remained for Louis to take advantage of the political weakness of the great European States and, following the policy of the Cardinals, so to strengthen the monarchy that no Power or combination of Powers could by whatever means weaken its foundations. In carrying out this scheme Louis was aided by a variety of circumstances. England under Charles II

and James II made no effective resistance to French projects; while the Empire was as disunited as ever, and many of its members continued more jealous of the power of the Emperor than they were of that of France. Moreover, the sudden recovery of Turkey under the Kiuprilis kept the east of Europe in a state of continual alarm; nor was it till the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 that the perennial menace to the Habsburg dominions was sensibly lessened. But the most alarming fact that Europe had to face was the fall of Spain from the position she had held under Charles V and his successors till the Peace of the Pyrenees. The disappearance of Spain from among the great European nations aided in a marked degree the rise of France under Louis XIV.

At the time of Mazarin's death the political outlook for France was promising. Louis XIV's marriage with Maria Teresa, the Spanish Infanta, brought with it possibilities of which time could alone determine the value. By the Treaty of the Pyrenees, France had strengthened herself on her north-eastern frontier by the acquisition of Avesnes, on the side of the Pyrenees by finally securing Roussillon, between Sambre and Meuse by the cession of Philippeville and Marienbourg, and in Lorraine by that of Bar, Clermont, Stenay, Dun, and Jarmetz. The Duke of Neuburg, the ally of France, had obtained Jülich; French troops had acquired the right to march through Lorraine; the League of the Rhine still more or less looked towards France for guidance.

The aspirations of the French nation were, however, by no means satisfied. The frontier of the Rhine had not yet been secured, and the Spanish Netherlands had not been conquered. Much, therefore, remained to be done; and by Louis XIV and his most astute advisers the Peace of the Pyrenees was regarded as merely a truce.

Till the War of Devolution in 1667, Louis contented himself with making elaborate preparations, with secretly helping the Portuguese, with concluding alliances in 1663 with Denmark, and in 1664 with Brandenburg and Saxony, and with taking an active part in the same year in the internal conflicts of the Empire. With the opening of the War of Devolution France entered upon a period of conquest and expansion, and till 1688 success on the whole crowned her efforts. From 1688, however, to the Treaty of Ryswyk in 1697, Louis XIV found himself confronted by an almost united Europe, and for the first time since the days of Mazarin a definite check was inflicted on French arms and French diplomacy. Nevertheless, throughout these years France held the foremost place in Europe. Had Louis XIV contented himself with following the policy of Richelieu, France would have been spared many disasters. But both in his home and foreign policy he aimed at ideals which in certain respects resembled those pursued by the Emperor Charles V.

No serious opposition to Louis' schemes was to be expected from Spain. That country was slowly but steadily declining in power and

influence. Spain had made a brave show during the Thirty Years' War and the succeeding eleven years; but the revolt of Portugal, the alliance between the English Commonwealth and France, the loss of Jamaica, and the humiliating terms of the Peace of the Pyrenees, were alike proofs of weakness. The failure of Philip IV, between 1661 and 1665, to reconquer Portugal was still more significant. Portugal could only collect 13,000 men to oppose two Spanish armies, one of 20,000, and the other of 15,000 men. But Charles II of England, who in 1662 had married a Portuguese Princess, placed an auxiliary force under the command of the able "Comte" Frederick Hermann "de Schomberg," who had several years earlier entered the Portuguese service on the recommendation of France; and the Count of Castel-Melhor, who owing to the imbecility of the young King Alfonso VI was at the head of affairs, showed conspicuous energy. At Evora, Don John of Austria, the chief Spanish Commander, was worsted, and at Amegial, on June 8, 1663, his army was, mainly through the gallantry of the English auxiliaries, disastrously defeated.

In 1665 Count Caracena, who had superseded Don John, headed a Spanish army which had been reinforced from Italy and Flanders, and besieged Villa Viciosa. On the approach of the Portuguese and English forces under Marialva and Schomberg he advanced, and on June 17, gave battle at Montes Claros, where he suffered a crushing defeat. Philip IV had failed, and recognised the humiliating character of his failure. On September 17, 1665, he died, overwhelmed with a sense of Spain's ruin and degradation, leaving the crown to his son Charles II, who was only four years old.

During the reign of Charles II Spain sank to the lowest point ever touched in her history. The causes, both external and internal, of her decadence can be traced back to the days when she was governed by the Emperor Charles V and have been discussed in earlier volumes of this *History*. Under the rule of Charles II no steps were taken to arrest the decline that had become almost irretrievable. The last representative of his race, Charles II was small in stature, with large blue eyes, light hair, and a white skin. His health was always deplorable; and, as he grew older, he was frequently attacked by fainting fits. But, though he was so irresolute that he could settle nothing without advice, he was not wanting in intelligence, and the last act of his reign showed that in his own way he had the interests of Spain at heart.

On his accession Charles II was under the care of his mother Maria Anna, sister of the Emperor Leopold; as he grew older, he became more and more indifferent to all his duties; unlike Louis XIV, he detested the cares of government, and rarely attended a Council. "If it was necessary that he should be a Prince," said the Venetian Ambassador, "he ought to be a Prince of the Church." He married twice, first Marie-Louise of Orleans, who died in 1689, and after her Maria Anna of Neuburg,

sister of Eleonora Magdalena, third wife of the Emperor Leopold, and of Maria Sophia, who married King Pedro of Portugal. To the Queen-Mother and to Charles' second Queen must in some measure be attributed the misfortunes of the reign. The Queen-Mother was in close alliance with her confessor, Father Nithard, a German Jesuit. Both were unpopular in Spain, but they were able to expel from Court Don John of Austria, an illegitimate son of Philip IV, who was a man of no capacity and eaten up with vanity. In 1669 Nithard was forced to retire, but his place was taken by Fernando de Valenzuela, who supported the cause of the Queen-Mother. After failing in 1675 to carry out a *coup d'état*, Don John proved successful in 1677. Valenzuela fled; the Queen-Mother was sent to a convent at Tours; and Charles married in August, 1679, Marie-Louise of Orleans. Don John's triumph was brief, for he died in September, 1679, having outlived his popularity.

His death was followed by the return of the Queen-Mother and the triumph of the Austrian faction. Till April, 1685, the Duke of Medina-Celi made vain attempts to check the anarchy and misery which prevailed in Spain, and which was not lessened by the struggles at Court between the Austrian and French parties. In April, 1685, the Count of Oropesa succeeded Medina-Celi and managed to carry out some reforms. He was a member of the Austrian party, and on the death of Marie-Louise of Orleans assisted the Queen-Mother in bringing about the marriage of Charles to Maria Anna of Neuburg. The new Queen soon turned against Oropesa, who fell in 1691, his duties being transferred at first to the Count of Melgar, Admiral of Castile. The rapacity of the Queen and of her German followers made her very unpopular and prepared the way for the triumph of French influences in 1701. Thus, from the death of Mazarin in 1661 to the Treaty of Ryswyk in 1697, Spain was unable to offer any effective resistance to the schemes of Louis XIV; the European balance was considerably affected by her disappearance as one of the great Powers.

The Empire as a whole cannot be said to have realised the danger which threatened it from the ambitious projects of France till the formation of the Grand Alliance in 1689. The Augsburg Alliance of July, 1686, though it united in it a considerable number of Estates, including both Spain and Sweden for their German possessions, was only an extension of the Luxemburg Alliance of June, 1682, which had been confined to the Emperor and the Franconian and Upper-Rhenish Circles. Moreover, the Emperor Leopold was not able to offer any effective opposition to Louis. Till 1672 he was outwitted by French diplomatists, and, after fighting against Louis from 1672 to 1679, was glad to make peace. The Hungarians, too, instigated in part by the diplomacy of the French "*Defensor Hungariae*," had risen against Leopold under Count Emeric Tökölyi (1677-82). Till 1689 the Estates of the Empire could not be relied upon to offer a united opposition

to the French monarch. From the Peace of Nymegen in 1678 their suspicions of the real aims of the German policy of Louis began to assume a definite shape; but the long war between Austria and the Turks which broke out in 1682 and lasted till 1699 prevented Leopold from using the strength of the Empire against its most dangerous adversary.

During the period from 1661 to 1670, the weakness of the Empire, the decadence of Spain, and the embittered war between England and Holland, enabled Louis XIV to formulate and carry out an aggressive policy, deliberately calculated to extend the boundaries of France and to strengthen and consolidate her position in Europe. The only Power which showed similar aggressive tendencies was Turkey. Under Mohammad IV (1648-87) and the Kiuprili, the gradual decline of Turkey was checked; and, from 1656 to the siege of Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire like the French kingdom enjoyed a period of success. The attacks of the Turks upon Transylvania (1661), upon Hungary (1663), upon Candia (1669), and upon Poland (1672-8), indeed, aided the projects of Louis XIV; for, by diverting eastwards the attention of the Poles and Austrians, they weakened the Emperor's power of resistance to the French aggressions.

In the west, too, the years from the death of Mazarin in 1661 to the invasion of the Low Countries by France in 1667 constitute a period in which events favoured Louis, and facilitated his preparations for taking his first step towards the establishment of his claims upon the succession to the Spanish monarchy. As the Spanish throne was not then vacant, Louis contented himself with asserting his claim to the immediate possession of the Spanish Netherlands. It was based upon the so-called *jus devolutionis*—a local custom of Brabant and Hainault, by which, though a man might have married more than once, the children of his first marriage succeeded to his property. Since Maria Teresa, the consort of Louis XIV, was the only surviving child of Philip IV's first marriage, Louis claimed the whole of the Low Countries; though in the course of his negotiations with Spain in 1662 he had declared his willingness to be satisfied with instant possession of Hainault, Cambray, Luxemburg, and Franche Comté.

The negotiations with Spain were resultless; but Louis never ceased his efforts to carry out his object. Already in April, 1662, he had entered into friendly negotiations with the leading statesman of the United Provinces, John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, and had concluded a treaty guaranteeing all the Dutch possessions in Europe. He had hoped at the same time to arrive at some arrangement with regard to the Spanish Netherlands. The plan of equal partition between France and the United Provinces was eventually rejected by de Witt, who preferred that the Spanish Netherlands should be erected into an independent Catholic republic, or remain under Spain if the latter Power

entered into a close alliance with the free Provinces. To Louis, who, like Mazarin, desired the annexation to France of the Spanish Low Countries, none of de Witt's suggestions were acceptable; and the death of Philip IV of Spain, on September 17, 1665, seemed a suitable opportunity for pressing the supposed claims of the King of France. But in March, 1665, war had broken out between England and Holland; and Louis was, by the treaty of April, 1662, bound to aid the Dutch. Though they were able to assert their supremacy at sea, the alliance of Charles II of England with the warlike Bishop of Münster resulted in his raising a large army and overrunning the province of Overijssel. De Witt, however, succeeded in persuading Louis XIV to carry out his treaty engagements, though the behaviour of the French troops nominally hostile to the Bishop of Münster tended to increase the dislike felt by the Dutch for their allies. In January, 1666, Louis, fearing that de Witt might conclude peace with Charles II, reluctantly declared war against England. The French alliance affected the fortunes of Holland in a variety of ways. It strengthened the hands of the Dutch, who, early in 1666, won a series of diplomatic successes. Denmark concluded an alliance with them; Sweden was induced not to unite with England. At the same time, some of the German Princes became fearful of the results of a too close dependence of the United Provinces upon France. In October, 1666, the United Provinces were enabled, through the influence of the Great Elector—who had in February, 1666, threatened the Bishop of Münster—to form a Quadruple Alliance with Brandenburg, the Brunswick-Lüneburg Princes, and Denmark.

England was thus left practically without an ally, and the Dutch were free from the necessity of placing too much reliance upon France. During 1666 the war between England and the United Provinces continued with varying results. In 1667 two important events took place. On March 31 Charles made the first of his secret treaties with Louis XIV, agreeing not to oppose a French invasion of the Spanish Netherlands, on the understanding that the French fleet withheld all assistance from the Dutch. But the calculations of Charles were upset in June, 1667, by the Dutch attack on the English ships in the Thames and Medway—which compelled Charles to agree to the Treaty of Breda on July 31, 1667. For the United Provinces peace was absolutely necessary, since on May 24 French troops had crossed the frontier of the Spanish Low Countries, and the War of Devolution had begun.

For this war Louis' preparations had been carefully made. By a treaty with Portugal, concluded in March, 1667, it was arranged that hostilities between that country and Spain should continue; by the treaty of 1662 with the United Provinces their hands were tied; and by the secret treaty of March 31, 1667, Charles II had bound himself not to enter into an alliance with the Emperor against Louis XIV during the year 1667. Secure of a free hand in the Spanish Low Countries,

Louis ordered his troops to cross the frontier (May 24, 1667). The southern portion of the Spanish Low Countries was speedily overrun; and Lille, the most important of the Belgian cities, was taken (August 27).

This rapid success alarmed Europe, and signs of opposition to France at once appeared. Spain hastily recognised the independence of Portugal (February, 1668), and, freed from all necessity of continuing her attempts to reconquer that kingdom, endeavoured to secure the assistance of the Emperor Leopold in the Low Countries. Her efforts were in vain. Louis, by the able diplomacy of his ambassador Gravel, contrived to induce the Imperial Diet in October, 1667, to abstain from active assistance to the Spanish Low Countries (which technically formed part of the Circle of Burgundy, one of the ten Imperial Circles); but he was unable to succeed in bringing about by the same means the continuance of the League of the Rhine beyond its formal term (August, 1668); when, after much negotiation, it came to an end. Further, by means of his able agent de Gremonville, Louis not only persuaded the Emperor Leopold to withhold all assistance from Spain, but actually induced him to agree to a treaty, signed on January 19, 1668, for the eventual partition of the Spanish monarchy between himself and Louis, should King Charles II, as seemed probable, die without children.

So far, the success of the French King had been remarkable and unchecked. Having secured by various means the neutrality of Brandenburg, and that of Sweden, and having encouraged the war between England and Holland, Louis had met with no serious resistance in his subjugation of the Spanish Low Countries. By the beginning of 1668 Spain was isolated and the alliance, or at all events the quiescence, of the Emperor secured. But it was these extraordinary successes of Louis which brought about the formation of the coalition between England, the United Provinces, and Sweden, almost distinctively known as the Triple Alliance.

Some such coalition was justified, not only by the French invasion of the Spanish Netherlands, but by the French conquest of Franche Comté, which was effected in February, 1668. On January 23 England and the United Provinces concluded an alliance which in April was on certain conditions joined by Sweden. Louis had thus to face a formidable adverse combination. The importance of the Triple Alliance lies in the fact that it was the "first formal expression of European resistance to the aggressions of Louis"—the first attempt to check a Power which continued to dominate Europe till the Treaty of Ryswyk. Spain and Portugal were now at peace (February, 1668), the influence of England being paramount in the latter kingdom; and Louis could no longer rely upon the abstention of Spain from active measures in the Low Countries. Moreover, by consenting to make peace, he would lose little, and would

break up the coalition which was being formed against him. By his recent secret partition treaty with the Emperor Leopold, Louis was eventually to receive as his share the Low Countries and Franche Comté. Though his pride caused him to resent the necessity of yielding to the Triple Alliance, Louis in the end agreed to come to terms with England, Holland, and Sweden. On May 2, 1668, the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed. In this compact Louis strengthened his north-eastern frontier by the acquisition of certain fortresses in the Netherlands with their districts. Franche Comté, Cambray, St Omer, and Aire were given up by the King of France; but by the secret partition treaty with Leopold it had been arranged that on the King of Spain's death all these were to be incorporated in the French dominions.

In face of the growing hostility of Europe Louis showed wisdom in agreeing to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle and in adopting a waiting policy. Yet Europe was far from being united; Brandenburg and other German States were jealous of the Emperor; England and the United Provinces regarded each other with hostility; Sweden was ready to fall in with the highest bidder. Some twenty years had yet to pass before the chief European States, recognising the danger which threatened them from France, were found prepared to sink minor differences in a united effort to reduce the power of the aggressive French monarch. Louis XIV, however, bitterly resented the necessity which forced him to agree to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, and from the moment of its signature seems to have resolved to gain his ends in the Spanish Netherlands by means of a direct attack upon the United Provinces. This decision ran counter to the policy to which the French monarchy had adhered since the days of Francis I. For it was distinctly opposed to the principle of pursuing Catholic interests at home and Protestant abroad, which had enabled France to secure allies against the Emperor among the German Protestant Princes. Louis, however, was bent on the reduction of the Spanish Netherlands; and the surest means to that end seemed to be found in the overthrow of the Dutch Republic. The magnitude of this blunder became more and more apparent, as the reign of Louis XIV proceeded. "In Holland," writes Mignet, "the old political system of France suffered shipwreck."

In order to achieve the end which Louis proposed to himself, the overthrow of the new combination which had led to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was necessary. The task was at once undertaken. "The years between 1668 and 1672," writes Camille Rousset, "were years of preparation; when Lionne was labouring with all his might to find allies, Colbert money, and Louvois soldiers for Louis." The task of breaking up the Triple Alliance itself, however, did not prove to be one of insuperable difficulty. For a short period after the formation of this Alliance western Europe remained in a condition of uneasy peace, while the obnoxious compact was being rapidly undermined.

The three partners in it were ill-assorted, and without any real ground of agreement. Sweden had little to fear from Louis. Her interest required constant watchfulness as towards Denmark and northern Germany. With Denmark Sweden was in an almost unending feud; while by her successes in the Thirty Years' War she had acquired possessions in northern Germany, which could not be regarded as definitively united to the Swedish monarchy. The rise of Brandenburg already threatened the stability of the arrangements made by the Treaty of Westphalia in the north-east of the Empire. Moreover, Sweden was a poor country, and her Government was ready to unite with any Power that offered regular subsidies, especially if combined with military assistance for the defence of Swedish Pomerania. From England and Holland no adequate help either in money or men could be looked for in the event of an attack upon Swedish Pomerania by any German Power. It was therefore not surprising that Sweden was easily detached from the Triple Alliance and made a treaty with Louis on May 6, 1672. Charles II of England had already by the Secret Treaty of Dover, signed on June 1, 1670, deserted the Triple Alliance and promised to join France in a war against the Dutch Republic.

The Triple Alliance was thus broken up, and, four years after its conclusion, Louis XIV was able to invade the United Provinces. Till 1688 constant attempts were made to form coalitions against France; but, owing to the policy of Charles II and James II of England, to the Franco-Swedish Alliance, to the necessity of defending Germany and Hungary against the Turks, to the divisions existing among the various German States and to their suspicions of the Emperor, no organised opposition was possible.

Unfortunately for the peace of the whole continent, the aggressions of Louis XIV in the west, which definitely began in 1672, coincided with the attempts of the Turks to dominate eastern Europe. In 1656 the appointment of Mohammad Kiuprili as Grand Vizier marked the beginning of the sudden revival of the Ottoman power, of which some account will be given in a later chapter. His successor, Ahmad Kiuprili, continued his policy of reform at home and aggressions abroad. With the help of Louis XIV, who sent a French force to his help, the Emperor Leopold defeated the Turks in the battle of St Gothard on August 1, 1664, and concluded the Truce of Vasvar on August 10. Vienna was saved; but the hold which the Turks had established over Hungary remained unshaken, and a compromise was arranged with regard to Transylvania. The outbreak of war between Turkey and Venice resulting in the capture of Crete (September, 1669) showed that the ambitious aggressive policy of the Ottoman power was as dangerous to the integrity and peace of eastern as that of Louis XIV was to that of western Europe. In 1669 the Polish Diet elected not the French candidate,

the Count Palatine Philip William of Neuburg, but Michael Wisniowiecki, the national candidate, who was married to Eleonora Maria, the sister of the Emperor Leopold, and looked to him for support.

It was impossible to hope for a united resistance to the French King, so long as there was a possibility of a Turkish attack upon Vienna, an opportunity for which was afforded by the disturbed condition of Poland. In 1672 that country was invaded by Ahmad Kiuprili; but the Turks were defeated by John Sobieski both before and after he had, in 1674, succeeded the weak Michael on the Polish throne. In June, 1674, Louis XIV made a treaty with the new King, who, in consideration for French subsidies, promised to support the malcontents in Hungary against the Emperor. The war between Poland and Turkey was brought to an end by the Treaty of Zurawna, concluded under French mediation on October 27, 1676. But, though by this treaty Ahmad Kiuprili, who died three days after its conclusion, left his country in a position in eastern Europe not very unlike that occupied by France in western, his alliance with Poland was of little benefit to Louis XIV; and in 1683, when Vienna was besieged by the Turks, it was the King of Poland who bore away the glory of the rescue. While, however, John Sobieski was defending eastern Europe during the years 1674-7, the Emperor, even though aided by Spain, the Dutch, Brandenburg, and Denmark, proved unable to place any substantial check upon the ambitious policy of Louis XIV.

In 1670 Louis had been resolved to win eventually the Imperial Crown, to secure part of the Spanish possessions, and to conquer the United Provinces. On February 17 of that year he had concluded a treaty with Ferdinand Maria, Elector of Bavaria, whose daughter, Maria Anna, was to marry the Dauphin, providing that in the event of the Emperor's death every possible effort should be made to secure his own election to the Imperial throne. The Treaty of Dover of the same year, followed by the formal detachment of Sweden from the Triple Alliance (April 14, 1672), left the United Netherlands open to a French attack; while the secret partition treaty concluded with the Emperor in 1668, followed by a treaty of neutrality in 1671, left it in the power of Louis to renew his occupation of Franche Comté. Sweden had been gained by the payment of 400,000 crowns and the promise of an annual payment of 40,000 crowns. In return, Sweden undertook, in concert with Denmark, to close the Baltic to the Dutch fleet and to land a force in the north of Germany. Like the alliance with England, that with Sweden proved of great value to France during the ensuing war. On December 31, 1669, Louis had made a secret treaty with the Elector of Brandenburg, who, in return for subsidies, to which was afterwards added the promise of the province of Spanish Gelders, undertook to aid France in conquering the Spanish Netherlands, and to support the interests of France in all the affairs of the Empire. Behind the plan of

conquering first the United Provinces and then the Spanish Netherlands lay, therefore, the design of securing for Louis a position of authority and power such as had been held by Charles the Great.

The Devolution War had thus not only disunited Europe, but had been followed by unexpected developments. In more or less intimate connexion with the rivalry of France and Spain, which, at the time of the death of Mazarin, was the most momentous fact in European politics, and remained such throughout Louis XIV's reign, arose other important questions. In 1668, Louis had, as has been seen, concluded with the Emperor a secret partition treaty, which was to come into force in the event of the death of Charles II of Spain. Would that treaty hinder the Emperor from opposing the schemes of Louis with regard to the United Netherlands, Flanders, the German lands on the Rhine, and Poland, or interfere with his intrigues in Hungary?

Though the League of the Rhine was no longer in existence, Louis had, as has been seen, entered into separate treaties with several of the German Powers, such as Bavaria and Brandenburg. Would they remain loyal to their alliance with France, should Louis adopt an aggressive attitude towards the Empire? By the Treaty of Dover England had been detached from the Triple Alliance. But would the English people consent to support the action of the French King, when once they realised the import of his ambitious schemes, and would they allow the national interests of England to be subordinated to the designs of Charles II for the maintenance of his personal power?

Thus, at the opening of the French war with the United Provinces in 1672, the European situation was extremely complicated. For a time each of the various States seemed to pursue its separate interests regardless of the welfare of Europe; and the diplomacy of the period was more than usually tangled. Yet the policy of Louis had never been clearer. For a successful attack on the Dutch it was necessary, after breaking up the Triple Alliance, to secure the alliance or neutrality of the Emperor and of as many German Princes as possible. The Treaty of Dover had placed at Louis' disposal the English fleet, which alone could render useless the Dutch navy; the treaty of April 14, 1672, had secured the invaluable help of a Swedish army in northern Germany. Treaties with Münster, Cologne, Hanover in July, and with Osnabrück in October, 1671, provided for the unhindered passage of French troops; and on December 18, 1671, the Emperor Leopold, fearing that Louis might stir up the Hungarians to rebellion, and encourage the German Princes to combine against him, promised neutrality so long as Louis abstained from attacking Spain or the Empire.

Alone among the chief German Princes, the Great Elector, whose strong Protestant feeling contributed to his decision, declined Louis' proposals, and in February, 1671, concluded a treaty with the Dutch Republic, to become effectual in April, 1672, by which he promised

armed assistance. Spain also, in December, 1671, signed a treaty with the States-General for mutual defence; and the Elector of Mainz, though he maintained friendly relations with France, also resolved to support the Dutch.

Early in 1672 a powerful French force was collected at Charleroi, and on May 5 it was joined by Louis XIV in person. The invasion of the United Provinces at once took place, while the forces of Luxemburg, Cologne, and Münster occupied Overijssel and besieged Groningen, which they failed to take. Meanwhile, the French overran the southern portion of the United Provinces; but on June 18 the dykes were cut, and the sluices opened in front of Amsterdam, which was thereby saved. Louis' failure to overrun Holland synchronised with the defeat of a French force which endeavoured to overcome Zeeland; moreover, on June 7 a combined Anglo-French fleet had been defeated by de Ruyter in the battle of Southwold Bay. On July 6 and 8, William of Orange was proclaimed Stadholder of Holland and Zeeland; on August 1, as will be narrated in a subsequent chapter, the French invasion came to an end, and Louis returned to St Germain, having conquered Gelders, Utrecht, and Overijssel; on August 20, John and Cornelius de Witt were murdered at the Hague.

These events created profound alarm in Europe, although for some years the attitude of the various European Powers with regard to the French aggressions was uncertain, and their opposition betrayed great lack of vigour. On June 23, 1672, the Emperor Leopold concluded an alliance with Frederick William of Brandenburg, and on October 27 another with the States-General. This coalition, sometimes called the Great Coalition of the Hague, did not prove very effective. Turenne's successes on the lower Rhine and the Weser, and his march upon the Elbe, forced Frederick William to make peace on June 6, 1673, and thus deprived the Dutch of their most valuable ally. A peace conference which met in June, 1673, at Cologne having proved a failure, the Emperor formed a second Coalition, which was joined in the autumn of 1673 by Spain and the Duke of Lorraine, and in 1674 by Denmark, the Elector Palatine, the Brunswick-Lüneburg Dukes, and on July 1 by the Great Elector. Further, the English Parliament forced Charles II to abandon his alliance with Louis, and to make peace with the Dutch, on February 19, 1674.

In June, 1672, the States-General had offered Louis Maestricht and its dependencies, a number of fortresses stretching from the Meuse to the mouth of the Scheldt, and six millions of *livres*. By the advice of Louvois, Louis had rejected this offer. At the beginning of 1674 the only Dutch towns in his possession were Maestricht and Grave. Nevertheless, in spite of his mistakes, and notwithstanding the number of his foes, Louis in 1674 won some brilliant successes. In June Franche Comté was conquered, on August 11 Condé checked William of Orange

in the battle of Seneff in Flanders; while on the Rhine Turenne conducted a most brilliant campaign. He defeated the Imperialists on June 16 at Sinsheim, driving them across the Neckar; and then, acting in accordance with the orders of Louvois, he devastated the Palatinate. A further victory at Enzheim on October 4 had no definite result, as a fresh concentration of his adversaries, reinforced by 20,000 Brandenburgers, forced Turenne to retire into winter-quarters in Lorraine. His enemies thought that the campaign was over and took no precautions. This was Turenne's opportunity; and, in spite of the opposition of Louis and Louvois, he determined to reconquer Alsace. In December, 1674, he carried out his brilliant Vosges campaign, which closed with the defeat of the Great Elector on January 5, 1675, at Colmar, and the expulsion of the enemy from the country on the left bank of the Rhine.

In 1675 Turenne continued his successful campaign, out-manceuvring the Imperialist general Montecuculi, and forcing him to retire to Sasbach to the east of Strassburg. There, on July 27, 1675, Turenne fell, and with his death the great successes of the French ended. Though Condé preserved Alsace for France, the Marshal de Créquy was defeated on the Moselle on August 11, and Trier and Philippsburg were lost. The Swedes, on whose intervention in Brandenburg the French had placed high hopes, had on June 18 been decisively defeated in the battle of Fehrbellin by the Great Elector and forced to beat a disastrous retreat. The campaigns of 1676 and 1677 were generally favourable to France. The towns of Condé and Bouhain were taken by Louis in 1676; and in 1677 Valenciennes, Cambray, and St Omer fell into French hands. William of Orange also suffered a disastrous defeat at Cassel, and Christian V of Denmark was overthrown by the Swedes at Lunden. In the Mediterranean the French fleet was on the whole successful. There Duquesne fought engagements off Stromboli (January 8, 1676) and Catania (April 22) with a Dutch fleet under de Ruyter; but both battles remained undecided. The death of de Ruyter, however, was of immense advantage to the French, who for a time remained supreme in the Mediterranean.

In 1678 all the Powers were ready for peace. On November 15, 1677, William of Orange had married Mary, daughter of the Duke of York; and on January 10, 1678, a treaty between England and the Republic was signed. It seemed that at last France would encounter the united opposition of the two countries. But William's hopes were almost immediately disappointed; for the treaty was never ratified, owing to the resolution of the Republic, in consequence of its suspicions of the terms of the treaty of January 10, to make a separate peace with Louis. In May William, convinced of the treachery of Charles, who the same month signed a secret agreement with Louis, consented to negotiate.

But Louis' attempts to gain undue advantages suddenly changed the

whole situation. Charles was compelled to tear up his secret agreement with Louis and to sign, on July 26, a treaty with the Dutch. Recognising the strength of public opinion in England and Holland, Louis finally agreed to make peace with the Republic on August 10, 1678; France ceding Maestricht and the Dutch incurring no loss. A second treaty, relating to commerce, abolished the onerous tariffs of 1667 and restored the more moderate of 1664.

On August 14 William of Orange and Luxembourg fought before Mons, then invested by the French, the battle of St Denys. Both generals knew that peace had been concluded, but William had no official knowledge of the fact.

A treaty between France and Spain was signed on September 17. Spain was not in a condition to continue the war. Her King Charles II had attained his majority on November 6, 1675. This event was soon followed by the overthrow of Fernando de Valenzuela, who, with the Queen-Regent, now fell into disgrace, and by the temporary ascendancy of Don John of Austria, the King's illegitimate brother. Don John, however, soon became unpopular, and, finding himself surrounded by internal difficulties, was anxious for peace with France. Spain yielded Franche Comté, Valenciennes, Aire, St Omer, Cassel, Bailleul, Poperinge, Warneton, Ypres, Cambray and the Cambrésis, Bouchain, Condé, and Maubeuge, all of which were regarded as necessary for the defence of the French frontier. France on her part restored to Spain, Courtray, Oudenarde, Ath, Ghent, Binch, Charleroi, and the duchy and town of Limburg.

With the Emperor and Empire peace was signed by France on February 26, 1679. Louis restored Philippsburg, but kept Breisach and Freiburg. To Duke Charles V of Lorraine, his duchy was restored on certain conditions, namely, that France should keep Naney, Longwy and Marsal, and control the four principal roads traversing the country. The Duke refused to accept these conditions, and the duchy remained in French hands till the Peace of Ryswyk. These four treaties are known as the Peace of Nymegen, and were supplemented by the Treaty of St Germain-en-Laye between Brandenburg and Sweden, and by the Treaty of Fontainebleau between Denmark and Sweden. The first of these treaties was signed on June 29, 1679. During the war with Sweden the Great Elector had, besides winning the battle of Fehrbellin, taken Stettin and Stralsund. But, the Emperor having in the name of the Empire agreed to the restoration of Sweden's German possessions, Frederick William was compelled to give up to the Swedes nearly all his conquests in western Pomerania. By the Treaty of Fontainebleau signed on September 26, 1679, Denmark also restored to Sweden the conquests made in Scania and the Baltic.

The Treaties of Zurawna and Nymegen reestablished peace in Europe, which now enjoyed a short period of rest. Though the Treaty of Nymegen had in a general way reaffirmed the terms of the Peace of

Westphalia, France was in a far stronger position in 1678 than in 1648. Spain in 1678 was in a condition of decadence, while the Empire was not only involved in troubles in Hungary, but was seriously threatened by the resurrection of Turkey. Moreover, though the League of the Rhine no longer existed, the suspicious attitude of the German Princes towards the Emperor was not as yet thoroughly changed. This suspicious attitude was encouraged and strengthened by Louis, who, by adroitly distributing pensions to certain Princes and influential personages in various German States, secured if not their active support at any rate their neutrality.

In its origin the war was an attempt of Louis to conquer and destroy the United Provinces. It had developed into a European struggle, and its end had been that the United Provinces had secured the abolition of the hostile tariffs of 1667, and had gained Maestricht without losing any territory, while Louis secured Franche Comté and some towns in the Spanish Netherlands. Louis' object in entering the war had not been attained, and his triumph was far from being complete. Moreover, he had roused the suspicions of Europe, and the attitude of the German Princes towards France in 1678 was very different from what it had been in 1658. Nevertheless, the concert of Europe was partial and ill-cemented, and, although peace had been made, could not be other than short-lived in face of the jealousies of the various States which the fear of France had temporarily united. The conclusion of the Peace of Nymegen in 1679 seemed, with reason, to the French people to mark a fresh triumph on the part of their King. In their eyes Louis XIV had brought additional glory to himself and his country, which had never stood so high in the eyes of Europe, nor had appeared so strong or so great.

At the Peace of Nymegen Louis reached the greatest height of his power. A large part of the Spanish Netherlands had been added to France, Freiburg in the Breisgau had been retained, Franche Comté had been definitively conquered. One of Louis' great aims since 1661 had been to enlarge and to fortify the boundary of France. Though he had not acquired the whole of the Spanish Netherlands, and though he had failed in his attempt to destroy the Dutch Republic, Louis could at any rate view with satisfaction the extension of the French frontier towards the Rhine, the acquisition of sixteen fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands, as well as the possession of Franche Comté. With the King of England he had made a treaty in May, 1678, which had nullified the effects of the marriage of William of Orange with the Princess Mary. Till 1689 England remained a cipher in European politics and offered no opposition to the execution of Louis' schemes. There seemed to be no obstacle to the attainment of the main object of Louis' policy—that the Bourbon House should take the position hitherto occupied in Europe by the Habsburgs. This implied the

enlargement of the kingdom of France, the recognition of Louis as the defender of the Church, the acquisition, if possible, of the Imperial Crown for the French Kings. A French Empire, extending over the Continent, was to be the crowning result of Louis' efforts. In 1679 and during the succeeding ten years such a result seemed capable of realisation. The Mediterranean was practically a French lake; England under Charles II and James II showed no desire to oppose Louis' aims; central Europe was divided; the Emperor Leopold was powerless; a Turkish invasion of Austria was imminent.

Till the Peace of Nymegen, Louis had directed his chief attention to Spain, and, taking advantage of her weakness, had enlarged and strengthened the French frontier on the north-eastern side of France. After 1679, Louis was chiefly interested in his plans for strengthening his position in Germany, with the view of ultimately securing the Imperial Crown. Till 1697, Spanish affairs fell into the background; nor do they again become prominent till the era of the Partition Treaties. The time seemed opportune for a further attempt on the part of Louis to push forward his candidature for the Imperial Crown. The treaty concluded with Bavaria in 1670, by which the Elector had promised to advance Louis' claims to the Imperial dignity in the event of the Emperor Leopold's death, had roused opposition in Germany, and for a brief period "the Empire stood united for its Emperor." But the Peace of Nymegen found Germany again disunited, and the reputation of the French King at a greater height than ever. The times were therefore propitious for a new attempt on the part of Louis to secure, in the event of Leopold's death, the Imperial dignity. In October, 1679, by a secret treaty with Louis, the Elector of Brandenburg engaged, in the event of the Emperor's death, "to secure the election of his Most Christian Majesty."

The danger to Europe was real and unmistakable, for the jealousies and selfishness of the various European Powers rendered them blind to the true meaning of Louis' ambitious policy, and unwilling to combine in the defence of the liberties of Europe. Hardly had the Treaties of Nymegen been signed than Louis entered upon a fresh phase of the policy which he hoped would gain for him the Imperial Crown. It was necessary in his opinion to strengthen France on her north-eastern and eastern frontiers. Lorraine was practically in his hands; the possession of Alsace and Luxemburg would complete the "*ceinture de frontières*," and, in Louis' opinion, would give greater weight to his influence in Germany, whenever the Emperor Leopold should die, or whenever it should be attempted to make his son Joseph (who was born in July, 1678) King of the Romans. Placing his own interpretation upon certain clauses in the Treaty of Westphalia, and adopting the view that the German Charles the Great was in reality a French Charlemagne, Louis resolved that "what once belonged to France continued to be by right the

inalienable possession of the French Crown though it had been sold, exchanged or given away." At Metz, Besançon, Breisach, and Tournay "Chambers of Reunion" were set up, for the purpose of adjudging to France certain territories and towns on the left bank of the Rhine. What these Courts did not declare to have been ceded to France at the Peace of Westphalia was held to be a "dependency," and under this head came Luxemburg and Strassburg. By means of these two fortresses the French King would have the three Spiritual Electors of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier as well as the Elector Palatine in his power, so that by means of them he would be able to carry through without much trouble his election to the Roman Kingship. On March 22, 1680, the *Parlement* of Breisach gave the support of legal authority to Louis' claim of absolute sovereignty over Alsace; on September 30, 1681, French troops occupied Strassburg, and on the same day a French force seized Casale. Two of the places which were "deemed essential for the rounding-off of French territory" had fallen into the hands of Louis; it only remained to occupy Luxemburg, in order to make France practical mistress of the Netherlands.

The first reply to these aggressions was seen in the opposition in England and Holland to Louis' siege of Luxemburg, which began in November, 1681. So antagonistic were the Dutch to the idea of the town falling into French hands, that, in spite of their dread of the outbreak of a fresh European war, William of Orange was instructed to march to the relief of Luxemburg, whenever its capture by Louis seemed imminent. The outbreak of such a war would have enlisted public opinion in England in opposition to Louis, who at that moment desired above everything to avert a European conflagration. In order, therefore, to tranquillise public opinion in Holland and England, Louis consented early in 1682 to raise the siege of Luxemburg.

Louis had indeed endeavoured to win over Charles to consent to the French occupation of Luxemburg; and, in 1680, the King of England had refused to be united with William of Orange in laying the foundations of a general alliance against France. Thus Charles, if left to himself, would no doubt have consented to be gained; but on the question of Luxemburg the English nation was peculiarly sensitive, and Charles realised that the occupation of the fortress by Louis would probably rouse great indignation in England, necessitating the summoning of Parliament. There was thus, as Ranke says, a close connexion between the siege of Luxemburg and the internal affairs of England. Charles II himself professed to believe Louis' assurance that he merely wished to dismantle the place, not to use it "as a point whence to attack others." He therefore undertook to reassure Louis' opponents on this point, but insisted that while the negotiations were proceeding Louis should not by a strict blockade force the surrender of Luxemburg. During the negotiations the divergence between the views held by William of Orange and those

held by Charles II and James Duke of York became very apparent. William desired to preserve "the balance of power in Europe by means of English intervention," and he was supported by the Spaniards. On the other hand, the English King saw no objection to the French conquest of Luxemburg, so long as the fortress was razed; and in the United Netherlands his views were supported by a small party of the opponents of William. To Louis it was of the utmost importance that the English Parliament should not be summoned. It would undoubtedly support the views of William of Orange; and, in the event of the European war which seemed likely to follow the French occupation of Luxemburg, England would side with Louis' enemies.

At that moment Hungary and Austria were threatened by a Turkish invasion, and Louis with great acuteness declared that, in order not to hamper the German Princes in their efforts to resist the Ottoman forces, he had withdrawn his troops from Luxemburg. The real motives which induced him to take this step were, therefore, not avowed, and the French King gained the credit for moderation and for taking a keen interest in the welfare of Christendom.

The year 1682 was thus marked both by the preparations made by the Emperor to resist the threatened invasion of Germany by the Turks and by a great political activity on the part of Louis XIV, as shown by his treaty with Denmark and his intrigues in Sweden, Poland, Hungary and Holland, and by his attempt to secure the independence of the Gallican Church. Throughout this and the following years the general uneasiness in Europe caused by Louis' activity and pretensions steadily increased. A notable instance of the effects was the "Association" formed at the Hague in February, 1683; the origin of which is to be found in efforts set on foot by Charles XI of Sweden and William of Orange in 1681, directly after the seizure of Strassburg and Casale, for the maintenance of the Treaty of Nymegen, and which was joined by the Emperor and the King of Spain. It was rendered ineffective by the Turkish advance on Vienna. That advance, followed by the siege of the Austrian capital, roused the interest of Europe and enlisted its sympathy on behalf of the Emperor. John Sobieski and the united Polish and German armies saved Vienna in September, 1683, and the opportunity for Louis to come forward as the defender of Christian Europe against the infidel had passed away. This success, which once more placed Austria in the centre of the resistance to the infidel, imparted fresh confidence to the Spaniards, who, in December, 1683, declared war against France. Luxemburg was at once seriously besieged by the French troops, and was taken in the beginning of June, 1684. It was impossible for the Emperor, with the Turkish War on his hands, to oppose the French successfully; and on August 15 the Truce of Ratisbon was concluded by Leopold and the Empire with Louis.

By this "truce" it was arranged that for twenty years Louis should continue to hold, in addition to Strassburg, all the places assigned to him before August 1, 1681, by the Chambers of Reunion. The Spaniards were compelled to make large concessions to France, including the transfer of many villages in Hainault and Luxemburg, and the establishment of a Spanish protectorate over Genoa; while the Dutch, finding it impossible to secure any united opposition to Louis, accepted a twenty years' truce. It was necessary for the Emperor, who was engaged in his great struggle with the Turks; it was acceptable to Louis, who confidently anticipated that the armistice would be converted into a general peace, and that all the territory and places made over to him provisionally would become permanent portions of the French kingdom.

So far, Louis had owed much of his success to the neutrality of England. Charles II had consistently refused to unite with William of Orange and Spain in checking the French aggressions on the north-eastern and eastern frontiers. Louis was thus freed from all fear of an attack on his flank, and enabled to concentrate all his attention upon his aggressive schemes with regard to Germany and the Spanish Netherlands. The sole chance of successfully resisting these schemes lay in a close alliance between England and the continental enemies of the French King. Charles II had thus facilitated the execution of several of Louis' most important designs; it remained to be seen whether James II, who succeeded to the English throne in February, 1685, would be equally friendly to the French projects. Owing to Charles II's compliant attitude, France was in 1685 obtaining a position of incontestable preponderance in continental Europe, nor had the monarchy ever seemed so strong at home. It was in 1685 that Louis felt able to expel the French Protestants and to establish religious uniformity. Under him France had become a Power "uniform in its nationality and ecclesiastical system, with well-defined frontiers, admirably armed for offence and defence, both by land and sea." Previously to the succession of the Stewarts, English monarchs had for the most part carried out a policy of antagonism to France. From 1672 onwards, it is manifest that English foreign policy should have followed similar lines. The rivalry of England and France on the sea was becoming serious; the colonial interests of the two countries were certain to clash; the Protestant feeling in England was deeply moved by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and was inclined to sympathise with the opposition of the Dutch and of several of the German States to the aggressive policy of Louis XIV. For three years, however, England was compelled to stand by and watch the preparations for establishing French predominance in Europe.

These three years (1685-8) proved to be decisive in the history of England and France not less than in that of Germany and Holland. James II, owing to his change of religion, showed himself to be more closely attached to France than had been Charles II. His self-confidence

was such as to make him believe that the conversion of England to Roman Catholicism was possible, and could be brought about by his own efforts, backed up by the aid of the French King. He was resolved never to break off his alliance with France, and, if necessary, to support Louis against William of Orange. In coming to a resolution of such significance at the very time when Europe was beginning to realise the danger of French preponderance, James was mainly actuated by religious considerations, which to him, as to Louis, were of paramount importance. James, almost openly, aimed at a restoration of the Roman Catholic religion so complete "as to make its subsequent destruction impossible"; and he perceived that only by means of a French alliance could he expect to carry out his policy. His accession at the beginning, and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (approved of by the English King) at the close, of the year 1685 were thus calculated, not only to give to the religious question the foremost place in European affairs, but also to impress forcibly upon Europe the existence of a close understanding between the Kings of England and France. Before the end of 1685, James had assured Louis that he hoped to carry out his own religious views in close alliance with France; for a time, however, the sympathy of the English people for the French Protestants forced him to take up a moderate attitude.

By the beginning of 1686 it was becoming evident that a great European crisis was at hand. The proceedings of Louis and James II implied the existence of projects for strengthening Roman Catholicism in England and France; the action of the French King with regard to the Reunions and Luxemburg signified a definite resolution on his part to gain the Imperial dignity for himself or his son. The Truce of Ratisbon had given France for twenty years the left bank of the upper Rhine, which constituted an eighth part of the Empire; and henceforward Louis aimed at converting the truce into a permanent peace. In 1686 the predominance of Louis was fully established, his ally James II was on the English throne, the Emperor was busy with the Turkish War. The situation was not unlike that of 1672. Had James II remained King of England, and the unswerving ally of the French King, Louis' chances of success in his next European war would have been decidedly good. The events in England during the next two years were, therefore, of immense importance to Europe, and the struggle on the eve of being decided in England became an important feature of the great conflict which was about to engross the attention of the civilised world.

The longer hostilities were averted, the stronger became the position of the opponents of Louis. The Emperor Leopold had greatly improved his own by carrying on a crusade against the Turks. He thus secured the support of Innocent XI, and, as a Catholic sovereign furthering the cause of Catholicism, assumed the preeminence which Louis had hoped to assert. Moreover, the Revocation of the Edict of

Nantes in 1685 roused all the Protestant countries in Europe, while Pope Innocent XI had been alienated by the French King's declaration of the independence of the Gallican Church. Already in February, 1685, the Great Elector, abandoning his alliance with Louis, had made an alliance with William of Orange, and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes only confirmed him in his Protestant attitude. The resolution arrived at by the Great Elector was all the more important, seeing that the year 1686 might bring with it a joint attack upon Holland by the forces of England and France. The Emperor and the Elector of Bavaria were occupied by the war against the Turks, and James II was the firm ally of Louis XIV, who was resolved to transform the Truce of Ratisbon into a peace. He himself declared that "he could not doubt that he should be attacked, so soon as the war with the Turks had been brought to an end." The formation on July 6, 1686, of the Augsburg Alliance, with the object of preserving the Treaties of Münster and Nymegen, together with the armistice of 1684, justified Louis' apprehensions. It was a defensive alliance between the Emperor and members of the Empire, due to fear of a French attack upon the Palatinate; and Louis was convinced of its hostile purpose. The successes of the Imperialists against the Turks, therefore, could hardly fail to stir Louis into action. In 1686 Buda fell at last; and, in August, 1687, the Emperor won a great victory at Mohács, in consequence of which the Hungarian throne was, in December, declared to be hereditary in the Habsburg line. As the clouds darkened in the east, Louis prepared to take action. He fortified many of the towns provisionally in his occupation; and it was thus quite evident that he intended to enforce their definite cession to him. He openly aimed at acquiring complete military preponderance in Europe, the ecclesiastical independence of France, and the Imperial dignity for himself or his son. In the pursuit of these aims he received the full support of James II, under whose rule England had become "the corner-stone of the fabric" of French aggression.

The situation in the early months of 1688 was on the whole favourable to the execution of Louis' designs, though his position with regard to the lesser German Powers had become far from satisfactory. The Elector of Brandenburg had definitely thrown in his lot with the Emperor and with William of Orange; and the Elector Maximilian Emanuel of Bavaria, who in 1685 had married the Emperor Leopold's daughter, Maria Antonia, took a leading part in opposing Louis' schemes. Marshal de Villars had in 1687 been sent by Louis to Munich to win over the Elector of Bavaria to the French cause. Through Villars Louis offered the Elector, in exchange for an offensive and defensive alliance, his good offices to obtain the dignity of King of the Romans for him, and to recover Bavaria's former rights over Ratisbon, Nürnberg, Augsburg, and the territories between the Inn and the Danube. He also promised subsidies. In return for these

advantages the Elector was to further the candidature of the Dauphin to the throne of Spain, should Charles II die without children. In that event, however, the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily would be handed over to Bavaria. The Elector, however, was proof against these offers of Louis, who further urged him to shake off the Habsburg yoke and to emancipate Germany; and he decided to support the Emperor, who appealed to his German sympathies, upheld the claims of his brother, Joseph Clement, Bishop of Freysingen and Ratisbon, to the electorate of Cologne, and proposed, with the consent of Spain, that part of Flanders should be ceded to Maximilian.

The year 1688 proved decisive for the future of Europe. The ascendancy of France had become a standing menace to the peace of Europe; the domination of Louis XIV was not less dangerous to the European world than was that of Napoleon in the early years of the nineteenth century. Under a vigorous, intelligent, and centralised despotism, France, with her immense material resources as yet unimpaired, held an undisputed supremacy in the west. The French armies were accounted the best in Europe, and the French fleets commanded the Mediterranean and rivalled those of England and Holland. French diplomacy had no equal. The effects of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes were not yet felt, and the resources of France had not yet been squandered by interminable wars. So far, all attempts to form coalitions against the French predominance in Europe had failed, and the League of Augsburg had had humbler aims. It was not till the Revolution in England which placed William of Orange on the throne of the Stewarts that the foundation was laid of the Grand Alliance, which checked the arrogant pretensions of Louis XIV and eventually removed the danger of French supremacy in Europe.

Until that Revolution had been accomplished, there was a well-founded fear in the minds of the enemies of France that the events of 1672 might be reproduced, and that Holland might again be found helpless before the forces of England and France. The danger was a real one; for, while all the Powers from whom the Dutch Government could look for support were occupied in the war against the Turks, James and Louis had come to an understanding with regard to operations against Holland and the Empire. A quarrel between Denmark, the ally of France, and Sweden about Schleswig-Holstein had led to an agreement between James and Louis, with the object of preventing a combination between Sweden and Holland. It was arranged that an English fleet should put to sea and make a demonstration so as to prevent Dutch aid being given to Sweden in an attempt upon the Danish islands. In June, 1688, an English fleet of twenty ships anchored in the Downs, and Louis undertook that it should shortly be joined by the French fleet, which had been sent to the Mediterranean to bombard Algiers. In the same month the Empire was also threatened. In

January, 1688, Maximilian Henry, Archbishop and Elector of Cologne, a Bavarian prince, who also held the important bishoprics of Liège and Hildesheim, appointed Cardinal William von Fürstenberg, a nominee of the French King, his coadjutor in the archbishopric. Maximilian had for some years been practically the vassal of France, and had supported the French cause in Germany. On his death, in June, 1688, Louis determined to secure the archbishopric for Fürstenberg, in order to retain the control of so important an electorate and ecclesiastical province. As Fürstenberg was most active of all the dependents who remained to France in Germany, his election as Archbishop of Cologne would imply the dominance of the French power in the north-west of the Empire. Though Fürstenberg received a majority of votes at the election, the Emperor determined, with the full agreement of the Pope, to uphold Prince Joseph Clement of Bavaria, the candidate of the minority. French troops at once occupied Cologne, and it was evident that Louis intended at all costs to carry Fürstenberg.

There seemed indeed, in the summer of 1688, little chance of any successful resistance being offered to the execution of Louis' schemes. He was allied with Denmark; he had made an agreement with Hanover; his fleet was supreme in the Mediterranean; James II was his supporter; the continuance of the Turkish War seriously hampered his opponents. The preponderance of France in Europe implied the complete overthrow of the balance of power; for not only would Germany be weakened and divided, but the very existence of the United Provinces would be constantly threatened by Louis' supremacy on the Rhine. He would acquire complete military domination in central Europe, while at the same time asserting the ecclesiastical independence of France. So long as James II, who cared nothing for the balance of power in Europe, was on the English throne, there was small chance of any successful resistance being made to the French King. Thus, the Revolution of 1688 in England, the deposition and flight of James II, and the accession of William of Orange to the English throne were events of the utmost importance in the history of Europe. So long as Louis felt safe from attack on the part of England, he was able to concentrate his energies upon his German schemes. The withdrawal of the English regiments from the Dutch service in the spring of 1688, the attitude of England and France with regard to the quarrel between Denmark and Holstein, the appearance in June of an English fleet of men-of-war in the Downs, the intention of Louis to bring the fleet then employed off Algiers up the English Channel—all convinced the Dutch of the danger which threatened the balance of power and the cause of Protestantism.

A clear perception of the full significance of Louis' policy was shared with the Dutch by the Protestant Princes of northern Germany. Among these Frederick William, the Great Elector of Brandenburg, who died in

April, 1688, had for some time been convinced that it would be necessary for the European States to unite against the rising predominance of France. His successor, Frederick III, who opposed Fürstenberg's claim to the archbishopric of Cologne, made a treaty with Landgrave Charles of Hesse-Cassel, with the object of protecting Protestantism, and of preserving from French conquest the United Netherlands and the towns of Cologne and Coblenz. These Princes were thus acting in full agreement with the views of William of Orange, who desired, before he set sail for England, to see northern Germany and the Netherlands ready to offer a combined resistance to Louis.

On his part, Louis realised in the autumn of 1688 that the continuance of the Imperial successes against the Turks would imperil his chances of converting the Truce of Ratisbon into a permanent peace. He also found in the claim to the Palatinate put forward by him on behalf, but against the wish, of Charlotte Elizabeth, wife of the Duke of Orleans, and last descendant of the Simmern line, another reason for invading Germany. Accordingly in September his ambassador at the Hague warned the Dutch Government against taking any hostile action against James II, and in the same month French troops invaded Upper Germany and besieged Philippsburg, which fell on October 29. This action on the part of France rallied the Princes of Germany to the defence of the Emperor. John George, Elector of Saxony, at once agreed to march with his forces to the middle Rhine, thus cooperating with the Emperor on the upper, and with Brandenburg on the lower, Rhine. Equally anxious to assist in the defence of Germany were the Brunswick-Lüneburg Dukes at Celle and Hanover, and the Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel. Innocent XI had already shown his apprehension of the growing ascendancy of France. He realised that the triumph of Roman Catholicism in England would bring with it a close alliance between the English and French Governments. To avert French predominance in Europe, the Pope therefore felt constrained to support the European opposition to Louis (October). All that was now necessary to prevent the triumph of Louis was the adhesion of England to the opposition offered to him by continental Europe.

On the day of the fall of Philippsburg, William of Orange first set sail for England. He had satisfied the Emperor that his expedition was not directed against the cause either of legitimacy or of Catholicism, but was simply intended to destroy the alliance between England and France. Had Louis attacked Holland instead of Philippsburg, William's expedition could not have taken place. Fortunately, the relations of James and Louis were at the time somewhat strained. James had taken exception to Louis' declaration at the Hague, which he thought implied that England depended upon France and could only defend itself with French aid. It was also the view of some of Louis' advisers that a civil war in England would best ensure English neutrality during the

continental war. Even with James II on the throne, it was by no means certain that a wave of popular feeling might not force him, as it had forced Charles II, into war with France. Thus, while French troops fought on the Rhine, William of Orange sailed to England and carried out the Revolution of 1688.

Louis XIV, anxious to throw his forces against Germany and to increase and strengthen his frontier on the middle Rhine, and not altogether satisfied with the independent tone assumed by James II, left him to struggle with his assailant. He had convinced himself that they might be left to carry on a long struggle which would occupy their energies and resources, while he conquered the Palatinate, and by his intervention in western Germany hampered the Emperor's chances of a decisive victory against the Turks.

There was no time to be lost; for on September 6, 1688, the Emperor captured Belgrade, a success which seemed likely to prove decisive. Louis at once determined not to besiege Maestricht, though its siege might have compelled the continued presence of William of Orange in Holland, and thus postponed for a time the overthrow of James II. He decided, instead, to declare war against the Emperor and to invade Germany. He had already shown his determination to allow no scruple to interfere with his settled plan of "acquiring complete military preponderance in Europe both for defence and offence." The election of his nominee, William von Fürstenberg, at Cologne (June), and the fall of Belgrade (September), decided Louis to take the equally important step of invading the Palatinate on September 25. In deciding on this course, Louis and his Ministers showed that they considered the interests of France were best served by insisting upon the permanent cession of the territories provisionally allotted to the French Crown by the Truce of Ratisbon in 1684, and by asserting the claims of the Duke of Orleans (in the name of his wife) to the Palatinate. William of Orange landed at Torbay on November 15, and entered London on December 28. James II fled, and on January 4, 1689, reached the French coast. The House of Stewart had fallen, and Louis XIV could no longer look upon England as an ally or as a *quantité négligable*.

The rapid success of William of Orange and his coronation as King of Great Britain and Ireland were events of immense importance for Europe. The whole fabric of Louis XIV's foreign policy was overthrown, and the year 1689 marked the close of the period of French aggression. England was no longer a possible ally; Denmark was unable to make any diversion in favour of France; the Turks were being driven back. Wishing to concentrate his chief efforts upon Roussillon, Italy, and the lower Rhine, Louis decided to evacuate the Palatinate; and, by the advice of Louvois, orders were given in December, 1688, to devastate the country. Heidelberg was sacked in March, 1689, and shortly afterwards Mannheim, Speier and Worms suffered a similar fate;

Ladenburg and Oppenheim were burnt, and a large tract of country, including not only the Palatinate, but parts of the electorate of Trier, and of the margravate of Baden were also ravaged. The Rhine district was in great measure ruined, with the result that the hostility to France among the German States was aggravated. Louis had been persuaded by Louvois that the devastation of the Palatinate, like that of 1674, was justifiable by custom, and necessary from a military point of view. Marshal de Villars in his memoirs condemns the devastation as unnecessary and opposed to the true science of war. It certainly united Germany in opposition to Louis, and it did not prevent the Germans from taking Bonn and Mainz. Thus, from a military as well as from a political point of view, Louis' action in the Palatinate and surrounding country was a blunder.

In many respects the year 1689 forms an epoch in the history of Europe as well as in that of France. The fall of the Stewarts and the accession of William of Orange marked the return of England to the position which she had held in the days of Elizabeth. In 1689 England had again become the bulwark against all attacks upon religious freedom, and the champion of the balance of power. Further, the year 1689 marked the beginning of the struggle between England and France for supremacy in India and America, and for the command of the sea. It also marked the destruction of Louis' hopes of securing the Imperial Crown for himself or for a French prince. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, followed by the devastation of the Palatinate, had for a time united Germany, and indeed the greater part of Europe, in opposition to the ambition of France. Failure also attended the French schemes for the restoration of James II, and the overthrow of the English sea-power. Consequently, Louis was thrown back upon his early project of securing the Spanish monarchy for his House. For some four years, however, after the Revolution of 1688, he still cherished the hope, that, with James II, his Queen, and his son in France, he had the means of stirring up civil war in England and rendering her a useless member of the European coalition against him.

At first, Louis intended to bring about the restoration of James II by advocating a religious crusade. He hoped to unite all the Catholic Powers of Europe, including the Emperor and the Spanish King, for the overthrow of the English and Dutch Governments. But since the Peace of Westphalia religion had been steadily losing its influence as an active force in European politics. In 1688 and 1689 political necessities silenced the advocacy of religious partisans. The Emperor was satisfied that William of Orange had no anti-Catholic aims in invading England. When James II, early in 1689, appealed to Leopold for assistance, the Emperor pointed out that the Catholic religion had "suffered no greater injury than from the French themselves," who had taken the opportunity of the Turkish War to attack in the most savage and unjust manner the

western portions of the Empire. On May 12, 1689, the Grand Alliance was signed by Leopold and the Government of Holland, Leopold recognising William III as King of England. While the Emperor thus undertook to defend Holland from French invasion, William bound himself to defend Germany from future attacks on the part of Louis XIV. Denmark had already come to terms with the allies, and the Duke of Savoy was firmly united with the Emperor and Spain. In April, 1689, Louis, who was already engaged in hostilities with Holland, declared war upon Spain, which country, then under the guidance of Count Oropesa, had refused to observe such a neutrality in the coming struggle as Louis desired.

Early in 1689 it was clearly apparent that all idea of a crusade in the West must be given up. Neither Innocent XI, who died in August, 1689, nor Alexander VIII, nor, again, Innocent XII, who became Pope in July, 1691, would give any real support to James II, so long as it was apparent that he was being used by Louis XIV in the attempt to make France all-powerful in Europe. In the great struggle which began in 1689 and continued without intermission till 1697, Louis "arranged France as if she had been a huge fortress in the heart of Europe." Her troops would on occasion make forward movements; but, if pressed by the enemy, they could retire to a safe position under cover of the numerous fortresses on the frontier. The centre of the operations was Belgium, and its conquest by France entailed the conquest of Holland. The overthrow of William III was therefore essential for the success of Louis.

The French King's attempt to organise a crusade on behalf of James II had failed. He next endeavoured to secure supremacy in the English Channel, and to stir up in Ireland a civil war which should occupy the attention and energies of William III. Ireland would thus be the means of creating a diversion against England; a long war would ensue; and Louis, unhampered by his chief opponent, would be able to carry out his aims on the Continent. For the realisation of this scheme the supremacy of the French fleet in the Irish and English Channels was absolutely necessary. Unfortunately for the success of the plan, Louis miscalculated the strength of Irish resistance. He sent only 2000 French troops to Ireland, and he made no attempt to secure supremacy in the Irish Channel. On July 11, 1690, the battle of the Boyne overthrew the hopes entertained by Louis of a long-drawn-out struggle in Ireland; and the fall of Limerick (October, 1691) rendered futile all plans for the restoration of James II by way of Ireland. Had Louis realised the importance of sea-power, a French fleet could have commanded the Irish Channel, and the battle of the Boyne would not have been fought. As it was, on July 10, the day before that battle, Admiral de Tourville, in command of seventy-five French men-of-war, defeated a combined English and Dutch fleet in the battle

of Beachy Head. On July 1, the French under Luxembourg had won the battle of Fleurus over the Dutch and their allies, who were commanded by Prince George Frederick of Waldeck. The time seemed opportune for an invasion of England on behalf of James II, while William III was still in Ireland. But Louis insisted upon a Jacobite rising as a necessary preliminary to the landing of any French troops in England. Still under the influence of Louvois, Louis attached more importance to the operations in the Netherlands and Italy than to the naval operations in the English Channel. In April, 1691, Louis himself was present at the capture of Mons, and in June Hal also fell into the hands of the French. The same year saw Savoy overrun by the armies of France; while the Duc de Noailles took advantage of the discontent of the Catalans and captured Ripoli and other towns. Had Seignelay's advice been taken, the French might have secured naval supremacy in the Channel, and by the destruction of some of the southern English towns and of English commerce, if not by an actual invasion, seriously interfered with William III's projects. The victory of Beachy Head was, however, not followed up, and on May 29, 1692, Tourville was utterly defeated by the English and Dutch fleets, under Russell, in the battle of La Hogue.

The importance of the battle of La Hogue, so far as the restoration of James II and the security of England were concerned, cannot be overestimated. Before the battle took place, James II was confident that an attempt on England would be followed by his own restoration, and by the triumph of the principle of legitimacy. Louis XIV had equally satisfied himself that the probability of success was considerable. His agents reported that there were few troops in England, and that the fleet was unprepared. He accordingly placed under Marshal de Bellefonds a force of 30,000 men, who (in anticipation of Napoleon's arrangements in 1805) were to be conveyed across the Channel and to accomplish the conquest of England. As in 1805, all depended upon the superiority of the French sea-power and the command of the Channel. A fleet from Toulon was to meet the Brest fleet under Tourville, and to carry out the invasion of England. Luckily, tidings of these plans reached the English Government, which at once took energetic measures. The English and Dutch fleets having been ordered to unite, Tourville was ordered to prevent, if possible, the junction, and, though the Toulon fleet owing to contrary winds had not yet reached Brest, to attack the enemy. His defeat in the battle of La Hogue meant that the plan adopted by Louis XIV and James II for the invasion of England had utterly failed; that, in spite of the success of French privateers, under such men as Jean Bart, Duguay-Trouin, Ducasse, Pointis, and others, the command of the Channel had definitely passed into the hands of England; and that William would be able to devote all his attention to the war in the Netherlands.

There the struggle was of a fierce and prolonged character. It was

impossible for the Dutch to allow the Spanish Netherlands to fall into the hands of the French. The Spanish Netherlands were the bulwark of the United Provinces: the loss of the former would leave the Dutch at the mercy of Louis. Moreover, their conquest by the French would mean the subjection of Spain to the will of Louis XIV. Though defeated in Ireland and on the sea, Louis could boast of successes in the Netherlands. In June, 1692, shortly after the battle of La Hogue, he had followed up his successes of 1691 by the capture of Namur, the bulwark of Brabant and Liége. Nor did the fall of Namur complete the list of Louis' successes on land in 1692, for on August 3 William of Orange was defeated by Luxembourg in the battle of Steinkirke.

The French defeat at La Hogue was thus to some extent balanced by the disasters to William of Orange in the Netherlands. What was more serious, the French naval power, though crippled in the Channel, had still to be reckoned with in the Mediterranean. Nor, moreover, had the army which Victor Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, had collected in Piedmont won any signal success during its invasion of Dauphiné in 1692. No valuable position was captured, and, owing to the presence of Catinat, and the illness of Victor Amadeus, the invading army fell back, having accomplished nothing of importance. Thus the close of 1692 left the issue of the struggle between Louis XIV and the Grand Alliance still uncertain; and four more years of warfare followed, during which the influence of the sea-power of England gradually made itself felt.

For some years, however, it was doubtful if the allies would be able to hold their own against the French armies. The Emperor had on his hands a war with the Turks; the English fleet had by no means acquired an unquestioned supremacy at sea; and both Spain and Savoy seemed likely to be compelled to make terms with the French King. Moreover, the English attacks upon Martinique, Newfoundland, Guadaloupe and St Domingo failed, and in 1694 the French reconquered Senegal and Goree. The complete triumph of the Austrians over the Turks, and the establishment of British supremacy in the Mediterranean and in the Channel, were needed in order to assure the victory of the Grand Alliance. Fortunately, the Emperor in the end proved triumphant over the Turks; and the English Government, supreme in the Channel after the victory of La Hogue, recognised the necessity of sending a powerful fleet into the Mediterranean.

It was not, however, till after some years of fighting that the victory of the Emperor over the Sultan was assured. The outbreak of the war on the Rhine had at first a serious effect upon the course of the struggle between the Austrians and the Turks. Up to 1689 the Imperialists, owing to the uneasy peace that prevailed in western Europe, had been able to win a series of almost uninterrupted successes. The continuance of these, which are narrated in a later chapter, was checked by the

outbreak of the war on the Rhine. The Grand Vezir Mustafa Kiuprili at once advanced, and in 1690 reconquered Servia, Widdin and Belgrade. However, at the battle of Szalankemen, Margrave Lewis of Baden, on August 19, 1691, defeated the Turks after a terrific struggle. Grosswardein was taken; but hostilities languished during the next few years, and it was not till September 11, 1697, that Prince Eugene was able to deliver an overwhelming blow upon the Turks in the battle of Zenta. In January, 1699, the Treaty of Carlowitz closed a war in satisfactory fashion for Austria, and enabled the Emperor Leopold to concentrate his attention upon the Spanish Succession question.

During the four remaining years (1693-7) of the war in western Europe while the financial distress of France, aggravated by bad harvests of 1692 and 1693, became more and more serious, the importance of the command of the Mediterranean was emphasised in a striking fashion. The withdrawal of English troops from Tangier in 1684 had been followed by the establishment of French supremacy in the Mediterranean and by the culmination of Louis' triumphs. The Truce of Ratisbon was signed six months after the retirement of the English fleet from the Mediterranean, and it was not till 1693 that any real attempt was made to interfere seriously with French naval preponderance in the south of Europe. In that year, William had been defeated at Neerwinden (Landen), and Tourville had captured a portion of the great Anglo-Dutch fleet which was making for Smyrna. The Duke of Savoy had been defeated in the battle of Marsaglia by Catinat, who was thus enabled to invade Piedmont, while the Spaniards had failed to check the advance of another French army under the Duc de Noailles into Catalonia. Unless the English fleet made a demonstration in the Mediterranean, it seemed more than likely that Louis would force Spain and Savoy to retire from the war. French supremacy in the Mediterranean being thus secured, Louis could withdraw his forces from the south of Europe and concentrate his attacks upon William III and the Emperor.

Immediate action was, therefore, necessary. The Tory admirals were dismissed; Russell was restored to his former position of Commander-in-Chief; and in May, 1694, he sailed for the Mediterranean. He arrived at a critical moment. Aided by the French fleet under Tourville, Noailles had invaded Spain, capturing Palamos and Gerona. The fall of Barcelona was imminent. The entry of Russell with his fleet into the Mediterranean at once changed the aspect of affairs. The advance of Noailles was checked; Barcelona was saved; and Tourville retired to Toulon. It was obvious that the recovery by the English fleet of the command of the Mediterranean would overthrow the plans of the French King, and would probably hasten the conclusion of peace. In 1695, Russell, who had wintered at Cadiz, planned to attack Toulon or Marseilles, to overthrow Tourville's fleet, and, with the cooperation of

Duke Victor Amadeus of Savoy, to deal the French sea-power in the Mediterranean an overwhelming blow. But the Duke was already meditating an arrangement with Louis, and Tourville continued his defensive tactics and remained safely in the harbour of Toulon, while the English fleet was unable to bring on a decisive action. Yet the presence of the fleet in the Mediterranean, and the tenacity shown by William III in the Netherlands, where he had besieged Namur, prevented Louis from achieving any striking success, and tended to exhaust the French resources. Nevertheless, during the later months of 1695, and throughout 1696, Louis was able to profit from the weakness and treachery of some of his opponents. The Duke of Savoy deserted the Grand Alliance, and, in consequence of this defection, the King of Spain and the Emperor were compelled to consent to the neutralisation of Italy. An attempted invasion of England in the winter of 1695-6 had, indeed, ended in failure; but the English Government had decided to recall the fleet from the Mediterranean, so that in 1696 Tourville was able to bring his squadron safely from Toulon to Brest.

The results of the English command of the Mediterranean during the years 1694-5 had, however, exercised a most profound effect upon the course of the war. Louis' plans had been upset; Spain had not been conquered, and the French fleet was no longer in a condition to carry out any important movement.

The adhesion of the Duke of Savoy on August 29, 1696, to the French cause, and the neutralisation of Italy, tended to reconcile William III to the prospect of peace; for the defection of Savoy would enable Louis to bring some 30,000 troops under Catinat into the Netherlands. William, indeed, on September 5, 1695, had taken advantage of the death of Luxembourg in the previous January, and had followed up the seizure by the allies of Dixmude and Huy by himself capturing Namur. For the first time during the war, the French armies had been badly beaten, and Europe was encouraged to find that Louis was not invincible. This success, however, was counterbalanced by the defection of Savoy in the following year, by Vendôme's reduction of Barcelona after fifty-two days' siege, and by Catinat's capture of several important Spanish towns in Flanders. In spite of these proofs of the growing weakness of the Grand Alliance, and in spite of the overtures of peace made by Louis to Holland and England, William III was, in the autumn of 1696, supported by Parliament in his determination not to treat with France except "with our swords in our hands." Early in 1697, however, to his astonishment, Louis expressed his willingness to restore Lorraine and Luxemburg to their lawful owners, to recognise William as King of England, and to surrender all the conquests made by France during the war. Accordingly, negotiations under the mediation of Sweden were begun. In May, 1697, the Congress of Ryswyk was opened, and on September 20 a general peace was concluded.

The first treaty was made by France with England, Spain, and Holland. William III was recognised by Louis as King of Great Britain and Ireland, and Anne, second daughter of James II, was declared heiress to the throne of Great Britain and Ireland. Louis, moreover, promised not to encourage plots against William III. All places won since the Peace of Nymegen were to be restored, France thus regaining Pondicherry and Nova Scotia, and Spain recovering Catalonia, Mons, Luxemburg, Ath, and Courtray. On the other hand, France restored Fort Albany to the Hudson's Bay Company, which had been driven out of most of its possessions in 1685. The chief forts in the Spanish Netherlands, such as Namur, Ypres, and Menin, were to be garrisoned by Dutch troops, and the Dutch were to obtain an advantageous treaty of commerce with France.

The Emperor made peace with France very reluctantly, and it was not till October 30 that William III induced him to agree to a treaty with Louis. By it France ceded all places taken since the Treaty of Nymegen, except Strassburg and Landau. She also withdrew from the right bank of the Rhine, yielding Philippsburg, Freiburg and Breisach, and she restored Lorraine to its Duke, keeping only Saarlouis in her hands. Louis, moreover, abandoned his candidate for the electorate of Cologne, and renounced the claims of the Duchess of Orleans to the Palatinate for a sum of money.

In view of the imminence of the Spanish Succession question and of the financial distress in France, Louis acted wisely in coming to terms with his foes. He hoped, moreover, by his concessions to win over to his side a number of the German Princes, who presumably might be expected to regard with alarm the great increase of the Imperial power consequent upon the defeat of the Turks and the annexation of all Hungary and Transylvania. At any rate, the Grand Alliance was broken up, and France, with her recuperative powers and her well-organised government, remained the strongest and most united Power in Europe.

CHAPTER III.

FRENCH SEVENTEENTH CENTURY LITERATURE AND ITS EUROPEAN INFLUENCE.

THE literature of France in the seventeenth century has always been regarded, both by other European peoples and (with the exception of a few writers whose influence is not perhaps of much weight) by the French themselves, as most thoroughly representative of the literature of which it forms part.

In no other period have the distinguishing characteristics of French intellect and genius—method, logical sequence of ideas, and lucidity of style—been so conspicuous. The classical tradition of Greece and Rome, followed by the great poets and prose-writers of the sixteenth century, with a zeal as overmastering as it was injudicious, and transmitted by them to those of the seventeenth, was handled by their successors with so fine an insight, so sure a sense of proportion, and so instinctive an art of combining national originality with the inspirations of classical tradition—in short, with such felicity and propriety and skill—as to have resulted in a success almost unparalleled in the whole history of literature.

Innumerable influences were intermingled and interwoven at this period of literary workmanship; but three of them, at least, proved so strong, so striking, and so continuous throughout the whole of the century, that a kind of authoritative rank ought to be assigned to them. These are the influence of Montaigne, that of Malherbe, and that of Descartes.

By virtue of the power which Montaigne exercised, he belongs rather to the seventeenth than to the sixteenth century. Every seventeenth century man of letters read his works incessantly and was deeply imbued with their spirit. In all these writers are to be found deep traces, echoes, imitations, and even plagiarisms, of Montaigne. It is a striking indication of this all-pervading influence that the two chief representatives in the seventeenth century of whatsoever in it was most Christian and most Catholic, the two most deeply religious men of the age, and therefore those furthest removed from the spirit of Montaigne—that is to say, Pascal and Bossuet—found Montaigne as it

were blocking their way, and became intent upon refuting his principles. This proves how living was the influence exercised by Montaigne on the minds of men, and how those who differed from him in their ways of thought and feeling, still felt it incumbent on them to wage war against him as against a present, and indeed an omnipresent, adversary.

Although Montaigne represented the classical tradition in perfection, and borrowed from it all that was most refined and best suited to the French mind, he himself represented, or it might even be said evolved, the true French spirit. From him his compatriots learnt delicacy of treatment, and derived the taste for a searching but dexterously and gracefully conducted analysis of ideas, together with their love of the study of characters, pursued with ardour but not without the sure touch of the master's hand—in short, every tendency proper to the humanist and the moralist who is at the same time a man of genius. The literature of the seventeenth century, which concerned itself almost exclusively with the study of man, owes its bent in large measure to him. In a word, Montaigne might almost be described as the literary father-confessor of the seventeenth century.

Descartes, himself a moralist (for we must not forget his marvellous *Traité des Passions*), bestowed on the seventeenth century those qualities which Montaigne either naturally lacked or did not deign to acquire—careful arrangement, a sense of order, the rectilinear sequence of ideas, the art of boldly tracing the grand outlines of general conceptions with a sure touch and a master-hand. Teacher, in this respect, of Bossuet, of Bourdaloue, of Boileau, even of Molière and of Racine, as well as of Malebranche, he mapped out the high-roads along which the French intellect was to travel; had Montaigne been the only writer to exercise a controlling influence over French minds, they might, perhaps, have become too much attached to winding by-paths; had Descartes been the sole influence, they might have fallen into the habit of keeping to the high-road. Thus, it is fortunate that one of those two great personalities revealed the charm of the labyrinths of literature through which the visitant strays, not however dropping the thread from his hand, while the other grandly opened out the royal highway straight through the forest intellectual.

Last, Malherbe, following in the footsteps of Ronsard, but with none of Ronsard's defects, taught Frenchmen, first of all, the use of plain, clear, and concise language, which had rejected everything superfluous and bore no trace of piecing; more especially, he taught them rhetorical poetry, eloquence clothed in noble verse, the amplitude and the movement of stately sentences. He taught the French to become perfect orators in verse as well as in prose; for we learn from poets how to write prose; and his influence, which, in a measure, had long been latent, made itself felt to an enormous extent throughout the

School of 1660, the central rallying-place of all French literary effort. The members of this School included orators in verse as well as orators in prose, who set forth abstract ideas in harmonious and ample style—in other words, in the style best fitted for them, since it placed their finest qualities in the strongest light.

In Montaigne, then, we find a delicacy of diction which is full at the same time of grace and of strength; in Descartes order and strength in composition; in Malherbe a sure and expressive oratorical form: and in one and all we find reasonableness. These qualities in combination formed the essence of the classical French of 1660, which in its turn has exercised so profound and, all things considered, so salutary an influence on the different literatures of Europe.

The School of 1660 included at least a dozen writers of the first rank, each with his own distinctly defined originality, but each possessing qualities common to all, and each exhibiting close affinities to the rest. Only a few of the chief among these writers can be here mentioned and characterised.

Corneille, who, however, preceded the others, and who only belongs to this group in the sense in which a father belongs to his family, was as much of a Stoic as was Montaigne; but, although he took delight in posing as such, he was, in the main, the poet of that doctrine of free will, of which Descartes was the convinced and eloquent exponent. Corneille sang of magnanimity, of loftiness of soul; though he was not thereby prevented from frequently drawing base and vile characters, or from displaying singular penetration in the analysis of complex individualities. But he is preeminently the poet of the human will. He portrays man struggling against the blows of Fate and prevailing against them, by means of his trust in himself and in the inward strength with which he feels himself endowed. He depicted those "warrior souls" whom Bossuet was later to call to mind; and at his bidding there passes before our eyes a long procession of combatant spirits. Corneille remains the very type of those artists who aspire towards the things that are great and who hold that the highest kind of beauty is to be found in the beauty of holiness.

Bossuet pressed the most powerful eloquence, and a "verbal," but yet disciplined, "vehemence" into the service of the religion he expounded. The impetuous arguments with which he stormed the enemies' citadel were tempered by order and method, and each was advanced in its own place and season. Indeed, he conveys the impression of a general who has weighty and powerful forces under his control, which he pushes to the front with equal rapidity and precision, in an assault that never breaks the ranks or mars the symmetry of their lines.

La Fontaine, the most self-contained and original of the poets and indeed of all the writers of the seventeenth century, owes little to Montaigne, little to Malherbe, although he loved him greatly, and

little to Descartes, although he read him incessantly and rendered him worthy homage. He was a sixteenth century poet, matured by the ideas of the seventeenth century and the various influences that circulated round him. His ingenuity rises into elegance, while the freshness of his originality might have tempted him to superfluity, had it not been kept within nice and just limits by the good taste of the time, so that he actually became concise, while remaining easy and supple. He had at his command an inconceivable variety of turns of style and mannerisms, derived, in the first instance, from his own intellectual nature and, secondarily, from his wide reading of authors of every age, country, and style; above all else he had the quality of life—that sense which makes even the slightest of his stories a miniature drama and endows each of his characters with a physiognomy all its own in its features, actions, and bearing. The most poetical of French poets, he stands as it were alone, and seems beyond the reach of extraneous influences, because he outvies them all.

Boileau is, strictly speaking, the pupil of Malherbe, and—whether for better or for worse, just as one may view it—a pupil turned teacher, a pupil, that is to say, who fears to go further than his master and shrinks from nothing so much as from being original. Possessed of wit, especially of that satirical wit which is not the highest kind, he had good judgment, a logical mind and even eloquence; he knew how to draw a portrait or at least how to block out a sketch; his style, when defining literary precepts, was clear and fairly powerful; he discoursed on questions of morals as one possessing authority and capable of some emphasis; and he could be carried away by feverish indignation in rebuking an indifferent writer. He ought to be, although he probably is not, the idol of the “Aesthetic School,” since he exhibited against the writers of other Schools than his own a spirit of indignation which found its vent in invective such as is usually reserved for criminals. Thus he possessed all the qualities, together with the chief failing, of men of letters.

Everything that can be said about Molière has been said—as to his wonderful gift for making even the most complex of his characters alive and real, until their conversation and even their very gestures have become proverbial; his comic power, or, in other words, his art of arousing, and of at the same time satisfying, more and more fully as he proceeds, the interest of curiosity seasoned by malice; his depth of conception, which is a very different thing from close observation of life, and which consists in the creation of characters capable of being viewed from ever fresh standpoints, and possessing an inexhaustible interest for those who subject them to analysis, so that they offer a new revelation to readers of each successive generation. But it has not been sufficiently pointed out that, like Corneille, like Boileau and like La Bruyère at later date, Molière has often, indeed almost always, the dogmatism of a preacher:

that his most important comedies are theses; that his aim was to teach, to exercise moral control, to impress his precepts on all who listened to him; and he too would have applauded the saying "Woe to him who is content with applause." In common with most of the French writers of the seventeenth century, he was an eloquent expounder of morality; and such he intended to be.

Finally (for we must not unduly prolong this rapid survey) Racine showed throughout his work what Corneille showed only on occasion, that he was a delicate and subtle and profound painter of the passions. It is true that, strictly speaking, he only studied the three passions of love and jealousy and ambition; but he treated these with great skill in all their devious movements, he traced their development, and he depicted every shade in their operation, even the most fleeting, without, however, losing himself in a maze of detail, and never forgetting the broad outline. Hence his gallery of living portraits, admirably managed from the point of view of technique, which time will never obliterate or change or tarnish.

These great men were the admiration of all Europe in their day, and they exercised a very powerful influence over the European literatures of their times. In Germany this influence lasted for nearly a century—from the Thirty Years' War until the middle of the eighteenth century. Mention must be made of Martin Opitz, who, copying the example of his Dutch master Daniel Heinsius, had imbibed the leading principles of French literature in such a degree as to earn for himself the name of the "German Malherbe"; he was a pronounced partisan of the system of imitation, and, far more like Ronsard than Malherbe, he strove to introduce into the literature of his own country the distinguishing beauties of every other literature.

We should also mention Fleming, who imitated the French, especially where they in their turn had borrowed from the Italian School;—Andreas Gryphius, a rather florid copyist of Corneille, a writer who, had he been French, would have found an acknowledged place between Rotrou and Ryer; the various imitators of the French Romances of the first half of the seventeenth century—imitators who really derive more from the Spanish influence in French literature than from French literature itself. Nor, above all, must we forget Gottsched, translator of Racine's *Iphigénie* and author of *The Dying Cato*, the German ultra-classic, who was, at the same time, the most thorough-going of the imitators of the French School, and also the last, or nearly the last, of these copyists; and who was speedily dethroned by the National School. And, for a moment, we feel impelled to call from oblivion the worthy and genial fabulist Gellert, who derived almost as much inspiration from La Fontaine as from his own kindly nature, and who thus possessed two excellent sources, from which in point of fact he might have drawn far more than he did.

But the great name which dominates the whole of the period from 1650 to about 1750 is that of Leibniz. He was great enough to need no master; nevertheless, he owed to Descartes his first incentive, the foundation of his inspiration, more especially and beyond doubt the very tone of his mind, that wide and tolerant optimism which runs throughout the whole of his work, and animates it with confidence and with hope. Leibniz might almost be said to impersonate a French idea, which after sounding the depths of a German mind, comes forth the richer and fuller for the experience, while still retaining the distinctive style and characteristics of its origin.

After him, Lessing appeared above the literary horizon, who dealt the *goût français* such a blow that, after 1760, the influence of French on German literature practically ceased to exist—a fact which should not be treated as a grievance, since it is best for every nation to live its own life, both intellectually and morally.

Italy, too, came under French influence after 1650, having, in its day, exercised an immense effect upon the literature of France. The *Seicentisti*, from the middle of the century onwards, were strongly coloured with French influence. Guidi bears the stamp of Malherbe, but his style is more inflated; Testi, a faithful disciple of Horace, also possesses something of the grace of Maynard and of Racan; Chiabrera, “the Italian Pindar,” learns lessons from the French poets rather than copies them; but his confirmed habit of imitating the classics is very evidently traceable to French influence, and his pupils, Filicaya and Menzini, followed the same course, perhaps almost too faithfully. Finally, in 1713, Italian tragedy, after keeping silent long after the profound slumber in which it had been sunk during the whole of the seventeenth century, was reawakened by the inspiring touch of the *Merope* of Maffei, who was, like Voltaire, one of the most brilliant pupils of the French tragic writers of the seventeenth century.

The Spanish writers of the seventeenth century scarcely borrowed anything from the French; it was rather the French who imitated them. But, from the beginning of the eighteenth century, it might almost be said that Spain was a pupil of the French School. To Ignacio de Luzan y Guerra, the disciple of Descartes and of Port-Royal, Spain owed the *Logic of Port-Royal*, and he also introduced Milton to his countrymen; Moratin wrote both tragedies and comedies entirely in the French style; Cadalso, after finishing his student days in Paris, imitated the *Lettres Persanes* in his *Cartas Marruecas*, and Voltaire in his tragedy *Don Sancho Garcia*; Jove Llanos, who also translated Milton, produced in the same epoch on the Spanish stage his tragedy *Pélage*, written on French lines. Spain had to wait until the nineteenth century before she again reverted to her own literary idiosyncrasy—which (assuredly in no sense to her discredit) altogether differs from that of the French nation.

Finally, from 1700 onwards, England came under French influence in a very clear and unmistakable manner. Addison is the pupil of Boileau, more gifted, more refined, and more brilliant than his master, but still never forgetful of his master's teaching. Moralist, satirist, and critic, a poet equally at home in the romantic, allegorical, and tragic styles, he could turn with ease from French wit to English humour, and often seems even to combine, mix and blend the two together. Taking everything into account, we find Addison so exquisitely French in his methods that we are often tempted to say of him as Valentine of Milan said of Dunois: "He was stolen from us."

Pope, who has inevitably been much imitated in France, owed much to her in his earlier days. The style and manner of his letters remind us of Balzac and of Voiture; his moral poems have the precise turn of wit characteristic of Boileau; he represents, as it were, the transition between Boileau and Voltaire; moreover, the *Dunciad* reads as though it were copied from the *Lutrin*, the evident relationship between the two poems being shown by their close similarity of style.

These great names must be supplemented by those of Waller, the friend of Saint-Évremond and the correspondent of La Fontaine, in whom we might almost say was revived all that was finest in our witty *précieux* of the seventeenth century; Garth, the amusing humorist, who recalls the French *burlesques*, and whose works Voltaire so highly appreciated as to translate some of them; Arbuthnot, Gay, Lord Bolingbroke, Lord Chesterfield. The name of Swift may be omitted from the list, inasmuch as, in the first instance, if he borrowed at all from the French, it was rather from the writers of the sixteenth than from those of the seventeenth century, and, secondly, because Swift's was too original and too individual a nature to allow of his being cited as an example of any kind of external influence. But here it is necessary to stop—in view of the well-known fact that, if the English humorists of the early eighteenth century certainly owe much to the French, the English "Sentimentalists" of the middle of the eighteenth century no less certainly exercised a very strong and deep influence over Diderot, Rousseau, and Sedaine.

This outline—for it is nothing more—indicates the general characteristics of the great French writers of the seventeenth century, who made themselves heard and felt throughout the European world of letters of that century and the earlier years of its successor. It was a glorious era in French history, however diversely it may be regarded according to the national standpoint of the student; as had been her lot in the thirteenth century, so again in the seventeenth France was unanimously acclaimed the intellectual sovereign of Europe, all eyes being turned towards her, and all ears listening for her action.

The predominant influence of French literature is everywhere perceptible; for a time its prestige blocked the way and arrested the action

of every individual impulse, every national movement, in the literary history of every nation. Especially was this the case in Italy and Spain; it was also partially true of Germany and England. Perhaps, after all, it is not a bad thing, in the long run, for a people to put itself to school for a time to another nation, or rather (since this is never really done) to enter upon a period of diligent, careful, and devoted study of the literature of another people. The French nation ought to be aware of this truth, for not less than four times in its history a period of imitation of foreign work has been succeeded by a brilliant, and, in some ways, a glorious, literary revival, by no means to be explained as a mere coincidence. First, after a searching study of the classics, came the *Pléiade*; then came the literature of 1660, after an intimate study of Italian and Spanish writers; then the period of Diderot and Rousseau, after a salutary enthusiasm for English literature; and lastly, the French Romantic revival, after a time of devotion to English and German literature.

It may be (for on these inevitably obscure and extremely complex matters it is better not to dogmatise) that contact with a foreign influence enriches, in a general way, the national literary sense; or, again, certain sides of the national mind which were unaware of their own existence or at all events hardly suspected it may awake and become conscious of their existence when they recognise themselves in the literature of a foreign land; or, yet again, the real essence of a nation's intellectual life may be distilled and acquire fresh strength by the very reaction against a foreign literature that has for a time been injudiciously worshipped; and in this case, too, good arises, though indirectly.

For example, English humour will endure for all time; but we have seen that it was developed to a singularly high degree in England after contact with French wit; and again, in Germany, the national revolution brought about by Lessing and the great literary results that ensued for German literature were stimulated by French influence, which not only invigorated German wit, but incited it to the assertion of its own independence.

We are reminded of the saying of La Bruyère concerning strong and sturdy children who fight their nurses. Nurses give sustenance to their foster-children for the very purpose of making them strong and able, if need be, to fight their foster-mothers. They perform this task in perfect consciousness, and cheerfully undertake the risk which it implies. Whatever the explanation may be, for nearly a hundred years France occupied a position towards every other European nation analogous to that of a nurse; and, on the whole, she cannot assert that, when she remembers this experience, it is wholly unsatisfactory to her.

CHAPTER IV.

THE GALLICAN CHURCH.

DURING the first half of the seventeenth century French religion went through a somewhat chaotic stage. Catholicism had triumphed under Henry IV, but the whole reign of his successor was taken up by discussions as to the particular form which Catholicism should assume. For a long while the country swung to and fro between two rival schools of extremists, neither of which was strong enough to crush the other. At one end of the line was the ultra-clerical party headed successively by Mary de' Medici and Anne of Austria. At the opposite end were the upholders of a purely official religion; their strength lay chiefly in the legal and administrative class, which Richelieu had raised to power. They were ready enough to call themselves Catholics, and "perform the ancient ceremonies of their country with a decent moderation," as one of their own great writers enjoins. But they insisted that Catholicism should be kept under the strict surveillance of the civil powers; its profession was not so much a duty to God as a duty to the State. Their real religion they found in the books of such men as Guillaume du Vair (1556-1621), Bishop of Lisieux and Lord Keeper during the regency of Mary de' Medici. He offered them a purely natural religion, set out in singularly impressive language largely borrowed from the ancient Stoics. Intensely moral and patriotic, it is touched throughout with Christian sentiment; but it owes quite as much to Epictetus as to the Sermon on the Mount.

Where the fathers swore by Du Vair, the children passed on to Descartes (1596-1650). The philosopher posed as an excellent Churchman; and when Protestant friends in Holland tried to convert him, he answered that the religion of his king and of his nurse was good enough for him. But his real work was to finish what Du Vair had begun. His *Meditations* gave the world what the world had never seen before—proofs of God, freedom and immortality, put into language strictly reasoned, but not too hard for average minds to follow. These three things once proved, however, Descartes made his bow and departed, leaving the field clear for theology. What God was like he did not pretend to say, nor how eternal happiness was to be compassed, or our freedom to be used.

That was matter of faith, not reason; and he only dealt with the domain where philosophy and religion overlapped. Hereupon followed the natural result. Most Cartesian imaginations fastened on the truths of reason, and but little occupied themselves with those of faith. The first were the essentials of religion, the second its accidental clothing, mere "ancient ceremonies of one's country."

Not that this consequence showed itself at once. Churchmen were a long while in deciding whether Cartesianism did more good or harm. The great Jansenist, Antoine Arnauld, spoke up warmly in its favour. Bossuet was much more doubtful; but Pascal was the one Christian thinker of the age who steadily opposed it. Nor were the rationalists themselves quite clear whither they were bound. At first sight no one looks more negative than Gui Patin (1601-72), an eminent, but very cross-grained, professor from the Collège de France. He was always congratulating himself on being "delivered from the nightmare"; and he rivals the eighteenth century in the scorn he pours on priests, monks, and especially "that black Loyolitic scum from Spain," which called itself the Society of Jesus. Yet Patin was no freethinker. Sceptics who made game of the kernel of religion came quite as much under the lash of his tongue as bigots who dared defend its husks. His letters end with the characteristic confession: "*Credo in Deum, Christum crucifixum, etc.,De minimis non curat praetor.*"

At the opposite pole from Patin stood the party of the so-called *dévots*. Patronised successively by the two foreign queens, its first object was to introduce new fashions in devotion, and new religious orders, from Italy or Spain. For French religion and French literature were alike impoverished, and must borrow from abroad. The *dévots* were only doing in one field what *préciosité* accomplished in another, when it brought in *gongorisme*, or exaggerated emphasis, from beyond the Pyrenees, and little *concetti* from beyond the Alps. In neither case did native taste take altogether kindly to the loan. The Bare-footed Carmelites, for instance, were brought to France under the patronage of one queen, and warmly encouraged by the other. Daughters of St Teresa, they represented the fine flower of the Spanish Counter-reformation. They brought with them a glow of torrid romance, that sat well enough on the countrywomen of Don Quixote, but was utterly out of place in the Paris of Descartes and Gui Patin. Their religion was all violent contrasts of light and shade. In their churches was great show of perfumes, flowers, and fine linen; in their cloisters extraordinary austerities—terrible scourgings, the most humiliating penances, and fasts on bread and water. Louise de La Vallière, flying from the arms of Louis XIV to scrub floors in a Carmelite convent, is a typical example of their picturesque sensationalism.

Still less acceptable to most Frenchmen was the piety of the Italians. Here artistic triviality reigned. Patin is never tired of denouncing their

"bad little books of devotion, full of miracles and monkish revelations, cords of St Francis and girdles of St Margaret." Nor was their want of taste their only fault. They, and all they represented, widened the breach between Cartesian rationalism and the Church. In particular, they exasperated the Huguenots, and stood wantonly in the way of their reconciliation with the Roman Church. And that was an object that most good Frenchmen had very much at heart, though often for political reasons quite as much as for religious. A good instance is the sceptical critic Saint-Évremond (1613-1703). He quite agreed with the Protestants that they would not find a rational religion in Italy or Spain. Thanks to the Gallican Liberties, however, he thought that they might find it in France, if they left the "girdle of St Margaret" alone, and took to reading Bossuet.

The Liberties in question were certain ancient rights, in which most Frenchmen took a patriotic pride. They were peculiar to France; and, as the Crown lawyers said, they had never been granted like a privilege, but grew up in the very nature of things. They consisted chiefly in four points. Papal bulls might not come into France without leave of the Crown. The decisions of the Roman Congregations had no legal weight in France. French subjects could not be cited before a Roman tribunal. French civil Courts took cognisance of ecclesiastical affairs, whenever the law of the land was thought to be broken. And, inasmuch as Catholicism was part and parcel of the common law, the *Parlements* could, and did, give this last article a very wide extension. They were perfectly ready to enter into the merits of an excommunication, and force Bishops and Cardinals to withdraw it, if they thought it improperly launched. There are even cases in which they "adjudged" the sacrament to those who could not obtain it from their parish priest.

However, these abuses were the exception; and the mass of the French clergy put up with the *Parlements* easily enough. After all, the only alternative was an appeal to the Pope; and to him they were by no means anxious to go, even had their Government allowed it. Most visitors to Rome told the same tale. They were scandalised at its pettiness, especially at its neglect of theological scholarship. Much more secular branches of learning tempted Italian ambition. The road to the purple lay through nunciatures and administrative offices; divinity was left to the friars, who had no other chance of advancement. But indifference leads as straight to intolerance as ever can fanaticism. When a too original book was published, the Cardinals made haste to put it on the Index, and troubled themselves no more about it, sure that it soon would be forgotten. In France this irresponsible high-handedness was neither possible nor desired; a single example would have drawn down on the offending prelate a swarm of jeering pamphlets. For the Huguenots were always on the watch to spy out a joint in Goliath's armour; and herein they were supported by lay Catholic opinion. Most

Frenchmen liked authority well enough within its proper sphere; but they expected it to obey the law and common sense.

All these things inspired a strong dislike of the doctrine of papal infallibility. Dogmatically speaking, Frenchmen thought it unhistorical, and opposed to the ancient traditions of their Church. Administratively speaking, it meant a revolution. Hitherto they had settled their ecclesiastical disputes at home. Once admit infallibility, and appeals innumerable would go from their own highly competent tribunals to a set of incapable judges in a foreign land. Lastly, Bellarmin and the Roman Ultramontanes had grafted on to the theological dogma a set of political consequences highly exasperating to French national pride. It was argued that ecclesiastical interests took precedence of all other interests; and of these the Pope was the only judge. Hence he had a right to dictate his will to temporal sovereigns, whenever he thought such interests were concerned. If they refused to listen, he could punish them in any manner he thought fit; in the last resort he could depose them, incite their subjects to rebellion, and head a crusade of Catholic Powers against them.

Much of this, no doubt, was simply dialectical steam, blown off by heated professors in a class-room. But steam can drive small wheels as well as great. The French Ministers knew very well that Ultramontanism could not depose Louis XIII from his throne; it could, and did, write seditious pamphlets, whenever Richelieu supported a Protestant Power against a Catholic. But in their foreign policy, at any rate, Richelieu and his successors meant to keep their hands entirely free; here they must be able to ignore ecclesiastical interests as much as they pleased without fear of ecclesiastical disturbance. Hence the need of a doctrine that would bind the consciences of all Frenchmen to obey no master but their King.

This need Gallicanism supplied. It may be described as a generalisation of the ancient Gallican Liberties, evolved as a counterblast to Ultramontanism. Like the rival theory, it developed a theological and a political side. Theological Gallicanism maintained that the supreme infallible authority of the Church was committed to Pope and Bishops jointly. Political Gallicanism declared that no amount of misconduct, or neglect of Catholic interests, justified the Pope in interfering with a temporal sovereign. The two doctrines grew up independently; and even under Louis XIV many Jesuits and other divines were politically Gallican, and theologically Ultramontane. But early in the seventeenth century the two sides of Gallicanism were welded together by Edmond Richer (1559-1631), a famous Doctor of the Sorbonne. To the Richelieus and Colberts Gallicanism was a mere device for snuffing out clerical opposition; in the hands of Richer and his successors it became an honest attempt to solve the great problem of the age, and show Frenchmen how to be at once good citizens and good Catholics.

For a new era was dawning. On the divisions of the Wars of Religion there followed an irresistible reaction towards patriotism and national unity. France had suddenly grown to her full stature; like the contemporary England of John Milton, she was become "a noble and puissant nation, rousing herself like a strong man after sleep." Ultramontanism strove hard to check what it called this "separatist" tendency, and to strangle national aspirations in the leading-strings of the Papacy. But even the clergy were swept away by the current, and meant to be patriots like everyone else. "Before my ordination," said Richer, "I was a subject of the King of France. Why should that ceremony make me a subject of the Pope?" His eccentric follower, Michael Chrétien, went further still, and exhorted the assembled Sorbonne to rally to the service of its King. "*Exhibeamus nos gallos, et non gallinas,*" he cried. Before long the Gallican wave had invaded the Jesuits themselves. When Louis XIV, after a period of diplomatic coolness, again sent an ambassador to Alexander VII, Father Rapin overflows about his royal condescension in thus "honouring" the Pope. And in the great quarrel with Innocent XI the Society was among the strongest supporters of the Crown.

Gallicanism necessarily led up to the doctrine of the divine right of kings. This doctrine is developed by Bossuet in his *Politique tirée de l'Écriture Sainte*, written between 1675 and 1680, while the author was tutor to Louis XIV's only son. But Bossuet by no means followed the same lines as his contemporaries across the Channel. The theologians of Charles II upheld the divine right of legitimate monarchy, as opposed to other forms of government. Bossuet's object was to show that all established sovereignties—whether monarchical or republican—hold their power directly of God, and not mediately through the Pope. God wills that in every country there should be some settled constitution; what particular form it takes the customs of the country will decide. But, once a particular form of government has established its prescriptive right, no power on earth can interfere either with the system itself or with its lawfully-appointed officers; a bad, but legitimate, king can no more be exchanged for a good than an established republic can transform itself into a monarchy. In short, Bossuet's book is a plea for political stability at all costs. He was old enough to remember the Fronde, and the misery its flighty constitutional experiments brought upon the common folk. He was writing a manual for the son of Louis XIV at a time when Louis' methods of government had culminated in a blaze of glory. Naturally he wished those methods to continue for ever.

No doubt, this royalist enthusiasm acquired a thick enough coating of vulgarity by the time it reached the lower strata of the clergy. The great Huguenot controversialist, Jurieu, has much to say about a thesis on the argument from design maintained by certain Franciscans of

Marseilles, wherein the chief proof of a Deity's existence was drawn from the triumphs of Louis the Great. But the worst effect of this perpetual incense was on the character of Louis himself. It is true it did not touch his religion; for that was a mass of Spanish superstitions inherited from his mother. As Madame de Maintenon told Cardinal de Noailles, the King would never miss a sermon or a fast-day, but no one could make him understand what was meant by humility or repentance. His private superstitions had, however, little to do with his public policy. Here he walked in the steps of Richelieu, and made the glory of God come altogether second to the glory of the King of France. The Church was a most effective instrument of government, and therefore he supported the Church; but he expected Pope and Bishops to take their marching orders from him. If they refused, he was perfectly ready to make war on the one, and send the others to the Bastille.

The clergy, in fact, were supernumerary members of the civil service. By the Concordat of 1516 the Crown appointed to all bishoprics and abbeyes. But the mere nomination was the least part of the business; the real strength of the Crown lay in its power to raise or lower clerical incomes as it pleased. It could burden an incoming bishop's revenues with pensions to whomsoever it chose; it could reward good service with fat sinecures. Of these the most important were the abbeyes *in commendam*. They could be granted to whomsoever the King chose. No residence, or other duty, was expected from the abbot. He need not be in holy orders; he might be a child, or even a Huguenot. Indeed, he could be anything except a monk; for if a qualified person were appointed, the abbey was "restored to rule," and further abuse became impossible.

Still more curious was the royal perquisite of the *régale*, or right to the temporalities of a vacant bishopric. Of these by far the most important was the patronage of benefices in the bishop's gift—chiefly canonries, archdeaconries, and a host of minor appointments in cathedral and collegiate churches. Parochial livings were excluded, as directly involving cure of souls. In the hands of successive generations of Crown lawyers this prerogative was developed to an incredible extent. It was held that prescription could not be pleaded against the Crown; hence, if a benefice once fell under the *régale*, there it remained, until the Crown had exercised its right. As a matter of grace, the Crown seldom interfered with a dignitary who had been in possession of his stall for thirty years; but at any time within that period an episcopally-appointed canon was liable to ejection, on the ground that the patronage of his place rightfully belonged to the Crown. Hence, to present a man to a canonry was often equivalent to presenting him to a costly lawsuit.

Quite apart from the *régale*, however, litigiousness was a besetting sin of the French clergy. Cathedral Chapters, in particular, were proverbial for their lawyers' bills. Their great object was to make themselves as independent as possible of the Bishop; and herein their

lead was followed by numberless deans of peculiars, rectors, incumbents of donatives, and the like. "The lichen of exemptions," said St Francis of Sales, "is fast eating away the trunk of the Church." Another great evil was non-residence. Bishops no longer commanded fleets; nor could they throw up their pastoral charges and marry, as more than once happened under Louis XIII. But most of them would very much rather serve at Court than reign in their cathedral cities; and to "banish" a prelate to his diocese was one of the heaviest sentences Louis XIV could pronounce. Even Fénelon talks of his palace at Cambray much as Ovid talks of Tomi.

These non-resident pluralists were divided by a yawning gulf from the humble country curates. Most of these were miserably poor—even poorer, relatively speaking, than their successors in modern France. Of education they had little; no means existed for obtaining it. The Sorbonne, or theological faculty of Paris University, gave an elaborate education in divinity; but very few young men could afford to spend seven years over their degree. Few of the provincial universities taught theology at all; and seminaries, or diocesan colleges preparing directly for the priesthood, were only just beginning to be founded. On the other hand, the Bishops expected nothing more from a candidate for holy orders than some evidence to character and enough Latin to stumble through a few lines of the Breviary. Hence the most astounding ignorance was common enough. Priests were found who did not know the common formula of absolution. St Vincent de Paul had much trouble in persuading others that they ought not to take money for hearing confessions. Jean-Jacques Olier, founder of the seminary of Saint-Sulpice, came across a priest in his parish, who was in the habit of praying to St Beelzebub.

The awakening of these poor curates and their flocks became the favourite project of St Vincent de Paul (1576-1660). His Lazarists, or Priests of the Mission, were to evangelise the country districts; his Sisters of Charity were to relieve their temporal distresses. These two bodies represent the triumph of two important innovations. The old-fashioned nun had spent her whole time behind high walls in prayer and contemplation; the one object of the Sister of Charity was the service of her neighbours. The first aim of an old-fashioned Order was to make itself independent of all existing authorities; St Vincent's two institutions were expressly intended to collaborate with the Bishops and parochial clergy.

This last idea was not absolutely new. Cardinal de Bérulle (1574-1629) had founded the French Oratory—a very free adaptation of the original institute of St Philip Neri—in order to train up clergy for country dioceses. But the Oratory proved too lettered for its work. Instead of a popular training college, it became the home of speculative recluses, such as the philosopher Malebranche (1638-1715), or Richard

Simon (1638–1712), founder of Biblical criticism in France. As a nursery of clerical scholars, the Oratory had only one rival. This was the Congregation of St Maur (1627), an offshoot of the Benedictine Order. Under the guidance of Mabillon (1632–1707), it developed an invaluable school of critics and ecclesiastical historians.

Mabillon and Malebranche only touched the few; the education of the mass of the clergy fell into the hands of the Sulpicians, founded by the Abbé Olier in 1641, and the Eudists (1643), so called from their founder, the Abbé Eudes de Mézerai. Following their lead came the Christian Brothers (1680), an association of celibate laymen, who furnished teachers for the humbler class of schools. But all three bodies laid much more stress on piety than on learning; Saint-Sulpice, in particular, devoted itself “not so much to theological science, as to the practice of that science, and the virtues proper to the clerical state.”

An abounding interest in applied religion marks the whole revival. Perhaps its most characteristic outcome was the rise of professed Directors of Conscience—divines who specialised in spiritual ailments; they stood to ordinary confessors much as a consulting physician stands to a general practitioner. No doubt, their rise was not an altogether healthy sign, and a director often aggravated the ills he was sent to cure. He became the natural target for all the morbid scrupulosity and self-analysis which idle and luxurious lives produce. Fénelon, a great expert in these matters, has many hard things to say about the valetudinarians in soul, who felt their pulses twenty times a day, and sent continually to the director to beg new drugs, or promises of quick recovery. But the prominence of Direction was a strong acknowledgment of the need of personal religion. It was felt, on the one hand, that something more than routine religious duties was demanded of the laity; it was felt, on the other, that they could not be trusted to pick out the vital elements in religion for themselves. Some were too feeble, others too erratic. Hence the use of a Director. He kept flightiness from trying dangerous experiments, and broke up the bread of doctrine into morsels suited to a feeble appetite.

Direction, however, was only for the few; for the many the one means of instruction was the sermon. Nowadays it is hard to realise how large a part the pulpit played in the life of seventeenth century France. Political assemblies were unknown. Journalism, still in its infancy, was closely muzzled. The pulpit was the only place where popular criticism of those in high places could safely make itself heard. Nor did preachers always resist the obvious temptation of airing their views on subjects in general, just to show off their own cleverness. La Bruyère declares that they made their pulpit a means of advancement as rapid, but not less hazardous, than the profession of arms. Others gave in to the dominant *préciosité*. Mascaron (1634–1703) and Fléchier (1632–1710), the two earliest of Louis XIV's Court-preachers,

could generally be trusted not to say things in a simple way, if it was possible to put them in an artificial. But the religious revival waged war on *préciosité*. St Vincent de Paul is said to have thrown himself at the feet of a flowery young orator, and begged him to give up ornaments so unworthy of a crucified Jesus. This spirit triumphed in Bossuet (1627-1704), greatest of all the preachers. Quite apart from their literary qualities, his sermons are distinguished by a fervour at once evangelical and practical. His aim was so to interweave doctrine and morality that each would lend assistance to the other. Faith would be the inspiration of all Christian practice; while practice, in its turn, would lead to a deeper grasp of faith. But, except on a few State occasions, Bossuet seldom mounted a Paris pulpit after he became tutor to the Dauphin (1670); and his mantle fell on the Jesuit Bourdaloue (1632-1704). In him, however, a moralistic, argumentative tone makes itself heard beside the evangelical; as Fénelon said, his sermons were magnificent reasonings about Christianity, but they were not religion. This criticism is still more true of Massillon (1663-1742), last of the great Court-preachers.

Preachers and Directors might make much of personal religion; but there was a general tendency to treat it as the crown and flower of religion, rather than as its root. For any high degree of sanctity it was indispensable; but it was thought that a man could scrape into a humble place in Paradise without possessing even its germs. This view was more especially common among the Jesuits. Not that it was peculiar to them. The Jesuits have invented little; but their energy, their boldness, their elastic organisation, unfettered by any ancient traditions, make them peculiarly conspicuous champions of whatever ideas they may adopt. In this matter of personal piety their sympathies were specially engaged. It appealed to individual experience, and such experience had been the great weapon of Luther and Calvin. But the Jesuits were sworn enemies of the Reformation and all its works; they boasted that they were nothing that Protestantism was, and all that Protestantism was not. Then, too, individual experience was cloudy and anarchic. But the Jesuits were essentially a combatant body, brought up to a more than military discipline; their sympathies were all for military precision—dogmas as clear-cut as a proposition of Euclid. Pascal might object that in religion what is clear-cut and precise is seldom true; but Jesuits had no time to listen to such scruples. Practical efficiency was their aim; and efficiency required a positive base of operations. Hence they were for ever extending the scope of papal infallibility.

Nor did these devotees of the practical take pains to distinguish between the ideal interests of religion and the terrestrial interests of the Church. It was God's vicegerent; and to appeal—as Pascal appealed—from its decisions to the judgment-seat of Christ was alike blasphemous and

foolish. Right-minded men trained themselves to believe that, whatever she did, the Church was always right. But a Church, ridden by the spectre of efficiency, is like to end in frank utilitarianism; and during the seventeenth century there was a continually-smouldering contest between the Jesuits and divines of a less worldly school as to exactly how far utility should be allowed to go. The great fight was over the confessional. Should priests pitch their standards high or low? The Jesuits argued that severity scared many away altogether—a contingency the more to be regretted in the case of the rich or influential. Accordingly they began a campaign to force confessors to be lax. The famous doctrine of probabilism—first broached about the beginning of the seventeenth century—made it a grave sin in the priest to refuse absolution, if there were any good reason for giving it; even when there were other and better reasons for refusing it. And to determine what such “good reason” was fell to Escobar and the Casuists.

These writers developed a whole system of expedients for protecting the penitent from a too zealous confessor. The kind of question he might ask was carefully defined. He must not cast about for general information as to his penitent's disposition, as would a physician; he must try each offence strictly on its merits, as would a magistrate. He must always lean towards the most “benign” interpretation of the law; and for his guidance casuistry ran many an ingenious coach and four through inconvenient enactments. In matters of detail most of these are harmless enough. They are chiefly concerned with proving that common peccadilloes—the white lies of the lady of fashion, the “trade customs” of the shopkeeper—are not grievous sins. Nevertheless, in the opinion of Pascal, Milton, and other contemporary critics, the Casuists degraded morality. They encouraged men to take over their ideas of right and wrong ready-made from the priest, and thus save themselves the trouble of thinking. As Milton said, their conscience became a “dividual moveable,” left entirely in charge of the priest. He, in his turn, must be content with a low quality of achievement. He might urge his penitents to do more; but human nature seldom resists the charms of a fixed standard—least of all, when it is administered by a live judge in a visible court. If he must be satisfied with little, why be at the trouble of offering more? But the less he could expect from them, the more he was driven to trust to the miraculous efficiency of sacramental grace. By hook or by crook get the sinner to confession, and the whole work was done. However bad his natural character, the magical words of absolution would make him a new man.

These abuses called forth a series of protests from eminent divines, among whom Bossuet was the most conspicuous; and during the later years of the century probabilism disappeared altogether from the French divinity schools. But Bossuet only struck at isolated points; meanwhile a movement was springing up, which aspired to cut down at the root

the whole Jesuit conception of religion. This was the revival known as Jansenism. It is so called from the name of its founder, Cornelius Jansen (1585–1638), a Dutch divine, long professor of divinity at Louvain University, and afterwards Bishop of Ypres in Belgium. His doctrines are contained in a bulky treatise on the theology of St Augustine, posthumously published in 1640. Meanwhile, however, his ideas had been popularised in France by his friend Jean Duvergier de Hauranne (1581–1643), commendatory Abbot of Saint-Cyran. Both were men strongly gifted with the evangelical impulse; and both had early been brought into conflict with the Jesuits. Saint-Cyran, like many other French divines, sympathised warmly with the secular Catholic missionaries in England in their interminable quarrel with their Jesuit rivals. Jansen had early taken sides in the controversy that had raged at Louvain ever since the days of its celebrated professor, Michael Baius (1513–89), and the eminent Jesuit, Leonard Lessius (1554–1625). The great question at stake was the right way of teaching theology. The Jesuits partly stood for the strictly logical scholastic method; the followers of Baius were for an appeal to mysticism and subjective experience.

Not that Jansen or his masters had any conscious tendencies to Protestantism. They might be willing to encounter the Reformation by its own weapons, and show that Catholic Louvain could be quite as evangelical as Presbyterian Leyden. But party-feeling was kept hot on both sides by continual border-affrays; Jansen himself had a long battle with the learned Calvinist, Voetius, still remembered as an antagonist of Descartes. This double line of warfare shaped the ideals of the two friends; they were in search of a theology which should be Catholic, but not Jesuit—evangelical, but not Protestant. They found it in the writings of St Augustine, who offered them a strongly individualistic mystical religion, dexterously interwoven with a high sacramental theory of the Church.

Accordingly Augustine became their oracle; and for years a sullen controversy raged as to whether Jansen had really understood his master. With the mass of his followers, however, these questions of scholarship were an altogether secondary matter; they valued his teaching because he gave them neither ceremonial nor theology, but genuine religion. For the great work of Jansenism was to insist that piety does not mean believing a particular opinion, or adopting a particular mode of life; it means conversion, becoming a new creature. Morality, church-going, orthodox opinions, might be excellent things in their place; but through them no man ever saved his soul. His fate in the next world depended on whether his life in this had been informed by the love of God. And by love of God Jansen meant simply the religious sense. This might be weak, or it might be strong; but even its humblest forms were enough to distinguish him who had it from those who had it not—to draw all his actions into a new perspective, and put a different colouring on all

his thoughts. But inasmuch as a radical change of character is beyond man's power to effect, Grace must descend upon him like a whirlwind—as once it descended on Jansen's two spiritual heroes, St Augustine and St Paul—and draw his will “irresistibly, unfailingly, victoriously,” out of darkness into light.

Thus Jansen's doctrine of conversion melted into Predestination. God calls certain souls to Himself; the rest He leaves to perish in their sins. Surprise has sometimes been expressed that Jansen should have made so many converts to so terrible a doctrine; even in his own day Deists had arisen to protest against a God, whose “justice” human misery exalted, whose “essence” human ills enriched. But the mass of Frenchmen conceived of their Maker as a hypostatized absolute sovereign: like the Louis XIV of Saint-Simon, He “commanded, and gave His reasons to none.” Moreover, Jansen's doctrine of conversion softened the grimness of his predestinarianism. A man might be unregenerate to-day; but to-morrow it might please God to convert him—as once He converted St Paul, “model of all penitents.” But Jansen's real object was to teach men that they cannot make their own religion for themselves. Left to their undisciplined fancy, they were straying on every side; some were experimenting with the geometrical God of Descartes, others with some Ultramontane “girdle of St Margaret.” Jansen answered that they cannot choose how, or when, they will be pious: they must wait till their Maker touches their heart, and tells them what He would have them do. “Those who really long for God,” said Pascal, “long also to approach Him only by means He has Himself ordained.”

Thus the ultimate religious sanction became subjective—an inward “witness of the Spirit”; and herein the French authorities saw endless possibilities of insubordination both in Church and State. For in the French seventeenth century a theological opinion was a political event. A disaffected party in the Church was sure to develop some kind of organised machinery for the furtherance of its views; and on this machinery all disaffected parties in the State threw a wistful eye. The *Frondeurs*, in particular, would have given much for Jansenist support. But the *Fronde* was still to come, when Jansenism gave its first great manifesto to the world. One of Saint-Cyran's most important converts was Angélique Arnauld (1591–1661), Abbess of Port-Royal, a convent near Versailles, and thenceforward the head-quarters of the party. She converted her brother Antoine (1612–94), a young Doctor of the Sorbonne. In 1643 Antoine Arnauld published a book on *Frequent Communion*, an attack on the confessors who gave absolution easily, without enquiry into the penitent's character, or the sincerity of his repentance. The book raised a violent storm, but many divines supported Arnauld, and no official action was taken against his party till 1649. Then the Sorbonne condemned five propositions from Jansen's

Augustinus, all relating to Predestination. This censure, backed by the signatures of eighty-five Bishops, was sent up to Rome for confirmation; and in 1653 Innocent X declared all five propositions heretical.

His judgment put the Jansenists between two fires. To accept it meant a surrender of their whole position; to reject it would put them outside the Roman Church. Accordingly they temporised. They accepted the censure in the abstract, but denied that Jansen had held the propositions in the sense condemned. In one sense this was true; for a book may well mean one thing to spiritual experience, and quite another to an ecclesiastical lawyer. But the authorities could not be expected to listen to such reasoning; in 1656 Arnauld was expelled from the Sorbonne, in spite of Pascal's *Provincial Letters*, begun in an attempt to save him. The *Letters* (1656-7) soon leave Arnauld behind, however, and go on to a general attack on Jesuit casuistry and *dévotion aisée*.

In October, 1656, Alexander VII cut away the ground from under Arnauld's feet by declaring that his predecessor had condemned the *Augustinus* in the sense intended by Jansen. Arnauld promptly set up the legal distinction of law and fact. In matters of dogma, he said, the Church was certainly infallible; but about the private intentions of an author it knew no more than anyone else. However, the authorities were obdurate. A "formulary," or declaration that the *Augustinus* had been rightly condemned in the sense intended by its author, was presently drawn up; and signature was made binding on all nuns as well as priests. At first, however, it was only imposed on suspected Jansenists (1661), most of whom refused to sign. The priests went into hiding; and the Government began to persecute the nuns of Port-Royal. But in 1665 Pope and King resolved to make signature really universal. Hereupon four Bishops protested—those of Alet, Angers, Beauvais, Pamiers—and were only induced to make a very ambiguous submission in 1668. With this, however, the pacific Clement IX declared himself satisfied; and the very secular French Ministers, who were frankly weary of the whole affair, persuaded the King to seize this opportunity of admitting the Jansenists generally to grace (1669).

Hence the so-called Peace of Clement IX is treated by Jansenist writers as a triumph: really, it was the beginning of their downfall. They had set out to reform the Church: they ended by having to fight hard for a doubtful foothold within it. And under the leadership of Arnauld—scion of a family of lawyers—the party itself had gone downhill; a controversial argumentative impulse was shouldering out the spiritual. Everyone admired Arnauld's talents; for he was not only a party-leader, but a considerable geometer and metaphysician. But, in admiring, the world agreed with Bossuet, who said that Arnauld was inexcusable for having squandered his great abilities in an attempt to prove that Jansen had not been condemned. Besides, the Peace was

much too artificial an affair to be loyally observed—least of all at a time when Louis XIV was preparing to enforce a rigid uniformity throughout his dominions. The Catholics he had well in hand already; the Huguenots he was soon going to expel from France. Why, then, show mercy to a handful of eccentric recluses, who believed themselves to be in special touch with Heaven, and therefore might at any moment set their conscience up against the law?

Nor was an object-lesson wanting. For many years past the Crown lawyers had been extending the *régale*; though a few dioceses, mainly in the south of France, still claimed exemption on the ground of ancient usage. But in 1673 the Government thought the time had come for enforcing uniformity; and Louis formally declared the *régale* universally binding throughout the realm. Only two Bishops protested—Pavillon of Alet, and Caulet of Pamiers—both of whom had taken the Jansenist side in the matter of the formulary. The storm broke loose in 1675, when Louis presented to a canonry at Alet. Pavillon excommunicated the royal nominee; his metropolitan, the Archbishop of Narbonne, supported the Crown; Pavillon appealed to the Pope. Very soon afterwards he died (1677), leaving Caulet to carry on the struggle alone. Caulet, whose temporalities were by this time confiscated, made a series of appeals to Innocent XI, a high-minded but very undecided pontiff; and at last persuaded him to interfere (December, 1679). In 1680 Caulet died, but his Cathedral Chapter more than replaced him. The metropolitan tried to interfere; Innocent declared his action intrusive, and threatened him with excommunication (January, 1681).

This invasion of the canonical rights of a metropolitan—for Innocent had prejudged the case, without listening to what the Archbishop might have to say—was bitterly resented in France as a gross invasion of the Gallican Liberties. After much consultation between the Court and the leading prelates, it was agreed to convoke a special Assembly of the Clergy—a body roughly answering to the Anglican Convocation—to deal with the whole question. The Assembly met in October, 1681; at its opening session Bossuet, just appointed Bishop of Meaux, preached a great sermon on the unity of the Church. The *régale* was soon settled by a compromise, carried through by Louis himself against the advice of his Ministers, and greatly to the advantage of the clergy. Colbert now suggested that this would be an excellent chance of setting at rest for ever the much-debated question as to the exact relation of the Gallican Church to the Papacy. Bossuet and other Bishops objected, on the ground that a declaration on this subject could do no good, and would give mortal offence at Rome. But Colbert persisted; and in March, 1682, the Assembly unanimously voted assent to four Articles drawn up by Bossuet. These are a skilful compromise. On the one hand, they assert the main points of Gallican belief. (1) The Pope has no jurisdiction over temporal sovereigns. (2) He is below a General Council.

(3) The Gallican Liberties are sacred. (4) The right of judging matters of doctrine belongs to Pope and Bishops jointly. On the other hand, the Articles steer clear of the extremer forms of Gallicanism. The chief share in judging questions of doctrine is reserved to the Pope; and the Declaration carefully leaves room for Bossuet's personal opinion—already expressed in his opening sermon—that the See of Rome, though not infallible, is “indefectible”: not necessarily right at any particular moment, it cannot fall permanently into error.

These concessions did not satisfy the Pope; peace with Rome was only made in 1691. But Bossuet's statesmanship won him enormous credit at home; for the next twenty years he was the dominant figure in the Church. A moderate and reasonable orthodoxy became the order of the day. As Ultramontaniam receded into the background, independent spirits of the type of Gui Patin began to gravitate back to the Church. Even Cartesianism yielded for the moment to the spell of Malebranche, and arrayed itself in the dress of a rationalistic and very much etherealised Catholicism. To the world at large, however, Bossuet was the great reconciler of faith and reason—on the lines sketched out in his *Traité de la connaissance de Dieu et de soi-même*, and his *Discours sur l'histoire universelle*. Both these books were written between 1670 and 1680, while their author was tutor to the Dauphin. Their great aim is to prove by reason that men ought to submit to authority. Philosophy—argued the *Traité*—shows that a God exists; and that He governs and controls the affairs of men. History—continues the *Discours*—teaches that His governance is mainly indirect; it is exercised by certain venerable corporations, ecclesiastical and civil, acting as His lawful representatives. Thereby the *Discours* rejoins the *Politique tirée de l'Écriture Sainte*, the third member of the trilogy.

But Bossuet's great object in life was the conversion of the Huguenots. In 1668 he had overcome the scruples of Turenne; two years later he published an *Exposition de la Doctrine Catholique*, so moderate in tone that his adversaries accused him of having fraudulently watered down the Roman doctrines to suit a Protestant taste. On the other hand, he never doubted the right of the State to enforce religious uniformity at the point of the sword; this, as he more than once boasted in his controversial writings, was one of the few points on which Catholic and Protestant doctors were agreed. Besides, the French Churchmen of the time were brought up to look on the Huguenots as a serious political danger: Saint-Simon only expresses the common belief, when he calls them “a sect which had become a State within the State, dependent on the King no more than it chose, always loud in complaints, and ready, on the slightest pretext, to embroil the whole kingdom by an appeal to arms.” This passage represents what the Huguenots would have liked to do, rather than what they did; but in the few places where they were strong, they had undoubtedly encroached on their legal rights.

Wherever they were weak, however, the Government had long gone consistently on the plan of giving them less than their due, with small regard to the Edict of Nantes. Hence its Revocation, of which an account has been given earlier in this volume, appeared to the clergy as simply the last term in a logical series. Concerning the *dragonnades* that followed, opinion was divided. Some divines, of whom Bossuet was one, honestly did their best for the sufferers. Others agreed with the cynical saying of Madame de Maintenon, that there might be some hypocrisy among the adults, but the children, at any rate, would be gained to the Church. Others, again, were chiefly concerned to protect the sacraments from the kind of profanation alluded to by Saint-Simon, when he says that twenty-four hours were often enough to bring a neophyte from torture to abjuration, and from abjuration to communion.

Revocation by no means interrupted Bossuet's appeal to other methods of persuasion. In 1688 he brought out his *Histoire des Variations des Églises Protestantes*, in which he sought to prove that variation is necessarily a sign of error. Soon after he began to correspond with Leibniz, with a view to the reconciliation of the German Lutherans with the Roman Church. But negotiations broke down on this point of variation. Individual Catholic doctrines, such as purgatory or the Mass, Leibniz thought that his countrymen might accept; but he refused to guarantee that they would believe to-morrow what they believed to-day. "We prefer," he said, "to belong to a Church eternally variable, and for ever moving forwards."

Nor was it only in Germany that Bossuet taught the Protestants to glory in their variations. Jurieu, and other Huguenot controversialists, fully accepted the idea of progress; and they presently went on to ask whether Rome itself was quite so unchangeable as Bossuet supposed. Herein they were supported by the Oratorian scholar, Richard Simon. He accused St Augustine, Bossuet's own especial master, of having corrupted the primitive doctrine of Grace. Bossuet set to work on a *Défense de la Tradition et des Saints Pères*; but Simon only went on to raise issues graver still. Under a veil of polite circumlocutions, such as did not deceive the Bishop of Meaux, he claimed the right of interpreting the Bible like any other book. Bossuet denounced him again and again, and even set the police in motion; Simon answered that he could afford to wait until "the old fellow" was no more. Another Oratorian was more dangerous still. Malebranche prided himself on having brought numbers of Jansenists, Cartesians, and other misbelievers back within the Catholic pale; but his remedies appeared to Bossuet almost as bad as their disease. Simon had endangered the belief in miracles by bringing lay rules of evidence into play; but Malebranche abrogated miracles altogether. On his principle it was blasphemous to suppose that the Author of Nature would break through a reign of law He had Himself established in the universe.

Bossuet might burst forth into refutations, and urge Fénelon to do the like; the philosopher courteously replied that to be answered by such pens did him too much honour.

But the worst rebel of all was Fénelon himself (1651-1715). The author of *Télémaque* had early made a great name for himself as a Director of Conscience, and as tutor to the Duke of Burgundy, eldest son of the Dauphin. But in contemporary eyes he was not so much a theologian as a "master of eloquence," or what would nowadays be called an accomplished man of letters; in the background, also, were large projects of political reform. These multitudinous interests gave him a far wider outlook than Bossuet, though his grasp of realities was not so sure; and intellectual curiosity more than once led him into dangerous paths. About 1689 he became much impressed by the ideas of Madame Guyon (1648-1717), a lady of good family, considerable abilities, and great charm of manner, but the very hysterical representative in France of the religious revival known as Quietism. This was an outgrowth of the Spanish mysticism of St Teresa; though it was first popularised in Italy by the Spanish priest, Michael de Molinos (1640-97). In his hands it became a violent means of escape from the petty ceremonialism of Italian religion. Molinos was always bidding the soul rise beyond sacraments and attributes and dogmas, beyond the Trinity and the Incarnation, to "a view, wholly obscure and indistinct and general, of the Divine Essence as it was." The one means of approach to this Deity was the ancient *via negationis*. All hope and fear, all thought and action, all life and feeling, must be laid aside; the soul must enwrap itself in the "soft and savoury sleep of nothingness, wherein it receives in silence, and enjoys it knows not what."

Such an attitude of mind might easily lead to Antinomianism; but Fénelon thought that a change of language would be enough to guard against the danger, while keeping all that was good in Quietism. Molinos had spoken as though mere thinking of ourselves was the great evil; Fénelon's enemy is self-interest. In his *Explanation of the Maxims of the Saints* (1697) he argues that, as men grow in holiness, they become indifferent to themselves. Not only do they not value religion for its consolations, but they cease to take an incidental pleasure in its exercise. Their whole soul is taken up in loving God, and they neither know nor care whether God loves them in return. Bossuet attacked this principle as inconsistent with Christianity, and for the next two years a bitter conflict raged between the two prelates, which did no great credit to either. Meanwhile, however, Fénelon had appealed to Rome. Early in 1699 Innocent XII gave judgment condemning the *Maxims*, although in very moderate terms. Fénelon at once submitted, and thereafter took small part in Church affairs, except to wage a vigorous war against the Jansenists.

For Jansenism was by no means dead, although the Government

tried hard to kill it. For a while Louis XIV had stayed his hand—mainly out of regard for his cousin, Madame de Longueville, once the heroine of the Fronde, and now the great patroness of Port-Royal. But in 1679 she died, and the Court at once proceeded to severities. The nuns of Port-Royal were forbidden to admit new members to their community; and Arnauld fled from France, never to return. Following the King's lead, the Oratory and other societies where Jansenism had found an entrance began to keep a closer watch over the opinions of their members. None the less, what was known as "mitigated Jansenism"—a doctrine which just managed to keep within the four corners of orthodoxy—found a large number of upholders. And among the laity a Jansenist spirit was kept alive by the *Réflexions Morales sur le Nouveau Testament* of Pasquier Quesnel (1634–1719). This book—a popular devotional commentary, first published in 1671—went through a number of editions without incurring any official censure; although the author was well known to be a Jansenist. In 1685 he had gone to share Arnauld's exile at Brussels; and on Arnauld's death in 1694 he succeeded to the official leadership of the party.

Round his *Réflexions* was now spun a web of complicated intrigues. As Louis XIV grew older and more devout, there began a fight for his soul between the Jesuit confessor, Father La Chaise (1624–1709), and Madame de Maintenon, an ardent disciple of the moderate school of Bossuet. In 1695 she secured the archbishopric of Paris for her friend, Noailles, Bishop of Châlons, a pious and well-meaning aristocrat, but woefully tactless and undecided. He was suspected, also, of a tenderness for Jansenism; he had certainly given official approval to Quesnel's *Réflexions* at Châlons, and this approbation he renewed in Paris (1699). Accordingly the *Réflexions* became the chief target of Ultramontane attack—so much so, as almost to supplant the *Augustinus* itself. While the work of denunciation was proceeding, a much more dangerous issue was unexpectedly raised. In 1701 an indiscreet Jansenist consulted the Sorbonne as to whether it was not enough to receive the condemnation of the *Augustinus* in "respectful silence"—that is, with the purely external deference which good citizens might show to a law that they privately believed unwise. This casual question stirred the fires of fifty years before, and soon ecclesiastical France was in a blaze. In 1703 Louis wrote to Clement XI, suggesting that they should take concerted action to put an end to Jansenism for ever. In 1705 the Pope replied with a Bull condemning "respectful silence" outright.

The Bull only whetted Louis' appetite. The older he grew and the thicker disasters rained upon him, the more the ugly superstitious side of his character awoke. A frenzied anxiety seized him to propitiate his Maker, and save himself from another Blenheim or Malplaquet, by exterminating the enemies of the Church. This resolution was by no means weakened, when Father La Chaise died in 1709, and was succeeded by

Father Tellier (1643-1719), a Jesuit of blood and iron, who has been immortalised by Saint-Simon in one of the most repulsive portraits in literature. Almost immediately he persuaded the King to expel the few remaining nuns from Port-Royal, the Holy Place of Jansenism. In 1711 their cemetery was violated, and their convent buildings pulled down.

After Port-Royal came the turn of Quesnel. In the winter of 1711 Louis proposed to the Pope to condemn the *Réflexions* in the most solemn possible form. In 1713 appeared the Bull *Unigenitus*, a censure not only of all that Jansenism said, but of all that it had tried to say. Even Fénelon, although a warm admirer of the Bull, admits that popular opinion credited it with having condemned St Augustine, St Paul, and even Jesus Christ. It went altogether beyond the technical questions raised by Jansenism—notably when it dealt a heavy blow against the practice of Bible-reading lately sprung up among French Catholics, under the auspices of Bossuet quite as much as of Port-Royal. Hence the appearance of the Bull was the signal of a popular outcry; even some fifteen Bishops supported Noailles in refusing to accept it. The next two years were spent by the Court in a feverish endeavour to force it down their throats; Noailles was only saved from deposition by the death of Louis in 1715.

On the accession of the Regent Orleans bigotry at once gave place to cynical indifference. Orleans was a freethinker, and all he cared for was to keep the clergy quiet; hence he always sided with the stronger party, in the hope of crushing out the weaker. As the Bull was generally unpopular, he began by taking the part of its opponents; Tellier was got rid of, and Noailles became chief ecclesiastical adviser to the Court. But the Regent very soon found that he had underrated the strength of the Pope and the Ultramontanes; besides, his two chief Ministers—Dubois (1656-1723) and Fleury (1653-1743)—were ecclesiastics, and wanted a Cardinal's hat. The Regent accordingly swung round to the side of the Bull. Nothing daunted by this, its four most resolute opponents among the Bishops published an appeal from the Pope to a General Council (1717). After some wavering Noailles supported them; but in 1720 Dubois patched up a truce between him and the Pope. This really satisfied neither party, though it obtained for Dubois a red hat. But in 1723 both he and the Regent died, leaving Fleury to carry on their policy.

Meanwhile the appellant Bishops had "re-appealed" against the truce of 1720. So Fleury resolved to make an example of the most determined, Soanen of Senes (1647-1740). He was suspended from his functions, and exiled to a remote monastery in Auvergne. Noailles protested against his treatment; but soon afterwards he died (1629), characteristically signing two documents on his death-bed, one of which accepted the Bull, while the other rejected it. The chief appellant out of the way, Fleury proceeded to sharper measures. In 1730 Louis XV

proclaimed the *Unigenitus* part and parcel of the law of the land, and ordered all the clergy to accept it, on pain of deprivation. This edict the Parliament refused to register; and a bitter struggle ensued, which lasted throughout the eighteenth century. But the questions at stake were really Gallican, rather than religious. The lawyers called themselves Jansenists, because they hated the *Unigenitus*; but they hated it mainly as a triumph of their hereditary foes, the Jesuits and the Pope.

Genuine Jansenism only survived among the handful of "Quesnellists," and even they had fallen on evil days. Persecution can generally be trusted to induce hysteria in its victims, all the more so when they already accept a strong doctrine of conversion. Belief in one kind of miracle easily leads to belief in another; and even the great days of Port-Royal could furnish a long list of special providences, miracles, and signs. As Jansenism shrunk more and more to the proportions of a harassed sect, these were multiplied a hundredfold. About 1728 the "miracles of St Médard" became the talk of Paris. These were a series of astonishing cures, mostly of nervous diseases, effected at the tomb of the Deacon Paris, a cleric of singularly holy life, and a perfervid opponent of the *Unigenitus*. On mere miracles followed "speaking with tongues," and the rise of the "Convulsionaries." These worked themselves up, mainly by means of self-torture, into a state of frenzy, in which they prophesied and cured diseases. They were, however, soon disowned by the more serious Jansenists.

Banished from France, these had taken refuge in Holland, where the Catholic minority was in close sympathy with Jansenism. In 1702 it had broken loose from Rome, and was now organising itself into an independent "Old Roman Catholic" Church. But the old spirit of Port-Royal still lingered in many a convent and country parsonage in France, and led throughout the eighteenth century to chronic conflicts with authority. Often the causes of quarrel were trumpery enough, and Jansen's latter-day descendants by no means always showed themselves reasonable or broad-minded. Still, in their dim fashion they upheld the great principle of their school—that religion begins and ends as an inward "touch of the Spirit." And over the movements of that Spirit no Church has jurisdiction.

CHAPTER V.

THE STEWART RESTORATION.

THOUGH the restoration of Charles the Second was unconditional, it was none the less a compromise. The monarchy which was restored was not the purely personal rule which Charles I had endeavoured to establish, but the parliamentary monarchy which the statesmen of the Long Parliament had set up on its ruins in 1641. Theoretically the constitution as it existed in March, 1642, before the outbreak of the War came into force again as the basis of the new settlement. Practically any settlement must also contain some guarantee for the new interests which had developed during the last eighteen years, and it was only through Parliament that such security could be obtained. The Declaration of Breda had outlined such a scheme of settlement; but the extent to which the King's suggestions would be adopted depended upon the temper of the nation, or rather of the House of Commons, and on the statesmanship of the King and his Ministers.

Charles II was thirty years of age on the day when he reentered London; he was now in the twelfth year of his reign by right; but, as he had been for the last eleven a king without a kingdom, he possessed no experience of administration. While he had a large knowledge of men he had none of popular assemblies. Yet he had great popular gifts when he chose to exert them, and was at once pliable and persistent. In the vicissitudes of his life he had learnt to adapt himself to the exigencies of the moment, and to adopt without scruple any expedient which seemed necessary for success. His political aims were simple and varied little throughout his reign. He desired to make the Crown independent of Parliament, but in order to be free from control rather than from love of power. He took throughout a genuine interest in the development of the commercial and naval power of England, and in the extension of its colonies. In religion he was half a follower of Hobbes and half a Catholic—with a preference for toleration, based partly on policy and partly on indifference, but not strong enough to resist the pressure of circumstances. It would be unjust to say that his policy was purely

selfish, but in the long run personal considerations or family ties exercised a predominant influence on his political actions. At the end of his reign events gave him for a moment almost absolute power; but he used it with comparative moderation because he was resolved, as he said, "not to go on his travels again." At the beginning of his reign, when his position was infinitely less secure, the same motive was still stronger. Added to this, the King's pleasures made him incapable of prolonged attention to public business, and obliged him to devolve the burden of public affairs upon a Minister. "Naturally I am more lazy than I ought to be," Charles frankly confessed; but nature had given him great abilities, and he possessed a fund of dormant energy which time revealed.

Edward Hyde, who had been Lord Chancellor since 1658, and the King's chief adviser since 1652, became the ruling spirit of the Government. The hostility of the Presbyterian leaders and the intrigues of the Queen-Mother failed to overthrow his influence, and even the marriage of his daughter with the Duke of York in the end confirmed it. In November, 1660, he was raised to the peerage, and at the King's coronation in April, 1661, he was made Earl of Clarendon.

In most respects Clarendon was well fitted for his task. Upright, laborious and faithful to his master's interests, he did not shrink from maintaining them against Court intrigue or popular opposition, or the King's own fluctuating will. In his political aims he was consistent, in his choice of means a strict observer of legality. No man was better qualified to restore the reign of law after a period of revolution; but he very imperfectly appreciated the changes which that period had effected in the temper of the English nation. Intellectually he was a contrast to his master—a slow-moving mind, inaccessible to new ideas, and neither quick to grasp new conditions nor ready to adapt his policy to them. He could rebuild the constitution upon the old lines, but he was not the man to reconcile conflicting parties, and his settlement contained the seeds of future strife.

In Clarendon's conception of the constitution the most important organ was a well-composed Council. Through it rather than through Parliament the machine of government was to be animated and directed. The Privy Council formed in June, 1660, represented the union of parties which had brought about the restoration. Monck, now Duke of Albemarle, Montague and Cooper, both also raised to the peerage, Manchester, Robartes, and Saye, sat in it side by side with Hyde, Ormond, Nicholas, and Southampton. In this and in other branches of the administration the fact that the royalist nobles had long been debarred from the management of affairs, while the ex-rebels were frequently experienced officials, gave the latter a weight out of proportion to their comparative numbers.

As a preliminary to the legislative settlement of the kingdom it was

necessary first to confirm the authority of the Convention itself, which, since it had not been summoned by the King's writ, was not legally a Parliament. An Act "for removing all questions and disputes" on this point received the King's assent on June 11, 1660; and all the chief measures of the Convention were subsequently confirmed by an Act of the next Parliament which became law on July 8, 1661. The principle upon which the Convention proceeded in making the settlement of 1660 was the illegality of all the *de facto* Governments which had existed since 1642 and the invalidity of all their Acts. One exception only was made. On August 29 an Act for the confirmation of judicial proceedings since May 1, 1642, received the King's assent. But all the Acts and ordinances of the Long Parliament and its successors were swept away, none of them having received the assent of Charles I or his son. It was necessary, however, to reenact some few of these measures without delay. Hence an Act was passed for the confirmation of the civil marriages which had taken place under the provisions of the measure passed by the Little Parliament in 1653. To conciliate the commercial classes the Navigation Act of 1651 was reenacted with but slight modification. To conciliate the country gentry, the abolition of wardship and other feudal incidents, completed by Cromwell's second Parliament in 1656, was maintained by the passing of an Act which abolished the Court of Wards, tenures *in capite* and by knight's service, and purveyance. The King was compensated for the loss of revenue by a moiety of the excise on beer and other liquors.

A question which for political reasons was much more pressing was the confirmation of the amnesty promised in the Declaration of Breda. The Indemnity Bill led to a conflict between the two Houses in which the Lords urged more severity than the Commons were willing to permit, while Charles and Hyde intervened in favour of lenity. "Let it be in no man's power," said the King, "to charge me or you with a breach of our word or promise, which can never be a good ingredient to our future security." In the end, punishment fell almost exclusively upon the regicides. Thirteen suffered capitally—ten in 1660, and three who were subsequently captured in Holland in 1662—while about twenty-five were imprisoned for life. Three politicians deeply compromised in the later troubles, though not guilty of the King's death, were also excepted, Lambert and Heselrige being imprisoned for life, while Sir Henry Vane was tried and executed for high treason in June, 1662. "He is too dangerous a man to let live, if we can honestly put him out of the way," wrote Charles to Clarendon. For other persons the amnesty was complete and comprehensive, securing those who had fought against the Crown from judicial proceedings of any kind, though they were liable to be arrested and imprisoned whenever the Government suspected the existence of a plot.

Far more difficult to settle, though it provoked less public dispute,

was the question of the land settlement. A Bill for "the satisfaction of purchasers of public lands" failed to pass. The Crown lands and the jointure of the Queen-Mother were restored by a general vote. Newcastle, Buckingham, and a few favoured noblemen were restored by special Acts to the possession of all they had held before the wars began. The lands of other noblemen and gentlemen, whose estates had been confiscated and sold by the successive Governments of the revolutionary period, reverted to their original owners, on the ground that sales by an unlawful authority could give no valid title. The restitution of the lands of the Church, estimated to be worth £2,400,000, met with more delay. A Commission was appointed to mediate between the purchasers and the rightful owners; but no agreement was arrived at. In this case, as in other cases in which lands had been sold by the State, the purchasers received no compensation for their outlay, though some became leaseholders on more or less advantageous terms. Thus a sweeping transference of landed property took place throughout England, and those who had invested their money in public lands became permanently alienated from the new Government. While the sales made by the State were thus nullified, private contracts were rigidly maintained. But since the late Governments had usually punished political delinquents by fines, which often obliged them to sell parts of their estates to find the money, a large amount of land had changed hands in consequence of the war, and many royalist families were permanently impoverished. The Royalists would have had these sales also annulled, but failed to effect this, and since they received no compensation for their losses they too were alienated from the Government. Moreover the permanent feud between the Royalists who had sold their lands and the Roundheads who had bought them embittered English politics for the next generation, and underlay the later animosities of Whig and Tory.

Statesmanship might have done something to mitigate the hardships which this rough settlement of the land question caused; but with the rudimentary machinery of public credit which then existed any large measure of compensation for the sufferers was impossible. Moreover, England was on the brink of national bankruptcy. At the moment all the resources of the State were strained in order to pay off the army and navy. Besides the fleet, there were in England and Scotland about 35,000 troops to be disbanded, and both soldiers and sailors had been promised their arrears in full. Parliament voted about £850,000 for this purpose, of which £210,000 was raised by a poll-tax and the rest by monthly assessments. By February, 1661, the work was completed.

Simultaneously the general question of the revenue was taken in hand. On September 4, 1660, the House of Commons pledged itself to make up the income of the Government to the sum of £1,200,000 a year; but the various sources of revenue allocated for this purpose failed to produce their estimated yield, and in 1661 it became necessary

to increase the excise and to impose the hearth-tax (March, 1662) to make up the deficit. Even so the shrinkage in the revenue continued; and from the commencement of the reign the Government of Charles II had to struggle with pecuniary difficulties which were not of its own making. Burnet's story that Clarendon might have obtained a larger revenue for the King if he had asked for it, but that he preferred to keep Charles dependent upon Parliament, is a mere fiction.

The religious difficulty proved as hard to solve as the financial. At the moment when the King returned the probable solution seemed to be some kind of union between moderate Presbyterians and Episcopalians. The King's declaration had held out the prospect of "liberty to tender consciences," and promised that no man should be "disquieted or called in question" for differences of opinion in matters of religion, which did not disturb the peace of the kingdom. Since the King's assent was secure beforehand, nothing remained but to draw up an Act of Parliament "for the full granting of that indulgence." All that the Convention could achieve was, however, the passing of an Act for the restoration of ejected ministers to their livings and for the confirmation of the present holders of livings in cases where the rightful incumbent was dead. A Bill for the settlement of the true Protestant religion was read twice, but dropped in committee, and the matter was then referred to the King and such divines as he should select. The King then put forward a scheme of comprehension which he embodied in a Declaration published on October 25, 1660. Its basis was limited episcopacy. Bishops were to be assisted and advised in the exercise of their spiritual jurisdiction by elected presbyters. The liturgy was to be revised by a committee of divines of both parties selected by the King. Questions of ritual were to be determined by a future synod, and in the meantime certain ceremonial requirements were to be relaxed in the interest of scrupulous consciences. The Presbyterians were full of hope. Reynolds accepted a bishopric, and Baxter thought of accepting one. The scheme, said Baxter, "though not such as we desired was such as any honest sober minister might submit to." But when Sir Matthew Hale introduced a Bill for converting the declaration into law it was rejected on the second reading by 183 to 157 votes (November 20, 1660). Since courtiers and officials both voted with the Noes, it seems clear that the Government did not really desire the Bill to pass. Charles had ceased to take much interest in the scheme for comprehension since the opposition of the Presbyterian ministers had obliged him to omit a provision in favour of toleration. Hyde had determined that the restoration of monarchy should be accompanied by the restoration of episcopacy in its integrity, and that the Church should be put in the position which it held before the revolution. Thus the Anglican opposition had free play.

On December 29, 1660, the Convention Parliament was dissolved, and the work it left unfinished devolved on its successor. In the interim a conference took place in the Savoy between twelve Bishops and twelve Presbyterian divines, with eighteen assistants of lower rank. Baxter produced a brandnew liturgy and his colleagues a paper of objections to that already in existence. The Bishops gave in a list of fourteen minor concessions which they were prepared to make, and for the rest stood rigidly on the defensive. They said that they had nothing to do till their opponents had proved there was a necessity for alteration, which they had not yet done. Then followed a discussion, or rather a disputation, in which Baxter and Gunning were the protagonists. "Baxter and he," says Burnet, "spent some days in much logical arguing to the diversion of the town, who thought here were a couple of fencers engaged in a thread of disputes, that could never be brought to an end, nor have any good effect." So it proved, and at the close of the conference the commissioners reported that "the Church's welfare, unity and peace, and his Majesty's satisfaction, were ends on which they were all agreed; but as to the means they could not come to an harmony."

Before the Savoy Conference had ended the new Parliament which met on May 8, 1661, was at work. Few but thorough-going Royalists and Anglicans had found seats there, and its ardour for Crown and Church was difficult for the Government to control. In its temper it resembled the French *Chambre introuvable* of 1815, which was the product of a similar reaction and had to deal with like problems. But while the French Chamber lasted for but one year the English Parliament sat till January, 1679, and left a more lasting trace on the history of its country. In secular matters its views, for some years, were in harmony with those of the Government. Clarendon held that the late rebellion could never be extirpated and pulled up by the roots till the King's regal and inherent power should be fully avowed, and vindicated, and till the usurpations in both Houses of Parliament since the year 1640 were disclaimed and made odious. The first step which Parliament took to effect this was the passing of an Act "for the preservation of the King's person," in which it was affirmed that neither one House nor both together had any legislative power without the King. A second Act declared that the sole command of the militia and of all forces by sea and land belonged to the King, and that neither House had any claim to it, or could lawfully levy war against his Majesty. A third provided that no petition should be presented to the King by more than ten persons, and none which sought for the alteration of things established by law in Church or State should be circulated for signature unless it had been previously approved by the magistrates.

These measures were followed in December, 1661, by the Corporation

Act, which provided for purging the governing bodies in all corporate towns by the imposition of a double test. A declaration that the Covenant was an unlawful oath excluded the Nonconformists, while another that it was not lawful under any pretext to bear arms against the King shut out all political opponents of the Government. Next came a Press Act (May 19, 1662) establishing a rigid censorship, requiring a license for all new books, restricting the importation of printed matter from abroad, and reducing the number both of presses and printers. The reconstruction of the constitution was completed two years later by the repeal of the Triennial Act (April 5, 1664). Charles boldly told the two Houses that "he would never suffer a parliament to come together by the means prescribed in that bill," and the Commons obeyed, though not without some resistance. "There are many in the House displeased at it, though they dare not say much," noted Pepys. A clause was added to the Bill stipulating that thereafter the holding of Parliaments should not be intermitted above three years at the most, and this compromise disarmed the nascent opposition. Politically the House of Lords was still more reactionary than the Commons. If the majority could have had their will they would have repealed not only the Triennial Act but all the Acts passed in the first two sessions of the Long Parliament, and a committee reported in favour of the revival of the Star Chamber.

The same uncompromising spirit was shown in the ecclesiastical legislation of these three years 1661 to 1664. The Act by which the Long Parliament had disabled all persons in holy orders from exercising any temporal jurisdiction or authority was promptly repealed; and on November 20, 1661, the Bishops once more reappeared in the upper House. A second Act restored the disciplinary jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical Courts which the Long Parliament had abolished, and enabled them once more to punish blasphemies or excommunicate nonconformists for non-payment of tithes. In their zeal the Commons, without waiting for the Savoy Conference to end, took in hand the amendment of the Prayerbook and read three times a Bill for imposing it. Then the Government intervened and by the King's orders Convocation undertook the revision of the Prayerbook, which it completed in December, 1661. Some six hundred alterations were made, tending for the most part to make the liturgy less palatable to Puritans rather than to meet any of their objections. An addition which testified to the neglect of Church ordinances during the troubles was that of a form of baptism "for such as are of riper years," while the memory of civil discord was made more lasting by the insertion of services to be used on January 30 and May 29. During the spring of 1662 the revised Prayerbook was approved by the two Houses; and on May 19 the Act of Uniformity was passed, which imposed

on clergymen of every rank, on all Fellows of colleges and university officials, on all tutors and schoolmasters, a declaration of their unfeigned assent and consent to all that the Prayerbook contained. All were also obliged to take the non-resistance oath and the renunciation of the Covenant imposed in the Corporation Act. Those who did not comply with these conditions by St Bartholomew's Day next were to vacate their livings. When that date came (August 24, 1662) about 1100 or 1200 refused to conform; and, since it is probable that about 800 more had been deprived during the two years which had elapsed since the King's return, the total number of nonconformists ejected must have been about 2000. The Lords had wished to allow one-fifth of the income of a living to the ejected minister; the Commons rejected this provision. Hence, as Baxter says, "hundreds of able ministers, with their wives and children, had neither house nor bread." Since they were allowed neither to preach nor to teach, while the severity of the censorship made it difficult for them to earn their bread by writing, many were driven to maintain themselves by handicrafts or husbandry. Others became dependent on the charity of their late congregations.

The Act of Uniformity marked the close of a period in the history of the Church of England. The policy of comprehension was permanently defeated, and the half-hearted attempt to revive it after the Revolution only emphasised the final character of the decision made in 1662. For the best part of a century the Puritan party had striven to alter the government, the doctrine, and the ceremonial of the Church while remaining within it; henceforth it was outside the Church that Puritanism must seek to realise its ideals. For the next generation the question at issue was whether Puritanism, or rather Nonconformity as it had now come to be called, should be allowed to exist and to develop itself in freedom, or whether it should be suppressed by penal laws as Catholicism had been.

The King was pledged to a policy of toleration. During his exile he had promised the Pope and the Catholic Princes of Europe to repeal the penal laws; by the Declaration of Breda he had promised toleration to the Protestant Nonconformists. The King was honourably anxious to keep his pledges. He owed much to the Presbyterians for the share they had taken in his restoration, and still more to the English Catholics for their devoted loyalty during the war. But both Protestant Nonconformity and Catholicism were politically discredited, Catholicism by the Irish rebellion, Nonconformity by the English. Independency in all its forms was still more odious, and to talk of conscience had come to be regarded as an excuse for sedition. Public opinion looked back on the late times as a period when, in Dryden's words,

"Sanhedrin and priest enslaved the nation,
And justified their spoils by inspiration."

Both "hot Levites" and "dreaming saints" were equally distrusted, and Venner's rising in January, 1661, supplied a pretext for confounding Independents in general with Fifth Monarchy Men and Anabaptists.

Whilst the feeling of the nation was hostile to all who stood outside the pale of the national Church, Protestant Nonconformists in general regarded Catholics with hatred and suspicion, and Presbyterians felt a similar aversion from the extreme sects of Protestant Nonconformists. A period of common suffering was necessary in order to produce mutual tolerance. When the King's Declaration of October 25, 1660, was under discussion, it was proposed to add to it, on the petition of the Independents and Anabaptists, a proviso authorising those sects and others to meet together for public worship so long as they did not disturb the public peace. Baxter protested against toleration. As to Papists, all that was wanted was the enforcement of the laws against them. As to sectaries, he said, "we distinguish the tolerable parties from the intolerable." In consequence of this the clause was dropped. Presbyterians adhered too strongly to the idea of a national Church to throw in their lot with those who demanded religious freedom.

A similar failure followed the attempt of the Catholics to obtain toleration for themselves. Upon their petition the House of Lords on June 10, 1661, appointed a Committee to take the penal laws into consideration, and ordered a Bill for the relaxation of those laws to be prepared. But the Bill was never introduced, and the restoration of the Bishops to their seats in the Lords made its prospects hopeless.

For Catholics as for Protestant Nonconformists the only hope lay in the constancy of the King. On March 17, 1662, when the Act of Uniformity was under discussion, Clarendon presented on the King's behalf a proviso allowing Charles, if he thought fit, to exempt from deprivation ministers whose sole objection was to the wearing of the surplice and the use of the cross in baptism; but while the Lords accepted this proviso the Commons rejected it (April 22, 1662). After the passing of the Act the King made a renewed attempt. On the petition of the Nonconformists, which was backed by Albemarle and Manchester, he promised to suspend the execution of the Act for three months. But this plan was frustrated by the opposition of Clarendon and Archbishop Sheldon.

These schemes would have relieved Protestant Nonconformists only and done nothing for the Catholics. Under the influence of Bennett, who became Secretary of State in October, 1662, and of the Earl of Bristol, who assumed the leadership of the English Catholics, Charles issued on December 26, 1662, a declaration announcing his intention of exempting from the penalties of the Act of Uniformity peaceable persons whose conscientious scruples prevented them from conforming. Parliament was invited to pass an Act which would enable him to exercise "with a more universal satisfaction" his inherent dispensing power. "I am

in my nature," Charles told Parliament when it next met, "an enemy to all severity for religion and conscience, how mistaken soever it be, when it extends to capital and sanguinary punishments." Lord Robartes brought in an "Act concerning his Majesty's power in ecclesiastical affairs," which would enable the King by the issue of letters-patent to grant dispensations from the Act of Uniformity and from other laws requiring oaths and subscriptions of the same kind (February 23, 1663). It was read twice in the House of Lords, but met with great opposition. While Lord Ashley spoke strongly in its favour, Clarendon was vehement against it. The Lords limited the operation of the Bill to Protestant Nonconformists; the Commons protested against it, declaring that it would "establish schism by law." Both Houses together presented a petition for the enforcement of the laws against the Catholics, and the Bill was consequently dropped.

Charles was, in Clarendon's phrase, "infinitely troubled" by this defeat. His feeling in favour of toleration was sincere, if not very deep, and it is significant that the passage of the Act of Uniformity was accompanied by a proclamation for the release of imprisoned Quakers (August 22, 1662). In the colonies he could carry his intentions into effect. The charters of Rhode Island and Carolina, the instructions to the Governors of Jamaica and Virginia, attest the King's tolerant policy. But at home the sons of Levi were too strong for him. After this, according to Clarendon, Charles never treated any of the Bishops with the respect he had formerly showed them, and often spoke of them slightly.

For the same reason the King was angry with Clarendon himself. The Chancellor had been in favour of comprehension in a general way, and had at first sought to conciliate the Presbyterians. But when he found the slight concessions he thought sufficient ineffectual he declared it useless to concede anything. "Their faction," said he, "is their religion." In the same way Clarendon would have been glad if the Act of Uniformity had been less rigorous, but when it was passed he thought that it ought to be obeyed without any connivance, and he was still more opposed to a systematic plan of toleration based upon the dispensing power. In spite of his protests he was credited with inspiring the opposition to the Bill, and its promoters, who were also his rivals, made the most of the charge with the King. Clarendon's power seemed shaken. The Earl of Bristol seized the opportunity to bring forward a charge of high treason against him (July 10, 1663), but the accusation was ill managed, and the articles extravagant and ill supported. Amongst other things Bristol alleged that Clarendon had said that the King was popishly inclined and that he intended to legitimate the Duke of Monmouth—suggestions which it was so undesirable to put into circulation that Charles declared the charge a libel against himself and his Government. Bristol was ruined instead of Clarendon.

From this time forward Clarendon's favour with the King sensibly diminished, but his retention of power depended now more on Parliament than the King. Parliament, and in it the House of Commons, was more and more the dominant factor in determining the policy of the State. In 1660 the nation had surrendered itself unconditionally to the King. "We submit and oblige ourselves and our posterities to your Majesty for ever," said the Commons; but in reality the last twenty years had but strengthened the resolution of England to control its own fate. Foreign observers who visited England after the Restoration noted with wonder the keen interest which all classes of the people took in public affairs. In this country, reported the French ambassadors in 1665, every man thinks he has a right to talk about matters of State. Even the watermen, as they rowed the Lords to Westminster, would try to get them to speak about the political questions of the day. What happened at Court was the continual subject of debate in the City. "As they are naturally lazy," says another traveller, "and spend half their time taking tobacco, they are all the while exercising their talents about the Government; talking of new customs, of the chimney-tax, the management of the public finances and the lessening of trade." All this activity of public opinion outside stimulated Parliament to assert itself. "Let the King come in," said Harrington in 1660, "and let him call a Parliament of the greatest cavaliers in England, so they be men of estates, and let them sit but seven years, and they will all turn commonwealthsmen." The prediction was not yet fulfilled; but there were signs that it was on its way to fulfilment. Inevitably something of the spirit which animated the Long Parliament of Charles I passed into the Long Parliament of Charles II. During the civil troubles first one branch of government, then another, had fallen under the control of the House of Commons. It had assumed not only the legislative power but the direct control of the executive. All the different functions of administration had been taken charge of by its committees; all the highest questions of policy had been subjected to its decision. Men might change and principles might change, but such an experience could not be forgotten, and the increasing independence and growing claims of the House of Commons testified its consciousness of its past. King and Minister were alike obliged in the long run to yield to its pressure. What Charles wished to do became a minor question. The King of France, wrote Courtin to Lionne in 1665, can make his subjects march as he pleases; but the King of England must march with his people. What Clarendon thought best for the King's service was more and more liable to be overruled, and he was obliged to conform himself, though not without a struggle, to the views of Parliament.

Accordingly, Parliament proceeded to complete its ecclesiastical settlement by a series of measures for the complete suppression of Nonconformity. An Act specially directed against the Quakers had

been passed in May, 1662. If five or more of them met for worship they were to be fined five pounds each or three months' imprisonment for the first offence, ten pounds or six months for a second, and to be banished to the Plantations on a third conviction. In 1664 this Act was strengthened and extended to Presbyterians and Independents in general, under the pretext that their assemblies were "the seedplots and nurseries of seditious opinions." A conventicle was defined as a meeting of more than five persons over and above the members of a household; conviction was facilitated, and offenders who could not pay the cost of their own transportation to the colonies were to serve five years as indentured labourers; transported convicts who escaped or returned to England before the expiration of their sentence were to suffer death as felons. A year later came the Five Mile Act, which aggravated the lot of ejected nonconformist ministers by prohibiting them from residing within five miles of any corporate town or teaching in any public or private school, unless they had taken a test. The test consisted of the non-resistance oath imposed by the Corporation Act, with the additional pledge not to "endeavour at any time any alteration of government either in Church or State." This closed the series of measures which some historians have dubbed "the Clarendon Code." Clarendon approved of the Conventicle Act; his attitude with regard to the Five Mile Act is uncertain. The King's compliance was due to his pecuniary necessities.

The growing power of Parliament was not only shown by the fact that it forced its ecclesiastical policy upon the King. It influenced both the relations of England to the rest of the British Isles, and still more its relation to Europe.

The settlement of Scotland and Ireland had proceeded *pari passu* with that of England. In both kingdoms the restoration of the old constitution in 1660 entailed the restoration of their separate Parliaments, and the undoing of the legislative union which Cromwell had effected. Equality of commercial privileges perished with the Cromwellian union or survived it only for a short time. The Navigation Act of 1660 excluded Scotland from the benefits of the colonial trade, though it included Ireland. The Act for the encouragement of English trade passed in 1663 imposed a heavy tax on the importation of Scottish cattle and sheep; Scottish corn was practically excluded, Scottish salt ere long heavily burdened.

Clarendon hints that the King might have done well to maintain the Union with Scotland, but that he "would not build according to Cromwell's models." In Ireland Charles had to do this, whether he would or not. The Cromwellian settlement rested on a solid legal basis, since the last acts to which Charles I had given his assent before the civil war began were a series of measures confiscating the lands of the Irish rebels, in order to pay the cost of reducing that country. The new colonists were in possession; all the machinery of government was in their

hands, and English public opinion was unanimous in their support. Despite the King's obligations to the Irish Catholics, despite his pity for "the miserable condition of the Irish nation," all he could do was to restore a few favoured individuals to their estates, and induce the soldiers and the Adventurers to submit to a slight reduction of their share of the land for the benefit of the dispossessed. On the other hand, the commercial jealousy which found expression in the restrictions placed by England upon Scottish trade was still more strongly felt with regard to Irish. In 1663 Irish shipping was entirely excluded from the colonial trade. In 1666 the importation of Irish cattle, sheep and swine, alive or dead, was totally prohibited. The latter Act led to a long struggle between the country gentlemen who backed it and the Government. The King yielded under compulsion; the House of Lords resisted stubbornly, and became involved in a heated controversy with the Commons; Clarendon sacrificed the last shreds of his popularity with the country party in his endeavour to maintain the prosperity of Ireland and the rights of the upper House and the King against the encroachments of the Commons. But the lower House would hear of no compromise; as in the case of the ecclesiastical statutes, so in that of economic statutes, they refused to leave any loophole for the exercise of the King's dispensing power, and carried the day. "The House of Commons," commented Clarendon, "seemed much more morose and obstinate than it had formerly appeared to be, and solicitous to grasp as much power and authority as any of their predecessors had done."

English foreign policy during the period between the Restoration and the close of 1664 developed upon similar lines; that is, its control passed by degrees from the hands of the King and his Ministers into the hands of the Parliament. Clarendon's policy, as stated by himself, was straightforward and intelligible. "He laboured nothing more than that his Majesty might enter into a firm peace with all his neighbours, as most necessary for the reducing his own dominions into that temper of subjection and obedience as they ought to be in." At first sight it seemed easy to attain this modest aim. The fact that the King was restored without the interposition of any foreign Power appeared to leave him free to follow what policy he pleased. It is true that Charles was personally pledged by his treaty with Spain in April, 1656, that when he recovered his throne he would abandon Jamaica and other possessions in the West Indies acquired since 1630, and would assist Philip IV to regain Portugal. But it might be argued that the King's restoration without Spanish aid freed him from these stipulations. England was still nominally at war with Spain when the King returned; but a formal cessation of hostilities was proclaimed on September 10, 1660. But Charles turned a deaf ear to the Spanish demands for the restoration of Jamaica and Dunkirk. Parliament was firm on that point; and a Bill for annexing both places in perpetuity to the Crown of England

passed the House of Commons on September 11, 1660. Their retention rendered an agreement with Spain impossible; the old treaty of November 15, 1630, was republished, but hostilities in the West Indies still continued, and in October, 1662, an expedition from Jamaica took and destroyed Santiago de Cuba. A new treaty of peace and commerce was not signed till May, 1667, and the American quarrels were not settled till July, 1670.

During the same period Charles instead of assisting Spain to recover Portugal adopted exactly the opposite policy. England had from the first favoured Portuguese independence. In 1642 Charles I signed a treaty with Portugal securing great privileges for English merchants, which were further increased by Cromwell's treaty with Portugal in 1654. Blake's fleet helped to preserve Portugal from the navy of Spain, and Cromwell's diplomacy laboured to compose her quarrel with Holland. On the very eve of the Restoration, in April, 1660, the English Council of State signed a treaty permitting Portugal to levy 12,000 men in England. It was natural therefore that Portugal, abandoned by Louis XIV at the Treaty of the Pyrenees, should turn to Charles II for aid as soon as he was restored to his throne. In the summer of 1660 Francisco de Mello, the Portuguese ambassador, proposed a match between Charles and the Infanta Catharine, daughter of John IV, and sister of the reigning king Alfonso VI. As an inducement he offered the cession of Tangier and Bombay, commercial privileges and complete liberty of conscience for English merchants, and a dowry of two million *crusados*. The Cromwellian statesmen in the King's council, Albemarle and Sandwich, were strongly in favour of the proposed alliance; Ormond and Hyde, the heads of the cavalier section, approved it; Bristol, the leader of the Catholic party, worked hard with the aid of the Spanish ambassador to prevent its acceptance. The treaty was signed on June 23, 1661; the marriage followed on May 21, 1662. England became pledged to assist Portugal with 2000 foot, 1000 horse, and ten ships of war until her independence was attained. Old soldiers were not difficult to find at the moment; the removal of the Cromwellian garrisons in Scotland, which took place about the end of 1661, supplied an organised body of infantry, whilst Irish Catholics who had served the King in Flanders helped to furnish the cavalry. Both did good service; in the battles of Amegial (June 8, 1663) and Montes Claros (June 17, 1665) the English contingent bore a large part in winning the victory. English diplomacy, too, represented by Fanshawe, Southwell and Sandwich, worked indefatigably on behalf of Portugal until the treaty of February 13, 1668, secured its independence.

By retaining Cromwell's conquests from Spain and by assisting Portugal Charles returned to Cromwell's foreign policy, though he succeeded in avoiding open war with Spain. At the same time he naturally drew nearer to France. At first he had testified his resentment of

These quarrels retarded the treaty between England and the United Provinces which had been set on foot in 1661 and was not concluded till September, 1662. It settled the long disputes about freedom of fishing and the salute of the British flag, but it left two outstanding questions undetermined. One was the question of the compensation claimed by the owners of two English ships taken by the Dutch in 1643, the other was the question of the restoration of Pularoon, one of the Spice Islands. The Dutch had expelled the English from it about 1620; and the verdict of the arbitrators appointed under the treaty of April 5, 1654, had adjudged it to England. The new treaty promised that the long-delayed transfer should be effected; but when one of the ships of the English East India Company arrived with authority to take possession the Dutch Governor refused to give it up. Besides this breach of faith, there were fresh complaints of the capture of English ships in the East Indies and the forcible obstruction of English traders in West Africa. Reprisals inevitably followed. Shortly after the Restoration Charles had granted letters-patent for the formation of the Royal African Company (December 18, 1660), to which he subsequently granted a charter (June 10, 1663). The Duke of York was the special patron of the company and one of its founders. At his instigation in October, 1663, Robert Holmes, with a small squadron, was sent to the African coast to protect the trade of the company against the Dutch, which he effected by capturing most of the Dutch stations there. England had also shadowy claims on the territories occupied by the Dutch West India Company in America. On March 12, 1664, Charles granted to his brother James a patent for Long Island and the whole country between the Connecticut and Delaware rivers. In May a small expedition under Colonel Nicolls set sail from Portsmouth to put the Duke in possession.

Throughout 1664 the war-feeling in England grew stronger and stronger. In April the Turkey Company and the East India Company presented complaints to Parliament claiming that damages to the amount of £714,000 had been inflicted upon them by the Dutch, and the two Houses petitioned the King to take effectual measures to obtain redress. In October and the following months de Ruyter recaptured the English possessions on the Gold Coast. In December an English squadron under Allen attacked the Dutch Smyrna fleet. War was declared on March 14, 1665.

Charles II was pushed into war by his people and by his brother. "I never saw so great an appetite to war as is in both this town and country, especially in the parliament men," he wrote to the Duchess of Orleans on June 2, 1664. "I find myself almost the only man in my kingdom who doth not desire war," he added three months later. Clarendon too was notoriously opposed to war; but, like his master, he was obliged to follow the current. When the English Government saw that war was inevitable, it began to look round for allies. Fanshawe

was sent to Madrid and Southwell to Lisbon, to negotiate a truce between Spain and Portugal, and if possible an offensive and defensive league with Spain. Sir Gilbert Talbot was sent to Denmark, and Henry Coventry to Sweden, to secure the aid of those Powers against the Dutch. Lord Carlingford went to Vienna to propose to the Emperor Leopold a league between England and the House of Habsburg; Sir Walter Vane was despatched to Berlin to gain the support of the Elector of Brandenburg. But the only ally England could obtain was the Bishop of Münster, who offered his services in return for a subsidy, made a treaty with Charles II on June 13, 1665, and invaded Holland two months later. All this diplomatic activity was frustrated by the attitude of Louis XIV. On April 27, 1662, he had signed an alliance with Holland by which he was pledged, if Holland were attacked, to aid the Dutch with 12,000 men, and to declare war against its assailant within four months. Charles was badly served by Lord Holles, his ambassador at Paris, and neither realised the precise nature of the engagements of Louis to the Dutch nor the political motives which swayed the French King. Through his sister he endeavoured in vain to procure the support of the French King, or at least his neutrality, and argued that since the Dutch were in reality the aggressors, Louis was not bound to help them. It was all in vain. Louis had no love for the Dutch, but, in view of his designs against the Spanish Netherlands, their future neutrality was necessary to him; nor was he disposed to overthrow their maritime and commercial power for the benefit of England. When the war broke out he sent two extraordinary ambassadors to England in April, 1665, to endeavour to mediate, and sought through his diplomacy to prevent other Powers from taking part in the war. The death of Philip IV of Spain (September 17, 1665) somewhat altered the situation, since an agreement between England and Holland might hinder the designs of Louis on the Netherlands, and its prolongation might facilitate their execution. Accordingly he sent an auxiliary force to the aid of the Dutch, which drove the Münster forces out of Holland, and declared war against England on January 26, 1666. The result was decisive. The King of Denmark, guaranteed by France against any danger from Sweden, allied himself with the Dutch on February 11, 1666. The Elector of Brandenburg on February 16, 1666, made a treaty with the Dutch, promising to aid them with 12,000 men. England's only ally, the Bishop of Münster, threatened alike by France and Brandenburg, made his peace with the Dutch on April 18. Sweden, which had been on the point of forming a league with England, declared itself neutral on July 17, and offered its mediation in the quarrel. Finally, on October 25, 1666, Holland, Denmark, Brandenburg, and the Dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg formed what was known as the "Quadruple Alliance" for mutual defence. The diplomatic defeat of England was complete.

At sea during the same period, in spite of some reverses, England had more than held its own. The details of the naval war are related elsewhere. Southwold Bay (June 3, 1665) was a great victory, and the repulse at Bergen (August 16, 1665) had been compensated by the capture of many Dutch ships during the next few months. The battle of June 1-4, 1666, was a defeat, but it was avenged by the victory of July 25, and by the burning of the Dutch merchantmen in the Vlie on August 8. In the West Indies Jamaica and Barbados were two strongholds from which English expeditions sallied forth against the Dutch or the French. Privateers from Jamaica captured St Eustatia, Santa Saba, and Tobago in 1665. In 1666 fortune turned the other way. Antigua, Montserrat, and the English half of St Christopher's fell into the hands of the French, and Surinam was captured by the Dutch.

On the other hand, the internal condition of England at the close of 1666 was extremely unfavourable. The strain of the war had been aggravated by two extraordinary calamities. The plague, which raged in London during the summer and autumn of 1665, swept away nearly 70,000 persons out of a population of rather less than half a million. It was still raging in the eastern and south-eastern counties during the first half of 1666, and in Colchester alone between 4000 and 5000 persons perished from it. In September, 1666, came the Great Fire of London, which is said to have destroyed 13,200 houses and reduced two-thirds of the capital to smouldering ruins. Throughout England there was wide-spread discontent, with complaints of heavy taxes, and of abuses. "The nation," said an anonymous letter addressed to Charles himself, "are ready with every puff of wind to rise up in arms because of the oppression that is laid upon them." There were rumours of conspiracies for the restoration of the Republic. Ludlow, Algernon Sidney, and other exiled republicans were summoned to Amsterdam. It was said that the Dutch Government intended "to relieve the good people," and that Dutch statesmen had at last come to see that their government could not long subsist if monarchy continued in England. De Witt suggested that Louis XIV should seize a convenient port in Ireland, and call on that people to shake off the English yoke. In Scotland there was still greater danger. The war with Holland had closed the only remaining market for Scotch merchandise; and in the western shires, exasperated by religious persecution, a general rising would certainly have followed any landing of the Dutch troops. The Pentland rising showed the temper of the Whigs; and its suppression at Rullion Green on November 27, 1666, was a piece of undeserved good fortune for the Government.

The real difficulty of Charles the Second's Ministers, however, was not the political, but the financial, situation. The King's ordinary revenue, nominally £1,200,000 a year, was really about £900,000, and he was in debt before the war began. In June, 1664, at the first threat of war,

he had to borrow £100,000 from the City of London in order to equip a fleet for sea. Parliament voted large sums for the expenses of the war. In December, 1664, it imposed a "Royal Aid" of £2,477,500, to be raised by a monthly assessment during the next three years beginning in January, 1665. In October, 1665, it voted an additional aid of £1,250,000, to be levied in the next two years beginning in January, 1666. Thus during 1665 the monthly assessment levied was £68,500 per month, while during 1666 and 1667 it rose to £120,000 per mensem, which was what the Long Parliament had raised during the first Dutch War. But this sum was far from sufficient. The expenses of the navy between September 1, 1664, and September 29, 1666, came to £3,200,000, and of that sum about £900,000 was still owing. About £238,000 had been spent in subsidies to the Bishop of Münster, whose services had proved a very insufficient return. The deficiency was freely attributed to malversation in high places. It was reported that since the war began £400,000 had been diverted from the service of the State to the Privy Purse, and people said: "Give the King the Countess of Castlemaine, and he cares not what the people suffers." In reality Charles was not to blame for the deficit. No doubt he was extravagant in his private pleasures, but the embarrassments of the State were due to other causes. The new taxes should have been imposed when the preparations for war began, not months after war had broken out. They dribbled in slowly; not a penny of the "Royal Aid" voted in December, 1664, reached the Exchequer till April, 1665. They brought in less than their estimated yield; the "Royal Aid" fell short by about £85,000; the "additional aid" by about £100,000. The Government had to borrow money from bankers at high rates for its daily expenditure, and it could only borrow with great difficulty. For there was no efficient way of anticipating the receipts of taxes already voted by borrowing on the credit of them, nor was the device of funding the debts of the State and assigning certain revenues to provide the interest due upon them as yet naturalised in England. In both respects the Dutch Government had a great advantage over the English. Not only were the United Provinces a far richer country, in which the rate of interest was much lower than it was in England and the available capital much larger, but the whole machinery of public finance was more highly developed, so that the Dutch could bear with comparative ease the burden of a war expenditure which was crushing to an economically more backward nation.

When Parliament met in September, 1666, it resolved to raise £1,800,000 for the King's service; but long disputes followed before the method of raising the sum could be agreed upon. Eventually it was determined to raise £1,256,000 by a monthly assessment beginning in January, 1667, and a poll-tax which was expected to produce £500,000, but really brought in only half that sum. At the same time the House

of Commons proceeded to claim the control of the finances of the State. Already in 1665, when the House voted the additional aid of £1,250,000, a proviso had been introduced into the Bill requiring that the money raised should be applicable only to the purposes of the war. But now, besides the right of appropriating supplies, it claimed the right of examining into their expenditure, and sent up a Bill nominating commissioners to inspect the public accounts. The King opposed it as an encroachment on his prerogative, and the House of Lords backed him. In the end, Parliament was prorogued before the Bill was perfected (February 8, 1667), and Charles, at the suggestion of the Lords, appointed commissioners of his own choice to carry out the proposed examination (March, 1667). With insufficient supplies and with a quarrel with the Commons on his hands, the King was left to face the difficulties of the next year's war.

In this extremity the King's Council adopted a plan full of peril. It was resolved to stand entirely upon the defensive; to lay up the great ships, and to send nothing but squadrons of light frigates to sea during the next year; to suffer the sailors who should have manned the fleet to take service on board merchantmen; to fortify Sheerness and other places in order to protect the ships in the river. No other course seemed open: there was no money in hand either to repair the ships, or victual them, or pay their crews. To the King and his political advisers it seemed a safe and economical way out of their difficulties. Peace seemed close at hand. Overtures had been made by the Dutch in the latter part of 1666, and in the spring of 1667 Charles had three negotiations on foot. There was a public one through the Swedish mediators, which ended on March 18, with an agreement for a general treaty to take place at Breda. There was a secret attempt set on foot by Lisola, the Imperial ambassador, to bring England and Holland to terms, in order that both might league themselves with the House of Habsburg for the defence of the Spanish Netherlands. Finally, through St Albans and the Queen-Mother, Charles was privately treating with France on the basis of the restoration of the French conquests in the West Indies, in return for the complicity of England in the attack on the Netherlands. In April the two Kings concluded their bargain, and in May the French army invaded Flanders.

In the same month the negotiations at Breda began. It was agreed that both England and Holland should keep their conquests; and after Charles had at last abandoned the demand for the restoration of Pularoon nothing but minor questions remained to be settled. Over these questions the English envoys at Breda, Holles and Coventry, haggled and delayed. The King felt secure. Now that he had agreed with France the Dutch would be obliged to come to his terms; and either Louis would prevent the Dutch fleet from putting to sea, or the preparations made would be sufficient to repel them. On the other hand the Dutch, who

had refused to agree to a cessation of arms, were eager for peace, and their eagerness was increased by the French invasion of the Netherlands. De Witt resolved, by a sudden and decisive blow, to prevent the prolongation of the negotiations, and enforce the conclusion of peace. The appearance of de Ruyter's fleet in the Thames, and the burning of the ships in the Medway on June 13, were the result not only of a strategic blunder but of diplomatic incompetence. The story of the disaster itself is told in a later chapter. Peace was signed at Breda six weeks later on the terms which the Dutch had offered in May (July 31, 1667). Charles had made up his mind to accept them before the Dutch fleet sailed, and de Witt with wise moderation did not attempt to raise his demands.

In England public feeling, exasperated by the national disgrace, demanded satisfaction. Men said in private that Clarendon and Arlington, who were responsible for the King's foreign policy, with Sir George Carteret and Sir William Coventry, who were responsible for the administration of the navy, were to be sacrificed. Nothing but some concession to the Nonconformists would put an end to domestic discontents; there must be a severe inquisition into the late miscarriages, and Parliament must take the whole management of affairs into its own hands. When Parliament met the first demand made was for the disbanding of the newly raised forces (July 15); for the fear of a standing army had become one of the dominant instincts of all English politicians. When the Cromwellian army was disbanded the intention was to leave Charles II with no forces but his guards and a few companies scattered through various garrisons. But Venner's rising in January, 1661, showed the need for more troops, and Monck's regiment was continued in arms under the name of the Coldstream Guards. The withdrawal of the garrison of Dunkirk added a second battalion to the King's own regiment, so that by 1663 Charles had a standing force of about 3400 foot and 1000 horse, quite apart from the troops in Scotland and Ireland and the garrison of Tangier. Each addition had excited the jealousy of Parliament, and the war caused a further increase. Three regiments of foot and 23 troops of horse were added during 1665 and 1666, while in June, 1667, 12,000 more foot and 2400 horse were raised to resist the threatened Dutch landing. Charles had over 20,000 armed men at his disposal, and it was freely reported that he meant to rule by a standing army, and to assimilate the government of England to that of France. Public opinion regarded the Duke of York as the man who had pressed this design upon the King, and Clarendon as his tool. There was some colour for the charge against the Chancellor. At the end of June, 1667, he had combated the proposal to summon Parliament, and had urged a dissolution and the calling of a new Parliament in the autumn. In Council he had advised that the newly raised forces should be supported by levying contributions on the counties in money or in

provisions, so long as the present emergency lasted. The belief that Clarendon sought to alter the Constitution was without foundation; yet, since his constitutional ideas were incompatible with the claim which Parliament now made, its leaders were right in regarding him as their enemy. Appropriation of supplies, audit of accounts, control of the armed forces of the nation, all appeared to him encroachments which the King must resist to the last.

Clarendon was likewise regarded as the inspirer of the King's foreign policy, though in reality he was merely its instrument. English opinion attributed the Chatham disaster as much to French intrigue as Dutch arms, watched with rising hostility the progress of the French in the Netherlands, and blamed the Minister for subserviency to France. The ambassadors of Austria and Spain fanned the flame, and sought to overthrow one whom they regarded as the creature of Louis XIV. Had the Commons sat a day longer an address in favour of a league with the House of Habsburg and a war with France would have been presented to the King.

For the moment the sudden prorogation of Parliament (July 29) saved Clarendon from direct attack; but it still more embittered parliamentary feeling against him, because it seemed a personal insult to the members. It did not diminish the King's difficulties. Charles was obliged to disband the newly raised forces because the conclusion of peace left him no excuse for maintaining them. He was obliged to dismiss Clarendon because his retention would make peace at home impossible, and on August 30 the Chancellor, by the King's order, gave up the Great Seal. Clarendon, in his autobiography, attributes his fall to personal reasons. He had been too bold with his master; he had told him plainly that he had no prerogative to make vice virtue; the courtiers and the mistress had poisoned the King's ears; this phrase had been misconstrued and that act intentionally misrepresented. But the real reason lay much deeper. It was true that the King had outlived any personal attachment to his Minister, but he also perceived that the situation demanded Ministers who possessed the confidence of Parliament. It was not possible, he told Ormond, to keep Clarendon, "and to do those things with the Parliament that must be done or the government will be lost." Clarendon did not realise this. "Parliaments," he told Charles in his last interview, "were not formidable unless the King chose to make them so; it was yet in his own power to govern them, but if they found it was in theirs to govern him, nobody knew what the end would be." Nobody knew better than the King that the first half of the sentence was a fundamental misconception; as to the second, Charles felt that it was easier to out-manceuvre Parliament than to fight it. In the seven years which had passed since he reentered London statecraft had come to mean not the steady pursuit of a well-considered policy, but the art of managing Parliament. And more and more Parliament signified the House of

Commons, "a beast not to be understood," because there were yet no definite parties, and because no machinery had yet been devised for securing cooperation between the executive and the legislative.

When Parliament met, the King yielded all the points at issue. He had already disbanded the newly raised forces; he now assented to the Bill appointing Parliamentary Commissioners to examine the public accounts (December 19, 1667), and permitted a searching enquiry into the naval miscarriage of the late war. But, though Charles promised never to employ Clarendon again, his enemies were not satisfied, and drew up articles of impeachment for high treason against the fallen Minister. The Lords refused to commit Clarendon, on the ground that the articles accused him of treason in general only, and did not specify any particular treason. There followed a complete breach between the two Houses. The Commons voted that the refusal of the Lords was an obstruction of the public justice of the kingdom. In the meantime Clarendon, hearing that Parliament was to be prorogued, and that he was to be tried by a special Court erected for the purpose, took the King's advice and fled the kingdom. The two Houses ordered the vindication he left behind him to be burnt, and passed an Act which banished him for life, and made his pardon impossible without their consent.

In dismissing Clarendon Charles had submitted to the will of Parliament—not for the first time, but more conspicuously than he had done before. But he did not feel that he had permanently surrendered any portion of his royal power. His concessions seemed to him, in his own words, rather "inconvenient appearances than real mischiefs." His new Ministers were his own choice, not imposed upon him by Parliament. The removal of Clarendon was the removal of a check upon his freedom of action; and in his heart Charles agreed with the courtier who told him that he was now King, which he never had been before. He began to meditate large projects at home and abroad, and initiated a policy of his own which was distinct from the official policy of his Government.

Clarendon lived until 1674 an exile in France. He spent the last years of his life in compiling a vindication of his political career, and in revising the exposition of constitutional royalism, which ultimately became the *History of the Rebellion*. The fundamental principle of that creed was the necessity of the union of Church and State. Clarendon's great political achievement had been the realisation of that principle by reuniting Parliamentary Government and the Anglican Church after they had been separated by the Civil War. One might almost say that the unconditional restoration of the old Church was the work of Clarendon, as the unconditional restoration of monarchy was the work of Monck. But, in achieving his purpose, Clarendon failed to perceive that toleration had become necessary to the peace of the nation, and his error led to the fall of the House of Stewart.

CHAPTER VI.

THE LITERATURE OF THE ENGLISH RESTORATION, INCLUDING MILTON.

THE Renaissance did not bear its perfect fruit in England till late. Long after in Italy it had been defeated in its protracted struggle with the reactionary element in the Church, it continued in England to find fuller expression not only in the minds but in the characters of men. In the Florence of Milton's day the spirit of the Renaissance lingered only in the intellectual pastimes of the Academies. In England, where the study of the classics continued hand in hand with that of the Bible, the freedom won refused to stop short at the acquirement of mental elegance. It embraced the whole man, raising before him an ideal of life and conduct largely Hebraic in its consciousness of duty to a Deity who had selected a nation (and, according to some, here and there a person) for favour. At the same time, the chivalric ideals were not dead. The memory of Sir Philip Sidney, the Elizabethan perfect knight, was still active; Dante and Petrarch, "lofty fables and romances," and *The Faerie Queene*, were still consulted for moral guidance as well as for pleasure. And the study of the classics had encouraged certain notions of the Stoic philosophy, which were assimilated into the ideal. Of this ideal, the result of the joint action of Reformation and Renaissance, John Milton in his early years was the supreme example. That there were others, Mrs Hutchinson's record of the youth of her husband, who was born seven years after Milton, helps to show. There was little in it of what we now imply by the name Puritan. The arts were freely practised. Milton, who inherited a love of music from his father, preserved it to the end of his life and formed a friendship with Henry Lawes, a Court musician. And the great heritage—as it had already come to be—of Elizabethan imagination as lavished in the Elizabethan drama was in his youth still a matter of glory, not, as it became later, of shame. If Milton hissed academical comedies at Cambridge, he hissed them not because they were stage-plays, but because they were silly. If he wrote nothing for a theatre which had already begun to show signs of decadence and immorality, he wrote (and that not long after the publication of *Histriomastix*) two masques for performance, meditated

for many years the composition of a Biblical or historical drama, and published, within three years of his death, a tragedy. His austerity was not that of a hatred, but of a severe choice, of pleasure. An intellectual and moral aristocrat, he disliked, not art, but vulgarity.

The humanist and the Puritan are often spoken of as two elements at war in Milton. Rightly regarded, they would rather seem to be interdependent, forming together the peculiar and beautiful result of the interaction of Reformation and Renaissance. So early as 1630 we find the two wrought into perfect harmony in the poem, *At a solemn musick*. The time was to come when they would be forced into opposition. Meanwhile, the youthful Milton is almost, if not entirely, such a man as he has been declared to have been—one who would not unnaturally have sided with the Cavaliers against the Puritans. His disinclination to take Orders may have been due partly to his inherited Calvinism, and his dislike of the growing Arminianism which followed Laud's elevation to the archbishopric; the final motive seems to have been his desire to reserve himself for something higher. He retired to his father's house at Horton, and there, while preparing for a greater task, he wrote, among other things, two poems, *L'Allegro* and *Il Penseroso* (1633 c.), which bring back into a world of decadence and barren conceits (conceits which his manuscripts prove him to have been at pains to avoid) something of the freshness of the Spenserian time, but chastened, scholarly, and informed with the constant suggestiveness of classical allusion. The poems paint nature as seen through two moods in the mind of a young scholar; they foreshadow, too, the coming conflict between those moods as expressed in Cavalier and Roundhead. To the same years of preparation belong the two masques, *Arcades* (1633 c.) and *Comus* (1634). The former is a work of the Jonsonian type: the latter is more interesting, not only for its superior poetry, but for the vision of the age that shows through it. *Comus* has been described as a double allegory. If it represents the conflict between virtue and vice, it represents also the conflict, now growing yearly sharper, between the two parties in religion and politics. In *Lycidas* (1637) we have a still stronger sign of the cleavage. Here, into the perfect pastoral, the last expression of the Spenserian influence, comes the first genuine note of the sublime passion for order in liberty which inflamed the remainder of Milton's life. Laud's insistence on uniformity was filling the pulpits with obsequious and greedy hirelings. The "sacred office of speaking" was "bought and begun with servitude and forswearing"; and the prophet, who formed so large a part of the poet as Milton conceived him, speaks for the first time in direct reference to national affairs. This was before the final separation. There were many afterwards to be found upon the other side who must have agreed with the passage in *Lycidas* concerning St Peter; and the two voices are still one.

Milton's enthusiasm for freedom in religious matters was probably

intensified by what he saw and learned during his travels on the Continent (1638-9). He must have heard from his friend Charles Diodati (the descendant of a family of Lucca which had emigrated in the sixteenth century to escape conformity with the Church) of the vigilance of the Holy Office and the Jesuits; and that he started with an almost dangerous amount of Protestant feeling may be deduced from the story of Sir Henry Wotton's famous warning, "*pensieri stretti ed il viso sciolto*." Paris, the home of experimental science, could not hold him, and he moved on to Italy. The language he had already mastered; the country he doubtless regarded as still the home of culture and the arts. Here he found matter to inflame him still further. He left an England where the battle was still to come for an Italy where it was long over. Nearly a century before, the establishment of the Holy Office, the activity of the Jesuits, and the accession of Paul IV had driven the Protestants from Lucca, Siena, and elsewhere, to Geneva and other places north of the Alps, to be joined there by Huguenot refugees from France. The Catholic Reaction had come, and the Academies where Milton was made an honoured guest were little more than schools of superficial elegance, of "flattery and fustian." In Florence Milton contrived both to speak his mind and to remain unmolested; in return, his Italian friends told him their real thoughts on the state of learning and life under the sway of the Church. In Rome he was shunned; at Naples Manso was afraid to make too much of him; at Florence, on his way back, he visited Galileo; at Geneva he was the guest of the Diodati and was able to contrast the conditions of life in the capital of Protestantism with that of the cities under the rule of the Church. To Milton's foreign travels we owe, indeed, the beautiful *Epitaphium Damonis*, in which he laments, in strains of genuine grief though with ample use of the conventional classic machinery, the death in England of his friend Charles Diodati, and other poems in Latin and Italian which prove him to have been still extremely susceptible to influences of beauty; we owe to them also an increase of his bias against religious authority.

Milton reached home in August, 1639. He had intended to include Sicily and Greece in his travels, but was recalled, as he himself records, by a sense of duty to his country, where lovers of liberty were preparing to strike a blow. His journey bore no immediate fruit; it was not till two years later that he put forth the first of his pamphlets.

The resolve to lay aside poetry to a more fitting time was not yet definitely formed; but the publication of the first pamphlet, *Of Reformation touching Church discipline in England* (1641) raises the question how far Milton deserted his first ambition in order to write his controversial prose works. More than any other man of his time, he had the consciousness of being dedicated. In his view, all men were dedicated to the service of the great Taskmaster; himself in particular was chosen for "the accomplishment of greatest things." He abstained

from trade or profession, mainly in order to be free for more exalted work. His task was to be a poet; and his view of the office differed widely from that current in his own day and in the age that followed. A poet, in Milton's eyes, was not merely a sweet singer, but a prophet. The poet must be in himself a true poem; a man of knowledge, wisdom, and religion; and he must sing, not for gain or pleasure, or even "with God's help, for immortality" for himself, but for the service of God and of his country. There was, then, no renunciation, certainly no betrayal, of his high calling in the postponement of the great epic or drama for which he had been preparing himself since youth. God and his country had needs more pressing than poetry could satisfy, and, if the inception of the pamphlets shows a change in his methods, it shows no change of final aim.

It is not within the province of this chapter to discuss the pamphlets in detail. It will be enough to refer briefly to one or two general characteristics of Milton's prose works. His argument is not clearly conducted, nor is it truly philosophic. A constant discrepancy is to be noticed between the aspiration that possesses him and the theorem that he has to advance. The *Arcopagitica*, for instance, shows no special knowledge and advances no practical schemes; in the *Tractate on Education* there is a deep fall from the principle to the scheme proposed. Of rhetoric there is plenty, sometimes magnificent, at others merely tinkling, at others tawdry. To read Milton's prose is to find frequent cause for wonder how the poet who chastened and solidified English blank verse after it had fallen into decay, could run so wild in working without the restrictions of metre. The want of arrangement, of construction, and of order, is almost as remarkable in the uncontroversial as in the controversial works. And the grossness, the malignity of the vituperation in which he occasionally indulged cannot be wholly excused even by a remembrance of the age in which he wrote, the enemies he was attacking, or the life and death struggle in which he engaged them.

In Milton's prose we find, it has been said, the poet in the politician. If the arguments are weak and the practical value small, the prose works are aglow with the highest purposes of the greatest mind of his time. The vision of the poet breaks through the question of the moment to the expression of a vast idealism inherited from the less hampered aspirations of the Elizabethans. However much this enthusiasm may be superficially affected in Milton's case by party spirit or the need of the moment, personal or political, it renders his prose more passionate and, at its best, more lofty than any other prose in the language. In arrangement and style we must mark a decline from the ordered dignity of Hooker; it is not so rich as Jeremy Taylor; for tempestuous passion, striving to force expression from an insufficiently developed medium, it has no equal. The passion at the root of it is the passion of liberty—liberty always conditioned by the Divine Law as revealed in the "double Scripture" of the Bible and the Spirit that is given to each man as a

yet more certain guide, and by the intellectual and aristocratic love of order. And the passion is increased by the fact that many of these pamphlets are strongly autobiographical. The *Areopagitica* was written in order to facilitate the publication of *The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, which in its turn was written (whether Masson's later theory of its date be correct or not) because of the author's personal sufferings in wedlock—sufferings, if this theory be indeed correct, sufficient of themselves to account for his mainly Hebraic view of woman. The aspiration, therefore, is never feigned. Milton speaks from his heart of hearts, his rare spirit elevated with conscious superiority to time-servers, slaves, demagogues and fools, stung by personal griefs and inflamed with a passion for freedom and order; and his prose is typical of his age—an age of vast ideals and makeshift practice.

If it is impossible to read Milton's prose without as much pain and disappointment as pleasure, it is also impossible not to realise that its whole effect was greatly for the good of English prose. His lowest vituperation, hardly less than his loftiest flights, helped to stretch the capacity of the tongue; and the application of Milton's scholarship to his own language resulted in the fortifying and enriching of it for the benefit of those that came after.

In the twenty years of battle, almost the only poetry produced by him consists of a few sonnets; not founded, like those of the Elizabethans, on accepted conceits and fashionable ardours, but struck out from the poet's heart. Perhaps for the first time in English literature we find the sonnet used for an expression of genuine personal feeling which owed nothing to Italian or French originals; Milton's sonnets were written not because the poet would, but because he must; and no more passionate or truly lyrical sonnets are to be found in the language. And, when the battle was over and the cause practically lost, the poet returned, old, blind and unhappy, to the work to which he believed himself dedicated.

The twenty years had left their mark. If there is much of the poet in the politician and theologian, there is a great deal of the theologian in the poet. It is a useless but fascinating task to speculate what the great epic or drama would have been like, had Milton produced it ten years earlier, after years of peace and retirement. One thing is certain: that the poem would have lacked certain priceless touches of self-revelation. The best-known passage in *Paradise Lost* is that in which the poet speaks directly of his own blindness (III. 1-55). On the other hand, it is easy to imagine that the poem, whether epical or dramatic, historical or sacred, would have been a more human poem. Aristocratic and aloof, "nice of nature, honestly haughty and self-esteeming" as Milton had always been, he found himself between 1658 and 1663 more out of sympathy with the world about him than he had been before. The principles that were the passion of his life were denied; he was blind, poor, surrounded by enemies and, during part of the time, in

personal danger. It is not surprising that, in addition to some outbreaks of bitterness, the poem shows an increase, an excess, of that detachment from the affairs of common humanity which had always been a feature of his sublime mind. Chosen many years earlier for the very reason that it relieved him of the necessity of dramatising, of characterising, men and women, his subject now formed at once a refuge from an overwhelming disappointment and a means of expressing his own exaltation above the study of his worthless fellow men. At the same time, it may well seem to the modern reader to be more aloof from the concerns of humanity than it seemed to Milton. If he had rejected the idea of an Arthurian or other legendary subject in favour of a Scriptural, it was because the legends, even history itself, had less of actuality, of literal truth and of human moment, than the subject of *Paradise Lost*. To Milton, his angels and his demons were not only eternally, essentially true, but more exactly and literally true than King Arthur. He took the Bible narrative and enlarged it, supplying nothing from uninspired sources but the imagery of his poem and such names and figures as were regarded by himself and his times as essentially linked with eternal truth by being personally existent sources of error and opposition. Criticism has succeeded in discovering only a single passage where Milton represents an incident in his story otherwise than as recorded in the Bible; and his authority in that case (ix. 179-191, and 494 *sqq.*) is the *Book of Wisdom*.

Though to-day, therefore, the poem is read mainly by scholars, who admire its learning, its technical beauties, and the constant stream of classical allusion which gives a deeper meaning to every line, and by such classes as the Russian peasants, to whom its story is still literally true and capable of being illustrated by flaming woodcuts, it is possible to regard *Paradise Lost* as more remote from the concerns of common humanity than it was. It contains no human sweetness, no charity, no love. Whatever of those elements there may have been in a man austere and sublime from youth, twenty years of pamphleteering, together with his private sorrows and the rejection of his ideals, had killed in him. The world of chivalry had passed for ever. Woman was no longer the lodestar, but the source of error; and man no longer the lord of the world, but a traitor to his own greatness. The voice is the voice of a man defeated. But to Milton, his contemporaries, and his successors for some generations, it seemed that *Paradise Lost* stood not only for an expression of the eternal truth, of matters of supreme and eternal moment to mankind, but for a story of the warfare between combatants, all of whom were perfectly familiar and personally existent beings. That the story should be presented with all the learning at the poet's command was in accordance not only with Milton's exalted idea of the office of poetry, but with the constant humanist element in him. Aspiring to the expression of thoughts and truths vaster than any that poetry had yet dealt with, he lavished on his poem all the knowledge,

the accomplishment, and the beauty, that he had to bestow. But the humanist in him was not now, as in the days of *Lycidas*, the master of the Calvinistic theologian. Not only in the doctrine of victory over evil by force, and the passages in which the spirit of the war still rings, may we trace the influence of the twenty intervening years. Setting out to place on record, as it were, as much of the eternal truth about God, the Devil, and Man as his poem could contain, in the face of an age which threatened already to forget or to deny that truth, Milton was led into regions of disquisition outside the scope of epical poetry proper.

Paradise Lost is the last and belated voice of a great age that was gone. It gathers up all the idealism, all the poetic labours, all and far more than all the learning of the Elizabethans; it takes the instrument which from the days of Surrey onwards had grown slowly towards perfection, and rescues it from misuse in order to employ it on greater themes than it had ever known. If the debt of the poem to the Renaissance is great, its debt to the Reformation is hardly less great, though it contains in it the seeds of decay. The spiritual scope of the poem could only be commanded by the choicest of the minds which were able to understand and assimilate all that was vital in the Geneva doctrine—the realisation of the justice and might of God and His direct concern with the affairs of man; the malignity and persistence of the Powers of Evil; the vastness of the scheme in which man is a minute, but responsible and therefore important, element. Of the world into which the poem was born, it shows no impress, though here and there a bitter reference recalls it. The nature of that world will be seen shortly; it was a world in which Calvinism was, except for an inarticulate remnant, as dead as the tradition of the English Renaissance. That the poem was read, we know; and it is to Dryden's honour that he saw its merit. But, so far as actual effect went, it fell on deaf ears. For its public appreciation, *Paradise Lost* had to wait not only till the Revolution but even later, till Addison, the mouthpiece of the greatly changed party of the Whigs, expounded such of its beauties as he and his age could grasp.

Paradise Lost, if Milton's greatest, was not his last message to the faithful remnant and the host of foes that surrounded them. *Paradise Regained*, his own favourite, and *Samson Agonistes*, published together in one volume, followed. And it is difficult not to see in these two very different works a kind of alternative suggested to the losing side. *Paradise Regained*, a "poets' poem," has been even less widely read, but more enthusiastically admired by a few, than *Paradise Lost*. Its severity is greater, its display of imagination, learning, and poetic adornment less; its nakedness being partly perhaps a protest against the false poetry, as Milton considered it, in fashion during his later years, and partly due to a feeling that the word of truth was sufficient of itself. *Paradise Regained* has, however, a unity and a closeness of form that have induced Wordsworth and Coleridge, among others, to rank it higher

than any other of Milton's poems. Its message is one of humility and hope, of a peaceful expectation of release from the bondage of evil. The message of *Samson Agonistes* is very different. In adopting the dramatic form and modelling his tragedy on Greek lines, Milton was only carrying into execution an idea that had possessed him from his earliest days. Since his return from Italy, the views of the author of the Sonnet on Shakespeare, of *Arcades* and of *Comus*, with regard to the acted drama had undergone a change, an approximation to the views of *Histrionastix*, which may be noticed in the reference to Shakespeare in *Eikonoklastes* (1649) and even earlier. He had rejected the dramatic form for *Paradise Lost*, influenced, no doubt, to some extent by the discredit into which the theatre had fallen, as well as by his sense of poetic fitness. But he had retained his admiration of the dramatic form of tragedy as "the gravest, moralest and most profitable." Had the play been written in his youth, there would have been, perhaps, no need for an apology. To *Samson Agonistes* he prefixed an essay *Of that sort of Dramatic Poetry called Tragedy*, partly in order to justify his choice of form to those remaining Puritans who might not grasp the distinction between the acted and the unactable drama; and partly to protest against what he held to be the lower kind, which intermixed "eemie stuff with tragic sadness and gravity...corruptly to gratify the people." If the simplicity of *Paradise Regained* is a rejection of the Restoration ideal and practice of poetry, it is also perhaps a rejection of the Spenserian. It is impossible not to see in *Samson Agonistes* a complete rejection of Elizabethan tragedy.

The play, then, is a tragedy on the Greek lines; it has been accused of lacking strength of design and vigour of handling. Read in the light of Milton's life and times, it becomes the most passionately personal expression he has left. Of direct symbolism the play contains much. The Philistines have triumphed over the chosen people; Samson is blind and at the mercy of his foes. Moreover, his chief fault is his marriage with a Philistine woman; and there can be no doubt that to some extent Dalila stands for Milton's first wife, Mary Powell, and that Samson's self-reproaches addressed to the Chorus and to Manoah and his scene with Dalila represent a recrudescence of the old wound. The Chorus, indeed, that follows the scene between Samson and Dalila is taken almost literally from the pamphlets on divorce.

In spite of the final words of the Chorus, the burden of the play is no message of resignation or patience. The prophet once more lifts up his voice to denounce, not only the victorious enemy but the half-hearted of his own side; to draw a picture of the doom awaiting the oppressor; almost to advise a last desperate struggle. The play and poem issued in one volume represent what may be supposed to have been Milton's two main moods during the last years of his life: violent indignation, reaching almost to despair, and a withdrawal from the memories of the past,

and from the hateful present which he could not see, into the inner world of his genius and his religion.

The tragedy that was then occupying the theatres was of a very different kind; but before it is examined the characteristics of the age as a whole may be briefly noted. In the age of Milton men had first fought with sword and pen for their ideals, and afterwards tried in many ways to find practical expression for them; in the age of Dryden, the men of ideals were silent, and the defeated party had returned to prominence, some of them weary of exile and poverty, others of an order of things which had discouraged the decoration of life. Between the two periods comes one of the sharpest divisions in the history of arts and manners. It was natural that there should be among the Royalists a reaction in favour of pleasure too strong for moderation and fine taste. The ideals, again, that had sought for expression in revolt had sought for it unsuccessfully, and the failure disposed men against ideals of any kind and in favour, rather, of ease and security. And, in the third place, the years of Puritan rule had effected so sharp and complete a cleavage between what we may call the age of the English Renaissance and the age succeeding them, that the nation found itself, in matters of art and literature, beginning afresh, with no living or continuous standard of taste for reference. We have seen the significant change of Milton's attitude to Shakespeare; by the time of the Restoration the spirit of the Elizabethan world was completely dead, and the only use of the Elizabethans which we find amounts practically to parody. The period, then, was one of low ideals; it was one in which the mind, starting anew, set to work to learn over again the world in which it found itself; it was one in which material aims and pleasures, things of certain if small return, were placed in the foreground; and it was one which, feeling the necessity of a new technique for the expression of its thoughts and desires, chose its own models and developed them according to its own needs. We have passed into a prosaic, a curious, a materialist, and an experimental period. For something of the temper of the times, no doubt, Charles II in person was responsible. Charles was a man, as the epitaph ascribed to Rochester, and the information given by Pepys, Hamilton and others imply, of sound sense, low ideals, and shrewd taste, imbued with French feeling in matters of literature, and preferring wit to aspiration. His age is the age of the heroic drama—an attempt to nationalise an exotic; of the comedy of wit and manners and the death of romantic comedy; of the foundation of the Royal Society, of curiosity about natural phenomena, and of such curiosity about the arts as may be found in Evelyn's *Sculptura*, that strange book which not only deals with the minutiae of processes, but attempts to link up the arts and sciences in a "philosophy" which was the prominent need of the age. Later come the philosophy of Locke, a patient investigation of the actual facts of

the human understanding, and the scholarship of Bentley, both in accordance with the spirit of the age. Finally, it was an age which, being full not only of curiosity but of controversy, perfected the form of didactic and argumentative poetry and wrought prose into a finished instrument. Possibly no one represents so completely the average man of his period as Samuel Pepys. His easy morality, his energetic curiosity, his serious practice of the arts combined with his characteristically uncertain taste, his materialism and his vulgarity, his care for detail and his earnest desire to be a man of culture and elegance, sum up in little the main features of his time.

The great representative of his age, the man who, like a journalist of genius, knew what his public wanted before they wanted it, and gave it them in the best possible form, was John Dryden. Instead of the remoteness and exaltation of Milton, we have the lower aims, the strong sense, the strange lapses of taste, and the frequent experiments of Dryden. Milton may be held, on the whole, to give the best expression to the best minds of his time; Dryden to give the best expression to the reigning fashions of his. Neither spoke, as Shakespeare had spoken, for the nation. Milton was the voice of one of two opposed ideals, Dryden the voice of the Court and of what we should now call society.

The theatre, falling lower and lower since the early years of the reign of James I, was revived at the Restoration, to be no longer a national institution, but the toy of the Court and the town. Sir William D'Avenant, in his tentative productions at Rutland House and elsewhere in and after 1658, had been led, partly by the necessity of a disguise, and largely by the influence of what he had seen in France and Italy, to introduce a form that lay between the heroic drama of France and the opera. The Restoration brought back to England a large body of men whose notions were French in character and origin. Lacking a tradition, and knowing enough of the Elizabethan drama only to misunderstand its form and aim, they turned to French models for guidance. It was not long before they introduced, mainly by the aid of Dryden, a form of tragedy which, though expressive in its native country of national ideas and aims, was in England an exotic. It is true that English heroic drama is far from strictly French or "classical" in form. The "unities" are a bondage which the English have never borne complacently. The Restoration dramatists studied Corneille and Racine only to dilute them, as it were, with something of the complexity of plot formerly learned of Spain and the freedom of movement characteristically English. The attempt to transplant the spirit of the French tragedy was more thorough in intention, but even less successful in result. The French Court of Louis XIV had at least an unbroken tradition of chivalry expressed in the typically French form of gallantry, an heroic past and a stately present. In France, Corneille's drama of the great problems of human life, Racine's drama of the ethical problems of a

polite age, expressed the facts of the society that enjoyed them. To the English Court, with no heroic past and with an idea of gallantry that had little in common with the chivalric, the two motives of love and honour were merely matters of fashion. Where the French drama embodied the difficulties and problems of real life, the English attempted to introduce actuality only by lowering the spirit of the problems to the morality of its patrons' practice. The morality was better than that of the later pre-Rebellion tragedy of Ford or Webster; that is all that can be said in its favour. "*Ce qu'on appelle aimer en France*," wrote Saint-Évremond, "*n'est que parler d'amour*." It was not so in England. And the fact, to which the same excellent critic points—that the English like to see blood and death on the stage instead of following the French and the classics in merely hearing of it—is another instance of the change undergone by the spirit of pseudo-classic drama in its transplantation. Again, having no heroic tradition as a standard, it was forced to substitute rant and bombast for appropriate loftiness. No one now can read the close of Dryden's *Tyrannic Love* (1669) without laughter. It is the work of a man groping in the dark after effect, and inspired partly by a misunderstanding of the heroic, partly, perhaps, by a failure to distinguish between the ebullient force of an Elizabethan author and deliberate, even painful, exaggeration.

Charles and his Court demanded heroic tragedy, and Dryden, who was not a dramatist of internal compulsion, gave it them, and gave it them, all things considered, very good. If he helped to turn *The Tempest* into an opera, he wrote *All for Love* on the basis of *Antony and Cleopatra*, and it is scarcely too much to say that *All for Love* is as good a play of its order as *Antony and Cleopatra* is. And, though there is a wide difference between *The Conquest of Granada* and the Scudéry romance on which it is founded, we cannot deny to it that "kind of generous and noble spirit" which has been claimed for it. How the "refined" age, which, in Evelyn's phrase, was "disgusted" with the "old plays", could have tolerated the lapses of taste to be found in these heroic plays would be hard to understand, were it not clear that, lacking its own tradition and standard, it took from another nation a standard which it misinterpreted. That there were some who deplored the resultant excesses, *The Rehearsal* (1671) is there to prove; but it is easy to overestimate the significance and effect of that burlesque. Aimed originally, not at Dryden but at D'Avenant, the character of its "hero" was a piece of patchwork. It has even been supposed that Sprat, Butler, and Clifford, three of the authors of the play, were not above making sly hits at the fourth, Buckingham. Dryden's first heroic drama, *The Indian Emperor*, had appeared in 1665; it was not till *Aurengzebe* (1675) that he announced his intention of deserting the heroic metre which was only one of the distinctive features of the heroic play, and so late as 1698 we find Crowne still employing that form. Dryden, with his unerring

eye for what his public wanted, was not likely to continue the use of a form of expression which had been outgrown. The heroic play satisfied a need of its time, and was, in one particular especially, of service to English literature. Dryden avoided blank verse because he regarded it as too "easy" for long works; the blank verse which he meant, however, was not that of Marlowe or of Shakespeare, but the blank verse run to seed of its last pre-Rebellion practitioners. And, if in English hands and to English ears the rhymed heroics of Dryden are not suitable for dramatic use, as the rhymed Alexandrines of Corneille and Racine were in French ears, they at least brought back point, concentration and reasonableness, though at some loss of naturalness and ease. The discussions on questions of ethics which we find in Dryden's dramas are neither so sincere nor so sensible as those of the French dramatists; but at least they are, within their limits, to the point, and they show an argumentative power and a measure of reason which were new. And when, after 1675, Dryden in *All for Love* (1678) turned to blank verse, it was all the firmer and more effective for his years of work in the heroic metre. There are elements, therefore, in the heroic drama, which, though imitated from the French, are adapted to the needs and express the characteristics of the English intellect of the period. The "*grandeur d'âme bien exprimée qui excite une tendre admiration*," according to the prescription of Saint-Évremond, was, no doubt, a makeshift substitute for the actual possession of a lofty ideal, and replaced a national aim by the worship of the person, especially that of the King; but, such as it was, it was better than anything that the dregs of the pre-Rebellion tragedy had had to offer.

Of the other writers of tragedy, Crowne is chiefly remarkable for the lyrics introduced into his plays. In Nathaniel Lee we find the popular bombast carried to extremes, though combined with "infinite fire." Otway, lacking Dryden's humour, has a more poignant tenderness than Dryden, quite as good a sense of character, and a greater sense of the theatre. *The Orphan* and *Venice Preserved* outlived all Dryden's plays on the stage, and showed what tragedy could achieve in this age, when it had cast off the heroic influence.

In the comedy of the period we find the reverse of the picture. Having exchanged, as it has been said, the telescope of the Elizabethans for the microscope, the Restoration authors used the microscope nowhere to better effect than in their comedy. Romantic and poetic comedy were dead. The opera and the ballet had come to take their places. Jonsonian comedy, the comedy of "humours," or single characteristics carried to the point of eccentricity, survived in the wholesome but extravagant comedies of Shadwell, whose *Epsom Wells*, and the comedies of which it is an example, are valuable pictures of contemporary manners. To some extent the Jonsonian principle of letting a characteristic stand for a character survives in the Restoration drama, at least as far

as Congreve, as its nomenclature tends to show; but in comedy, more perhaps than in any other branch of literature, the Restoration period started afresh to study the life of the moment, the instances, not the exceptions. The field is narrow at first, including only the men and women of the Court and "the town"; it widens in Vanbrugh, and in Farquhar it expands still further. Its debt to French comedy, especially to Molière, and through French comedy to Plautus and Terence, there is no disguising and no need to disguise; for here there is no question of forcing a foreign taste on people with no taste of their own, but of borrowing a form for independent use. It was early discovered (and perhaps unfortunately, says a historian of the English drama) that one French plot was not enough for an English comedy; indeed, there is only one good English comedy, Congreve's *Double-Dealer*, that has a single plot: the English stage needed more persons and more action, just as it needed stronger characterisation than it could find in the Spanish comedies of intrigue. With regard to its morality, such a perversion as that of Molière's *Alceste* into the Manly of Wycherley's *Plain-Dealer* is a comprehensive comment on the general degradation of tone for which no condemnation is too strong. It is ungracious and unpleasant work to call attention to the glaring error in work which is unmatched in all English literature; but it must be stated again that Restoration comedy is gross, licentious, and cynical, and—more important still—that just because of its want of a moral standard it failed, for all its wit and its use of the microscope, to interpret human life in enduring terms. It began its career as the plaything of a corrupt Court; and it reflected the gross temper of a materialistic period among a people always inclined to confuse grossness with humour and the gratification of the appetites with pleasure. The accession of James made no difference in this respect. After the Restoration it took some years for the purer influence of Queen Mary—a good woman and a good judge of a play—to make itself felt. But the growing disgust with the immorality, not only of the drama but of the theatre, before and behind the curtain, found expression in 1698 in a book, which all must admire but the necessity for which all must regret, Jeremy Collier's *Short View of the Profaneness and Immorality of the English Stage*. By so much as Collier was better acquainted with his subject and less of a fanatic than Prynne, by so much is the *Short View* a more damning indictment than *Histriomastix*. It was answered by Congreve, among others, with deplorable flippancy. Farquhar tried to turn it against the purpose of its author, and failed. Dryden protested against its exaggerations, and, like the great man he was, confessed with contrition its substantial justice. But its effect was not seen immediately. Farquhar's *Sir Harry Wildair* (to take a single instance) dates from three years after its publication.

It was not till the Sentimental Comedy of Steele, who followed up a

hint given by Colley Cibber, that the reform really began. Meanwhile, from Etherege to Farquhar we find a social comedy which represents, with some brilliance and a fair show of completeness, certain aspects of the actual life lived by a small circle of men and women sufficiently "elegant," leisured and self-conscious to be interested in themselves and to provide food for the "wit" which had changed its meaning since the days of the metaphysical poets. All the types that composed the small circle are revealed to us with an elegance and fineness of characterisation unknown before. If plots, incidents, and people are alike borrowed from Molière, the effort is always towards approximation to the English social life of the day. In 1661 Cowley had caused offence by daring to hint, in *Cutter of Coleman-Street*, that there were black sheep among the Royalists: Mrs Behn, in *The Roundheads* (1682) and *The Rover* (1677 and 1681) boldly shows the new society regarding as objects of humour not only the Roundheads, who, of course, are outrageously caricatured, but the Cavaliers themselves. Old heroism and ideals are forgotten or scorned, and the town is engrossed in its own little affairs of gallantry or roguery. Immensely interested in itself, it likes to see itself reflected on the stage, with some exaggeration of its wit, and possibly of its immorality.

The pioneer in this new comedy was Sir George Etherege. The date of Etherege's return to England is, like many other facts in his life, uncertain, but there is reason to believe that he lingered in Paris long enough to see the production of some of Molière's plays. On his return he wrote *The Comical Revenge* (1664), a tragi-comedy in which the serious portions are written in rhymed heroics. To Etherege, therefore, belongs the honour of writing the earliest regular play in which the use of rhyme was adopted. But his significance does not end there. He was the first to introduce to England the new comedy, which forsook eccentricities and moral castigation, and simply attempted to transfer to the stage the life of the time. A witty man himself, Etherege made the mistake of endowing all his characters with his own wit; and the fault persisted throughout most of the Restoration comedy; nevertheless his characters are portraits. Of them, as of the characters of Restoration comedy in general, it may be said that, so far from being abstractions, they represent the attempt to be as exact and realistic as possible. The few chances enjoyed by modern playgoers of seeing Restoration comedies acted are quite enough to prove these men and women very much alive indeed. In *She Would if she Could* (1668) Etherege developed the idea of the new comedy, and produced the brightest and gayest of his pictures of contemporary life. In the underplot of his only other play, *The Man of Mode* (1676)—the play which contains the first of a long line of fops—Etherege, says Gosse, virtually founded English comedy as it was understood by Congreve, Goldsmith, and Sheridan.

Dryden's first essay in comedy, *The Wild Gallant* (1663) is, in effect,

a comedy of the old Jonsonian type of "humours." The value of Etherege's work may be seen by a comparison of this play of Dryden's and the plays of Wilson and Shadwell with Dryden's later comedies and the school of younger writers, Wycherley, Congreve, Mrs Behn, Vanbrugh, and Farquhar. Dryden's comedy, as a whole, shows more sense and less wit than that of his fellows. In general, he is a large borrower of plots, scenes, and characters from the French, which, however, he stamps with his own mark and that of his country. He coarsens what he takes, as a comparison of *Sir Martin Mar-all* (1667) with its original, *L'Étourdi*, is enough to show. He leans a little towards farce, and is no whit less licentious than his fellows in the art; on the other hand, he does not suffer from the bleak cynicism and cruelty of Etherege and Wycherley. Some of his women, indeed, have breadth and sweetness. Possibly, his best dramatic work is to be found in some of his tragi-comedies, *Marriage à la Mode* (1672), *Don Sebastian* (1690), *Amphitryon* (1690), and even *Love Triumphant* (1694). An even more important figure is that of Wycherley, a born playwright. To *The Plain-Dealer* we have already referred. This, with his three other comedies, was written before he had reached forty. His gaiety is almost hideous; he sees the worst of everything, and has no spark of nobility to counteract his bitterness; but he is an effective if clumsy satirist, and the possessor of strong dramatic power.

With Congreve we reach the summit of this form of expression. His output was very small, being checked partly by Collier's *Short View* and partly by the social ambitions of the playwright, whom offices and rewards had relieved of the necessity of work. *The Old Bachelor* (acted in 1693) had been highly praised and adapted for representation by Dryden. *The Double-Dealer* (1693) we have mentioned before. The skill and vigour with which the single plot is kept alive and full of interest to the end are masterly. With *Love for Love* (1695) he opened the theatre in Lincoln's Inn Fields after the secession of Betterton and others from Drury Lane; and in 1700, after the attack of Collier, appeared his finest play, *The Way of the World*. It was his aim in this play to substitute the folly of affectation for the folly of grossness, and the result is a severe satire on the world of fashion and foppery. Congreve cannot be acquitted of the charges of frivolity, cynicism, and indecency. On the other hand, he is never, like Wycherley, Vanbrugh, or Otway in his comedies, offensive, and Millamant, in his last play, is a woman so entirely fascinating in her wit and her wilfulness as to prove him aware of something higher than the gross attractions dwelt on by his fellows. It may be pointed out, too, that in *The Double-Dealer* virtue is rewarded; and, on the whole, it may be said that the faults of Congreve are largely the faults of his age, while his merits are of his own contriving. In him the characteristic "wit" of the age finds its most perfect expression. Like Etherege, he suffers from too much of

it; his servants talk as elegantly and pointedly as their masters and mistresses; but, as representing the talk of a society which had leisure and ambition to be "polite" and exquisite, it is, in all probability, not far from the truth, while the attainment by English prose of such finish, flexibility, and point as his marks the advance on the previous age. The writers of comedies in deserting poetry, with Etherege, rendered invaluable service to the development of prose. On Mrs Behn and other writers we need not dwell. Sir John Vanbrugh, a writer and architect of mixed English and Flemish parentage, is noteworthy for the unsurpassed gaiety and ease of his dialogue and his vivid pictures of contemporary life. In Farquhar we reach a writer of greater significance. No fine gentleman, but an Irish adventurer of genius, he extended the field—especially in his last two plays, *The Recruiting Officer* (1706) and *The Beau's Stratagem* (1707)—to embrace types outside the little parish of St James' and sentiments more modern and humane than those of the "beaux" and "belles." His comedy comes nearer to being national, to dealing with the life of the people at large, than that of his contemporaries. His frequent references to current events are apt and diverting, and his rejection of the traditional topics of Restoration comedy in favour of wider and more actual material was the basis of a similar advance on the part of Lessing, whose *Minna von Barnhelm* owes more to Farquhar than some of its incidents.

It was in this age that the drama, especially the tragic drama, began to be used for political ends, if not with the virulence shown by Henry Fielding and others in the next century, at any rate with almost unabashed openness. In Dryden's own case we have, notably, *Amboyna* (1673), which raked up an old story for the purpose of inflaming public opinion against the Dutch, and *The Spanish Friar*, a "Protestant play" (1681); and *The Duke of Guise* (1682), written by Lee with Dryden's aid, drew a parallel between Guise and Monmouth, and practically foretold for the latter—in spite of the disclaimer in the epilogue and the subsequent *Vindication*—an end similar to that of the former. Otway's shameful caricature of Shaftesbury as Antonio in *Venice Preserved*, though personal rather than political, is another instance. Even more frequently than the play itself the prologue and epilogue were used as political weapons. The curious custom by which the playwright spoke personally to the public through the mouth of an actor or actress was at its height during this period. The result was almost always inartistic, in some cases disgusting, as in the famous epilogue to *Tyrannic Love* or in the first version of that to *The Duke of Guise*; the language was often indelicate, and the sentiments highly objectionable. At the same time, in the hands of Dryden the prologue and epilogue reached a very high level of epigrammatic point, and were admirably adapted in their freedom to inflame political passions by sneers, innuendos, or open attack or defence.

In the plays of the period, too, may be found embedded—to its disadvantage and neglect by posterity—most of the lyrical poetry of the time. In a self-conscious age, when feeling was at a low ebb and the passion of love debased by the prevailing mode, good lyrical poetry was rare. Marvell and Waller carried on the characteristics of the former age; for the rest, the lyrics of Dryden, Crowne, Congreve, Pordage, Rochester and others are both small in quantity and deficient in genuine lyrical quality. Rochester, indeed, is often worthy of comparison with Catullus; but his lyrics, like those of his contemporaries, are rather neatly finished than spontaneous, and their harmony is a matter of rule more than of essence. A favourite form was the ode, and here, as elsewhere, Dryden outstripped his fellows. The *Pindariques* of Cowley were freely imitated by Sprat, and to Congreve belongs the honour of pointing out that a Pindaric ode proper was not of irregular structure. Dryden's odes are irregular in structure, but almost faultless in accomplishment. If *Alexander's Feast* (1697) is not poetry of the highest sort, it has been justly called "the best thing of its kind"; and the first portion of the *Ode to the Memory of Mrs Anne Killigrew* (1685-6) is famous as one of the most superb pieces of verbal organ-music in the language.

The age, however, was not an age of song-birds, but of enquirers, critics, prose-writers; and the best prose of the time was the work of the critics. The men of "science" exercised an influence of their own, for it was one of the merits of the new Royal Society to exact from its members a "close, naked, natural way of speaking; positive expressions, clear senses, a native easiness." From the turbulent splendours of Milton we pass to the ordered, clarified prose, which is the work of men who use it for the purpose of saying what they have to say, of communicating their discoveries, thoughts, and arguments, as clearly as possible. It is, as befits its purpose, for the most part a plain and useful means of expression; yet in the hands of Dryden, that great man of letters, it rises, with no professed aim at ornament, into a thing of dignity and beauty. Dryden used prose for many purposes: the *Epistle to the Whigs* that precedes *The Medal* is a piece of political argument so clear, forcible, and ordered that it is difficult to believe it a work not forty years younger than the *Areopagitica*. But his most important prose-works are in literary criticism, a new branch of activity introduced into England from France, partly by Charles and his Court, partly by a French exile, Saint-Évremond, who exercised a very important influence on the criticism of his time. Modern French writers find him too much dependent on prejudice imbibed in the France of his youth, on personal fancy and taste, and lacking in reason and conviction. To modern England, accustomed to an even more thoroughly "impressionist" style of criticism, such a verdict seems strange. Saint-Évremond's letters (for they are little more) on the English, French, and classical drama seem full of principle and reason, however little

knowledge of the English drama of the day his preference of Shadwell and other "coarse" poets, as Dryden called them, to the more "polite" may reveal. At any rate, his influence—and particularly his preference for the modern drama over the ancient—had a great effect on English men of letters. Everyone who wrote a play wrote in a preface his own theories of play-writing; and this is the form in which most of Dryden's critical work—excepting the *Essay of Dramatic Poesy* (1665)—was done. Dryden, while a large borrower from the French, is a sturdy champion of the English drama. He displays a truer taste in discriminating Elizabethan authors than any of his fellows. Though he lent a hand in the spoiling of *The Tempest*, and "tagged" Milton's lines in *The Age of Innocence*, he recognised the true place of both the poets he attempted to adapt. As a rule, his critical work is called out by some special need of his own—the defence or the surrender of the heroic couplet in drama, for instance; and it combines reason and enthusiasm in a manner that makes it at once profitable and delightful to read. It was in this school, as the preface to the translation of the *Georgics* shows, that Addison was trained; and by Dryden, Sprat, Rymer (whose manner is far better than his deplorable literary matter), Congreve, and other critics, were laid the foundations of the edifice completed in the following century.

Such an age as this makes fruitful ground for satire—a form of literature that looks not so much at the ideal itself as at the faults of those who depart from it. And it is due to Dryden that the satire of this period at its best is of supreme merit. The *Hudibras* of Samuel Butler, much of which was written before the Restoration, is in some respects a voice from the age that had passed. Its versification has all and more than all the ruggedness of Donne or Marston at their worst: the author chooses deliberately to make his effects by jocular anties of diction, which his shrewd humour and close observation of detail carry off successfully. But we look in vain for elevation, dignity, or strong purpose. Butler shows to the full some of the worst characteristics of the age which laughed at *Hudibras*; its easy ridicule of externals, its want of conviction and of taste, its vulgarity and its scepticism. It is not Puritanism but Puritans that he attacks, and he attacks them rather with caricature than with satire. Neither Royalist nor Churchman, but sceptic and opportunist, he writes less from belief in a cause than from the desire to make fun of the external extravagances of its opponents, and there is as little principle in his message as there is plan or cohesion in the poem he took up and dropped and took up again. Reverence was not a characteristic of the man who could so use his models, *Don Quixote* and *The Faerie Queene*, as to debase them in Butler's manner. It might be objected that there was as little conviction at the bottom of Dryden's satires as of Butler's; and, allowing for all reasonable change of opinion, consistency can hardly be claimed for the man who wrote *Amboyna* with its prologue and epilogue in 1673, and eight years later attacked in *Absalom and*

Achitophel and *The Medal* the policy which he supposed to be Shaftesbury's. But here Dryden's genius, the dignity of his mind, the actual superiority conferred on him, not by lofty purpose but by mere ability, came to his rescue. He took to satire late in life, and then, probably, rather on suggestion than from any ardent interest in politics; and the qualities of his mind and the nature of his training for the work were such that in his hands political satire reached its highest point.

Absalom and Achitophel, the first and greatest of these poems, was published in November, 1681. The "Popish Plot" and the rejection of the Exclusion Bill by the Lords had wrought popular feeling to a height not reached in any preceding period of Charles' reign. The Parliament at Oxford had been dissolved; Shaftesbury was on his trial for high treason; and it is said that Charles himself suggested to Dryden that he should strike a blow in the fight. Dryden's blow was this satire, which, though it failed of its main object on the acquittal of Shaftesbury a few days after its publication, was one of the most powerful aids to the King in his resistance to the Exclusionists. The story of Absalom and David fitted aptly enough the circumstances of Monmouth and his father: Achitophel, considerably changed, became Shaftesbury, whom Dryden affected to regard as part inventor of the "Popish Plot" and the leader in the decision to make war on the Dutch. The Biblical story could not, of course, be closely followed, and the conduct of the fable, which ends with a speech from the King, is its weakest part. Its strength lies in its masterly characterisation, the finest in an age which Clarendon and Saint-Évremond had helped to educate in a favourite field of literature, and in Dryden's ability in presenting a case. To celebrate the acquittal of Shaftesbury, a medal was struck, which formed the text of Dryden's next satire, *The Medal, A Satire against Sedition* (March, 1682), also suggested to him, as report declared, by Charles II. In the introductory *Epistle to the Whigs* and in the satire itself Dryden makes fun of the medal and attacks the party; he returns to his invective on Shaftesbury, and explains in a passage of great didactic force, sound sense and strong fancy, the unsuitability of republican institutions to the climate and temper of England. *The Medal*, like its predecessors, was not allowed to go unanswered by the Whigs, and among the answers was Shadwell's *The Medal of John Bayes*, a savage piece of scurrility. Dryden, for once, used his satire for personal ends, and replied to Shadwell in October, 1682, with *Mac Flecknoe, or, a Satire on the True Blue Protestant poet*. In this he fathers Shadwell on Flecknoe, an Irish priest and an indifferent poet, who had died not long before, and represents the sire handing on his mantle of dulness to his duller son. In the following month, he returned to the attack with some 200 lines on Shadwell, Settle and others included in the second part of *Absalom and Achitophel*, the rest of which was composed by Nahum Tate, possibly (for the verse is above Tate's level) under Dryden's revision. And in the same month with this, his last satire and

the most violent attack he ever wrote, he put forth a remarkable piece, the *Religio Laici*, an examination of the credibility of the Christian religion and the claims of the Church of England against the Catholic Church and the Deists. The surprise that has been expressed at Dryden's sudden excursion into theology is ungrounded. Theological thought must have been called forth in all who had dwelt on the double question, religious and political, raised by the "Popish Plot" and the Exclusion Bill. Still less is there reason for suspecting Dryden's sincerity. The poem could not serve his turn with Charles, of whose secret leanings to Catholicism he must have been aware, or with the Duke of York. It forms a sober and sincere expression of the opinions of a man of fifty-one who was passing through the process of thought which led him four years later to join the Catholic Church. The conversion was followed by the publication of *The Hind and the Panther* (1687), in which, with even more argumentative skill than was shown in the *Religio Laici*, he supports the claims of the Church, commending at the same time the policy of James II. The sincerity, again, of Dryden's conversion has been questioned; and even Saintsbury admits that it may have been helped on to some extent by the prospect of being on the winning side, by the "journalist spirit" and by his dislike of the unliterary character of the Protestant Whigs. Dryden indeed was always abreast or a little in advance of the public opinion of his party. But it is from the Whig party and its descendants that this charge of insincerity, together with that of personal profligacy, proceeded, and neither rests on good foundation. Sincere or not, Dryden held to his path. Except for the *Britannia Rediviva*, an ode celebrating the birth of a son to James II, *The Hind and the Panther* was his last word on matters of state and religion. The Revolution found him on the losing side; he was deprived of his laureateship; his authority, save in matters of literature, was at an end.

We have only to compare the work of Oldham, who published his *Satires upon the Jesuits* the year before the appearance of *Absalom and Achitophel*, with the poems mentioned above, to see what Dryden did for satire and didactic poetry. Oldham, student of Marvell though he was, is a rugged writer. His hits are shrewd; but he has none of the "science" of Dryden in the art of attack, and none of his dignity and intellectual supremacy. He maintains throughout the tone to which Dryden descends in the regrettable attack on the son of Shaftesbury in *Absalom and Achitophel*. For the most part, only on the greatest provocation does Dryden stoop to personalities. He strikes from above, and condescends as he strikes. In most cases, though the individual sufferer is unmistakable, Dryden succeeds in treating him as the embodiment of a principle. He writes not as a moral reformer but as a man of sense, and hits hardest when apparently most cool. There is no calculating exactly the effect of such a weapon as this of Dryden's in the victory of Charles over the Exclusionists. Besides the direct satire of *Absalom and*

Achitophel, its severe and logical expression of the political thought of the King's party, its scorn of popular rule and of such abstractions as "that golden calf—a state," and its glorification of monarchy and of Charles, account must be taken of the skill with which, by its very tone of ease and superiority, it contrives to put a social stigma on those whom it attacks in an age which was socially ambitious and socially sensitive. The place of these poems as pure literature has been almost universally acknowledged to be supreme in their kind. Poetry and argument go hand in hand in a manner never before achieved, and the management of the couplet—for which Dryden had been trained by years of work in the drama—is perfect. These didactic poems and the *Fables* from Chaucer and Boccaccio to which he turned after the Revolution may be regarded as the best poetry of a prosaic age. If skill in stating a case or telling a story does not constitute the highest form of poetry, it is to Dryden's honour that he gathered up all the reasoning power, the wit, and the polish of his age and gave them expression with the best of the taste that his labours had helped to form.

A last word must be added concerning another form of literary expression, which the following century brought to perfection—the novel. During the closing of the theatres after 1642, the heroic romances of France made their way into England and were translated and imitated freely by Orrery, Crowne, and others, while D'Avenant's *Gondibert* and Chamberlayne's *Pharonnida* are heroic romances in verse. The renascence of the drama affected the demand for romances; but in Mrs Behn we find an attempt to bring romance into touch with contemporary life. Her prose novel *Oroonoko* is a strange mixture of the romantic and the realistic; a mixture even more strangely marked in *The Fair Jilt*. This attempt was to bear little fruit. A more important work is Congreve's novel, *Incognita*, which reveals him as a humorist in prose fiction, and a parodist of the heroic style. On the other hand, we have the allegories of Bunyan, which have no parentage but the Bible and the vivid imagination of an untutored man. The voice of Bunyan is not the voice of his age. He has no affinities with Milton save his knowledge of the Bible; he owes nothing to the other writers of his day. His imagination and sincerity made him forcible and arresting; the Bible made him lucid and direct. His immediate influence was nothing, and the temptation to dwell on his genius must be resisted. Despite the attempt of Mrs Behn and such close interest in the common facts of life as Bunyan shows in *Mr Badman*, the origin of the novel must be looked for not in the fiction of this age, but in its history and in its "characters." Clarendon and Burnet with their powers of characterisation and anecdote, Butler with his Theophrastian *Characters*, Halifax, Saint-Évremond, and the letter-writers and diarists, sowed the seeds of such work as the *Spectator* papers on Sir Roger de Coverley, and their development into the English novel.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JOHN DE WITT AND WILLIAM OF ORANGE.

(1651-88.)

THE sudden demise of William II was the signal for a reaction against the Orange party and policy. The Great Assembly of 1651 assured the triumph of the principles of the "States party," which inherited the tradition of Oldenbarneveltdt, and the domination in the Union of the Province of Holland. It was really called together to decide between two opposing systems of government; and the critical conjuncture of affairs, which left the Orangists without a leader, made the decision a foregone conclusion. Its effect was to emphasise the sovereignty of the States of the several Provinces at the expense of that of the States General of the Union. By the thoroughgoing advocates of provincial autonomy it was indeed denied that the States General possessed any of the attributes of sovereignty at all. The Federal Assembly represented the Republic in the eyes of the outside world; but it had no authority save what was delegated to it by the seven sovereign Provinces acting in accord. It could not coerce the Provincial States or take action in opposition to their wishes. Such a theory, had it been pushed to its extreme limits, would have proved from the first unworkable. It had been corrected in practice by the existence in the United Netherlands of two strong, though antagonistic, influences. The one was the extensive executive powers vested in successive Princes of Orange. By their distinguished abilities, no less than by virtue of the offices they filled, the Stadholders William I, Maurice, Frederick Henry, and William II, exercised an authority which was strong enough at critical moments to override opposition. They were in reality, what they were often styled, "eminent heads" of the State. The other influence was that of the predominant Province of Holland, which bore more than half of the entire financial burden of the Union, and provided the greater part of its indispensable fleet. The States of Holland jealously and vigilantly asserted their independence and privileges, and their control of the purse gave them an almost irresistible weight in the determination of the policy of the Republic. Twice, in 1618 and 1650, had it been necessary to settle the question of supremacy between Holland and the Generality by the sword. But the imprisonment of Jacob de Witt and

his five companions in the Castle of Loevestein by William II only made their party, henceforth known as the Loevestein faction, the more determined to seize the opportunity offered by the young Stadholder's untimely death to ensure the triumph of their principles; and they succeeded.

Before the end of the year, Jacob de Witt had been restored to his old place in the Town Council, and his second son John appointed Pensionary, of Dort (December 21, 1650). John de Witt was at this time 25 years of age, having been born on September 24, 1625. His brother Cornelis, two years his senior, was already a sheriff in the Government of his native place. Both had been educated at Leyden and had travelled in France and England together. John settled down in 1647 to practise as an advocate at the Hague; but with his appointment as Pensionary a political career was opened to him. This post carried with it a seat in the Provincial States and in the Great Assembly, where, in virtue of his office, he was the spokesman of the town deputation. He soon distinguished himself by his industry and capacity for affairs. In the deliberations of the Great Assembly he took an active part; but it was in the disputes and negotiations with England that his political and diplomatic talents were first exhibited.

The relations between the English and Dutch Republics had, ever since the murder at the Hague of the Parliamentary envoy, Doreslaer, in 1649, been strained. There were many causes for embitterment between two maritime nations, whose commercial interests clashed in almost every part of the world. The rights of fishing, the so-called massacre of Amboina, the battle of the Downs, the striking of the Dutch flag in the Narrow Seas, the disputes between the two East India Companies—all these were sores that rankled. The Civil War had for a number of years prevented the English from pressing their grievances; but, when Cromwell found himself in possession of the Government, he was no longer willing to acquiesce in the Dutch monopoly of the carrying trade in English harbours or to yield one jot of English pretensions to the dominion of the seas. Cromwell's first ideas were peaceful but utopian. Visions of the formation of a great Protestant Coalition floated before his mind; and he wished, if possible, to get rid of the rivalry between the two neighbouring Republics, by bringing about a close alliance between them, which should differ little from political union. Accordingly, in March, 1651, a stately embassy, at the head of which were Oliver St John and Walter Strickland, was sent over to the Hague to carry these ideas into effect by inducing the States General to consent to an intimate and strict alliance and to the establishment of a great Common Council, to sit in London. Such proposals were seen by the Dutch to imply the loss of their independence and the practical absorption of the smaller State in the larger. Received with coldness by the States party, with undisguised and open hostility by the Orangists and the mass of the population, the English mission was a

failure. The irritation was great in England, and it speedily showed itself in vigorous action. On October 9, 1651, the celebrated Navigation Act was passed, which forbade all foreign bottoms to import into the country any merchandise except the products of the soil or of the industry of their own country. By this Act a deadly blow was dealt at the carrying trade of the Dutch, which was the main source of their prosperity. It was essential at this critical juncture that the conduct of foreign affairs should be in capable hands; and in a stadholderless Republic the Grand Pensionary (*Raad-Pensionaris*) of Holland, by his responsible position and the varied character of his functions both in the Provincial States and in the States General, was the man who by common consent exercised the greatest weight in public, and especially in foreign, affairs. The position so long filled by Oldenbarneveldt was now open to a statesman of the same mould as the great advocate, holding a similar office and professing the same principles. In John de Witt Oldenbarneveldt was to find a fitting and competent successor. When the Great Assembly met, Jacob Cats, a worthy man and a popular poet, was Grand Pensionary; but he was no politician. At the closing of the Assembly Cats resigned his office, and was succeeded by the aged Adrian Pauw.

In the spring of 1652 a special embassy had been despatched to Westminster, consisting at first of three members, Cats, Schaep, and van der Perre, who were afterwards joined by Pauw himself. The most strenuous efforts were made to induce the English Government to withdraw or modify the obnoxious Act of Navigation, and to open negotiations on the basis of the Treaty of Commerce of 1495 known as the "Great Intercourse"—but to no purpose. All the old grievances of the English against the Netherlands were raked up, and reparation demanded. More than this, the States were required to recognise unconditionally the English claim to the dominion of the sea, and to agree that, whenever Dutch and English vessels should meet in "English waters," the Dutchmen should strike sail and flag and in certain cases fire salutes. The issuing of letters of marque by the English Government and the seizure of seventy Dutch merchantmen widened still further a breach which diplomacy was unable to close. Much against their will, the Netherlands found themselves forced to prepare for war (March, 1652); and it finally broke out after an accidental encounter between Tromp and Blake over the striking of the flag (May 29). An account has been given in a previous volume of the hard-fought struggle between the two rival Maritime Powers, which was signalled in the course of fifteen months by twelve great sea-fights and a number of smaller engagements. It was in the midst of this terrible War that the Pensionary of Dort was called to the direction of affairs. During the absence of Adrian Pauw in England he had acted as deputy in his place; and after the death of that statesman he was (March, 1653) first appointed provisionally to fill his office, then definitively elected (July 30). Thus becoming Grand Pensionary at a

moment of sore difficulty and anxiety, he speedily displayed a firmness and clear-sightedness which more than justified the selection of so young a man to a position of so great responsibility. The unpreparedness of the Dutch navy for the conflict, and its inferiority in the size and equipment of its ships, had caused the fortunes of war to turn decisively to the side of the English. Both fleets had fought with heroic courage, victory alternating for each of them with defeat, and the admirals on both sides were men of exceptional merit. The death of Tromp, however, in battle (August 10, 1653) had caused consternation in the Netherlands, and de Witt on entering upon his office found himself confronted with an almost desperate situation. The great fisheries industry had ceased, business and commerce were at a standstill. There was a deficiency in the supply of corn and of all the imported necessities of life; beggary stared thousands in the face; and, worst of all, there was no money in the treasury, nor any source from which to obtain it. The mass of the population, always Orangist in sentiment, attributed all their misfortunes to the change of Government, and in many places tumults arose, which assumed serious proportions.

This condition of things made the States party, who from the beginning had been averse from the War, ready to consider any reasonable terms of peace; and they found in the Grand Pensionary a zealous and whole-hearted leader. Meanwhile Cromwell, with the army behind him, had forcibly dissolved the Long Parliament and become practically master of the State. He had never viewed the outbreak of war with favour, for it had put a summary stop to his schemes for a close and intimate union between the two Republics. No sooner therefore had he obtained dictatorial powers than he lent a ready ear to peaceful proposals. Many ineffectual attempts had already been made to open negotiations, but had failed. Cromwell had in February, 1653, sent over a certain Colonel Dolman, formerly in the States' service, to make known privately his conciliatory disposition towards the United Provinces; and, acting under the influence of de Witt, the States of Holland had taken upon themselves to address certain proposals to the Parliament in a letter sent without the assent of the States General. The Parliament, however, not only refused to modify the terms proposed before the War, but printed and published the letter with the title of the "Humble Supplication of the States of Holland." Such a course of action was intentionally offensive, and roused general indignation in the Netherlands. The States of Holland were blamed for the initiative they had taken without the knowledge of the other Provinces, and loud outcries were raised by the Orange party. It required all the persuasive powers of de Witt to prevent the States General from replying to the Parliament in the same arrogant tone in which they had been addressed. Owing, however, to his arguments and efforts, moderate counsels prevailed, and the States General declared themselves ready to appoint plenipotentiaries to discuss the conditions of a treaty of peace.

De Witt would gladly have entrusted the mission to a single plenipotentiary whom he could thoroughly trust; but the jealousy of the other Provinces would not permit the negotiations to be placed entirely in the hands of Hollanders. It was agreed therefore to send four envoys, two from Holland—Hieronymus van Beverningh, Burgomaster of Gouda, and William Nieuwpoort, Pensionary of Schiedam—with whom were associated representatives of the two other maritime Provinces, the Zeelander, Paulus van der Perre, Pensionary of Middelburg, and Allard Pieter Jongest al, President of the Court of Justice in Friesland. Beverningh and Nieuwpoort were both good friends of de Witt, and to the former of them he gave his entire confidence. The reception accorded by the Council of State in England was not very encouraging. The old demands were insisted upon, nothing less than political union—“*una gens, una respublica*”—in other words, the annexation of the United Provinces by the English Republic. There was to be one State under a common Government, with the same laws, rights, possessions and interests. Such proposals were absolutely unacceptable. A continuance of the War appeared a lesser evil than loss of independence. All hopes of accommodation were not, however, abandoned. Van Beverningh and van der Perre were instructed to remain in London and continue the negotiations, while the other two envoys returned home to confer with their principals. For some months but little change took place in the situation. The War went on; but the interchange of views as to possible conditions of peace was not stopped. Nieuwpoort and Jongest al returned to England in November; and in December Cromwell became Lord Protector, and acquired a free hand. He at once assured the Dutch ambassadors that he was sincerely anxious to bring to an end a war which had from the outset grieved him. It was difficult, in the midst of his protestations, to discover what were the Protector's actual aims. Many conferences took place; and Cromwell, though still proclaiming his wish to bring about a close alliance, no longer made demands involving the sacrifice of Dutch independence. The fear that an Orange restoration in the Netherlands might resuscitate the Stewart cause and possibly lead to attempts to bring about a royalist restoration in England haunted his mind. At last he formulated his peace proposals to the plenipotentiaries in 27 articles. In these he made no mention of the union of the two Republics. The States General were to pay an annual sum for the right of fishing upon the English coasts, to maintain only a limited number of ships, to strike the flag in the English seas, and to recognise the right of search. But, in addition to these sufficiently severe conditions, the States General were by Article 12 required to bind themselves never to permit the Prince of Orange or any of his race to obtain any of the civil or military dignities and powers which had been held by his ancestors.

Great was the disappointment of de Witt on learning that the

Protector thus put forward a demand, which he knew would never be conceded by the States General. The situation was "desperate," and the envoys asked for their passports. In a speech to the States General the Grand Pensionary urged the necessity for taking the strongest measures for carrying on the War with vigour. The fleet must be strengthened regardless of cost, and alliances sought with foreign Powers, two of which, France and Denmark, had already shown an inclination to take sides with the Dutch; indeed, Denmark had begun to negotiate for a treaty and had provoked the hostility of England by the closing of the Sound to English commerce and by the seizure of English ships. This determined attitude had its effect upon Cromwell. He showed a willingness to modify the terms; but he insisted on the exclusion of the House of Orange from the stadholdership and captain-generalship; and, on account of the hostile action of Denmark, he refused to allow her to be included in the Treaty of Peace. Just, however, as the Dutch plenipotentiaries were on the point of embarking at Gravesend on their return, a messenger from Cromwell arrived with the information that the Protector gave way so far as regarded Denmark, and that he would be content with a secret article in the matter of the exclusion. All this time confidential correspondence was constantly passing between the Grand Pensionary and van Beverningh, and de Witt lost no time in dealing with the new situation. Van Beverningh was instructed to inform Cromwell that there was not the least chance of securing the assent of the States General to such a secret article. In a private interview with van Beverningh Cromwell now gave the plenipotentiary to understand that, if the Province of Holland would guarantee the exclusion of the Prince of Orange from the stadholdership and the post of Captain-General, he would accept it. De Witt, although he saw clearly all the immense difficulties that stood in the way of obtaining such a guarantee, set to work to accomplish the task. The Grand Pensionary in the Hague and van Beverningh in London in the deepest secrecy conducted clandestine negotiations with Cromwell, while openly de Witt was inducing the States General, and with success, to agree to and ratify the treaty, out of which the article concerning the exclusion of the House of Orange had been struck. On April 22 it was signed and sent over to England. The only reference to the burning question was contained in Article 32, the so-called "*temperament*" clause, by which the States General and the States severally undertook that every Stadholder, Captain-General or commander of military or naval forces was to be required to take an oath to observe the treaty.

Meanwhile a very delicate and dangerous diplomatic game was being played—that of seeking to obtain in absolute secrecy the consent of the States of Holland to the undisclosed Act of Seclusion. Quite unexpectedly, and without agenda having been prepared, the States were summoned to meet on April 28. All the members were first bound by oath to secrecy; and hereupon the Grand Pensionary read to them an official letter from

van Beverningh and Nieuwpoort stating the requirement of Cromwell. Surprised and perplexed, the deputies asked for time to consult their principals before coming to a decision. It was agreed, however, in order to avoid delay and publicity, that only the regent Burgomasters should be informed of the contents of the envoys' despatch, once more under oath of secrecy, and that the States should meet again in three days' time. On May 1 the Assembly met, when the Pensionary read another despatch which he had just received from London, notifying Cromwell's demand that the Act should be handed over to him within a couple of days of the ratification of the treaty—or he would not consider it binding upon him. After stormy discussion, under the influence of Cromwell's threat and de Witt's persuasive arguments, a majority, consisting of the nobles and thirteen towns, voted for the signing of the "Act of Seclusion." Five towns, Haarlem, Leyden, Alkmaar, Edam and Eukhuizen, however, obstinately refused their assent. Despite the protest of the minority, de Witt declared the Act to be passed; and it was sent on the following day to the two envoys in London, with instructions, however, not to deliver it unless it were absolutely necessary.

Through the treachery of a clerk the secret was betrayed to William Frederick, Stadholder of Friesland; and, as the rumour spread throughout the country, a loud and threatening outcry arose against the States of Holland and the Grand Pensionary. Not only was the entire Orange party up in arms, but the other Provinces bitterly resented the action taken by the Hollanders as a breach of the Union. In the States General de Witt endeavoured to meet the attacks upon him by evasive replies, asserting in general terms that the States, his masters, had done nothing that was illegal or outside their powers. The States, however, themselves were not as courageous as their Pensionary and shrank before the storm which they had raised, thanking their envoys for not having handed in the Act to the English Government. Some five weeks passed, but at length the patience of the States General was exhausted; and on June 6 it was resolved that orders be despatched to the envoys to send all the secret instructions they had received from the States of Holland to the States General, together with a copy of the Act of Seclusion. But de Witt's extraordinary skill in political strategy and his talent for diplomatic intrigue shone out the more brilliantly, the more hopeless the embarrassments from which he had to extricate himself. At the eleventh hour he determined to make one last effort to gain his end. Acting on his advice, the States General gave instructions that the despatch to the envoys should be written in cipher, not in the ordinary form. With the despatch, however, he enclosed a letter to van Beverningh and Nieuwpoort, informing them that the States of Holland assented to the request of the States General, and asking them to send the copy of the Act, *if it were still in their possession*. The plan succeeded. While the despatch of the States General was being painfully deciphered,

van Beverningh read de Witt's letter, at once grasped its meaning, demanded an interview with the Protector, and delivered the Act of Seclusion into his hands. When the deciphering was completed, it was already too late to carry out the instructions of the States General.

Throughout the whole course of this crooked business there can be no two opinions as to the ability displayed by the Grand Pensionary. His correspondence, moreover, proves his honesty of purpose. He felt peace to be absolutely necessary for the welfare of the Republic, so long as its conditions were not humiliating or threatened the independence of the State. Bitterly hostile as he was to the House of Orange, there are no grounds for the accusation that the Act of Seclusion was desired by him, still less that it was due to his instigation. Such a course of chicanery and deception is, however, not to be defended either by its motives or its results; and, as a matter of fact, it brought unpopularity upon de Witt and his party and was never forgotten or forgiven by the great majority of the people of the Netherlands, who cherished the memory of the great deeds of the House of Orange. Nothing could have more effectually enlisted the sympathy and affection of the populace for the young Prince than the thought that he had been in an underhand way defrauded of his rights at the bidding of a foreign ruler.

Peace once concluded, commerce revived and with returning prosperity men's spirits grew calmer, and the angry manifestations against the Act of Seclusion gradually died down. Even the two Princesses of Orange were appeased by the personal explanations and marked courtesy of de Witt, and thought it better not to run any risk of doing injury to the interests of William by adopting an attitude of irreconcilable hostility. The States of Holland admitted that their conduct required exculpation; and the Grand Pensionary drew up a laboured defence of their action in the matter of the Act of Seclusion in a lengthy document known as the "Deduction of the States of Holland." This state-paper was far indeed from convincing the opponents of de Witt's policy, notwithstanding the undoubted skill and acumen which it displayed; but those opponents were far too divided amongst themselves to be able to concentrate their efforts against the constantly increasing power and influence of the Grand Pensionary. The Princess Dowager and the Princess Royal were at enmity with one another and with Count William Frederick, and their family bickerings and private ambitions prevented the supporters of the House of Orange from being able to pursue any common policy. Moreover, the marriage of de Witt in February, 1655, with Wendela Bicker greatly strengthened his position. Two of Wendela's uncles had been the leaders of Amsterdam's opposition to William II in 1650 and had been declared incapable of henceforth holding any municipal office. Through this marriage de Witt became connected with several of the principal members of the burgher oligarchy of the great commercial city, thus supplementing the powerful family

influence he already possessed in the south of Holland. The Grand Pensionary, indeed, was soon surrounded by a group of relatives and intimate friends, holding important official posts in public or local administration. His brother Cornelis was appointed *Ruwaard* (Governor) of Putten in 1654; his father was made a member of the Chamber of Finance in 1657; his cousins van Slingelandt and Vivien were in succession Pensionaries of Dort; his wife's uncles, Cornelis Bicker and Cornelis de Graeff, were all-powerful in Amsterdam. The most influential functionary of the States General, the *Griffier* (Secretary), Nicolas Ruysch, de Witt's predecessor as Pensionary of Dort, was his devoted adherent; so were the distinguished diplomatists van Beverningh, van Beuningen and Nieuwpoort. Successive vacancies in high commands in the army and navy and in the presidencies of the Courts of Justice were filled with supporters of the anti-Stadholder party; so that, in the absence of any serious rival to his authority, the Grand Pensionary found himself able, while nominally only a Minister in the service of the Provincial States of Holland, to gather into his hands the supreme direction alike of the foreign and domestic affairs of the State. Not even Oldenbarneveltdt during the youth of Maurice had possessed so wide and far-reaching an authority.

One of the great difficulties with which Holland had to contend was that of finance. The Province had borne the greater part of the burden of the War of Independence; and although, with a view to lightening its weight, the rate of interest had in 1640 been reduced from $6\frac{1}{4}$ to 5 per cent., the debt had kept growing, and at the close of the English War amounted to 153,000,000 florins, the annual charge upon which reached nearly 7,000,000 florins. De Witt began with retrenching expenditure, wherever it could be done with safety, by a careful examination into all superfluous and wasteful outgoings, and a better and more vigilant administration of the public revenues. Finding it impossible, however, to make the charges balance the receipts, and faced by an annual deficit, the Grand Pensionary resolved upon the bold step of a further reduction of interest. It was with difficulty that he persuaded the States of Holland to agree to his proposal, that the rate of interest should be reduced from 5 to 4 per cent. Such a step could not be taken without a serious loss of income to the numerous holders of public securities. By establishing a sinking fund, however, for the paying off of the entire debt in 41 years, he succeeded in carrying out his proposal. This achieved, he was able to induce the States General to follow the example of the Province, and to reduce the interest on the federal debt likewise to 4 per cent.

No one saw more clearly than de Witt that the foremost interest of a trading and colonising country like the United Provinces was peace, and to this end all his efforts in the conduct of foreign affairs were directed. Unfortunately his lot was cast in troubled and anxious times. In the relations with England, in spite of the goodwill of the respective

Governments, the trade rivalry caused continual controversies to arise. In Nieuwpoort, however, the States had an envoy in whom the Grand Pensionary reposed the utmost confidence, and who succeeded in ingratiating himself both with Cromwell and his Secretary of State, Thurloe. Difficulties arose between the two countries with regard to Portugal, and still more acutely in the Baltic. The death of Cromwell in 1658 alone prevented active English intervention in the war with Portugal caused by the loss of Brazil, where the Portuguese rebels against Dutch rule in Pernambuco had had at first the secret and afterwards the open support of the mother country. The last remnant of the authority of the Dutch West India Company had disappeared so long ago as 1654 with the loss of Recife, and the English War had prevented any active steps being taken to reassert it. There was no inclination in the Netherlands to send any expedition across the Atlantic to recover the lost colony; but it was felt that there was a claim against Portugal for compensation, and de Witt in 1657 determined to enforce it. War was declared against Portugal; and the conquest of Ceylon and Macassar followed. In Europe the hostilities, which dragged on for some years, were confined to naval demonstrations on the Portuguese coast. The complications in the north were much more serious.

In Sweden, on the abdication in 1654 of Christina the warlike and ambitious Charles Gustavus ascended the throne. As has been already seen, he aimed at nothing short of the conversion by force of arms of the Baltic into a Swedish lake. But the interests of the United Provinces in the Baltic trade were enormous. It was from the Baltic that their supplies of corn were brought. Aided by Frederick William of Brandenburg, Charles Gustavus entered upon a career of victory. Poland was overrun, and the allied armies (1656) laid siege to Danzig, the emporium of the wheat trade. Under pressure from the merchants of Amsterdam de Witt determined on an energetic policy. It was proposed by the States of Holland, and agreed to by the States General, that a naval demonstration should be made to save the beleaguered town and preserve the balance of power in the Baltic. A fleet of forty-two ships accordingly set sail under Obdam de Wassenaar, which raised the blockade of Danzig, and by an understanding with the Poles placed a garrison in the town. This act of vigour brought the King of Sweden to reason. At a conference at Elbing (September, 1656) the former treaty of friendship between the two Powers was renewed, and Danzig was declared a neutral port. This check to Sweden was, however, to be the precursor of fresh strife. Hostilities again broke out. Brandenburg changed sides, and the Swedes were rapidly driven out of Poland. Their defeat encouraged Frederick III of Denmark to declare war against his northern neighbours, in spite of the counsel and remonstrances of the States. A treaty of defensive alliance had recently been concluded between the United Provinces and Denmark; and de Witt therefore regarded with alarm this bold assault

of the weaker upon the stronger Scandinavian Power. It was too late. Charles Gustavus attacked and utterly defeated the Danes, and was able to dictate terms of peace at Roeskilde (March, 1658), where Frederick agreed to close the Sound to all foreign fleets. But when, on the plea that the Treaty of Roeskilde had not been carried out by the Danes, Charles Gustavus laid siege to Copenhagen, de Witt, who had hitherto in his desire to avoid the risks of war confined himself to diplomatic pressure, now felt that, unless the absolute dominion of the Baltic was to be given up to the Swedish King, instant action must be taken. It was a dangerous situation, for the Republic was at war with Portugal and on far from friendly relations with either France or England. But the Baltic question was vital, and de Witt did not hesitate. In the beginning of October, Admiral Obdam de Wassenaar sailed for Copenhagen, which was obstinately defended, at the head of a fleet of thirty-five vessels carrying 4000 troops. His orders were to destroy the Swedish fleet and to raise the siege of Copenhagen. A terrific battle took place at the entrance into the Baltic. The Swedish fleet of forty-five vessels, under the command of Wrangel, made a valiant defence against the attack of the Netherlanders. The two Dutch Vice-Admirals, Witte de With and Pieter Floriszoon, were both killed; Obdam himself was nearly taken prisoner; but the Swedes suffered heavy loss and took refuge in the harbour of Landskrona. Copenhagen was saved from capture. The siege, nevertheless, went on; and, fearing the intervention of France and England, de Witt prudently entered into negotiations with those two Powers, and a convention was signed by which the three States agreed to act together as mediators between the Kings of Sweden and Denmark, and, if necessary, compel them to make peace. For months the negotiations continued without an agreement being reached. Both Kings were obstinate, but more especially Charles Gustavus, who refused to accept the terms proposed by the mediators, and still threatened Copenhagen on the land side with a strong force. In these circumstances de Ruyter, who was now in command of the Dutch fleet, was ordered to expel the Swedes from the island of Fyen. On November 24, 1659, the town of Nyborg was taken by storm, and the whole Swedish force there entrenched was captured. The Swedish fleet took refuge in Landskrona, where it was blockaded by de Ruyter. The proud spirit of Charles Gustavus was broken by this disaster, and he died a few months later (February 23, 1660). Peace between Sweden and Denmark was at length signed at Copenhagen (May 27), guaranteed by the mediating Powers. The Swedes retained most of their conquests; but the passage of the Sound was made open. The firm, but prudent, policy of de Witt thus successfully attained its aim; and the Republic, after this display of maritime power, took its place with added weight in the councils of Europe.

The sudden restoration of Charles II in May, 1660, to the throne

of his ancestors placed de Witt and the States party in Holland in a dilemma. Their hostility to the interests of the House of Stewart in its hour of humiliation and distress had been marked; but the Grand Pensionary was too supple a statesman not to be able to accommodate himself to the complete change in the situation. Charles was at Breda when the invitation reached him to return to England. The States General, the States of Holland, and de Witt himself, vied with one another in their deferential attitude and in their adulation of the poverty-stricken exile of yesterday, who had now become a powerful king. His reception at the Hague was magnificent. When he set sail from Scheveningen, he was solemnly escorted to the beach by the members of the States of Holland and of the States General. Profuse promises of eternal friendship were exchanged. But the States party knew that the change boded them no good. It was significant that, on his public visit to the States of Holland, Charles handed to the Grand Pensionary a declaration signed by himself, commending to their care "the Princess my sister and the Prince of Orange my nephew, two persons who are extremely dear to me." It was nothing less than a demand for the rescinding of the Act of Seclusion, which indeed speedily followed. De Witt, however, despite the efforts of the Princess Royal, steadily declined to allow the young Prince to be appointed to the civil and military posts held by his ancestors. In many parts of the country, even in Holland itself, there were strong movements in favour of William III being at once nominated Captain- and Admiral-General. But de Witt would not consent to this. The States of Holland, however, at his advice, by a unanimous vote, agreed to regard the young Prince as their ward and to educate him at the public expense. William, who had hitherto been under the ban of the ruling authorities, was thus placed in a position which virtually implied the ultimate reversion to him of his ancestral dignities.

Peace with Portugal was one of the results which flowed from the restoration of Charles II, whose marriage with a Portuguese princess led him to take a friendly interest in the settlement of this protracted dispute. After many delays a treaty was at length signed, August 6, 1661, though it was not ratified until the following year. By this treaty the Dutch abandoned all claims in Brazil, subject to an indemnity of 8,000,000 florins to be paid in sixteen years. They were further compensated by being left in possession of their conquests in the East Indies. De Witt had to use all his firmness and skill in the accomplishment of this diplomatic task. He had to face the opposition of Zeeland and Gelderland and the wiles of the English ambassador, George Downing. He had finally to force the hands of the procrastinating Portuguese Government by the threat of the immediate despatch of a Dutch fleet to Lisbon.

Thus in 1662 all outstanding difficulties and quarrels with foreign Powers appeared to have been removed, and an era of peaceful develop-

ment and progress to lie before the Dutch Republic. The issue was to be far otherwise. An understanding with France had been arrived at (April 27, 1662), and an offensive and defensive alliance concluded, a pledge for the maintenance of which seemed to be assured by the sending of Count d'Estrades, already well known in the Netherlands, as ambassador to the Hague. Between him and John de Witt the closest ties of friendship and confidence were soon established. With England, however, the relations of the United Provinces were strained from the outset of Charles II's reign, and there was a constantly growing irritation between the two countries, in spite of the efforts made by de Witt to remain on friendly terms. The part, indeed, which the Grand Pensionary took in the delivering up of the three regicides, Burghstead, Corbet and Okey, led to a charge being made against him of cowardice and subserviency. It was all, however, of no avail. Downing, a very master of intrigue, was secretly hostile to the Republic, and used his diplomatic opportunities to aggravate the differences arising from the maritime and commercial rivalry of the two nations. The English Government refused to modify in any way the Act of Navigation, or its claims to the sovereignty of the seas. A prolonged dispute arose as to the indemnity to be paid for the seizure of two English trading vessels in the East Indies. There was a controversy of long standing about the rights of the English and Dutch East India Companies to the possession of the island of Pularoon in the Moluccas. A more serious grievance arose from the seizure, in February, 1664, of some of the Dutch possessions on the west coast of Africa by an English expedition, commanded by Robert Holmes, on behalf of the Royal African Company, of which the Duke of York was patron. Such a flagrant violation of the law of nations in time of peace could not be passed by. As the complaints of the States General to the English Government were met by evasions, it was resolved in all secrecy to order de Ruyter, who was cruising in the Mediterranean with a squadron of twelve ships, to proceed to the coast of Guinea, and reconquer the lost possessions. In October came a still worse piece of news from the West Indies, to the effect that another English expedition, sent out under the auspices of the Duke of York, had taken possession of the Dutch colony of New Netherland on the river Hudson, and had changed the name of the capital from New Amsterdam to New York. The States General again protested in the strongest terms; but nothing was done rashly to provoke hostilities. De Witt was earnestly desirous of maintaining the peace, but the war party in England was all-powerful; and already in December it was clear that nothing but the declaration of war was wanting to make the rupture complete. This followed in March, 1665, and the two nations once more found themselves engaged in a fierce struggle for the mastery of the seas.

The Dutch were far better prepared than in 1653, and the Admiralties vied with each other in building ships and providing equipment.

The want of an Admiral-General was supplied by the immense diligence and zeal of de Witt, who had taken pains to make himself thoroughly acquainted with all the details of naval administration; and who personally, with the Commissioners appointed by the States General, visited all the ports and superintended the preparations. Inferior in some respects to the splendidly equipped and disciplined fleet of England, the Dutch navy could at least boast that in Michael Adrianszoon de Ruyter it possessed a leader second to none in the whole history of sea warfare. An account of the naval campaigns of 1665, 1666, 1667 is given in another chapter. It is sufficient here to say that, while the heroic courage and determination exhibited on both sides have never been surpassed, victory on the whole inclined to the side of the English, though the final dazzling exploit of de Ruyter in sailing up the Medway and burning the English ships at their anchorage before Chatham has perhaps impressed the popular imagination more than any of the great battles, in which so much skill and endurance were called forth.

The conduct and calmness of the Grand Pensionary throughout the vicissitudes of the struggle all authorities—enemies as well as friends—agree in praising. With imperturbable serenity he faced all the difficulties and changes of fortune, and inspired others with the patriotic faith and courage which animated himself. Not content with the enormous labours involved in the direction and control of the diplomatic, financial, and domestic affairs of the Republic, he on more than one occasion himself accompanied the fleets to sea and exposed his person freely to all the dangers of the campaign, instilling into officers and men the strength of will and unremitting energy which were apparent in all his actions. At no time in his splendid career did John de Witt more conclusively show his possession of rare qualities as a leader of men.

But though the navy had been raised to a high state of efficiency and was able to hold its own against the superior maritime strength of England, it was far otherwise with the army, whose numbers and training had been allowed to fall far below the requirements of safety. Charles II had concluded a secret alliance with the Bishop of Münster, who had grievances against the States for their refusal to admit his pretensions to the lordship of Borkelo. Force had even been employed to prevent him from asserting his claims. The Bishop now (September 19, 1665) declared war and crossed the frontier at the head of an army of 18,000 men. There was no organised force to oppose him, and no commander-in-chief. William Frederick of Friesland had died (October 31, 1664) from the results of an accident and had been succeeded in his stadholdership by his young son, Henry Casimir II, under the guardianship of his mother. In this emergency the States offered the command to Joan Maurice of Nassau-Siegen, distinguished as Governor of Dutch Brazil, who had latterly been Governor of Cleves for the Elector of Brandenburg. A considerable part of Drente and Overijssel was overrun by the

Münster troops before effectual means of resistance could be prepared. De Witt, however, secured the assistance of a body of French troops, and another force of subsidised troops raised in the Brunswick-Lüneburg dominions under the command of Count George Frederick of Waldeck. By these measures the danger was averted and the Bishop compelled (April 18, 1666) to conclude a peace by which he relinquished all his claims on Borkelo. Already in the beginning of 1666 de Witt had begun to feel his way to opening negotiations with England for peace. While neglecting nothing to draw closer the bonds of alliance with France, who had declared war against England (January, 1666), and to secure the friendly cooperation of Denmark and Brandenburg against possible danger from Sweden or Münster, the Grand Pensionary was sincerely anxious to relieve the Netherlands from the tremendous burden which the cost of the war and the cessation of commerce imposed on the Provinces, especially upon Holland. He knew that England was likewise suffering heavily from the same causes, and he was resolved to spare no effort to promote a good understanding between the two nations. With this object in view he proposed, after consultation with the Princess Dowager of Orange, to the States of Holland that they should take charge of the education of William III, as "Child of State"; and the proposal was carried into effect, April 9, 1666. A commission was now appointed, with the Grand Pensionary himself at its head, whose duty it was to see that the young Prince was thoroughly instructed in the principles of the Reformed religion and in the good and wholesome rights, privileges and maxims of the State. A similar proposal, it may be remembered, had been made in 1660; but the sudden death of the Princess Royal a few months later and the unfriendly attitude of the English King had caused it to remain a dead letter. Exactly a year after the passing of this resolution, the plenipotentiaries of the Powers were slowly gathering at Breda for the peace negotiations. The result of the meeting was not encouraging; there was endless haggling over all the old grievances and causes of quarrel, and in the middle of June no sort of progress had been made. The delay led to de Ruyter's humiliating expedition to Chatham, when the sound of the Dutch guns was heard in London (June 22). This surprising success led to the speedy conclusion of peace (July 31, 1667), on terms which, though showing moderation on the part of de Witt, were far more favourable to the Dutch than could at an earlier period have been thought possible. The Navigation Act remained in force, but was qualified so far as to admit goods from Germany and the southern Netherlands carried in Dutch vessels; while the question as to the saluting of the English flag was left untouched. As regards the East and West Indies the principle of *uti possidetis* was adopted, the date fixed being May 10, 1667. This gave New Netherland to England and Pularoon to the States, who also acquired the colony of Surinam and the island of Tobago, which had been conquered by a

squadron under the command of the Zeelander Abraham Crynssen (February, 1667).

The signing of the treaty was followed by measures being taken on the part of the Province of Holland to maintain its supremacy in the Union. Serious and widespread movements had for some time been on foot for the overthrow of the States party and the conferring of the posts of Stadholder and Captain-General on the Prince of Orange. To prevent such a consummation, the States of Holland passed (August 5) unanimously what was known as the "Eternal Edict." It decreed that no Captain- or Admiral-General of the Union could be at the same time Stadholder of a province: in Holland itself the office of Stadholder was for ever abolished. This strong step was followed by the trial of the *Sieur de Buat*, a French officer in the service of the States, before the Supreme Court of Holland for treasonable correspondence, as an Orange agent, with the enemy. *Buat* was condemned to death and executed (October 11).

No sooner was peace concluded with England than the Republic found itself confronted by a new danger from the ambition of its former ally, the King of France. The causes which led to the "War of Devolution" need not be again recounted here. On May 21, 1667, Louis XIV crossed the Belgian frontier with an army of 50,000 men. It was not an invasion, but a state entry of the new ruler of the "Spanish" Netherlands (for Queen Maria Teresa accompanied the expedition) into her inherited dominions. The Spanish Governor, *Castel-Rodrigo*, was in no position to oppose such a force; and in the course of three months the long line of frontier fortresses fell, almost without resistance, into the hands of the French. The conquest of the whole of the southern Netherlands appeared imminent. Great was the alarm of the Dutch at such a prospect. It had long been a fixed principle of their statesmen, "Greet France as a friend, not as a neighbour"; and *de Witt*, whose policy it had always been to cultivate the goodwill of France, was fully alive to the vital importance of having a barrier State between the United Provinces and the powerful military monarchy ruled by Louis XIV. He was in a most difficult position. The Dutch Republic, which had just emerged exhausted from one great war, could not venture to oppose by force—with only Spain as an ally—the ambitious schemes of the French monarch. To do so would be to court disaster. With *d'Estrades* at the Hague, and through *van Beuningen* at Paris, he entered into negotiations, with the aim, if possible, of discovering some compromise which would satisfy the King and at the same time avert in some measure the danger which threatened the States. All his efforts were in vain. His only hope lay in forming a coalition against France; and he turned to England and Sweden. In September *John Meerman* was sent on a special embassy to England, and negotiations were opened with the Swedish envoy *Dohna*, at the Hague. The fall of *Clarendon* and the rise to power of *Arlington*

brought about a complete change of English policy. Sir William Temple, the English resident at Brussels, was sent to the Hague to learn in person the views and aims of de Witt, and afterwards to repair to London to confer with the home Government. Temple was heart and soul in the accomplishment of his mission, and he returned to the Hague (January 17, 1668) commissioned to express on the part of the English Ministry their willingness to cooperate with the United Provinces in common action against French pretensions. It was only natural for the States General, and for de Witt himself, to regard somewhat distrustfully this offer of alliance on the part of their recent enemy. But Temple's persuasiveness prevailed; and, largely by his personal exertions, the matter was driven through at express speed. Thus, on January 23 the treaty which bound England and the United Provinces to a defensive alliance and joint resistance to French aggression was signed by the English ambassador and the commissioners of the States General. Three days later Dohna was able to inform Temple and de Witt of the adhesion of Sweden to what was now the Triple Alliance. There was great rejoicing among all parties in the Netherlands, which was marked by the presence of both the Prince of Orange and Prince Joan Maurice of Nassau at a ball given by the Grand Pensionary in honour of the occasion.

There were still, however, many difficulties to overcome. The French King was indisposed to draw back in the full tide of success. Spain was unwilling to surrender territory. Swedish support was to a large extent mercenary, and dependent upon subsidies. The firmness of de Witt and the tact of Temple, however, overcame all obstacles. To prove that they were in earnest a strong military force was gathered on the Scheldt and the Yssel, and a fleet equipped. The Spanish Governor, Castel-Rodrigo, was informed that, unless he consented to accept the mediation of the allies, the States army would cross the frontier and occupy Flanders. Louis XIV, now master of Franche Comté, felt himself in a strong position to negotiate and was ready to make concessions rather than enter upon a war in which Spain would have the armed support of the Triple Alliance. The preliminary conditions of peace were settled at St Germain-en-Laye between the French Foreign Minister, Lionne, and the Dutch and English ambassadors, van Beuningen and Trevor (April 15), and confirmed by a conference of the Powers at Aachen (May 2). The treaty was very advantageous to the French King, who restored Franche Comté, but retained in Flanders and Brabant most of the towns he had occupied. A guarantee was given to Spain by the three Powers of the remainder of her Belgian possessions; but the ephemeral character of the Triple Alliance rendered such a guarantee of little real value. It was felt, nevertheless, by all that the result achieved was a great personal triumph for the Grand Pensionary's statesmanship. He had succeeded in checking the ambitious projects of

Louis XIV, at a moment when the French military power seemed to be irresistible, and in forcing him to conclude peace. At the Congress of Aachen the Dutch Republic was able to take its place among the Great Powers of Europe and to pose as the arbiter of peace and war. Never before or since did the United Provinces occupy so high a position of influence and authority. The Peace of Aachen, following closely upon that of Breda, set the seal to the greatness of the administration of John de Witt. The inscription upon a medal struck for the occasion gives expression to the proud self-satisfaction felt throughout the States: "After having made the Laws secure, reformed Religion, reconciled Kings, maintained the Freedom of the Seas, established Peace in Europe the Council of the United Netherlands has caused this medal to be struck in 1668." It reads like an epitaph. The sequel will show that as such it might well be regarded.

The Peace of Aachen rankled in the mind of Louis XIV, and from this time he vowed the destruction of the Dutch Republic and of the Grand Pensionary. His first efforts were directed to the detachment of Charles II from the "Triple Bond." It was not a difficult task. Charles' object in entering it had been not to maintain Spain in possession of the southern Netherlands, but to detach the Dutch Republic from France. Every possible ground of dispute with the Netherlanders arising out of the Treaty of Breda was now raked up and treated as a diplomatic grievance. In vain was van Beuningen sent on a special mission to London in June, 1670, to settle complaints about comparatively trifling matters in the East Indies and in Surinam. There was a strong war party in England, who wished to wipe out the memory of Chatham, and Charles only too readily fell in with their wishes. On December 31, 1671, he concluded at Dover a secret treaty with Louis XIV, which bound him, in consideration of a yearly subsidy of 3,000,000 francs and the acquisition of Walcheren and the mouths of the Scheldt, to abandon the Triple Alliance and at the bidding of Louis declare war upon the Dutch. At the same time steps were being successfully taken to undermine the, at all times, rather wavering attachment of Sweden to the Alliance.

At home in the United Provinces the position of de Witt had during the English War become decidedly weaker. The bitterest attacks were made upon him, and nothing but want of leaders prevented the Orange party from the overthrow of the stadholderless Government. Even among his old friends there was dissatisfaction at the ascendancy of what may be styled the de Witt family connexion. Van Beverningh resigned the post of Treasurer-General. Van Beuningen, who had great influence in Amsterdam, became alienated. Indeed, a strong opposition to de Witt was gradually forming there, of which the leader was Gillis Valckenier. And, meanwhile, the Prince of Orange was slowly growing to adolescence. Of feeble health and weak in body, William was endowed by nature with extraordinary intelligence and a strength of character quite uncommon.

He had passed a somewhat miserable boyhood amidst the jars of family quarrels. His home was a hot-bed of intrigue, and he was keenly watched by eager partisans and jealous enemies. But with a self-restraint that was almost unnatural, observing everything, committing no false step, uttering no rash words, William bided his time. Cold, calm and impenetrable, in proud isolation, forming his plans for the future, confident that his hour would come, with a sagacity and a dissimulation beyond his years the heir of the Nassaus went quietly on his way. How many an anxious moment must de Witt have passed, as he tried to read the thoughts and to forecast the future of the Child of State, whose tutelage the Province of Holland had placed largely in his hands! The Eternal Edict of August, 1667, is a measure of the fear with which the Grand Pensionary and the Holland Regents regarded the growing menace to the domination of their party. The erection of this paper barrier gave a sense of security. To the majority at least, if not to all. The story runs that, as the document lay on the table before him, de Witt's cousin, Vivien, the Pensionary of Dort, stuck the point of his penknife through it. "What are you doing?" asked the Grand Pensionary. "I am trying to see what steel can do against parchment," was the reply.

The earnestness with which de Witt set to work to persuade the other Provinces to follow the example of Holland shows that he was haunted by the same suspicion as Vivien. He succeeded quickly in gaining over Gelderland, Utrecht, and Overijssel; but for a long time Zeeland, Friesland, and Groningen absolutely refused their concurrence. In these Provinces the Orange partisans had the upper hand, and they remained deaf to all the solicitations addressed to them.

Meanwhile, in July, 1668, de Witt, whose five years' term of office had been renewed in 1658 and 1663, was now for the fourth time reappointed Grand Pensionary, and in recognition of his great services with a doubled salary, besides a large gratuity. Hitherto his salary had been only 3000 florins; and since 1660 he had derived another 3000 florins from the emoluments of two other offices. He had, however, never cared for display; but had lived like an ordinary burgher in a modest house, keeping only a single man-servant and dressing with great simplicity. His marriage had been very happy, and his only pleasure and relaxation had been found in the quiet joys of family and domestic life. The death of his wife, which took place but a few weeks before his reelection, was a heavy blow to him. De Witt on this occasion, as in 1663, before entering upon this fresh period of office requested the States of Holland to give him an Act of Indemnity and a promise of a judicial post on his retirement.

Two months later (September, 1668) the Prince of Orange gave the first clear sign of his intention to claim to the full, as opportunity offered, his ancestral rights and dignities. On the pretence of a visit to Breda he made his way to Middelburg, where the States of Zeeland had

just met, to take his seat, being now 18 years of age, as first noble in their Assembly. Amidst the jubilation of the populace he made his state entry into the town in a coach drawn by six horses, attended by a numerous suite. Following the example of his ancestors, he merely came to be installed in person in his post, after which by the leave of the States he appointed his cousin, the Lord of Odyk, to act as his representative. The installation over, he returned to the Hague, where for another two years he was content to remain nominally under the guardianship of the States of Holland. During this interval the Grand Pensionary had at last succeeded in obtaining the consent of all the Provinces to the Eternal Edict, his so-called "*Concept of Harmony.*" Zeeland, Friesland and Groningen, however, made it a condition of their assent, that William, now in his twenty-first year, should be at once made a member of the Council of State. It was still a question whether he should have the right to vote or only to advise. De Witt was in favour of the restricted power; but, finding that he had not the support of Amsterdam, he gave way. The Grand Pensionary had now to reckon with the formation of a powerful middle party with Orange leanings, of which Gillis Valckenier and Conrad van Beuningen at Amsterdam, and Caspar Fagel, the influential Pensionary of Haarlem, were the leaders. Van Beuningen and Valckenier were successively elected Burgomasters at Amsterdam in opposition to all the influence of the Bickers and de Graeffs and the de Witt connexion. The election of Fagel as Secretary (*Griffier*) to the States General (November, 1670) by removing him from the States of Holland, however, strengthened de Witt's influence in the latter assembly, as did also the appointment of Pieter de Groot, on his return from his embassy in Sweden, to the post of Pensionary of Rotterdam. He was a devoted adherent of the Grand Pensionary, whose downfall powerful enemies in his own Provincial States were now working to bring about.

The steps taken by Louis XIV to break up the Triple Alliance and to isolate the United Provinces have already been noted. The Secret Treaty of Dover (December 31, 1671) had bound Charles II to join with the French King in making war on a people still nominally allied with England. The feelings of enmity to the Dutch on the part of Louis had not been concealed. He had placed heavy duties on all goods from the United Provinces entering French harbours. The States General in their turn had laid duties on French goods entering the Netherlands, and a tariff war had ensued. But, despite all these signs of ill-will, de Witt appeared to be blind to the design and the preparations of Louis. Perhaps he could not bring himself to believe that the French monarch had conceived so embittered a hatred against himself personally, and had resolved at all costs to compass the destruction of the Republic. De Witt knew that war would mean the transfer of authority from his hands to those of the Prince, and he still hoped by conciliation to avert it. His trusted confidant, Pieter de Groot, the Pensionary of Rotterdam, was sent as ambassador to Paris. He was

received with all personal courtesy, but could effect nothing. He soon convinced himself that war was inevitable, and in his despatches urged the Grand Pensionary to prepare for it. In March, 1672, he quitted Paris, and on April 6 Louis declared war against the States. Already on March 28 a similar declaration had been made by England. Münster and Cologne followed. The only allies of the United Provinces were Spain, Brandenburg, and the Emperor.

At sea the Dutch had a fleet strong enough to defend their shores under such a commander as de Ruyter even against an Anglo-French coalition; but on land the condition of things was very different. Economy had been the watchword, and had led to repeated disbandments. The army was small in numbers and thoroughly disorganised. The town levies (*waardgelders*) were called out, and foreign mercenaries hurriedly recruited, but a trained staff of officers and proper cohesion were wanting. Meanwhile a splendid French army, 120,000 strong, was advancing against the Provinces from the south under the command of some of the first captains of the age, while their eastern frontier was attacked simultaneously from the side of Münster and Cologne. There was practically no resistance. Within a month Gelderland, Overijssel, Drente, and Utrecht were overrun. The opening of the dykes alone saved Holland itself from invasion. Black despair brooded over the land. Business ceased. Men knew not what to do. All eyes were turned to the young Prince of Orange.

Already at the first approach of war William, though not yet twenty-two years of age, had been appointed Captain-General of the Union amidst general rejoicings (February 25). The office had been granted to him only for one campaign, with restricting conditions as to its exercise, betokening the unwillingness with which at last the burgher-regents yielded to the overwhelming force of public opinion. It was but the beginning of a movement that nothing could check. The Eternal Edict was swept on one side. On July 2 the States of Zeeland elected William Stadholder; two days later the States of Holland did the same. On the 8th he was made Captain- and Admiral-General of the Union. The call came suddenly; but it did not find the Prince unprepared. Though he had had no experience of administration, no schooling in the art of war, he set about his task with calm self-confidence and determination. The mere fact that a Prince of Orange was once more head of the State inspired confidence. That confidence became redoubled when it was seen that this youth was dowered with all the qualities of leadership, which were the heritage of his House.

The immediate cause which led to the revolution of July 2-4 was the failure of de Groot's mission to move Louis XIV to terms of peace. Amidst the shipwreck of his life's work, de Witt had through the months of May and June laboured with unremitting zeal. Finance, the equipment of the fleet, negotiations, the cutting of the dykes for the defence of Holland—all had occupied his attention. Both he and his brother

had stood by the side of de Ruyter at the great sea-fight at Southwold Bay (June 6), which prevented the combined English and French fleets from effecting a landing on the Dutch coast. But this display of patriotic courage availed nothing to lessen the people's growing hatred of the two brothers, who were looked upon as the enemies of the Prince of Orange and as the primary cause of the misfortunes which had fallen on the State. Attempts were made on the lives of both—on John at the Hague (June 21); on Cornelis at Dort (June 23). In the face of strong opposition, de Witt had just at this time sent Pieter de Groot on a special mission to Louis XIV to supplicate for peace. He was to offer the French King the surrender of Maestricht, with the Generality Lands (States-Brabant and States-Flanders), and the payment of all the costs of the war. The offer was scornfully rejected; impossible and humiliating terms were asked, including a large cession of territory to France and other cessions to England, Cologne, and Münster, and an enormous war indemnity of 16,000,000 florins. Asked for his advice by the States of Holland, William replied: "All that stands in the missive is unacceptable; rather let us be hacked into pieces than accept such conditions." His advice was accepted by a unanimous vote. But his Highness drew a difference between England and France. "The English proposals," he said, "come not from the King, but from his Ministers; therefore answer France that the conditions are unacceptable, nothing more; with England keep the negotiations alive." Already William had firmly grasped what were to be the unchanging principles of his whole life's policy. To seek the friendship of England, and with her help, and, if possible, with other allies, to beat back the aggression of France and maintain against the ambition of Louis the freedom of nations and the balance of power—these were the objects at which from the first he aimed, and whose realisation he pursued with a resolution that nothing could shake. On the present occasion great concessions were offered to England; but, although King Charles was well disposed to his nephew personally, his demands were inadmissible and were rejected. "But don't you see that the Republic is lost?" the English envoy is reported to have said. "I know one sure means of not seeing her downfall," was the haughty reply of the Prince—"to die in the defence of the last ditch."

The Orange restoration had been bloodless, but a catastrophe was to follow. The hatred which had long been felt against de Witt and the oligarchic burgher party by the mass of the people had been intensified by late events and now found vent in popular outbursts and acts of violence against members of the oligarchy which had so long ruled the land. There was a rain of scandalous pamphlets against the Grand Pensionary, who was charged, among other things, with malappropriation of public funds. Rising from his sick bed, de Witt defended himself in the States, and was by a unanimous vote exonerated (July 23). His brother Cornelis was equally an object of hatred. At Dort, where once the de Witts

had been supreme, his portrait in the Town Hall was torn in pieces and the pictured head hung from a gallows. On July 24 he was suddenly arrested on a charge, brought against him by a barber named Tichelaer, of being an accomplice in a plot against the Prince, and was incarcerated in the Gevangenpoort at the Hague. On August 4, John de Witt asked the States of Holland to accept his resignation of the office of Grand Pensionary and to give him the judicial post that had been promised to him on his retirement. The resignation was accepted; but, in accordance with the wishes of the Prince, no vote of thanks was given to him for his services. William, however, agreed that his request for an appointment as judge in the High Court should be granted. Five days later Caspar Fagel was chosen Grand Pensionary in his place. Meanwhile, Cornelis de Witt had been lying in the Gevangenpoort awaiting his trial. Six judges were specially commissioned to try him. On August 19 he was put to the torture, and on the following day sentence was pronounced against him of deprivation of all his offices and banishment from the land. The Ruwaard, on learning his fate, sent a message to his brother that he wished to see him. John de Witt, though warned of the risk he was running, proceeded forthwith to the prison, where he had a long interview with Cornelis. Meanwhile a vast crowd collected outside and barred all exit. Three companies of cavalry under Count Tilly had been posted by the States of Holland near the prison, with orders, if necessary, to disperse any rabble that seemed bent on mischief. Later, the civic guard (*schutterij*) were called out. The air was full of rumours; and, hearing that a body of peasantry were marching towards the town, the Deputed-Councillors sent a message to Tilly, directing him to take two of his companies and close all ingress into the gates, leaving the civic guard to keep the crowd in check. Tilly refused to leave his station without a written order, and when he received it, exclaimed, "I will obey, but the de Witts are now dead men." He was right. The *schutterij* were citizens with the same prejudices against the de Witts as the mob before them; and, instead of keeping order, with a few exceptions they fraternised with the rabble. Seeing they had now a free hand, the crowd, urged on by their leaders, foremost amongst them a goldsmith named Verhoeff, van Bankhem, one of the sheriffs, and the barber Tichelaer, forced open the door of the prison and rushed in. It was about 4 p.m. The two brothers were seized, hurried with violence into the street and there brutally murdered. They were literally torn to pieces, and finally their bloodstained and hardly recognisable remains were hung up by the feet to a lamp-post.

Was William in any way privy to or morally implicated in this horrible deed? The answer must be, no. He was absent from the Hague at the time, and most careful research in the records has failed to discover any trace of complicity. The murder was the savage act of a maddened mob. It must, however, be admitted that the Prince refused to take

any steps to punish the chief instigators of the riot; and that they were in fact protected and rewarded. There is good evidence to show that William was deeply moved when the news of the tragic ending of the de Witts was brought to him; but his cold temperament led him to regard the matter dispassionately, now that it was an accomplished fact, from the point of view of political gain and loss. The impulse, which had moved the crowd, had after all been love to himself and his House; the number of the leaders was large; to proceed against them criminally would infallibly stir up party strife at a moment of crisis when the whole strength of the country required to be concentrated on the task of resisting the invader. Such were the arguments which seem to have weighed with the Stadholder. It is to be regretted that he allowed any considerations to influence him to leave this "execrable *faict*," as the new Grand Pensionary Fagel termed it, unpunished. By acting as he did William III has made it impossible for posterity to clear his own memory from suspicion and his country from the charge of base ingratitude.

That the young Stadholder should have wished to be relieved of any addition to the heavy cares and responsibilities which rested upon his shoulders in the summer of 1672, may well be granted. The very existence of the land depended upon the holding of the water-line (from Scheldt to Zuyderzee) against the advance of Luxembourg and Turenne. Had the French pressed on in June, there is little doubt it might have been carried. But time was lost in petty sieges; and in August the Prince, with the help of the experienced commander Waldeck, now appointed Field-Marshal in the States service, and of van Beverningh, deputy of the States General in the field, and other capable advisers, had placed the whole line in a thorough state of defence. Small vessels detached from the fleet cruised up and down all navigable waters, and at the weak points fortifications had been thrown up which were held by strong garrisons. The whole force at William's disposal reached in the autumn 57,000 men, many of them experienced and disciplined soldiers. The successful defence of Groningen against the Cologne-Münster troops (July 21 to August 26) checked the advance of the enemy on the eastern frontier. The invasion was brought to a standstill. But the Prince was not content with inaction. He made an attack on Woerden (October 10), which failed. So did a more daring attempt to cut the French lines of communication at Charleroi; but the display of vigour and initiative on the part of the young commander was of good service to his cause. At the close of his first campaign William III had succeeded in winning the confidence of his own troops and the respect of his foes. The surprise of Coeverden (December 29) by a small force under the command of Rabenhaupt, the defender of Groningen, brought the year to an end with a gleam of success. Luxembourg indeed had taken advantage of a hard winter to march over the frozen waters, burning and plundering, to the very walls of the Hague, but the thaw obliged him to retreat (December, 1672).

In the following year the tide began to turn in favour of the Netherlanders. Spain and Austria lent active assistance. De Ruyter and Cornelis Tromp fought successfully with inferior forces against the allied English and French fleets at Schooneveld (June 7 and 14); while at Kykduin (August 21) the advantage was still more decisive. Maestricht surrendered to the French in June, but William captured Naarden in September; and at the head of an allied force of Imperial, Spanish and Dutch troops besieged and took Bonn (November 5-12). The loss of this important Rhine fortress compelled the French to evacuate the United Netherlands. The French King's schemes of conquest had thus completely failed. Once more a Prince of Orange had freed the country from the yoke of a foreign foe. He was rewarded by the grant of almost sovereign power. In the three reconquered Provinces of Gelderland, Utrecht, and Overijssel he became Stadholder with greatly increased prerogatives. Further, all the five stadholderships were declared to be hereditary by the respective Provinces, as were also the offices of Captain- and Admiral-General of the Union by the States General. Over the conduct of foreign affairs he had complete control. So long as he retained this control he was content. On the wide field of international politics William III's chief interest and attention were throughout his life centred; in domestic affairs his assiduous care was so far as possible to avoid complications, which might interfere with the carrying out of his plans for curbing the ambition of Louis XIV by means of the English alliance. The first great step was taken when peace with England was concluded (February 19, 1674). The conditions were practically the same as at Breda. All States ships were to strike the flag even when meeting a single English man-of-war. The United Provinces were to pay a war indemnity of 2,000,000 florins. Surinam was retained by the Dutch, and New Netherland, which had been reconquered by a squadron under the command of Evertsen in 1673, was restored to the English. Treaties of peace were likewise signed with Münster (April 22) and Cologne (May 11). The Republic had succeeded in isolating France, with whom war still continued, and had secured for herself a group of allies—the Emperor, Spain, the Dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Brandenburg, and Denmark.

The Prince of Orange was the soul and guiding spirit of the Coalition. At the head of an allied army of some 70,000 men, William met Condé at Seneff (August 11, 1674), commanding an almost equal force. It was the first pitched battle in which he had held supreme command. Both armies suffered severe losses, and no decisive advantage was gained; but the Prince displayed a coolness, courage, and skill which greatly increased his military renown. The year 1675 was marked by the despatch of de Ruyter with a weak squadron to the Mediterranean, to help the Spaniards to put down an insurrection in Sicily. The great Admiral bitterly complained to the States General of the condition of the ships with which he had been sent to contend with a superior French fleet

under Duquesne. Two battles were fought: the first off Stromboli (April 22), with doubtful issue; the second off Messina a week later, in which the Dutch were successful, but de Ruyter was wounded severely. He died shortly afterwards. His was a loss that could not be replaced. In a subsequent battle at Palermo the Dutch were defeated, and de Ruyter's successor in command, Vice-Admiral de Haan, killed. In 1676 the States navy regained its laurels by a brilliant victory gained by a combined Danish-Dutch fleet under Cornelis Tromp (June 11) at Öland over a superior Swedish force. During the last years of the war Dutch commerce suffered severely at the hands of the Dunkirk corsairs, amongst whom Jean Bart made himself famous by his boldness and success. On land, the war operations went on without any decisive events. In a battle fought at Montcassel against the Duke of Orleans (April 11, 1677), in an attempt to relieve St Omer, the allies were defeated, but they were saved from a rout by the personal efforts of the young commander, who conducted a masterly retreat. The great qualities of William III, as a general, were always most evident in the hour of danger and defeat.

The lack of success attending the efforts of the allies gave added force to the general desire for peace which was felt in the Netherlands. The country was suffering severely from the heavy war charges, and craved relief. Already in the spring of 1676 the French King, fearing lest England should be induced to join the coalition against him, and having troubles at home to occupy his attention, had made serious proposals for peace, and negotiations had been opened at Nymegen. But it was a long time before the plenipotentiaries met, and still longer before any basis for a settlement could be arrived at. Meanwhile the war went on. France was anxious to conclude a separate treaty with the States, and to obtain this was willing to make concessions. Public opinion in the Netherlands was quite prepared to treat separately with Louis; but to this the Stadholder was resolutely opposed. He held that it would be a breach of faith on the part of the States General to make peace entirely in their own interests, and to leave the allies in the lurch to whose help they had owed so much in their hour of jeopardy. He had no faith in the French King's intentions. He had been working steadily, since the Peace of Westminster had been concluded, to induce England to join the coalition against France, and thus to be able to place an effectual barrier in the path of the ambitions of Louis. To attain this end had been, from the time of his accession to power, the chief aim, the pivot of his policy. William's opponents in the Provinces accused him of love of war and of the glory to be achieved on the field of battle. The desire for military fame was, it is not to be denied, a consuming passion with him; but it was not the ruling motive.

It is not too much to say that England occupied in the mind and the calculations of William III a place of vital interest and concern. He had no sooner secured the position in the Netherlands which he looked

upon as his paternal heritage, than his ambition began to busy itself with the possibilities which the future might have in store for him as the son of the Princess Royal of England. After his uncles, Charles II and James Duke of York, only James' two daughters stood between him and the throne. He was, unless the Duke of York should have a son by his second marriage, actually the next male of the blood-royal. The fact that the Duke of York had become a zealous convert to Roman Catholicism had aroused a strong feeling of aversion from his succession on the part of the large majority of the English nation, who naturally turned their eyes to the young Dutch Stadholder, the representative of a race which had done so much in defence of the Protestant cause. But the relations which William established with a number of leading English statesmen, and the part, however, that he took in Court intrigues and parliamentary struggles during these years will be more appropriately treated elsewhere in this volume. He played a difficult and a subtle game, and he succeeded in gaining his end, chiefly because he knew his own mind and was not deterred either by failures or by risks from going forward along the path he had marked out for himself. For his sister's son King Charles had perhaps as much affection as was to be expected from a man of his heartless temperament; but William's influence was not sufficient to make Charles give up the French connexion, and form, as his nephew urged and as the majority of the English people wished, an alliance with the Dutch Republic against Louis. Thus things remained for some years, but at last in 1676 there came a change. The difficulties with his Parliament, and his knowledge of the influence his nephew possessed with the Opposition, led Charles to see the advantage of drawing closer his relations with him. Already in 1674 there had been proposals for a marriage between him and his cousin Mary, the eldest daughter of the Duke of York. But, apart from other reasons, the youth of the Princess (born 1662) led to a postponement of the plan. The project, which had never been dropped, once more revived in 1677. His defeat at Montcassel had made the Prince feel more strongly than ever the necessity of securing the support of England in the war, and in the summer of this year he sent over his friend and trusted confidant Bentinck on a mission to London. The result was an invitation to William to pay a personal visit to the English Court, with a view to the conclusion of the marriage with Mary, and to the establishment of more friendly political relations. On October 19 the Prince arrived in London, and shortly afterwards the marriage was concluded which was to have such far-reaching consequences for the history of England and of Europe. But even at such a moment in his life William's thoughts were dominated by politics; and, when in the beginning of December he and Mary took ship for Holland, he had won over King Charles to promise his support to the conditions of peace offered by the allies to France, and his adhesion to the coalition in case of the rejection. On January 10, 1678, the

treaty between England and the United Provinces giving effect to these undertakings was signed and sealed. The results, however, did not fulfil William's expectations. The dynastic connexion had been viewed with distrust both by the English Parliament and by the powerful peace party in Holland, headed by Amsterdam. Indeed, in the Netherlands the Stadholder found himself confronted by an almost general opposition to the further prosecution of the war. Not merely were Valckenier and Hooft, the two most influential leaders in Amsterdam, against him; but in the ranks of the Opposition were to be found Fagel, van Beverningh and van Beuningen, and even William's young cousin, Henry Casimir, the Stadholder of Friesland. French diplomacy, meanwhile, was kept well informed of all that was occurring, and took full advantage of its knowledge in order to bring about that separate peace which Louis XIV desired.

In the meantime, a vigorous campaign was conducted by the French armies in the southern Netherlands. Ghent and Ypres fell, and the war again drew very close to the Dutch frontiers. The dread of another invasion strengthened the efforts of the peace party. Seizing their advantage, the French plenipotentiaries at Nymegen addressed themselves directly to the States General with the offer of favourable conditions; and on June 1 an armistice of six weeks was concluded. The French offered to restore Maestricht and the district known as Overmaas to the States, to conclude an advantageous treaty of commerce, and to leave the Spanish Netherlands covered by a line of fortresses. They claimed, however, as the fruits of the war the incorporation of Franche Comté and suzerainty over Lorraine. These conditions the States General, in spite of the opposition of the Stadholder, agreed to accept, and they persuaded Spain to acquiesce. The Emperor, Brandenburg, and Denmark, however, refused the terms offered them, and were bitterly incensed at being deserted. The French plenipotentiaries now suddenly announced that they would not restore the conquered towns until full restitution for her losses had been made to Sweden by Denmark and Brandenburg. This sudden change of attitude led England to declare that, unless before August 11 the French consented to the immediate restoration of the towns, she would make common cause with the Republic in reopening the war (July 26). The aim of the French in delaying the conclusion of the treaty had been to gain time for Luxembourg to reduce Mons, which he was blockading, by famine, for Spain had not been included in the armistice, and so to obtain by the possession of so important a place a more favourable position for negotiating with that Power. The Prince, who had advanced to relieve the town, waited anxiously in his camp for the day when the truce should end. The only fear was that Mons might not be able to hold out. But at the very last moment, just before midnight on August 10, the French plenipotentiaries signified to van Beverningh their intention to sign the treaty

with the States on the conditions previously agreed upon; though difficulties on certain points were raised to delay the signing of the treaty with Spain. On August 13 news reached William of the signature of the Treaty on the 10th by van Beverningh, but not an official intimation. On the morning of the 14th official information from d'Estrées was brought to Luxembourg, who was on the point of communicating the fact to William, when the Prince's advancing army compelled the Marshal to join battle at St Denys. The issue was undecided; but it achieved its purpose of preventing the surrender of Mons. A month later (September 17) peace with Spain was concluded, at the cost to that Power of Franche Comté and twelve fortresses, and the French armies evacuated the Spanish Netherlands.

The Peace of Nymegen brought a welcome respite to the Netherlands; but, though it endured for ten years, it was felt to be an armed truce rather than a permanent settlement of differences. It left Louis XIV the dictator of Europe. Meanwhile his sleepless adversary in Holland strove against almost insuperable difficulties to arouse his countrymen to a sense of the dangers which threatened them, and to revive the coalition which the conclusion of a separate peace by the United Provinces at Nymegen had broken in pieces. But the old anti-Stadholder party had again lifted up its head and offered strenuous opposition to all schemes and proposals which might lead to a renewal of war with its heavy imposts and interference with commerce. Of this opposition Amsterdam was the head and centre, and it had the support of Henry Casimir, who was jealous of the supremacy of his cousin in the Republic, the two Provinces of which he was Stadholder, Friesland and Groningen, following his lead. The death, in 1680, of Gillis Valckenier, who had for a decade been the most influential man in Amsterdam and had induced his fellow-citizens to offer a bitter and stubborn resistance to William's policy, somewhat relieved the strained situation. The Amsterdammers, however, continued to be an obstacle in the Prince's path, though their leaders, Nicolaes Witsen and Johan Hudde, were not men of the same calibre as Valckenier. William had also to contend with the secret intrigues of the experienced French ambassador, Count d'Avaux, who did his utmost, by threats, promises, and bribery, to undermine the influence of the Stadholder, and, by fomenting the divisions and party spirit in the United Provinces, to render them powerless in the councils of Europe. In the southern Netherlands, Luxemburg and Alsace, Louis was able to pursue his policy of plunder and aggression unchecked. William's repeated efforts to form an armed alliance which should compel the French King to adhere to the terms of the Peace of Nymegen were fruitless. His countrymen were determined to hold aloof from foreign entanglements, so long as no one interfered with their thriving trade and rapidly reviving prosperity.

The events of 1685 were to give a shock to their self-complacency

and be a lever in the hands of William of which he was not slow to avail himself. These were the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the accession to the English throne of James II. Already, from 1681 onwards, the persecutions of the Protestants in France had led a constant stream of refugees to seek shelter in the free Netherlands. But with the Revocation of the Edict their number was swelled by tens of thousands; and among the refugees were many of the most industrious and skilled workmen of France, who were received with open arms by their fellow-Protestants in Holland, the towns vying with one another in offering them freedom of settlement and municipal privileges. Great was the impression produced by the tales that were brought by these unhappy Huguenots of the character of the French King and of his government; and even in Amsterdam a strong feeling of enmity to Louis and abhorrence of his methods of rule gained possession of the people. D'Avaux had to confess that his influence grew less and less, while that of the Stadholder increased. In August, 1686, William's skilful and patient diplomacy was able to bring about an alliance between the Republic, the Emperor, Brandenburg, Spain, and Sweden, for the maintenance of the treaties of Münster and Nymegen, and for common defence. The coalition was, however, incomplete, for it did not include England. In that country the accession of James had been followed by a deliberate attempt on the part of the new King to set up absolute rule and to establish Roman Catholicism as the religion of the State. This necessitated the severance of all connexion with the Protestant Powers, and a return once more to the policy by which the King of England depended for support upon the subsidies of a foreign Power in order to dispense with the necessity of applying to his own Parliament for money grants. As the feelings of the nation became more and more outraged by the arbitrary acts of James, those who were deeply attached to the cause of civil and religious liberty turned their eyes to the Prince of Orange, who had never ceased to keep himself in close touch with a number of leading English statesmen. At the same time public opinion in the States, with its growing enmity to France, could not remain unmoved by the spectacle of a Romish King in England in league with Louis for the oppression of his Protestant subjects. The spectre of 1672 began to loom large in the imagination of the Netherlands—the uneasy feeling that the Republic might find itself at any moment face to face with a combined attack from France and England.

William took full advantage of the change of sentiment to press forward by negotiations public and private to the realisation of his unalterable and dominating life-purpose—the welding together of a coalition against French overlordship in Europe. A man of inflexible temper and one overmastering idea does not as a rule ingratiate himself with others. This was eminently the case with William III. Haughty, cold, domineering, somewhat harsh in his manner, he was not a man to

win popular applause, or an attractive personality. Except to Waldeck and Bentinck and a few confidants, he never unbosomed himself; he was to the outside world a riddle, misunderstood and misjudged, as can be seen by the portrait drawn of him in the memoirs of Constantine Huyghens, who was for many years his secretary. No one suffered more from the unamiable qualities of William than his wife. Gentle, unassuming, sympathetic, deeply and sincerely religious, and filled with a profound sense of duty, she was rightly regarded by the people amongst whom by a marriage of state her lot had been cast, as a model of what a woman, a wife and a princess should be. No Princess of Orange ever succeeded in winning her way so completely to the hearts and affections of the Dutch of all classes. And yet for years her husband treated her with a frigid indifference and neglect, which it is impossible to excuse. The estrangement between them did not tend to increase William's popularity, and it caused pain and wonder to many, among these to Bishop Burnet on his visit to the Hague in 1686. He spoke to the Prince on the matter, and learnt to his astonishment that the aversion, for it amounted to this, arose chiefly from the fact that the proud, masterful nature of the man could not endure the thought that one day his wife would be a queen in her own right and that he would be her subject. No sooner was Mary informed by the Bishop of the Prince's grievance than she at once sought an interview with her husband, and told him that she would never consent to accept the Crown unless Parliament would grant to William the right not merely to the regal title but to the administration of the Government. "In return," she said, "I only ask this, that, as I shall observe the precept which enjoins wives to obey their husbands, you will observe that which enjoins husbands to love their wives." William was deeply touched, and from that time there was reconciliation between them. Neither of them can have suspected that within two years Mary would be called upon to choose between the cause of her husband and her religion and the ties of filial love. She did not hesitate to follow what she conceived to be the path of duty. Side by side in Westminster Abbey on February 21, 1689, William III and Mary II were crowned King and Queen of England, but it was William who sat upon St Edward's Chair.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ANGLO-DUTCH WARS.

(1) NAVAL ADMINISTRATION UNDER CHARLES II AND JAMES II.

THE history of naval administration between 1660 and 1688 falls naturally into four periods:—(1) 1660–73, from the appointment of the Duke of York to the office of Lord High Admiral, to his retirement after the passing of the Test Act; (2) 1673–9, the first secretaryship of Samuel Pepys; (3) 1679–84, the interval of administrative disorder which followed Pepys' resignation; (4) 1684–8, from the return of the Duke of York until the Revolution—this period being also that of Pepys' second secretaryship.

In the navy, as in other departments, the Restoration involved a reversion to the old order. At the date of the King's return its administrative direction was in the hands of an Admiralty Commission of twenty-eight, appointed by the Rump Parliament in 1659, with a Navy Board of seven experts under it. But so early as May 16, before his landing at Dover, the King had appointed his brother James Lord High Admiral of England; and on July 2 the existing commissions were dissolved, and the ancient form of government by four "principal officers" was restored. With them were associated three "commissioners," and the "principal officers and commissioners of the navy" were usually known as the Navy Board. In determining their remuneration, however, the restored monarchy followed the precedents of the Commonwealth, and offered an increased stipend in place of the traditional fee with allowances. Upon the Navy Board of the Restoration experience was largely represented. Of the seven officials who composed it, four had been used to the sea, one had an extensive military experience, one came of a family of shipbuilders, and but one was altogether without knowledge of naval affairs. This exception, curiously enough, was Samuel Pepys, the Clerk of the Acts, for his brief tenure of office in 1660 as secretary to the Generals of the Fleet, could scarcely have equipped him with any special knowledge of the sea.

The older system of naval administration was thus restored; but changes of considerable importance were effected in it, both before and after the Second Dutch War. In 1662 an attempt was made to deal with a serious abuse by prohibiting officials from trading in commodities sold to the navy. In 1667 the increase of business caused by the war, and the administrative confusion which it created, led to a reorganisation of the Comptroller's office, and the appointment of two assistant Comptrollers, one for the accounts of the Treasurer, and the other for the victuallers' and pursers' accounts. Last of all, in 1671, a separate Comptroller was appointed for the stores, and the Treasurer of the Navy was brought much more completely under the control of the Navy Board. Nor did the Government of the Restoration disdain to learn from its predecessors. In 1662 the practice was taken over from the Commonwealth of requiring security from pursers; and in 1664 resident commissioners were appointed, as during the First Dutch War, for the dockyards at Portsmouth and Harwich, in addition to the commissioner assigned at the Restoration to Chatham, the "master-yard of all the rest." In fact, naval administration during the period of the Second Dutch War does not entirely deserve the indiscriminate condemnation which has been poured upon it. The men were at any rate experienced in naval affairs, and some of them were men of ability; they effected material improvements in the system under which they worked; and the system thus improved was sufficiently good to survive without any fundamental changes until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Its disastrous failure during the period under review is to be accounted for by moral and financial causes, rather than by structural defects. The higher naval administration, itself not free from corruption, had to contend with idleness and dishonesty in the lower ranks of the service, due to a relaxation of the standards of public and private duty; and the combination of this with financial disorder ruined the Navy Office under Charles II, as it would have ruined any other public department in any country and at any time. When the management of the navy came to be enquired into in 1668 after the close of the War, it was found that the Principal Officers had been neglecting to carry out the instructions of 1662 under which they were supposed to work. The Treasurer had been remiss in attendance, and his accounts were two years in arrears; the Comptroller had neglected a large part of the details of his office; and the Surveyor had omitted to report to the Navy Board on the state of the dockyards, ships and stores. Their defence was that the business of the War had absorbed their attention; but we find Pepys writing: "The pest of this Office has all along been an indifference in some of the principal members of it in seeing their work done, provided they found themselves furnished with any tolerable pretence for their personal failures in the doing it."

Still more important as a cause of disaster was the want of money,

the root of all evil in the navy of Charles II. For this the restored monarchy was not entirely responsible, as it had inherited from the interregnum navy debts of more than a million and a quarter. Associated with this was a want of ready money; and the result was that when the War with the Dutch broke out, in the spring of 1665, the credit of the Government had sunk to the lowest ebb. This involved an enormous waste, for the merchant "resolved to save himself in the uncertainty of his payment by the greatness of his price"; while the hardships to private persons occasioned by delays in payment were almost intolerable. At the end of the War, the accumulated debt of the navy was estimated at over a million, at a time when its ordinary charge in time of peace was to be reduced to £200,000 a year. Measures of retrenchment were adopted in 1669; but so difficult a situation could not be at once remedied, and it was not until the later years of the Restoration period that the burden was lightened. In 1686 the arrears had declined to about £172,000.

When the Test Act in 1673 expelled James, Duke of York, from office, the King delegated part of the functions of the Lord High Admiral to a Commission; but he reserved the Admiralty dues and the patronage of the office to himself. This retention of powers in the King's hands was probably intended to give an opportunity to the Duke, who, in spite of the Test Act, retained until 1679 an important influence in naval affairs. The Secretary to the new Commission was Samuel Pepys, now promoted from the office of Clerk of the Acts; but the changes of 1673 did not interfere with the character of the Navy Board as a body of experts. Although they now took their orders from the Admiralty Commission instead of from the Duke of York, the main features of Admiralty policy were unchanged. It was the work of the new administration to bring the Third Dutch War to a close, and then to repair, by an energetic building programme, that depreciation of the navy which was one of the results of the War. The Admiralty Commissioners were sensible and vigilant, and they were remarkably well served by their Secretary; while the Navy Board was strong on the technical side of its work, and was fortunate in numbering among its members an official so thoroughly capable in his own department as was the great shipbuilder, Anthony Deane. Moreover, although the financial difficulty was not removed, and still continued to hamper and cripple the navy in every possible way, a vigorous building policy was made possible by the better support which Parliament now gave to naval expansion. The political classes were beginning to understand and appreciate the importance of sea-power to England. The Act of 1677 for the construction of thirty new ships was a striking expression of the new parliamentary interest in naval problems.

In 1679 the Popish Plot compelled the withdrawal of the Duke of York and the resignation of Pepys; and the higher administration of the

navy passed to a new Admiralty Commission which was almost entirely without naval experience. They induced the King to surrender into their hands that part of the functions of the Lord High Admiral's office which he had hitherto reserved to himself, and then proceeded, unchecked in their zeal for retrenchment, to destroy the fighting efficiency of the fleet. "No king," wrote Pepys, "ever did so unaccountable a thing to oblige his people by, as to dissolve a Commission of the Admiralty then in his own hand, who best understands the business of the sea of any prince the world ever had, and things never better done, and put it into hands which he knew were wholly ignorant thereof, sporting himself with their ignorance." The result which followed was inevitable. The effective force at sea was reduced; the ships in harbour were allowed to fall out of repair; the yards were hopelessly disorganised; and waste and neglect appeared in every department of the administration. In particular, the thirty new ships built under the Act of 1677 were allowed to fall into a deplorable state through "the plain omission of the necessary and ordinary cautions used for the preserving of new-built ships."

In 1684 the King found himself once more in a position to recall his brother and to restore the old order in the navy. The Test Act still prevented the Duke from actually holding office; so the King resumed for himself the whole office of Lord High Admiral, executing it with the advice and assistance of his brother; and the Duke's recovery of his place of influence in the navy carried with it the reappointment of Samuel Pepys to the office of Secretary for the affairs of the Admiralty of England, now formally constituted for the first time by letters-patent under the Great Seal.

The important episode of the period 1684-8 is the establishment of the Special Commission of 1686—an experiment in organisation for which Pepys himself was largely responsible. This Commission, which superseded for the period of its existence the old Navy Board, consisted entirely of experts, and included the notable names of Sir John Narbrough and Sir Anthony Deane, with Sir Phineas Pett as resident Commissioner for Chatham and Sheerness. They acted under special instructions, and were charged with the duty of putting the navy into a state of thorough repair, an annual sum of £400,000 being assigned for three years with that object. The work was finished earlier than was expected; and in 1688, after two and a half years' tenure of office, the Special Commission was dissolved, and the system of government by Principal Officers was restored. Their work was subsequently investigated by a parliamentary Commission, which reported in 1692 "that the ships built, rebuilt, and repaired by these commissioners were fully and well performed, and the buildings and other works by them erected and made during the continuation of the said Commission were done with great exactness, sufficiency, and frugality of expense in the managery and conduct thereof."

During the period of naval history which extended from the Restoration to the Revolution, successive administrations, whether incompetent or relatively efficient, were alike grievously hampered by the deficiency of men, both in the dockyards and at sea. This is only another aspect of the redoubtable financial problem; for, except during the years affected by the Plague, the deficiency was largely due to the failures of the Government in the matter of pay. The state of things during the Second Dutch War was appalling. We hear of wages fifty-two months in arrear; and Pepys, by this time a hardened official, writes down in his *Diary* pitiable stories of poor seamen starving in the streets because there is no money to pay them. This reacted upon discipline, and both seamen and workmen in the yards gave a great deal of trouble by their disorderly demeanour. At the close of the War the scarcity of money was such that the dockyard authorities were sometimes compelled to allow their men to go for a time into the employment of private merchants, so that they might earn money to enable them to buy bread. The delays in payment of wages also involved the Government in much needless expense; for, in order to avoid the necessity of paying off surplus men, ships were kept in commission longer than was really required. In spite of the revival in 1664 of the Commonwealth scheme for the distribution of prize-money, it was difficult to obtain a sufficient number of men, and the deficiency could only be supplied by a somewhat indiscriminate use of the press. One result of this was that the material supplied was often of the poorest kind—"poor patient labouring men and housekeepers," men lame and palsied, and afterwards "little children and never at sea before," who could not be suffered "to pester the ship." So uncertain was the prospect of pay, that English prisoners took service with the Dutch, and Pepys records that when they came up the Medway the English tongue could be heard on board their ships. On the outbreak of the Third Dutch War in 1672 the same difficulties recurred, although in a less aggravated form; and so late as 1692, in the maturer reflexions of his retirement, Pepys still places the "length and badness of the payment of the seaman's wages" first among his "discouragements."

In providing for sick and wounded seamen the Government of the Restoration imitated that of the Commonwealth. The Commission of 1664 was framed on the model of the Commission of 1653, and that of 1672 considerably improved upon it. All the arrangements were admirable upon paper; but in this department, as in others, the want of money prevented their being effectively carried out. It stands, however, to the credit of the higher naval administration that, when at the close of the Third Dutch War the temporary Commission of 1672 was dissolved, its duties were assigned by an Admiralty warrant of 1674 to the "Chirurgion-general of his Majesty's navy," so that a permanent provision was now made for sick and wounded seamen in time of peace. "Mariners and soldiers maimed in his Majesty's service at sea" were

also entitled to relief out of the Chest at Chatham, according to a regular scale of compensation for the loss of a limb, or for other hurts "according to the Chirurgeon's discretion."

During the period 1660-88 a good deal was done to place the rates of pay, and especially of officers' pay, upon a more satisfactory footing. In 1666 a revised scale of pay was established for flag-officers; and in 1668 flag-officers who had served in the Second Dutch War received "pensions" in proportion to the scale of pay on active service. This is an important landmark in the history of naval organisation. Hitherto it had been usual to regard officers as appointed for particular services only, and as possessing no claim upon the Government when these services had been discharged. The result of this was that, except in time of war, the field of employment was far too small, and a number of good officers were thrown upon their own resources. The change now actually effected was a small one; but, when the Government thus formally recognised the claim of a particular group of flag-officers to pay in time of peace, a principle was established which was destined to lead in the long run to the modern system of continuous employment. In 1674 the same scale was established for flag-officers who had served in the Third Dutch War; and the benefits of half-pay were extended to the captains of first- and second-rates and to the second captains of flag-ships, and, a twelvemonth later, to commanders of squadrons.

In 1672 another important change was made with regard to pay by the adoption of the principle of pensions on superannuation by age; and in 1673 this was extended to officers wounded in service at sea. In the same year the principle was further extended so as to include volunteers "borne by particular order of the Lord High Admiral," and to "the officers of the land soldiers serving on board any of his Majesty's ships," "both as to their own relief in case of wounds, and their widows and orphans in case of death." Thus the advantages which seamen and soldiers already enjoyed from the Chest at Chatham were now extended to officers at the expense of the central Government.

In the wages of seamen the considerable increase which had taken place under the Commonwealth was maintained. The misfortune of the "poor seaman" under the later Stewarts was, not that his rate of pay was insufficient, but that he could not get his money; or, if he got it at all, it was in the depreciated paper currency known as the "ticket." A "ticket" was a certificate from the officers of his ship, issued to each seaman, specifying the quality and term of his service; and this, when countersigned by the Navy Board, was the seaman's warrant for demanding his wages from the Treasurer of the Navy on shore. The original purpose of these tickets was to save the necessity of transporting large sums of money on board ship; but the want of funds soon made it the regular practice to discharge all seamen with tickets instead of money, or with money for part of their time and a ticket for the rest.

Theoretically, the ticket should have supplied the seaman with credit almost up to the full amount of his wages; but, in practice, the long waiting and uncertainty of payment caused a great depreciation of tickets, and this gave rise to discontent among the seamen. In 1667 their grievance attracted attention, and the House of Commons enquired into "the buying and selling of tickets." The "infinite great disorder" of the ticket office also attracted the notice of the Commissioners of Public Accounts; but it was impossible to go behind the reply of the Navy Board when asked to justify the practice: "We conceive the use of tickets to be by no other means removable than by a supply of money in every place, at all times, in readiness where and when...any...occasions of discharging seamen shall arise."

The arrangements for victualling had always had an important bearing upon the contentment and efficiency of the seamen. "Englishmen," wrote Pepys, "and more especially seamen, love their bellies above anything else, and therefore it must always be remembered, in the management of the victualling of the navy, that to make any abatement from them in the quantity or agreeableness of the victuals, is to discourage and provoke them in the tenderest point, and will sooner render them disgusted with the King's service than any one other hardship that can be put upon them." But in this department also the want of money had fatal effects, and contributed more than any other single cause to the comparative failure to provide victuals of good quality and sufficient quantity, promptly delivered where they were required. Before the Restoration the victualling had been managed by victualling commissioners "upon account," the State keeping the business in its own hands. But the system had little chance of a fair trial, owing to financial embarrassments; and just before the King's return matters were as bad as they could well be. The restored Government reverted to the older system of contract; but the contractor proved unable to meet the large demands of the Second Dutch War. Still, no change could well be made in the system until the Government was in a position to settle accounts with him. Thus the victuals, though on the whole good in quality, were deficient in quantity, while the contractor had an excellent defence in the failure of the State to make payments on account at the stipulated times. Probably now, as undoubtedly later, the backwardness of the victualling in turn affected the scarcity of men, for the sailors deserted from ships where they could get no food.

The practical breakdown of the victualling system during the spring and summer of 1665 led to a change in method, and in October of that year Pepys was appointed Surveyor-general of the victualling, with a subordinate surveyor in each port to keep the contractor's agents up to the mark. The result was a slight improvement; but the new arrangement was only intended to be temporary, and it was abolished at the conclusion of peace. The victualling during the Third Dutch War was

managed by five victuallers in partnership; and these did better on the whole than a single contractor had done during the earlier War, because they commanded a larger capital; although the greatness of the demand and the scarcity of the payment still caused frequent complaints of their "dilatatoriness." The Admiralty Commission of 1679, supine in other departments, decided to revolutionise the whole system of the victualling, and abandoned contract in favour of a state victualling department: this reversion to the method of the interregnum appears to have resulted in an improvement in the victualling of the navy.

The period between the Restoration and the Revolution witnessed various attempts to improve discipline, both in the dockyards and at sea. The first Articles of War to which the service had been subjected were issued by the Commonwealth in 1652; and upon these the Government of the Restoration founded a disciplinary statute, passed in 1661. An Act of 1664 gave the Navy Board authority to punish disturbances or riots in the yards and the embezzlement of stores and ammunition; and their powers against embezzlement were further extended when the expired Act of 1664 was revived in 1671. An abuse of long standing had been the taking of merchants' goods in the King's ships, which made it easy for the officers to sell the King's stores under the pretence that they were merchandise; to waste time in the ports which ought to be spent at sea; so to fill the ship's hold "that they have no room to throw by their chests and other cumbersome things upon occasion of fight, whereby the gun-decks are so encumbered that they cannot possibly make so good an opposition to an enemy as otherwise they might"; and, lastly, to defraud the custom-house. The abuse was peculiarly difficult to deal with, as the merchants themselves tempted the captains to violate their instructions and made it profitable for them to do so; and, although exemplary punishments were inflicted, the practice was not easily eradicated. Similar efforts were made, especially during the period 1673-9, to prevent captains from being absent from their ships without leave; but the attractions of London were often too much for them, and, although the King took "more than ordinary notice" of this kind of delinquency, discipline continued to be far too lax. In the case of the ordinary seaman this was partly due to unpunctual payment; but in the higher ranks of the service it was due mainly to moral causes, and nothing could cure it but the steady pressure of authority exerted over a long period of time. It was not a case for heroic remedies, but for the gradual development of a higher standard of duty; and, although Pepys did his best, under Restoration conditions it was impossible that he should succeed. Some of the trouble appears to have been due to the favour shown by the restored Government to "gentlemen captains," these "thinking themselves above the necessity of obeying orders and conforming themselves to the rules and discipline of the navy, in reliance upon the protection secured to them therein through the quality of their friends at Court."

It is curious that in 1677, at a time when complaints against "gentlemen captains" were frequent, regular provision was first made for examining candidates for the office of lieutenant in the navy. In the same year better security was also taken for the appointment of fit persons to serve as naval chaplains, none being thereafter admitted in that capacity unless they were first approved by the Archbishop of Canterbury or the Bishop of London. In 1687 this duty was transferred to the Bishop of Durham.

If the reign of James II had lasted longer, it might have been an epoch of importance in the history of naval discipline. The King was a disciplinarian by nature, and he supported Pepys in an energetic effort made between 1685 and 1688 to put down drunkenness and debauchery among the captains. The political miscalculations of James II did not affect the navy; and under this aspect the history of his unfortunate reign is a record of steady improvement, due to well-directed energy. An important new departure was the "establishment about plate carriage and allowance for captains' tables," carried through by Pepys and the King in 1686. This unostentatious title covered a serious attempt to revive discipline in the navy by giving the Admiralty a ready control over ships on foreign service, and at the same time so to improve the position of the captains as to put them beyond the reach of temptations to neglect public duty for private gain. It was clearly laid down that commanders were not in future to carry passengers or "any money, bullion, jewels, or other merchandise" without royal warrant; all orders for the proceeding of ships on any service were to be in writing, a copy being sent to the Secretary to the Admiralty both by the superior giving the order and the inferior receiving it; commanders touching in foreign ports were to send "a particular account of their proceedings" to the Admiralty; and at the end of each voyage they were to send in "a perfect journal thereof." With these additional demands upon the commanders of ships was associated an increase in their emoluments, taking the form of an extra allowance "for the support of their tables," and varying from £83 a year to £250, according to the ship's rate.

Pepys himself had something like a genius for the application of business principles to naval administration. His ambition was to systematise everything by means of a methodical "establishment," and two of these not already referred to are peculiarly characteristic of his policy. In 1677 he obtained the adoption of a "solemn, universal, and unalterable adjustment of the gunning and manning of the whole fleet," calculating with infinite labour, precision, and amplitude of detail the number, weight, and type of guns to be carried by ships of each of the six rates in "peace," "war abroad," and "war at home" respectively, together with the proportion of men required for each ship. In 1686, with a view to the prevention of waste, he worked out an elaborate "establishment" for boatswains' and carpenters' stores.

The shipbuilding policy of the later Stewarts maintained, if it did not increase, the strength of the navy inherited from the period of the interregnum. Excluding fire-ships and yachts, there were 108 ships on the navy list at the Revolution, as compared with 135 at the Restoration; but the former figure included nine first-rates as against three, and the fleet of 1688 was strongest in third- and fourth-rates, while that of 1660 was strongest in fourth- and fifth-rates. The numerical excess in the Commonwealth navy is more than accounted for by ships of the two lowest rates. In this period the English builders were to a certain extent indebted to foreign models. The history of the yacht in the English navy begins with 1660, when the *Mary* was presented to Charles II by the Dutch. In 1663 and 1664 an improvement in two-decked ships was effected by an adaptation from the French and the Dutch; and in 1674 Sir Anthony Deane built the *Harwich* after the dimensions of a French ship, the *Superbe*, which came to Spithead with the French fleet during the Third Dutch War. She was recognised as a great improvement upon the corresponding English type, and the *Harwich* became the pattern for the second- and third-rates built under the Act of 1677. The English builders also tried cautious experiments with galleys, in imitation of the Mediterranean Powers.

In dealing with naval history before and after the Restoration, there has been a tendency among historians to over-emphasise the contrast between the efficiency of virtue and the incompetence of vice. That the naval administrators of the Commonwealth were on the whole more strenuous, upright, and devoted than their successors cannot be denied; but there are other factors in the explanation of their success, which are too often left out of account. The Puritan colonels who controlled the Commonwealth navy had already received a training, through the Cromwellian army, in the principles of business as applied to war. The confiscation of Royalist property placed at their disposal funds that seemed almost unlimited, until the time came when they were exhausted, and want of money began to create for the revolutionary Government precisely the same difficulties which afterwards beset the restored monarchy. Pepys and his colleagues had none of these advantages, and the wonder is that without them they achieved so much. They had to deal with the characteristic vices of the Restoration, exhibited throughout the service—"the laziness of one, the private business or love of pleasure in another, want of method in a third, and zeal to the affair in the most"; and they were perpetually entangled in the remorseless consequences of bad finance. Yet, except during the period 1679 to 1684, there was no abject incompetence, and much was effected from time to time, at first towards the incorporation of the improvements of the revolutionary period into the permanent system of the navy, and then in the direction of independent reform. The naval progress of the period may be perhaps partly attributed to the growing interest of

the political classes in sea-power, expressing itself at first in parliamentary enquiry into corrupt administration, and then in parliamentary grants appropriated to shipbuilding and other naval expenditure. But something must be ascribed to the knowledge and interest in these matters displayed both by Charles II and James II, and to the fact that in this department of affairs the Crown was always on the side of intelligent policy and vigorous administration. And in Samuel Pepys, "the right hand of the navy," the last two Stewart Kings had found a great public servant, who exhibited just those qualities which the navy required for its regeneration—a sound judgment, orderly business methods, administrative energy and capacity, shrewdness and tact in dealing with men, and above all a standard of public duty, which, in spite of his earlier lapses, derived its character from the period of Puritan supremacy.

(2) THE WARS (1664-74).

Indisputable as had been the English victory in the First Dutch War (1652-4), it had not been sufficiently decisive to preclude a renewal of the struggle, nor had the peace removed its principal causes. While the naval strength of Holland was weakened but not annihilated, commercial jealousy was embittered by the memories of the conflict. The Dutch, conscious that their international importance rested above all on their commerce, were not ready to leave unchallenged England's hard-won naval supremacy. Nor had the restoration of the Stewarts improved the chances of peace. Charles II, while following the Protector in upholding the commercial interests of England, did not share the zeal for Protestantism which had made Cromwell so anxious to end the strife with the sister Republic. Moreover, the existing Government of the United Provinces had expelled him from Holland at Cromwell's bidding, and was identified with the exclusion from power of his relatives of the House of Orange. Thus it was not on the side of peace that the influence of the English Court was likely to be exerted, and the King's connexion with the mercantile bodies which felt Dutch competition most keenly, the East India and Royal African Companies, greatly strengthened the advocates of the use of force against commercial rivals. Almost from the beginning of the reign strained relations prevailed between England and the United Provinces. The Dutch viewed with so bitter a jealousy the English occupation of Tangier (January, 1662), that at one time it seemed likely that Spain and her former provinces might combine to oppose the establishment of an English naval station at this important strategic point. That crisis passed away; but the ill-will implied by the presence of de Ruyter's squadron in the Straits

remained. It was in vain that in September, 1662, a treaty was negotiated in which the Provinces showed every disposition to be conciliatory, recognising the English "right of the flag," and promising to give up the island of Pularoon. This last concession was never carried out, and the treaty became a dead letter. Collisions between Dutch and English traders in the East Indies and West Africa continued to occur—collisions which, seeing how little control the home governments could exercise over their representatives in those distant quarters, it would have been hard enough to prevent, even if the English Government had genuinely wished to keep the peace. On both sides complaints were frequent. In April, 1664, the Royal African Company protested that "the Dutch leave no stone unturned to discourage and ruin" their trade; and in the same month claims against the Dutch were reported to the House of Lords for damages amounting to £800,000, of which the East India Company demanded £230,000 and the "traders to Africa" £330,000. But before this Charles II had taken a step which made war inevitable. In October, 1663, he despatched to the Guinea Coast a small squadron of men-of-war under Major (afterwards Sir) Robert Holmes, to protect the Royal African Company against the encroachments of the Dutch. Holmes had instructions to avoid hostilities, if possible; but, according to his own narrative of his proceedings, he met with a most unconciliatory reception from the Dutch authorities, who fired upon him when he attempted to negotiate and stirred up the natives to take part against him. Thus provided with the excuse he wanted, Holmes retaliated forcibly, capturing most of the Dutch possessions and vessels on the coast.

Such proceedings, amounting as they did to acts of war, not unnaturally provoked vigorous protests from the Dutch, and, at the request of their ambassador, Holmes was thrown into the Tower on his return to England and subjected to an examination before the Secretaries of State. However, the Dutch did not confine themselves to seeking redress by diplomatic means, but paid Charles back in his own coin. They had at that moment in the Mediterranean a squadron under de Ruyter, ostensibly protecting Dutch trade against the Barbary corsairs; and, when the English Government threatened to treat as a declaration of war the despatch of Dutch reinforcements to West Africa, de Witt, while apparently giving way, was able to steal a march on England by using de Ruyter's ships for the purpose. Appearing on the Guinea Coast in January, 1665, de Ruyter surprised several English vessels at Goree, recovered that post and others which Holmes had seized, and captured several of the English settlements. Thence he crossed to the West Indies, only to be repulsed from Barbados (April, 1665), after which he coasted along the American sea-board to Newfoundland, making many prizes but failing to recover the Dutch settlements on the Hudson, known as New Amsterdam. These had been captured in the previous

autumn by an expedition under the command of Governor Nicolls of Massachusetts who had renamed them New York, in honour of the Lord High Admiral, James, Duke of York. Not till June, 1665, did he turn homewards; and long before that date open war had taken the place of those irregular hostilities which both sides endeavoured to justify under the name of "reprisals." During the winter of 1664-5 these had been extended from colonial to European waters by Sir Thomas Allen's attack on the homeward-bound Dutch Smyrna fleet in the Straits of Gibraltar (December, 1664). The next step was the seizure of the Dutch ships in English harbours and the confiscation of their cargoes. In February a proclamation was issued warning merchant-ships in foreign parts not to sail home alone for fear of the Dutch, but to wait for other vessels or for proper convoy. Letters of reprisal were freely issued, and preparations for war were generally pushed forward. The Dutch for their part spared no effort to fit out as large a fleet as possible, levying heavy additional taxes, and raising loans. Their application to Louis XIV for the assistance due from France under the treaty of April, 1662, proved unsuccessful, as Louis sought to use the opportunity to obtain from them a recognition of his claims on the Spanish Netherlands, a concession to which they would not agree. Meanwhile the Commons had voted £2,500,000 for the navy (February, 1665), and on March 4 Charles published his declaration of war.

That the struggle on which England and Holland thus entered would be of a purely naval character was made sufficiently certain by their common military weakness. Neither combatant could hope to achieve anything on land beyond mere raids on exposed points; systematic military operations, such as an invasion, were quite out of the question. Hence the command of the sea was sought, not in order that naval preponderance might open up a field for the operations of armies, but to obtain security for the combatant's own commerce, and to inflict as much injury as possible on the commerce and shipping of the enemy. In the war of 1652-4 neither side had suspended its commerce, and the operations had largely consisted of the attack and defence of great convoys. Now the States-General, recognising the impossibility of success in the double task of contesting the command of the sea and protecting their own commerce, issued a proclamation prohibiting all their subjects from stirring out of any of their ports, in the hope that, if thus relieved of the duty of protecting merchant-ships, they might concentrate all their energy and strength on gaining command of the sea by victory over the enemy's fleet. Fully aware of the great advantages of being the first to get to sea, each side made every effort to anticipate its enemy; but, while Charles had committed a serious imprudence in declaring war when he was not in a position to strike at once, the defects in the Dutch administration made their mobilisation even more backward, and, despite all de Witt's efforts, the Zeeland squadron had not yet managed to join

the main fleet in the Texel, when on April 23 the Duke of York appeared off their coast at the head of over 100 sail. During more than a fortnight he cruised off the Dutch harbours, capturing their homeward-bound merchantmen, vainly challenging their fleet to battle. But Obdam, to whom in de Ruyter's absence the command had been given, would not come out when a third of his fleet was separated from him and the enemy held the interior position, and he remained quiet till heavy weather combined with shortness of provisions to drive the English home (May 15). Then, having rallied the Zeelanders, Obdam crossed to the English coast, hoping from reports of their unreadiness to catch his enemy at a disadvantage.

However, when on June 1 he appeared off Southwold Bay, to which the English had moved from the Gunsfleet two days before, he found them ready and eager to engage. The English at once stood out to sea, and spent all that day and the next in working out to the eastward, Obdam, who had the wind (S.E.) of them, keeping away and avoiding action. At daybreak next morning (June 3) the wind shifted to the S.S.W., thereby giving the English the weather-gage and enabling them to force on an action. Twice the fleets passed each other on opposite tacks, exchanging a heavy fire, the English retaining the wind despite an effort of the Dutch to weather Prince Rupert's squadron, which led the fleet at the second "pass." Then, by promptly tacking, the fleet came on to the same course as the Dutch, and bore down to closer quarters to force the fighting. For some time the battle was very evenly contested; and, though the English appear to have throughout manœuvred with more skill than the Dutch, they could not altogether avoid some confusion. Thus James himself seems to have changed places with Sandwich in order to prevent the Dutch van from stretching ahead and gaining the wind of the Earl's squadron, which on the port tack was leading the English fleet. The decisive moment came when Obdam, endeavouring to close with the Duke's flag-ship, perished in an explosion which wrecked his ship and was the signal for the rout of the Dutch. Night and a slackening of the pursuit, due probably to the unauthorised intervention of one of the Duke's suite, nervous for his master's safety, prevented the Dutch defeat from becoming a disaster, and enabled them to find shelter among their shoals. The English had suffered too severely in spars and rigging (for it was the Dutch practice to fire high so as to cripple their opponents) to be able to establish a blockade of the Dutch ports; but nevertheless the English victory was incontestable. With the loss of one old ship and about a thousand casualties, they had sunk and destroyed over a dozen vessels, taken as many more, and inflicted on the enemy a loss of about 5000 men. The old fault of indiscipline and insubordination still marred the efficiency of the Dutch, and the English fleet was in much better order and far smarter and more skilful in manœuvring.

The War had thus opened well for the English; but the subsequent course of the campaign proved disappointing. The shortcomings of the victualling department seriously impaired the efficiency of the fleet, and despite a "hot press" and the embarkation of an unusual number of landsmen, want of hands proved a great source of trouble. Moreover, later in the year, the ravages of the Plague greatly increased the difficulties of the Government and the disorders in the administration. Nor was Sandwich, who had replaced James in the command, conspicuously successful when at last he did get to sea (July 5). An attempt on some Dutch East Indiamen in the neutral port of Bergen (August 2) was repulsed with heavy loss; but more serious than the repulse was the fact that, while Sandwich was thus out of the way, de Ruyter had reached home in safety, so that the Dutch secured not only a valuable convoy and many prizes, but also a commander-in-chief capable of reviving their drooping courage. He was at once sent off to Bergen to bring home the Indiamen in refuge there, a task he accomplished successfully despite the efforts of Sandwich to intercept him. A storm which dispersed the Dutch (September 3) allowed Sandwich to capture four men-of-war and some valuable merchantmen; but they proved a source of more trouble than profit, as Sandwich seems to have allowed a premature distribution of the cargoes, a step which gave a handle to his numerous enemies, and mainly accounted for his supersession. Towards the end of October, after the English fleet had taken up its winter station at the Nore, the Dutch made an ineffectual demonstration off the Thames; the English, hard hit by the ravages of the Plague, were too short of men to accept the challenge, and, before long, bad weather drove the Dutch home.

Meanwhile (June, 1665) Charles, as has been more fully narrated in a previous chapter, had secured the aid of Münster's warlike prelate, the restless and energetic Bernhard von Galen, who was the more ready to lead his troops against the ill-guarded eastern frontier of the United Provinces (September), since on several occasions the Republic had thwarted his schemes. For war by land the Dutch were but ill-prepared, and their eastern provinces were speedily overrun; but here the Bishop's successes came to an end. Charles could send his ally no troops, and the Dutch could now claim French help against an undeniable aggression. Louis, anxious lest the recent death of Philip IV of Spain (September 17, N.S.) might induce England and the Dutch to sink their differences in order to check his designs on the Spanish Netherlands, was determined to prolong the war; and accordingly he despatched 6000 men to support the Dutch and gave orders to his admiral, the Duc de Beaufort, to make ready to bring the Toulon squadron round to the Atlantic for the campaign of 1666.

The importance of the intervention of France is not to be measured by the fact that de Beaufort never joined de Ruyter or fired a shot in action. His squadron was nevertheless the principal cause of the

English defeat in the "Four Days' Battle." The strain of the war was beginning to tell on the ill-managed finances of England, nor was it till the end of May that Monck and Rupert, the new "Generals at Sea," were able to put out; and, even then, they had only some eighty fighting ships under them, although, in order to concentrate all available force against the principal enemy, it had been found necessary to recall the squadron under Sir Jeremy Smyth, which had recently taken the Levant "trade" out to the Mediterranean. Could this squadron have been left in the Straits of Gibraltar, it would have held the French at Toulon in check, and have prevented de Beaufort from joining the Brest ships under Duquesne or coming to the aid of the Dutch. But, after recalling Smyth's squadron in order to concentrate, it was an inexcusable blunder to divide the main fleet by detaching Rupert with twenty of the best ships to attempt the destruction of the French at Belleisle. To fix the responsibility for this blunder is not easy. The evidence on the point is inadequate and conflicting. On the one hand, in the account which he gave to the Commons after the war, Monck states most explicitly that the fleet was divided "by order from above"; and he declares that he had been surprised by the proposal and had pointed out the risks which would be incurred. That the final decision as to the movements of the fleet rested not with the commanders but with the King and Council seems clear from the language of the State Papers of the period, while Rupert, in his version of the affair, speaks of "sailing in pursuance of the orders he had duly received from the Duke of York." According to Pepys, not an impartial witness against the rival who had superseded his patron, Sandwich, the step was in the first instance suggested "from the fleet." Sir William Coventry, the informant on whom he relied, had an excellent reason for wishing to fix the blame on the admirals, for according to Monck it was Coventry who had first come to the Nore to submit the proposal to Monck and Rupert. If the evidence is not enough to warrant us in definitely ascribing the plan to the Duke of York, whose secretary Coventry was, Monck's seems the more credible of the two statements.

But whoever was really at fault, the result was disastrous. Barely had Rupert sailed (May 29) than Monck received orders to move from the Downs to the Gunfleet; and, in obeying these, he fell in with the Dutch between the North Foreland and Dunkirk (June 1). Retreat would perhaps have been the most prudent course, for the Dutch had eighty sail to his fifty-four; but many of his fleet were "heavy sailers," and even retreat might not have averted a battle. Moreover, Monck had the wind (S.W.) in his favour, while the Dutch were much scattered, the majority being far to leeward, and consequently badly placed for assisting the windwardmost squadron, Cornelis Tromp's, which Monck hastened to attack with his whole force. Tromp had to cut his cables and to bear away S.E., while de Ruyter and Evertsen strove to

come to his help. But, before Monck could reap the fruits of his tactics, the rapidly shoaling water forced him to tack to escape the sands, and in standing back to the north-westward he could not avoid engaging the Dutch centre and rear. Through these he fought his way gallantly, first standing N.E., then tacking and working back W. "through the body" of the hostile fleet, after which nightfall ended the engagement. Though the shoals had intervened to mar the success of his stroke at Tromp, Monck had given a brilliant example of tactical insight and daring, and he might fairly claim to have had none the worst of the day. The flag-ship of the Vice-Admiral of the White, Sir William Berkeley, was missing, and two or three other vessels had been lost, apparently being cut off through failing to keep the line; but the Dutch had suffered as much damage as they had inflicted, and two at least of their ships had been sunk or fired.

Next morning (June 2) found the indefatigable Monck plying to windward (S.S.W.) to renew the fight, the precision and order of his line exciting the admiration of a French eye-witness in the Dutch fleet. Having gained the wind, thanks to superior manœuvring and to more weatherly vessels, he "bore up round on" the enemy, and engaged "more hotly than before." For some time the English had by no means the worst of the action, dividing the enemy's fleet, and pressing very hotly upon "the leewardmost part of them." However, numerical inferiority prevented the English from profiting by their superior discipline and smarter manœuvring; and, when about 2 p.m. Monck, making a final "pass," tacked back to the west, weathering most of the Dutch fleet, and drew his ships together, he found it impossible to continue the contest. In the course of the day some sixteen sail had reinforced de Ruyter, while many of Monck's captains had gone off to repair damages without waiting to obtain permission, so that he was left with less than forty ships, and these much injured in masts and rigging. Retreat was therefore imperative, but it was carried out with order and skill, the sixteen most effective vessels being formed into a line abreast in the rear to cover their more crippled consorts, some of the worst of which, Dutch prizes and other "slugg ships," Monck destroyed there and then. The Dutch followed the retreating squadron; but, when next morning (June 3) they attempted to press home the pursuit, they were so hotly received that they sheered off to a more respectful distance. About three in the afternoon ships were sighted to the southward, which, to Monck's relief, soon proved to be Rupert's squadron returning to their comrades' aid in response to the orders which had reached them at St Helen's. The course was promptly altered to W.S.W.; but, before a junction could be effected, several vessels ran on the Galloper Sand, among them the *Prince*, the flag-ship of Sir George Ayscue, which, failing to get off, surrendered somewhat tamely, and was burnt by her captors. However, though the Dutch detached a squadron to intercept Rupert,

the attempt failed, and the reunited English stood to the northward to clear the Galloper, the Dutch standing away to gain the wind (S.S.E.).

Next morning (June 4), the English hastened to renew the engagement, the Dutch lying-to to windward (S.W.) to await the attack, which was led by Rupert's vessels. As the enemy showed a disinclination to come to close quarters, the English on the starboard tack bore down upon them, and forced their way through the Dutch line, with the result that the Dutch fleet seems to have become divided into two groups, one to leeward and a larger one to windward, between which the English "stood backward and forward" several times, exchanging broadsides. At length, as the English pressed heavily upon the leewardmost group, the Dutch to windward bore up to their comrades' aid, thereby allowing Rupert and several supporters to weather them. But, as Rupert tacked again, meaning to bear down to help Monck, on whose division the Dutch were now pressing, some of his damaged masts fell and left him crippled. Monck, likewise too much disabled to tack, was forced to bear away, and failed to prevent the capture of two or three of the "lamed ships" in his rear. The Dutch were, however, in little better plight, and, so soon as Monck and Rupert had rejoined, "made no further after them," but stood away homeward, "as glad to be quit of us as we of them." It was but a Pyrrhic victory they could claim. Without reckoning several fire-ships which they had expended, they seem to have lost four or five ships at least; and, in view of the English practice of reserving their fire for close quarters and "levelling most at the hulls," whereas the Dutch fired high, disabling masts and rigging rather than doing execution among the crews, it would be unreasonable to put the Dutch casualties lower than the English, of which latter 3000 killed and wounded, with 1500 prisoners, seems an approximately correct estimate. The twenty or thirty English ships usually alleged to have been lost or taken come down, on investigation of the official lists of the fleet before and after the battle, to ten exclusive of fire-ships. And, if the English discipline had not been strong enough to prevent the speedy quitting of the action by some faint-hearted captains, the tenacity and endurance displayed by most of the vanquished fairly entitles them to a share of the honours. It was with some justice that the sailors cursed the division of the fleet as the cause of the disaster; they had been outnumbered, not outfought, and all they asked for was another chance on more equal terms.

Indeed, the real reason for calling the battle a Dutch victory was that de Witt's strenuous exertions enabled the Dutch to be at sea again by June 28 (O.S.), three weeks earlier than their rivals. However, they made little use of this period. The French failed to appear, and without French aid an invasion could not be contemplated. Their presence on the English coast does not seem to have very seriously impeded commerce; while, by the time the Dutch put out, "the buoy at the Nore," where the fleet was assembling, was "beginning to fill and to look proudly

again," as disabled ships were refitted, so that an attack on the English at their moorings would have been hazardous. The chief trouble of the English commanders was lack of men. The last battle had left the fleet ill-manned, and the counter-attraction of privateering proved a serious competitor. Vigorous pressing supplied quantity rather than quality; and, though the deficiency was to some extent met by shipping soldiers—an expedient freely employed by the Dutch—in the end some fifteen vessels of no particular value were left behind, and their crews distributed through the fleet. At length, on July 19, the fleet, eighty-eight men-of-war and seventeen fire-ships, left the Nore, and after managing to pass the Narrows at one tide reached the Gunfleet (July 22), the Dutch withdrawing eastward to bring the shelter of their friendly shoals close at hand in case of defeat. Next day, the English sailed again with the wind at S.S.E. and stood out through the King's Channel after the Dutch.

Bad weather prevented a battle till the 25th, when daybreak found the Dutch on the port tack, steering S. by E. with the wind at N.N.E. As they, though to windward, made no attempt to engage, the English bore down upon them, Sir Thomas Allen, who led the van, closing "as soon as he came to the head of the enemies' fleet." The action speedily became general; and, though the Dutch appear to have deliberately adopted the "half-moon" formation, which was considered an effective method of meeting an enemy attacking in line ahead, the English "plied them so close that they could not tack on us." For some hours the battle was evenly contested; but about 3 p.m. the Frisian and North Holland squadrons, which formed the van, disorganised by the fall of Evertsen and two other flag-officers, gave way in disorder; whereupon de Ruyter, unable to withstand any longer the fierce attacks of Monck and Rupert, was forced to follow suit with the centre. In the rear, where Tromp and the Zeelanders were opposed to Sir Jeremy Smyth, matters were more even. The Blue, the weakest of the English squadrons, included several heavy sailers, which were lagging behind, and Tromp was able to hold on towards the south, keeping the wind of Smyth, who, however, held on with him; so that before long the rears were completely separated from their main bodies which were standing away eastward, the Dutch making for home, the English in pursuit. Fortunately for de Ruyter, who exerted himself most gallantly to cover his "maimed ships," the wind dropped considerably; so that the Dutch, who could sail better in light winds because they drew less water, were able to keep ahead of their pursuers until, on the evening of the 26th, Monck and Rupert had the mortification of seeing their quarry gain the shelter of the sand-banks and make their way into the Dearloo Channel. There remained, however, the hope of intercepting Tromp; and to this end the commanders anchored where he was likely to pass, though most of their ships failing to follow this example were carried by the tide to the leeward. Moreover Smyth, nervous about venturing too near

the banks, failed to keep very close on Tromp, so that the Zealand squadron also gained the Wielings and safety (July 27, O.S.). Yet, though the Dutch had reason to congratulate themselves on having escaped with the loss of only five or six sail, their defeat was more decisive than that of the English in the "Four Days' Battle." Their shattered vessels had to lie inactive in harbour, powerless to hinder Monck and Rupert, who continued on the Dutch coast, holding their privateers in check, capturing many prizes—a vessel taken on August 21 is spoken of as the eighty-fifth taken since the fleet came out—and inflicting upon Dutch commerce damage estimated at £1,000,000 by destroying the town of Brandaris on the island of Schelling, together with some hundred-and-sixty merchantmen lying in the Vlie (August 8).

But England was as incapable of following up on land the successes which she had gained at sea as was her adversary; and she could no longer rely on the renunciation of the Bishop of Münster, who had been forced to make peace in April, restoring to the Republic all his conquests. Lack of provisions at length drove the English home; and the Dutch, who were still hoping for a junction with de Beaufort, put to sea about the end of August. Hearing of this, Rupert and Monck hastily sailed from Southwold Bay (August 30); and, though a violent storm which compelled them to bear away down Channel to St Helen's (September 2), baulked them of the battle they desired, no junction was effected, and the Dutch returned to the Wielings. By September 13 Rupert was again at sea, and he continued cruising in the Channel till the end of the month; while de Beaufort, who had ventured as far as Dieppe, but was by no means anxious to risk his raw crews in action, returned to Brest after a very brief stay within the reach of danger. Once again de Ruyter put out; but again, just as Rupert was on the point of bringing him to action, an exceptionally violent gale prevented the fleets from engaging by driving them both to shelter, September 25; and thus operations came to an end on both sides.

By this time both combatants were heartily anxious to end the war. The hopes which had caused Charles II to embark upon it had been disappointed. Far from proving lucrative, it was a heavy drain on financial resources already unequal to the requirements of an extravagant Court, and an ill-managed administration. The Plague, the Great Fire, disaffection at home, and risings in Scotland, combined, as has been shown in an earlier chapter, to make peace urgent; while de Witt, alarmed by the designs of Louis XIV on the Netherlands, wanted to be quit of a struggle which was inflicting serious losses on Dutch commerce and shipping. Hence, when Charles made overtures (October, 1666) they were favourably received; and in May a conference met at Breda. With peace thus appearing assured, Charles was reluctant to spend money on preparations for a campaign which might not take place. Accordingly, instead of restoring the fleet to a war footing

by refitting the first- and second-rates which, as was then usual, had been laid up during the winter, it was decided to send out a few light squadrons to attack Dutch commerce. For commerce-destroying as a weapon of the weaker belligerent a fairly plausible case can be made out; but its deliberate adoption by the combatant who had till then certainly had the best of the contest, not merely threw away dearly-won advantages, but might have entailed utterly disastrous as well as disgraceful consequences, had the enemy been able to improve the occasion properly. Moreover, it seems clear that all the experts were against these proceedings, not merely Rupert and Monck, but the Duke of York also. However, Charles was determined to spend no more on the fleet, and the command of the sea was deliberately allowed to go to the Dutch by default.

It would be easier to treat this misguided step as a mere error of judgment, if adequate preparations had been made for local defence of places likely to be attacked, or if the English Government had been without information as to the movements and intentions of the Dutch. No such extenuating circumstances can, however, be pleaded. So early as April it was reported that the Dutch meant to block up the Thames; and at the end of the month thirty sail appeared in the Firth of Forth, and, after demonstrating uselessly against Edinburgh, bombarded Burntisland without much more result. But all warnings were neglected, and on May 24 the King ordered that, to avoid further expense, the third-rates also should be laid up, and only small parties sent out "to distract the enemy and to disturb their trade." Orders were also issued for putting the various ports into a state of defence; but, as the Council declined to provide any money, "the peace being as good as made," the orders remained a dead letter.

De Witt was not the man "to be registered to posterity as casting away arms of offence and defence while in treaty with armed and active enemies"; and he eagerly grasped the chance of carrying out a project he had for some time entertained of attacking the English in their harbours. Early in June some sixty-six sail left Holland on this errand, and by 7 p.m. on the 10th the half-finished works at Sheerness were in de Ruyter's hands, and all was uproar and panic at Chatham. Monck, hastening to the scene of danger, did all that one man could accomplish; but the fatuous negligence of the Council had made effective measures of resistance impossible: guns, ammunition, stores of every kind were lacking, and he was none too well supported by the dockyard officials. All in vain ships were sunk to block the passage of the Medway, and so cover the vessels lying unmanned and unfitted in Gillingham Reach. June 12 saw the humiliating results of Charles II's policy. Not only were the triumphant Dutch able to inflict on their impotent adversaries a loss far heavier than that suffered in the "Four Days' Battle," sixteen vessels in all being taken, burnt or scuttled by the defenders, among them the famous *Royal Charles* and three other vessels of almost equal strength; but these losses were as nothing in comparison with the

disgrace and ignominy thus gratuitously incurred. The King's reluctance to spend money on national defence was the sole cause of a humiliation which might easily have been averted. In the previous autumn there had been murmurs enough against the inadequate protection given against privateers, and men had remembered how "in Oliver's time there was better care taken to secure the coasts than now"; thus the exploits of the Dutch in the Medway throw a lurid light on the Stewart conception of the duty of national defence.

To the general relief, the Dutch proved unable to follow up the blow they had given. Retiring to the Nore (June 16) they remained inactive during all the next fortnight, merely hindering trade by their presence at the mouth of the Thames. Now at last something was done to put the coasts and forts into a proper state of preparation. Everywhere the militia were called out. Rupert hurried down to Woolwich to erect defences such as would prevent the Dutch from coming up the Thames to London; and, though exasperation and indignation with the Government for its culpable negligence were universal, men flocked to arms. Early in July the Dutch at last bestirred themselves to assault Landguard Fort; but they were repulsed with loss, and some troops whom they landed at Felixstowe as a diversion were so warmly received by the local militia that they "had much ado to keep themselves from disorder when re-embarking." Equal unsuccess attended a squadron which was sent down Channel to intercept the home-coming "Straits fleet." The prey got safely into Dartmouth, which de Ruyter found too well prepared for him to venture on an attack; and, meanwhile, the ships he had left in the Thames had been assailed by fire-ships and other small vessels under Sir Edward Spragg (July 24), and had been forced to retire seawards. But the blow at the Medway had done its work: the English negotiators had had to abate their demands, and on July 26 official news was received that peace had been concluded on the 21st. By its terms the Dutch retained Pularoon and Lord Willoughby of Parham's settlement at Surinam which they had just captured (March, 1667); the Navigation Act was also somewhat modified in their favour, and the commercial treaty of 1662 was reaffirmed. But they had to recognise that "right of the flag," which had been so long a cause of contention, and also to leave New Amsterdam in English hands, thereby losing their foothold in North America. Simultaneously England and France made mutual restoration of their conquests in the West Indies, England also evacuating Nova Scotia, which she had conquered in 1654.

That after the Dutch raid on the Medway England should have obtained such favourable terms is largely to be ascribed to de Witt's moderation, and to his anxiety not to estrange England in the face of the growing danger from Louis XIV. But the United Provinces had little to gain by continuing operations. The events of July had shown little prospect of repeating the Chatham success, and their command of

the sea rested on the somewhat doubtful title of the deliberate neglect of the English to contest it. Had Charles listened to reason and put his fleet on a war footing in 1667, he might have obtained very favourable terms. Up to the end of 1666 the balance of advantage had certainly lain with the English, well as de Ruyter had done. Many of the Dutch captains were still, as in 1652-4, indifferent fighting men, and the efficiency of the Dutch fleet had been gravely marred by the old fault of indiscipline, exhibited at times by subordinate flag-officers such as Tromp and van Nes, no less than by disobedient captains and mutinous crews. On the other hand, while it cannot be denied that the service suffered not a little through faction and the rivalries of the different commanders and their followers, as has been seen the licence and low moral standards of the Restoration period had not yet altogether corrupted the English navy. Certainly in tactics and the handling of fleets the English were superior to their enemy. In Myngs, Lawson, Penn, Allen and many others, the English navy possessed capable and accomplished subordinates; and, while James acquitted himself creditably enough at Southwold Bay, it is certainly unfair to dismiss Rupert as a mere cavalry officer at sea. Monck too, whatever his shortcomings on the seaman's side of the admiral's art, was anything but an amateur in tactics. Indeed, there seem to be good grounds for attributing to him a very important share in the introduction of the new system of tactics, the development of which can be traced in the Fighting Instructions of the period. These show clearly that the close-hauled line ahead was a purely English innovation, adopted because it admitted of the full utilisation of the gun-power on which the English principally relied. Whatever the exact stage in its evolution reached in the First Dutch War, in the Second it may certainly be regarded as the established English formation; and the detailed accounts of the battles of 1665 and 1666 certainly leave the conviction, not only that the greater skill with which the English manœuvred was the result of familiarity with this formation and of constant practice, but that, notwithstanding any opposite impressions based on Pepys' famous report of his conversation with Sir William Penn after the "Four Days' Battle," instead of the English having learnt the line-ahead from the Dutch, it was the Dutch who strove to imitate the English formation—not always with much success. "Nothing," wrote the French eye-witness of Monck's attack on June 2, 1666, "equals the beautiful order of the English at sea. Never was a line drawn straighter than that drawn by their ships. They fight like a line of cavalry handled according to rule." It is only the blunder which exposed Monck to greatly superior forces in the "Four Days' Battle," and the criminal folly which brought about the humiliation of June, 1667, that prevent us from looking on the Second Dutch War as a period of naval success; and for these errors neither the navy nor its commanders can reasonably be held responsible.

That there were Englishmen who shared de Witt's fears of Louis was proved by the next phase in the relations of England and Holland, the Triple Alliance of 1668. But Temple and his supporters were powerless to secure the permanence of an alliance which rested on no secure basis; and, so far as Charles was concerned, his assent to the alliance was a piece of the grossest insincerity and political treachery. In the country at large the sense of the danger from France which threatened both England and the United Provinces was not yet strong enough to outweigh the commercial jealousy of the Dutch, which had not at all diminished, and the desire to vindicate the honour of the English arms by avenging the raid on the Medway. Even Buckingham and Shaftesbury, who were not in the full secret of the Treaty of Dover, were well disposed to the French alliance as a return to the policy of the Protectorate, and a guarantee for the adequate humiliation of the detested Hollanders.

Once the Treaty of Dover had been concluded, the outbreak of hostilities was only a question of time. In vain de Witt sought to conciliate Charles. His evident desire for peace was interpreted as a proof of weakness; and the only result was that Charles, having failed to goad the Dutch into some act which he might treat as a provocation, opened the game by attacking (March 13, 1672) the Dutch Smyrna fleet on its homeward way up Channel. The attack, delivered without any warning, not to speak of a declaration of war, was not merely a breach of international decencies, but a discreditable failure, for the force employed proved insufficient to overcome the convoy's escort, and most of the ships escaped capture. Four days later (March 17) England declared war.

The conditions under which the Third Dutch War was fought differed appreciably from those of the Second, since the combatants sought to gain the command of the sea, not merely in order to protect their own commerce and to destroy or drive off the enemy's mercantile marine, but also with the intention of bringing their maritime operations to bear directly on the course of the War by land. The English army was still in its infancy; but by 1672 Charles had managed to raise forces in England and Scotland quite large enough to have effected something decisive, could they have been landed on the Dutch coast so as to combine with the successful advance of Louis against the eastern frontier of the Republic. The victories of June 1665 and July 1666 had been barren of results, because the victors could not follow up their naval successes by carrying the war into the enemy's country. If beaten at sea now, the Dutch would be exposed to a danger even more serious than the paralysis of their commerce.

Once again Charles had rushed into war before his forces were ready; and the imprudence might have cost him dear, had de Witt been able to get his ships out in time to prevent the Duke of York, who had resumed the command—for Monck's death (1670) had removed his principal rival—from joining his French allies undisturbed. But the usual inefficiency of

the over-decentralised Dutch naval administration disappointed de Witt's hopes of repeating the raid of 1667. The Zeeland squadron was late, and when at last de Ruyter with seventy-five ships appeared at the entrance to the Thames (May 5), the English were already on their way down the Channel to meet the French. The junction took place at Portsmouth on May 7; and the two fleets promptly set sail eastward to bring the Dutch to action. Together they mustered rather over ninety sail, excluding fire-ships, the French supplying about a third of the force.

Contrary winds so much impeded progress that it was not till May 17 that the allies were off the North Foreland; and by that date their water supplies were running short. Accordingly it was decided to make for Southwold Bay, where they cast anchor on May 22, having on the way fallen in with the Dutch (May 20), though bad weather had prevented an action. It does not say much for the English administration that the watering and provisioning should still have been incomplete six days later, when, in the early morning of May 28, a scout brought the news that the Dutch were standing into the bay before an easterly breeze. Their adversaries appear to have been somewhat unprepared, for, though they promptly weighed anchor and stood out to sea, the movement was executed in some disorder, the English standing northward, the French going out on the other tack to the S.S.E. and thus becoming completely separated from their allies. Moreover, those English ships which had been lying to leeward, nearer the shore, found it impossible to work out to join the vessels to windward, which, being for the most part flag-ships or other heavy vessels, could not bear down to rejoin their consorts for fear of the shoals. Thus the line was never properly formed; and, when de Ruyter, leaving the Zeeland squadron to "contain" the French, bore down "like a torrent" on the English with the rest of his fleet, the windwardmost ships came in for some severe treatment. For nearly three hours the English stood northward, closely engaged, till about 11 a.m. Jordan, who was leading the Blue squadron, managed to get ahead of the Dutch van, and tacking gained the wind. Sandwich being "deep in the enemies' fleet" was unable to follow, but his rear-admiral, Kempthorne, was more fortunate, weathering the enemy and forcing them to tack and stand south. He then endeavoured to succour his commander, now closely beset by fire-ships, three of which he repulsed before a fourth succeeded in setting fire to the *Royal James*, with fatal results to the ship and to Sandwich himself. About the same time the Duke of York, who had shifted from the disabled *Prince* to the *St Michael*, had to tack to avoid the Red Sand; but, as the wind was too light to clear the smoke away, his action was not at first perceived by the bulk of his squadron; nor was it till about 2 p.m. that Harman and Spragg discovered what he had done and followed suit. By this time both fleets had lost their formation and

had fallen into several groups, all standing southward towards the French and the Zealanders. James, who was hotly engaged, had some Dutch to leeward, but a larger body, including de Ruyter, to windward. Jordan and Kempthorne were on de Ruyter's weather-quarter, pressing hard on him, Harman and Spragg coming up from astern. For some hours the action continued; the *St Michael* was in turn disabled, so that when Spragg came up James shifted to his flag-ship, the *London*; but the English pressed so hotly on the leeward group of Dutch that, about 8 p.m., they bore away, whereupon de Ruyter also disengaged and made off, eventually rallying the Zealand squadron, and all standing away for the Dutch coast.

During the night James stood after the Dutch, though with only some thirty ships in company. At daybreak the enemy, seeing his weakness, tacked back to the westward to engage him, but promptly resumed their retreat on the appearance of the French and the Blue squadron. The allies, now reunited and having the wind, stood after the Dutch who were now to the southward. However, just as the English van had come level with the leading Dutch ships and were about to bear down on them in obedience to the Duke's signal, a sudden fog prevented an engagement; and, when it cleared, the allies, finding the Zealand banks in dangerous proximity, tacked and stood away home, the Dutch also seeking the shelter of their harbours.

Inasmuch as de Ruyter had so far crippled the allies that they had to return home to refit, and that therefore the invasion had to be postponed, Southwold Bay was strategically a Dutch victory. Tactically, however, it was a draw, if not slightly in favour of the allies. De Ruyter had caught them at a disadvantage, and in spite of his inferiority in numbers had at first had the best of the fight; but in the end it was he who had been forced to disengage, and the care with which for the rest of the season he avoided another action suggests the inference that his losses had been so heavy that he did not care to risk repeating them. Certainly he left two prizes in English hands, and apparently one or more of his ships were sunk. Seeing how lightly the French had been engaged, it is a little hard to believe the story that they lost two ships; and, while the English crews suffered severely, having 700 killed and about twice as many wounded, with several hundred prisoners, the *Royal James* was the only ship lost, two others of the Blue squadron which fell into Dutch hands having been retaken by their crews. To avert defeat was, however, sufficient for de Ruyter. At that critical juncture in Dutch affairs there was little to gain by running risks; and it was enough that, when in July the allies reappeared on the coast, de Ruyter, by maintaining his fleet in watchful readiness and by utilising fully those friendly sand-banks which had so often proved the salvation of the Dutch, prevented the threatened landing. Early in August a storm and shortage of provisions drove the allies to their ports, with which

the major operations of the year ended, the French returning home (September 19, 1672, O.S.).

Before the next campaign opened, the passage of the Test Act had deprived James of the command, and his place was taken by his cousin Rupert. The choice was probably the best possible, though Rupert had the reputation of being "unlucky"; but it was bitterly resented by Spragg, now Admiral of the Blue, who seems to have hoped for the command, and whose Journal reflects his keen disappointment. As before, the best chance for the Dutch was to deal a blow at one of the hostile fleets before its ally could join it, and in April de Ruyter crossed to the Thames with this object. But Rupert was ready for him; and he therefore put back to rally the unready Zeeland squadron, so that Rupert was able to join d'Estrées and the French at Rye unhindered (May 14, O.S.). This junction effected, the allies' next aim was to bring de Ruyter to action, or, if he refused to fight, to blockade the Dutch ports and so cover the transport to Holland of the troops which were collecting at Yarmouth. On May 23 they were off the Schoonveldt, where the Dutch were lying. Having only sixty ships to oppose to eighty, de Ruyter showed no haste to give battle; so a council of war decided (May 27) to send in the lighter vessels as a "forlorn" to force him out. However, the Dutch did not wait to be forced and speedily engaged (May 28). From noon till dark the two fleets stood backwards and forwards along the coast, first standing N.W. and then tacking and working back to the S.E., the Dutch hugging the shore so that the English, though they had the wind (W.S.W.), could not close for fear of the shoals. Thus, though Rupert in the van pressed so hard on his opponents that the Dutch were "cut asunder," he had not sea-room enough to profit by his advantage, while Spragg put the Zeelanders to flight only to find himself to leeward of de Ruyter, as the latter stood back south, and consequently in some peril. About night-fall, finding his fleet in five fathoms, Rupert decided to disengage and bear away from so dangerous a place, the action thus ending with about equal losses on both sides, the Dutch having one ship taken, the English two disabled and three fire-ships expended. During the next week the allies cruised off the Schoonveldt, refitting under much greater disadvantages than the Dutch, who had the resources of their ports within easy reach. On June 4 (O.S.) de Ruyter, having a strong N.E. wind in his favour, took the offensive. The allies stood N.N.W., keeping as near the wind as possible, Spragg leading and trying to stretch ahead and weather the Dutch. This, however, he could not achieve; and at last the Dutch bore down and engaged at some little distance, as usual directing their fire at the English masts and rigging. Rupert vainly endeavoured to get to a decisive range; and, as the sea was too high for the English to use their lower-deck guns, the action proved as inconclusive as its predecessor. During the night the Dutch tacked and stood away S.E., pursued by

the allies till about 6 a.m., when Rupert, seeing that the sands would shelter the enemy before he could overtake them, abandoned the chase. A return home was now unavoidable. He had not lost any ships; but many of his vessels had been badly damaged, and he was short of men, supplies and provisions, for the fleet had been "merely huddled out" without being properly found or equipped, and the deficiencies had not since been made good.

Thus, instead of covering the projected landing, the allies had to relieve the Dutch coast of their presence for nearly six weeks at the best season of the year. For this the blame must rest on an administration which, despite all the energy and vigilance of Pepys, could not escape the prevalent failings of the Restoration. In vain Rupert sought to hasten the refitting; men and materials alike were lacking; and, though 2000 soldiers were embarked, it was not till July 17 (O.S.) that the repairs were sufficiently complete to let Rupert leave the Nore with some ninety fighting ships, thirty of which were French. On the 24th he was off the Schoonveldt, trying to draw de Ruyter out and force him to fight. But though the Dutch put out (July 22), keeping with the allies as they made northward, Rupert could not bring on the desired battle. No sooner did he, thinking he had "drilled them a pretty distance," tack and stand down to engage, than a shift of the wind gave the Dutch the weather-gage and enabled them to regain "their old sanctuary," the Schoonveldt. Into "that hole" Rupert would not follow them, and, adopting the plan previously arranged, he stood away for the Texel.

The scheme proved efficacious; only by keeping touch with the allied fleets could de Ruyter prevent the landing of the troops from Yarmouth. It would not have been enough to keep his fleet "in being" in harbour; moreover, the East India fleet was due home, and he could not let that valuable prize fall into Rupert's clutches. Thus on August 10 Rupert had the satisfaction of seeing his enemy to leeward. He "bore down at a great pace" upon them, but the Dutch would not fight at a disadvantage, and kept away till nightfall. During the night a shift of wind to the S.E. put de Ruyter to windward, and enabled him to engage on his own terms (August 11). Calculating on the disinclination to get to close quarters which the French had continually displayed, he determined to contain the allied van, formed by their thirty sail, with part of the Zeeland squadron, whereby he was able to engage the sixty ships of Rupert and Spragg with practically equal numbers. The battle, which began about nine o'clock, speedily resolved itself into three separate engagements; in the van, d'Estrées, much to the dissatisfaction of his rear-admiral, de Martel, allowed Bankaert's few ships to hold him in check, and never attempted to close; in the centre, Rupert and de Ruyter stood along together to the S.W., very hotly engaged; astern of them, Spragg, in deliberate disobedience of Rupert's orders, backed his topsails to allow Tromp, who was a little astern, to come up with

him, whereby the whole Blue squadron fell far behind the body of the fleet. Tromp concentrated his attack on Spragg's flag-ship, and the *Royal Prince* was speedily disabled and forced out of the line, Lord Ossory, Spragg's rear-admiral, taking his place. About midday, the wind suddenly shifted to the S.W., which gave the allies the weather-gage, and deprived d'Estrées of his last excuse for not falling on the detachment which was containing him. However, he stood away to the S.E. and allowed Bankaert to bear up and actually pass through the rear of the French fleet on his way to join de Ruyter against Rupert. The Commander-in-Chief was thus very hard beset, having de Ruyter on his lee quarter, and the Zeelanders to windward of him, while his rear-admiral, Sir John Chicheley, who had fallen to leeward badly damaged, was cut off from the rest of the Red squadron and was in some peril, till Rupert, pressing hard on the Dutch to leeward of him and forcing them to bear away, brought him relief. After this there followed a lull in the action; and Rupert perceiving the Blue squadron some leagues to leeward decided to bear down and rejoin it. De Ruyter conformed to the move, and the two centres ran down parallel, within range of each other but without firing. It was just as well that Rupert made the move. Spragg had had a second flag-ship disabled, and in shifting to the *Royal Charles* his boat was sunk and he himself drowned. Tromp then pressed hotly on the *Prince* and other cripples, which were with difficulty protected by Lord Ossory and a few supporters, who had forced Tromp to sheer off when de Ruyter drew near, "bearing down with all the sail he could to make himself master of our lamed ships." Meanwhile, Rupert was making strenuous endeavours to induce certain vessels of the Blue and Red, which were lying inactive to windward, to take their places in his wake. Failing to do this, he pushed on and, interposing between de Ruyter and the cripples, renewed the action very sharply. Had the French, who by this time had tacked and followed the Red, only obeyed Rupert's repeated signals and borne down upon the enemy, the action would probably have ended in a victory for the allies. "I must have routed them," Rupert wrote; "it was the greatest and plainest opportunity ever lost at sea." And the justice of his bitter complaints is admitted by de Martel.

Nightfall at length parted the exhausted combatants, Rupert standing to sea under easy sail so as to carry off the disabled ships, and the Dutch making for their own coast. Desperate as the fighting had been, the only vessels lost were fire-ships and other small craft; and, in spite of his losses in officers and men and the injuries his ships had received, Rupert had no intention of acknowledging defeat by quitting the coast. He was furious at the conduct of the French, and some of his own captains had behaved in a manner with which he was strongly dissatisfied. But the bad weather which followed almost immediately after the action, and before damages could be repaired, forced him home (August 18, O.S.).

The season was now so far advanced that all thoughts of a descent upon Holland had to be laid aside; the camp at Yarmouth was broken up (September 1), and a little later the French departed for their own ports.

By this time not only were the relations between the French and English fleets, admirals, officers and men alike, strained almost to breaking point, but the nation was heartily sick of the war; and the "dissatisfaction at this conjunction with the French" was so great that "the general speech in the City" was that "unless this alliance with France be broken the nation will be ruined." National hostility to commercial rivals was being obliterated by the rising tide of antipathy to France, in which men saw the champion of the Roman Catholicism which they dreaded. It was felt that English sailors were being sacrificed to fight the battles of Louis; and, when Parliament met in October, it was all but unanimous in its determination to bring the War to an end. Charles was the more disposed to yield to its importunity, because the revolution in Holland which had overthrown de Witt and had supplanted him by the Prince of Orange had involved him in an attempt to ruin his own nephew. The Dutch, eagerly grasping a chance of reducing the odds against them, were ready to grant favourable terms, acknowledging fully the "right of the flag" and restoring New York, which they had taken in the previous July.

Thus on February 9, 1674 (O.S.), the Treaty of London ended a war in which the honours certainly rested with the Dutch, and more especially with de Ruyter. Nothing is more remarkable than the improvement in tone, discipline, skill, and all-round efficiency displayed by the Dutch navy in the Third Dutch War, the fruit very largely of the stringent measures of reform taken by de Witt and de Ruyter after the Peace of Breda. The Dutch had fought in a manner worthy of the best days of their race; they had realised the imminent peril of their country, and had ably seconded their great leader's brilliant combination of offence and defence, of vigorous attack and skilful avoidance of unequal combats. That even de Ruyter's great skill would have averted defeat if the French had cooperated cordially it would be bold to affirm. Rupert might fairly claim that, had d'Estrées played his part properly, the battle of the Texel would have had a very different result; and certainly he had no cause to feel ashamed of his own share in the war. Spragg's sweeping criticisms of his commander are the jealous words of a disappointed rival, and Rupert had had to contend against an untrustworthy ally, a defective administration, constant shortness of money, and a jealous and disobedient subordinate, whose conduct was typical of the insubordination and indiscipline which were gaining ground in the fleet. The Restoration standard of conduct was making itself felt. The tone of the Court could not but affect the navy; and the failures and other unsatisfactory features of the Third Dutch War were the inevitable result of the King's example.

CHAPTER IX.

THE POLICY OF CHARLES II AND JAMES II.

(1667-87.)

CLARENDON'S dismissal was Charles' opportunity, and he proceeded to take advantage of it with all the speed compatible with the caution of a far-seeing calculator whose immediate future, even at crises appalling to the most daring of his followers, was invariably pledged to his personal pleasure, and with the leisurely readjustment that attends transitions in great affairs. Clarendon was succeeded by the famous Cabal—Sir Thomas Clifford, Lord Arlington, the Duke of Buckingham, Lord Ashley, and the Earl of Lauderdale—the initials of whose names gave notoriety and permanence to a word already in common use. They formed a Ministry containing two of the cleverest and two of the most capable men in all England; but, despite their varied talents, they never enjoyed the complete confidence of the King and never acquired an influence over his policy comparable to that enjoyed by the late Chancellor. Less than eighteen months after Clarendon's fall, Charles wrote to his sister, Henrietta of Orleans: "One thing I desire you to take as much as you can out of the King of France's head, that my ministers are anything but what I will have them...whatsoever opinion my ministers had been of, I would and do always follow my own judgment, and, if they take any other measures than that, they will see themselves mistaken in the end." Widely as the aims of the two men differed and widely as their characters differed in almost every other respect, Charles II may be compared to his nephew William of Orange, in the uncommon tenacity with which he pursued his object. That he was, when he chose, an excellent man of business, his Ministers were well aware; that he was among the most adroit men of his age his friends and enemies, both politicians of England and the able diplomatists of France, had ample experience; but that, in power of projecting a great scheme and maintaining it in the face of almost unexampled difficulties and dangers, in coolness of judgment and in keenness of foresight he deserved to be classed among statesmen of the first rank, only the history of eighteen years could show.

The policy of Clarendon at home had been a severely Anglican royalism of the old style. In foreign affairs he had at the beginning of the reign been regarded by Mazarin as consistently opposed to French interests; and, although there had of late years been more ground for the popular belief that he was on the contrary their active promoter, he had desired peace with the Dutch, had dreamed of an alliance between England, Sweden, and Spain, and claimed to have prepared the way for the Triple Alliance to oppose the encroachments of Louis XIV on the territory of the Spanish monarchy. From Clarendon's retirement to the end of the reign, the cardinal point in Charles' policy was dependence on France: not however the submissive dependence of servility, but dependence on support and supplies extorted by himself and used to free him from servitude to the Church of England, either by the destruction of her privileges or by compelling her enlistment in the service of the Crown. Even when under Danby's Ministry the Court returned to a policy resembling that of Clarendon, its intention was not to secure the supremacy of the Church, but at the price of the political annihilation of her adversaries, to buy her blind and perpetual support for the Crown. The position of the Crown in the State was the constant object of Charles' undertakings: his involved intrigues in affairs both at home and abroad were only the means to assure it.

The first field in which the influence of Charles' government was decisively exerted on continental politics was the Low Countries. On July 31, 1667, the Treaty of Breda was signed. Six weeks earlier, Louis had declared what became known as the War of Devolution against Spain, and had poured a large and well-equipped army under Turenne into the Spanish Netherlands. On June 2 Charleroi was taken; and before the end of August Tournay, Douay, Courtray, and Lille were in French hands and the greater part of Flanders was occupied. The intention of Louis to make good the claim which he had openly abandoned to the property, if not the title, of the Spanish throne was thus revealed to the world with startling abruptness. To the Dutch the opening of the Scheldt, which it clearly forecast, meant the rise of Antwerp and the corresponding decline of Amsterdam; to the English it dimly foreshadowed the extension of Louis' system—the system of Catholic absolutism—over practically the whole of civilised Europe. Far-seeing minds could perhaps perceive that the curtain had been rung up on a drama of incalculable gravity, of which the scene was to shift from one end of Europe to the other, and the last act was not to be played till after the lapse of more than a generation. The opponents of French aggrandisement were fortunate in the English Minister at Brussels. Sir William Temple had during the negotiations at Breda convinced himself that the only means of safeguarding the peace of Europe from Louis' ambition lay in an alliance between England and Holland, and in the following months urged the plan repeatedly on his Government. In

September he took the opportunity of a trip to Holland to discuss the matter with John de Witt, with the result that Buckingham and Arlington held a series of conferences with the Dutch and Spanish ambassadors in London and discussed the idea from every point of view. So rapidly did the situation mature that at the end of December Temple returned to the Hague, this time on an official mission, and before a month was out had signed the momentous treaty which, on the accession of Sweden a few months later, received the name of the Triple Alliance. This treaty, ratified on January 13, 1668, took the form of two alliances: by the first, which was purely defensive, the contracting parties undertook, in case of attack, each to come to the assistance of the other with a specified force by land and sea; by the second, they undertook to restore peace between France and Spain. Louis had already offered to make peace on one of two conditions: either he would keep what he had got, or he would take in exchange Franche Comté and three fortresses in the Netherlands, without in either case explicitly surrendering the claim that he had set up by going to war. By the Alliance, the Dutch and English Governments now bound themselves to persuade Spain to accept one of the alternatives offered, or, failing this, to compel her by force of arms; and moreover, by a secret article, should the King of France refuse to make good his offer of peace, then to combine "with all their united force and power" not only to compel him to make peace but also to continue the war till France was reduced to the boundaries set by the Treaty of the Pyrenees. The effect of the alliance was immediate. Despite the severity of the weather, Condé was despatched with a force of fifteen thousand men into Franche Comté and overran the province in a fortnight; and Louis, having thus provided himself with a powerful diplomatic weapon, opened negotiations for a peace with Spain, which, on May 2, was concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle on the basis of the first alternative, France surrendering Franche Comté and consolidating her north-east frontier by a long line of fortresses in Flanders and Hainault.

To John de Witt and Holland the Triple Alliance was of capital importance. Although the Dutch were ostensibly on the best of public terms with the French Government, this friendship was but a hollow pretence. Colbert's economic system had already threatened the commerce of the Dutch; Louis despised and detested them as a nation of Protestant and republican tradesmen; and it was evident that, once the bulwark of the Spanish Netherlands was down, the turn of the Dutch would come soon. De Witt had not been without qualms at the thought of breaking with France for an alliance with the changeful fortunes of England, and he had been surprised at the readiness with which Charles fell in with his proposals during the negotiations for the treaty; but he had, in fact, no choice in his search for support. For him it was the English alliance or nothing. What vitiated his calculation was that he could

not penetrate the intentions of Charles. He did not know that, at the very moment when Charles was proposing to Holland an offensive alliance against France, he was also proposing to France an alliance against Holland and Spain, and to Spain an alliance against France to the disadvantage of Holland. Charles had no more liking for the Dutch than Louis had; but he wished to make his weight felt, to detach the Dutch from their traditional alliance with France, and to put himself in a position where all the European rivals would compete for his services. The Triple Alliance had not been long completed, when he betrayed the secret article to Louis; and within a few days of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle he was offering Louis a reciprocal alliance on the closest terms. The object of Charles had been gained: Louis was filled with a burning desire for revenge upon the Dutch, the rivals in trade not of France, but of England, and had been forced to realise that for the success of his European schemes it was necessary to buy the support of England. Incidentally, the Triple Alliance was the most popular hit in England that Charles' government had yet made.

When Parliament met on February 10, 1668, the two subjects contained in the King's Speech were the Triple Alliance and an intention to achieve "a better union and composure in the minds of my Protestant subjects in matters of religion." While Temple and Arlington had been absorbed in foreign affairs, Buckingham and Sir Orlando Bridgman, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, had been engaged in a series of conferences with the leading nonconformist divines, such as Baxter and Manton, in order if possible to devise a scheme for the admission of the dissenting body into the Established Church. The opinion of certain Anglican clergymen also was taken; and Lord Chief Justice Hale, who attended the meetings, drafted a Comprehension Bill, to be laid before Parliament. At the same time, to guarantee a more business-like administration, the Privy Council was reorganised in a number of committees, the most important being that for foreign affairs, an eminently practical system that had been disliked and long hindered by Clarendon.

Charles II had always had a leaning towards toleration, combined with a desire in particular to free the Catholics from their heavy disabilities. The House of Commons on the contrary had always shown the bigoted zeal of persecuting Anglicanism; and, now that a moderate proposal for the relief of dissenters was in the air, could be trusted to prevent its taking effect. For once the Cabal had found a question on which all its members were agreed: Clifford and Arlington were, or were about to be, Roman Catholics; Buckingham was the patron of the Independents; civil liberty was the guiding principle of Ashley's life; and Lauderdale, who was chiefly concerned with Scotland, was an administrator rather than a statesman and, if he had an opinion at all, viewed the proposal favourably. Yet neither the success of the Government abroad, nor the promise of better order at home and the strange

unanimity of the Ministers in an age of divided Ministries, could mollify the Commons, who proceeded to petition the King for a proclamation against conventicles and to read a Bill for their suppression by 114 votes to 78. Their natural bias was accentuated by the chance, since the policy of the Triple Alliance was irreproachable, of opposing the Court on the question of religion. Their Bill was passed, but, to their indignation, did not reach a second reading in the Lords, where it was dropped on the prorogation of Parliament; they returned, however, to the charge, and in April, 1670, a Bill of increased stringency for continuing the Conventicle Act, which had expired in 1668, became law. The Commons made it plain to the King that, however gladly they might be rid of Clarendon's personality, so far as the Church was concerned they were not going to desert his principles.

There can be little doubt that this had a great effect on Charles' mind. The Commons' uncompromising determination made it impossible for him, were they unresisted, to retain a shadow of authority or to pursue the national policy towards which the Triple Alliance seemed to point the way. His statesmanlike dream had been of a national Church, formally organised on the basis of the Roman Catholic religion, but broad enough to include the majority of moderate Protestants, depending but slightly on Rome in political affairs, and perfectly tolerant of dissent. But, because neither Rome would admit such privileges nor Parliament so much as allow a temporary toleration, a dream it remained. In 1668, he seems to have made another attempt in the same direction. Charles' own son, his eldest bastard, born to him by a lady of good family in Jersey, had been bred a Catholic and had recently entered the Society of Jesus at Rome. Under the name of James de la Cloche he was now at his father's request despatched by the Jesuit General to receive a communication from the mouth of Charles, who saw him and sent him back with an oral commission as his "secret ambassador to the Father General." The rest is shrouded in mystery. The return of the youth to Rome, the nature of his mission, his subsequent career, are hidden from us: nothing more is known for certain of the eldest child of Charles II. Nor did more considerable results attend the journey to London of the papal Internuncio at Brussels a short time after, and his secret interview with the King at the Pope's command. The decisive action was to be taken in another quarter.

In January, 1669, a remarkable meeting took place at St James' Palace. The King was present and informed the Duke of York, Clifford, Arlington, and Arundel, that he desired to reconcile himself to the Catholic faith and to turn England Catholic with him. A short time before, James had announced his conversion to his brother, but while the Duke's change was probably in the main religious, Charles was acting rather from political motives. In the course of the next year James' conversion was suspected, though it was not until the spring of

1676 that he ceased attending the royal chapel and all England knew him for a Papist; but Charles dissembled his religion till the day of his death. For the present there was no question in his mind of a public profession unless he could make sure of its political results; but he was so far moved by the actual situation as to assure the French ambassador a few months later that he intended to go over, "and that, besides the spiritual advantage he should gain from doing so, he also considered that it was the only way of reestablishing the monarchy." Only under a Catholic constitution, as it seemed to Charles, might a king of England hope to be absolute.

From the point of view of Louis XIV the political element in Charles' projected conversion had the merit of bringing him within reach of the French purse-strings. Louis wanted Charles' support, but at least his neutrality: Charles wanted Louis' support, but above all his money. This is the key to the complicated and mysterious negotiations between the two Courts from this date to Charles' final triumph, the question at bottom being how much pressure Charles could put on Louis by a tacit threat to make terms with Parliament, and how far Louis could allow or compel Charles to go in that direction without the situation becoming too dangerous. For six months before the meeting at St James' Palace Charles had been discussing the basis of a commercial treaty with France by means of Buckingham and Colbert de Croissy; and it was due to Buckingham's suggestion that the further questions arising should pass through the hands of the King's sister, the Duchess of Orleans, that the affair took the now well-known lines of what can only be regarded as one of the deepest plots in history. To facilitate proceedings and to avert suspicion the Abbé Pregnani, a fashionable Parisian astrologer, was sent to London to act as a means of communication; and the better part of a year was spent in a detailed correspondence between the two Courts concerning the best course to be adopted.

The scheme thus set afoot was to remodel England upon the example of France and to introduce Catholicism and absolute monarchy, hand in hand, by means of French gold and French force. In return for this assistance Charles was to declare joint war with Louis on the Dutch and to recognise that Louis was not bound by his wife's renunciation of her claim to the Spanish crown. On a first consideration of the matter, Charles wished the opening move in the game to be his declaration of Catholicism. Colbert de Croissy, however, pointed out that the excitement caused by this step would be so intense throughout the Protestant world and would so distinctly place the Dutch in the position of champions of the reformed religion that it would be hopeless to expect the English nation to consent to war with them; and, although Charles would not commit himself to put the foreign war first and the civil conflict second, he was so much struck by the justice of the remark that he tacitly fell into line with the French proposal. The interest of

France was not to support him in a prolonged dispute with his subjects, unless it were conducive to success on the Continent: to put religion first might mean postponing the Dutch war indefinitely, while the strength that would accrue to him in money and arms by the success of a war supported by English commercial jealousy would put his opponents at home in an inferior position when he turned on them afterwards. On May 5, 1670, the Duchess of Orleans reached Dover, whither Charles, whose hand was strengthened by the substantial supply voted at the spring sitting of Parliament, journeyed to meet her. The negotiations were complete; the time was spent by Charles and his sister in unaffected happiness; and on June 1 the Treaty of Dover was signed by Colbert for France, by Arlington, Clifford, Arundel, and Sir Richard Bellings for England. Henrietta did not live to see the fruits of the treaty in which her share had been so great that it was named by the French “*le traité de Madame*.” She had been ill before her arrival in England; on her return to Paris on June 18 her symptoms continued, and on the 29th, after drinking a glass of chicory water, she died in a few hours, believing herself and believed by all the world to be the victim of poison. The cause of her death is now scientifically known to have been a perforating ulcer of the stomach.

The treaty, which consisted of ten articles and three additional clauses, set forth the joint policy of the two monarchs in some detail for the subjugation of England. Louis was to furnish Charles with six thousand men at his own expense and £150,000, and was, together with Charles, to fix the date of the stroke. For the attack on Holland Charles was to furnish six thousand men to serve under the French commander-in-chief, and fifty ships of war to serve together with thirty French under the Duke of York as admiral—the whole at the expense of Louis. Charles was to take Walcheren, Sluys, and Cadsand as his share of the spoil; the rights of the Prince of Orange were as far as possible to be preserved; and Louis was to pay Charles £225,000 yearly while the war lasted. For the success of “*la grande affaire*,” as Charles called it to his sister, he reckoned further on his resources at home. The Governor of Hull was a Catholic; those of Portsmouth, Plymouth, Windsor, and other strong places, were devoted to his service; the Catholic sentiment and force of Ireland were ready to hand; and Lauderdale controlled an army twenty thousand strong in Scotland, bound to serve anywhere within the British dominions. If the design should succeed, he would find himself at the head of a Catholic State and master of his kingdom.

A necessary consequence of the Treaty of Dover was a second treaty. All the Ministers knew of the negotiations; but only those who were in the Catholic plot could be acquainted with their result. Therefore, to cover the traces of the real business, an elaborate sham treaty was drafted at Charles’ suggestion by Buckingham, who was led to imagine

that he was doing the work for which all the trouble had been taken. "*Le traité simulé*" went over the ground of the real treaty, except that no mention was made of Catholicism, while the subsidy offered towards its establishment was added to that offered for the purpose of the Dutch war, and that the combined military forces were to serve under an English general. As Buckingham expected to be that general, he was all the more delighted with the treaty, which was signed in February, 1671, by himself, Ashley and Lauderdale. He only began to discover his mistake, when Charles induced Louis to forego the troops thus provided for and replied by a jeer to Buckingham's expostulations on his deprivation of the command.

In April, 1670, as the price for the renewed Conventicle Act, the Commons had voted a tax calculated to bring in £300,000 a year for eight years, and in the October session they added a supply of £800,000; but, as the annual expenses of the services alone amounted to half a million, and the King's debts to over two million pounds, the financial prospects, despite a further supply obtained in the following March in response to a royal proclamation against Papists, could hardly be considered brilliant. The attitude of the Commons, moreover, made it clear that, although Parliament was now prorogued from one date to another, doing little business till February, 1673, the French ambassador had been only too accurate in his prophecy of the results that would follow the King's public change of religion. In promising the late proclamation Charles had only ventured to hint at exemption for the Catholic Royalists who had fought for his father; and there could be no doubt that any attempt to put in action the great Catholic scheme would ruin the hopes of the Dutch war, interrupt the stream of French gold, and perhaps overturn the monarchy itself in the fury it would let loose in England. Arlington, who had been of the King's original opinion, agreed with Charles that the declaration must be definitely postponed till the war had placed him in an overwhelmingly strong position. In the meantime Charles amused himself with two new mistresses, the two most famous of the thirteen whose names have been preserved. Nell Gwyn, the darling of London audiences, did not cost the nation above £4000 a year in revenues; the other, a young Breton lady who had come to England in the suite of Henrietta of Orleans, Louise de Kéroualle, soon Duchess of Portsmouth, drew an income of £40,000 besides gifts amounting to many times that sum.

Money was always a difficulty at Charles' Court, and, now that the spring of 1672 was fixed by Louis for his attack on Holland, a difficulty that pressed. Further, the French preparations for the war and the likelihood that England would assist in it were becoming known; and to summon Parliament would be to court disaster. The audacity of Clifford suggested a source of supply that needed nothing but a proclamation to tap it. During the Commonwealth and since the Restoration

the Government had acquired the habit of obtaining assistance from the London goldsmiths, who thus became bankers. The public deposited their money with the bankers, who paid 6 per cent. on deposits, and made loans at 8 per cent. to merchants and others requiring advances. Charles' Government found the system particularly useful as a means of realising the taxes that had been voted but not collected: supplies were rendered immediately available by bankers' advances on the security of the votes, and the Exchequer derived a certain continuity from the process. At the present time nearly £1,400,000 had been advanced by the bankers to the Exchequer, when it was suddenly announced that none of the capital would be repaid for a whole year. A panic ensued; bankers were forced to suspend their engagements; merchants were unable to meet their bills; and a large proportion of the ten thousand persons to whom the sum thus quietly pocketed by Charles belonged were ruined. Nor did the mischief end there. Although the "Stop of the Exchequer" was intended for a period of twelve months only, and although in the following year the Lord Chancellor actually assured Parliament that all arrears had been made good and that interest would continue to be paid at the bankers' rate, as promised in the proclamation, not a penny was forthcoming till 1674, when interest at about 6 per cent. was paid on the capital without arrears and continued till 1683. Legal proceedings were instituted by the creditors, who finally obtained an Act under William III for payment of arrears at 3 per cent. till half the capital was refunded; but the Act remained inoperative, and the debt, which was first taken over by the South Sea Company, was ultimately incorporated in the National Debt. It was estimated that the total loss to the bankers and their creditors amounted to three million pounds.

One startling event after another now broke upon the nation and made, said Baxter, "all Protestant hearts to tremble." The Stop of the Exchequer took place on January 2, 1672. On March 15 the King issued a Declaration of Indulgence, suspending "all manner of penal laws in matters ecclesiastical against whatsoever sort of Nonconformists or recusants." On March 17 war was declared against the Dutch Republic. Hostilities had actually begun before their official declaration; for after seeking in vain for a plausible pretext to break with their allies, and after de Witt had gone almost to the extreme of conciliation to keep the peace, the Government gave orders to force a war by an act of open piracy. On March 13 Holmes, the admiral in command at Portsmouth, who had opened the first Dutch war, sailed out to where a Dutch merchant fleet, laden with a rich cargo from the Levant, lay at anchor off the Isle of Wight, and opened fire upon it. War was rendered inevitable; but the treasure, the expected capture of which would help to defray it, escaped, for the Government and the admiral had laid their plans so badly that the

Dutch, after returning the English fire, were able to sail off with the loss of only two ships.

The story of the war, which may be regarded as one thread in the double policy of the Dover treaty, does not belong to this chapter. The Declaration of Indulgence (March 15, 1672), which was the other, was a kind of trial flight of the grand religious revolution that had been planned by Charles. Even at the time it was vehemently suspected that its true object was to favour the Catholics; but it was a fact that owing to Bridgeman's protest Catholics could only claim the right to worship privately, while Protestant dissenters could do so in public, and that it was actively supported by Ashley and other prominent men whose Protestantism was less suspected than the King's. The gaols were opened; Bunyan left his prison at Bedford; and hundreds of nonconformists, and especially Quakers (for the persecution had been very fierce against them), walked the streets again in freedom. Still there was much hesitation. The Presbyterians, with their strongly democratic views on Church matters, disliked the personal nature of the relief accorded them by the King, and also being relieved as merely part of the whole body of dissenters, most of whom had experienced a less conciliatory treatment in the past. All feared to bring on themselves the disapprobation of Parliament. However, the Government had succeeded for the moment. A nonconformist deputation to thank the King was introduced by Arlington. Bridgeman surrendered the Privy Seal; Clifford, with a peerage, stepped into the high place of Lord Treasurer; Ashley became Earl of Shaftesbury and Lord Chancellor; Arlington was made an Earl, Lauderdale a Duke, and both received the Garter. Although the Declaration was but a shadow of the real scheme in Charles' head, it was considered by sound Anglicans to be a staggering blow to the Church: "Papists and swarms of sectaries" astonished the world of London by the numbers in which they met publicly; and on the following Easter Day it was remarked to the general scandal that the Duke of York, who attended church with the King, refrained from partaking of the Communion for the second year in succession. So lively was the agitation on the subject of Catholic toleration that when Parliament met in February, 1673, after a recess of practically two years, Charles attempted to ride the storm that was known to be brewing by a display of personal authority. "I shall take it very ill," he said, "to receive contradiction in what I have done. And I will deal plainly with you: I am resolved to stick to my Declaration."

Meanwhile, negotiations had been proceeding with the Dutch. The war had gone badly for Holland; but neither had it gone well for England, and the despatch, after all, of an English contingent to Louis' army had by no means mollified Buckingham's disappointment, since it had gone under command of the Duke of Monmouth. Consequently Buckingham was more inclined to the Dutch, and less to the French, than he had been two years before. Ambassadors arrived from the

Republic; and Buckingham and Arlington created a sensation by crossing the Channel in person, ostensibly to discuss terms of peace. They found themselves in the midst of a revolution. The successes of Louis had enraged the populace against their magistrates; and on the very day of the ambassadors' arrival at the Hague the young Prince of Orange, as Stadholder, had been raised to the office of his ancestors. Scarcely six weeks later Cornelius and John de Witt were torn to pieces in the streets. The news of his nephew's restored and quasi-monarchical authority could not but be pleasing to Charles, who had entertained him on a visit to England in the autumn of 1670; but it soon appeared that William was impervious both to threats and to bribes. Lord Halifax, who joined the two Ministers in the Prince's camp, inclined to peace on terms favourable to the Dutch; and Buckingham, though still demanding a high price for England's defection from France, was urgent for peace, and indeed at one moment could scarcely be restrained by Arlington from signing a treaty on the spot. But the lowest terms offered were such as William would not accept. Then Buckingham tried to work on his despair. "Do you not see," he said, "that all is lost? Do you not see?" "I know a sure way never to see it," answered the Prince—"to die on the last dyke." The embassy moved on to the French King's camp, and here the true nature of the mission, which was known to Louis and had been secretly entrusted by Charles to Arlington, came out. The peace overtures had been arranged primarily in order to throw dust in Protestant eyes and put the Republic in the position of having rejected an offer: the real business was the signature of an engagement between Charles and Louis that neither would make peace before the demands of the other were satisfied, while they agreed upon joint terms which the Prince of Orange was sure to refuse. Buckingham had been tricked again.

Charles had thus prepared opinion at home for the prosecution of the war and for a large supply to support it. No better advocate for his cause could have been found than the new Chancellor, Shaftesbury, who followed the Speech from the Throne with a skilful and inflammatory harangue on the text "*Delenda est Carthago*," that obtained an immediate vote of a million and a quarter pounds, to be spread over a period of eighteen months. But the Commons were less manageable on the delicate question of the Indulgence. Though, when the subject was introduced, the House showed a general hesitation to touch it, the silence was that of a calm before the storm; once loosened, tongues wagged freely. Why had not legal and ecclesiastical advice been taken before the Declaration? What authority could such a Declaration have? It was not even made under the Great Seal, the judges appointed under which swore to carry out the Acts of Parliament that the King now claimed to override. Acts of Parliament! Why, the Declaration broke forty of them. Sufficient doubt, however, existed on the whole subject of the

Royal dispensing power to turn the debate into a serious rather than an angry channel. A division gave a vote of 168 to 116 in favour of the resolution, "That Penal Statutes in matters ecclesiastical cannot be suspended but by act of Parliament," which was embodied in a respectful petition to the King that the laws should once more be given their full force.

At Court counsels were divided. There could be no denying that the situation was most serious. Buckingham, Clifford, and Lauderdale were for force: a considerable army, assembled at Blackheath under the experienced command of Marshal Schomberg and Colonel Fitzgerald, might be used against Parliament while the Scotch forces seized Newcastle. For Charles to submit at such a crisis might be the first step on the road trodden by his father; whereas a determined stroke would free him from danger. Shaftesbury was for dissolution, and Charles himself favoured the idea, with the intention, it would seem, of carrying on his policy by a personal government without any Parliament at all. But this would mean peace with the Dutch and presumably the refusal of assistance from France. To Arlington, the Minister most trusted by the King, this consideration appealed strongly: by dissolving Parliament at this moment Charles would sacrifice all hope of fulfilling the Dover policy and would have to face a national opposition without support; while, if he gave way now and carried the war to a successful conclusion, he would still be in as good a position as ever to dictate terms to his people. On behalf of Louis, Colbert de Croissy brought forward the same arguments. He went even further. Charles' cooperation in the war was of such importance to his master that he was authorised to promise at the end of it not only the 6000 men already stipulated, but 12,000 or 15,000, or even his whole might, for the conquest of England.

This offer was decisive. On the same evening, March 8, Charles cancelled the Declaration; and the next morning he appeared in the House of Lords to announce his assent to the Commons' petition. The news was received with general delight and celebrated by bonfires all over the town. Nevertheless the Commons were unsatisfied. They hurried through the remaining stages of the Subsidy Bill, but lingered over religion. Possibly they noticed that, although Charles had not asserted his right to dispense with the law, he had at the same time not abandoned it. In their fear of Catholicism they proceeded to consider a subject that had formerly only roused parliamentary opposition, namely, the toleration of Protestant Dissent, and professed themselves willing to pass an Act which should secure it. But it was more characteristic of the Cavalier Parliament that out of the debates on this measure of toleration, which did not pass, grew the project for the most famous of all measures of persecution, which did. A Bill against the increase of Catholicism had come down from the House of Lords: it was now proposed to insert in it a proviso imposing on all holders of civil and

military office an oath explicitly denying the doctrine of transubstantiation in the sacrament, which would render it impossible for any Catholic to serve the Crown even in the most humble capacity. The amendment was adopted, the Bill triumphantly passed, and returned to the Lords. There a curious scene took place. Clifford denounced the Bill with such fury that the Commons were flustered; he was answered by the Earl of Bristol, "a Catholic," he described himself, "of the Church of Rome, not a Catholic of the Court of Rome," that the Bill was for the good of the nation and that their duty was to judge it "not as Roman Catholics, but as faithful members of a Protestant Parliament"; and, strangest of all, Arlington and Shaftesbury, the King's two chief Ministers, rose to press its passage. Arlington had coveted Clifford's place: Shaftesbury, it is said, had received from Arlington a hint as to the real scope of the Treaty of Dover. Moreover, Halifax and Sir William Coventry, who were Shaftesbury's near relatives, were among the keenest forces of the Opposition. So the Bill passed and received the royal assent and became the Test Act. On March 29 Parliament was prorogued.

Before the year was out, the Act had worked important results. Clifford gave up the Treasurer's staff and retired to the country, to die, it was believed, by his own hand. The Duke of York surrendered all his offices. Prince Rupert, a strong Protestant, took command of the fleet. But there were further consequences of a less direct character. Arlington withdrew from his post of Secretary of State and accepted the colourless office of Lord Chamberlain. Shaftesbury, suspected by the King to have been bribed by Spain and by the Duke of York to have opposed his second marriage, which took place in the autumn, was dismissed and immediately flung himself into violent opposition to the Court. "It is only laying down my robe," he said, "and buckling on my sword." Sir Heneage Finch, the Attorney-General, became Lord Keeper and Earl of Nottingham. Sir Joseph Williamson succeeded Arlington as Secretary of State. Sir Thomas Osborne, a Yorkshire baronet of small fortune and Cavalier principles, took up the Treasurer's staff. Buckingham, Lauderdale and Arlington were attacked in the Commons on their meeting in October. The great Cabal Ministry had been scattered to the winds.

It was now admitted by all the partners to the Catholic scheme that it must finally be abandoned. Arlington declared it impossible, Charles spoke of it no more, and the French ambassador, who had devoted all his energy to its furtherance, begged Louis to recall him. Colbert de Croissy had learnt from his friends in Parliament, among them the poet Waller, that there were not four members who believed that there was any other means of preserving the Protestant religion but peace with Holland, or who considered the French alliance to have any object other than the establishment of Popery in England. The new Treasurer did not return

Colbert's visit, and he felt that he could no longer be useful as Louis' representative. In January, 1674, he withdrew to France, leaving in his place the Comte de Ruigny, an elderly Protestant of respectable character, who detested "*le sale trafic*" of buying men, women, and parties, in which he found himself busily engaged. Ruigny had not been a month at the head of the embassy, when peace was made with the Dutch.

Meanwhile, the Duke of York's marriage had provided another topic of explosive interest. Anne Hyde, his first wife, died a Catholic early in the year 1672, leaving two daughters, Mary and Anne, who were now being brought up in the Protestant faith, and, the King's marriage being barren, were after their father the nearest heirs to the throne. Now, it was desirable both that there should be an heir male and that, for the better guarantee of his title, he should be sprung from a royal line on both sides. The question, therefore, of a second wife for the Duke was of much importance; but, since he was himself a Catholic, the choice was perforce narrowed to the marriageable Catholic princesses of Europe. The Spanish interest could provide an Austrian archduchess (Claudia Felicitas, daughter of Ferdinand Charles of Tyrol); and, as Spain had a lively concern in upholding the Dutch Republic as a barrier to the claims of Louis, this was perhaps the nearest approach to a Protestant match that could be made; but when the Austrians demanded conditions unfavourable to France, the negotiations fell through and the field was left open to candidates of the French Court, from among whom the Princess Mary of Modena was finally selected. On September 30, 1673, the Princess, who was barely fifteen years of age, was married to James by proxy, the Earl of Peterborough taking the place of his master, the Duke. In order to get the ceremony over before the meeting of Parliament, the papal dispensation, necessary since Mary had taken the first step towards entering a convent, was not awaited and was ultimately not obtained without abject supplications from England and the good offices of Louis. To the politicians of the papal Court, who preferred Spain to France, the match was by no means welcome. Among Protestants at home, that is to say, in nine-tenths of the nation, it created an uproar. Apart from the vulgar belief that Mary was "the Pope's eldest daughter," it was evidence of the relations existing between Charles and Louis. Personally James enjoyed but little popularity. His conversion to the Catholic religion had rendered him an object of real distrust; his marriage under the auspices of the French King, so as to assure a Catholic and almost a French succession, now revived all the most violent suspicions that had attended the beginning of the war. Meeting on October 20, the Commons voted an address to the King, praying that the marriage should not be consummated, and that the Duke should not wed "any person but of the Protestant religion." Hereupon Parliament was promptly adjourned for a week. When they reassembled, the Commons were informed that the marriage had been completed, and were coolly

reminded by Charles that they had for several months been aware of the negotiations for a match between the Duke and another Princess, also a Catholic, without expressing dissatisfaction. Since this observation was unanswerable by argument, the Commons solaced themselves by the practical step of refusing a supply, on account chiefly of the war, but also of "the danger of Popery and popish counsels and counsellors"; again addressed the King in favour of a dissolution of the proxy marriage, and on November 3 voted the standing army a grievance. Early on the morrow, before the address could be presented, Charles appeared in the Lords and prorogued Parliament for two months.

Nor was the meeting of Parliament in January, 1674, more peaceful or more productive. To meet the repeated charges that the alliance with France meant the introduction of Popery into England, Charles laid before a committee of both Houses the "*traité simulé*," concluded to disguise the real business at Dover, with the assurance that it was the only treaty with France in existence. The speech, however, was so ill composed and delivered, that the Commons proceeded on their business without the least sign of being conciliated. No supply was voted, but heady debates took place on grievances and on the subject of evil counsellors, until, matters going from bad to worse, the King, after announcing that peace was concluded with the Dutch, suddenly prorogued Parliament till the following November. Members hastened away from Westminster in alarm and disgust. But their astonishment was still greater, when Charles, who had kept his intention secret from his most trusted advisers, announced that Parliament should stand further prorogued till April, 1675. He had received 500,000 crowns from Louis to enable him to do without it.

The disordered state of affairs inclined many minds towards the only policy which seemed capable of giving quiet to the kingdom, namely, that of assuring a Protestant succession to the throne. At the time of Clarendon's fall, the Chancellor's enemies and successors, fearful lest his son-in-law should avenge him by compassing their overthrow, took counsel whether it were not possible to supplant James as heir presumptive of the King. Within a few years of the Restoration, rumours had even been afloat of the Duke's apprehension that Charles would recognise as legitimate his handsome young son, whom he created Duke of Monmouth; and there was talk of attempts to extract from the King documents relating to him without the damaging epithets *naturalis et illegitimus*. But, however deeply such gossip may have infected Monmouth's ambitious dreams, it soon became evident that his father would give no countenance to schemes of the kind; and a more plausible means seemed to have been discovered in the project of obtaining for the King a divorce from his Queen and of remarrying him to a lady capable of bearing him lawful issue. The proceedings about the same time in Lord Roos' divorce case, which ended in 1670 by an Act of

Parliament dissolving his marriage, lent a practical interest to the notion, for which the divorcee of Henry VIII might also furnish a precedent. Divines were consulted on the point; and about the year 1671 Gilbert Burnet, afterwards Bishop of Salisbury, gave his opinion, at the instance of the Duke of Lauderdale, that a woman's barrenness was just cause for divorce or polygamy, and that polygamy was lawful according to the New Testament. Such was the talk at the Court of Charles II: talk that gained fresh force from the crisis of the Duke of York's marriage. As a practical suggestion, however, the idea of the King's divorce depended wholly upon the King, and Charles made it plain that he was not going to inflict this last insult upon his patient wife. Even when she was supposed to be mortally ill, the utmost drawn from him on the engrossing domestic subject was that, if he married again, the lady would have to be very, very beautiful. Charles was resolute not to be the cat's-paw of any party in his matrimonial affairs.

Thus it was that men's eyes turned overseas to the King's nephew, the grandson of Charles I, who was now guiding the policy of the Dutch Republic. William of Orange had taken over the machinery of de Witt's Government and consolidated in himself the power of the State; moreover he had a high reputation in England. He had formed connexions with Sir William Temple, with Shaftesbury, William Howard, afterwards Lord Howard of Eseriek, and Halifax, who composed the nucleus of an Orange party in Parliament; and it was perhaps in his interest that the Earl of Carlisle, with the support of Halifax and Shaftesbury, introduced a motion into the Lords to restrict future royal marriages within the bounds of the Protestant religion, under penalty of incapacity to succeed to the throne. This motion was rejected with scorn; but in the course of the year 1674 a great advance was made in the Prince's interest by the acceptance at Court of the idea of marrying to him the Duke of York's eldest daughter, Mary. Partisans of the Prince hit upon the scheme as one likely to afford them protection against the vengeance of the Duke. Charles, who in the spring had declined a second visit from William in order to please Louis, now that he had extracted a sufficient subsidy from his ally, conceived that a Protestant match would allay the excitement caused by the Modenese marriage and would guarantee him and to some extent his brother against the most dangerous political elements in the kingdom. Negotiations were accordingly begun without the knowledge of the Duke, who consented with as good a grace as possible to the project in which he thus found himself involved. Arlington, who was specially responsible for the scheme, and Ossory, the young son of the Duke of Ormond, went to the Hague in December to put the matter to the Prince; but their mission was unsuccessful. To the proposal which Ossory made, William replied agreeably, but without assenting; he was in the midst of war, he said; the Princess was very young, and he did not know whether he

would be personally acceptable. He thought it better to postpone consideration of the match until he could come to England. Save Arlington's retirement from politics, everything therefore remained doubtful.

The spectacle presented by the state of England at this juncture was deplorable. The policy of Dover appeared to have all but destroyed the stability of the kingdom. The factitious enthusiasm which had greeted the Restoration had long since died out. For the first seven years despite war, plague, fire, and some suspicion of the Government, the country had been quiet under the control of a Minister whose ideas were in sympathy, if not identical, with those of the majority of Englishmen. On his downfall the reins of policy were seized by the King, whose mind had been formed in a new time and on foreign soil, and who within seven more years brought the kingdom to the verge of disruption. Charles' lassitude of temper concealed from his subjects the independence of intellect and pertinacity of character that drove him towards an absolutism detested by them. Yet such was his skill that the difficulties which crowded on the nation were ascribed less to him, their author, than to advisers, of whom certainly some had followed him with alacrity, but others had been wholly ignorant of the scope of his plans. The dissolution of the Cabal marks a turning-point in the King's policy. Charles was clever enough to see when the game was up. He had attempted to mount with the support of the Catholic revival to heights he saw occupied by his cousin across the Channel. He had failed, but he had at least concealed from his people his object and his failure in it. Now he dropped Catholicism as a political force for ever. His most useful weapon was still unimpaired: the neutrality of England was still necessary for the plans of France. He had been able to obtain from Louis a considerable price for freeing himself from the last pressure put on him by Parliament in the matter of the Dutch war. He now proceeded to use his freedom by following a new line, which, if successfully pursued, would place him in much the same position as that just abandoned.

In Sir Thomas Osborne, created successively Earl and Marquis of Danby, Charles had found a Minister of extraordinary capacity. Danby was the first man of his time to apply himself systematically to the problems of finance that underlie all administration, while he combined with this energy the talent for managing men and affairs that alone could make it effective. He invented, it may be said, government by machine. Bribery of members of Parliament was already known, having been first practised on a large scale by the Spanish ambassador Molina at the crisis of Clarendon's dismissal and occasionally resorted to by others; but the art was not properly understood until Danby mastered, organised, and ruled by it. Numerous pensions and places existed which had hitherto been bestowed without thought of services to be rendered

by their holders: these were so distributed by the Treasurer as to ensure to the Government a compact body of voters, whose loyalty depended on their obedience to a common paymaster. Danby, in short, discovered that patronage was the soul of party. He could thus reckon on solid support for the measures of the Court, while by strict economy he reduced the national expenditure to a point which guaranteed the Government against the necessity of constant begging from Parliament. For the farm of the excise he was able to obtain £550,000 per annum, an increase of £20,000 on the sum obtained by his predecessor; the return from the hearth-tax mounted from £145,000 to £162,000, the Irish revenue from £190,000 to £240,000; and he was soon able to borrow money at 8 per cent., or 2 per cent. lower than the ordinary rate for private borrowers. When a rumour gained credit in the spring of 1674 that a fresh Stop of the Exchequer was contemplated, it was officially contradicted in the *Gazette* as "false and scandalous." On his arrival at the Treasury Danby found the Government in enormous arrears for dockyard works and for the wages of sick and wounded sailors. On these counts alone he gradually paid out £136,000 and £93,000 respectively. The household debts were soon reduced by £79,000. The army and navy left on his hands at the conclusion of the war were paid off at the rate of over £100,000 a month for fifteen months; and it should be remembered to Danby's credit that he found means to pay in cash, where formerly promissory notes and truck had been forced on the men in part discharge. It was again Danby who managed to begin and to continue the payment of interest on the debt caused by the Stop of 1672, who put Charles in a position of security at home and enabled him to pay for a large permanent addition to the fleet, and who on his fall from office in 1679 left over £100,000 in an Exchequer which before his control of it had hardly ever been a penny to the good. Danby's reorganisation of the royal finance had more to do with the growth of national prosperity in the latter part of the century than has generally been acknowledged. From the first his administration produced seeming marvels. Before the end of September, 1674, he had reduced the weekly expenses of government to £10,000 below the revenue, and, taking the precaution of putting the Duchess of Portsmouth in his debt, had thus in less than a year's time provided a sure basis from which to start on a new scheme of national policy.

This was no less than to place all possible opponents of the Crown in the position in which the Test Act had placed the Catholics: namely, to reduce them to impotence by obliging them either to accept office upon the Court terms or to remain incapacitated for ever by their exclusion from it. Under cover of his affection for the Church of England and his fear of "the pernicious designs of ill men," Charles was in a fair way, if he should be successful, to

bring about a revolution that amounted, as Andrew Marvell justly declared, to "a dissettlement of the whole birthright of England." The engine to accomplish this was the so-called Non-resisting Test, which early in the session of April, 1675, was introduced into the Lords under the title of a Bill to prevent the Dangers which may arise from Persons disaffected to the Government. It proposed to exact from all officials, justices of the peace, and members of both Houses of Parliament, a declaration that to take up arms against the King, "on any pretence whatsoever," was unlawful, and an oath never to attempt any alteration in government or religion "now established by law." Practically the Bill was an assault on the Country party—the descendants of Hampden and Pym—and on every shade of Nonconformity by the full force of the Church, the Cavaliers and the Court. Charles was offering a perpetual tenure of power to Anglicanism, and, in the Ministry of Danby, whose opposition to France was generally known, a guarantee to the nation of a really English Government at the price of supremacy for Danby and himself. The Court sought beforehand to create a suitable atmosphere for the measure by erecting a statue of Charles I at Charing Cross and by a severe Declaration against Popery; and on both sides strenuous preparation was made for a struggle, which was to define parliamentary positions with exquisite clearness. The King, the Minister, the Bishops, and all whom royal, ministerial, and episcopal influence could touch were for the measure; the Catholics, who had schemes of their own that would be ruined by it, the Nonconformists, the Country party against. Louis, who saw in Danby his worst enemy, was against; the Dutch and Spanish Governments, who felt him their best friend, for. In the Commons the golden age seemed to have arrived, and fortune rained every coinage in Europe.

For seventeen days the serried ranks of the Bishops waged unequal war with the keen eloquence of Shaftesbury, the wit and wisdom of Halifax, the terrible ridicule of Buckingham. Against the three most brilliant men in the kingdom they were ill-matched, supported though they were by the presence of Charles, who appeared regularly at the fireside of the House of Lords to watch the course of debate and was likened to the sun, blinding his opponents. If, however, the Court was worsted in argument, it was victorious in numbers; and the Bill was passed and sent down to the Commons. Here the most violent scenes had in the meantime taken place. While the Test was being debated in the Lords, the Country party in the lower House, under the leadership of Lords Russell and Cavendish, Sacheverell, Powle, Littleton, Sir William Coventry, and Colonel Birch, attacked Danby and put forward a popular policy to rival his. They demanded the recall of the English troops serving under the French flag abroad, the exclusion of Catholics from both Houses, the exclusion of placemen from Parliament, and refused to consider fresh legislation till they were satisfied. The excitement was

intense. Swords were drawn on the floor of the House. Nevertheless, Danby had so well organised his adherents that there was every expectation of the Test being carried in the Commons also, when chance put a weapon into the hands of his adversaries, which they were prompt to seize. A certain Dr Shirley, who had an action in the Court of Chancery against Sir John Fagg, member for Steyning, appealed to the House of Lords. The case was one of privilege as well as of law and led to an instant revival of the dispute occasioned between the two Houses by Skinner's case in 1666. Shaftesbury fomented the dispute with such dexterity that before the middle of June Charles found himself obliged to prorogue Parliament till October, before the Non-resisting Test could be discussed in the Commons. Danby's great scheme vanished for ever.

All parties, however, prepared with diligence for the autumn session, when it was known that the Country party contemplated pursuing its advantage with vigour. The Duke of York had received £20,000 from Louis for distribution, and had established an understanding with Shaftesbury. Van Beuningen, the Dutch, and Don Pedro Ronquillo, the Spanish ambassador, provided themselves with means for combating the influence of Ruvigny. Louis, who by his connexion with the Commons was striving to prevent Danby from becoming too strong, at the same time guarded himself against Charles being reduced to impotence by offering him £100,000 a year to dissolve Parliament, should supply be refused except on condition of a breach with France. The death of Turenne in July was a terrible blow to his arms, and subsequent reverses rendered the goodwill of the English Government even more important to him than before. The session opened in the temper foreseen. Further proposals were made to suppress Popery. The Commons refused money for paying off anticipations on the revenue. Supply was only voted for the specific purpose of building ships. Fresh attempts were made to put an end to bribery of members by the Court. But Danby's strength was so great and the foothold of his combined opponents so precarious that, to stop further business, Shaftesbury managed to revive the dispute between the Houses in the case of Shirley, while at the same time he pressed for a dissolution. It was almost certain that a new Parliament would contain far more members hostile to the Court than the corrupt Cavalier Parliament. Charles replied to the proposal, to the discomfiture of its authors, by proroguing Parliament for the unprecedented period of fifteen months, from November, 1675, to February, 1677. Louis, though he had bargained for a dissolution, feared to arouse opposition at Court; and Charles, who was so sure of his game that the first £100,000 had already been entered in his accounts, obtained his price without difficulty. When Danby refused to touch the accompanying agreement, he wrote out, signed and sealed it with his own hands. "King says, he had rather be a poor king than no king," is the pregnant phrase of a letter-writer

some time before ; £100,000 a year was not wealth, but it was enough to enable Charles to "dish" his Parliament.

The year 1675, which saw the defeat of Danby's attempt at a perpetual endowment of the Anglican-Cavalier system, saw also the birth of the Whig party. In contracting his alliance with the parliamentary Opposition Ruvigny had frequent occasion to treat with a committee of Lords, containing Buckingham, Wharton, and, chief among them in vigour of intellect and character, Shaftesbury. From that time onwards Shaftesbury enjoyed a growing ascendancy over the opponents of Court policy. In the Lords he became their recognised leader; and the adoption of his demand for the dissolution of Parliament is evidence of his following in the Commons also. His unscrupulous force in pursuing his object enhanced the authority he had won by his acknowledged ability and impartiality as Lord Chancellor, while his object was capable of commanding support from all sections of the Opposition. Popery and slavery, in Shaftesbury's memorable phrase, went hand in hand; and it was his work to combine men of all classes and characters to keep them out. If Danby invented the machine in government, Shaftesbury discovered the art of organising popular sentiment on a grand scale. The Green Ribbon Club, which was founded about this time by means of an extensive system of agents, agitators, and pamphleteers, gave the tone with increasing certainty to political feeling throughout the country, and during the next seven years played a part in English politics that can only be compared to that of the Jacobin club in France. The headquarters of the Green Ribbon Club were in the King's Head tavern at the bottom of Chancery Lane; and of the club Shaftesbury was the president and the soul. The name Whig does not occur till some years later; the thing was already in existence.

From Christmas, 1675, to the middle of 1677 Charles drew his allowance from Louis in regular quarterly instalments. When Parliament met at the beginning of the latter year, the Whigs despaired of obtaining any success in a House of Commons of which one-third was calculated to be in permanent employment under the Crown, and yet another third to wait—"like so many jackdaws for cheese" said Danby—for pay at the end of each session. The remaining third was in the pay of Louis, who in this session distributed among them nearly £3000. Therefore they adopted the extraordinary course of moving in both Houses that after so long a prorogation Parliament had ceased to have any legal existence. The statute of Edward III on which they rested their case, was manifestly obsolete, and their action only resulted in Shaftesbury, Buckingham, Salisbury, and Wharton being sent to the Tower for contempt of Parliament. After a few weeks the last three made submission and were released; but Shaftesbury lay in prison for a year before he could bring himself to face the ordeal. "Thus," said Marvell, "a prorogation without precedent was warranted by an imprisonment without

example." Not only was Danby freed from the presence of his chief opponent, but the incident gave him such strength that he was able to obtain a vote of £600,000. When, however, he introduced a Bill to secure the Protestant religion, in case a Catholic should succeed to the throne, the Commons threw it out, merely because a Catholic succession seemed thereby to be legalised. They pressed the King to join the alliance against Louis XIV and by the end of May were so far emboldened as to refuse further supply save on condition that all alliances should be submitted to them. Charles angrily adjourned them, and, when the Dutch ambassador spoke to him on the subject, tossed his handkerchief into the air, saying, "I care just that for Parliament." Before it met again, Charles had extorted an additional £100,000 from Louis, through his new and penetrating ambassador Barillon, and followed up this success by marrying James' eldest daughter Mary to the Prince of Orange with such secrecy that Barillon knew nothing till the betrothal was complete. James' hand was easily forced. Charles and Danby hoped by the marriage to consolidate their situation, and when Louis refused further payments, summoned Parliament for January, 1678, instead of, as had been agreed, in April. At a public banquet Danby gave the toast "Confusion to all that are not for a war with France," and on January 10 a treaty was signed at the Hague binding England and Holland to compel the King of France to make peace.

The alliance with William came too late for Charles. Three years before it might have won him a national support; but, now that the Opposition was committed equally by policy and by the secret receipt of money from Louis to attack the royal power, it could only lead to confusion more obscure than ever. Louis was willing to help Charles if he could avoid strengthening Danby; Danby, to crush the Whigs if he could avoid supporting Louis; the Whigs, to overthrow Danby at any cost. In February Charles, who had refused a large offer from Louis, obtained a vote of a million for a French war; but Louis' success in taking Ghent and Ypres, and the suspicion caused by the discovery of a secret article in the treaty of January, binding Charles and William to assist each other against their rebellious subjects, made the King recoil from risking a defeat that would place him in a position of inferiority. In May he signed another treaty with Louis, engaging to disband his army and dissolve Parliament in return for a huge subsidy, while at the same time Barillon entered into a strict alliance with the Whigs for the attainment of the same objects; but on Louis' departing from the terms of peace he had offered to accept, Charles, to the horror of the Whigs, made instant preparations for continuing the war in close agreement with the Dutch.

Thus all parties in England had entered into engagements which they dared not fulfil. Each threatened, offered, retracted, and advanced again only to draw back, while each was in the dark as to the secret

intrigues and concessions made by the others. Suddenly the complicated knot was cut by the signature of treaties of peace at Nymegen, on August 10 between France and the States-General, and on September 17 between France and Spain. From the Peace of Nymegen, which, though Holland had shown her strength, gave Louis Franche Comté and his north-eastern frontier with the most magnificent position held by any monarch between Charles V and Napoleon, Charles, albeit he had figured as its mediator, derived no profit. But its result was to give him for the moment an overwhelming advantage at home. With a formidable army released from foreign service, his pocket full of money, and Danby's organisation in Parliament, he seemed on the point of triumph. It was still Louis' interest to support the Opposition against a Minister who might turn against him; but the forces against the Whigs seemed too strong and, despairing of the future, they talked of acknowledging their defeat and retiring from politics, when without warning an event occurred that completely changed the situation.

The political atmosphere was electric. Since Charles' accession hardly a year had passed that was not surcharged with trouble and alarm, none in the last eight that was not full of horrible rumours due to the rift between a Protestant country which remembered the Gunpowder Plot and a Catholic Court which had planned the treason of Dover. Thus it is not strange that when Titus Oates, an Anglican clergyman who had been reconciled the year before to Rome, came forward in August, 1678, to denounce a vast Jesuit conspiracy against the King's life and the Protestant religion, his tale of wild lies met with a degree of credence that later ages would perhaps have refused to it. Oates was afterwards shown to be a man of infamous character; but channels of communication were bad and suspect, and in those days news travelled slowly. He had actually spent some months in Jesuit colleges at Valladolid and Saint-Omer, and on his expulsion from the latter returned to England, to concoct, with the aid of local colour thus acquired and of a silly London parson, his information concerning the Popish Plot. The Pope, he declared, had commanded, and the Jesuits undertaken, a conquest of the kingdom; an army of 20,000 men was ready under the orders of Lord Bellasis to carry it out; London was again to be burned, the King assassinated, and the Duke of York also, unless he would consent to his brother's murder. In all the arrangements he had been, he said, a trusted emissary, and he had been present at a Jesuit "consult," held on April 24, 1678, at the White Horse tavern in the Strand, where means were concerted for disposing of Charles. Over a hundred conspirators, mostly Jesuits, were mentioned by name, the most prominent besides Lord Bellasis being the Lords Arundel of Wardour, Powis, Petre, and Stafford, Sir William Godolphin, who was ambassador in Spain, Mr Edward Coleman, and Sir George Wakeman, the royal physician.

With much mystery Oates contrived to bring his great "discovery"

to the notice of Charles, who treated it with contempt. But Danby urged that the Privy Council should be informed; and, when the Duke of York discovered that forged treasonable letters were being sent to his Jesuit confessor, Charles could no longer resist. On September 28 and the two following days Oates was examined at the Council Board. The King caught him lying, but the extent and gravity of his charges demanded investigation; so, under Oates' guidance, a guard was despatched at night to arrest the chief persons inculpated. In one important point Oates' story was confirmed. He had accused Coleman, who had for some years acted as James' private secretary, of carrying on a treasonable correspondence with Père de La Chaise, the Jesuit confessor of the King of France. When Coleman was arrested, the papers seized at his house proved this to be true.

From the moment when Charles, in 1673, cancelled his declaration of indulgence, the Catholics had nothing to hope from him. The more active among them turned to the Duke of York as their natural leader, and began to organise a party in his interest. They fought the Non-resisting Test hard, and congratulated themselves on its failure to establish the royal power. They hoped eagerly for the day when they should be supreme. Closely in touch with the Jesuits in England and France, Coleman laid the threads of a widespread intrigue, which can be traced up to the end of the year 1676, for fleehing the reins of power from the King by the aid of French money and support and placing them in the hands of his master, the Duke. When the unlucky secretary stood his trial for treason, his correspondence with Père de La Chaise was the heaviest evidence against him. What was concerted in these dark channels between 1676 and 1678 is unknown; but there exist clear indications that the Jesuit activity did not cease. There was no "plot" in Oates' sense; but there was quite enough of plotting to cost men their heads under the English law of treason, and Titus evidently had some knowledge of the facts, which he embroidered to suit his own purpose.

When Oates was summoned before the Privy Council, he probably believed that he was about to be summarily got rid of. He therefore took the precaution to place his information beyond reach of the Court by leaving a sworn copy with Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey, a London magistrate celebrated for having on a previous occasion resisted royal pressure in the popular cause. Intense excitement had already been caused by the arrest of the Jesuits and the rumours of Coleman's letters: it now swelled into a feverish panic, when on October 12 Godfrey disappeared, and when five days later his corpse was found in a field at the foot of Primrose Hill, transfixed by his own sword. It is certain that he was murdered, but not by robbers and in no common way. He had been strangled, his sword thrust through his heart after death, and his body brought from a distance and arranged where it was found so as to simulate the appearance of suicide. Whatever may be the true

explanation of the mystery of his death—and the only one that seems alike reasonable and supported by circumstantial evidence makes Jesuit agents guilty of his murder—to the citizens of London and Englishmen generally Godfrey's murder seemed the first blow in a wholesale massacre of Protestants and sure proof of Oates' veracity at every point. The country went mad with terror and hatred, and a grievous persecution of Catholics set in under the guidance of Oates, the crew of perjurers who followed his lead, and their political supporters. For the Whigs discovered in Oates' revelations the means of fanning up a popular fury against the Court that might well seem irresistible. Out of the debates in Parliament on Coleman's letters grew the project of excluding the Duke of York from the throne. When on October 21 Parliament met, both Houses flung themselves eagerly into the agitation. Under Shaftesbury's influence committees were appointed, addresses were made, for every conceivable purpose connected with the Plot; a Bill was prepared to disable Catholics by a test oath from sitting in either House; Oates and Bedloe, his chief coadjutor, were heard at the bar of both; and on November 1 a joint resolution was voted that "there hath been and still is a damnable and hellish plot, contrived and carried on by popish recusants, for the assassinating and murdering the King and rooting out and destroying the Protestant religion." According to an estimate prepared for Danby in 1676, the number of recusants in the whole province of Canterbury did not exceed 12,000; but great doubt prevailed as to the total strength of the Catholics, of whom there were said to be 30,000 in London alone, and it is certain that the size of Oates' "Popish army" did not seem at all improbable. Events now moved fast. While the informers were lodged at Whitehall, pensioned, feasted, and acclaimed as saviours of society, on November 2 Sacheverell asked the lawyers in the Commons "whether the King and Parliament may not dispose of the succession to the Crown"; on the same day Shaftesbury, supported by Halifax and Essex, moved in the Lords, and on the 4th, Russell in the Commons, that the Duke of York should be dismissed from the King's presence and counsels; on November 20 the Test Bill sent up by them passed the Lords, though with the proviso, obtained by almost incredible exertion on the part of James and Danby, that it should not extend to the Duke of York; and by the first week in December Coleman and another Catholic layman had been tried for high treason, convicted, and executed. In attacking the Duke, the Whigs concerted their action with Barillon. Both, for different reasons, wanted to be rid of Danby and of the army, and they agreed that an attack on James was the best way. If Danby upheld him, the Minister could be accused of popery: if he withdrew his support from James, he would be surrendering the prerogative, on which his power depended. Danby supported James, and, in a short time, fell. While an attempt was made to have the militia called out for a fixed period of forty-two

days, the Whigs persisted in their cry for the disbandment of the army; and on December 26, a few days after the impeachment had been voted of the five Catholic Lords accused by Oates, a supply was granted and appropriated to that object. The combined fear of the Court, of Catholicism, and of France, and the energy of the French ambassador and of the politicians who harped on that fear, were rapidly demolishing the Treasurer's organisation. At this moment the personal assault was delivered. Danby had refused the post of Secretary of State to Ralph Montagu, ambassador in Paris; Montagu now revenged himself by taking 50,000 crowns from Louis to publish the instructions he had received from Danby in March, 1678, in which 6,000,000 francs were demanded of the King of France as the price for the dissolution of Parliament. That Danby had always strongly disapproved of such negotiations, which were forced on him by Charles, mattered little. He tried to forestall Montagu, but in vain: the production of the papers in Parliament caused an affrighted clamour for his dismissal; he could not effectively defend himself without betraying the King; and his impeachment was voted, when Charles, in a desperate attempt to save his Minister (January 24, 1679), dissolved the Cavalier Parliament which had sat for nearly eighteen years, had restored the authority of Crown and Church, and had in turn betrayed and been betrayed by both.

The Whigs swept the country, though at an enormous cost in beer and gold; and when the new Parliament met on March 6, 1679, it was found that the Government could count on a mere handful of twenty or thirty members in the Commons, as against a hundred and fifty in the old. Danby, who in the interval had been dismissed from office and, as compensation, been given a marquisate and, as security, a general pardon, took refuge from the impeachment by hiding at Whitehall. The Commons then proceeded against him by Bill of attainder. Four days before the Bill would have had effect, Danby appeared in the House of Lords and was committed to the Tower. There he remained for five years. He had done more than any man to consolidate the royal power; his downfall gave an immense impetus to the attack of the Whigs upon it. Charles was left to govern alone.

It is beyond our purpose to disentangle here the confused intrigues which filled the next two bloody and panic-stricken years. Above the vulgar web of plot and counterplot, in which treacheries, perjuries, and forgeries were the tools of Catholic and Protestant alike, two figures stand out clear in the history of the time: the one of Shaftesbury, under cover of the Popish Plot levelling stroke after stroke at the Duke of York in the belief that, unless he were ruined, he would ruin England; the other of Charles, maintaining his brother's defence, in the hope that through him he would save the rights of the Throne. From the first the King took the line of offering every possible concession, whether real or illusory, that was not vital to his interests. Within a few days of

Danby's imprisonment the Privy Council was remodelled on a scheme devised by Sir William Temple, by which he trusted to restore concord to the State. To prevent caballing the new council was to contain thirty members, instead of fifty, so as to deliberate in a single body; it was to be rich, so as to have authority; it was to be half official and half popular, so as to hold the balance between different ideas. Charles welcomed the scheme, to the joy of its promoters; to their yet greater joy he consented to include Halifax in the Council: but to their amazement he insisted upon naming Shaftesbury its president. In point of fact the King intended the Council to fail and soon made it impossible for the Whigs, who had already lost credit with their friends by serving, to remain upon it. Shaftesbury was dismissed in October: his chief supporters resigned three months later. But Halifax, nicknamed for his moderate policy "the Trimmer," remained, and with Essex and Sunderland the new Secretary of State, formed a coalition that obtained for them the name of "the Triumvirate."

Early in March, to avoid the storm brewing in Parliament, Charles had ordered his brother, much against his will, abroad to Brussels. On May 11, a Bill was introduced into the Commons "to disable the Duke of York to inherit the imperial crown of this realm." The Exclusion Bill was the work of Shaftesbury, and it dominated English politics for two years. On May 15 it was read for the first time; but on the 26th Charles, to stop its progress, first prorogued and afterwards dissolved his second Parliament, against the advice of his whole Council. One Act of this Parliament alone, the Habeas Corpus Act, is on the statute book; and that only passed its third reading in the Lords because the Whig tellers in joke counted one very fat lord as ten.

The whole summer was hot with blood and excitement. In the seventeenth century the law, both in theory and in practice, was far less favourable to persons accused of crime, especially against the State, than it has come to be in a more humane age. Dissection of evidence and cross-examination of witnesses were arts unknown till a century later. Spies and parish constables took the place of professional police; perjury was seldom detected; and the whole administration of justice was coloured by the knowledge that the acquittal of a traitor might mean civil war. For the murder of Godfrey three innocent men were hanged. Six Jesuit fathers and three others were executed, chiefly owing to Oates' evidence, for treasons of which they were guiltless; and in the early autumn began a number of prosecutions and convictions of priests throughout the country under a statute of Elizabeth which made it treason for a priest to be within the land. But in July the important trial of Sir George Wakeman resulted in the acquittal of Wakeman and his fellow-prisoners. So far little decisive evidence had been put forward by the defence at the trials, and it was almost due to chance that at Wakeman's a witness was called who proved Oates' perjury beyond a doubt. Oates tried to bully

the Court; but Scroggs, the Lord Chief Justice, a strong, brutal, and honest man, rated him in such vigorous style that he was reduced to a state of collapse, and the jury for the first time disbelieved his evidence. Scroggs was furiously attacked by the Whig Lords and the Whig mob: but the informer had received a check from which he never wholly recovered. More than Wakenham's life hung upon the trial, for in the preceding November Oates, inspired by the Whig leaders, had accused the Queen of high treason in conspiring with Wakenham against Charles' life. If the accusation could be supported, Shaftesbury hoped to force the King to a divorce and a Protestant marriage. For his part, Charles, as he said, was willing to give Oates line enough; but he was determined never to let the Whigs off the hook on which he was skilfully playing them. Baffled on this side, Shaftesbury turned his hopes towards Monmouth, who in June gained great reputation by suppressing the Bothwell Brigg rebellion in Scotland. But thereby he definitely sacrificed the support of Halifax; for though Halifax, who told Temple that "the plot must be handled as if it were true, whether it were so or no," was anxious to restrain by law the power of a Catholic sovereign, he refused to countenance such a revolution as the Exclusion Bill implied. And the proposal seemed even to portend a second civil war: on the prorogation of Parliament in May Shaftesbury had sworn to have the heads of those who advised it.

In August the King was taken violently ill at Windsor, and both sides eagerly prepared for the event of his death. While the Triumvirate summoned James in swift secrecy from Brussels and arranged for his proclamation as King, the Whigs planned insurrection. They were ready to seize the Tower, Dover Castle, and Portsmouth, to arrest the Duke's supporters; and it was believed that a large force could have taken the field in a few days under the banner of Monmouth. Fortunately for the country, Charles recovered as quickly as he had been struck down, and before his brother arrived was out of danger. The rejoicing of those who saw how near the nation had been to a civil war exasperated the dismay of the Whigs. James returned to Brussels, but for a brief visit only: on October 7 it was announced in the *Gazette* that he would remove to Scotland, whither he proceeded after a triumphant reception in the City before the end of the month. Monmouth on the other hand was banished to Holland, and when at the end of November he returned without leave and insolently struck the bar sinister from his arms, the King refused to see him, deprived him of all his offices, and ordered him to quit London. Monmouth at length obeyed, but only to make the semi-royal progress through the West, that afterwards had such ill-fated results.

Charles' fourth Parliament had met on October 7, 1679. It was immediately prorogued, adjourned, and again prorogued to October, 1680. Charles had acted, as usual in matters of importance, without

the advice of his Council, and by way of retort to a petition for an early meeting, got up by Shaftesbury. He calculated that without means of agitating in Parliament the Whigs would be driven to unconstitutional procedure which would further alarm all moderate men. The Whig managers, taken by surprise, could do nothing but procure petitions from all over the country; the Government met them by a flood of counter-addresses, expressing confidence in the King's wisdom and abhorrence of the petitioners. Petitioners and Abhorrrers divided the nation; and it was this quaint incident that solidified the Court party, to which the nickname of "Tory," bestowed on it by no less a godfather than Titus Oates himself, henceforth persistently attached itself. Next, Shaftesbury was drawn into a negotiation with the Court on the lines of a divorce and a Protestant marriage for Charles. He hoped for success, when suddenly, to his intense chagrin, the King on January 29, 1680, declared that, as James' absence had not produced the desired result, he was about to recall him. The Whig leader retaliated by setting about stories of a certain "Black Box," which, if found, should contain the contract of marriage between Charles and Lucy Walters, the Duke of Monmouth's mother. Well into the summer, the Black Box occupied the Council and the public and produced several memorable pamphlets asserting and proclamations denying its existence. At the end of June, Shaftesbury with a number of Whig Lords and commoners tried to present the Duke of York to the grand jury of Westminster as a popish recusant; but the judges discharged the jury before a bill could be found.

At last the meeting of Parliament could be delayed no longer, and the Exclusion Bill was speedily introduced. To remove a source of disturbance, the King had forced his brother to withdraw again to Edinburgh, and, to James' horror, offered a compromise, known as "the Expedients," by which, when he came to the throne, he should retain the title of King, but forfeit all the power. Halifax viewed the Expedients with favour, but the Commons, taking their cue from Shaftesbury, rejected them with insult. Abhorrrers were violently attacked, members expelled for discrediting the Plot, and on November 15, Russell, attended by a great company and "with a mighty shout," presented the Exclusion Bill to the Lords. Its passage was pressed with all the passion, the force, the eloquence of the famous Whig orators. Charles was present at the debate and witnessed the defection of Sunderland, who with the Duchess of Portsmouth had been moved by fear and bribes to join his enemies. When Monmouth urged Exclusion as the only means to safeguard the King's life, he broke in with a loud whisper, "the kiss of Judas." Treachery, fame, and eloquence seemed like to carry the day; but Halifax, in a superb effort, met them at every turn. He rose to speak fifteen or sixteen times, and it was due to his exertions that at nine o'clock in the evening,

after a debate of six hours, the Bill was thrown out by 63 to 30. Maddened by their defeat, the Commons plunged into a series of indiscriminate attacks on their opponents. Supplies were refused, and a Bill for a Protestant Association for the government of the country with Monmouth at its head was being prepared, when on January 10, 1681, Charles prorogued and then dissolved Parliament. Writs for a new Parliament were instantly issued, but in order to avoid the hostile atmosphere of the capital, Charles, on the advice of Danby, who continued to correspond with him from the Tower, summoned it to meet, not at Westminster but at Oxford. The London mob, fiercely hostile to the Court, was completely under Shaftesbury's influence; and Charles had reason to believe that an attempt would be made to place Parliament under the control of the City.

One tragic success was scored by the angry Commons. On November 29, 1680, his sixty-ninth birthday, Lord Stafford was brought to the bar of the House of Lords on the charge of high treason made against him two years before by Oates, and after a trial of seven days was found guilty. The perjured evidence marshalled against him was so strong as to obtain a verdict that was not wholly partisan; but, though Charles' belief in Stafford's innocence had been shaken, the result was a political defeat that the King felt keenly. One month later Stafford was led to the scaffold; when the executioner showed his head to the crowd a howl of joy broke from their lips.

While the Whigs, who were again returned to Parliament with a powerful majority, pledged to demand the Exclusion, the Association, and the restriction of the King's right to prorogue and dissolve Parliament, rode down to Oxford with bands of armed retainers, the Government prepared likewise for the fray. Windsor Castle, the Tower, Lambeth Palace, and Whitehall were put in a state of defence; and a regiment was posted along the Oxford road, for the event of the King being forced to retreat. From time to time during the last eighteen months Charles had been negotiating for a money-treaty with Barillon, and just before the dissolution had obtained what he wanted. For a sum of 12,500,000 francs, to be paid in the course of the next three years, he agreed to disengage himself from the Spanish alliance which he had concluded after his breach with Louis, and to prevent the interference of Parliament with the schemes of the French Government. The fear of Parliament compelled Louis to make Charles independent of his people. "If the King would be advised," said Halifax to Sir John Reresby, "it is in his power to make all his opponents tremble." Charles had in fact timed his stroke to perfection. The crisis of the struggle had arrived. He had obtained security on the side of finance at the precise moment when, unless he took the offensive, the day would be lost to him. The Parliament that now met (March 21) lived but a week, and it was his last. Charles offered

a compromise: it was refused. Shaftesbury approached the King personally, but was met by an open declaration of war. On March 26, the Exclusion Bill was voted. The 28th was fixed for its first reading; but on the morning, while Sir William Jones was appealing to Magna Carta, the Commons were summoned to the King's presence. They thought they had come to receive his surrender and crowded eagerly into the House of Lords. Charles, who had kept his intention absolutely secret, thereupon ordered the Lord Chancellor to declare Parliament dissolved. He soon afterwards drove off to Windsor; the Whigs fled. Shaftesbury in vain tried to hold his followers together; but they refused to fulfil their engagements. Their power was broken at a blow.

Within these two and a half years the long struggle that had filled the history of England since the dismissal of Clarendon had reached its culminating point. For ten years the King lived at odds with Parliament, the Commons striving to control the royal power, Charles to free it. Then the Country party, transformed by Shaftesbury into the Whig organisation, seized on the Popish Plot as a means to oust the King. Charles met them by a cool and Fabian strategy, always seeming on the point of defeat, and always driving them to greater violence, till their excesses had alienated the country and he could strike a decisive blow. He gave Parliament just enough rope to hang itself. Though belief in the Popish Plot was not yet dead, and though he could not save from the gallows the venerable Archbishop Plunkett, Catholic Primate of Ireland, who was convicted on perjured evidence for an alleged Irish Plot and executed on July 1, 1681, Charles was thenceforth secure. A policy of fierce retaliation on the Whigs was immediately carried out, while the nation looked on undisturbed; the doctrine of "non-resistance" was pushed to its furthest limits; Filmer's *Patriarcha*, written during the Civil War to maintain the divine right of kings, was published and favourably received; and Dryden's magnificent satires, *Absalom and Achitophel* and *The Medal*, gave lasting expression to the ideas that underlay the Tory reaction.

The first step of the Court was to safeguard itself in the City. A conviction for high treason was obtained at Oxford against Stephen College, a henchman of the Green Ribbon Club. But the City controlled the election of the London Sheriffs; the Sheriffs saw that Middlesex juries were composed of staunch Whigs; and in the autumn, when a similar accusation was brought against Shaftesbury, the grand jury ignored the Bill. Shaftesbury had offered, if he were released without trial, to go into voluntary exile; but, though Halifax, who was now the King's most influential adviser, strongly urged that his terms should be accepted, Charles said that he could not trust his great enemy's word and refused. So long as London remained Whig, Shaftesbury was unassailable. Accordingly, in the following year a formidable attack was begun on the self-governing corporation of the

City by means of a writ of *Quo Warranto*, brought in the Court of King's Bench and calling on the City to show cause why it should not forfeit its charter on account of abuse of its privileges. Once or twice before in the course of the reign the process had been made use of against corrupt boroughs: now it was systematically adopted for the purpose of rooting out self-government in England. The proceedings against the City charter, which were of immense length, only terminated in June, 1683; though the case for the Crown was in all respects weak and in some frivolous, judgment was entered against the City and the charter forfeited. Charles offered to restore it on his own terms, the chief being that he should have a veto on the election of the principal officers; the City accepted, then withdrew its acceptance, whereupon the King proceeded without more ado to nominate its officers directly. At the same time proceedings were instituted against the charters of other towns; and, while some were forfeited, others were voluntarily surrendered. Early in 1682 Hereford surrendered its charter; Nottingham followed; then York; and as many as sixty-six cities and towns, whose charters were forfeited or remodelled, passed under the control of the Crown. The discredit of this momentous revolution fell chiefly upon Halifax; but he seems not to have been specially responsible for the scheme.

Long before the fight for the charters was over, the stronghold of London was captured by the Tories. On Midsummer Day, 1682, by a combination of force and fraud the Lord Mayor, who had been won over by the Court, foisted two Tory Sheriffs on the City and, before the year was out, made sure that a Tory Mayor would succeed him. The Whig leader, and indeed all of prominence in the party, were at the mercy of the Crown, should they be prosecuted: their safety had lain in the certainty of a Whig panel; and the return of the Duke of York to London and to office, the open defiance of the Test Act, and a renewal of the most rigorous persecution of dissenters by the triumphant Tories indicated the extent of the mercy that would be shown. Driven to desperation, the members of the Green Ribbon Club plotted open rebellion. A council of six, consisting of Monmouth, Essex, Russell, Algernon Sidney, Hampden, and Howard, with Shaftesbury as its president, debated plans for a general insurrection and a simultaneous movement under Argyll in Scotland, while a plot for the assassination of Charles and James was hatched by the old Cromwellians, Wildman, Rumbold, and Rumsey, and by Robert Ferguson, nicknamed "the Plotter." But everything was in confusion: those concerned had different ideas and different intentions; their support was doubtful; Monmouth, on a second Western tour, found the country-folk unwilling for war; Shaftesbury had lost his old mastery and, fearful of arrest at his house in Aldersgate Street, was skulking in the London slums. The pope-burning on November 17 had been named as a signal for the rising, and,

when the Government prohibited it, Shaftesbury felt that the game was up: he fled to Holland and died on January 21, 1683, embittered and broken. The remainder persevered; and a day was fixed in April for attacking the King on his return from Newmarket at Rumbold's abode, the Rye House; but, owing to a fire in the town, Charles returned a week sooner than was expected and escaped. In June both plots came to light. Lord Howard turned traitor, and Russell and Sidney were brought to the bar for high treason. Against Sidney the law was strained by Jeffreys, the new Lord Chief Justice, but Russell was legally and justly convicted. Both were executed, and Essex committed suicide in the Tower. Monmouth was allowed to hide, was then forgiven, and then exiled. Thus the Whig opposition was finally destroyed. Charles had attained the object of so many years' endeavour: he was King, absolute and uncontrolled.

Meanwhile, the seizure of Strassburg by Louis in 1681 and the subsequent attack on Luxemburg had roused the fears of Europe to the highest degree, and strenuous efforts were made and backed by Halifax to obtain the cooperation of England against him. Charles, however, true to the policy that had won him success at home, took advantage of the crisis, while engaging in dilatory negotiations with the allies, to extort at the end of November, 1681, a million *livres* from Louis as the price of his neutrality. Halifax, the Duke of Ormond, and Danby, now released from the Tower, pressed him to summon Parliament; in 1683 Charles married Princess Anne of York to Prince George of Denmark, who, though in the French interest, was a Protestant; but, although in the autumn of 1684 there was certainly talk of an arrangement between himself, Halifax, Monmouth, and the Prince of Orange against the Duke of York, Sunderland, and the French, it is doubtful whether he more than played with the scheme. But on February 2, 1685, Charles, being then fifty-four years old, was seized, as is now established beyond doubt, by an apoplectic fit. He lingered for some days, apologising for being such "an unconscionable time in dying," and on the 6th, after being received into the Roman Catholic Church by Huddleston, the priest who had saved his life after the battle of Worcester, expired. Among his last words were: "Let not poor Nelly starve." The nation loved him well and mourned him long.

Charles II's brilliant gifts, his love of pleasure, his indolent coolness amid the thrilling and tragic vicissitudes of his reign, while endearing his memory to many English people, have obscured the height of his political genius. At the time of his death he had, in fact, fully accomplished, by secret means and without the force destined to support it, the secular part of the policy into which he had entered at Dover nearly fifteen years before for the destruction of English liberties and the consolidation of his own power. He left to his brother a kingdom compact, loyal and prosperous, which James, in the attempt to carry out the religious side of the policy of that splendid treason, within four years turned

against himself, to the ruin of the House of Stewart and the undoing of all Charles' work. The new King, who combined his grandfather's Scottish stubbornness with the raw Catholicism of a convert, owed to the ungraciousness of his manners a wholly undeserved reputation for probity and veracity. He was easily prejudiced, easily alarmed, never forgot a foe, and seldom remembered a friend. With a passion for revenge and an exceptional want of imagination, foresight, and political tact, he longed at the same time to play a great national part on the European stage and to establish Catholicism in England, so that its subsequent destruction should be impossible. He thought that everyone who did not agree with him was a rebel. He was convinced that his father had lost crown and head by an unaccountable weakness for making concessions. Moderate counsels were neglected, Halifax and Danby disgraced and driven to opposition, and the royal confidence was reposed in men of servile character and ignorant ambition.

The new reign, however, began well. James' declaration that he would preserve, defend, and support "this Government, both in Church and State, as it is now by law established" was received with general satisfaction; and it was certain that the Parliament summoned for May 19 would be overwhelmingly Tory. Meanwhile James, having made Rochester, the second son of Lord Chancellor Clarendon, Lord Treasurer, confirmed Sunderland as Secretary of State, and removed Halifax to the pompous position of Lord President of the Council, renewed through Barillon his brother's engagements to France and sent John, Lord Churchill, to Versailles to express his warm gratitude for Louis' support, which took the shape of an immediate gift of some £40,000 and large promises of help for the future. The King had thus security, as he thought, for the fulfilment of the religious schemes that had already been inaugurated. Mass was said at Whitehall with open doors, and the Catholics everywhere raised their heads in joyful expectation.

Before Parliament met, the new Government had already made its mark. On May 7, Titus Oates was indicted for perjury, convicted on two counts, and sentenced to be flogged from Aldgate to Newgate, and from Newgate to Tyburn. Though the sentence was carried out with the utmost brutality, Oates survived; but Dangerfield, another perjurer, died of a similar whipping and of a subsequent assault by a savage Tory, who, to relieve the Government of odium, was himself hanged for murder. The signal was given for the persecution of dissenters; throughout the country the penal laws were sharpened against them, and Baxter, their revered and temperate chief, was bullied by Jeffreys, fined, and imprisoned. Parliament showed itself as favourably disposed as could be hoped. The Commons not only voted to James for life the whole of the revenue enjoyed by the late King, but an extraordinary supply of £400,000; the proceedings against Danby and the Catholic peers were terminated; and a Bill reversing Stafford's attainder was well advanced,

when its passage was interrupted—as it proved for nearly a century and a half—by the news that the Duke of Monmouth had landed in arms in the west of England.

Monmouth had heard in Holland the news of his father's death with dismay. His cousin William advised him to seek fame against the Turks, and he himself contemplated retiring into private life; but the counsel of other exiles and of malcontents in England prevailed. While Argyll, in pursuance of the old Rye House plan, was to rouse the Highlands, Monmouth undertook to invade England as champion of freedom and Protestantism. On June 11, he landed with a small force at Lyme Regis, proclaimed himself King, and after some futile manœuvring with raw country levies, attempted to surprise the royal troops under Lord Feversham, a nephew of the great Turenne, and Churchill, at Sedgmoor on the night of July 5. His men were scattered; he fled, was captured, brought to London, and, being already attainted, was executed on Tower Hill on the 15th. James took his fill of revenge. After the battle Colonel Kirke, who had earned a vile reputation at Tangier, was let loose on the country with his regiment, known in ironical allusion to the emblem on their standard as “Kirke's Lambs.” Then Jeffreys, accompanied by four judges, went on the western circuit to what have ever since been known as the “Bloody Assizes.” A few examples were made in London; in Hampshire, Dorset and Somerset 320 persons were hanged; 841 transported; one woman was beheaded; one was burnt alive. There was plunder too: the Queen and her maids of honour trafficked in slaves and ransoms, and Jeffreys returned to London rich with the proceeds of the pardons he had sold. He was welcomed by the King, and in September was appointed Lord Chancellor in place of Lord Guilford, who had died in disgrace because of his protest against the proceedings of the King.

Three days before Sedgmoor Parliament had adjourned. When it met again on November 9, the spell of ecstatic loyalty, if not broken, was plainly weakened. Beneath the surface, the tendency of the Court and the horrors of the rebellion were working a reaction. James had now an army of 20,000 men, largely quartered at Hounslow, for the maintenance of which the attempt on his throne would serve him as a pretext, while the deficiency of experienced Protestants warranted his officering it with Catholics. He hoped at the same time to abolish the militia, the only force which could, he conceived, be used against him. When Halifax urged that commissions to Catholics were illegal, he was dismissed from office and his name struck off the list of privy councillors. The King assured Barillon that, come what might, he should keep the army on foot. If he were to reign with the goodwill of his people, his need was, besides supply for the army, the repeal of the Test Act. But, while the Test Act was popular, a standing army was hated; and, a few days before Parliament met, came the news from over the channel that Louis, in the cause of political absolutism, had put the final

touch to the persecution of the Huguenots that had raged with increasing violence for the last three years. James was informed in advance of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and expressed his entire approval of it. Yet even so high a Tory as Sir Roger L'Estrange declared that the Protestant religion must be "the trump card" of the Government; and, while the sight of Huguenot refugees incensed the minds of the populace against France and Rome, a powerful minority was preparing in Parliament to oppose the King's policy. In the Commons an artful stand was taken on the question of supply, and not more than £700,000, exactly half of the sum wanted by James, was voted; but the disposition evinced by both Houses to take his dealings with religion into account was even more serious. He felt that the result would be unfavourable and, coming swiftly to a decision, prorogued Parliament on November 20, without even awaiting the passage of the Money Bill. Recalcitrant members who held posts under Government were dismissed. Compton, Bishop of London, who had spoken bravely of the danger to his Church, was removed from the deanery of the Chapel Royal and the Privy Council. In James II's reign Parliament met no more.

Compared with his brother, James was an ignorant man, and the ignorance that possessed him most was ignorance of the value of time. Unless he were constant in pressing on the cause he had at heart, he thought his religion delivered over to its enemies and himself false to his trust. Under the influence of this miscalculation and of the delusion that high-churchmen were more than half Catholic, he proceeded to crowd into the remainder of his reign an astounding number of follies. A committee consisting of Sunderland, several Catholic peers, the Jesuit Petre, and "lying Dick Talbot" who, though the traducer of James' first wife, had been raised by him to the earldom of Tyrconnel, had already been formed to watch over the Catholic interests. The King published two papers of theological argument, found in his late brother's strong-box, as proof that Charles II had been a Catholic. By this and by his personal declaration to the same effect James thought to convince Anglicans that they were in error; in reality he only irritated them. He now determined to obtain public admittance for Catholics to offices both of State and of Church. The royal Dispensing Power was ill-defined: then let it be defined according to his wishes. Four timid or unsympathetic judges and the Solicitor-General, Heneage Finch, were removed; and a collusive case was brought under the Test Act against Sir Edward Hales, a Catholic who had been appointed Governor of Dover. Hales pleaded a dispensation by letters-patent, and the King's right to dispense with the statute was upheld by eleven out of twelve judges. The judgment gave James his opportunity. Catholics were sworn of the Privy Council; a Catholic was confirmed in the mastership of University College, Oxford, where with the aid of a Jesuit chaplain he publicly said mass; a Catholic was appointed Dean of Christchurch; the ambassador of the

Catholic Elector Palatine was obliged, against his Prince's inclination, to open a chapel for Catholic service in the City; and favours were showered on the obsequious Cartwright, the sycophantic Crew, the cautious and eloquent Sprat. When Dr Sharp, Dean of Norwich and Rector of St Giles' in the Fields, animadverted in a sermon on the motives of converts, James called on Compton to suspend him. Compton refused. James bethought him of using the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Crown to crush the rising resistance of the Church, and, disregarding the statute of 13 Charles II, cap. 12, on the pretext that it had only abolished the extraordinary powers of the Court of High Commission, constituted an Ecclesiastical Commission Court, to which he delegated all his disciplinary powers over the Church. Sancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury, refused to serve on the commission, which under the direction of Jeffreys and Sunderland immediately suspended Compton for refusing to suspend Sharp. But the King gained little from his victory. In face of his attack, the Church recovered the dignity of which she had lost something in the days of unquestioning subserviency. Compton became a popular hero, and a wag nicknamed the commission the "*Congregatio de Propaganda Fide*."

James' administration had reached a point where it was impossible to stand still. He must go either forward or backward, and there were no thoughts of turning back. The storm now broke on Rochester. The Lord Treasurer, a convinced churchman, had shown himself adverse to the recent development of the royal policy; and Sunderland, who possessed the complete confidence of the Queen and aimed at sole influence over the King, determined to get rid of him. Rochester was given his choice between conversion and dismissal, chose the latter, and left office. On January 7, 1687, the Treasury was put into commission; and, a month later, Tyrconnel succeeded Clarendon at the head of the government in Ireland. The threat to the Church was unmistakable. Clarendon and Rochester were the King's brothers-in-law, his old personal friends, devoted to the monarchy, and among the most experienced servants of the Crown. It was evident that James, who professed to desire nothing but toleration, had dismissed them merely for being Protestants. The hubbub was great; and, since he still hoped to obtain from Parliament the repeal of the Test Acts, he was forced to look for support in the country. Dryden went over, and produced his strange and beautiful poem, *The Hind and the Panther*; yet, though lesser men went with him, it was clear that the number of conversions was not sufficient; and the High Commission proved incapable of suppressing the numberless pamphlets put forth all over the country against Rome. But an alliance between all dissenters from the Church of England might perhaps break down its protecting walls. Toleration might be made to do further service. William Penn, the celebrated Quaker, had, since his return in 1684 from the colony that bears his name, been much at Court and had

come to exercise a certain influence over the King's mind. His object was universal toleration, and he attended James' advance in that direction with joy. James would have much preferred a combination of the Catholic and Anglican Churches against all outside them; but he had no choice. On April 4, 1687, he issued a Declaration of Indulgence, not only suspending all penal laws in religious matters, but abrogating all religious tests, allowing public worship to all men, and forbidding his subjects to interfere with any religious assembly. "You are therefore to be hugged now," wrote Halifax in his famed *Letter to a Dissenter*, of which 20,000 copies were circulated, "only that you may the better be squeezed at another time."

Alone among the Powers of Europe, France had approved and encouraged the headlong course of the King of England. It was as much to Louis' interest as ever that England should remain neutral in the European situation, and he was well aware that a substantial agreement between James and his Parliament would probably mean her adherence to the Grand Alliance which William of Orange was forming against him. The League of Augsburg, formed in 1686 between the Empire, Spain, Sweden, and several German Princes, was countenanced by the austere and upright Pope, Innocent XI. All these, Catholic as well as Protestant, desired nothing so much as to see England united and peaceful. The envoys of the secular States backed Rochester against Sunderland and lamented his fall. William, who through his agent Dykvelt and by visits of both Burnet and Penn was in close touch with English opinion, advised that the King should obtain a general toleration from Parliament, without at the same time touching or dispensing with the tests. Had James, after a quiet administration for some years, acted on his advice, there can be little doubt that he would have succeeded amid the gratitude of Catholics and Protestants and enjoyed a long and prosperous reign. But his mind was dominated by Barillon, by Sunderland and by his Jesuit confessors, who under a strongly French bias ruined themselves and him and the whole body of English Catholics. By Pope Innocent his attitude was deeply reprobated. His impolitic zeal had previously evoked pontifical rebukes. His importunities in favour of his wife's relatives and of Petre, his favourite, met with procrastination and refusal. He sent as ambassador to Rome Lord Castlemaine, who was personally obnoxious and carried objectionable instructions. He forced the papal Nuncio in England, the suave Count d'Adda, into a compromising situation. He neglected the good of the Catholic Church, as seen by the Pope, with the obstinacy with which he neglected the good of his Crown, as seen by all his wisest statesmen. "All the advices sent from Rome," said Cardinal Howard, whose influence as Cardinal Protector of England the Jesuits felt bitterly, "were for slow, calm, and moderate courses. But he saw violent courses were more acceptable, and would probably be followed." His foresight was justified by the event.

CHAPTER X.

THE REVOLUTION AND THE REVOLUTION SETTLEMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN.

(1) ENGLAND.

(1687—1702.)

THE period 1687-1702 is unique in the history of England. Such achievements as the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement, the foundation of a National Bank and a National Debt, the Toleration Act and the withdrawal of the Press-Licensing Act, would have exercised an influence both deep and wide at any time and among any people. But, as taking place among this people and in this period, they had a peculiar value; for their influence transcended the bounds of one country and had a European significance and effect. The question of the removal of the Tests engaged the attention of Princes and diplomatists in Europe, as well as of Dissenting ministers and Catholic priests in England. Continental statesmen watched the results of divisions in the English House of Commons, knowing that on a casual party vote the fate of a great alliance might depend. The resolutions of the Bank and the state of the currency in England decided the fate of a campaign on the Continent. A native-born King deserted England and tried to reconquer it with the aid of Frenchmen and Irishmen; a foreign potentate defended it with an army of Swedes, Dutchmen, Brandenburgers, and Englishmen. The rule of an English-born King threatened disgrace and humiliation to his country; the rule of a Dutchman brought it power and glory. England no longer revolved in an orbit of her own; her course was deflected, and her movements were determined, by the presence of other bodies in the political firmament. International policy is here subordinate to internal history; but, none the less, the course of domestic policy can often be explained only by reference to continental problems.

The disasters of James II were chiefly due to the fact that he mistook tributary streams for main currents of national thought. Thus, he gathered from the widely different opinions of the clergy that the Establishment was divided in doctrine; he did not perceive that it would unite against Catholicism. And, as he perceived the disunion and was blind to the latent strength of the Establishment, so he saw the

superficial unity, and was blind to the underlying divisions, between Dissenters and Catholics. Obstinate and courageous, sincerely believing that concession had ruined his father and his brother, he was the very man to ignore obstacles and attempt impossibilities. He at first thought that the resolute expression of his will would move the Establishment to consent to the toleration of Catholics. When this expectation failed, he turned to the Dissenters, and relied upon their coalescence with the Catholics to secure toleration for both parties. Such were some of the motives which inspired the Declaration of Indulgence (issued April 4, 1687), by which he suspended all penal statutes against Catholics and Dissenters, and admitted them to public office in corporations, army, or civil service.

The Declaration had been issued on the sole ground of the royal prerogative, by which, it was claimed, the laws could be suspended. Unfortunately for James, though opinion veered as to the true limits of royal power, it was steady on the one point on which he elected to challenge it. Parliament had pronounced a similar Declaration of Charles II illegal, and the King had acquiesced and withdrawn it (1672). If precedents counted for anything, James was legally in the wrong; and, if the legal irregularity was clear, so also was the political motive inspiring it. It was obvious that a power which could enforce the doctrines of toleration might eventually also enforce the doctrines of absolutism, in the teeth of Parliament. Hence, by a strange but intelligible paradox, the establishment of liberty in religion would lead to the destruction of it in politics. But, while recognising that political motives inspired James, it is not necessary to assume that they excluded all other considerations. His religious sincerity does not seem to have been questioned by the foreign diplomatists at his Court. His conversion to the principle of toleration was perhaps late; but the influence of the great William Penn upon him may explain much. At any rate, when the conversion was once effected, it remained permanent. Long afterwards, when in exile—and when he had much to lose by his attitude—James continued to profess at least a theoretical zeal for toleration.

An attack upon the Universities accompanied the Declaration, and supplied the mirror in which Englishmen read that toleration meant hostility to the Establishment. The proceedings against Cambridge are particularly important, because resistance was here offered even before the issue of the Declaration. On February 9, 1687, the Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge (Peachell) received a royal letter, commanding him to confer the degree of M.A. upon Alban Francis, a Benedictine. Nearly the whole Senate at once signed a protest against the proposal, describing their resistance as proceeding not "from any principle of disobedience and stubbornness, but from a conscientious sense of our obligations to laws and oaths." Eventually the Vice-Chancellor, with eight delegates (including Isaac Newton), was summoned before the Court of High

Commission (April and May, 1687). Peachell, after being thoroughly bullied by Jeffreys, was deprived of his office. But the protest succeeded, and Francis was left without a degree. The proceedings at Oxford were different and more violent. Catholic influences had already been introduced into Christ Church and University College without much open protest. In April, 1687, James had sent a letter recommending Anthony Farmer—a man of bad character who was a convert to Catholicism—for the presidency of Magdalen. But the Fellows had already met and elected John Hough to the post. They were hereupon cited before the Commission, and ultimately expelled. They offered a more dignified, if less successful, resistance than the Cambridge Vice-Chancellor and his companions; but the Oxford opposition, being subsequent to the Declaration, was more natural and has therefore less historic significance.

The interference of James with the Universities has more value as an illustration of ecclesiastical and popular resentment than as an instance of royal illegality. For it is hard to say that James had sinned against established custom. Letters mandatory or dispensatory had expelled or appointed Fellows under Charles I and II often enough to create precedents. Professed Lutherans had been admitted to colleges; the ambassador of Morocco had lately received a degree at Cambridge, in direct defiance of statutes and in the absence of loud or general disapproval. But when James tried to leaven the colleges with Roman Catholic Fellows the academic bodies suddenly discovered and denounced the inroad on their privileges. The conviction that the King desired to override the existing law was becoming deep-rooted, and it nowhere found a better expression than in the controversial protests of University officials. But, if James had not violated the statutes or departed from the custom of the Universities, he had certainly broken his word. He had confirmed all the suspicions awakened in the Declaration by an assault upon institutions which every Anglican believed to be nurseries of the learning, the piety, and the steadfastness of his Church. He had attempted to humiliate and degrade, he might actually mean to destroy, the Church which he had repeatedly sworn to defend. Anglicans began to feel that his measures tended, as the Prince of Orange told the English ambassador, “really to sap the foundations of the Protestant religion.”

Meanwhile, the Dissenters were beginning to suspect James as an ally. All the eloquence of the great William Penn, the reputed author of the Declaration, could not win over the Nonconformists. It was significant that he could not even secure the whole body of the Quakers, amongst whom his personal influence had hitherto been boundless. And, apart from them, the majority of the Dissenters looked askance at the Declaration, and their chief divines, Baxter and Howe, actually denounced it. The joint admission of Dissenters and Catholics to office in the corporations was producing extraordinary results. Thus, Newcastle had a Papist Mayor and a Puritan Council, and the corporation vetoed every

loyal address put forward by its Catholic head. Such a result was typical and indeed inevitable; and all the suspicions which could possibly arise from so unnatural a union were subtly suggested or emphasised by a pamphlet from the pen of Halifax.

The famous *Letter to a Dissenter* (published apparently in the middle of August, 1687) dissected the Declaration with inimitable irony. The incongruity of an alliance between liberty and infallibility, between Tiverton weavers and Jesuit priests was skilfully exposed, and well spiced with allusions to the Popish plot and Romish treachery. Halifax then proceeded to point out the danger of affronting the Church of England "from a desire of ease and revenge." The Declaration depended solely on the sincerity of the Court, for which there was no guarantee; and the first act of Princess Mary of Orange, on her accession, might be to cancel it. Was it worth while to accept a favour of dubious permanence, from a suspected source, at the certain price of alienating the whole Establishment? The air of detachment and seriousness, which Halifax always preserved even in the wittiest and most prejudiced of his pamphlets, made the effect of this appeal more remarkable. Twenty thousand copies were sold; and twenty-four answers, each excelling the other in violence of abuse and feebleness of argument, vainly endeavoured to counteract the effect of the most successful pamphlet of the age.

It was followed, at an interval of three and a half months, by another communication which was inferior to it in literary grace, but surpassed it in political importance. The document, which put into the shade even a pamphlet by Halifax, was a letter written by Fagel, Grand Pensionary of Holland, authoritatively announcing the views of the Prince and Princess of Orange upon the Declaration. Though their opinions had been known to James and to diplomatists so early as June, 1687, they were not revealed to the English people until the publication of Fagel's letter in November. Fagel announced that the Prince and Princess desired toleration, and wished no man to be persecuted for matters of private conscience. But, while several religions might be tolerated in private, the Prince and Princess thought that there could not in one State be two, "public and established." Hence they could approve nothing "so much against the existing laws," as removal of the Tests, those necessary safeguards against the Catholics. Such language was admirably chosen. The Prince and Princess disclaimed the right of interference, while clearly condemning the methods of James; they profusely protested their duty and affection to the King, while delicately insinuating that his Declaration was illegal. The success of Fagel's letter was so extraordinary that, by the beginning of 1688, forty-five thousand copies had actually been sold. From this time the position of the Prince of Orange, as the protector of the public liberties and the Protestant religion, was recognised by most members of the Established Church and by the majority of Dissenters.

The ablest of English, and one of the ablest of European, statesmen had thus pronounced against the Declaration of James. But, apart from these weighty commentaries, the facts themselves seemed to the English people to show clearly enough that the royal policy was directed first against the Established Church, and ultimately against the Constitution. James was quite aware of their suspicions, and of the danger of putting himself legally in the wrong. He accordingly sought to secure the sanction of Parliament for the repeal of the Tests and for the establishment of religious toleration. With this view he made persistent efforts during the summer of 1687 to establish his personal influence over members of Parliament by securing their adhesion to himself. When this system of "closeting" (as it was called) proved a hopeless failure, he dissolved Parliament (July 2). One last resource remained: a new Parliament might be packed, and the public officers turned into electioneering agents. If officials refused to act this part, they could be turned out. In these circumstances, half the Lords Lieutenant and eight hundred Protestant magistrates speedily resigned or were dismissed. James proceeded to fill the corporations, the benches of magistrates and the state departments with his own nominees. Commissions of "Regulators" filled the corporation councils and the commissions of the peace with Catholics and Dissenters, and expelled from the public departments any officials likely to resist the King. Such violent changes could not be accomplished without disorganising the machinery of State and producing universal discontent. The continuance of drastic reforms in the public service, together with a lavish creation of peers, might at any time place both Houses of Parliament at the feet of James. A revolution of this kind, if systematically pursued, must eventually be met by a revolution of another kind; and from this time forward passive constitutional opposition began to develop into active resistance. By the winter of 1687 James might have read the signs, for almost all the nobility had deserted his Court and retired to their country estates. Foreign diplomatists at least were not deceived, and the sagacious Prince of Orange understood that the time for active interference was approaching.

In spite of some previous disputes the differences between William and James did not become acute till 1687. The beginnings of a real quarrel may be dated from that year, when William sent Dykvelt to England on a mission whose professed object was one of diplomatic compliment to James (February—May). Dykvelt speedily revealed his real purpose by arranging for secret interviews with Devonshire, Halifax, Danby, Shrewsbury, and others, and endeavouring to ascertain their views as to the Declaration and the policy of James. It appears that Dykvelt repeated the main substance of these conversations to James, and that there is no reason to suspect any direct attempt at conspiracy. But none the less his mission marks an epoch in the history of the time. William concluded from Dykvelt's report that he must abandon all

hope of bringing England into the continental alliance by conciliating James himself. That this deduction was correct can be seen from the memoirs of James which, though not entirely composed by himself, substantially represent his views. He there explains that, in the war which was seen to be approaching, it seemed to him that France would attack and weaken the Dutch Republic. As the Dutch were our rivals in trade he thought that England might gain and could not lose by neutrality. This account omits one all-important consideration. James, though in his own way a national king, was not wholly swayed by cynical calculation of England's self-interest. He might perhaps have been willing in certain eventualities to act as the ally of Louis; he would certainly have been delighted to remain neutral. But, as he said on the eve of his downfall in 1688, he never would declare war upon France. To William the safety of Europe and of his own country was bound up with bringing England into the scale against France. The neutrality of James, therefore, compelled William and foreign diplomatists to interfere in England, and turned an internal struggle between King and people into an international event of the greatest magnitude.

After May, 1687, the relations of William with the Opposition Lords, which up to this time appear to have been quite constitutional, began to develop into a conspiracy against James. If James would not join the coalition against Louis in Europe, William would join the Opposition Lords against James in England. Even during Dykvelt's mission Danby had let fall some dark hints about a design; and Shrewsbury, who came to Holland in August, may have gone further. But William was determined neither to hazard any rash or premature attempt, nor to appear in England as a foreign invader. Both of these resolutions induced slowness and caution, and deepen the obscurity which hangs over his policy during the winter of 1687. All that can be said with certainty is that, very early in 1688, he made it clear that he would take no action unless he received a definite invitation from leading Englishmen. This was secured to him in June, 1688; and the two events precipitating the crisis were the birth of a son to James, and the trial of the seven Bishops.

It was known that James II's queen, Mary of Modena, was about to become a mother, and it was believed that the most momentous issues would be determined by the sex of her child. The party of prerogative declared that the birth of a son to James would solve all difficulties, and produce the discomfiture of the "Orangeists." At least one foreign diplomat had a different opinion. "Such an event," wrote Hoffmann, the Emperor's resident in London (April 2), "would only consolidate the union among them, increase their aversion from the King, and make them use every effort to prevent the Catholic succession to the Crown." The news of the birth of James Edward (the "Old Pretender") on June 10 speedily proved that Hoffmann was right. The "Orangeists"

alleged that the Queen had never been with child, and that the pseudo-prince had been smuggled up the backstairs in a warming-pan. The readiness with which this fable was circulated and believed is a measure of the unpopularity of James. But statesmen were not content with the effects of the warming-pan lie upon popular opinion. They speedily resolved that, since the birth of a son appeared to assure a Catholic successor to James, the only way of preventing this was to invoke the interference of the Prince of Orange.

At this critical moment James succeeded in alienating the one great institution in the State not already hostile to him. The clergy of the Establishment held the doctrine of passive obedience so strongly that they advocated submission even to the decrees of a Nero. In 1687, James had rightly deemed their opposition almost unthinkable; in 1688, he took the only measure which could possibly have produced it. Not content with the establishment of practical toleration, he was determined to make the Establishment acknowledge the justice and wisdom of his policy. On May 4, 1688, he reissued the Declaration of Indulgence, and commanded the Anglican clergy to read it to their congregations. But even the advocates of non-resistance had no intention of becoming personal advocates of a measure which struck at their own supremacy. The Established Church was at length forced to oppose him in self-defence. On May 18, Sancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury, and six other Bishops, petitioned to be excused reading the Declaration. In point of fact, very few of the clergy actually read it on either of the prescribed days (May 20 and 27). James could not attack the whole mass of the clergy; but he promptly indicted his episcopal petitioners for libel. He seems to have meant that they should be tried, condemned, and then released by royal pardon. The plan was clumsy and the error fatal. When the so-called martyrs of the Church passed to the Tower, every eye was fixed upon them; the soldiers at the gates knelt to receive their blessing. Popular enthusiasm penetrated the Law Courts; the judges were not wholly on the side of James, and the jury at length proved to be decisively against him. On June 30 the seven Bishops were acquitted amid indescribable enthusiasm. Halifax waved his hat in the face of the Court like a schoolboy, and the people lit bonfires in the streets and shouted themselves hoarse with exultation.

On the same night seven men assembled at Shrewsbury's house and signed a letter of invitation to William. This letter, which asked the Prince of Orange to bring over an army and secure the liberties of the people, was carried to Holland by Admiral Herbert in the disguise of a common sailor. The signatories were the Earl of Devonshire, Henry Sydney, and Admiral Russell, who represented the extreme Whig party; Shrewsbury, a moderate Whig; Compton, Bishop of London, a Trimmer; Lumley, an ex-Catholic; and Danby, an ex-champion of prerogative. Two conspicuous Opposition Lords, the Marquis of Halifax and Lord

Nottingham, stood aloof, and preferred to rely upon passive constitutional opposition. But the diverse character of the signatories shows how James had contrived to unite against himself almost all parties in the State. Besides the letter of invitation, William soon received assurances from Lord Churchill, Kirke, and Trelawney, leading officers in the army, from Vice-Admiral Herbert, whose influence was great with the navy, and finally from Sunderland, the most influential adviser of James. As Sunderland was at this moment receiving the gold of Louis, it is permissible to doubt whether he earned the gratitude of William. But apart from his assurances, William was confident of strong support in England, and forthwith began to organise his army and fleet for immediate action.

In view of the intrigues above mentioned it can cause no surprise that Hoffmann should have reported in September that King James had against him almost everybody in his kingdom, and that even his soldiers had become "his most dangerous enemies." To secure himself against disaffection in the army, which had been infected by the "No Popery" riots and Protestant vehemence of the capital, James had introduced some Irish troops into England in August. Their appearance occasioned murmurs, riots, discontent and the publication of the scurrilous ballad *Lillibullero*. So extraordinary was the popularity of this song that its author, Thomas Wharton, afterwards boasted that he had sung a king out of three kingdoms by it. James did not venture to land any more Irish troops. He was equally afraid to turn for aid to France, for he knew that an open alliance with Louis would be dangerous in the existing state of English feeling, while a secret league was infinitely hazardous. Perhaps he would have risked it, had he realised the extent of his danger. Louis XIV had repeatedly sent warnings of the design of the Prince of Orange; but James, with an excess of cunning, argued that these were only pretexts for entrapping him into an alliance with France. He seems to have believed the assurances of Mary, William, and the Dutch ambassador, that no design against England was afoot. His memoirs relate that Sunderland never failed to ridicule the idea mercilessly when it was discussed in council. As to the motives of this most acute and perfidious of politicians, many conjectures have been offered; but the advantage of his policy to the cause of William remains undeniable.

The task of William had only begun when his naval and military preparations were complete. He had to convince German Princes and Dutch burghers that their safety could only be assured by an expedition which would remove the Dutch army to England, and leave the German lands open to attack from the most powerful military sovereign in the world. The German Princes, with Frederick William of Brandenburg foremost among them, had hitherto remained more or less neutral. Though secretly hostile to Louis, they feared the French armies which had so often triumphed over the German, and doubted whether the Dutch navy would triumph over the English. But the Great Elector's

son, Frederick III, who succeeded him on April 29, 1688, finally brought Brandenburg out of its neutrality. He coöperated heartily with William, and lent him troops for his English expedition under the command of the famous Schomberg, the Protestant ex-Marshal of France. The Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel and the Brunswick-Lüneburg Duke at Celle speedily concluded treaties of alliance with William; the Elector of Hanover intimated approval; and the Elector of Saxony was drawn in. The Spanish Habsburg appears to have regarded with complacency the proposed expedition to dethrone a Catholic King, for his envoy at the Hague subsequently ordered masses to be sung for its success. His Austrian kinsman was more scrupulous, and it was not until William had established relations with the Pope (Innocent XI) that he made any impression on the Emperor. Leopold was at length reconciled to the enterprise by the Papal dispensation, and yielded a reluctant consent. Thus the Prince of Orange was assured of assistance from many foreign Princes, before his own people, through their organ, the States-General, had pronounced in its favour. While the destinies of Europe were suspended on the vote of the States-General, Louis XIV suddenly intervened and took the decision from its hands.

The policy of Louis at this crisis can be best understood on the assumption that his attention was fixed upon Germany rather than upon England or Holland. He presumably thought the establishment of his own power on the Rhine to be easier and more immediately probable than the success of William in any design against England. Yet, during the trial of the Bishops he had vainly offered large sums of money and the loan of his fleet to James, and later had repeatedly warned him of William's designs. Losing patience, he at last attempted to force the English King's hand; but the result of his effort was only to play the game of his rival. On September 2, his ambassador, d'Avaux, made an announcement to the assembled States-General of the Dutch Republic, of which the immediate effect was to secure for William the object at which he had so consistently aimed. D'Avaux pronounced the vast naval and military preparations of William to be a menace to England. Owing to the bonds of "friendship and alliance" existing between England and France, any enterprise undertaken by the Dutch against England would involve an immediate declaration of war from France. The States-General were struck dumb with rage by this haughty and insulting menace. The mighty armaments of William, which had appeared to lay a heavy burden upon his country, were now seen to be the instruments of its salvation. But one difficulty still remained. After the threats of Louis the Dutch were never likely to allow William to go on his apparently quixotic expedition to England. But just as the diplomacy of Louis had won over the Dutch to William's schemes of an alliance against France, the diplomacy of James was to reconcile them to his plan of an expedition against England.

James received the news of Louis' friendly intervention in his favour

with the utmost embarrassment. Conscious of his weakness at home, he resolved not to compromise his position further by exciting suspicions about a secret engagement with France. At the moment when the aid of the French fleet was of vital importance, since his own fleet was smaller than that of the Dutch, James resolved to pose as the patriotic independent sovereign, secure in his island kingdom. He emphatically denied the existence of any alliance with France, and openly rejected her proffered assistance. By this masterpiece of folly he contrived not only to injure the feelings of the French King, but to awaken his suspicions. Louis was justly indignant and turned to pursue his own most pressing needs, well assured that James would soon find out the need of relying upon France. On September 25, Louis threw the whole of his vast military force, not upon the Dutch frontier, but against the middle Rhine. Thus the continued impolicy of James and the momentary misjudgment of Louis brought about what the ability of William himself could not perhaps have effected. The States-General, fully assured that the Dutch frontier could not be attacked in force before the end of the year, gave the long-desired consent, and bade the Prince of Orange God-speed on his bold venture for the English Crown.

By September a large army and a vast fleet of transports had been collected, and in October all was ready. On October 19, Herbert embarked his squadron at Helvoetsluys, and the Dutch warships sailed from the Texel, only to be driven back by a terrific storm. The enterprise now stood confessed; and even James was aroused to a sense of impending danger, and employed the temporary respite in a desperate effort to restore his popularity. On October 27, he dismissed Sunderland, borrowed money from the French King, and implored his aid. He summoned before him the Bishops, whom he had once treated with such disdain, and begged for their advice. He gave back their privileges to the Universities, replaced many of the dismissed public servants, and restored the charters to London and many other cities. Finally, he dissolved the Ecclesiastical Commission and promised to summon a new Parliament in November. But James was as reckless in his policy of conciliation as he had once been in that of compulsion, and the bewildering suddenness of the changes inspired universal distrust. His concessions were openly attributed to motives of fear and necessity, created by the action of a foreign Prince. And, in truth, at this very moment a proclamation of the Prince of Orange lay in the portfolio of Fagel, demanding the very reforms that James was hurriedly conceding.

In 1688, as in 1588 and 1798, the course of English history was profoundly affected by the chances of wind and weather. William had to wait long, chafing at a delay which seemed infinitely hazardous. But at last on November 1, the "Protestant breeze" bore gaily out to sea the whole vast flotilla of 600 ships, with 15,000 soldiers aboard. Like Henry of Bolingbroke and Edward of York, William had at first

thought of landing in Yorkshire. But the unkindly wind forced him to run for the west coast, though it made up for this by binding King James' fleet in the Thames. As William's fleet passed the straits of Dover, the assembled crowds on either coast could hear the clash of cymbals and roll of drums, celebrating his birthday. The breeze bore the fleet strongly past Plymouth and then suddenly dropped, allowing it to get back to the harbour of Torbay. The services of the breeze were not yet over, for it revived on the night of the 6th, and dispersed the fleet of King James, which had sailed up in the hope of disturbing the landing. The disembarkation began on the 5th, and was speedily effected. On the 18th William's cavalry reached Exeter, and on the 19th the inhabitants were cheering the English regiments of Mackay and Talmash, gaping at the Dutch guards and the Swedish horse, and gazing on the stately form of Schomberg and the impassive face of William. The numerical superiority of the foreign troops to the English regiments in William's army illustrated the proportion between the international and the insular significance of the great enterprise.

On the banner of William were inscribed the words *Pro Religione protestante—Pro libero Parlamento*, and beneath them his own proud motto, *Je maintiendrai*. His proclamation, published in England on November 5, expanded these sentiments. It declared that there was no attempt at conquest, and that the Prince had only come at the invitation of Lords Temporal and Spiritual. It denounced the dispensing power, the expulsion of the Judges, the establishment of the Court of High Commission, the attack on the corporations, and the raising of an army of Irish Papists. It concluded by hinting, in accordance with the widespread popular rumour, that the Prince of Wales was a supposititious child, and that Parliament must decide on his legitimacy. The proclamation was speedily followed by a supplementary manifesto denouncing "the pretended redressments and concessions" of James as illusory, and declaring that only a settlement by a free Parliament could be final or satisfactory. It is not easy to see how far this proclamation represents William's real views; but its purpose was to excite popular feeling rather than to propound a definite settlement. In particular it contained no hint of William's intention of bringing England into the alliance against France. On the still more urgent question of his own designs upon the Crown, the proclamation is equally silent.

On November 16 tidings of the landing at Torbay arrived, and James at once directed the royal army to concentrate at Salisbury. On the 17th James decided to join his army, of which Lord Churchill was commander-in-chief. When James set out, half-a-dozen noblemen had already joined William; Danby had raised the north and captured York; Devonshire was in arms at Derby, Delamere in Cheshire. The serious moral effect of these defections was such as to leave no resource to James but an immediate battle. But, on the morning of the 23rd, he had already

decided to retreat, "as," wrote Barillon to Louis, "he had intended from the first." On the night of the 24th, Churchill and the Duke of Grafton fled to William. On the 25th James, as he left Andover, learnt of the defection of Ormond and Prince George of Denmark. On nearing London the unhappy father heard of the flight of his daughter the Princess Anne. He found his capital in a ferment, and his hopes at their lowest ebb. So disastrous had been these last few days to James that the preseiënt Hoffmann was already able to foretell the result of the struggle. On December 9 he wrote to the Emperor that the English affair would be terminated in two or three months, and that all the forces now in arms would soon march conjointly against France.

When departing for Salisbury, James had refused a petition for a new Parliament, on the ground that the invasion made it impossible. But on November 27 he summoned a presentable substitute in the shape of a great Council of Peers, which thirty or forty attended. At the meeting Clarendon bitterly reproached the King, while Halifax spoke with more delicacy and respect. Their speeches outlined clearly the difference between the two parties represented by them. The High Churchmen were incensed with James because of his attack on the Establishment; the Moderates were less hostile because less fanatical. The upshot was a resolution to send Nottingham, Halifax, and Godolphin as Commissioners to treat with the Prince of Orange. On December 2 they started on their mission, which they appear to have conducted in good faith. In reality they had been completely deceived by the King, who merely wished to gain time for preparing his flight to France. On December 9, James despatched his wife and the Prince of Wales to France by way of Portsmouth, promising to follow them in twenty-four hours. During the night of the 10th-11th, he cancelled the recently prepared writs of the new Parliament, and also wrote a letter to Feversham, who interpreted it as an order to disband the royal army under his command. At three in the morning, taking with him the Great Seal, which was afterwards fished up from the Thames, James secretly fled from Whitehall to Sheerness. On the afternoon of the same day the Commissioners returned to London, to find the city in terror and the King gone.

The flight of James has always been regarded as the most fatal of all his mistakes. His avowed intention was to dissolve the Government of the State and to produce confusion by his flight, so as to make it clear to the people that the return of the King was the sole security of law and order. But he had taken measures before his departure which were actually instrumental in preventing this result. He had summoned the Peers to assist the Privy Council on the 11th; and it was natural, when they met and heard of his flight, that they should assume provisional authority. The assembly chose Halifax as its president, and drafted a resolution to cooperate with the Prince of Orange in procuring a free Parliament. On the 13th, they received a letter from James with the

bewildering news that he had fallen into the hands of the mob at Faversham, in Kent. Assistance was promptly sent, and on the 16th, the Earl of Feversham, amid shouting crowds, escorted the King back to the palace he had deserted. On the same day the Privy Council Registers show that James held a last Privy Council, attended by eight councillors, at which some orders were issued to the Lords Lieutenant and the Secretary of the Admiralty. But neither the Lords Lieutenant nor Samuel Pepys seem to have paid any attention to the last commands which King James ever issued in England.

The duplicity with which James had deceived not only William but his own Commissioners, his evident desire to produce disorder, his craven flight—all these things provoked general indignation. But his flight brought something more than wrath and humiliation upon James—it revealed his innermost secret. It was now fatally clear that France was the goal on which he had determined for his flight, and that he would trust to French arms for his restoration. France was the Power which had persecuted the Protestants and humiliated England; William, who had always defended the one, was now ready to befriend the other. The Prince of Orange saw his advantage and made prompt use of it. Until the flight of James, it seems certain that he had hoped for no more than a regency. Now—from the moment of the flight—he seems to have conceived the plan of directly assuming the Crown. His obvious policy was to convince England that James was the ally of France, that hereditary enemy of her race and her religion. Hence the second flight of James was, with consummate skill, facilitated by William. At ten on the night of December 17 the Dutch guards invested Whitehall, and carried off King James to Rochester early the next morning. Once there, James found his guards relaxed, and avenues of escape open. The man whom Turenne had declared to be inaccessible to fear was now a prey to almost childish terrors. He declared that there was but one step from the prison to the grave, and the memory of the fate of Richard II and of his own father hovered before his eyes. He therefore eagerly seized his opportunity and, on December 23, 1688, quitted the soil of England for ever. By this second flight, which William had deliberately encouraged, James committed political suicide. When Hoffmann first heard of the intended flight of the Queen and the Prince of Wales, he expressed his opinion to the Emperor that, if they went to France, the son would lose his crown. This far-sighted prediction applied even more strongly to the case of James himself. By remaining in England, James might have retained great influence and caused great difficulties, as his father had contrived to do while discredited and a prisoner. But once in France, however uncontrolled, he seemed the sworn friend, almost the henchman, of England's traditional foe. When William heard the news of the King's flight, he bade the French ambassador quit England within twenty-four hours. The action marked the complete immediate

harmony between the wishes of the English people and the policy of the Dutch Stadholder. The protector of the public liberties and the Protestant religion of England had, with the applause of the nation, enlisted its resources in the service of that "Great Design" which he so inflexibly pursued, and of that "Grand Alliance" of which he was the recognised head. The English people did not as yet realise that "the Great Deliverer" had, in Halifax' luminous sentence, merely "taken England on his way to France."

With the opening of the year 1689 our interest shifts from the affairs of France and the Grand Alliance to the internal problems of England. All parties were agreed that James, as an actually ruling sovereign, was now an impossibility; but all parties differed as to the new settlement. The main lines of division were already shaped in December; but they were blurred and confused by the flight of James. The extreme High Church Tories, headed by Clarendon, advocated a regency, with James as the nominal sovereign; Danby and a small body of Tories argued that James had abdicated by flight, that proofs of his son's legitimacy were unobtainable, and that judgment therefore going by default, the next legal successor was Mary. The Whigs, under Somers and Maynard, went further and proposed the simple and logical plan of declaring the throne vacant and filling it by election. Halifax headed a fourth party of "Trimmers" or Moderates, who advocated giving the Crown to William and Mary. He objected to the plans both of Somers and Clarendon, wishing the settlement to rest, not upon logical perfection or historic precedent, but simply upon grounds of practical necessity.

On the news of James' second flight William had, at the request of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, the members of Charles II's Parliaments and the Common Council of London, assumed the administration. Following their instructions, he issued a circular to constituent bodies, requesting them to elect representatives for a Convention. William made no attempt to interfere with the elections. The secret of his calm is to be found in a momentous interview with Halifax about this time, which Halifax has recorded with his own hand. It shows clearly that William was resolved to retire if James returned to England, and to refuse the Regency if it was offered him. Regarding his succession to full power as practically assured, he awaited the progress of events with imperturbable calm. Perhaps no member of the Convention Parliament, which assembled on January 22, as yet thought that events would end in the way which William already foresaw. The Commons speedily (January 28) resolved that James, "having endeavoured to subvert the constitution by breaking the original contract between King and people, and by the advice of Jesuits and other persons, had violated the fundamental laws and withdrawn himself out of the kingdom, and that the throne had thereby become vacant." The logic of the

resolution was as bad as its grammar; for it was obvious that, though desertion of the kingdom might produce vacancy of the throne, by all precedents misgovernment and acceptance of bad advice could not. Yet all three reasons were alleged as causes of vacancy and abdication. The lack of logic marked in fact the compromise of principles and the blending of views between the moderate Tories and the Whigs.

On January 29 this resolution was sent up to the Lords, together with another, to the effect that a Popish King had been found by experience inconsistent with a Protestant Government. This second resolution excited no dispute, and even no comment; but the first gave rise to the most envenomed controversy. The parties of Clarendon, Danby and Halifax were in conflict in the Lords, with startling results. The Lords threw out the "vacancy" clause; the Commons declined to accept this amendment; and the two Houses were thus at a complete deadlock. A conference took place on February 6, in which the views of all parties were stated with remarkable clearness. Clarendon and Pembroke appealed to the seven disputed successions in English history to prove that the vacancy of the throne had never been assumed, and that the hereditary principle had always theoretically prevailed. But there was a flaw in this argument which the Whigs were not slow to see. Maynard pointed out that if, as even Tories admitted, James had lost the exercise of his power, someone had a right now to that power. Both Houses had agreed to the resolution that no Papist could in future be King, and therefore Clarendon's faction, while urging that James was the nominal King, could not propose the Prince of Wales as either the actual or eventual ruler. Why not, then, admit the Whig doctrine of the original contract between King and people, with its proviso that the throne became elective when the contract was broken? The Whigs had the worst of the precedents and the best of the arguments; but their doctrine of an elective Crown still appeared too revolutionary for the Lords. At this point Halifax intervened, basing his appeal neither on history nor on logic, but on the grounds of practical common-sense. He argued that the Crown would only be made elective in the way of exception and *pro hac vice*, and would then revert to the original hereditary channel. Frankly admitting the need of some break with tradition, he advanced the overwhelming plea of necessity, the defence of revolutionaries as well as of tyrants. When the Lords again debated the question alone, Halifax, to the great wrath of Clarendon, "drove furiously," and carried the acceptance of the Commons' resolution intact. It only remained now to settle the succession. William had declared publicly, at the beginning of the month, that he would return to Holland unless he were chosen King regnant conjointly with his wife, with the whole administration vested in himself. On February 6 the Lords resolved, without a division, that the Prince and Princess of Orange should be declared King and Queen of England. William

accepted the vote on behalf of Mary and himself, and within a week the pair were proclaimed King and Queen from the steps of Whitehall.

With the settlement of the Crown immediate practical difficulties vanished, anarchy was averted, and a vigorous external policy was continuously pursued. But the great constitutional problems, the sphere of direct royal power, the relations of King to Parliament, to the Courts of Justice, and to the army—all these were still unsettled. A committee, appointed to secure the laws and liberties of the kingdom, with the all-accomplished Somers in the chair, had already drawn up a Declaration of Right (February 12). This resolution was afterwards expanded, renamed the Bill of Rights, and passed as a statute by the new Parliament (October). The Declaration and the Bill were intended as a final summing-up and settlement of the long struggle between King and Parliament, and as a manifesto and defence of the Revolution. The Bill of Rights therefore opens with a lengthy controversial statement as to the misdeeds of James and the virtues of William, before "asserting the ancient rights and liberties of England." It would be difficult to say that new rights were claimed or old laws infringed. But new precedents were certainly created; for on almost all disputed points the verdict went decisively in favour of Parliament and against the King. The reason why the greatness of the change was not very obvious at the Revolution is to be sought in what took place at the Restoration. By the settlement of 1660 the powers of Parliament were greatly enlarged, and the substantial increase of its powers became apparent long before 1688. The Revolution of 1688, in increasing the power of Parliament, only moved along a path already marked out for it by the political developments of the generation immediately preceding. In this fact lies the chief explanation of the anomaly, on which Macaulay so frequently insisted, that the great changes of the Bill of Rights were accomplished without any positive change in law.

The Bill of Rights denounced as illegal the assumption of a royal power of suspending or dispensing with laws, or of erecting a Court of High Commission or other special Courts. Levying money by prerogative, or keeping a standing army in peace-time without consent of Parliament, are likewise declared to be against the law. Parliament is to be free in its elections, in its subjects of debate, and "ought to be held frequently." The rights of the people as a whole are secured in the right to petition the King. The rights of the sovereign are restricted by the provision that Papists, and those marrying Papists, are *de facto* excluded from the throne. On these terms, and with these limitations, William and Mary are acknowledged as joint sovereigns. There were two serious omissions, subsequently removed by the Act of Settlement. No real attempt was made to exempt the judges from undue royal influence, and a clause including Sophia of Brunswick-Lüneburg in the succession was struck out by the Lords.

Perhaps the most striking insertion in the Bill of Rights was the provision declaring standing armies illegal, and placing the power of the sword beneath the control of Parliament. Yet an express law declared the whole power of the militia, and immemorial custom admitted the general control of the army, to lie solely with the King. Hence this provision was an innovation, and a very great one, based on the general repugnance to standing armies, initiated during the Protectorate and expressed in the Parliaments of the Restoration, but nowhere decisively asserted by statute or custom. William, who said he came to England to restore the invaded liberties of the people, not to circumscribe the acknowledged rights of the Crown, was to find the novelty of this particular provision most displeasing. Incidentally, the parliamentary control over the army tended towards a similar control over foreign policy. Eventually, it was the most important influence in establishing and maintaining one of the fundamental maxims of our modern constitution, that the military power in the State is and must be subordinate to the civil. It is doubtless in the main true that the Bill of Rights makes few positive legal changes, but the provision as to the power of the sword is one of them. Here at least the Bill of Rights breaks with the black-letter of precedent, and asserts new principles of fundamental and far-reaching importance.

To a well-informed contemporary observer the smallness of the actual change effected by the Revolution would hardly have been apparent. He must have noted the triumph of the policy of the Exclusionists in the provision excluding Papists from the Crown. During 1680-1, that party had been utterly broken; its leaders had died upon the scaffold or fled the country in disgrace. Within eight years from that date its main principle had first been championed by Halifax, the greatest of its opponents, and finally accepted by the country as a whole. The cause of this remarkable change is to be found, partly in the accidental circumstances of the Revolution, partly in the slow growth of a political theory which owed far less to Coke and the precedents of the past than to Harrington, Locke, and the philosophy of the future. The main ideas on which the Revolution was based were expressed by Harrington and Locke. Of these, the one may be said to have taught the lessons of forty years of revolution, the other to have provided the theory by which the change of government was to be defended.

During the years 1640-60 every political theory had received some application and every one in turn had been found wanting. The conviction had gradually been enforced that the old monarchy, with all its practical disadvantages, was superior to the new republic with all its theoretical perfections. Monarchy, though somewhat limited by the increased influence of Parliament, emerged from the welter of anarchy powerful and venerated. Regicide became, in the eyes of the nation, the most odious of crimes, and this belief was based on reasonable as well as upon sentimental grounds. For Harrington, while advocating

fantastic schemes for a republic, had contrived to demonstrate the practical advantages of a monarchy. This was the unforeseen result of his assertion that the sole test and proof of good government was the connexion of property with power. To confine the franchise to property-holders would manifestly produce a government based on experience and stability. So argued Harrington, and his readers drew an unexpected inference. The characteristics of the old monarchy had been inequality of possessions, gradation of classes, the supremacy of rich over poor, of land over capital. What were all these but the reign of property, which produced securities for stable government? It was this tendency in political thought, that largely accounts for the sudden and total disappearance of republicanism, which is so remarkable a phenomenon in 1688. William excluded all regicides from his amnesty; and in the vast flood of pamphlets called forth by the Revolution it is hard to find one of note or importance which may be called republican.

The union of property and power produced a just balance in the State, and for this discovery, though it was also to be found in the later pamphlets of Milton, Harrington was regarded as the Columbus of political science. His ideas permeate the whole Revolution settlement, in which there is but little appeal to absolute or general principle, and hardly a whisper of parliamentary reform. Private property in land is the basis of all authority; power is rigidly confined to an aristocracy of freeholders, and the reign of property is acknowledged and complete. "For the divine right of Kings," writes Lord Acton, "it [the Revolution] established the divine right of freeholders; and their domination extended for seventy years under the authority of John Locke, the philosopher of government by the gentry."

It is true to say that there existed few or no republicans in 1688, if that term designates men who desired to abolish the hereditary monarchy. But, if it means men who asserted the doctrine of popular sovereignty, then there were many such, of whom the most eminent was Locke. His "Two Treatises on Government" were not published till the summer of 1689. But he had been the intimate of Shaftesbury, and, as the friend of Somers and other leading Whigs, had first-hand knowledge of the ideas of the Revolution settlement. Indeed the inconsistencies and contradictions, the imperfections, and the over-emphasis, of his work betray too clearly that his theory was intended to apply to practical political needs. It was in fact chiefly in practical applications that the originality of Locke consisted. There was nothing very new in his doctrines of contract between king and people, of limitations on royal power and extensions of popular sovereignty, and of the justification for the deposition of kings. But ideas which had floated in the brains of solitary thinkers, or had amused the intellects of scholastics, were used by Locke for the practical purpose of glorifying and defending an actual and not an imagined Revolution.

It must always be regretted that Locke did not directly measure blades with Hobbes. In the *Leviathan* the latter had written the greatest work on political thought as yet produced in England, and the ablest defence of absolute monarchy ever published in Europe. But his cynical attack on the clergy had alienated the Establishment, and extreme loyalty found its philosopher not in Hobbes but in Filmer. The *Patriarcha* of Sir Robert Filmer—a popular exposition of the doctrines of Divine Right and passive obedience—had been written in 1642 and published in 1680. It was adopted in all its tenets by the University of Oxford, and became generally popular with the royalist party. Hence Locke set out with the primary intention of destroying “Sir Robert” and “his wonderful system,” rather than of confuting Hobbes. Locke easily disposed of Filmer and “the hereditary jurisdiction of Adam,” and it was only in constructing his own theory in the second part of his treatise that he came indirectly into contact with Hobbes.

The end of all government is the good of the people, and the good of the people Locke defines as “the preservation of (private) property,” to “secure which men enter into society.” On that ground and with that object people meet together and make an Original Contract to submit to a common recognised authority. This contract is broken, and the society dissolved, when private property and personal liberty are endangered. With an absolute Prince the people cannot be assured of this preservation and these rights, for the absolute sovereign, being above law, is not bound to respect it. Hence the people as a whole are the best judge whether the general good is being endangered and whether the social contract is near to breaking. To avoid a reckless sanction of revolution, Locke carefully defines the cases in which resistance is justifiable, in the instance of a hypothetical State, whose constitution is transparently based on the English. These cases are: first, when a single person sets his own arbitrary will in place of the laws which are the will of society; next, interference with the electors or ways of election; then, the delivery of the people into the subjection of a foreign Power; lastly, neglect or abandonment of the government by the supreme executive power. In all these cases government is dissolved, the contract broken, and resistance justifiable. It will not escape notice that all these cases included actions of which James might plausibly be accused. Locke argued for a particular purpose, with practical qualifications; and he fairly pays the penalty of one who binds up a political pamphlet in the cover of a philosophic treatise. He can claim as a recompense that he became the oracle of the Whigs, that he inspired the political ideas of his country for nearly a hundred years, and was for at least fifty the most influential political philosopher in Europe.

The English Revolution, unlike the French, never carried its originating principles to the extreme of logical severity. It showed little idealism and much common-sense, often allowing practical considerations

to outweigh consistency or principle. Moreover, its international and diplomatic character rendered personal factors of great importance, and the form which it finally assumed was profoundly affected by the personalities of both William and James. In his exile James was accustomed to ascribe every disaster to his advisers. But it is certain that Mary of Modena, Father Petre, and the extreme Catholics opposed some of his most impolitic measures, and that Penn and Sunderland opposed others. And, even supposing his ordinary counsellors to have been unwise, James had frequently disbelieved the information and disregarded the advice of Louis. His actions and opinions during and after 1688 exhibit a complete misunderstanding of the limits of the possible, and show that he lived in a world of illusion. If to these considerations is added that of his well-known haughtiness and love of power, it is reasonable to conclude that his worst counsellor was himself, and his neglect of other advice the main cause of his fall. On the other hand, the respect and deference shown by William to his English advisers was one of the main reasons of his success. The firm stand of the seven Bishops, the pen of Burnet, the voice of Clarendon, and the policy of Compton, brought the Established Church for the moment on to the side of William. The calm diplomacy of Shrewsbury and the resolute purpose of Danby brought over the moderate Whigs and Tories; the well-timed desertion of Churchill secured the army. The eloquence of Somers inspired the Commons to settle the Succession, and the arguments of Halifax induced the Lords to agree in it. The influence of Halifax, or of his "trimming" policy, is apparent everywhere—in the moderation, the cautious temporising, the concessions to expediency, and the compromises of principle, in which the Revolution abounded.

The last cause of the moderation and tranquillity of the Revolution is to be found in the personality of William, and in the elements and forces which he controlled. His European outlook enabled him to entertain views of a purely practical kind and to judge the struggle with a calmness which no Englishman could equal. He decided to interfere only when assured of powerful support, and when his own interests would have been endangered by delay. The impolicy of James and the caution of William combined to produce a result very rare in history—namely, a foreign intervention which successfully accomplished a great internal revolution with the minimum of bloodshed and change. Other explanations are to be found in more impersonal forces, especially in the course of events which bewildered contemporaries by their sudden and kaleidoscopic changes. The vigorous minority, which supported William, alone had a clear-cut plan and purpose. Hence it came about that even ardent royalists were surprised into revolt against their King. This is admirably illustrated by two well-known incidents recorded in Clarendon's *Diary*. On November 15, 1688, Clarendon hears of the flight of his son, Lord Cornbury, to William, and writes: "O God, that

my son should be a rebel! The Lord in his mercy look upon me, and enable me to support myself under this most grievous calamity!" On November 30 he records calmly and without comment that he has himself decided to fly to the Prince of Orange. His change of front is bewilderingly sudden, but there is no reason to doubt his sincerity. In revolutions events move and men think with unwonted rapidity.

The pressure of events had wrought strange conversions among the Tory landed gentry, but the impression made upon the people as a whole had similar and even more striking effects. The indifference of the people to a revolution is usually the cause of its failure; here it was the reason of its success. "The People," said Halifax, "can seldom agree to move together against a Government, but they can sit still to see it undone." Indeed, though at first cold towards William, the people refused to stir a finger for James, and their indifference most powerfully influenced the event. It rendered the Revolution, although aristocratic in appearance and execution, popular in principle and in its eventual result. Hence the religious motive, though not at first sight the most apparent, is still the deepest cause of the Revolution. In the Exclusion period the people had shown that, if the choice had to be made, they preferred a Protestant sovereign with very large powers to a Catholic with very limited ones. Of 1688 Guizot boldly asserts that "in no country and at no time has the faith of the *masses* exercised more control over the faith of their government." There can be little doubt that this view is correct, though the revolution was initiated by the great nobles, effected by the aid of a foreign ruler and a composite army, and consummated by a constitutional settlement made by country gentlemen in the House of Commons. Never, perhaps, have the goodwill of a people, the rebellion of an aristocracy, and the armed interference of a foreigner, had equally striking and beneficent results.

The character of William, though excellently suited to effect, was little calculated to sustain, a successful revolution. Bred a soldier from his boyhood, he had the excellences and defects of his training. He was swift to decide and to execute, calm in judgment, resolute in purpose, serene and immovable in the face of tumult or danger. But he was ready on occasion to sanction acts of ruthless cruelty, and he often showed considerable lack of scruple and some indifference to high principle. His cold, keen nature made him deficient in sympathy, and unable to consider or even to perceive, other views than his own. Able to overawe and to command, he was never able to awaken enthusiasm or inspire affection. Thus it came about that, with many of the qualities of a great general, he could never win victories over Condé or Luxembourg; and, though possessing almost all the essentials of a great diplomatist, he could never bind together a divided alliance with the graceful art of a Marlborough. Though he achieved his real aims, he never struck the popular imagination as forcibly as many a lesser man. He lives in history

not as the idol of cheering mobs but as the champion of threatened liberties, not as the darling of one country but as the preserver of many.

William was not qualified by previous training or character to understand the proud and jealous nation over which it was now his lot to rule. He had spent twenty years of his life in a vain attempt to understand the vagaries of the Council of Amsterdam, and he was too old and too impatient to humour or cajole a new representative assembly. His letters to Heinsius, Grand Pensionary of Holland, are full of complaints about the ruinous delays and the trivialities of Parliament, its strange prejudices and fatal blindness. The impossibility of forecasting the attitude of the Commons from day to day, the cabals which produce such astounding changes and turn people from black to white, the stupidity of individuals, the hateful spirit of party, the intrigues which will finish by destroying the country and himself—all these he confides to his sympathetic correspondent. "*Les gens*," wrote he, January 21, 1698, "*ne s'occupent ici que d'une prétendue liberté, tandis qu'ils sont forcés de reconnaître qu'ils n'ont jamais été si libres, et qu'ils n'ont même rien à redouter de mon part.*" His people were unable to discern his true character; and he bitterly, but not altogether justly, resented their failure to understand him. He had no ability for finance, and while possessing the energy, he had not the gifts of a great administrator. Though devoid of ostentation, his manners were harsh and repellent, and showed none of the graces to which England was accustomed in her kings. His wretched health seriously affected his temper and disposition. Calm and steady at great crises, he was often peevish and irascible on lesser occasions, chafing at small delays and slight irritations. His fondness for Dutchmen and favourites, though to some extent justified by the untrustworthiness of the most prominent Englishmen, cannot be excused in the cases of Keppel and Lady Orkney. These trivial excuses for the slight esteem in which the English held him, were strengthened by one far deeper and more fundamental, which caused his unpopularity to increase with the advance of years and with the unfolding of his policy.

William's political ideas were large and grand—those of an international statesman genuinely labouring for the good of Europe as a whole. To his "great design" he really subordinated every particular interest, so far as in him lay. Thus, in 1689 he forced his own countrymen into a disadvantageous and humiliating convention with England, and treated their remonstrances with indifference. By looking for the same magnanimity in his new subjects, he showed how fundamentally he misread their temperament. He had declared to the English that he came to restore their Parliament and religion; it became increasingly evident that he had come to engage them in continental war. He did not remember that England had been comparatively free from continental warfare since the death of Elizabeth, and had retained a horror

of standing armies since the death of Cromwell. Nor could he see that, after 1692, her interests were far less engaged in the struggle than those of the land Powers. When, on April 6, 1701, he wrote to Heinsius that he had to do with people "whom it is necessary to lead by indirect ways for their own good," he put into a single sentence both his own defence and the justification of his English subjects.

The defects in William's character, which obscured its real elements of greatness, were in no small measure disguised by the influence of his wife. Mary was the most popular of women, and her gentle charm did much to counteract the unfavourable personal impression produced by her husband. Though William sometimes added harshness to the crime of infidelity, her devotion towards him never ceased. Her letters breathe a spirit of exquisite sincerity and gentleness, and evince a resigned and touching belief in Providence. Indeed, the whole-hearted religious fervour of Mary did much to incline the Church of England to acquiesce in the new order. The Calvinistic William was not unnaturally or unjustly suspected of lukewarmness towards the Establishment. But the influence of Mary, her unaffected piety and zeal for the Church, and the care with which she watched over the appointment of Bishops, disarmed the resentment of the Tories. Moreover, as Regent in 1690 and 1692 she showed some capacity in civil affairs, and a courage little short of heroic after the appalling news of Beachy Head (1690). William gradually became aware of her devotion and her services—and softened towards her in later years. When her death occurred (December 28, 1694), he was so painfully affected that it seemed he would follow her to the grave. The nation mourned with him, and Prior, in touching verse, bade him forget that "grief which hinders Europe being freed." But the English could not continue to regard the foreign ruler in the same light as when he had been the husband of the warm-hearted English Queen. After her death his popularity, which had never been great, declined so rapidly, as not only to retard the continuance of the war, but even to endanger the throne.

The difficulties which beset William at the beginning of his reign were increased by the natural reaction after the Revolution. A resolute minority had effected a settlement substantially upon its own lines; it was certain that the more traditional and conservative forces, which had yielded to the shock of circumstance, would soon reassert their strength. William formed his first administration with the express view of lessening the effect of this recoil, by balancing between the different parties. He seems in this to have followed the counsel of the famous "Trimmer" Halifax, who himself became Privy Seal and who advised the appointment of the Whig Shrewsbury and the Tory Nottingham as Secretaries of State. In his contemporary account Burnet says, that the inclusion of Nottingham in the Ministry "first preserved the Church, and then the Crown." As Nottingham, though only a moderate Tory, was a

notorious champion of the Church, as religious questions were now specially in the foreground, all devout Churchmen hailed his appointment and that of Caermarthen (Danby), who was made President of the Council, as an earnest of the good intentions of the Calvinistic King.

The religious measures of William's reign are dealt with elsewhere. The Toleration Act passed in 1689 secured the loyalty of the Dissenters to the existing *régime*, though various signs hinted at future trouble between Dissent and Establishment. At the same time the imposition of a new oath of allegiance and supremacy produced the deposition of the Archbishop of Canterbury and six other bishops, and caused the famous schism of the Non-jurors within the Established Church itself. Meanwhile, the financial settlement was producing important results by making the King more dependent on Parliament. The Commons granted the King an annual revenue of about £800,000. But the duties and customs, amounting to about four hundred thousand, which had been settled for life on James, were granted to William and Mary for only four years. The principle thus suggested, of creating conditions which enforced on the King the frequent summoning of Parliament, was further developed by the Mutiny Act. This Act, suggested by the mutiny of a regiment in William's service, passed the conventional condemnation on standing armies unsanctioned by Parliament. It expressly declared illegal the establishment of Courts-martial and military discipline, unless annually reenacted by statute, though such powers had till now always been exercised by royal prerogative. So long as William possessed a standing army, which it was obvious he would always do his utmost to retain, an annual summoning of Parliament would be essential.

In October, 1689, the new Parliament met, legalised the acts of the Convention Parliament, and passed the Bill of Rights. The Whigs, flushed with success and intoxicated by their recent triumph, resolved to make their opponents atone for the sins of the past. Everything was thus thrown into confusion, for it was possible, by reviving the memories of the Rye House Plot, to attack members of the existing Ministry. The Lords appointed a committee, popularly known as the "Murder Committee," to enquire who were answerable for the deaths of Russell, Sidney, and other Exclusionists. Though John Howe and John Hampden were implacable in the Commons, Shrewsbury managed to repress the most violent outbursts in the Lords, and the proceedings of the murder committee speedily collapsed. But the Whigs had another expedient for persecuting their opponents. They inserted clauses in the Corporation Bill, to render any man, who had been a party to the surrender of his town charter under Charles II, incapable of holding office in his borough for seven years. This clause, which would have resulted in a wholesale disfranchisement of Tories, was brought forward in the absence of many members. But the proposal was too violent; some of the moderate Whigs hesitated; the Tories hurried back to town.

The obnoxious clause was rejected (January, 1690), and the Tories, emboldened by their success, then tried to pass an Indemnity Bill, which provided for a general amnesty for the past. But here they met with a reverse; the moderate Whigs came back to their allegiance, and threw the Bill out in committee. The reunited Whigs were proceeding to engraft upon the original Bill a Bill of pains and penalties against various Tory offenders, when their progress was suddenly interrupted. The King, who had viewed these disputes with the utmost impatience, dissolved Parliament (February, 1690).

William was so disgusted with the violence of the previous Parliament that, in the general election which followed, he for the first time resorted to an unsparing use of political corruption. The result was the triumph of the moderate Tory party. Even before the results of the election were known, William had decided to effect changes in the Ministry. The dismissal of Halifax forms a real landmark in ministerial history (February, 1690). Henceforth the King was without his most conciliatory and unprejudiced advisers, and the policy of "trimming" and of compromise was gradually abandoned. The wits said that the King had exchanged the "White Marquis" (Halifax) for the "Black" (Caermarthen), thus implying that, for the moment, Tory influence predominated. On the new Parliament William pressed a measure, which was largely due to his own personal initiative, and which has justly been claimed as one of his chief titles to renown—namely, an Act of Grace (May 20, 1690), exempting only regicides and thirty others from pardon. After very little discussion the House, as if ashamed of its violence in the previous session, accepted the Bill. Past errors and criminals were thus buried in oblivion, and a fruitful cause of bitterness removed. Above all it at last became possible for real energy to be infused into the conduct of the war, and for William to take the field with a united nation at his back.

The great campaigns of the period in which the Grand Alliance waged war in Italy and Flanders, in Ireland and Catalonia, on the Danube and the Rhine, in the Channel and in the Mediterranean, can only be noticed here in their more insular aspects. To the continental Powers the most imminent danger was from the land forces of Louis. Unlike them England had most to fear from the predominance of the sea-power of France. Throughout 1689 William seems not to have realised the immense peril threatening from Ireland, so long as the question of naval supremacy hung in the balance. The English in Ireland were confronted by a revolt of three-fourths of the population, and by the more formidable presence of veteran regiments from France. They might well be overmatched, if the French fleet could sweep the seas and blockade the coast of Ireland. Towards the end of 1689 William realised the danger; and henceforth he showed remarkable energy. In June, 1690, he sailed from England to assume command in Ireland,

leaving Mary as Regent with a council of nine to assist her. In his absence the Grand Alliance fared ill alike on sea and land. On July 1 Luxembourg won a great victory over the Allied Army at Fleurus; on the previous day Admiral Tourville severely defeated the Allied Fleet off Beachy Head. Disgrace accompanied disaster, for Admiral Herbert (Lord Torrington), by allowing the main brunt of the fighting to be borne by the Dutch, somewhat unjustly incurred the censure most fatal to a sailor. The strategic consequences were not as serious as is sometimes supposed, nor was the Cross of St George almost banished from the seas. None the less, Tourville triumphantly swept the Channel, threatened the southern coasts, and burnt Teignmouth. In this extremity the spirit of the nation rose; subscriptions poured in; crowds of volunteers rushed to arms; and London took the lead in patriotic ardour. But the hour of suspense was not long, for, on July 4, a courier rode through the City with the news that William had won a great victory in Ireland.

William had come to Ireland only just in time. On the very day that the sea-power of England was temporarily destroyed he was able triumphantly to restore its military renown. By his victory of the Boyne (July 1) William secured the fall of Drogheda and Dublin and the flight of James from Ireland. But as yet William's power stopped at low-water-mark. Without a fleet he found it impossible to reduce Limerick, though Marlborough was able to capture Cork and Kinsale. In 1691, Russell replaced Torrington in command of the navy, and held in check the sea-power of France. The inevitable result was the fall of the hopes of Louis and James in Ireland. In July the last Irish army was routed at Aughrim, and the appearance of an English squadron in the Shannon decided the fate of Limerick, the last Irish fortress of note which held out (October 3, 1691). On May 19 (O.S.), 1692, the French fleet was utterly defeated by Admiral Russell off Cape La Hogue, under the very eyes of King James, who watched in anguish from the shore. Henceforward the command of the sea was triumphantly restored to England. After this the French could carry on a destructive privateering warfare, and the English were also repelled with great loss from attacks on the French coast at St Malo (August, 1692) and at Brest (1694). But such reverses were irritant rather than dangerous; and, the fighting fleet of France having been once swept from the seas, neither England nor Ireland could be in vital danger of invasion. Not even William's defeat at Steinkirke (August 3, 1692, O.S.) nor the fall of Namur (May) could dash the hopes of England.

Two attempts to restore James had thus failed, the first at the Boyne, the second off Cape La Hogue—a third remained to be planned. The energy and firmness which James had once displayed, alike in the shock of battle and amid civic strife, had deserted him at the end of 1688, and they never returned. In Ireland he showed a vacillation and weakness admitted by his own followers, and openly proclaimed by French

generals and statesmen. The inconsistent series of proclamations issued to his rebellious subjects (1689-93) awoke dismay in his supporters and scorn in his opponents. In 1693 (July 29) Luxembourg achieved his last triumph over William by worsting him in the bloody rout of Neerwinden (Landen). The hopes of James now stood high, for in this same year the French privateers destroyed an enormous Anglo-Dutch convoy from Smyrna. But in 1694, though an English expedition to Brest was disastrously repulsed, the English navy swept the seas, and William held his own in Flanders. In 1695 he took the offensive, and, finding the incompetent Villeroi at the head of the French army in the place of Luxembourg, was able to recapture Namur (October, 1695) in the most brilliant and successful campaign which he ever directed. During the last months of 1694 the English fleet had triumphantly wintered in the Bay of Cadiz, and had thus assured England's command over both Mediterranean and Atlantic. Louis thus found his fleet swept from the seas, and his armies seriously weakened on the land.

Few historic contrasts have more pathos than that which these years presented between the luxurious splendours and the thronging crowds of courtiers which surrounded the omnipotent sovereign at Versailles, and the unreal pageantry, the fast dwindling band of exiles, which clung to the phantom King at St Germain. Like most exiles, James vastly exaggerated the strength of the party in his favour in England. His delusions were fostered by assurances from Godolphin, Marlborough, and Russell, and by correspondence with Anne, Penn, Halifax, Dartmouth, and Shrewsbury. In spite of all his flatterers, Louis had a more real grasp of the English situation than that to which James and his followers attained. He now made it clear that he would not risk sending a French force until a rising offering fair chances of success should have broken out in England. This resolution on the part of Louis determined the form of the third and last serious attempt to reestablish James. In January, 1696, the Duke of Berwick, the natural son of James, came over to England in disguise, and, failing to organise an armed insurrection, hurried back to France to avoid being party to a plot. A plan to assassinate William was at this time being devised by George Porter and a few other Jacobites in England. The plot was not unknown to James, and the exiled monarch came to Calais to await the flash of a beacon fire from Dover cliffs, which was to be the announcement of William's death. On receiving the signal, James was to step on board a fleet of French transports, and convey an expeditionary force to England. That signal never came, for the "Assassination Plot" was detected (February 24, 1696). Porter turned King's evidence, with the result that his own life was spared by William, though Sir John Fenwick, who knew nothing of the real nature of the plot, was executed. While he was awaiting the signal James had written pious letters to de Rancé, the austere Cistercian Abbot of La Trappe, hinting that

"a visible interference of the good God for His greater glory" would soon be manifested in his favour. When this did not appear, his thoughts turned elsewhere; and henceforward he edified divines by his devotion to religion, as much as he enraged statesmen by his indifference to politics. After 1696, when James refused the French offer to support his election to the Crown of Poland, Louis ceased to regard him as an independent political factor, as, indeed, he ceased to consider himself. The influence of de Rancé had transformed him into a mystical recluse, whose garments were touched by pilgrims from afar, whose miracles were attested by bishops, whose holiness was admitted by the Pope.

The progress of the War, from the shame of Beachy Head and Steinkirke to the triumphs of La Hogue and Namur, had been viewed in England with mingled feelings. After 1692, and still more after 1694, the war seemed to be carried on for aggrandisement rather than defence, for gain not for existence. England's trade interests in the Indies or Mediterranean might indeed be secured or impaired by the progress of the war in Flanders. But many English did not measure the war either by the loss of convoys or ships to Whig merchants, or by gain in security to German Princes and Dutch burghers. The landed gentry, who formed the backbone of the Tory party, simply calculated whether the war in Flanders really gave adequate benefits to England in return for its enormous expense and frequent disasters. This exclusive consideration of insular interests, which made Parliament willing to grant large sums for the navy, but reluctant to increase the army, William could not understand. He speaks contemptuously of "the inconceivable blindness of people here," and ascribes it to the spirit of party; yet in this matter he was really thwarted on national, not upon partisan, grounds. But the causes of his irritation were perfectly natural. He could not but be conscious, though his gaze was fixed upon Europe rather than upon the Indies, that the War was exalting beyond measure the maritime and commercial supremacy of England. The Dutch were forced by treaty to supply a larger proportion of troops than of ships to the common cause. Hence their commerce and marine suffered. If William's conversations with Montanus are to be believed, he had realised long before 1688 that the inclusion of England in the Alliance must advance her shipping and commerce to the detriment of that of his own people. In any case, he had realised this during the war, and was therefore exasperated on finding that, when he had sacrificed so much for the common cause, England did so little to help him. He was giving her the commercial and naval empire of the globe, and she showed her gratitude by cutting down the numbers of the army and starving his military campaigns.

Milton had discovered that war moved by two main nerves, one of iron and the other of gold; and Louis had declared in the midst of his victories that the Power with the last gold piece would win. Hence it is

as much to the superiority of organisation and method in developing their economic resources, as to their superiority in naval power, that the English kingdom and the Dutch Republic owed their eventual triumph over France. That England should depend on her own food supplies in time of war, and upon a prosperous landed class in time of peace, had been accepted dogmas for some years before 1688. A series of severe prohibitory Acts, beginning in 1671, had penalised and checked the importation of foreign corn. The Bounty Act of 1689 gave large bounties on the export of corn to foreign countries, and thus increased the home output. The economic result was to produce immense immediate prosperity to English agriculture, though corn was encouraged to the detriment of turnip and grass cultivation, and to the retarding of a more scientific system of agriculture. As with the economic effects, so with the political, the result was to give prosperity to what was existent without providing for the future. The new Act favoured the landed gentry at the expense of the merchant, gave an undue preference to the landlord, who possessed capital, and discouraged the small yeoman who did not. The result was to increase and make permanent the power of the landed gentry and of real property, the confirmation of which was so distinct a mark of the Revolution settlement. The Bounty Act was the economic counterpart of the philosophy of Locke and Harrington. It was by the operation of this Act that the landowners were enabled to hold at bay for so long the rising forces of wealth and commerce. The earlier economic laws of the reign gave security to the landed class, just as the later gave security to the commercial; and these facts, though marking the transition of political power from Tory to Whig, show that the Revolution settlement was likewise national in character and aim.

The general commercial policy of England is perhaps the only department of public life in which the Revolution made no striking or even apparent innovation. Though immense developments of her commerce and shipping took place within the period, England's trade really increased by means of the sword or diplomacy, and not in the main through any specifically new commercial provisions. For the main lines of mercantilist policy were already laid in the Poor Laws, the Corn Laws, and the Navigation Laws. A broad system of national policy thus existed, which was amended in detail but not disturbed in principle. In 1696 a reorganisation of the committee of the Privy Council dealing with commerce and colonies was necessitated by the persistent criticisms of Parliament. The Board of Trade was constituted with a permanent staff as well as privy councillors, in order to prevent further encroachments of Parliament upon the executive. By these means some order was reintroduced into departments which had been carefully organised by James, and much neglected by William. The chief effect of the new Board, of which Locke was an active member, was the adoption of an exclusive mercantilist policy, which gradually ruined the nascent linen

and cloth industries of Ireland, in order to protect the drapers and clothiers of England.

The debts of the Protectorate and the extravagances of the Restoration monarchy had been immense; but the outbreak of the continental war speedily entailed expenditure on a scale unknown to Cromwell or to Charles. The extravagant Charles had maintained an army of less than nine thousand men; for the frugal and thrifty James an annual income of less than fifteen thousand pounds had usually sufficed. Englishmen recalled these days with regret when the Dutch deliverer showed them the cost of freedom by demanding an army of over eighty thousand men and an income of nearly six millions (1693). The first real measures to grapple with the problems of expenditure and revenue were taken in 1692, and the impulse came in the main from the Whig party and their famous financier Montagu. The method of raising subsidies which had prevailed in the first half of the century was now hopelessly obsolete. Under the Commonwealth and the Restoration a new plan had been tried. The sum to be raised was fixed, and then distributed according to assessments based on the reputed wealth of each county. In 1692 a newer and more exact valuation of landed estates was made, and it was decided to fix a rate on the values of the rentals which should vary as necessity demanded. The only serious drawback was that the new valuation was in many respects inaccurate, and fell with undue severity on the Eastern Counties. Still, the new tax was the most productive yet imposed, and when, as in 1693, the rate of 4s. in the pound was imposed, about two millions annually flowed into the Exchequer.

Nothing is more obvious to a modern observer than that there must occur crises in the history of every nation, when it can no longer settle all its obligations at the end of each year. Such a crisis had already occurred in the history of France and of Holland, both of which had large debts. It had, in fact, also occurred in England, when Charles II refused to repay to the goldsmiths the sum of £1,300,000 which he had borrowed from them (January, 1672). In 1692 the creditors had received no interest for ten years, and they seemed to have no prospect of repayment of capital. With this unhappy example before him, the average Englishman might well consider the contraction of a debt by Government, which extended beyond the end of the year, to be suggested by the discreditable shifts of a royal spendthrift or the mischievous innovations of a foreigner. All this was very different in Holland, where Sir William Temple had long ago pointed out the advantages of a national debt as a sound investment for private individuals. On every side and in every enterprise stock-jobbing drew on or deluded the individual investor. Watered stock and bogus companies, over-capitalisation and falsification of accounts—none of the expedients or disasters of modern speculation were wanting. The scale was indeed small, but the modern

financial world already existed in miniature. Montagu had resolved to divert to the national Exchequer some of that wealth which private enterprise was hiding in cupboards or dissipating in companies. He could not but perceive the double advantage of providing individuals with good investments on national security and the State with easily-raised loans. Two things were wanting—a national debt and a national bank, the chief agents which impart steadiness and balance to modern finance; and both Montagu was now to provide. The proposal of a Government loan for nine hundred thousand pounds was carried through Parliament (1693). The loan was based on the ordinary principles upon which national debts were then founded. It pledged the existing credit of the State, and it also levied a tax upon posterity; for it was certain that the annuities established by it could not be extinguished for at least half a century. The principles so clearly established were certain to receive a speedy extension.

At the end of 1693, Montagu, face to face with another serious deficit, was ready with a host of expedients, in the shape of a poll-tax, stamp duties, and lottery loans. But, despite all this ingenuity, another million was needed, and supplied by the expedient of a national bank. The idea of a national bank was far less familiar to Englishmen than that of a system of a national credit. Before this time merchants had usually kept their surplus cash in their own houses, buried it like Pepys in their gardens, or deposited it in the Tower or Corporation Treasury. But, from 1640 onwards, the uncertainties of war and distrust of the Government constrained them to place their money in the strong-rooms of the goldsmiths. From these causes the system of banking and exchange received an unprecedented development, and under Charles II private banks became numerous and flourishing. The most famous of early private bankers was Sir Francis Child, who numbered among his customers Cromwell and the Prince of Orange, Churchill and Nell Gwyn. After England had secured her own private banks, she began to examine the national banks of other countries. Those of Venice and Genoa had long been famous; the Bank of Amsterdam was now the most renowned financial institution in the world, and Englishmen were never slow to borrow the methods and the practice of Dutch finance.

Business men generally began to realise that the lowering of interest, the circulation of a paper currency, and the general steadiness of the financial world would all be secured by the establishment of a national bank. The scheme appears to have been first suggested in a reasonable form by Francis Cradock in 1660; and henceforward innumerable pamphlets on the subject were issued, varying in merit from the masterly expositions of Petty to the ridiculous fallacies of Chamberlain and Murray. The commercial necessity for such an institution had been obvious even in the time of the Restoration; the political necessity for it became overwhelming after the Revolution. The goldsmiths, who acted as private

bankers, speedily found that the more business they did with the Government the less they did with the public. A contemporary authority tells us that, when King William sought even a small loan from the City of London, Ministers of State went from shop to shop and office to office soliciting it. Even these trivial loans were furnished rather from motives of honour and patriotism than from hope of gain. It was at this moment that William Paterson, a traveller of vast financial experience, genius, and resource, submitted to the Government a pamphlet containing a practical plan for a national bank (1691). The Government was favourable, but Parliament was adverse, and for three years the subject dropped. But in 1694 Montagu planned to raise his loan of £1,200,000 by establishing a bank, and found himself strongly supported by the City. Montagu's plan, which was an adaptation of Paterson's, was to raise the loan, with its interest of 8 per cent. secured by a new duty on tonnage. Those who took up the loan were to form a company, with the title of "Governor and Company of the Bank of England." They were permitted to borrow money at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., while lending to the Government at 8. They were allowed to transact private business, but restricted from trading in anything but bills of exchange, bullion, and forfeited pledges. Paterson, in a new pamphlet (1694), demonstrated that the Bank's action must have beneficial effects, and lower the rate of interest just as the Banks of Amsterdam and Genoa had done. The consequence must be to attract money and trade from abroad, and thus to benefit all borrowers, merchants, and ultimately also landed proprietors.

The comparative ease with which the Bill passed the two Houses, and the extraordinary readiness with which it was subscribed in the City, appear very surprising in face of the enormous clamour raised outside the walls of Parliament. The objections put forward throw a ray of powerful light upon the economic knowledge and political condition of the age. The economic arguments against it were that the establishment of the Bank would render it hard to borrow money upon mortgage, and thereby diminish the value of land. In addition, the free circulation of money would be impeded, and local centres be denuded of cash. The political arguments against the Bill partook more of prejudice than of weight, except in one instance. The reasonable objection that the Bank might endanger public liberty by its relations with the Crown, was removed by the insertion of a clause preventing the Bank from advancing loans to the Crown save by Act of Parliament. The other political arguments, brought forward as they were by men of both parties, had an agreeable variety. The Whig section argued that the Bank would introduce absolutism, the Tory that it would introduce republicanism. The Tory party saw a more special danger to the landed interest, and declared with some plausibility that a private company of Whig merchants were thus endowed with power in perpetuity. The whole question seems to have been decided less on the merits of the new institution,

than from motives of expediency and patriotism. As Caermarthen pointed out in the Lords, there might be objectionable clauses in the Bill, but it was the only means of providing money for the navy to take the sea that summer. This practical argument sufficed, where all others might have failed.

Like so many other measures of the time, the Bill for establishing the Bank, though it bore the Whig stamp, was still the outcome of compromise and was directed to a genuinely national end. It is less clear, than in the case of his other financial measures, how far Montagu understood the real value of his creation—whether he was making shift with an expedient designed to be temporary, or whether he intended his creation to rival the great banks of the Continent, or realised that it might become the greatest of financial institutions. On the whole, it would seem that the Bank in its origin was carefully adjusted to the needs of the time, with due regard to the spirit of individual enterprise and with care to avoid too much dependence on the State. It differed fundamentally from all banks except those of Genoa and Stockholm. Other banks were primarily established as offices of exchange, as places where good coin could be obtained, or as banks of deposit—that is, safes from which in theory at least the original coins could be recovered. But the Bank of England boldly circulated notes, without pretending that its paper currency corresponded exactly to the amount of its bullion. Again, its notes were not legal tender in England, as were the notes of the national banks of Amsterdam, Genoa and Venice. Thirdly, it had in no sense an exclusive monopoly; for the Government reserved the right of discharging the loan and dissolving the organisation in 1705, and raised up a formidable rival to it in 1696. The new Bank was eminently original, and in its originality lay no small part of its danger, for it had many of the burdens and singularly few of the advantages of a connexion with the State.

The dangers which so speedily menaced the Bank were partially caused by the inexperience of its promoters, but even more by the malice of its opponents. The goldsmiths bought up the notes which the Bank issued for circulation and waited their time to inflict a blow on an institution whose success they believed would seriously injure their own private banks. The operation of the Recoinage Act supplied the opportunity in two years. This measure had long been rendered necessary because the clipped or damaged coins of James I or Elizabeth had been treated as of equal value with the good milled coins of Charles II and James II. To the amazement of contemporaries, increased issues of milled crowns did not increase the circulation of good currency. Gresham's law, that bad money drives out good, was illustrated on a gigantic scale, and bad money circulated, while most of the good coins were melted down, exported, and sold as bullion. Both in town and country the face value of the coins rose on the average to about twice their real value as metal.

Stringent Acts to prevent exportation and melting proved ineffective, and a drastic recoinage became essential. Singularly enough the remedy eventually adopted was framed by the united counsels of the greatest lawyer, the greatest financier, the greatest political, and the greatest natural philosopher of the age, namely, Somers, Montagu, Locke, and Newton.

The main principles of the settlement were laid down by Locke in his famous currency pamphlets. His views, that the new coinage should follow the established standard in weight and denomination, and that the loss incurred by recoinage should be borne by the State, were accepted by the Ministry. The actual form of the Bill was suggested by Somers and carried by Montagu, whilst the practical measures of recoinage were taken by Sir Isaac Newton as Master of the Mint. By the *Recoinage Act* (January, 1696), it was provided that the old clipped coins should cease to be legal tender on May 4, though full equivalents of their face value in the new milled coins were to be issued as fast as possible. The withdrawal from circulation of such large amounts of coin made itself sensibly felt, and it was this very moment of distress that the goldsmiths selected to deliver their long-planned stroke against the Bank.

On May 4 the goldsmiths organised a run on the Bank, at the moment when the Treasury had swallowed all available coin. Ruin and bankruptcy seemed imminent. The Directors refused to cash such notes as they held to have been presented with malicious intent, bidding the goldsmiths seek their remedy at law. But a run on the Bank had begun, and they could not refuse to honour notes presented by ordinary creditors. Yet even here they were able to pay only a percentage. The recoinage went on slowly; the scarcity of coin showed no relaxation for three months, and very little for twelve. In January, 1697, William could still tell Heinsius that he had no money to secure the ratification of the treaty with Denmark and no subsidies to pay his troops—nay, could not even despatch a certain diplomatic agent, being actually unable to defray his travelling expenses. If such were the straits of princes, it may be imagined what were those of the Bank Directors or of still humbler persons. It was only after March, 1697, that the crisis had definitely passed, either for the Bank or the country. The difficulties had been enormous and the sufferings great, while the actual expenses of recoinage involved the Exchequer in a loss of little under three millions. Money and suffering would both have been saved, had the remedy been adopted some years earlier. As it was, it came but just in time. Had it been deferred a year longer, the consequence might have been more serious than the loss of a pitched battle by land or sea. But the settlement was successful, and the most subtle and one of the most serious causes of commercial crises and fluctuation was removed by the establishment of a sound currency system.

Before they had recovered from the attack of the goldsmiths, the Bank Directors had to meet an assault from the landed gentry, thus experiencing at once the united force of the economic and the political opposition to their original establishment. A coalition of Whig and Tory landed gentry, with the support of King William, carried a badly-devised project for the establishment of a Land Bank in spite of Montagu's opposition (May, 1696). Subscriptions opened in June, and owing to the almost total failure to attract subscribers, the project was entirely abandoned on August 1. But it was one of the ironies of the situation that the Bank of England, which had been so much damaged by the creation of the Land Bank, was even more endangered by its destruction. Hardly were their rivals crushed than Montagu applied to the Directors of the Bank of England for an immediate loan, which the Land Bank had promised but, in consequence of its failure, had not supplied. Montagu pleaded William's direct statement that nothing short of £200,000 in cash could enable his army to take the field. On August 15 the Directors made a further call of 20 per cent., which the General Court of subscribers accepted from patriotic rather than financial motives. In ten days the bullion was pouring into the King's coffers, the Allies presented an imposing front in the field, and a decision of the money-market had, not for the last time, exercised a momentous effect upon a military campaign.

Montagu wrote to William, telling him that, as the Bank had risked all for the Government, Government must now risk something for the Bank. William assented, not perhaps perceiving that he entrenched the Whig party in the citadel of the State, by settling the Bank on a firm basis. In view of the scandalous treatment meted out to the Bank by the Government in 1696, the privileges granted in 1697, though immense, were hardly excessive. The Bank was to be guaranteed its position till 1710, when the Government received the right of discharging its obligations. It was allowed authority to issue notes, on condition that they should be payable on demand. Last, and perhaps most important, a monopoly was granted; no society of the nature of a bank was to be authorised by Parliament till 1710. The neglect to establish branch institutions and secure the organisation of local credit was to entail much future distress in the country. To this and other faulty provisions it was due that, during the first century of existence of the Bank, it had to undergo crises more serious than its predecessors at Genoa, Venice or Amsterdam had encountered in the same number of years.

Even now the Bank of England remained only a joint-stock company, pursuing the ends of individual enterprise, under the control and with the encouragement of the State. Though Montagu eventually provided that the Bank should become a national institution, he immediately secured that it should be a partisan one. The failure of the Land Bank had meant the rout of Jacobites and Tories, and the Whig

merchants, who had risked their fortunes in the Bank of England, had fought for William as energetically and more successfully than his soldiers in the field. For the moment a Whig policy was imposed on a willing nation. The Bank plumped its weight on the side of Revolution and against the Church, and the bags of Whig money-lenders outweighed the sermons of Jacobite clergymen. Addison's famous allegory pictures the Stewart rushing into the Grocers' Hall, turning money-bags into bladders and gold coin into rubbish, and sending the goddess Credit off in a fainting fit. Whether or not James II would really have repudiated the State obligations contracted after 1688, is doubtful. But the belief that he would was a wide-spread and deep-rooted superstition, which contributed immensely to the stability of the new order of things and to the supremacy of the Whig party.

Before turning to the development of party government, we may deal with the great measure which established the freedom of the Press. For both these changes had eventually international effects, far wider than are usually caused by events of such an apparently domestic character. It is impossible to view any part of the reign of William without perceiving to how great an extent public opinion criticised and influenced political action. Even James himself had showed deference to that supreme tribunal, before it passed its irrevocable sentence upon him. The criticisms of minorities in Parliament had frequently revealed cases of grave injustice, and had prevented the perpetration of scandalous political jobs and maladministration alike under Charles, James and William. But a force stronger than the voices of the Opposition in Parliament was required to extend and to secure the power of public opinion, and that force could only be found in a free press. In the *Arcopagitica* Milton had nobly pleaded that cause; but the great soldier of the Commonwealth had exercised the most rigorous press-censorship ever known. Under Charles and James the Licensing Acts had been renewed; and in 1676 Sunderland had expressed his desire to suppress the "damnable trade" of supplying news-letters to the coffee-houses.

During the turmoil of the Revolution shoals of pamphlets had been unchecked by licensing or censorship. The pamphlets of Burnet, Locke, Somers, Chamberlain, and Paterson most powerfully influenced and moulded religious, political, and economic opinion. Owing to a series of accidents, needless to relate and unimportant in themselves, it was eventually decided (1695) not to renew the Licensing Act. Henceforth, the number of printing presses was not limited and vexatious restrictions were removed. Ministers still reserved the right of prosecuting printers for attacks on the Government, and under Anne, both Godolphin and Bolingbroke showed that serious restrictions could be imposed on the press through this means and by the expedient of a paper-tax. But, apart from these restrictions, the liberty of the Press—with its subtle influences of suggestion, its broad powers of criticism, abuse and exhortation,

with all its immeasurable consequences for securing the toleration and freedom of opinion—was at last acknowledged and established.

To understand the political movements of the time, it is needful to grasp the form of the executive Government, as it then existed. The King could check the Lords by a threat of creating peers, and the Commons by the use of his veto and the power of dissolution. In these cases his power was immediate. But in administration also he had a wide and direct influence apart from his Ministers. King James had, with general applause, personally directed the naval administration and written his own speeches for Parliament and Privy Council. The relations of the King and his Council are equally significant. It is certain that before the reign of William, the power of the Privy Council had passed into the hands of a number of committees, which the King directly controlled. Some of these committees were permanent or "standing," as for Ireland and for trade; others secret, as for foreign affairs and foreign and domestic intelligence; others appointed *ad hoc* for various special purposes, diplomatic, commercial or judicial. All these bodies were indifferently described as "cabinets," though the term was more usually applied to the foreign committee and to that for intelligence. These committees dealt with matters in detail, decided upon them, and acquainted the King with their decisions, which, if approved by the King, were presented to the Privy Council. Discussions sometimes took place at that Council; but its consent was not very much more than a formality. The power and authority of the King were really supreme. He alone constituted and selected the committees, and could dismiss recalcitrant committee members or privy councillors with a stroke of his pen. Further, he alone gave authority and legality to the committees. During William's reign those Ministers, who were members of the most committees and who held the dozen most important offices of State, gradually began to form a kind of general committee. This body is sometimes termed the Cabinet, and to it William often deferred. But he could always set aside its decisions as he did those of other committees, and its authority depended wholly upon his will. This is shown by the admitted fact that the King could take a step of his own in foreign policy on the advice of a single Minister. It is also evident that he could on his own authority, as in 1690 and 1692, constitute a Council or Cabinet, whose numbers varied at his pleasure, as the supreme authority in his absence. The King's position, therefore, was that he transacted business with a number of different committees, in which he formed the centre of power and union. He had the main direction of foreign affairs, and immense opportunities for influence and control in other directions. He was really his own chief Minister; but, from inexperience in domestic affairs and preoccupation in foreign, William could not attend to administrative details or gauge the shifting currents of popular opinion. It is very evident that, under such conditions,

a system of party government, based on a united Ministry, could not easily arise. For the King was the pivot on which everything turned; and till the end of 1692 he refused either to be the instrument of a single party, or to devolve his power upon a single man or group of men.

In his relations with Parliament, William, his Ministers, and the House of Commons, were alike dominated by a most mischievous theory, to which the great authority of Locke had recently lent renewed life. This was the theory that legislature and executive were and ought to remain separate, that the King's Ministers were the executive, the two Houses the critical body. There was no doubt a sense in which this was true, in that Parliament and the Ministry ought to some extent to be independent of each other. But it was madness to assert this theory in its full completeness just after the Revolution had placed new and great powers in the hands of the Commons. In the event of an absolute exclusion of Crown officials from the Lower House, one of two results must have followed. Either the King would have drawn his Ministers exclusively from the peers—in which case administration would have been entirely in the hands of the aristocracy; or he would have trained a staff of clerks—in which case administration would have been in the hands of a bureaucracy. In either case the Commons would have been a body which could check, criticise and harass, but not actively direct the Government. The strength of the popular House must therefore have been weakened and endangered.

The insight of men of William's day did not pierce into the future; it was governed by remembrance of the past. Men were oppressed with the fear of the Crown and of the undue influence exercised by Charles and James upon members of Parliament, upon corporations, and electors. This was the real cause of the vigour of Locke's theory and the real origin of the Place-Bills, of which the earliest was brought before the Commons at Christmas, 1692. It actually provided for the entire and absolute exclusion from the Commons of all holding office under the Crown. When it was known that existing place-holders would not be disturbed till the dissolution of the existing Parliament, the Bill passed the Commons with marvellous rapidity. It was thrown out by the narrowest majorities in the Lords. After various adventures the Place-Bill was finally rejected in the Commons in 1694. Thus was averted for the time being the danger of an absolute separation between executive and legislature, while the regular session of the latter was assured by the passing of a Bill providing for Triennial Parliaments (1694).

The extraordinary conduct of Parliament was largely due to imperfect harmony not only between King, Ministers, and legislature, but between party-leaders and their followers. This the Whigs were the first to realise, in a dim, imperfect fashion, through the agency of the discredited Sunderland. That ex-Minister's career had been such as to disgrace him even in that age of loose political conscience and easy public

virtue. But his past did not prevent him from giving, not only the Whigs, but William himself, some valuable lessons in the art of government. In 1693 Sunderland counselled William to favour the Whigs and admit them to office, first because their political theory favoured the Revolution, next because they favoured the war, and last because they were the stronger party in the Lower House. The fact that the majority of the Commons, which in 1690 was certainly Tory, was in 1693 uncertain or inclining to be Whig, marks the lack of cohesion and the presence of chaos in the parties. This indeed is the explanation of the extraordinary vicissitudes that befel the various Place and Triennial Bills. After 1692 the Tories were gradually beginning to oppose the war, and the immense power of Crown influence over parliamentary placemen was naturally thrown against them. In addition to this a small knot or *junto* of statesmen was gradually imparting to the Whigs an organisation and discipline, such as Shaftesbury had given to the Exclusionists. Somers, already the first among the lawyers, Montagu, destined to prove the first of the financiers, Wharton, the first of the wire-pullers, and Russell, the naval hero of the day, formed the famous Whig "*Junto*," soon to be the ruling force in politics. It is certain that William did not appreciate the full import of Sunderland's advice; but he gradually and almost unconsciously began to act upon it. Somers had been made a peer and Lord Keeper so early as March, 1693; the Tory Nottingham was courteously dismissed; the Whig Shrewsbury resumed the seals of Secretary. The situation then became curious; for William's chief confidence was not yet given to the Whigs, though they formed the bulk of his Ministry. He still relied in the main upon the Tory Caermarthen and upon Sunderland, who was not a Minister at all.

In 1695 Caermarthen was implicated in the scandals of the East India Company, and was obliged to resign. His withdrawal was followed in 1697 by that of Godolphin, the last of the Tory Ministers. The Ministry became exclusively Whig, just at the moment when the Peace of Ryswyk was carried to a successful conclusion amid general rejoicings. With peace the old hatred of standing armies reasserted itself, and the forces were immediately cut down to 10,000 men in the face of William's intense disapproval. It was in vain that Somers wrote the famous "*Balancing Letter*," to calm the national hatred of militarism. The feeling may not have been justified, yet it was at least not partisan, but genuinely national. For, though the majority of the Commons was Whig, it united with the Tories against its own leaders; and in 1699 a hostile House forced William to dismiss his famous "*Blues*," his dearly-loved regiments of Dutch Guards. In 1699 Parliament severely attacked the grants of Irish lands, made by the King to his Dutch favourites and to Lady Orkney, and in the next year actually passed a Bill for their resumption. William in despair at length summoned the Tories Rochester and Godolphin to the Ministry. They succeeded in checking the attacks

on the King, by giving a free rein to attacks upon the former Ministers; Bentinck (now Earl of Portland), Russell (now Lord Orford), Montagu (now Earl of Halifax), and Somers, were all impeached. But it was not for nothing that William had filled the Upper House with Whig Bishops and peers. The impeachments eventually failed; but their effect had been to remove from office and to discredit the intended victims.

In the midst of all the turmoil and party intrigue of 1701, the Ministry contrived to add the keystone to the arch of the Revolution by passing the Act of Settlement. This famous Act had been necessitated by the death of the Duke of Gloucester—the only surviving son of Anne. The Act supplied two important omissions in the Bill of Rights. In the first place judges were to receive fixed salaries, and to be removable only after being convicted in the law-courts or on address from both Houses of Parliament. In other words the judge, though appointed, could not be removed, by the King. A long step was thus taken towards that separation of the powers, which Locke declared essential to liberty, and which Montesquieu was actually to regard as the characteristic excellence of the English constitution. The other important provision of the Act of Settlement decided that the Crown should pass on the death of Anne to the Electress Sophia and her Protestant descendants. It is often said that this provision established the elective character of the English Crown. This was not the opinion of contemporaries, nor was it that of Burke. Mary and William had been acknowledged Queen and King, because the Prince of Wales was already excluded by the resolution that no Papist could reign, and the Act of Settlement merely confirmed this principle. Expediency had rendered it needful to alter the succession, and to make the Crown elective *pro hac vice*, but the case was not intended to form a precedent. In this, as in every other instance, the Revolution settlement rested upon compromise rather than upon the general principles, which, however, the particular action went far towards establishing in each case.

The Act of Settlement had not been passed before the international situation began to dwarf the importance of internal events. The accession of Louis' grandson, Philip, to the whole inheritance of Spain destroyed the balance of power and endangered the existence of Holland. England, secure on the other side of the Channel, remained unmoved, and William wrote to Heinsius that he would secretly engage her in the coming war. But he did not find it easy to attain this object. At length the pride of Louis and the Whig merchants' evident apprehension of being entirely excluded from the commerce of the New World, began to stir the pulse of the nation. This resentment was inflamed to the highest pitch by Louis' action on the death of James (September 6, 1701), in recognising his son as James III of England. In a moment, the country was wild with rage, and William, riding on the wave of popular anger, was able to include England in his "Great Alliance."

But just when a new and vaster struggle than he had yet waged was opening—at the moment of all others when he wished to live—it was ordained that he should die. He had fractured his collar-bone, and a chill, which followed on the accident, was too much for his enfeebled frame. He died at Kensington on March 8, 1702.

On a survey of the whole period of the Revolution and reign, the imagination is struck by the comparatively small part played by William upon the English stage, and the immense figure which he made upon the European. By a tragic irony, he spent his life in opposing in England the very tendencies which he was promoting abroad. On the *Continent* William stood for the principle that the too great predominance of one Power, being dangerous to all the others, must be checked by their union. Yet it was right that there should be a balance of power in the Constitution as well as in diplomacy, in England as well as in Europe. By apportioning the balance of power between King and Parliament, by separating the judicial from the executive powers, the Act of Settlement did much to further the theory of checks and balances. According to this theory no power is absolute and uncontrolled in the State, and where there are limitations on power the rights of minorities are secured. The checks upon uncontrolled executive power imposed by the existence of a quasi-independent legislature and judicature were strengthened by the growth of party government, the development of political, and the beginning of religious, toleration, and the establishment of a free press. Such theoretical views and such practical checks had not been unknown in Holland even before their adoption in England. But, speaking generally, nothing was more opposed to contemporary political thought than Locke's view that different powers in the State should move in independent spheres, and that none should be uncontrolled or supreme. Nothing has therefore exercised more influence upon the future than this view, and its effect is revealed in the framing of the constitution of the United States, and in any other constitution which has taken the English polity for its model.

In England William was too anxious to retain the great privileges of the Crown, unable to see that, by this policy, he united all other powers in the State in resistance to the predominance of one—the Executive. Hence he sometimes had to face in England a coalition of both parties or even of Parliament and people. Judgment or his fortune always enabled him to avert a crisis which would have been disastrous, but many of the great reforms of the age were undertaken in his despite or without his decided approval. In the constitutional and legislative problems, whose settlement so profoundly affected the destiny of political institutions, William exercised an influence which was actually small and not always beneficial. The immense development of the national power and resources, the foundation of what were to be the most renowned system of national credit and the most famous

financial institution in the world—all these he viewed with indifference or even hostility. In commercial and colonial policy he had no active interest, though he was careful to secure England's rights in the diplomatic treaties of the time. On the other hand, it is only fair to say that in urging forward the need of political amnesty in the Act of Grace, and the cause of religious liberty in the Toleration Act, he was at once more enlightened and more disinterested than any Englishman of the time. James or Halifax desired religious liberty, Nottingham and Somers political toleration, perhaps more earnestly than William. But no single Englishman so sincerely desired and so simultaneously and consistently forwarded both causes.

The constitutional principles introduced by the Revolution can hardly be said to be new, and the curiously concrete method of their application only rendered probable, and did not finally determine, their development and triumph. The Bill of Rights expressed the idea that resistance to tyranny was justifiable, and the Act of Settlement did much to forward the imperfectly apprehended view that government finally rested on consent of the majority, and that the gift of the crown lay ultimately with the people. Thus were foreshadowed for a particular end the principles, which eventually became general and absolute, which enabled Jefferson to overthrow the sway of England's constitutional Parliament over America, and Rousseau to assail the rule of absolute kings in Europe.

While veneration is paid to Locke, to Halifax, and to Somers, for devising the theory and creating the practice of a constitution which has been the model to so many others in the world, something must be allowed to the great man who defended it from external assault, and who accomplished as great a work for the good of Europe as any of these achieved for the institutions of England. William did for the continental polity what Locke and Halifax did for the English. He asserted and maintained, in the name of the allied States of Europe, the right of confining within due bounds the aggressive and predominating spirit of one nation or element which endangered the liberty of all others. It is possible to suppose that, if Locke and Halifax had never lived, England might have still preserved her freedom; but it is impossible to hold that, if William had never lived, the States of western Europe might not have lost theirs. And, in securing the one object, William really secured the other, for by arresting the progress of despotic France he assured the triumph of constitutional England. It was in this final sense that the interests of England and of Europe, the policies of Halifax and of William, were inseparable. And though Englishmen persist in regarding William as a ruler often unsympathetic or indifferent to their special interests, Europe cannot fail to see in him one who laboriously and triumphantly toiled, amid infinite difficulties, for the general interests of a continent.

(2) SCOTLAND FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE UNION OF
THE PARLIAMENTS.

(1660—1707.)

The political situation in Scotland at the Restoration of Charles II in 1660 would have taxed the vigour and prudence of the most experienced statesmen. At no previous period had the nation been more distracted in its aims or torn with conflicting passions. The great revolt against the ecclesiastical policy of James VI and Charles I, which had issued in the overthrow of the royal authority and the reestablishment of Presbyterianism, had eventually resulted in a national catastrophe. Triumphant Presbyterianism had been cleft in twain by its own internal divisions, and had lost the support of the nobility by whose aid alone it had successfully waged war with Charles I. Then came the domination of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, when for ten years the nation had to accept such institutions and methods of government as an alien power deemed to be in the interest of both countries. The domination had on the whole been beneficent, but it had been the result of conquest, and no considerable section of the Scottish people were in sympathy with the political or religious ideas either of Commonwealth or Protectorate.

It was, therefore, with an enthusiasm almost as general and spontaneous as the feeling displayed in England that Scotland hailed the restoration of her ancient line of kings. The burst of loyalty was at once the expression of hope for the future and joy at the deliverance from a rule under which the national ideals could never be realised. But the momentary exaltation of feeling could not conceal the fact that no possible policy of the new government could satisfy all parties in the State or harmonise their divisions. The paramount public concern remained what it had been since the Reformation a century before—the question of the national religion in doctrine and polity. At the Reformation there had been two clearly-defined parties—Protestants on the one side and Roman Catholics on the other—and the issue between them could not be misunderstood. At the Restoration Protestantism was the religion of the nation, with the exception of a remnant that still clung to the old faith; but it was a Protestantism so divided in doctrine, spirit, and aspirations as virtually to create a number of distinct religious bodies

incapable of harmonious action towards a common end. There was that section of the Presbyterians, known as the "Protesters" or "Remonstrants," who in 1650 had rejected Charles as their King, till he should have furnished satisfactory evidence that in his heart as well as with his lips he had given his sanction to the National Covenant of 1638 and the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643. But, as Charles was never likely to afford this satisfaction, the Protesters from the beginning stood in irreconcilable opposition to his government. On the other hand, the main body of the Presbyterians, known as the "Resolutioners," who had sanctioned the coronation of Charles after his father's death in 1649, were disposed to accept him as their King on easier terms: if he would guarantee Presbyterianism as the polity of the national Church, they would not rigorously insist on his acceptance of the Covenants. But in this main body itself there were degrees of strictness, alike regarding doctrine and forms of Church government. It was now more than twenty years since the signing of the National Covenant; and a new generation had arisen for whom the Covenants were only a memory and not a palladium won by blood and tears. During the reign that had begun it was to be seen with what different degrees of rigour or steadfastness the new generation held to the faith of Andrew Melville and Henderson.

At the restoration of Charles, however, the salient fact was that in numbers and strength of conviction the Presbyterians were the dominant religious party in the country; and it was with this fact that Charles and his advisers had to reckon in whatever policy they chose to adopt. As to what that policy should be Charles had no hesitation from the first. Presbyterianism had dethroned his father, and, once more in the ascendant, it might take the same measures with himself. But, if Presbyterianism had been found incompatible with the Stewart conception of the royal prerogative, it had also been found alien to the spirit and traditions of the feudal nobility. It had been only by the support of the nobles that the revolt against Charles I had succeeded; but in the course of the struggle the nobles had discovered that the interests of their order were vitally bound up with the interests of the Crown. Thus, at the date when Charles ascended the throne, the Scottish nobles as a body were hostile to Presbyterianism and were prepared to support the royal authority in supplanting it. Had they been of the same mind as in the period preceding the National Covenant, Charles could not have carried out that ecclesiastical policy which was to be the absorbing object of himself and his successor, and which was eventually to end in the national rejection of the House of Stewart. In approving or abetting that policy, therefore, the nobility as an order must share the responsibility of the Crown.

The first measures of the new reign implied a direct return to the methods of government which James VI had bequeathed to Charles I.

The Parliament, which met in 1641, had, in the presence and with the sanction of Charles, enacted that all officers of State, Privy Councillors, and Lords of Session should be chosen by the King "with the advice and approbation" of the Estates. Without waiting for the meeting of Parliament Charles II appointed his own Privy Council, and, following further the precedent of James VI, he arranged that a section of it should sit in London and that a part of this section should consist of Englishmen, of whom the most notable was Edward Hyde, afterwards Earl of Clarendon. Of the Scotsmen who were chosen, some had once been Covenanters, but all had since given satisfactory proofs of their attachment to the Crown. The man who was to be the dominating spirit of the Council and Charles' chief instrument in the government of Scotland was John, second Earl of Lauderdale, once an ardent Covenanter, but who by his nine years' imprisonment after his capture at the battle of Worcester had done full expiation for his backsliding from loyalty. To Lauderdale was given the office of Secretary, which involved residence in London, and thus placed him at an advantage over every other member of the Council. The "King of Scotland"—such was the current designation for the holder of the office; and no Secretary of the Council was more of a King than Lauderdale, who swayed, while he only seemed to approve, the mind of his master. Lauderdale's ideal for the administration of Scottish affairs was "the good old form of government by his Majesty's Privy Council"; and, in point of fact, it was through his Privy Council that Charles mainly governed Scotland from the beginning to the end of his reign.

It was on January 1, 1660, that Monck had crossed the Tweed, and on May 25 that Charles had landed at Dover, but it was not till August that an ostensible executive body was established in Scotland. As the Privy Council was still in England and the meeting of Parliament was postponed till the beginning of the next year, a temporary executive body was found in the Committee of the Estates which had been captured by Monck in 1651. The proceedings of this Committee left little doubt as to the future policy of the Government. A body of "Protesters" which met in Edinburgh to draft a petition to Charles was broken up, and all but one of them were imprisoned in the Castle—an action which was followed the next day by a prohibition against all assemblies "without his Majesty's official authority." Protesters and Resolutioners were alike disquieted by these proceedings; but some comfort was found in a letter from Charles (August, 1660), in which it was ambiguously stated that the Church of Scotland, as it was settled by law, would be maintained "without violation." When the Parliament at length met (January, 1661), it was brought home to the whole body of the Presbyterians that they had little to hope from a King to whom, with good reason, the Covenants and everything connected with them were a hideous remembrance. Carefully packed by the methods which

had been devised by James VI, Parliament simply registered decrees which had been drafted by the King and his Privy Council in London. The Commissioner chosen to represent the royal authority was John, Earl of Middleton, who, as a renegade Covenanter, announced in his own person the intentions of the Government. The work of the Parliament may be briefly summarised: it restored the constitution which had been fashioned by James VI, and which, as inherited by his son, had provoked the revolt that had brought forth the Covenants. By a Rescissory Act the proceedings of every Parliament since 1633 (those of 1650 and 1651, over which Charles himself had presided, being practically, though not nominally, included) were declared null and void, and the King was proclaimed "Supreme Governor of his Kingdom over all persons and in all causes." As a substantial evidence of its loyalty, the Parliament further voted an annual grant of £40,000 to the King—an excess of liberality which, according to a contemporary loyalist, "became the ruin of this Kingdom." It was an ancient custom of the Scots to nickname their Parliaments from some peculiarity that distinguished them; and the first Parliament of Charles came to be known as the "Drunken Parliament."

As Charles was now "Supreme Governor of his Kingdom over all persons and in all causes," it only depended on his pleasure what Church should be imposed on the nation. It fell to the Privy Council, which met at Holyrood after the rising of the Parliament, to announce his momentous decision. In his letter of the previous year Charles had declared his intention of maintaining the Church "as it was settled by law"; and this Church, it was now decreed, was the Episcopal Church as it had been established by James VI and confirmed by his son. It was in September (1661) that the decree was announced; and, that no time might be lost in giving it effect, four persons were sent to England in the following December to receive consecration, as there were no bishops in Scotland to communicate it. Among the four there were two who were to play very different parts and to bequeath very different memories. The one was James Sharp, who had been a prominent Resolutioner and was now Archbishop-elect of St Andrews. In the beginning of 1660 Sharp had been sent to London by his brother ministers to promote their interests in view of the expected Restoration. They had misjudged their agent; for Sharp returned to Scotland as an instrument of the Court, whose ecclesiastical policy he was to promote with all the astuteness and persistency which were the leading traits of his character. If Sharp was a born ecclesiastic, Robert Leighton, subsequently Archbishop of Glasgow, was a natural saint—a "Christianised Plato," Coleridge called him—whose unhappy destiny it was to be cast in a time when saintly attributes seemed but the timid hesitations of a character incapable of strenuous conviction. To Leighton the strife between Episcopalian and Presbyterian appeared but "a drunken scuffle in the

dark"; as, however, he had once been a Covenanted Presbyterian and eventually accepted an archbishopric, his former brethren had an obvious rejoinder.

The Privy Council had done its work in decreeing the reestablishment of Episcopacy; but the constitution required that Parliament should ratify its action. In May, 1662, therefore, Parliament again met, and completed the work of the Council by readmitting the Bishops to its sittings, and reinstating them in their "accustomed dignities, privileges, and jurisdictions, of which they had been deprived during the ascendancy of the Covenants." Another Act, passed on June 11, was the direct occasion of the subsequent conflict between the Government and a section of the people which is the dominant fact of Charles' reign. The Covenanted Parliament of 1649 had abolished lay patronage; and many of the existing ministers held their charges direct from their congregations and presbyteries. It was now enacted that by September 20 following all such ministers should receive presentation from their lawful patrons or demit their cures. When the appointed day came, it appeared that few of the ministers in the diocese of Glasgow had taken the prescribed step. At a *sederunt* in Glasgow, therefore, the Privy Council further ordained that, if any minister did not conform to the law by November 1, his parishioners should cease to attend his ministrations and to pay him his stipend. Even in the eyes of Sharp this action was "so rash a thing" that he could not have believed it "till he saw it in print." Convinced of its own impolicy, the Council postponed the day of grace till February 1, 1663; but, even when that day came, about a third of the whole ministry had still refused to give in their submission.

Middleton had proved himself a rash and tactless administrator; and in the Secretary Lauderdale he had an enemy at Court who made the most of his blunders. Since the beginning of his administration there had been rivalry between the two for the first place in Charles' councils; but the influence of Lauderdale at length prevailed, and Middleton was recalled from a position for which neither his character nor his previous career had even in a remote degree adapted him. Nevertheless the policy which he had inaugurated was the policy which the Government of Charles had deliberately adopted, and the action of his successors was but its logical and necessary consequence. It had been decreed that the Covenants were incompatible with the royal prerogative, and in the execution of the Marquis of Argyll and of the Protester, James Guthrie, the Government had proclaimed to the nation its judgment on the cause of which they had been the most prominent champions.

Middleton was succeeded in the commissionership by John, Earl of Rothes, a man, according to Burnet, of "quick apprehension, with a clear judgment," but, as an illiterate debauchee, incapable of the serious statesmanship which his office demanded. Rothes was at first the tool of Lauderdale, but, as Lauderdale was to discover, not the most suitable

instrument for giving effect to his Scottish policy. In June, 1663, the Restoration Parliament met in its third and last session—Lauderdale himself being present—and crowned the work which had been begun under the administration of Middleton. One of its Acts restored the method of choosing the Lords of the Articles which had been devised by James VI, and which, as was said, virtually converted Parliament into the "baron court" of the King; and another authorised the raising of a militia of 20,000 foot and 2000 horse for the double purpose of suppressing disorder in Scotland, and of being a serviceable instrument in England should Charles ever have occasion to require it. But it was another Act, significantly known as "the Bishops' Dragnet," which was to have the most momentous consequences during the remainder of the reign. By this Act "against separation and disobedience to the royal authority," heavy fines were imposed on absentees from the parish churches, and a relation between subject and ruler was thus created which explains the chapter of woes that was to follow.

The prime object of the Government was now to exact obedience to the new constitution in Church and State. It was in the case of the Church, however, that it had to encounter its chief difficulties; two-thirds of the public business, it was said by a statesman of the time, directly or indirectly concerned religion. To enforce acceptance of the new religious order the Court of High Commission, which had proved so obnoxious in the reigns of James VI and Charles I, was revived (1664) at the suggestion of Archbishop Sharp. But more drastic means were required to coerce the spirit of resistance which had been evoked by the Restoration policy; and these means were now conveniently at hand. In the body of dragoons which had been levied with the sanction of Parliament the Government had an instrument which it could use with convincing effect on contumacious recusants. The Privy Council sought to enforce its decrees by the imposition of heavy fines; and, to ensure that the fines should be forthcoming, the dragoons were quartered on recalcitrant parties till they were "eaten up." It was in the south-western counties—Ayrshire, Wigtownshire, and Dumfriesshire—that the Government was most persistently defied; and it was in these shires that the Protesters had found the most numerous following, and where the largest body of ministers had demitted their cures rather than accept them at the hands of a lay patron. In place of these ejected ministers, incumbents had been substituted (1663) who, for the most part, had had no previous training for their office, and whom a colleague of Lauderdale described as "insufficient, scandalous, imprudent fellows." Thus the Westland Whigs, as they came to be called, had the choice of three alternatives—to attend the ministrations of "the King's curates," to pay a heavy fine, or to be "eaten up" by the dragoons. The dilemma had again arisen with which Scotland had been familiar since the Reformation—allegiance to a legitimate King or obedience to the

dictates of conscience. The memory of the successful revolt against Charles I was an encouraging precedent; and, as the history of the reign proves, the recusants of the west were at all times prepared to follow it. The occasion came in November, 1666, when Sir James Turner, one of the commanders of the dragoons, who had made himself specially obnoxious, was seized and made prisoner by a party of the men of Galloway. This action proved to be the signal for revolt; joined by increasing numbers, the insurgents marched through Ayrshire and Lanarkshire, and in a body some 3000 strong, amid incessant winter rains, made their way towards Edinburgh. At Colinton, three miles to the west of the capital, they found themselves in a critical position; the inhabitants of the surrounding country were hostile; the forces of the Government were closing in upon them; and their only safety lay in a rapid retreat. At Rullion Green, on the southern slope of the Pentland Hills, they were overtaken and dispersed by the royal troops led by Sir Thomas Dalziel, fifty falling in the action and about eighty being taken. The haunting dread of the statesmen friendly to the Restoration was the possibility of a national uprising such as had overthrown the authority of Charles I; and it was in cruel fear that the Privy Council proceeded to the punishment of the leaders of the rebellion. Over thirty were hanged in different towns; the rank and file were for the most part transported to the Barbados, and the agents of the Government were enriched by fines and confiscations.

The results of Rothes' administration had not commended him to Charles, and he had, moreover, made an enemy of Lauderdale, whom he and Archbishop Sharp had been endeavouring to supplant. Again Lauderdale triumphed, and Rothes was deprived of the commissionership (September, 1667), Lauderdale himself taking his place. It had been the contention of Lauderdale that the Pentland Rising was the result of the oppressive measures of the late administration, and it was in a spirit of conciliation that he entered on his charge. Two military agents of the late Government, Sir James Turner and Sir William Bellenden, were disgraced and removed from their posts; and by what is known as the First Letter of Indulgence (1669) permission was given to such ejected ministers as had lived "peaceably and orderly" to occupy charges which happened to be vacant. But to accept the Indulgence implied the acceptance of Episcopacy, and only forty-two ministers succumbed to the temptation. Conventicles, hot-beds of sedition, as the Government regarded them, became more numerous than ever; and, which gave special ground for alarm, those who frequented them now began to carry weapons along with their Bibles. Against his will, therefore, Lauderdale was driven to a succession of measures which surpassed in severity those of his predecessor Rothes. In the second session of a Parliament, which had met in 1669, he passed what he called a "clanking act" against conventicles, which in spite of its stringency signally failed in its object.

A second Indulgence (1672) equally missed its aim of bringing over the majority of the recalcitrant ministers, and only intensified the zeal of those who refused to profit by it. But there were other weapons at Lauderdale's disposal which might prove more effectual. Since the Reformation a succession of repressive statutes had been passed against Roman Catholics, which in their case had operated with deadly effect and which might be equally successful in the case of refractory Protestants. In 1674 all heritors and masters were declared responsible for the conformity of their tenants and servants; and in the following year "Letters of Intercommuning" (the Scottish form of the "boycott") prohibited all intercourse with above a hundred persons, eighteen of whom were ministers. But, in the districts against which they were specially aimed, even these enactments proved of no avail; and in 1667 an Act of the Privy Council imposed a bond on heritors and masters for the loyal behaviour of all persons whatever who resided on their lands. To enforce this Act, which exasperated many who had shown no signs of disloyalty, Lauderdale took a step which was the crowning act of his coercive policy. To avert another rising, which every year made more probable, he quartered in Ayrshire a host of 6000 highlanders and 3000 lowland militia, with instructions to help themselves to whatever accommodation and necessities they might find to their taste. The special business of the "Highland Host" was to disarm the denoted districts and to exact the bond from all who had hitherto refused it—tasks which, after a month's luxurious living at free quarters, they performed to the satisfaction of the Government.

A succession of tragic events (1679) brought Lauderdale's satrapy to a close. On Magus Muir, near St Andrews, Archbishop Sharp was murdered by a band of zealots, who in their own eyes were the instruments of Heaven in taking off an apostate and a persecutor of the saints. Within a month after Sharp's assassination the long-anticipated rising came to a head in the disaffected west. On May 29, the anniversary of the Restoration, a band of eighty armed recusants entered the village of Rutherglen, extinguished the festal fires, and burned all the Acts which had overthrown the Church of the Covenants. Three days later, at Drumclog in Ayrshire, they defeated John Graham of Claverhouse, who at a later day was to be their avenger of blood. Their next movement was on Glasgow, where they had many sympathisers; but the town was well garrisoned, and they were forced to retreat to Hamilton in Lanarkshire. Ever in dread of an uprising such as had produced the Covenants, the Government took vigorous measures to suppress the revolt before it attained more formidable proportions. Orders were issued for the levy of 15,000 men; and the Duke of Monmouth, who had married the heiress of Buccleuch, and was known to disapprove of the policy of Lauderdale, was sent down from England to command them. On June 22 the two armies faced each other at Bothwell Bridge on the

Clyde, and a vain attempt was made by the insurgents to gain concessions that would have stultified all the past policy of the Government. Their supplication refused, they chose to abide the issue of battle; but the increase of their numbers had turned their camp into a debating assembly, and the ministers "preached and prayed against each other." Against such an enemy Monmouth had an easy task; and, though a resolute stand was made at the Bridge, his victory was complete—about 400 being slain and 1200 taken. Bound two and two, the prisoners were led to Edinburgh, where for five months the majority of them were kept in Greyfriars' Churchyard, exposed day and night to the weather. By the end of July 400 of them had been allowed to return home on the condition of their remaining peaceable subjects; but others, 250 in number, refusing to give the necessary pledge, were shipped to Barbados—never to reach their destination, as the vessel in which they sailed was wrecked off the Orkneys, and the majority of them perished.

Lauderdale had failed, as Rothes had failed, to give a satisfactory account of his stewardship; the revolt that had resulted in Bothwell Bridge had been more formidable than the Pentland Rising. Both in England and Scotland he had made many enemies, and the English Commons demanded his removal from the King's councils on the ground that he had assailed the liberties of both countries. Lauderdale had at least been a faithful servant of his master; and it was against his own will, as he knew it was against his own interests, that Charles deprived him of the commissionership and put in his place James, Duke of York, afterwards James VII. The policy of the three successive Commissioners had not made Scotland a happy and peaceable country, but it had succeeded in breaking the once mighty power of Presbyterianism. The three Acts of Indulgence (Monmouth had procured the third) had cut deep into the ranks of nonconformity, as had been wofully shown in the camp at Bothwell Bridge. Of the irreconcilable recusants of the west only a remnant was now left after fines, confiscations, slaughter, and transportation. Outlaws with a price upon their heads, this intractable remnant still bade defiance to authority, and on the mountains, moors, and mosses flocked to hear their preachers in armed conventicle. Of these preachers two hold a supreme place in the Covenanting martyrology—Donald Cargill and Richard Cameron. Under the inspiration of these two leaders, a section of the proscribed recusants formed themselves into a body, known as the "Society People," or Cameronians, with a definite set of tenets and a definite programme of action. In a Declaration, affixed to the market-Cross of Sanquhar (1680) they formally disowned Charles as their King on the ground "of his perjury and breach of Covenant to God and Kirk." The doctrine of the Declaration—that rulers might be dethroned when they failed in their duty to their subjects—was no novelty in the history of the Christian Church, but it was a doctrine that involved internecine war between people and king.

Extirpation of the dreaded sect, therefore, was the only policy left to a Government whose existence was bound up with a definite form of ecclesiastical establishment; and the hunting of conventiclers became the special work of the dragoons. Little more than a year after the Sanquhar Declaration, Cameron and Cargill had finished their course. At Airds Moss, in Ayrshire, a band of the "Wanderers" was defeated by the royal troops, Cameron being among the slain; and Cargill, captured in the following year, was executed in Edinburgh, hailing the day of his death as the most joyful of his pilgrimage on earth.

It was not till July, 1681, that the Duke of York made his appearance in his capacity of Royal Commissioner. He had already been twice in Scotland, and had made himself acceptable to the leading loyalists, and specially to the Highland chiefs, who at a later day were to give notable proof of their attachment to the House of Stewart. It was considered a propitious step that shortly after his arrival he summoned a meeting of Parliament—the first that had assembled for nine years; but the Acts it was required to pass were a gloomy portent of what was to come. By one of these Acts—the Act of Succession—it was declared that "no difference in religion . . . can alter or divert the right of succession and lineal descent of the Crown." As the Duke was a known Roman Catholic and the presumptive heir to the throne, the drift of this Act could not be mistaken. But it was another Act that raised the greatest alarm—even among well-disposed loyalists. This was a Test Act to be imposed on all persons holding offices of trust in Church and State. So self-contradictory were its terms that, in the general opinion he who took it implied that he was Presbyterian, Episcopalian, and Roman Catholic at once. On this ground Sir James Dalrymple, President of the Court of Session, demitted his office rather than come under an impossible obligation—eighty of the Episcopalian clergy similarly refusing to do injury to their consciences. The Earl of Argyll agreed to take the Test "as far as it was consistent with itself"; but this conditional pledge was not found satisfactory, and he was committed for trial, which he eluded by escaping from the Castle of Edinburgh where he had been confined. To introduce Catholicism and to prepare the way for his own succession to the throne—such were the manifest ends to which James' action was tending. But, divided as Scottish Protestants might be among themselves, they were united in their dread and hatred of Rome; and various popular manifestations might have warned James of the dangerous path he was treading. The students at the University of Edinburgh burned the Pope in effigy, and those of Glasgow ostentatiously wore the blue riband of the Covenant (1680)—significant indications of the drift of public opinion.

While James was thus alienating many who had hitherto been faithful supporters of the Throne, the struggle between the Government and the Westland Whigs proceeded with increasing exasperation on

both sides. Armed conventicles were still held in various parts of the country; and, goaded to desperation, their frequenters at length virtually declared open war against authority. In their Apologetical Declaration (1684) they announced that, if attacked, they would defend themselves with weapons in their hands. As they had thus openly proclaimed themselves outlaws, the commanders of the Government troops, the most noted of whom were Graham of Claverhouse and Sir Thomas Dalziel, received simple instructions for dealing with their prisoners. If they refused to abjure the "Apologetical Declaration," they were shot; if they abjured it, they were detained for further examination.

The reign of Charles II, which had begun amid such exuberant manifestations of loyalty, closed amid the gloomy forebodings of every class in the country. "Though we change the governors," wrote a moderate loyalist, "yet we find no change in the arbitrary government." No class or order in the country had reason to be satisfied with the policy that had followed the Restoration, in the affairs of either Church or State. Presbyterians of every shade of opinion had been more stringently treated than in the reigns of James VI or Charles I. Nor had Episcopalians, though their Church had received the sanction of the State, found themselves in a position compatible with the dignity and credit of religion—their clergy in all ranks being the nominees of the Crown, and retaining their charges on the condition of absolute obedience to its mandates. For the trading and commercial classes the reign had been disastrous owing to two principal causes. Free trade with England, which had been enjoyed during the Commonwealth and Protectorate, was abolished at the Restoration, with the result that the country lost its best market for corn and cattle. Still more calamitous had been England's ten years' war with Holland, which had begun in 1664. Holland had for centuries been the main outlet for Scottish exports, and by the closing of its ports foreign trade was for the time practically annihilated. No class had hailed the Restoration with greater fervour than the nobles; but their hopes also had been disappointed by a policy which had ignored their order as a whole and given places of authority and trust to a favoured few, who were prepared to be the facile instruments of every new fiat of the royal pleasure. When Charles II died on February 6, 1685, it was with unhappy memories of the past and grave uneasiness for the future that the nation saw James VII ascend the throne.

It was an ominous beginning of the new reign, that James on assuming the Crown did not take the Coronation oath—an omission which was made the gravest charge against him at the crisis of his fate. An Indemnity, granted at his accession, hardly affected the existing situation, as every nonconformist was expressly excluded from its operation. The first year of his reign, indeed, was marked by greater severities against

these persons than at any previous period; and among the people who were the principal sufferers it was known as the "Black Year," the "Killing Time." On April 23, 1685, James' first and only Parliament met, with William, Duke of Queensberry, as Commissioner. The chief reason why it had been summoned (so its members were informed in a royal letter) was that it might have an opportunity "of being exemplary to others"—the "others" being the English Parliament which was about to meet. "Exemplary" the Estates proved, and in a high degree. They pledged themselves to provide a national army whenever it was required, voted the excise to the Crown in perpetuity, and (most stringent of all measures of the kind) enacted that all persons proved to have attended a conventicle should be punished with death and confiscation.

While the Estates were sitting, an attempt was made to effect a revolution. In concert with the Duke of Monmouth, the Earl of Argyll, who had fled to Holland in the previous reign, had approached the west coast at the head of an armament, in the expectation of being joined by his own clansmen and the disaffected people of the west. In this expectation he was disappointed; and delay and mismanagement on the part of the leaders of the expedition doomed it to failure. Captured at Inchinnan in Renfrewshire, Argyll was conveyed to Edinburgh, where he met the same fate as his father, the Covenanting Marquis. Connected with Argyll's enterprise is one of the black pages in the national history. As a precautionary measure it was deemed necessary to bestow in a safe place all who were in ward for religious offences. But secure prisons were not numerous in Scotland. About 200 men and women, therefore, were committed to the vaults of Dunnottar Castle in Kincardineshire, and there confined for two months amid conditions which made their lives a prolonged torture. The danger past, the survivors were offered the alternative of recantation or the Plantations: the majority chose the Plantations.

The proceedings in connexion with the second session of the Parliament, which met at the end of April, 1687, left the country in no doubt as to James' ultimate intentions. As Queensberry, the Commissioner of the previous year, had refused to become a Roman Catholic, the office had been conferred on Viscount Melfort who had been more compliant. This in itself was a significant circumstance, but it was a letter from James to the Parliament that raised the gravest alarm. In this letter the Parliament was recommended to repeal the penal laws against his "innocent subjects, those of the Roman Catholic religion." The Estates replied that they would take his recommendation into their "serious and dutiful consideration" and "go as great lengths therein," as their consciences would allow, but expressed their assurance that "His Majesty will be careful to secure the Protestant religion established by law." After this rebuff James resolved to have done with Parliaments, and he turned to the Privy Council as the convenient instrument for enforcing

his desires. He had in mere courtesy, the Council was informed, requested the Parliament to abolish the penal laws against Roman Catholics; but this request had been wholly unnecessary. The Council was, therefore, commanded to rescind the laws in question, to permit the Catholics the free practice of their religion, and to set apart the Chapel Royal of Holyrood for their special use. Even in the Council, however, there was opposition, and James found it necessary to remove eleven Protestants and to put in their places Catholics, among whom were the Earl of Traquair and the Duke of Gordon.

These were sufficiently clear indications of the object James had in view, and there were other circumstances equally fitted to warn the nation that its religion was in danger. The Lord Chancellor, James, Earl of Perth, and the two Secretaries of State, Viscount Melfort, and Alexander, Earl of Moray, had all become Catholics. A Catholic press was set up in Holyrood under the management of the pamphleteer Sir Roger l'Estrange, and Catholic worship was celebrated in the Chapel. It was not only the Presbyterians who were alarmed at James' policy; their fears were equally shared by the Episcopalians. The Episcopal clergy of the diocese of Aberdeen, the most intensely Episcopalian part of the kingdom, represented to their Bishop the iniquity of abolishing the penal laws against Roman Catholics; and the Bishop of Dunkeld and the Archbishop of Glasgow were deprived because of their opposition to James' action. James could not shut his eyes to the storm he was evoking, and to avert it he took the same step as he had found necessary in England. He published three successive Letters of Indulgence, in the last of which he offered freedom of worship to all nonconformists, Protestant and Roman Catholic alike, provided they taught nothing "to alienate the hearts" of his subjects. By the main body of the Presbyterians this last Letter was accepted, and many of them who had fled to Holland now returned to their own country. To the followers of Cameron, however, the Indulgence brought no respite; only a Covenanted king could satisfy their ideal of a State and Church which had the sanction of Heaven. But their deliverance from the dragoons at least was fast approaching, though they were to yield one more victim to the political necessities of the Restoration. In February, 1688, the year that was to prove fatal to the Stewarts, James Renwick, who had succeeded Richard Cameron as the leader of the devoted remnant, was executed in Edinburgh. In his last words from the scaffold he uttered the warning and prophecy that Scotland "must be rid of Scotland before the delivery came"—words which were to be literally fulfilled in the transformation which she was to undergo in the impending revolution.

The birth of a Prince of Wales (June 30, 1688), which involved a Catholic succession and the eventual dominion of Rome, raised the same forebodings in Scotland as in England. England was now turning to William of Orange as a deliverer, and in William Scotland also saw her

best hope. It was on September 18 that the news of his coming was received; on December 18 William was in Whitehall. Without a struggle James' authority came to an end in Scotland, and for a time law was in abeyance. The Catholic Chapel in Holyrood was sacked by the Edinburgh populace, and the Presbyterians of the west "rabbed" and evicted the obnoxious King's curates with a harshness which showed that their own sufferings had not taught them charity. At length, on the petition of about thirty nobles and eighty gentlemen, William issued a summons for the meeting of the Estates, which duly assembled on March 14, 1689, with a decisive majority in favour of the Revolution. Without and within the Convention, the situation showed that the country was at a turning-point in its destinies. The Castle of Edinburgh was held for James by the Duke of Gordon; and Graham of Claverhouse, now Viscount Dundee, had come down from London at the head of a troop of sixty horse, prepared to act for the exiled King. On their part the supporters of William had introduced armed men from the west to be ready for battle if the occasion should arise. Unmolested, however, the Convention proceeded with the momentous business for which it had met; and its action proved that the cause of William was in the ascendant. By a majority of fifteen the Duke of Hamilton was chosen President; and, when two days after, letters came from William and James, William's was at once read, while before James' was opened it was voted that nothing it contained should invalidate the Convention.

On April 11 the House agreed to a formal "Declaration," consisting of two parts—a Claim of Right, and an offer of the Crown to William and Mary. The Claim asserted that the Estates had the constitutional right to dethrone a ruler who had violated the laws of the kingdom; and it was found that in fifteen cases James had infringed the constitution. On these grounds he was declared to have "forefaulted" the throne; and representatives were commissioned to proceed to London and make formal offer of the Scottish Crown to William and Mary. The ceremony was held at Whitehall on May 11, when William and Mary took the Coronation Oath which James had ignored. To one of its clauses, which bound the sovereign to be "careful to root out all heretics," William raised a demur; but the words were explained to his satisfaction, and that they could be so explained significantly denoted the fact that a new age had begun. Thus Scotland had cast out her native prince—the 109th of his line, as was her proud boast to the nations. In widely different circumstances and with widely different results, the same national inspiration had dethroned James as had overthrown his father. It was the dread of Rome that had inspired the revolt against Charles I, and it was the same dread that had brought disaster to his son. With the Revolution the spectre of Rome ceased to haunt the spirit of the nation, and new cares and new interests were henceforth to determine its future destinies.

In ascending the throne of Scotland William had not behind him the general popular enthusiasm which had hailed Charles II at the Restoration. The first Parliament of Charles was virtually unanimous, and in the exuberance of its loyalty gave its sanction to all the royal measures. Very different was the temper of the first Parliament of William. It was not thought prudent to risk a new election; and the Convention that had dethroned James was continued as a Parliament under the new King. To the chagrin of the Duke of Hamilton, who had been President of the Convention, his place was given to the Earl of Crawford, an ardent Presbyterian. With him, for the management of business, was associated as Lord Advocate Sir John Dalrymple, who had no preference for any form of polity, whether in Church or State, but was simply a statesman of cold, clear, and large intelligence. That William associated these two men as his representatives shows that he saw the necessity of a tentative policy. On Dalrymple devolved the task of upholding the rights of the Crown, which William was fully resolved to maintain. The Parliament met in June, 1689; and Dalrymple found that all his great powers would be taxed to secure his master's interests. Three different sections in the House were bent on giving trouble—Jacobites, who desired the recall of James, Whigs who aimed at curtailing the royal prerogative, and a body of dissatisfied politicians, who came to be known as the Club or the Country Party, ready to play fast and loose, as opportunity offered. It was on the mode of electing the Lords of the Articles that the opposition was mainly concentrated. The later Stewart Kings had virtually assumed the privilege of appointing these officials and thus made themselves masters of the Parliament. William in his instructions offered a remedy for this grievance; instead of twenty-four Lords there should be thirty-three, of whom the Estates, from which the Bishops were excluded as the result of the Revolution, should each choose eleven—the remainder to be made up from officers of State without election. The Opposition refused to accept the compromise, and the question remained in abeyance. But the main concern of the session was the settlement of the question whether Presbyterianism or Episcopacy was to be the national Church. William's recommendation was that, if the Presbyterians proved the predominant body in the nation, theirs should be the chosen Church. The decision at which the Parliament actually arrived showed the uncertainty of the public mind. Episcopacy was abolished, but Presbyterianism was not put in its place—a conclusion which cut off the hopes of the one party and could not satisfy the other.

While Parliament was still sitting, the supporters of James made a bold stroke for his restoration. The hero of the adventure was Viscount Dundee, whom both his instincts and his interests attached to the House of Stewart. In the Highlands, henceforward to be the stronghold of Jacobite hopes, he succeeded in collecting a force with which he threatened

to descend into the Lowland country. Met at Killiecrankie (July 27) by General Mackay, he fell in the hour of a brilliant victory, and, as there was no one equal to carrying on his enterprise, the danger to the Government passed as quickly as it had arisen.

The Government was safe from immediate danger; but the most critical question with which it had to deal—the settlement of religion—had yet to be faced. The predominance of national feeling in favour of Presbyterianism was not so decisive as to make it clear which form of polity should receive the preference. Moreover, the difficulties of William and his advisers were increased by the fact that the Church of England had declared her resolution to stand or fall with her sister Church in Scotland. In his uncertainty William took the advice of one who of all men was best fitted to give it—William Carstares, a Presbyterian minister who had been exiled in the reign of Charles II, and had made William's acquaintance in Holland. Mainly on the counsel of Carstares, William resolved to establish Presbyterianism as the national Church; and with this object the Parliament met in its second session (1690). The same parties appeared as in the previous year; but the extreme Whigs were conciliated by the abolition of the Lords of the Articles; and the Government succeeded in giving effect to its ecclesiastical measures. The assumption of the later Stewarts that the King was "supreme over all persons and in all causes ecclesiastical" was declared unconstitutional; sixty ministers, the survivors of those who had been ejected since 1661, were restored to their parishes; and Presbyterianism was established as the national Church. Finally, against the wishes of William, patronage was annulled and the right of electing ministers conferred on the congregations.

In spite of the sanction which had thus been given to Presbyterianism, it was with grave apprehensions that William and his advisers looked forward to the meeting of the General Assembly, which had been fixed for the following October. It was the first Assembly since that which had been broken up by the officials of the Commonwealth in 1653; and the natural dread was that the now triumphant Presbyterians would mete out such treatment to the Episcopalians as might endanger the peace of the country. A hundred and eighty members, laymen and divines, appeared on the appointed day, but among them were none from the north—the stronghold of Episcopacy; and, though three Cameronian ministers were received at their own express desire, they did not represent the majority of that body, to whom the Revolution Settlement was an unblessed compromise. The main business of the Assembly was to make arrangements for setting the new Church in order; and with this object it appointed two Commissioners, one for the north and the other for the south of the river Tay. The duty of the Commissioners was to restore church order and to extrude such ministers, Presbyterians and Episcopalians alike, as failed to give satisfaction in their doctrines and practices.

The Commissioner for the south had a comparatively easy task, as there he had the sympathy of clergy and people; but in the Episcopalian north the work of purification met with determined opposition, and so harsh were the measures employed that the Government had to control the zeal of the inquisition.

So far as the Lowland country was concerned, the Government had no reason to fear a serious rising in favour of the exiled King; but in the Highlands there were symptoms of unrest which demanded vigorous measures if the public peace was to be secure. For various reasons the sympathies of many of the Highland chiefs went with the Stewart. James, we have seen, had, while Commissioner under his brother, made a special effort to conciliate them; and in the eyes of the chiefs of the west, the ascendancy of the House of Argyll, assured by the Revolution, was a hateful fact that made them the natural enemies of the new Government. As the disaffected chiefs were led to believe that a French armament was about to arrive in the interests of James, their attitude became more and more menacing; and it was necessary to take measures to avert a probable rising.

First, as a means of conciliating the impecunious chiefs, over £12,000 was distributed among them, but with so little effect that Dalrymple was in doubt whether the money would not have been better employed "to settle the Highlands or to ravage them." This measure having failed, an order was issued commanding all chiefs who had not yet done so to take the oath of allegiance by January 1, 1692, under "the utmost penalty of the law." All the chiefs took the oath by the prescribed date except Macdonald of Glencoe, who in bravado postponed the obnoxious act till the day of grace was past. As in Dalrymple's opinion the Clan Macdonald was "the worst in all the Highlands," he resolved, with unconcealed satisfaction, that it should be made an example of what the Government could effect against its enemies. Through his action as prime mover, a troop of a hundred and twenty men were quartered in the vale of Glencoe, and were hospitably entertained by the inhabitants for nearly a fortnight. On the morning of February 13, the errand of blood on which they had come was accomplished. The chief and thirty-seven of his clan were butchered, and the remainder escaped massacre only through the darkness of the morning and the neighbourhood of the hills. Had the Massacre of Glencoe occurred at any period previous to the Revolution, it would have been regarded merely as another of the long list of atrocities recorded in Highland history; but it was the interest of the Jacobites to stigmatise the existing Government, and at home and abroad they denounced the crime as an example of the iniquity of which it was capable. It was against Dalrymple, detested for other reasons, that the clamour was loudest; and, though William himself had signed the letters of fire and sword against the Macdonalds, he was at length (1695) constrained to grant a commission for an enquiry. As

its result, Dalrymple resigned his office of Secretary, and remained in privacy till the next reign, when his remarkable gifts were to be signally displayed in the service of his country.

The great problem for William in the government of Scotland was to conciliate the Episcopalians who composed such a formidable body of his subjects. On the loyalty of the Presbyterians he could securely reckon, since, however they might grumble and protest, they would in no event find it their interest to prefer the Stewart to himself. The Episcopalians, on the other hand, who had lost their status through his accession and had no prospect of recovering it, were his natural enemies, and their one aim must be to undo the Revolution. It was thus evidently William's interest to make their position as tolerable as was consistent with the maintenance of his own authority. In 1693 the Parliament again met—the first time since 1690; and his representatives succeeded in carrying two measures intended to improve the existing situation. From the peculiar tenure by which William held the Crown the Jacobites had found a convenient ambiguity in the terms of the Oath of Allegiance: they might swear that he was King *in fact*, but with the mental reservation that he was not King *of right*. To remove the ambiguity it was enacted that to the Oath of Allegiance there should be added an "Assurance" affirming that William was King *of right* as well as *in fact*. It reveals the difficulty of William's position that the "Assurance" was as obnoxious to the Presbyterians as to the Episcopalians against whom it was specially aimed; in the eyes of the former the exaction of such a pledge was an assumption of the Crown over the Church which had been the damning offence of William's predecessors. The other important Act of the session equally failed in its object of improving the ecclesiastical situation. By the terms of this Act all ministers were to be admitted into the national Church who should subscribe the Confession of Faith, the Oath of Allegiance, and the Assurance. To the Presbyterians the Act seemed only a deep-laid scheme to swamp the Church with Episcopalians, and to the Episcopalians the conditions it offered were incompatible at once with their principles and their aspirations. Thus abortive proved William's well-meant scheme of comprehension, and alike for religion and the State its failure was to be a national disaster in the years that were to come.

The last important event of William's reign was one which is written large in Scottish annals and, in its origin and its effects, is to be regarded as one of the most significant in the national history. In the process of public affairs since the Revolution, it had become evident that a new spirit reigned in the councils of the statesmen who were responsible for the conduct of the country; and in no sphere of their action had the change been more conspicuous than in their settlement of religion. The framers of the Solemn League and Covenant had sought to impose

Presbytery on the three nations on the ground that it was the one form of polity which had the sanction of Heaven; the authors of the Revolution Settlement had established Presbytery as the national Church, because it was the most expedient policy in the interests of the new régime. Thus in the minds of statesmen secular had overridden theological considerations; and it was now to be proved that a similar change had come over the spirit of the nation. In the year 1695 James Paterson brought forward his scheme for the founding of a Scottish colony on the Isthmus of Darien: the scheme received the sanction of the Scottish Parliament and of the King; and subscriptions were promised from Holland, always on good terms with Scotland, and at first from London. But the enterprise, so promisingly begun, evoked the commercial jealousy of English traders; and, to the bitter indignation of the Scots, William was persuaded to withdraw his sanction. Thrown upon their own resources, the promoters of the scheme in Scotland appealed to their own countrymen; subscription lists were opened, and the response by all ranks and classes of the nation recalled the days of the signing of the National Covenant. The enterprise thus launched proved a temporary national calamity. A pestilential climate, the active opposition of the English merchants, and the hostility of the Spaniards, who claimed possession of the Isthmus, baffled the efforts of the colonists to effect a settlement; and three successive expeditions experienced the same fate. The immediate result of the tragical failure of what was a national enterprise was exasperation against William and England; and this remained an abiding feeling to the close of the reign. But in the national development the Darien scheme has a wider significance. That the nation which for a century and a half had been dominated by theological interests should have thrown itself with such enthusiasm into a purely secular enterprise was a striking proof that a revolution had been wrought in the public mind. Scotland, following the example of other countries in Europe, had in fact entered on a stage of development in which material interests had become the prime consideration, alike in her foreign relations and in her internal economy.

Such being now the dominant national preoccupation, the result of the Darien scheme could not but suggest to responsible statesmen both in England and Scotland that the existing relations of both countries could not remain as they were—that complete separation or a closer union lay in the necessity of things. During the closing years of William's reign the state of opinion in Scotland pointed to the former alternative as the more probable event. Yet amid all the clamour against William and the English there was one consideration that held the majority of the nation fast to the Revolution Settlement—the dread of the return of the Stewart with absolutism and Roman Catholicism as its inevitable result. A common Protestantism, a common political ideal, and common material

interests, on the one hand, and national sentiment and national antipathies, on the other—between these warring forces the two nations had to decide whether their destinies were to lie apart or to be joined in indissoluble union.

Throughout the reign of Anne (1702-14) the dominant concern of Scotland was the Union—first, as an impending and, afterwards, as an accomplished fact. It had been the dying counsel of William that, in the interest of both countries, the Union should be effected at the earliest date possible; and, as it chanced, the Tory Queen Anne was of the same opinion as her Whig predecessor. Anne's first action in Scottish affairs decisively showed that she and her advisers had the great object at heart. In her first speech to the English Parliament she expressly suggested that Commissioners from both countries should be appointed to treat regarding the conditions under which the Union might be accomplished. The Commissioners were actually appointed (1702); but public opinion in neither country was sufficiently ripe for the momentous transaction, and their meetings led to no immediate result. It was the proceedings in the successive sessions of the Scottish Parliament which at length convinced both nations that there was no other alternative than complete severance or closer union.

By an Act of the previous reign (1696), similar to one passed in the Parliament of England, it had been settled that the existing Parliament should meet twenty days after the King's death, and should continue to sit for six months thereafter. As the Parliament did not meet within the prescribed period, the Duke of Hamilton protested that it could not be held a legal body; and, at the head of fifty-seven members, he marched out of the House. The members who remained, a hundred and twenty in number and contemptuously nicknamed the "Rump," were virtually unanimous in passing a succession of Whig measures, and, what is specially noteworthy, in response to the Queen's request desired her to nominate Scottish Commissioners to treat regarding union with a similar body representing England. But it was not this Parliament that was to have the responsibility of consummating the Treaty of Union. In 1703 a new Parliament was returned—the first elected since 1689, and destined to be the last in its succession. In the previous year the English Bill against Occasional Conformity, which would have deprived Dissenters of civic status, had been introduced into the English Parliament; and, though it was defeated by the Lords, it had been ardently supported by the Commons. In the eyes of the Scottish Presbyterians the approval which the Bill had received could only portend the eventual triumph of Episcopacy in both countries; and to avert the dreaded event they spared no effort to secure a majority in the new Parliament. Their efforts were successful, and it was a Parliament with a Whig and Presbyterian majority that carried the Union. This was to be its great achievement;

but its action during its three antecedent sessions gave little promise of such a result. The one motive animating all parties was hostility to England and the determination to let her know that Scotland was an independent kingdom. The Duke of Queensberry, who was continued as Commissioner in the new Parliament, was instructed in the first place to obtain a grant of supply, and, next, to secure the passing of an Act of Settlement similar to the English Act which devolved the Crown on the Electress Sophia and her heirs. In neither object did he succeed; what the Parliament did, Whig and Tory agreeing, was to pass an Act of Security, which declared that, twenty days after the death of the reigning sovereign without issue, the Estates were to name a successor who should be a Protestant and a descendant of the House of Stewart: whoever this successor might be, he or she must not be the person designated by the Parliament of England unless under conditions that secured to Scotland complete freedom of government, religion, and trade. To such an Act, which virtually declared Scotland an independent kingdom, the Government could not give its sanction; and the session closed amid mutual recrimination between the Commissioner and the House.

When this refractory Parliament met in the following year (1704), the new Commissioner, the Marquis of Tweeddale, found it as resolute as ever to have its own way: no supply would be granted till the Act of Security received the royal sanction. As the less of two evils, Godolphin, the English Treasurer, advised the Queen to yield; and the Act was passed. It was intended as a defiance to England, but by the irony of events it was the chief immediate cause in furthering union. As a direct reply to Scotland's challenge, the Tory House of Lords and the Whig House of Commons passed an Act which declared that, unless the Crown of Scotland were settled by Christmas Day, 1705, all Scotsmen would be declared aliens and the importation of Scottish commodities prohibited. By the same Act, however, the Queen was empowered to appoint Commissioners to negotiate a union between the two countries, never less disposed to fraternal feelings than at this moment. But the threat contained in the English Alien Act had the desired result. The Scottish Estates were satisfied with having asserted the national feeling in the Act of Security; and, when they met in the following year (1705) under the presidency of the Earl of Argyll, they passed an "Act for a Treaty with England," by which the Queen was desired to appoint Commissioners to negotiate the terms on which the union might be concluded.

The two Commissions, each consisting of thirty-one representatives, met on April 16, 1706, and in nine weeks accomplished a task which in the opinion of the majority of both nations had seemed "a chimera of the English ministry." By the terms of the proposed Treaty, as it finally emerged from their hands, the two kingdoms were to be united

under the name of Great Britain; the United Kingdom was to be represented by one Parliament; and the Crown was to devolve on the House of Hanover in accordance with the English Act of Settlement. There was to be complete freedom of trade between the two countries, both at home and abroad; in the case of certain commodities—malt, salt, stamped paper, vellum and parchment, etc., Scotland was for a time to be partially exempt from duties; and her proportion of the land-tax was to be one-fortieth of that of England. In compensation for her losses at the hands of various English trading companies and of her share in England's national debt, she was to receive an "equivalent" of £398,085. 10s. 0d., which was to be expended in recouping the parties who had suffered these losses and in encouraging trade and industry. In the United Parliament sixteen Scottish peers, elected by their own body, were to sit in the House of Lords, and forty-five Scottish members in the House of Commons. Scotland was to retain her own Courts of Law, with the addition of a Court of Exchequer which was to deal exclusively with fiscal questions. The privileges of the Royal Burghs and the feudal jurisdictions of the nobles were to remain intact; and, finally, as sign and symbol of the completed union, the arms of the two countries were to be conjoined, as her Majesty saw fit, on "all flags, banners, standards, and ensigns both at sea and land."

The Articles, as drafted by the two Commissions, had now to receive the sanction of the Parliaments of both countries, and, as the greatest opposition was anticipated from the Parliament of Scotland, it was deemed prudent that it should first sit in judgment on the Treaty. The last of Scottish Parliaments, it met in its last session on October 3, 1706, with Queensberry as Commissioner, Lord Seafield as Chancellor, and the Earl of Mar as Secretary of State. In the teeth of a hostility which threatened civil war, the Government addressed itself to the task of passing the Treaty into law. From the Convention of Burghs and from every royal burgh except Ayr, petitions poured in, denouncing the proposed union; in Edinburgh and Glasgow there were open riots, and at Dumfries the Treaty was publicly burned. It was from the national Church, which dreaded union as inevitably involving the ruin of Presbytery, that the most dangerous opposition was anticipated; but its leaders were appeased by an Act of Security which guaranteed the existing establishment "to continue without any alteration to the people of this land to all generations." Opposed at almost every step by the different parties in the House, the Articles were at length successfully carried without essential modification; and on January 16, 1707, Queensberry touched the Act of Union with the royal sceptre, and at the same time, as inviolably bound up with it, the Act for the security of the national Church. In the English Parliament, the Articles had met with little opposition, and on March 6 the Queen gave the royal assent to the Act in the presence of the Lords and Commons.

The Treaty of Union, which had thus been sanctioned by the Parliaments of both nations, was not to result in immediate and fraternal cooperation. How the Treaty was regarded by the general educated opinion of Scotland, it is difficult to determine; for, as a leading Jacobite of the time admitted, the petitions against it were in general inspired and even manufactured by the Jacobite party. By the mass of the people, influenced by national sentiment and traditional dislike of England, it was long considered as a disgraceful transaction—the work of venal statesmen and traitors to their country. And in the years that immediately followed there was not a class which did not find ground for alarm in the treatment it received from a legislature in which English influence was necessarily predominant. The nobility were irritated by what they considered infringements of their order; the Church saw in an Act that restored patronage a deliberate intention of reviving Episcopacy; the traders and merchants were exasperated by taxation which they declared to be at once unjust and a breach of the Treaty of Union. Not till towards the middle of the eighteenth century did the national prosperity become so apparent as to convince the majority of Scotsmen that the Union had been a necessity and a blessing. The preeminent advantage that Union brought to both countries, had, indeed, been the same—strength and security as the result of their combined resources. Had Scotland become an independent kingdom retaining her ancient traditions, England would have been seriously crippled in the course she was to run. On the other hand, Scotland, to hold her own in the conflict of material interests in which the nations were now engaged, would have required a fleet and an army, the maintenance of which would have overstrained her resources and permanently retarded their development. Relieved from this necessity and no longer dominated by theological preoccupations, she was at liberty to pursue the new paths on which she had entered at the Revolution; and it was only these new conditions that rendered possible her growth in material prosperity and her contribution to the world's thought, which make the close of the eighteenth century the most distinguished period in her annals.

(3) IRELAND FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE
ACT OF RESUMPTION.

(1660—1700.)

In the fulness of his joy at finding himself safely seated on the throne of his fathers Charles II had expressed his desire to make his people as truly happy as he himself was. So far as Ireland was concerned, it was soon apparent that the attempt to make all happy was likely to end in gratifying nobody. There had been a rebellion in Ireland; the rebellion had been suppressed with the result that the greater part of the soil of the country had passed into the hands of those who had been instrumental in suppressing it. That the Irish had deserved their fate every Englishman was convinced. On the other hand the Irish were not slow to point out to Charles that the rebellion had been condoned by the treaties of 1646 and 1648-9, and that in sharing his exile with him they were entitled to share also his restoration. The argument, so long as no one enquired too closely into the premisses on which it was based, appeared plausible enough. But by accepting his restoration at the hands of the new settlers Charles had deprived himself of all choice in the matter. His decision to leave the decision of the question to Parliament was accepted as satisfactory by the Convention of Estates that met at Dublin in February, 1660. Being in possession, the colonists could afford to wait. But it was otherwise with the Irish, whose impatience to recover their forfeited properties led them in some isolated instances to attempt a forcible ejection of the new occupants. The latter did not fail to make the most of these disturbances, in order to impress upon their friends in England the danger of a fresh rebellion. Pressure was brought to bear on the King; and on June 1 strict orders were issued to suppress all such disorderly proceedings, and to confirm the adventurers and soldiers in the temporary possession of their estates. Still, there can be no question that Charles was seriously anxious to gratify, as far as he possibly could, all reasonable claims on the part of his quondam allies; and, being led to believe that a sufficient fund of lands existed to enable him to do so, without touching the interests of the adventurers and soldiers, he issued, on November 30, a Declaration for settling the affairs of Ireland.

The Declaration (afterwards embodied in the Act of Settlement) was admirably calculated to satisfy everybody, on the one condition that sufficient lands could be found for the purpose. The plan on which it was based had been suggested by the agents of the new settlers, in the belief that few Irish would be able to prove their innocency. To make sure of this point, they took care that in selecting the commission before which the Irish were to plead their claims, their own interests should be exclusively represented. But in this they overshot their mark. For, after wasting much time and displaying incredible partiality, the commission was dissolved. Checked in this direction, the new settlers (or, as they called themselves, "the English interest") found themselves suddenly attacked by the old settlers (nicknamed "the Irish interest"), who pointed out that, if there was a deficiency of land to satisfy the Irish according to the King's intentions, it could easily be made good by forcing the adventurers to disgorge the lands they had illegally acquired under the so-called Doubling Ordinance of 1643. The controversy waxed hot in the Parliament which met in May, 1661; and the new settlers, finding themselves likely to be outvoted if they tried to pass the Declaration as it stood, effected a compromise, by which it was agreed to refer the matter to the King in Council. Backed by English opinion, they hoped to recover in London what ground they had lost in Dublin. But as Ormond, whom Charles appointed Lord Lieutenant in November, clearly recognised, the question, though veiled as one between the old and new settlers, was in reality a contest between the latter and the Irish claiming restoration. The Irish, with the support of the old settlers, held a strong position. Unfortunately, by disclaiming the character of rebels and by insisting too strongly on the simple justice of their demands, they managed to put themselves in a false position. The production of the original instructions from the Supreme Council to their agents abroad, authorising them to dispose of the kingdom to any Catholic Prince who would take it under his protection, settled the matter against them. The debates in Council which had threatened to prove interminable found a sudden conclusion; and the Bill for the Settlement of Ireland, being returned to the Irish Parliament, passed in May, 1662, and received the royal assent in September.

As a concession to the Irish a commission, consisting of seven Englishmen nominally unconnected with any interest in Ireland, was appointed to decide the claims to innocence. The Commissioners opened their Court on September 20; but it was not till January 13, 1663, that they actually began their sittings. More than 4000 claims for restoration, it was said, had been entered. By the end of the month only twenty-seven cases had been decided; but, of these, twenty-one had been admitted. The Cromwellians were alarmed. Complaints of partiality were raised against the Commissioners. A proposal to require proofs of innocency more stringent than those already exacted was not carried out;

but the dissatisfaction caused by the proceedings of the Commissioners grew from day to day. A plot to overturn the Government was detected and several individuals implicated in it were executed. The incident exercised a sobering effect on all parties. Urged by their fears, the Cromwellians expressed a readiness to come to terms. Their offer to surrender one-third of the estates in their possession on May 7, 1659, was accepted; and on this basis a Bill for the Explanation of the Act of Settlement was drawn up and, after various interruptions, became law on December 23, 1665.

The end had come at last. Taking the total arable land of Ireland at Sir William Petty's estimate of about seven and a half million plantation acres, and discriminating three sets of proprietors, viz. (1) the native interest, including families of Anglo-Norman descent; (2) the Irish interest, i.e. the planters introduced by Elizabeth and James I, including the Church of Ireland; (3) the English interest, i.e. the Cromwellian element, it would appear that by the operation of the Acts of Settlement and Explanation an equal portion of land (or about two and a half million acres) was definitely assigned to each class. Of the multitude, who could expect no hearing in the new Court of Claims that opened its sittings on January 4, 1666, to administer the Acts, hundreds took to the congenial calling of Tories (outlaws).

The settlement had not come a minute too soon. The economic crisis through which England was at this time passing had led to a strong demand for protection against the introduction of Irish live-stock into the English market. An Act had accordingly been passed in 1663, limiting the importation of Irish cattle to the first six months of the year. The measure, though it pressed heavily on Ireland, only slowly recovering from the ravages of war, was not attended with the success that had been predicted for it; and in October, 1665, a Bill was introduced absolutely prohibiting the importation of all live-stock from Ireland. The Bill was opposed in the House of Lords; and, the prorogation of Parliament having put a temporary stop to proceedings, it was hoped that the generous contribution of 30,000 head of Irish cattle towards the relief of London, after the Great Fire, would incline the English Commons to a more liberal treatment of the Irish landowners. These hopes were disappointed. For no sooner had Parliament reassembled in the autumn of 1666, than the Commons promptly agreed to a Bill for the virtual exclusion of all great cattle, sheep, and swine as well as of all beef, pork and bacon, on the ground that such imports were destructive of the prosperity of the country and a "common nuisance." On January 18, 1667, the Bill, after a fierce contest in the House of Lords, received the royal assent. The consequences of the measure were soon apparent. From statistics taken at the time it appears that whereas in 1665 57,545 oxen and 99,564 sheep were exported from Ireland, in 1669 the number had fallen to 1454 oxen and 1120 sheep. On the other

hand, barrelled beef, butter, tallow, hides, and above all wool, which rose from 131,013 stone to 254,760, showed a remarkable increase. These statistics are significant. By closing the English market against Irish live-stock, the Act practically killed the chief existing Irish industry. Unable to find a market for their lean cattle the Irish landowners turned their land into sheep-walks and took to fattening their own stock for the provision trade. Irish wool was of excellent quality; but its exportation (except to England) was severely restricted, and finding no legal outlet for it the Irish established a woollen industry of their own. Owing largely to Ormond's encouragement the industry began to flourish. English capital found its way into the country; skilled labour was introduced; and, though debarred by the Act of Navigation from directly participating in the colonial trade, Ireland, owing to the cheapness of living and labour, was ere long able not merely to compete with England but even to undersell her in the European market. The linen manufacture revived. Other trades followed in the wake of the chief industries; and for twenty years Ireland enjoyed a period of unexampled commercial prosperity.

As a result, religious discord lost much of its asperity. No doubt, the restoration of Episcopacy and the ejection of their ministers caused much bitter feeling among the Presbyterians of Ulster, especially where they constituted the bulk of the population. But such struggles as those which soured the existence and frustrated the labours of Jeremy Taylor in the diocese of Down and Connor were happily exceptional; and it may be said that throughout the whole reign the position of the Protestant nonconformists in Ireland contrasted favourably with that of their fellows in England and Scotland. Nor had the Roman Catholics much reason to complain. The policy inaugurated by the Commonwealth of excluding them from corporate towns was theoretically maintained; but there was no attempt made to interfere with individual liberty of conscience or to exclude them from the higher professions. Ormond, whose object was to stimulate a feeling of loyalty to the Crown by repressing the religious bigotry of both Protestants and Catholics, had, shortly after assuming the government, been much gratified by the presentation of an address by Peter Walsh, a Franciscan friar, on behalf of a number of Catholic clergy and gentry, protesting their unfeigned loyalty to the Crown and disclaiming all foreign power "either papal or princely, spiritual or temporal." The Loyal Remonstrance, as it was called, was greeted with contumely by the Ultramontanes; but it afforded Ormond the opportunity he wanted of drawing a distinction between loyal and disloyal Roman Catholicism. Whether his policy of playing one party off against the other, with the avowed object of ultimately weakening both, would have been followed by the success he expected may be doubted; but it was certainly attended by a more tolerant treatment of the Catholics generally.

Before, however, it had time to fully develop, Ormond was recalled. The real reason of his removal, though veiled by charges of issuing a commission of martial law in time of peace, and of misapplication of the revenue, is to be found in the intrigues which had led to the downfall of his friend the Earl of Clarendon. His successor, Lord Robartes, owed his appointment to the zeal with which he had advocated the claim of the Crown to exercise a dispensing power in the matter of religious tests; but, having during his six months of office managed to render himself personally objectionable to all classes of the community, except to the more rigid Presbyterians, with whose tenets he sympathised, he retired in a huff in May, 1670. He was followed by John Lord Berkeley of Stratton. Berkeley's appointment, though apparently devoid of political significance, was like that of Robartes, a step carefully calculated in the spirit of the Treaty of Dover. Of a naturally indolent disposition, Berkeley, through his wife and his secretary, Sir Ellis Leighton, was entirely under Catholic influence.

With Leighton's assistance Richard Talbot, better known by his subsequent title of Duke of Tyrconnel, and his brother Peter, the recently-appointed titular Archbishop of Dublin, speedily effected a radical change in the conduct of public affairs. Not only was the favour that had hitherto been shown to the Remonstrants withdrawn and a systematic attempt made to prosecute them out of existence; but, under colour of carrying out the King's intentions, a number of Catholics were placed on the Commission of the Peace, and a proclamation was issued in March, 1672, dispensing with the Oath of Supremacy as a condition of their admission to the Corporations. Moreover, at Talbot's instigation, the King consented to the appointment of a committee to consider the desirability of instituting an "impartial" enquiry into the execution of the Acts of Settlement. The indignation of the Protestants was unmistakable; and, foreseeing a storm in Parliament, Charles prudently transferred the government to Arthur Capel, Earl of Essex, a zealous Protestant. As he had anticipated, the English Parliament had no sooner met than a vigorous address was presented to him in March, 1673, insisting on the maintenance of the Acts of Settlement, the revocation of the Commission of Enquiry, and the removal of Talbot from his counsels. Charles yielded. All the same, he had no intention of surrendering the advantage he had gained. Essex gradually began to perceive which way the wind was blowing. For himself he was willing enough to pursue a neutral policy; but, to his credit, he was too honest to become a mere tool for the subversion of the Protestant interest and for exploiting the country in the interests of the harpies that battered on the extravagance of the King. When he refused to carry on the government without being allowed to exercise any control over the revenue, he was recalled (1677).

The unexpected reappointment of Ormond was hailed with satisfaction

by the Irish Protestants. Recent events had not tended to inspire them with confidence in the Government. The finances of the country were in disorder; and, though Ormond had obtained Charles' consent to a more rigorous control of the revenue, the only radical remedy for the situation lay, as he clearly saw, in summoning a Parliament. Before, however, anything could be done in this direction, the Government was distracted by the news of the discovery of a popish plot in England, with ramifications extending, it was alleged, to Ireland. Uncertain at first what credit to give to Oates' revelations, Ormond thought it prudent to arrest one or two suspicious individuals, and to issue orders for disarming the Catholics. His moderation, however, gave great offence to Shaftesbury and his allies, and knowing, as he said, that his position was a slippery one, he saw himself constrained to issue a proclamation to encourage persons to come forward to make discoveries of the plot. The proclamation, though it did not fail to bring forth a host of informers and to lead in the end to the judicial murder of Oliver Plunkett, Catholic Archbishop of Armagh, failed to answer the expectations of the managers of the agitation. When the reaction came, Ormond's difficulties wore off; but only, as it proved, to be followed, after a short pause, by others of an even more serious nature.

The opportunity, for which Charles had long been waiting, to free himself from the control of the Protestant party in Ireland, seemed to have arrived at last. By the advice of the Duke of York and Talbot he resolved to recall Ormond, to divide the civil from the military authority, and, by placing the latter in the hands of a trusty Catholic, to remodel the army on a Catholic basis. At the same time a commission was to be issued for the establishment of a Court of Grace, nominally to enable the new settlers to strengthen their defeasible titles, really as a means of clipping their properties in the interest of the Irish. It is hard to say to what lengths Charles was willing to go; but before matters could be arranged he died. His death did not materially affect the situation. Ormond, having proclaimed James II, retired from the government. Pending the appointment of his successor the government was placed in commission, and in the interval advantage was taken of Monmouth's rebellion to effect a partial disarmament of the Protestants. In January, 1686, the Earl of Clarendon was sworn Lord Lieutenant; but the real director of Irish affairs was Talbot, whom James shortly after his accession had created Earl of Tyrconnel, and whom he now appointed commander-in-chief of the army. In pursuance of the plan already agreed upon, Tyrconnel set to work at once to remodel the army on a Catholic basis. His proceedings did not fail to alarm the Protestants; and, as Clarendon, whose pride was hurt at the daily insults offered to his authority, failed to prove as subservient an instrument as James had expected to find in him, he was recalled and the government transferred to Tyrconnel (January, 1687).

This appointment, while it inspired the Protestants with the gravest apprehensions, so that thousands of them, it was said, disposed of their property and fled the country, afforded the liveliest satisfaction to the natives, who, in the expectation of a speedy reversal of the Acts of Settlement, were already in imagination revelling in the recovery of their forfeited estates. The fears and hopes of both alike were well founded. Towards the end of August Tyrconnel was granted an interview with James at Chester, who approved his proceedings and, it is asserted on credible authority, arranged with him a plan whereby, in the event of his policy in England miscarrying and the succession falling to a Protestant, Ireland was to be put in a position to maintain itself as an independent kingdom.

Events moved faster than either expected. With the cheers of his own army ringing in his ears at the acquittal of the Bishops, James turned for assistance to Tyrconnel, as his father had to Strafford, and, despite the warning voice of Sunderland, 3000 Irish troops were transported to England during the autumn of 1688. The assistance, purchased at the price of exasperating public opinion in England, proved of no use to James, while by compelling Tyrconnel to denude Derry of its garrison the opportunity was given for a revolt which was destined to upset all his plans. Recognising his mistake, he ordered the Earl of Antrim to proceed with his regiment to Derry. But the tinder had already taken fire. Alarmed at the menacing attitude of the natives and by rumours of an intended repetition of the horrors of 1641, the citizens of Derry, actuated by one of those sudden impulses of self-preservation that override all habits of obedience to authority, gave the signal for rebellion by closing the gates of the city in the face of the royal army. Enniskillen followed suit, and everywhere the Protestant colonists drew together for safety and formed military associations for their defence. Taken by surprise, Tyrconnel seemed to hesitate. Thinking he might be won over, William sent Richard Hamilton over to negotiate terms with him. Hamilton betrayed his trust; and, after Tyrconnel had thus learnt the real state of affairs in England, his hesitation, real or affected, quickly passed away. By the end of January, 1689, he had got together an army of 36,000 men; and, though they were badly officered and but partly armed, the prospect according to Pointis, whom Louis had sent over to report on the situation, was encouraging.

Meanwhile a strong force under Hamilton was despatched into the north, to put an end to the resistance there. At Dromore he came up with the bulk of the Protestants under Sir Arthur Rawdon and Major Baker. Seeing themselves overmatched, they broke and fled, some to Coleraine, others to Derry and Enniskillen, breaking down the bridges in their rear, and destroying everything they could not carry away with them. On March 12—two days before the “Break of Dromore”—James, accompanied by the Count d’Avaux as Louis’ plenipotentiary and

a number of French officers who were to assist him in organising his forces, landed at Kinsale with a small army of about 1200 men, for the most part his own subjects. On landing, he was heartily welcomed by the Catholics of the district; and a promise on his part to take the Protestants under his protection went some way to disarm opposition on their part. At Cork he was met by Tyrconnel, who escorted him in triumph to Dublin.

All the same, James' heart was not in the enterprise. He had hoped with Louis' assistance to have made a direct descent on England. But Louis was anxious at almost any price to avoid an open breach with England. By assisting James to establish himself firmly in Ireland he hoped, at a moderate cost to himself, to prevent William from interfering actively on the Continent. It is doubtful whether James saw through Louis' scheme; but it was not long before Tyrconnel recognised James' perfect indifference to Ireland, and perceived, from his endeavour to reconcile the Protestants, that his thoughts were all the time concentrated on England. For such a plan, however, Tyrconnel was not to be had. First and foremost, he was an Irishman. His object, to put it plainly, was to sever the connexion with Great Britain. If James was willing to be King of Ireland, well and good; if not, then Tyrconnel was ready to offer the crown to Louis. But in this he reckoned without Louis himself, who no sooner heard of the intention than he clearly indicated his dislike to the proposal. In the background stood d'Avaux, cynically urging the extirpation of the Protestants as the only rational solution of the situation.

On March 24 James made his public entry into Dublin. Next day he published a batch of proclamations, commanding all his subjects who had fled the kingdom to return to their allegiance, under a general promise of taking the Protestants into his protection; forbidding robberies; ordering a market to be opened for the provisioning of the army; raising the nominal value of the currency, and convoking a Parliament to meet at Dublin on May 7. At the same time, he created Tyrconnel a Duke, and admitted d'Avaux to a seat at the Privy Council. This done, he announced his intention of proceeding in person to Derry. Once in possession of that city, there was nothing to prevent him from crossing with his army into Scotland. Tyrconnel and d'Avaux did their utmost to dissuade him; but, supported by Melfort and the English Jacobites, he held to his purpose, and shortly afterwards set out for the north.

Since their rout at Dromore the Protestants of Ulster found themselves in a precarious position. Driven northwards by Hamilton's advancing forces, as many as were able to do so took shipping and fled to England; a few accepted protection from the Irish general; others found a refuge in Enniskillen and Derry, the rest ensconced themselves in Coleraine, whence they appealed to Robert Lundy at Derry for help.

Lundy's position was a peculiar one. He was a Protestant, and had been appointed military governor of Derry at the instance of one of the most trusted leaders of the party, William Stewart, Viscount Mountjoy. Yet he had from the first failed to give entire satisfaction to the more resolutely-minded citizens, who suspected him, perhaps not altogether without reason, of being secretly a Jacobite; and it must be admitted that, whether he was a traitor at heart or not, his conduct had the effect of nearly wrecking the Protestant cause. Sligo in particular, with almost as good a chance of holding out as Enniskillen, was lost by his contradictory orders. On the other hand, his advice to evacuate Coleraine appears to have been founded on sound military reasons; and he cannot be held responsible for the panic-stricken flight that followed its rejection. Owing to bad weather, the almost impassable condition of the roads, and the difficulty of finding provisions in a country almost devoid of inhabitants, James' army advancing in two divisions—the one under Hamilton against Derry, the other under Galmoy against Enniskillen—made slow progress. On April 13 the former came up with Lundy's outposts at Cladyford, about three miles above Strabane on the Finn, and, after some sharp fighting, succeeded two days later in forcing a passage at Castlefinn. Finding their flank turned and their retreat menaced, Lundy's raw levies broke and fled in wild confusion to Derry, closely followed for some miles by Hamilton's cavalry. The bulk of them got safely into the city, but a number of isolated parties were wiped out.

Disgusted and dismayed at the conduct of his troops, Lundy saw no chance of holding out against the overwhelming force which, with King James at its head, was now rapidly approaching the city. At a council of war he gave his advice in favour of a capitulation. In the light of subsequent events his conduct may be regarded as an act of treachery; but it should be remembered that all competent military authorities agreed in believing that Derry was indefensible. Military opinion proved wrong; but, if the successful defence of Derry forms one of the most brilliant pages in Irish history, the odds were that, like that of Drogheda, it would prove one of the bloodiest. Informed of what had passed at the council, James appeared under the walls of the city on April 18, expecting an easy surrender. But both he and Lundy failed to reckon on the fierce spirit of racial hatred that burned in the breasts of the citizens. While negotiations for a surrender were proceeding, a cannon-ball, fired either by accident or of set purpose, came very near to cutting short James' life, while at the same time it put an end to his hopes and Lundy's authority. A feeble apology followed; but that same night Lundy slipped out of the city; the defence was reorganised, and next morning, with a defiant shout of “No surrender,” Derry entered on her memorable fifteen weeks' siege.

The unexpected resistance with which he had met completely upset

James' plans; and on April 29 he left the camp, to open the Parliament summoned by him to meet at Dublin on May 7. Considering the precautions taken by Tyrconnel to regulate the elections, it was only to be expected that the Parliament, which assembled on the day appointed, should have consisted almost exclusively of men who either in their own persons or in those of their fathers before them had suffered most severely by the plantations that had in large measure caused their rebellion, and by the confiscations that had followed on its suppression. They had now, as they thought, got the upper hand of their enemies—the colonists; they had got a King of their own religion; and it was only natural that they should have determined to use their power to recover possession of those estates of which they had, in their opinion, been most unjustifiably robbed.

In his opening speech James, after gratefully acknowledging their loyalty, expressed his firm resolve to put an end to all calumnies against him, by granting full liberty of conscience to all his subjects, and to recognise no test or distinction between them but that of loyalty; as for those who had been injured by the late Acts of Settlement, he was ready to agree to any plan that might be found to relieve them “as far as might be consistent with reason, justice, and the public good of his people.” It was from his own point of view a politic speech; though to most of his hearers his reference to the necessity for a revision of the Acts of Settlement must have seemed rather lacking in warmth. Unfortunately the object he had before him of uniting Protestants and Catholics into a body of loyalists, quite apart from the fact that it suited nobody's purpose but his own, was utterly impracticable. The protection of a King who could not protect himself was not likely to impress the Protestants; and, to gratify the Catholics, he was bound to upset the Act of Settlement. To do this, however, was equivalent to forfeiting all chance of recovering England. The question as to which course he would pursue was soon brought to a practical issue.

On May 12 a Bill was introduced into the House of Commons for repealing the Acts of Settlement and Explanation. In the preamble to it, in which the causes which gave rise to those measures are discussed, nothing is more remarkable than the intense hatred displayed against Ormond, who “by his interest and power cherished and supported a fanatical republican party...and to transfer the calamitous consequences of his fatal conduct from himself upon your trusty Roman Catholic subjects...interposed betwixt them and his late Majesty's general indulgence and pardon.” The absurdity of the charge is apparent on the face of it; but a scapegoat had to be found, and it would hardly have suited the purposes of those who were trying to procure its repeal to remember that the Act of Settlement was simply the price Charles had paid for his restoration. As James listened to the debates in the House of Lords, the hopelessness of his position began to dawn upon

him. Not he, but Tyrconnel, was master of the situation, and nothing would satisfy Tyrconnel but an absolute repeal. To his intimates James admitted that he had no other choice than to consent. The Irish, he said, were determined to "ram that and much more down his throat."

When the session came to a close on July 20, he had given his assent to thirty-five Acts, some of them no doubt of great, others of questionable, utility. Taken together, they represent the political ideal of the party led by Tyrconnel—parliamentary independence, the restoration of the land to its original owners, and freedom of trade. Unfortunately, however legitimate they were in themselves, they were claims that could only be made good by the sword.

Meanwhile the situation in general had undergone little change. Though hard pressed and with a garrison sadly diminished by hunger and sickness, Derry still continued to bid defiance to her besiegers; but, as July drew to a close, her powers of resistance rapidly declined, and any day, any hour could see her forced to capitulate. The fate of Enniskillen hung in the same balance. Hitherto, by distracting the attention of James' generals the Enniskillencers had rendered Derry excellent service. But even to their powers of resistance there was a limit; and, if Derry fell, they too were bound to succumb.

Absorbed in their own affairs, Englishmen had at first paid little attention to Ireland. After his flight there had been a natural revulsion of feeling in James' favour; but this feeling had quickly given place to one of intense resentment, when the news arrived of his landing in Ireland. In its indignation, Parliament insisted on an instant declaration of war against France. Putting his own construction on the address, William thought that the hour had at last arrived for setting his scheme of the Grand Alliance in motion. Parliament thought otherwise. From being a subject of secondary importance, Ireland suddenly became the sole topic of interest. As time went on and Derry remained unrelieved, public opinion grew restless. In June, a committee of the Lords was appointed to enquire into the causes of the miscarriages in Ireland. Witnesses, including Archbishop Marsh, were examined: the minute books of the Committee of Council for Irish affairs and the Admiralty books were called for and closely inspected. The evidence elicited was of a contradictory sort; but it was generally admitted that with a little foresight the rebellion might have been prevented. Even after Tyrconnel had declared for James, the Protestants could, with a little help, easily have held their own; but no attention had been paid to their appeals for assistance; on the contrary, Sir William Harbord had been heard to say that "Ireland could wait: land there would be cheap enough shortly."

The fact is the muddle was due to causes which in the circumstances were unavoidable. The Committee for Irish affairs had been active enough. Already on March 30 orders had been issued for an

army of over 22,000 men to be got ready to march on May 1; and on April 29, when it was evident that Derry, contrary to all expectation, was managing to hold out, instructions were sent to Major-General Kirke to sail with four regiments and what provisions he could collect to its relief. But weeks passed away; and it was only after receiving a second order that Kirke, "*un homme capricieux*," as Schomberg called him, at last set sail. The middle of June had arrived before his fleet appeared in Lough Foyle. Even then he could not make up his mind to attack the boom which the besiegers had thrown across the river. At last a peremptory message from Schomberg, who had been appointed commander-in-chief of the forces for Ireland, compelled him to move. The task proved easier than had been expected, and on July 28 Derry was relieved.

His failure to capture Derry was a terrible disappointment to James; but the news of the complete defeat, on July 31, at Newtown Butler, of the army he had sent to reduce Enniskillen under Viscount Mountcashel, followed as it was by that of the loss of Sligo, was in the circumstances little less than a calamity. Dundee's death (July 27) had put an end to his hopes of assistance from Scotland, and the question of how he was to maintain himself was becoming daily more difficult to solve. From raising the nominal value of the currency he had proceeded to the issue of a debased coinage, with the natural result of ruining what little commerce there was left to the country. Provisions for the army could only be obtained at the sword's point; and, with bankruptcy staring him in the face, the temptation to follow d'Avaux' advice and lay forcible hands on the Protestants became almost irresistible. In the midst of his troubles came the news that Schomberg, with an army which rumour placed at about 20,000 men, had landed in county Down. The feeling at Dublin was one of utter consternation. The advisability of retiring beyond the line of the Shannon was discussed; but neither James nor Tyrconnel would listen to the suggestion; and, when it was found that Dublin was not immediately menaced, the feeling of panic gradually yielded to bolder counsels.

As a matter of fact the situation was not nearly so critical as it had at first sight appeared to be. So far from being 20,000 men strong, Schomberg's army, composed mainly of raw recruits, badly equipped and worse officered, was barely more than half that size. Belfast of course fell into his hands; but Carrickfergus had to be reduced by force. Having been joined by most of the Enniskillen horse Schomberg on September 2 moved southward by way of Lisburn and Newry to Dundalk. Here he was brought to a standstill by lack of provisions; and, recognising the necessity of keeping open his connexion by sea, he entrenched himself on a little slip of land to the north of the town, where he was practically secure from attack, and where reinforcements could easily reach him. His action, unavoidable under the circumstances, revealed his

weakness to the enemy. Enthusiasm took the place of despondency in the Irish ranks, and with an army over 20,000 strong James marched northward. On September 21 the two armies stood face to face at Dundalk, both eager for the fray, but neither willing to yield the other the advantage of an attack. Finding it impossible to draw Schomberg, James, after laying the country bare of provisions, retired with his army to Ardee, where, owing to the bad roads and broken-down bridges, he was as inaccessible to Schomberg as the latter was to him at Dundalk. The autumn was cold and wet, and both armies suffered severely from sickness; so that, when at the beginning of November James moved into winter-quarters, Schomberg promptly followed his example.

The campaign, which closed with the recovery of Sligo by Sarsfield, had ended better for James than could reasonably have been expected after his successive defeats. On the other hand, Schomberg's management of the war caused great dissatisfaction in England, where it was generally felt—and the feeling was shared by William—that he might have risked a little more than he did. The feeling was excusable; but the real blame lay with the commissariat department; and the fact that the commissary-general, Henry Shales, was, or had been, a Papist, furnished the Whigs with an admirable opportunity of pointing their argument that nothing but mismanagement could be expected, so long as Tory influence was allowed to make itself felt in the King's counsels. To William, however, it had become evident that the subjugation of Ireland was a matter of first necessity, if he was not to become a mere puppet in the hands of the Whigs. In this dilemma, he announced his intention of going himself to Ireland. The proposal was not agreeable to the Whigs, and even his own friends thought it a risky experiment; but it was received with applause by the country, and, taking advantage of the situation, he dissolved Parliament. The general elections answered his expectations; and on June 11, 1690, he set sail from Chester for Carrickfergus.

Meanwhile, in Ireland both sides had been busily occupied in recruiting their armies for the coming campaign. The priests worked hard for James, and many a man who came to mass found himself before the day closed enrolled in the army. Provisions seem to have been plentiful in the Irish camp; but there was a great dearth of money and war material. Schomberg's difficulties, on the other hand, arose chiefly from scarcity of provisions and forage, in which respect the loss of Sligo, which was only partly made good by the capture of Belturbet by Colonel Wolsley in December, 1689, made itself severely felt. In January he was compelled to disband a number of regiments, and to send their officers to gather recruits in England. Suffering as he did from ill-health, it was with a feeling of intense relief that he heard of William's determination to come to Ireland himself. From that moment things began perceptibly to improve. Under the management

of Shales' successor, Pereira, provisions became more plentiful; and at the beginning of March a stream of recruits set in, including nearly 7000 Danes under the personal conduct of Duke Ferdinand William of Würtemberg. That nothing might be wanting when William arrived, stores were laid up, forage collected, roads and bridges on the proposed line of march repaired, and finally in May the fort of Charlemont was attacked and captured.

Nor had Louis been altogether wanting to his ally. At James' request d'Avaux was recalled; and on March 14 the Duc de Lauzun landed at Cork with 7000 veterans, a park of artillery, and considerable stores of arms and ammunition. Numerically both armies were about equal; but in general efficiency William's was infinitely superior. So great, indeed, was the disorder in the Irish camp, that Lauzun at once recognised the hopelessness of a contest on equal terms, and, as d'Avaux had formerly urged, he too advised setting Dublin in flames and retreating behind the line of the Shannon. To his credit, James refused his consent to such a step. When the news of William's landing reached him on June 16, he moved his army to Dundalk. The position was strategically a good one, though it had the disadvantage of exposing his base at Dublin to a flanking movement from the direction of Armagh. Urged by this consideration and by the importunate advice of Lauzun to avoid risking a battle, he fell back on Drogheda. If he meant to fight, the spot was, as Schomberg had long foreseen, the best he could have chosen. But from the fact that fully a third of his available force was scattered in garrisons, it can hardly have been his intention to risk a decisive battle.

William meanwhile was following closely on his heels. To those who urged precaution in the pursuit he replied that he had not come to Ireland to let the grass grow under his feet; and on June 30, sixteen days after his landing, both armies stood facing each other with only the Boyne between them. The odds against James were very great. Still, the advantage of position lay with him, and to the experienced eye of Schomberg the determination of William to force a passage on the following morning (July 1) seemed little short of folly. Unfortunately for himself, James could not make up his mind either to fight or retreat. His indecision lost him the battle. Forced by William's impetuous attack to turn and defend himself when he was actually on the point of retiring, he was unable to bring half his army into action before his adversary had crossed the river at three different points. Taken more or less by surprise, the Irish and their allies, especially the cavalry, fought with a determination that fully justified Schomberg's criticism of William's tactics. Seeing the centre division falter in the attack, Schomberg himself plunged into the river, when he was surrounded by a body of hostile cavalry and killed. His death allowed the main body of the Irish to make good its retreat through the pass of Duleek,

and, according to the Duke of Berwick, saved James' army from destruction. Among the earliest to quit the field was James. At Dublin he snatched a few hours' rest; and, having laid his express commands on the mayor to prevent any attempt to pillage or fire the city, he hastened to Waterford, where he took ship for France.

To William as to Mary the flight of James was a great relief; and, in anticipation that, now that the chief actor was gone, resistance to his authority would cease, he allowed the fruits of his victory in large measure to slip from his grasp. The fact was he had yet to learn that the Irish had not taken up arms out of any feeling of loyalty to James, but solely and entirely in their own interests. They were acute enough to see that Tyrconnel's attempt to restore things to the *status quo ante* October 23, 1641, had failed and they would have been glad to lay down their arms on terms of a general amnesty. For himself, William would readily have agreed to purchase peace on these terms. Unfortunately the desire for revenge on the part of the colonists rendered a policy of conciliation impossible. Baser motives cooperated. The Irish were still in possession of thousands of acres of fertile land, and the desire to get hold of them was as strong in the breasts of Englishmen as it had been in the days of Parsons and Borlase. So it came to pass that, instead of a general amnesty, which would in all likelihood have put a speedy end to the war, the proclamation of pardon published on July 7 to all who should lay down arms by August 1 was, as it had been in the days of Cromwell, confined to the tenant and landless man. The result might have been foreseen. With ruin staring them in the face, the Irish resolved to sell their lives as dearly as possible, and in the extremity of their position the landless man and the landowner awaited their fate shoulder to shoulder.

After the loss of much precious time William, on July 9, despatched Lieutenant-General Douglas with a considerable force to take Athlone, while he himself with the bulk of the army set out two days later in the direction of Limerick, whither Tyrconnel had withdrawn with the bulk of his forces. Wexford, Waterford, Duncannon, Clonmel, and other places fell into his hands. At Carrick-on-Suir he received intelligence of the battle off Beachy Head, and, thinking his presence required in England, he handed over the command of the army to Count Solms and returned to Dublin. There he was met with more reassuring news, and in the belief that the war would be over in a fortnight he returned to the camp. On August 8 he was joined by Douglas, who had failed to capture Athlone, and the next day he sat down before Limerick.

The situation within the city was strange. Tyrconnel, who had James' authority to come to terms with William or to continue the war as he thought most conducive to his interests, was inclined to treat. He was convinced that the city could not hold out against a regular siege, and his opinion was shared by Lauzun. On the other hand the Irish, animated by Sarsfield and with the example of Derry before them,

insisted on defending the place. Finding it impossible to convince them of the futility of their resolution, Tyrconnel withdrew with Lauzun and the French regiments to Galway, leaving Major-Generals Boisselot and Sarsfield with about 6000 men to conduct the defence of the city. The summons to surrender had hardly been rejected, when information reached the besieged that William's heavy siege-guns were approaching. Acting on the spur of the moment, Sarsfield, having collected about 500 horse, crossed the Shannon at Killaloe, and surprising the escort at Ballyneety within seven miles of Limerick, blew up the entire train. The loss of his artillery delayed William's operations; and, after several desperate efforts to storm the place, seeing the rainy season approaching, he raised the siege on August 31, and sailed for England on September 5.

His failure to capture Limerick was a surprise to everybody, and not least of all to Louis, who, after James' sudden reappearance at Versailles full of complaints against the Irish, had issued orders recalling all his troops from Ireland in the belief that "the game there was lost." In obedience to his commands. Lauzun was busily attending to their embarkation at Galway, when the news that the siege had been raised caused him to delay their departure in the expectation of fresh orders; but, more than a week having elapsed and no orders arriving, he and the French brigade sailed from Galway on September 12. With him went Tyrconnel, moved to this step partly in order to explain his conduct, partly to solicit fresh assistance.

Hardly had the French withdrawn when an English fleet, with about 5000 men under the command of the Earl of Marlborough, appeared before Cork. Landing hard by the city on September 22, and being joined by the Duke of Würtemberg with 4000 foot and 1500 horse, he forced the place to surrender within a week and at once proceeded to attack Kinsale, which, after a vigorous but short defence, capitulated on October 15. Though compelled to abandon the greater part of Munster, the possession of the line of the Shannon enabled the Irish during the winter to carry on an exasperating guerilla warfare, with which Ginkel, who had succeeded to the command of the army, found it almost impossible to cope, even with the help of a strong militia force which he had raised.

In January, 1691, Tyrconnel returned from France with an assurance of further assistance from Louis. But month after month passed away, and the hope of assistance had almost died out, when, early in May, St Ruth, accompanied by d'Usson and a number of French officers, arrived at Limerick with large supplies of ammunition and other provisions, and with a commission rendering him practically independent of Tyrconnel in the command of the army. St Ruth's arrival scattered the gloom that had begun to settle down on the Irish; and, encouraged by his presence and energetic measures, they quickly recovered confidence in themselves and their cause.

Meanwhile, Ginkel on his side had been busily engaged in preparing for the coming campaign; and, on taking the field towards the end of May, he found himself at the head of 20,000 well equipped troops with a train of artillery such as Ireland had never seen. Concentrating his army at Mullingar, he set out for Athlone on June 6. Ballymore, which the Irish had occupied with a small garrison, was easily captured; but at this point he lost more than a week waiting for his pontoons, and it was not until the 19th that he arrived before Athlone.

The town lying partly on the Leinster, partly on the Connaught side of the Shannon, and connected only by a bridge, occupied a strong strategical position. To St Ruth it seemed absolutely impossible for Ginkel to capture it by a direct attack; and, in the belief that his real object was to attempt a turning movement from the direction of Banagher several miles lower down the river, he had concentrated his main force somewhat to the south of the town, leaving the direction of the defence to d'Usson. On the 22nd, Ginkel opened a heavy fire upon the enemy's entrenchments on the opposite side of the river. Day and night for days together the cannonade continued. But every attempt to cross the river failed, and as forage began to grow scarce Ginkel's position became very critical. At a council of war on the 30th the advisability of raising the siege was discussed; but in the end it was decided to make one more effort. The defence had somewhat slackened; and, encouraged by the unusual lowness of the Shannon, a picked body of men succeeded early next morning in fording the river a few yards below the bridge. Others followed, and, before the Irish had time to recover from their surprise, Athlone was captured. St Ruth, who could hardly believe his ears when the news reached him, made a desperate effort to recover the position, of which his negligence more than anything else had deprived him; but, failing in this, he withdrew his army in the direction of Galway.

The success was one for which William had been anxiously waiting. A year had passed since the battle of the Boyne and Ireland was apparently as far as ever from being reduced. He had missed one opportunity, and, in the determination not to miss another, he had given his sanction to a proclamation (to be issued at the first moment of success) offering a free pardon with the recovery of their estates and liberty of religion to all who should lay down their arms within a limited time, or by their action be instrumental in bringing the war to a close. The proclamation, published on July 7, though it failed to exercise any immediate effect, undoubtedly prepared the way for the surrender of Galway and Limerick. The terms offered by it being calculated to give great offence both in England and Ireland to those who hoped to see the Irish, according to Lord Justice Porter's expression, "quite beggared," it was kept as secret as such a thing could be.

Having crossed the Shannon and reorganised his army with as little

loss of time as possible, Ginkel set out in pursuit of St Ruth. On July 12 he came up with him near Aughrim, half-way between Athlone and Galway. St Ruth had made up his mind to fight. His army, though weaker in cavalry, was, so far as numbers went, equal to Ginkel's; and he had the advantage of occupying a strong position. For two hours the issue of the battle hung in the balance. The Irish fought with unexampled bravery; and, seeing the enemy waver, St Ruth was already counting the day his own, when a cannon-ball put an end to his life. His death decided the battle. Deprived of their commander and ignorant of his plans, the Irish continued fighting desperately for some time longer. Then they broke and fled. No quarter was given, and night alone put an end to the slaughter.

A week later Ginkel appeared before Galway. He was anxious to finish the war as soon as possible, and at once offered the benefit of the recent proclamation, if the city would submit "without further trouble." D'Usson, who commanded the garrison, at first refused; but in the end, "considering the ill-will of the citizens," he consented to capitulate. Articles based on the proclamation of July 7, securing the inhabitants in the possession of their properties and the private exercise of their religion, were drawn up; and, having signed them on the 21st, d'Usson surrendered the city and withdrew with the garrison to Limerick. Thither also Ginkel prepared to march. But bad weather, and the necessity under which he lay of recruiting his army and providing horses to drag his siege-artillery from Athlone, greatly delayed his progress. August was drawing to a close before he reached Limerick. It was too late in the year to begin regular siege operations; and his hope of forcing a surrender rested mainly on the effect which a heavy bombardment was likely to produce on the already depressed spirits of the garrison.

As in the previous year, opinion in the city was divided, as to whether it should be defended or not. Mindful of the mistake he had formerly made, Tyrconnel now insisted on carrying on the defence to the uttermost. Of the ability of the city to hold out there could be no question. But the situation was no longer the same. On August 14 Tyrconnel died. His death deepened the present feeling of despondency, and even Sarsfield began to waver. The summons to surrender was, however, rejected, and on August 30 Ginkel opened up a heavy fire on the city; but the distance was too great to do much damage, and it was soon evident that so long as the Irish continued in unmolested possession of county Clare, the mere battering of the walls was of little use. The pontoons were accordingly got ready; and, advantage being taken of a particularly dark night, a landing was effected on the opposite side of the Shannon, before the Irish, who were looking rather to see the siege raised than for any such assault, had recovered from their surprise. Their camp fell into Ginkel's hands; but otherwise he reaped no advantage from his success.

A week elapsed, and, seeing no sign of surrender, Ginkel recrossed

the river on September 22 with fully half his army, for the purpose of destroying the works that commanded the bridge on the other side. Had the Irish been properly commanded, the experiment might have cost him dear. As it was, the works were rushed, and the defenders driven helter-skelter back over the bridge. Fearing for the city, the officer in charge of the gate raised the drawbridge, and in an instant what had been a mere rout was turned into a bloody disaster. Terrified at what had happened the garrison broke from control and called wildly to surrender. Twenty-four hours later a truce was concluded.

The moment for which Ginkel had been waiting had at last arrived, and, rather than lose the chance thus offered him to end the war, he resolved to grant all that his instructions allowed him to concede. On their side, the Irish, naturally anxious to make as good a bargain as possible, submitted as conditions of surrender seven articles, which, besides indemnifying them for their rebellion, would have secured them in the possession of their estates and the public exercise of their religion, and would practically have placed them on a position of equality with the Protestants. Knowing nothing of their legal disabilities, Ginkel would have conceded even these terms; but, at the instigation of those about him, he returned them as incompatible with the laws of the realm, and formulated his own demands in twelve articles. These twelve articles provided the basis for the civil and military treaties of Limerick signed on October 3. By the military treaty it was agreed, that all persons of whatever quality or condition who desired to leave the country should have liberty to depart with their families and portable goods, and that Ginkel should provide the necessary shipping for them. By the civil treaty, it was conceded that the Irish Catholics should enjoy all those religious rights which they possessed in the reign of Charles II, with such further privileges as their Majesties (William and Mary) might with the consent of Parliament in the future procure for them, and that they and all Irish still in arms, who should immediately submit and take the oath of allegiance, should be secured in the free and undisputed possession of their estates as they possessed them according to the Act of Settlement. In other words, the price of the surrender of Limerick was to be a general indemnity and a return to the state of affairs that had existed in the reign of Charles II. In the full belief that the debt would be loyally discharged, Limerick was forthwith surrendered to Ginkel. By the middle of December, the last of the 12,000 men who elected to seek their fortunes abroad had quitted Ireland; and three months later a royal proclamation declared the war at an end.

Ireland was once more at peace; but the peace was one that brought no satisfaction with it. The conquerors, angry at seeing their prey escape them, sulkily protested against being held to an agreement which furnished no guarantee against a fresh rebellion. The feeling that they had been betrayed found open expression in a sermon preached by

Dopping, Bishop of Meath, before the Lords Justices Coningsby and Porter in Christ Church, Dublin, on the Sunday after the signature of the treaty. A preacher more agreeable to Government was found in the person of Moreton, Bishop of Kildare, who argued eloquently on keeping faith with the Irish; but Dopping's view of the situation was that generally taken, and his words found an echo in England.

For the English Parliament had no sooner met on October 22, than it passed an Act rendering it compulsory on all members of the Irish Parliament to take the Oath of Supremacy and to subscribe the Declaration against Transubstantiation. This Act was not only a flagrant breach of the spirit of the Treaty of Limerick, but a direct attack on the independence of the Irish Parliament. It, however, so entirely harmonised with the sentiment prevailing in Ireland among the colonists that no exception was taken to it; and the Parliament convened on October 5, 1692, under Lord Sidney, who had succeeded Coningsby and Porter in the government, "paid" as Molyneux admits "an entire obedience to it." But that in doing so the colonists had no intention of recognising the subordination of the Irish Parliament to that of England, soon became apparent. The Parliament had been called for the double purpose of confirming the Treaty of Limerick and settling a revenue. Bills to these ends had been transmitted from England, with an intimation that, so far as the treaty was concerned, it had been sufficiently discussed in England, and nothing further was required beyond a simple confirmation. The Commons took offence at the message. They were willing enough to admit that the Crown of Ireland was inherent in that of England; but Ireland was a kingdom and not a colony, and in their legislative capacity they were independent of England. The treaty as it stood was, they asserted, too dangerous to be allowed to pass; and, though they were ready, under the peculiar circumstances, to consent to the taxes demanded, they were compelled to assert that they and they alone had the right to originate money-bills.

The Lord Lieutenant was in a difficult position; but there can be no question that, in causing a protest to be entered on the Journals of the House against their claim to originate money-bills as a breach of Poynings' Law, he acted entirely in accordance with public opinion in England. All the same, the quarrel afforded a very welcome opportunity to the English Parliament for attacking William on his Irish policy. In its zeal the House of Commons even proposed to enquire into the grounds of Sidney's protest; but, on second thoughts, the point was quietly dropped, and in addressing the King the House contented itself with complaining of the encouragement shown to Irish Papists, and the misapplication of the forfeited estates. In his answer the King promised to remedy what was found amiss; but, to put an end to the discussion, he prorogued Parliament. Sidney, however, was recalled, and the administration placed in the hands of Lords Justices, in one

of whom, Lord Capel, the colonists found a man of their own way of thinking.

Two years elapsed. The country was rapidly recovering from the effects of the war; but great distress prevailed among the natives, and as a natural consequence the Tories were much in evidence. Under the pretext that fresh rebellion was hatching, a proclamation setting a price of £5 on the head of every Tory killed in action was published, and did something to abate the mischief, though, as a contemporary historian remarks, "It is to be feared that many innocent persons fell a sacrifice to the temptation of the reward." In their eagerness to keep down the Irish the colonists even yielded to Capel's persuasion to waive their claim to originate money-bills, on being allowed a free hand to regulate matters as they wished between themselves and the Irish Catholics. An understanding on these terms having been arrived at, Capel was appointed Lord Deputy, and a Parliament was summoned for August 27, 1695. Supplies to the amount of £163,325 having been voted, the Commons immediately turned to a consideration of the state of the nation. The causes of the recent calamities they traced chiefly to the long intermission of Parliaments, to the proclamation of March 8, 1672, permitting Papists to reside in corporate towns, and in general to the favour shown them by Government since the Restoration. To remedy these evils the proclamation of March, 1672, was declared void, and Acts were passed prohibiting parents from sending their children abroad to be educated in any Catholic seminary; disqualifying Papists from teaching in schools at home; rendering it penal for any Catholic, except those privileged to do so by the Articles of Galway and Limerick, to carry arms, or to possess a horse worth more than £5; limiting the number of holydays to those marked as such in the liturgy of the Church of Ireland; and rendering all who refused to work on Catholic holydays liable to be fined or whipped. Finally, an Act was passed abrogating all Acts passed in James' Parliament, and ordering the records relating to the same to be destroyed, which was accordingly done on October 2.

This outburst of fanatical legislation did not pass unchallenged. Among the members of both Houses there were some who, much as they disliked and feared the Catholics, felt even a greater dislike for the Puritan nonconformists. The spirit that had animated Bramhall and Jeremy Taylor reasserted itself; and, under the guidance of Lord Chancellor Porter, a party of opposition, to which the titles Tory, High Church, Jacobite were indifferently applied, came into existence, and proved strong enough to throw out a Toleration Bill, with which William had intended to reward the loyalty of the Presbyterians. Parliament was prorogued on December 14. In May, 1696, Capel died and Porter became Lord Justice; but he, too, dying in December, the government was placed in the hands of de Ruigny, Earl of Galway, and the Marquis of Winchester.

Parliament, after several adjournments, reassembled on July 27, 1697. The situation was practically unaltered; and, having voted a supply of £150,000, the Commons proceeded to gratify their craving for further protection against Roman Catholicism. But when a Bill limiting the reversal of the outlawries following on the Rebellion was submitted to them, they broke with Government in a way quite inexplicable to the Lords Justices. The question was one that, in their opinion, touched the disposal of the forfeited properties; and they were highly dissatisfied with the way in which William had disposed of them. Better, they insisted, that the properties should remain in the old families than be squandered in that fashion. Forced to withdraw the Bill for one of a less sweeping nature, and safeguarding the interests of a number of the old nobility and gentry, Government hoped that, in its new-found zeal to protect the victims of the Revolution, Parliament would at last consent to ratify the Articles of Limerick. But here the current of anti-Catholic feeling ran with irresistible violence; and, instead of a full confirmation of the Articles, a Bill was passed (though it escaped rejection in the House of Lords by only a single vote) confirming, as the preamble to it expressly admits, only so much of them as consisted with the safety and welfare of his Majesty's subjects in Ireland. Whether in doing as it did Parliament acted within its constitutional rights or not, is a moot point; but there can be no doubt that its repudiation of the treaty was as politically unwise as it was morally unjustifiable.

Meanwhile, a certain measure of commercial prosperity had returned to the country; and in 1698 Ireland possessed a quite flourishing woollen industry, a no less flourishing provision trade, besides a number of smaller industries, of which linen, glass, iron, fisheries were the most noticeable. But it was on the development of the woollen manufacture that the hopes of the commercial prosperity of the nation rested. Unfortunately, the success with which it had been attended had aroused the jealous fears of the English manufacturers, and there were not wanting warning voices to point out the political danger likely to accrue to England by allowing Ireland to attain a position of wealthy independence. Still, it was not an easy matter to invite the Irish to assist in the destruction of their own commercial prosperity; and, in preparing a Bill for laying additional duties on all woollen fabrics exported from Ireland, great care was taken to represent it as an encouragement of the linen industry. To the surprise of the Lords Justices, the Irish Parliament, on reassembling in the autumn of 1698, agreed without much discussion to a Bill placing duties of from 10 per cent. to 20 per cent. on all woollen goods (except friezes) exported from Ireland for a limited period of three years and three months, beginning on March 25, 1699. It is probable that these duties were regarded as countervailing and not prohibitive, and it is evident that in limiting the duration of the Act the Parliament only consented to an experiment. But, before it had time to test its

working, the English Parliament clinched the matter by an Act expressly forbidding, under the severest possible penalties, the exportation from Ireland of all wool and woollen goods except to England, and even this only under duties which were intended to be absolutely prohibitive.

Having thus, as it supposed, sufficiently safeguarded English commercial interests by an unblushing infringement of the privileges of the Irish Parliament, the English House of Commons proceeded, with an equal disregard of the prerogative of the Crown, to call it to account for the way in which the Irish forfeitures had been disposed of. A commission of seven members was appointed to enquire into the matter; and, on the strength of a report signed by four out of the seven, it was unanimously resolved that a Bill should be brought in to apply all the forfeited lands in Ireland, and the grants thereof since February 13, 1689, to the use of the public. A Bill for the resumption of all grants, and for vesting the disposal of the forfeited estates in the hands of thirteen trustees, with a clause protecting the interests of the Irish included in the Articles of Galway and Limerick, was accordingly passed; but, in the well-grounded apprehension that it would be rejected by the Lords, it was adroitly tacked to a Bill of Supply. The manœuvre succeeded; but it led to a fierce passage of arms between the two Houses, and the measure was only allowed to pass on William's intervention (April 10, 1700). It proved a failure. Instead of the £1,699,343, which it had been confidently asserted would accrue to the Crown after all legal obligations had been met, less than half (or £724,501) was recovered, and this only after compromising the public faith, insulting the sovereign, inflicting incalculable mischief, both of a public and private nature, and in the case of the Earl of Galway directly infringing an Act of the Irish Parliament, confirming the estate granted to him by William for his services during the war.

Historically, the Act of Resumption closes the chapter which opened with the Act for the plantation of Leix and Offaly. For nearly one hundred and fifty years the process of confiscation and colonisation following on rebellion and conquest had continued with little intermission, till at last there was practically no more land to confiscate. The Ireland of the O'Neills and Fitzgeralds, of the wild Irish and the gentry of the Pale has passed away for ever. With the eighteenth century, we enter on a new and, to most of us, more familiar period of Irish history.

CHAPTER XI.

RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN ENGLAND.

WHEN we speak of toleration, we mean that there is a dominant religion, but that dissent from it is not of itself an offence against the law. As the word was used in the seventeenth century, it fell far short of religious equality; for it did not mean that dissenters were to have the same political rights as others; but it did mean that the State allowed them full civil rights, and protected all peaceable and decent worship. On one side, religious beliefs must not be made an excuse for overt acts of treason, breach of the peace, or scandalous immorality. On the other, they must not be taken as summary proof that such acts have been committed.

Toleration may be universal, in the sense that all beliefs are so protected; but it is more commonly incomplete. Certain sects may be forbidden, or subjected to special disabilities. Thus Protestantism has been tolerated in Spain since 1868, but only on condition that it gives no public sign of its existence. A notice at the street corner, or a Bible exposed for sale, would be illegal. Even in England, a decent and sober expression of atheistic belief still seems to be a crime in law. But law and practice often differ widely. The authorities may limit or disregard the legal rights of an unpopular sect, or stir up the mob to lawless violence; or, again, they may leave persecuting laws unexecuted, or even frustrate them by annual acts of indemnity. But this kind of practical toleration is precarious: and if the dissenter runs little danger, he cannot feel free from stigma till the law is formally repealed.

There could not be much idea of toleration in the Middle Ages, when the Latin Church turned religion into a concrete law, summing up all virtue in obedience, all vice in disobedience, and handing over offenders to the secular arm. Disobedience *per se* was an ordinary offence for which penance might be done or ordinary punishment inflicted; and no question of heresy arose till the authority of the Church was disputed. But then there was no mercy. Heresy was a sin

that brought down the wrath of heaven on the land, so horrible a sin that even the records of the trials were systematically destroyed.

Of course every persecuted sect pleads for toleration; but nothing is gained till toleration finds advocates in the dominant Church, or at least till the sectaries take some better ground than that error ought not to persecute truth. Neither of these conditions was fulfilled in England before the seventeenth century. Sir Thomas More indeed, on the eve of the Reformation, drew a clear picture of toleration. But that was in *Utopia*: when it became a practical question, he proved as merciless a persecutor as others. In making Scripture (and therefore its meaning, as determined by sound learning) superior to Church authority, the Reformers made persecution logically indefensible. But they did not see the full meaning of what they had done. They took over ways of thinking from the Middle Ages, and made less of a break with the past than is commonly supposed. If they made the Church national, they fully agreed with the Roman Catholics that there ought to be one Church only, and that no dissent could be allowed. This was the dominant theory from the separation in 1534 to the Toleration Act of 1689. Edward VI established a single form of Common Prayer in 1549, and in 1552 required all persons to attend on Sundays and holydays on pain of ecclesiastical censures, to which Elizabeth added fines in 1559. The system was now complete; and with most persons the only doubt was where to draw the line—what doctrines or practices must be enforced, and what might be left open. Comprehension was a method open to discussion, but toleration was utterly ungodly.

For a few years the system seemed a complete success; but Puritan conventicles began in 1567, Romish after 1571; then first Elizabeth and James struck hard at both parties, and afterwards Charles I struck so hard at the Puritans, who represented much of the best religious life of the time, that he drove over the moderate men to their side. However, it is not surprising that the Roman Catholics generally fared worse than the Protestant sectaries, and were expressly shut out even from the Toleration of 1689.

The *English* Roman Catholics were commonly loyal enough, and in the Civil War much too loyal to please the Parliament. In fact the Stewarts (after the first years of James I) were not very zealous against them. But there was a real difficulty in the way of toleration, after the Bull of Pius V in 1571 forbade them to be loyal subjects, and still more when, a few years later, seminary priests came over from Douay. If some of these devoted themselves in good faith to spiritual ministrations, there were others who stirred up sedition or encouraged assassination; and it was not easy for the Government to draw the line between them. Besides this, the modern principle that overt acts are needed to constitute treason was not yet established; it is therefore not surprising that some of them should have suffered for refusing to disavow treasonable beliefs

which they never dreamed of carrying out in practice. The Roman Catholics came out of the Reformation discredited by the Marian persecution; and this was followed by the Bull against Elizabeth, the Massacre of St Bartholomew, the coming of the Douay priests, the Armada, the Gunpowder Plot, the Irish Massacre, the Popish Plot, and the designs of James II, while the intervals were filled up with plots and rumours of plots which never gave time for suspicion to die away. Till the last danger was dispelled at Culloden, the English were never allowed to forget that the struggle with the Roman Curia was a struggle of life and death for everything of value to the nation.

It was different with the Puritans. Their loyalty was never in doubt before the Civil War, and even the Church was in no serious danger from them for at least a generation after Cartwright's time. Speaking generally, they were sober and serious churchmen, who wanted only a little more liberty inside the Church. Anabaptists and Brownists were the only revolutionaries, and the more violent of these were mostly exiles on Dutch and New England soil. On their behalf pleas for toleration were put forth by Leonard Busher so early as 1614, and by others after him. Of course they had no effect. Toleration was a new idea; the Anabaptists were a specially obnoxious sect; and Busher's first principle, that the State has no right to meddle with religion, ran directly contrary to the main current of English thought.

So things drifted from bad to worse, till at the meeting of the Long Parliament in 1640 the Government had practically no supporters. Reform was pushed into revolution; and indeed revolution is almost unavoidable when a king cannot be trusted. But then it was seen that, however the mass of the nation might resent the administration of Charles and Laud, they had no quarrel with monarchy or with the Church. So the end of the Civil Wars found Church matters in strange confusion. Had the King conquered, there would have been an orderly episcopal Church of some sort; and if the Presbyterians had got their way, the Scotch discipline would have been regularly organised all over the country. In neither case would there have been any question of toleration. In this respect the Presbyterians were narrower than Laud, who had no great dislike of heterodoxy that was not Puritan—witness his patronage of Chillingworth and Jeremy Taylor.

But the Presbyterians did not get their way. The Covenant was forced on England by the military necessities of 1643; but it was never generally liked. It was Scotch; it was newfangled; it was too rigid for some, too morose for others. The Episcopalians awaited their time; but the Independents represent a ferment of thought such as was never seen again till the French Revolution. It was greatest in the army, where every man was welcome who "had the root of the matter in him," and could be trusted to fight against the King. Within these limits, toleration was already established, to the disgust of the Presbyterians. And

the principle of 1647 was that of 1789. Saints and Jacobins both began with the sovereignty of the people; only, the Saints never forgot that they were God's people. It was a principle which could not but profoundly influence the development of politics and society, of religion, and of philosophy. So we see three distinct lines of thought slowly coming out from the enthusiasm of the time, in which they lay confusedly together. First, the Independents proper maintained the right of every congregation to settle its own worship; then, they dealt with the King as a public servant who had betrayed his trust; then, in 1653, they set on foot the far-reaching reforms of the Nominated Parliament. So far Cromwell had gone with them; but now he had to stop them. He could not let them unsettle the whole structure of society in hope of Christ's return on the morrow. The reign of the Saints was over, though the Instrument of Government reflected their ideas, so far as they were consistent with order. The purely religious side of the current enthusiasm came next to the front; and, after a stormy transition period of plots and Fifth-Monarchy dreamings, it was partly absorbed by the great centre party of serious persons, and partly settled down upon the claim of the Quakers for the individual conscience guided by the inner light. Later in character, though scarcely later in date than the other two, a third movement made its appearance. Reaction as it was from the enthusiasm, it was largely shaped by the enthusiasm. It held some of the best religious thought of the time, yet was largely irreligious. For good or bad reasons many were tired of controversy; and the stress laid on personal religion in an age of controversy tended to emphasise the central doctrines which may commend themselves to reason, and to throw the rest into the background. In one direction we have the Cambridge Platonists and the beginnings of the Latitudinarians, in another Biddle and the Unitarians; and in different ways we note foreshadowings of the Deists and the Arians of the next age, with its shallow moralism and indifference to religion.

Now, all these three lines of thought pointed to toleration. If congregations ought to be independent, they must not be restrained by a state Church; if the individual conscience is free, it must not be coerced by others; if reason is to judge, the shibboleths of controversy are not worth enforcing. Accordingly, the first effective demand for toleration in England is contained in the *Agreement of the People*, presented to Parliament by the officers of the army in January, 1649. They agree that Christianity in its purest form be "held forth and recommended as the public profession in this nation," and that its teachers be paid by the State, but not by tithes. That to this public profession none be compelled by penalties or otherwise, but that all who profess faith in God by Jesus Christ shall be protected in their worship, "so as they abuse not this liberty to the civil injury of others, or to the actual disturbance of the public peace." This means full toleration of all Christian worship; for

the principle is not infringed by the further provision that "this liberty shall not necessarily extend to popery or prelacy." Serious as the exception was, it might be defended after the Civil War as a political necessity.

Cromwell is the only man who has ever ruled England with success from an almost isolated position. He crushed the Episcopalians in the first period of civil war, the Presbyterians in the second (1648-51), and separated himself from the Independents, when he allowed the Nominated Parliament to resign its powers (December, 1653). Levellers and Quakers detested him, though he was on terms of personal respect with Fox; and even a man so free from partisanship as Baxter thoroughly distrusted him. But Cromwell was always enough of an Independent to keep in touch with the army; and his policy was that of the Independents, with the unpractical items omitted. At one point he went beyond the toleration they offered to all Christians, for he allowed the return of the Jews, who had been banished from England since the time of Edward I. The *Instrument of Government* and the *Humble Petition and Advice*, under which he ruled, simply copy the clause already quoted from the *Agreement of the People*, but with one significant change. The limitation which the Agreement indicates is now made actual. "Provided that this liberty shall not extend to popery or prelacy, nor to such as under the profession of Christ hold forth and practice licentiousness." The *Humble Petition* also shuts out those who publish horrible blasphemies, while requiring belief in the Trinity and that Scripture is "the revealed Will and Word of God."

The Episcopalians said that it was the execution of the King which made impassable the gulf between them and Cromwell; but it was quite as much the systematic fines and sequestrations which the financial distress of the Parliament induced it to levy from the "malignants" who had fought for the King. Royalists and fanatics never ceased to plot, and could sometimes plot together, against Cromwell. No wonder if he struck at them with harsh measures. Thus his proclamation of November 24, 1655, forbade sequestered or ejected ministers to keep any school either public or private, or either publicly or privately (except in their own family) preach or use the Book of Common Prayer. But Cromwell seems to have meant this rather *in terrorem* than for serious use. He was on friendly terms with such an Episcopalian as Ussher, and allowed his daughters to be married by the form of the forbidden Book. In any case, the law was not steadily enforced. Thus Morton, Jeremy Taylor, and others, were left unmolested in their private chaplaincies; and a large proportion of the Episcopalian clergy retained their livings throughout the interregnum, often saying the Prayers of the Liturgy by rote, or disguising them with a few alterations. Even the Roman Catholics were virtually tolerated so far as concerned religion, though they suffered heavily as malignants.

The oppression of Cromwell's government brought together Episco-

paliars, who formed the bulk of the "malignants," and Presbyterians, who had also suffered defeat from him; and the confusion which followed on his death convinced the bulk of the nation that the only hope of good order was in the immediate recall of the King. So the Restoration was carried out by a coalition of the two parties which had always been opposed to toleration. Jeremy Taylor certainly advocated it in his *Liberty of Prophesying* (1647); but he is much the reverse of a typical Episcopalian, and even he does not keep clear of the sceptical argument that most questions are uncertain, which logically leads back to the old doctrine that truth (when certainly known) has a right to suppress error. So there was no more serious thought of toleration. Charles had promised from Breda (April 14, 1660) "a liberty to tender consciences," and that no man should be called in question for such religious opinions as do not disturb the peace of the kingdom. But this promise had to be put into shape by Parliament; and it soon appeared that comprehension, not toleration, was in view.

The Presbyterians were no longer the haughty Covenanters of twenty years before. Moderate men like Baxter tended to Presbyterianism as a *via media* between the Laudian churchmen and the fanatics of the Commonwealth. So now the mass of the party wanted only some ceremonies abolished and others made optional, freedom for extempore prayer, and the autocratic power of the Bishops limited by councils of presbyters. They flattered themselves that, if they brought back the King, they would be able to make their own terms with the Episcopalians, and then the united Church could put down the sects. A vigorous persecution of Quakers was set on foot before Venner's insurrection (January 6, 1661).

The Convention Parliament, for which "malignants" had not been supposed to vote, held the balance fairly even, though it yielded more and more to the rising tide of royalism. But the new Parliament, which met in May, 1661, was almost entirely Cavalier. It began by imposing the Sacrament on its own members, and went on to pass the Corporation Act. By this all members of corporations were required (1) to swear (besides the oaths of allegiance and supremacy) "that it is not lawful on any pretence whatever to take arms against the King, and that I do abhor that traitorous position of taking arms by his authority against his person," as was done in 1642; (2) to declare the Covenant null and unlawful; (3) to have received the Sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England within a year before their election.

Presbyterianism as a political power was destroyed at once by its exclusion from the Commons and the corporations; but could it not still obtain some concessions in matters of religion? The answer was the Act of Uniformity (May 19, 1662). All persons in Holy Orders, all teachers in the Universities, and all public or private schoolmasters, were to make the same declarations as members of corporations, and all public ministers further to declare their "unfeigned assent and consent to all

and everything contained and prescribed" in the Book of Common Prayer recently revised; while all Orders not episcopal were made legally invalid. And the revision of the Book had not been conciliatory. The Bishops at the Savoy Conference refused nearly all the demands of the Presbyterians, and the concessions afterwards made by Convocation were not very important. Few of the "offences to tender consciences" were removed, and one or two more were added, such as the reading of *Bel and the Dragon*. Harsher still was the provision that the assent and consent must be declared before St Bartholomew's Day (August 24)—just before the half-year's tithes fell due. Some clergy were unable to make it, solely because the Book had not reached them in time. But if the Presbyterians got very little by the revision, the Laudians at the other end of the scale got nothing, for the amendments in that direction proposed by Sancroft were all rejected. The restored Church took its stand with the Articles unaltered, and the Liturgy very little changed from its form of 1559, or even from that of 1552.

Once again, and for the last time, England returned to the old ideal of a single national Church with no dissent allowed. And from that Church the Puritanism which had been struggling within it for the last century was now shut out by law. The national Church had been substantially national till it was narrowed into a party by Laud; and now it was condemned to remain a party in the nation—no doubt the strongest party, but still not more than a party; for one whole side of the religious life of the nation was driven into opposition. So persecution assumed a new character. Elizabeth might plead that the contest with Rome was in the main a struggle with foreign enemies for the very existence of Church and State in their national form; and even Laud might fairly say that the Puritans would put him down, if he did not put them down. But there was no excuse of self-defence in 1662. The mass of the Non-conformists were no enemies of the Church, and desired no great changes in it: and, had they been ever so evil-disposed, the Church was utterly beyond the reach of attack. Baxter would have had no more chance against it than Lodowick Muggleton. But, if there was no valid plea of self-defence, persecution was pure and simple revenge on the defeated party; and of mere revenge the better sort of churchmen would sooner or later be ashamed.

They were half ashamed all along. Even the Cavalier Parliament only passed the Act by a majority of six (186 to 180). The Lords would have exempted schoolmasters and allowed a maintenance to ejected ministers, as the Commonwealth had done, and Clarendon himself wished to give the King some power of dispensation; but the Commons would allow no change. The distress caused by the Act was great and widespread. Near two thousand ministers—including those already displaced by the old royalist incumbents—went out; and these were of the better sort, for of course all time-servers conformed. Thenceforth the

controversy never rested till the Revolution. On the side of the Church were Sheldon's chaplains, first Thomas Tomkins, then Samuel Parker (James II's Bishop of Oxford, 1686) and men of learning like Richard Perrinchief and Herbert Thorndike. The main argument was rather political than religious. Nonconformists had been rebels before, and were still rebels at heart. The worst they got was less than they deserved, and they would not complain if they were honest men. Herbert Thorndike was more of a Laudian, and wanted the Catholic faith enforced, and the laws of the primitive Church within the first six General Councils. This, however, was not the general view of Sheldon and the Bishops. Roger L'Estrange, writing as a layman and a man of the world, refers to the answer of the Judges in 1604, that it was an offence "very near to treason and felony" to collect petitions in a public cause as the Puritans had done, in order to tell the King that, if he denied their suit, many thousands of his subjects would be discontented. The most remarkable position he takes is that the malcontents had perfect freedom of conscience already; because they were free to think what they pleased; but that freedom of action in religion must be absolutely at the command of the State. This last might have been a hint from Hobbes. On the other side were moderate men like Corbet, who advocated "an establishment, a limited toleration, and a discreet connivance." The limited toleration was meant to shut out the Roman Catholics, on the ground that it was part of their religion to kill kings, and to persecute all who differed from them. Later, in 1675, Herbert Croft, Bishop of Hereford, published *The Naked Truth*, which called out a host of answers. Croft saw no need of any Confession beyond the Apostles' Creed; and, as for ceremonies, the only wonder was that anyone thought it worth while to dispute about them.

One of the most effective charges against the Nonconformists was that they were disciples and allies of the Jesuits, who also held meetings in holes and corners, set up "enthusiastic" preaching, hated the Liturgy, and laboured for the overthrow of Church and State. In fact, the Church was a bulwark of Protestantism, and the Nonconformists themselves lamented that the separation weakened it in the critical times that followed. The Puritan controversy was very soon entangled with the Roman, and gradually became secondary to it. Charles II was a Roman Catholic, so far as he had any serious belief at all; and this drew him to France, which under Louis XIV was moving towards a distinctly Romanising policy, very unlike that of Richelieu. So the history of his reign resolves itself into a triangular contest of King, Commons and Nonconformists. The Commons are resolute for persecution; but they are also resolute for the liberties of England as they stood at the opening of the Civil War. The King is plotting to restore despotism and Romanism, leaning on French subsidies, and striving to win the Nonconformists to his plans by first letting loose the Commons to persecute

them, then offering them an illegal dispensation—which also covered the Roman Catholics. It was a hard choice for them; and the future of England turned very much on the question whether they would have sense enough to see that religious liberty is precarious without civil liberty. If the King gave them toleration for his own purposes, he could also revoke it for his own purposes.

Alongside of this triangular contest which brought politics into religion, there was another which had a more directly philosophical bearing, however little some of the combatants may have perceived it. The sharpest clash of the Civil War was that of men who thought Episcopacy needful and Calvinism false against men who thought Calvinism needful and Episcopacy sinful. These were the main parties, though the division was not sharp; for some Episcopalians like Hammond were decided Calvinists, and many of the later Presbyterians modified the Calvinism and allowed a limited Episcopacy. But, even so, the two parties were never the whole of the nation. There were always many who believed in, and perhaps fought for, one side or the other without regarding the difference as vital. The common intercourse of life was teaching moderate men of all parties a good deal of mutual respect; and intermarriages were not always unfortunate as in Milton's case. A good foundation is already laid for legal toleration, when the regret that a decent neighbour is on the wrong side is—not because it will bring him to hell some day, but because it gets him into trouble now. And this was often the feeling, even as regards Roman Catholics.

The larger number of these men went their own way without much regard to the reason of the thing; but, as others thought it out more or less distinctly, opinions from all sides drew together to form a third party in favour of toleration. The Puritan side contributed something. Baxter and Howe were not the only champions of past controversy who fell back in later life upon the simplest teaching of a common Christianity. On the Episcopalian side also we find a succession of conspicuous men more or less of this way of thinking, such as Chillingworth, John Hales, Jeremy Taylor (three friends of Laud), Hammond, Sir Thomas Browne, Wilkins and the Cambridge Platonists, Tillotson and Locke. Greatly as in many respects they differed from each other, they were as earnest in religion as any of the zealots, and all upheld toleration and respect for other men's conclusions. Nothing marks more clearly the change of feeling than the way Locke takes it as self-evident that the saving power of a religion is not to be reached by an assent of the old sort, but only by full belief in such religion.

Now that we have seen the forces at work in the transition period (1662-89), we can trace the history of their action. The first despair of the Nonconformists was soothed by a proclamation which announced the King's desire to exempt peaceable persons from the penalties of the Act. Next year (1663) a Bill was brought in enabling him to dispense

not only with the Act of Uniformity but with all other such Acts, and to grant such dispensation not only to Protestants but to Roman Catholic recusants. The aim was too clear. The Nonconformists themselves would not support the proposal, and the Commons took alarm. Next year (1664) they passed the first Conventicle Act, making penal all meetings of more than five persons (beyond a household, if any) for worship other than that prescribed by the Liturgy. And in 1665 they followed this up with the Five Mile Act, which forbade an ejected minister to come within five miles of any market-town or of any place where he used to minister aforetime, unless he took the oath of non-resistance, and further swore that he would at no time endeavour any alteration of government, either in Church or State. This completed Clarendon's work of persecution; for the second Conventicle Act (1670) was not passed till after his fall, and the Test Act, as we shall see, was not aimed chiefly at the Puritans.

Charles was watching his opportunity. The fall of Clarendon in 1667 made way for the Cabal and an attempt at comprehension. The scheme of 1668 bore the name of John Wilkins, one of the founders of the Royal Society, and a man of such eminence that his marriage with Cromwell's sister did not prevent his appointment to the see of Chester. Its chief novelty was that those ordained by presbyters were to receive imposition of hands from the Bishop with the form "Take thou *legal* authority"; so that it was not a re-ordination, but simply a calling according to the existing law. The scheme had strong support, but the Commons threw it out: nor would the King have cared to strengthen the Church.

In 1670 came the secret Treaty of Dover. The first condition, that Charles should declare himself a Roman Catholic, had to be postponed; but the other—war with the United Provinces—could be taken up at once. Charles won over to it Ashley, the political advocate of the Nonconformists, by promising an illegal indulgence not extending to Roman Catholics (issued in 1672), while French subsidies enabled him to do without Parliament. But the Dutch held France and England together at bay so long that Parliament had to be summoned (1673). It met in a dangerous temper, for grave and just suspicions of a Romish plot were widespread, and yet could not be fully proved. They began by forcing the King to recall the Indulgence and promise that it should never be made a precedent. Their next step was a Test Act, of which the provisions and the results have been alike described in a previous chapter. It required from all persons in the employment of the State the oaths of allegiance and supremacy, a declaration against transubstantiation, and reception of the Sacrament according to the Liturgy. The Duke of York avowed himself a Roman Catholic; Clifford laid down the Treasurer's staff, and numbers of officials resigned their posts.

Suspicion was now thoroughly roused, and deepened yearly. The

Nonconformists themselves supported the Test Act. Men suspected, and suspected with reason, more than they could prove; and then they grew wild. In vain Parliament strove to force the King into a clear and consistent Protestant foreign policy. Genuine Popish plots in great variety were always hatching in Stewart times, and, if Oates and Bedloe piled up a monstrous heap of perjuries, they piled them over a foundation of truth. At first they got little credit: the panic was only let loose by Godfrey's murder—for murder it seems to have been—but at such a time as this every tale went down. It was the worst panic in English history, for Danby and Shaftesbury encouraged it, each for his own purposes. For once the penal laws against Roman Catholics were strictly enforced, and became a real persecution. The King played his game with consummate skill. Let the managers of the agitation sacrifice as many victims as they pleased: he "gave them line," and waited for the reaction when the series of judicial murders became too shocking. There was good reason for preventing the succession of the Duke of York; but Shaftesbury scandalised all decent feeling by proposing the King's bastard, Monmouth.

So the last years of Charles II were a time of reaction. A loyalist revival swept away Shaftesbury and the Exclusion Bill, and Protestant suspicion was abated. After all, the Papists were not so bad as Oates had made out. Charles used his victory with moderation, and was careful to give no further provocations. Hardly a murmur was raised when the Duke of York became King in 1685; for Monmouth's rebellion was an utter failure. None but exiles could have dreamed of success for so wild an enterprise.

Our first impression may be that the reign of Charles II is a pure and simple falling-back from the toleration which seemed approaching in Cromwell's time. It began with persecution systematic and extensive—Quakers lay in jail by thousands—and it ended with few signs of amendment. Every attempt to relax its severity had been defeated; and in 1685 persecution and passive obedience seemed as much the dominant creed as in 1662. But in 1662 these principles were an enthusiasm; in 1685 they were little more than orthodoxy, and men were not wanting who saw this. The University of Oxford might proclaim passive obedience (1662); but Bishop Morley from his death-bed (1684) warned the Duke of York that, if ever the clergy wanted a way out of it, they would certainly find one. So, too, with persecution. The belief of educated men was more and more coming round to toleration. It was adopted by men of all sorts—by divines like Tillotson, by royalists like Bishop Croft, lawyers like Orlando Bridgeman, students like Wilkins and Locke, politicians like Shaftesbury, men of the world like John Churchill, the future Marlborough. The cause was really won; but a shock was needed to show that it was won. That shock was given by James II.

James began with fair professions; but his actions soon revived the worst suspicions. Had his one object been to convince the nation that a Roman Catholic is never to be trusted, he could not have done his work better. The open parade of Roman worship and the open favour shown at Court to crowds of Roman Catholics and renegades gave offence enough, and the matter became serious when James packed the Bench till he obtained from his judges what he could not get from the most loyal Parliament on record—power to dispense with the Test Act—and when he proceeded to officer the army and the civil service with Roman Catholics. Before long the most devoted loyalists took alarm, and the English Roman Catholics themselves mostly held aloof. The Pope was for moderation, but the Jesuits and the renegades urged the King to reckless haste.

So far James had reckoned on the Church, in hopes of getting a legal toleration for recusants only. He thought he could do what he pleased with men who preached passive obedience. But Morley's warning now came true. Instead of practising their doctrine, they began to reconsider it. They had taken for granted that an English King would be a good son of the Church; and they might fairly doubt whether quite the same obedience was due to such an enemy as James. They could go a long way with the King; but, when the successive blows of the new High Commission, the suspension of Compton, Bishop of London, and the attacks on the Universities and the Charterhouse brought them face to face with Romanism and despotism, they settled down into opposition.

Meanwhile James had changed his tactics. If the Church would not help him, he could turn to the Nonconformists. They had been persecuted with much severity since 1681, and might be grateful for relief. So in April, 1687, came out a Declaration of Indulgence. King James expounded that conscience ought not to be constrained, and that such constraint had always been contrary to his inclination, promised to protect and maintain the Church as by law established, and finished up by guaranteeing to all men their lands and properties, particularly church and abbey lands. To carry out this liberal policy, he "thinks fit, by virtue of Our royal prerogative," to suspend all penal laws and all religious tests affecting Nonconformists and recusants.

The jails were emptied. The Nonconformists were invited to Whitehall, and plied with the seductions of Court favour. It was a strange promotion for them. "The other day they were Sons of Belial; now they were Angels of Light." But would they help the Jesuits and the King to pull down the Church? Some were willing, but leaders like Baxter and Howe and Bunyan ranged themselves on the other side, and presently (about August) the case was summed up by Halifax in his *Letter to a Dissenter*. Could they believe in this sudden change? Was Popery the only friend to liberty? Would they justify the dispensing

power and all its consequences? Were they willing to repeal and enact laws with the Roman Consistory for Lords of the Articles? It was idle for the Court to offer securities or "equivalents" to Protestantism. As Halifax said later in his *Anatomy of an Equivalent*: "If laws were binding, let them be observed: if not, they were no security." Such arguments as these were decisive; and, though a few of the dissenters like Penn supported the Court, it soon appeared that the main body of them preferred a Church which persecuted by law to a King who claimed the right of suspending laws wholesale at his pleasure.

In truth, it was not now a persecuting Church. Even in the time of exile the Caroline divines never showed much leaning to Rome. In the main they were as resolute Protestants as the Puritans themselves; and now the common danger drew even extreme men like Sancroft closer to the Nonconformists. The old quarrels were dropped, and all was peace and charity in the Protestant fold. Very few "remained in their peevishness." So, when James added insult to injury by reissuing the Declaration of Indulgence in May, 1688, and ordering the clergy to read it in church, dissenters and churchmen stood together against him. Even the Roman Catholics—the English Roman Catholics—would not lift a hand to save him. What the Revolution overthrew was little more than a cabal of Jesuits and renegades.

Now, the condition of this league of Protestants was that the Nonconformists were to be secured relief by law—toleration certainly, and if possible comprehension. Accordingly, so soon as William and Mary were fairly settled on the throne, the work was taken in hand. It was a Tory and a zealous churchman who brought in the Bills. The Earl of Nottingham (then Mr Daniel Finch) had borne a hand in framing them in the days of the Popish Plot; but Shaftesbury would not hear of them. Now, he laid them on the table of the Lords, and the Toleration Act passed without difficulty (May 24, 1689). It enacted that the Act of Uniformity and the persecuting Acts should not apply to persons taking the oaths of allegiance and supremacy and making the declaration against transubstantiation, provided only they did not hold meetings with locked doors. Ministers were also required to sign the Articles excepting those on Church government; and the Anabaptists were further excused the clause approving Infant Baptism. The Quakers had to "promise and solemnly declare" themselves good subjects who renounced the authority of the Pope and believed in the Trinity and the inspiration of the Bible. Dissenting chapels were to be certified, and there was to be a penalty of twenty pounds for disturbing the same. But Papists and those who denied the Trinity were expressly excluded from the benefit of the Act. Toleration was thus established in practice, though not in theory; for the persecuting statutes were still the law of the land, and toleration was only an exemption. So late as 1787 the Methodists were liable to the penalties of the Conventicle Act, and could gain no relief

till they were not only licensed, but licensed as dissenters. As for the Roman Catholics, after the Revolution connivance was the most they could expect, and this they generally got. Toleration such as William or Halifax would have given them was hardly a matter of practical politics: the Tories were against it to a man, and most of the Whigs too. Fresh persecuting statutes were enacted later, especially after the Tory reaction of 1699 and Bolingbroke's plot of 1715; and though they soon fell into disuse, no great relief was given by law till 1778, and even then it led to the Gordon riots.

After the Toleration Act, the Comprehension Bill. This Bill, brought forward in 1689, relaxed the subscription to the Articles, made the "nocturnal ceremonies" optional in most churches, and admitted Presbyterian ministers without reordination. The Bishop was to lay his hands on them with the words, "Take thou authority to preach—in the Church of England." It ended by proposing to ask the King and Queen for a commission to revise the Liturgy. But now came difficulties. The mass of the clergy were Tories and High-churchmen; and, now that they had got over the panic of 1688, they were most unwilling to make any changes so as to let in dissenters. If Nottingham himself was for comprehension, he chiefly aimed at making the Church strong enough to enforce the Test Act, which the dissenters largely evaded by the practice of occasional conformity. And this again raised difficulties on the other side. The veterans of 1662 might look back wistfully to the Church from which they had been expelled; but a younger generation was growing up which preferred to remain outside. Better be content with toleration than become unwelcome guests of a hostile Church. Moreover, there were many dissenters whom no comprehension could include; and every such person saw the danger to himself of Nottingham's policy. The greater the success of comprehension, the greater the danger for those not comprehended. Indeed, the men who raised the Sacheverell riots (1710) and passed the Schism Act (1714) were quite capable of repealing the Toleration Act.

Thus the Comprehension Bill was attacked on both sides—by the High-churchmen who hated the idea, and by the dissenters who feared its success—and the Whigs were divided, one section of them wanting Comprehension, the other preferring to relax the Test Act. However, an Ecclesiastical Commission was appointed which revised the Liturgy. But Convocation refused even to discuss their labours, and proved so mutinous that it had to be prorogued. The Comprehension Bill was dropped.

CHAPTER XII.

AUSTRIA, POLAND, AND TURKEY.

THE second half of the seventeenth century is perhaps the most critical period in the history of Austria, as it certainly is in the history of the great House of Habsburg, with whose fortunes those of Austria have for ages been inextricably intertwined. The Spanish monarchy, in the hands of the elder branch, was steadily sinking through impotence towards partition. Portugal had to be surrendered in 1668; and the feeble throne of Charles II was only preserved till the close of the century by constant cessions of territory to French greed and by the costly aid of European coalitions. The Austrian Habsburgs seemed to be threatened with a similar fate. Their dreams of a revived Imperial control over Germany, which might have been realised if Ferdinand II could have been his own Wallenstein, instead of having to employ so unmanageable an agent, were shattered by the victories of Gustavus Adolphus, by the disintegrating diplomacy of Richelieu, and in the end by the military strength of France. The Treaty of Westphalia not only transferred the Habsburg rights in Elsass to the Bourbon, but, by securing to the Princes of the Empire the independent control of their foreign relations, it made Germany the loosest and most impotent of federations. Nothing held it together except the survival of a great tradition and a grandiose title, together with the more practical unifying force of the dread of Turkish aggression. This danger enabled Leopold I, the son and successor of Ferdinand III, to obtain his election to the Imperial dignity in 1658, in spite of the intrigues of Mazarin. But, with the aid of French gold, the Electors were induced to extort from the young Emperor in his capitulation a pledge that he would abstain from sending assistance to Spain. And France gave added force to the pledge by joining in the same year the League of the Rhine, formed by those Electors and Princes whose territories would have to be traversed by troops on their way from Austria to the Netherlands.

In face of the League of the Rhine and the continued danger of cooperation between France and Sweden, it was impossible to gain substantial power for the German monarchy. If the Austrian Habsburgs

were to retain their position among the great dynasties of Europe, they must rely solely upon their personal dominions. These, however, were not to be compared in the matter of unity and cohesion with the territories of any other first-rate Power. It is true that Bohemia, whose revolt had given occasion to the Thirty Years' War, had been coerced into orthodoxy and sullen submission. It is also true that the fatal practice of subdivision, revived in the last century by Ferdinand I, was now abandoned, and that, on the extinction of the Tyrolese branch in 1665, the whole bundle of Habsburg territories was permanently combined under the personal rule of the head of the House. But these territories were held together by nothing more substantial than the recognition of a common ruler. Each province had its own estates, its own officials, and its own rule or custom of succession. Leopold I ruled in each by a separate title; and, though he had absolute control of foreign relations, he was by no means possessed of equal authority in domestic matters. While Louis XIV could raise taxes at will, Leopold I could only augment an inadequate revenue by bargaining with the various estates. The Habsburg succession in Hungary and Bohemia had to be secured by carefully arranging for the recognition of the heir during his father's lifetime. And the provinces were not only independent units; many of them were divided by differences of race and religion. The greatest difficulties, now that Bohemia was subdued, presented themselves in Hungary. Since 1526 the Habsburgs had claimed to be Kings of Hungary; but they had never governed more than a few of the western counties with their capital at Pressburg. Buda (Ofen) was the seat of a Turkish Pasha who ruled some seven-tenths of Hungary proper. And further east was the principality of Transylvania, inhabited by Magyars, Saxons and Roumanians. Transylvania had been ruled by a *voivod* in dependence upon the Hungarian Crown since the eleventh century, until, in the sixteenth, John Zapolya, after disputing that Crown itself with Ferdinand I, succeeded in casting off all Hungarian control; and his successors, by playing off the Turks against the Habsburg dynasty, were able to maintain a stormy and aggressive independence. In the middle of the seventeenth century it seemed that Transylvania would become hereditary in the House of Rákóczy, and that this family, by extending its power over Poland, Moldavia and Wallachia, might for a time hold the balance between the Crescent and the Cross. The injury which this would have done to Austria was not merely political. The rulers of Transylvania, Bethlen Gabor and the two George Rákóczys, had allied themselves in the course of the Thirty Years' War with the Protestant opponents of the House of Habsburg. Both Transylvania and Austrian Hungary contained a large and restless Protestant element, which resisted all efforts at proselytism as vigorously as the national spirit of the Magyars resented the Habsburg attempts to subject them to German domination. The presence of German troops

upon Hungarian soil provoked bitter resentment, even when they came to defend the country against foreign invasion; while it was an equally grievous wrong to ask Hungarian soldiers to serve beyond the limits of their native land. And these mutinous subjects were always ready to appeal to the Turk for assistance against their alien ruler. The Protestants, especially, preferred the tolerant government of the Pasha of Buda to the bigotry and persecution of the Jesuit-ridden Court of Vienna.

In spite of all her difficulties, external and internal, Austria, unlike Spain, emerged from the critical half century, not only with undivided dominions, but on the whole with increased strength and prestige. In the series of coalitions which first checked and then foiled the ambitious designs of Louis XIV the Austrian ruler played a part hardly second to that of William III of Orange. But for the momentous decision of Leopold I to come to the assistance of the sorely-pressed Dutch in 1673, the French King, with the interested connivance of the degenerate Stewarts, and with the help of Turenne, Condé, and Luxembourg, must have firmly founded his supremacy in western Europe. Without Austria and Prince Eugene, no league could have been formed strong enough to prevent the retention by Philip of Anjou of the whole dominions of Spain. The western policy of Austria in this period, though chequered by reverses and leading to some bitter disappointments, is in itself no discreditable part of Austrian history. And any apparent discredit is removed when it is remembered that, all the time, the Habsburgs were fighting a double battle against domestic disaffection and Turkish aggression. Moreover, from this eastern struggle, of which only one salient episode, the relief of Vienna in 1683, has succeeded in fixing the attention of western Europe, Austria emerged victorious. By the end of the century Transylvania had been reunited to the Hungarian Crown, the Turks had been driven from almost the whole of Hungary, and that kingdom had been permanently subjected to the House of Habsburg. It is this eastern side of Austrian history which is the subject of the present chapter. The interest and importance of the events narrated in it may appear slight to the western reader, and the policy of Austria may often be blamed as vacillating, short-sighted and oppressive. But how different would have been the history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, if Austria had fallen from her rank among the foremost Powers of Europe!

The ruler whose long reign witnessed some of the most critical moments in the fortunes of Austria, was singularly unfitted by nature and training to guide the State through troubled times. Leopold I, "the little Emperor in red stockings," was the second son of Ferdinand III and the Infanta Maria Anna of Spain. He was originally brought up for the Church until the death (from small-pox) in 1654 of his elder brother made him heir to the Austrian dominions. He

never lost the impress of his early education, and never freed himself from the control of the Jesuits, whose power was even more unrestricted during his reign than in those of his father and grandfather. In private life Leopold was irreproachable. He was chaste, pious, a lover of justice and honesty. The time which he could spare from the labours of state and from punctilious attendance at religious services was devoted to the chase, to music, and to the collection of rare books and curios. As compared with contemporary sovereigns like Louis XIV of France and Charles II of England, he was a model of virtue, and the Jesuits were never tired of extolling the merits of their august pupil. But Machiavelli declared that a perfectly good Prince must be ruined among so many who are evil, and a less cynical observer must admit that a ruler needs other qualities than the virtues which adorn a private station. With these qualities Leopold was inadequately endowed. He did not shirk the labour of audiences or of signing public documents; but he had little insight or initiative, an imperfect knowledge of men or power of choosing fitting instruments, and no consistency of purpose except what was inspired by his religious counsellors. Nor were his defects counterbalanced by the help of Ministers of exceptional ability. Prince Wenceslas von Lobkowitz, the only member of the Emperor's council who rose above mediocrity, was opposed to the anti-French policy by which alone Austria could maintain either safety or dignity. The eminent generals whose victories saved Austria from annihilation, Montecuculi, Charles of Lorraine, Lewis of Baden, and Eugene of Savoy, were all of alien birth. The most invaluable service of all, the relief of Vienna, was rendered by a foreign king, John Sobieski. Yet, in spite of the bigotry and the childish pedantry which sometimes exposed Leopold to deserved contempt, he had one quality which has often redeemed the rule of a feeble prince—a sublime confidence in the justice of his cause, and a belief, which never wavered, in the fortunes of his dynasty and his Church.

The clue to the difficulties and dangers of Leopold I in the east, and also to such success as he ultimately achieved, is to be found in his relations with the Ottoman Turks. Throughout the sixteenth century the Austrian dominions had been the most substantial barrier between central Europe and the threatened advance of Turkish power; and this had done more than anything else to secure the election of successive Habsburgs to the Imperial throne. Fortunately for Europe, the unique opportunity offered by the Thirty Years' War had been lost by the Turks, in consequence of the internal decline of their State. Since the death of Solyman the Magnificent in 1566 the iron discipline which held together the Turkish forces had been sensibly relaxed. Degenerate Sultans ceased to lead their armies into the field, passed their lives in the enervating atmosphere of the harem, and became the puppets of female intrigue. The constitution of the once invincible army

gradually underwent a momentous change. The Janissaries and Sipahis, originally celibate, were allowed to marry, and speedily began to demand admission to the corps as a right for their sons. The tribute of Christian children, upon which the military and civil administration had so long rested, ceased to be exacted with regularity, and in the course of the seventeenth century became obsolete. The need for it disappeared, when the supply of orthodox recruits was more than sufficient to fill the ranks; and the Christian subjects of the Porte were more valuable as cultivators and tax-payers than as breeders of soldiers. A hereditary fighting force was more interested in struggling for pay and privilege than in keeping up its own efficiency; and, as the numbers of the regular troops increased, they grew more formidable to their own Government than to its enemies. Meanwhile the civil administration became equally unsatisfactory. Favouritism and corruption, the twin cankers of Oriental rule, determined the choice of the highest officers in the State. The Pashas in the various provinces thought more of enriching themselves than of serving their master, and the subject peoples began to resent unlicensed oppression. The evils which had undermined the empire of Rome seemed to be reproduced in the dominions of the Sultan. For nearly eighty years the Turkish power ceased to expand. The frontier in Hungary fluctuated till the Treaty of Zsitva-Torok in 1606, after which it remained without important change till 1663. In maritime enterprise, which had been forced upon the Turks (as formerly upon the Romans) against their habits and prepossessions, the decline was even more marked than on the mainland. The battle of Lepanto, fruitless as it was in many ways, had shown the vulnerable point of Turkish domination. In the seventeenth century the Christian sailors of the Mediterranean began, not merely to hold their own, but to venture on reprisals for past injuries. It was these insults which roused the Turks to enter upon the first war of conquest which they had undertaken since the reduction of Cyprus. The Knights of Malta had been the most daring aggressors; but with characteristic prudence the Porte sought a more vulnerable and a more remunerative victim in the republic of Venice. In 1645, in the time of Ibrahim, an ambitious but incompetent Sultan, a Turkish fleet escorted a considerable army to the island of Crete. The harbour of Canea was speedily taken, and in 1648 the Turks began the long and famous siege of Candia. The defence was obstinately maintained for twenty years, and in this protracted war the Venetians showed some of their old maritime skill and daring. Not only did they succeed in frequently interrupting the Turkish communications with the island, but they won victories in naval encounters, and even recovered for a time the islands of Lemnos and Tenedos. They were aided and encouraged by anarchy and revolutions in the Turkish capital which, in a more civilised and coherent State, would probably have put an end to foreign war. Ibrahim was

deposed in 1648 in favour of his son Mohammad IV, a boy of seven, and was soon afterwards murdered. The Turks were unaccustomed to minorities, and during the early years of the new reign power was obstinately disputed between the mother and the grandmother of the young Sultan. At last the younger Sultana rid herself by assassination of her rival, and in 1656 gave the office of Vezir to an Albanian septuagenarian, Mohammad Kiuprili, the founder of a ministerial dynasty which for forty years made the Turks once more an object of dread to Europe. In spite of his advanced years, Kiuprili displayed equal energy and ability. By ruthless severity he crushed disaffection and disorder, restored discipline in the army, and deprived the provincial Governors of the independence which they had so grossly misused. At the same time, he determined to prosecute the war in Crete and to restore Turkish supremacy in Hungary. The Turkish army was no longer as efficient as in the days of the great Sultans; and in the interval the forces of the great States of Europe had been enormously improved. But the Turks were still a formidable fighting force, and in the organisation of their commissariat and of all the auxiliary departments of military administration they were superior to any nation except the French.

The revival of Turkey, which was contemporaneous with the accession of Leopold I, constituted a danger of the first magnitude to Austria, and also to two other eastern States, Russia and Poland, which, in spite of mutual rivalry, were forced by common defensive interests into cooperation with Austria. Russia under the House of Romanoff had recovered unity after the internal disturbances at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and in the reign of Alexis (1645-76) was beginning to feel her way towards a place among European Powers. Her progress westwards was barred by Sweden and Poland, and southwards by the Tartar tribes of the Crimea and the Kuban, which had been under vassalage to Turkey since the fifteenth century. But, though Russian aggrandisement was destined to be ultimately ruinous to Poland, her most immediate enemies were Sweden, which blocked the way to the Baltic, and Turkey, which stood between Russia and the Black Sea. And both Sweden and Turkey were the enemies of Austria. Poland was in a somewhat similar position as regards external relations, though her domestic government was wholly different. For centuries Poland had been the foremost Slav State in Europe, but she had begun to decline since 1572 when, on the extinction of the male line of Jagello, she had made her monarchy elective and adopted a constitution which transformed the kingdom into an oligarchical republic. Geography made Poland the enemy of Turkey; the history of the State had involved it in a prolonged and bitter quarrel with Sweden. In 1587 the Poles had elected as King the Roman Catholic Sigismund Vasa, whose mother was a Jagello princess and who in 1592 inherited the Swedish

throne. His advent in Sweden was followed by the revolt of that country under a younger and Protestant branch of the House of Vasa, and in the resultant war Poland had been stripped of her provinces on the eastern Baltic. This war was, as has been related in a previous volume, renewed in 1656, when the bellicose Charles X attacked John Casimir of Poland, who had refused to recognise the former's accession to the Swedish throne. One of the last acts of Ferdinand III was to conclude a treaty for the defence of Poland against the dreaded power of Sweden. Leopold I inherited this alliance and did not hesitate to fulfil its obligations. The Tsar of Russia, though he was actually quarrelling with John Casimir over the Ukraine, was equally ready to oppose the Swedes. Charles X, who might have called in the Turks to help him against this coalition, appealed to a more congenial though weaker ally, the Prince of Transylvania. George Rákóczy II, who had succeeded his father in 1648, found his mountainous principality, over which both Turkish Sultan and Hungarian King claimed the suzerainty, by no means adequate to his ambition. He accepted the overtures of Sweden in the hope that, like his predecessor Stephen Báthory, he might find his way to the Polish throne. But Charles X was recalled by the news that the Danes, the inveterate enemies of Sweden, had attacked his peninsular kingdom. In his absence the combination of Poles, Russians, and Austrian troops under Montecuculi, made short work of Rákóczy, who was driven back to Transylvania. Charles X found consolation and revenge in the rapid reduction of Denmark; but, as has been related, his enemies were too many for him. After profiting by his enterprise to throw off Polish suzerainty over East Prussia, the Great Elector of Brandenburg cooperated with Montecuculi; and the English and Dutch fleets threatened to carry the allied forces into Zealand and even into Sweden itself. Louis XIV had found it necessary to threaten a diversion in western Germany in favour of his ally, when, at the critical moment, the death of Charles X brought about the pacification of the North by the treaties of Oliva (between Sweden and Poland, May 3, 1660), Copenhagen (between Sweden and Denmark, June 5, 1660), and Kardis (between Sweden and Russia, June 21, 1661).

Meanwhile, Mohammad Kiuprili had found in this war the pretext which he desired for intervention in eastern Europe. He had no reason to support the integrity of Poland or to desire the victory of the Poles; but he was determined to restore Turkish control over Transylvania, and he had reason to suspect Rákóczy of tampering with the fidelity of the rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia. On the pretext that the invasion of Poland was a breach of Rákóczy's obligations as a vassal, he decreed his deposition and ordered the Estates to choose a successor. They submissively chose Francis Redei; but Rákóczy speedily deposed his feeble rival, in the confident hope that the Turks would be too fully occupied in Crete to pay much attention to the affairs of a distant province.

Kiuprili met this defiance by leading an overwhelming army in 1658 to cooperate with the Pasha of Buda against Transylvania. The open country was laid waste, and the population sold into slavery. The towns only saved themselves from the same fate by payment of heavy contributions. The haughty Vezir nominated Achatius Barczai Prince of Transylvania, and forced the Estates to acknowledge him. All pretence of free election was disregarded. The annual tribute was raised from 15,000 to 50,000 florins, and a large war indemnity was demanded. But Rákóczy obstinately continued the struggle against overwhelming force, and appealed to Leopold I as King of Hungary to send him assistance. The Court at Vienna was watching with growing uneasiness the treatment of Transylvania as a dependency of the Porte. But Leopold had no standing army; he was anxious to avoid a great eastern war; and Rákóczy's recent action in Poland was not yet forgiven. All that Austria would do in 1658 was to offer diplomatic remonstrances, which the Porte treated with contempt. In spite of the return of John Keményi, Rákóczy's lieutenant in the Polish war, who had been carried off into captivity by the Crimean Tartars, and in spite of assistance from the deposed Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, Rákóczy's cause was hopeless. In May, 1660, he was mortally wounded in a heroic struggle against heavy odds, and a fortnight later he died at Grosswardein.

In August, after an obstinate resistance, Grosswardein was forced to surrender to the Turks. But the patriots were not yet reduced to despair. In January, 1661, John Keményi was chosen Prince of Transylvania; and soon afterwards Achatius Barczai, whose troubled reign was identified in the people's mind with humiliating submission to the oppressive invader, was put to death. Keményi renewed the appeal for help to Vienna, where, as a born Hungarian, he was more acceptable than Rákóczy had been. The appeal was supported by the Palatine and the chief nobles of Hungary, and Leopold could hardly refuse to help in the defence of his own kingdom, which was now threatened by the victorious Turks, though he was still desirous of avoiding any open declaration of war. In 1661 Montecuculi was sent into Hungary with the wholly inadequate force of 10,000 men, which were to be reinforced by Hungarian levies. This was a virtual recognition of Keményi; and the Turks replied by forcing the Estates of Transylvania to accept another nominee of their own, Michael Apaffy, the fifth holder of the perilous dignity within three years. Meanwhile Montecuculi's campaign had produced little result. His original plan of diverting the Turks from Transylvania by an attack upon Buda was overruled from Vienna, and he was ordered to effect a junction with Keményi on the Theiss in Upper Hungary. Together they advanced into Transylvania as far as Klausenburg (Kolozsvár); but the population gave them a cold welcome. The Turks refused to fight a battle, and the army was seriously weakened by disease and privation. Montecuculi, a cautious

and methodical general, determined to retreat towards his base. Leaving a garrison in Klausenburg, and 2000 men to act with Keményi, he returned to the valley of the Theiss. During the winter Keményi nearly succeeded in surprising Apaffy at Schässburg in the Saxon region, but he was detained by artful pretence of negotiation until the arrival of a Turkish relieving force, and in the encounter which followed he was slain, whether by the enemy or by treachery was never known (January 23, 1662).

After the death of Keményi hostilities languished for a year; Mohammad Kiuprili had died in November, 1661, and the Sultan gave the vacant office to his son Ahmad Kiuprili, the ablest and most famous Turkish commander of the century. The success which had attended the father's severity enabled the son to rule with greater leniency; and for a time Europe hoped that the Porte under new guidance might abandon its aggressive policy. The Hungarians demanded the withdrawal of the German troops, whom they had called to their assistance. The Protestants clamoured for the redress of their grievances and resisted all proposals in the Diet for a reasoned plan of defence. The Austrian Ministers were so irritated by what they considered gross ingratitude that they opened negotiations with the Turks; and the Vezir was only too glad to lull suspicions while he made preparations for a campaign on a grand scale, which was intended to complete the conquest of Hungary and to carry the Crescent to the walls of Vienna. The result was a futile congress at Temesvar, and a complete neglect of military preparations on the part of Austria. In 1663 the Turks threw off all concealment, and commenced open war against the Emperor. At Adrianople Ahmad Kiuprili received the sacred standard from the hands of the Sultan, and in June he led an imposing army of over 120,000 men to Belgrade. In face of such a force it was hopeless to think of defending Transylvania. Klausenburg opened its gates to Apaffy, whose authority remained undisputed till his death. Meanwhile, the Vezir had advanced from Belgrade to Buda, whence his army threw itself like a slow but irresistible flood upon western Hungary. The Austrian Government was wholly unprepared for resistance. Leopold was ill with small-pox, and all that the Ministers could do was to send Montecuculi with some 6000 troops to "play the Croat" in face of the overwhelming enemy. Fortunately the Turks, in spite of their strength, were delayed by the necessity of capturing the various fortresses which defended the course of the Danube and its tributaries. One of these, Neuhäusel (Ursek Ujvar), offered an invaluable resistance, and it was not till September 25 that the garrison surrendered with the honours of war. Montecuculi, too weak to attempt the relief of Neuhäusel, sought to cover Pressburg and the eastern frontier of Austria by throwing himself into the long island of Schutt, formed by two channels of the Danube, where he was joined by the tardy levies of

Hungarian militia, and by the warlike Ban of Croatia, Niklas Zrinyi, whose dashing guerilla tactics were lauded by fiery patriots in contrast to the methodical procedure of the Commander-in-Chief. The strength of Montecuculi's position was never seriously tested, as Kiuprili contented himself with the capture of Neuhausel, and retired into winter-quarters to prepare for a more energetic advance in the following year.

The news that, after the interval of a century, a Turkish army comparable to that of Solyman the Magnificent was advancing westwards under a young and capable leader, made a profound impression in Europe, and woke some faint echo of the old crusading ardour. Hungarian malcontents rallied to the House of Habsburg when they found their homes desolated by the Tartar bands, whose predatory instincts were imperfectly restrained by the discipline enforced among the regular troops of Turkey. The sluggish Diet at Ratisbon, to which Leopold appealed in person, voted a levy of money and troops from the Empire. Even Louis XIV, abandoning the selfish alliance with the Turks which his predecessors had maintained, and not unwilling to pose as the disinterested protector of a rival State, sent 4000 men under General Jean de Coligny to serve with Montecuculi. The prospect of external assistance encouraged the Austrian troops to begin the campaign instead of waiting to be attacked. The cavalry under Souches defeated and harassed the outlying forces on the right wing of the Turks, and even recovered some of the forts which had been taken in the previous year. Kiuprili was slow to commence his march, and his delay enabled the French and German auxiliaries to effect their junction with the main army. When the Turks advanced, it was seen that they kept to the southern side of the Danube, and that they were diverging from the main valley towards Styria in order to turn the defences of Pressburg. Montecuculi waited for them behind the Raab. As the Turks marched south-westwards along the right bank of the river, the Christians kept pace with them on the other side. At last, under the convent of St Gothard, Kiuprili found a convenient angle of the river at which the passage of troops could be protected by artillery placed at the two corners of the arc. Here he determined to brush away the one serious obstacle to his advance. A victory would give him unimpeded entry into the main Austrian dominions; and already the Imperial Court was preparing to abandon Vienna for greater safety in Linz. On August 1 large bodies of Janissaries were thrown across the Raab and began to fortify a position on the left bank. Montecuculi, unable to dispute the actual passage, drew up his army in three divisions. The centre was formed by the troops of the Imperial Diet, the French were on the left wing, and the Austrians and Hungarians were on the right. Their great advantage was that the Turks could only cross in detachments, and were therefore unable to make full use of their superior numbers. But the first onslaught of the infidels, delivered with the

confidence begotten of past victories, broke the ill-organised Germans in the centre and produced serious disorder. The Austrian right wing, however, taking the advancing Turks on the flank, gave the Germans time to rally, and the impetuous onslaught of the French completed the rout of the Janissaries, who refused quarter and were cut to pieces. Meanwhile, Turkish reinforcements had crossed the Raab in the rear, and against them Montecuculi hurled his united forces. After an obstinate conflict, the Turks were utterly broken and driven back into the river. Most of the cannon on the right bank were captured, and the projected invasion of Austria had perforce to be abandoned.

The battle of St Gothard is of supreme importance in the light of future events, because it gave the first proof that the Turks had lost their military superiority. Their courage and their obstinate fighting power were as indisputable as ever; but their arms and their tactics were those of the time of Solyman, and they had made no progress in the art of war. On the other hand, the Christian troops had profited by the lessons and experience of the Thirty Years' War. In artillery, in cavalry, and above all in the use of the pike, the supreme infantry weapon of that day, they were the masters of their opponents. The great achievement of Montecuculi foreshadowed the later victories of Charles of Lorraine and Prince Eugene. But while Europe was exulting at the disappearance of a great danger, it was astounded to learn that the victor had made a hasty and not very creditable peace. Montecuculi's army was too exhausted and too ill-united to attempt the arduous task of driving the Turks out of Hungary; and there were Ministers in Vienna who held that the continuance of the Turkish peril served a useful purpose in making Hungary dependent upon Austria. By the Treaty of Vasvar, signed on August 10, a truce for twenty years was arranged between Austria and the Turks. Apaffy was recognised as Prince of Transylvania; the free election of his successor was guaranteed, and the principality was to be evacuated both by Turkish and Austrian troops; but the Sultan's suzerainty over it was maintained. The Turks kept their most important conquests, Grosswardein and Neuhausel; but, in compensation for the latter, the Emperor was to be allowed to build a new fortress on the Waag. Finally, a sum of 200,000 florins was to be given to the Porte. The Austrians called it a gift; but it was easy to regard it in Constantinople as a tribute. Ahmad Kiuprili, in spite of his defeat, was able to return with the credit of one who had enlarged the bounds of Turkish rule, and he set himself to maintain and enhance his reputation by bringing the long war of Candia to an end. In 1666 he took the command in person, and against his iron determination the heroic efforts of the great Venetian general, Francesco Morosini, and of the volunteers who flocked from all countries to the service of the Republic proved unavailing. In September, 1669, the defenders of Candia capitulated, and the whole island of Crete, with the exception

of the coast fortresses of Suda, Spinalonga, and Karabusa, passed from Venetian to Turkish rule. The natives had shown little courage or loyalty during the war, and a large number of them hastened to curry favour with their conquerors by adopting the Mohammadan religion.

While the Turks were restoring and strengthening their ascendancy in the Mediterranean, the Austrian Government had three difficult questions to deal with. The War of Devolution, provoked by the preposterous claims of Louis XIV in the Netherlands, led to the earliest proposals of a European coalition to check the ambition of France. Of such a coalition Leopold I, who had just married the Infanta Margaret, the presumptive heiress of her brother Charles II, was the natural leader, and its most energetic advocate was the Austrian ambassador, Francis de Lisola, who was the first to formulate that policy of vigorous opposition to Louis XIV which was afterwards pursued by his master and by William of Orange. But at this time the Austrian Ministers, the Princes von Auersperg and Lobkowitz, were dominated by the French envoy, Bretel de Grémonville. Not only did Leopold remain neutral in the Netherlands war, but on January 19, 1668, he was induced by his love of peace to conclude a secret treaty with France for the eventual partition of the Spanish inheritance. By this he virtually admitted the force of Louis XIV's contention that his wife's renunciation of her claims was invalid.

As against this weakness of Austrian policy in the west must be set a strenuous struggle to oppose the dangerous growth of French influence in Poland. John Casimir, the last of the Vasa Kings, had in 1648 renounced his Orders, to succeed his brother on the Polish throne and to marry his widowed sister-in-law, Mary di Gonzaga, daughter of the Duke of Nevers. On his death the right of election would be freed from any strong dynastic claims, and the prize of the Polish Crown would be thrown open to unlimited competition. The reign of John Casimir was a time of unrest. Poland was saved by its allies from the attack of Charles X of Sweden; but the Peace of Oliva was followed by a renewal of the long struggle with Russia for the hazardous right of ruling the turbulent Cossacks of the Ukraine. During the Swedish war Poland had relied upon the Emperor's help, and Austrian influence had been so predominant at Warsaw that schemes were entertained for adding the great Slav kingdom to the possessions of the House of Habsburg. But since 1660 the influence of the Queen had been actively exerted on the side of France, and a strong party was formed to support the candidature of a French prince as John Casimir's successor. In 1663 Mary brought about a marriage between her favourite niece, Anne of Bavaria, and the Duc d'Enghien, son of the great Condé. A strenuous effort was now made to induce the Poles to elect either Enghien or his father during the lifetime of the reigning King. As soon as this should be done, John Casimir pledged himself to abdicate and to retire to a more congenial

life in France, where rich benefices were allotted for his maintenance. The intrigue was so openly carried on that it was not difficult for Austrian diplomacy to excite ill-feeling in Poland against the attempt to interfere with freedom of election by allowing a reigning king to dictate the choice of his successor. An opposition party was formed under Lubomirski, the Grand Hetman or commander-in-chief of the Polish forces. The Court attempted to put down this opposition by force. Lubomirski's command was transferred to John Sobieski, whose wife, Mary d'Arquien, was a Frenchwoman, and who now becomes identified with French interests in Poland. Civil war broke out; but John Casimir was as unable to defeat domestic enemies as he was to gain a triumph over foreign foes. In 1667 he lost his wife, and in the following year he insisted upon abdication. The election which followed was a wild scramble. The most prominent candidate was Philip William of Neuburg, who had married the sister of John Casimir. He had originally been supported by Austria, in order to checkmate the dangerous pretensions of the Condé princes. But the War of Devolution had modified the situation. Louis XIV had set himself to isolate the Netherlands by preventing the entry of foreign troops to their assistance. With this aim he had appealed to Philip William, the acknowledged owner since 1666 of the border duchies of Jülich and Berg; and to secure his aid he had promised the official support of France to his candidature in Poland. Secretly, however, the French envoys were instructed to gain votes for Condé. On the other hand Leopold's advocacy of Philip William was cooled by the agreement between the latter and France, and the influence of Austria was employed on behalf of Prince Charles Leopold of Lorraine, the nephew of the reigning Duke Charles III; and the life-long enemy of France. But in the end the foreign intrigues served only to counterbalance each other, and on June 19, 1669, the choice of the Diet fell upon a Lithuanian *Piast* (descendant of the ancient royal house of Poland), Michael Korybut Wisniowiecki, who had neither wealth nor ability to excite the jealousy of his compeers, and who accepted the Crown with tears of genuine reluctance. The election was a bitter disappointment to Louis XIV, who had been led by his agents to anticipate Condé's success; and the defeat of France was emphasised in the following year, when the new King was married to the Emperor's sister Eleonora Maria.

Alike in his relations with France and with Poland, the Emperor was constantly hampered by the continuance of dangerous discontent in Hungary. Any gratitude which might have been felt for the great service rendered at St Gothard was obliterated by the hasty conclusion of the Peace of Vasvar. The treaty itself was denounced, not only as a betrayal of Hungarian interests, but as a breach of the coronation oath, by which Leopold was pledged not to make peace or war without consulting the Estates. The fortress of Leopoldstadt, erected on the Waag

in accordance with the treaty, was regarded as a new stronghold of Austrian oppression rather than as a barrier against the Turks. The old demand was raised for the removal of all German troops from Hungarian soil. A widespread suspicion prevailed that Hungary was to be deprived of its liberties and coerced into religious uniformity by the same methods which had been employed in Bohemia in the time of Ferdinand II. The most formidable malcontents were the nobles, who felt their privileges as well as the cause of national independence to be at stake. Neither their exemption from taxation nor their right to defend their interests with arms was likely to survive the establishment of a Habsburg despotism. Niklas Zrinyi, the fiery champion and poet of the Hungarian nationality, had died on a boar-hunt near Vienna soon after the Turkish war. His brother, Peter Zrinyi, succeeded as Ban of Croatia, and also to some share of Niklas' influence and popularity. With him were associated his brother-in-law, Francis Frangipani, the descendant of a family which had come to Hungary with the Angevin Kings in the thirteenth century; Francis Nadasdy, who had long enjoyed the special favour and confidence of Leopold; Stephen Tökölyi, a wealthy landowner in northern Hungary; the Styrian Count Tattenbach; and, above all, the Palatine of Hungary, Francis Vesselényi. In 1666 an important recruit was gained by the marriage of Zrinyi's beautiful daughter, Helen, to Francis Rákóczy, the son of the former Prince George II of Transylvania, who inherited from his father a great name and from his mother the immense wealth of the Báthory family. The wedding served, like many such ceremonies, to cover a conference of the great nobles, in which the growing conspiracy against Habsburg rule was extended and consolidated. A whole network of threads was woven between the chief conspirators and with the foreign States from which assistance was hoped or desired. Michael Apaffy, as an interested enemy of the Habsburgs, was early in the confidence of the malcontents, and served as a medium of communication with the Turks. Overtures were also made to John Sobieski and the anti-Austrian party in Poland, and to certain of the German Princes, especially those belonging to the League of the Rhine. But the most intimate relations were established with Grémonville, the restless envoy of France at Vienna, who was prepared, if necessary, to play a Hungarian rebellion as a card in his diplomatic game with the Ministers of the Imperial Court.

So vast and many-sided a plot—resembling in many ways the Jacobite organisation in England in the early eighteenth century—could hardly have escaped detection, if all the parties had been loyal and disinterested. Its disclosure became certain, when a jealous rivalry grew up among the leaders, when personal ambition became stronger than devotion to a common cause, and when the failure to gain any assurance of foreign aid began to excite disappointment and alarm. Apaffy's zeal rapidly cooled, as he saw in the young Rákóczy a dangerous

rival in the affections of the Transylvanians. Ahmad Kiuprili would undertake no other enterprise until his work in Crete was completed. All prospect of help from Poland was removed by the election of Wisniowiecki. The German Princes had no love for Hungary, nor Hungary for them. Worst of all, Louis XIV, so long as he was negotiating with Leopold about a Spanish partition, and so long as there was a chance of this partition treaty being carried out, was compelled to disavow all the formal and informal promises of Grémonville. The death in March, 1667, of Vesselényi, the most sincere patriot among the confederates, was a serious blow to the cause. Zrinyi, giving the reins to his imagination, aimed at an independent principality in Croatia and Slavonia, if not at the Crown of Hungary, while his son-in-law was to recover Transylvania for the House of Rákóczy. Nadasdy, a rival rather than a colleague, was chiefly anxious to assert his own claim to the office of Palatine. From one quarter and another information came to Lobkowitz, who in 1669 succeeded in supplanting Auersperg as chief Minister. In 1670, when sufficient damnable evidence had been collected, he struck hard and promptly. Troops were sent into Hungary to cope with any attempt at armed rebellion. The leading plotters were seized and brought to trial. The enquiry which followed was secret and was in all probability biassed and unfair. But it is hardly possible to doubt the substantial justice of the sentences which were pronounced. On April 30, 1671, Zrinyi, Frangipani and Nadasdy were put to death. Tattenbach shared their fate in December. The life of Francis Rákóczy was saved by the mediation of his mother, Sophia Báthory, who had the double merit of being wealthy and also a devout Roman Catholic; but he had to abandon all his ambitious designs, and died in obscurity in 1676. Stephen Tökölyi died in 1670, while obstinately defending his castle against the Imperial troops; but he bequeathed the championship of the Hungarian cause to his more famous son Emeric.

On the suppression of the famous conspiracy of the Hungarian magnates followed a reign of terror, which has loaded the name of Lobkowitz with obloquy in Hungarian tradition. All the designs which had been attributed to the Austrian Government were now put into practice. The nobles could only escape suspicion and trial by the most abject submission. The Protestants were punished for treason as well as for heresy. Their preachers were sent to the galleys, and their churches were either closed or handed over to the Catholics. The time-honoured office of Palatine was suppressed; and Caspar von Ampringen, High Master of the German Order, was sent with full powers as Governor to Pressburg. The Jesuit advisers of Leopold believed that Hungary might be reduced by the methods which had proved successful in Bohemia. The Magyar, though inferior as a plotter, is, however, a more resolute rebel than the Slav. Possibly, if there had been no external difficulties, his obstinacy might have been overcome. But European affairs at this time

underwent a momentous change. In 1673 Leopold, after more than ample provocation, broke loose from France and allied himself with Brandenburg for the defence of the United Provinces. It is true that, until the fall of Lobkowitz in October, 1674, there was still a curious reluctance at Vienna to make the breach with Louis XIV irreparable. The Great Elector was so disgusted that he forsook the coalition for a time; and Montecuculi resigned his command because, as he is represented to have said, he preferred to receive commands direct from Paris rather than roundabout by way of Vienna. But enough had been done to convince Louis XIV that the secret treaty of January 19, 1668, was waste-paper, that the old quarrel with the Austrian Habsburgs was still to be fought out, and that he must make use of any weapons which lay to his hand. He was therefore willing and eager in 1674 to encourage those Hungarian rebels who were urged either by patriotism or by Protestant zeal to resist the oppressive and persecuting rule of Ampringn. Ever since 1671 they had conducted a guerrilla war in northern Hungary against the Imperial troops. Their nearest patron was Michael Apaffy, whose right-hand man, Michael Teleki, became the commander of the rebel forces. As Louis XIV was too busied in the west to give direct assistance to the Hungarian rising, he set himself to bring about the intervention of Poland. There the rule of the unfortunate Michael Wisniowiecki had been hopeless from the first. The French faction treated his authority with contempt, and their opposition would probably have kindled a civil war, but for the outbreak of a new struggle with the Turks.

This conflict had its origin in the Ukraine, which in 1667 had been divided between Russia and Poland, the whole district on the left bank of the Dnieper being assigned to Russia, while the town of Kieff was to remain in her occupation for two years. The partition was a grievance to the turbulent Cossacks, who desired to recover their unity and who equally resented control from Warsaw or from Moscow. After two years of desultory warfare the Cossack Hetman Doroszenko appealed for aid to the Turks. Ahmad Kiuprili responded to the appeal in 1672 by once more leading an imposing army northwards. The Sultan was induced to accompany his troops on what was little more than a triumphant march. Kameniec was carried by storm; Lemberg surrendered; and the whole of Podolia was at the mercy of the invaders. The timid King Michael became a suppliant for peace, and agreed by the Treaty of Buczacz (October 18, 1672) to cede Podolia, to acknowledge Turkish suzerainty over the Ukraine, and to pay an annual tribute of 220,000 ducats. Mohammad IV returned in triumph to Adrianople.

But the elation of the Turks was premature. The haughty spirit of the Poles was roused by the news of the King's abject surrender. In response to the fiery appeals of Sobieski, the shameful treaty was repudiated. Kiuprili had to return northwards, where he threw a strong

garrison into Kameniec and advanced to the siege of Khoczim. Under its walls he was attacked by Sobieski, and suffered a defeat hardly less signal and complete than that of St Gothard (November 11, 1673). On the previous day King Michael had died, and the throne of Poland was once more vacant. In spite of the perilous condition of the kingdom, there was no lack of foreign candidates. Among the princes discussed was James, Duke of York, who had just been deprived of office in England by his notable refusal to comply with the provisions of the Test Act. But the most formidable competitors were those who could count on the support of either France or Austria. The Emperor again favoured Charles Leopold of Lorraine, whose prospective duchy had been in French occupation since 1670. To strengthen his candidature Charles Leopold was eager to marry the widow of the late King¹. Philip William of Neuburg was still living, but on this occasion put forward his son, who could claim descent through his mother from King Sigismund III, and who was equally willing to marry the dowager Queen. The French envoy was instructed to oppose at all costs the election of Charles of Lorraine, to give a sort of official support to the Neuburg prince, but to act with such prudent opportunism that whoever gained the Crown should believe himself indebted for it to the support of France.

As might have been anticipated, the choice of the Diet fell upon the vigorous champion of the nation's honour, John Sobieski (May 21, 1674). His accession was a triumph for Louis XIV, as that of his predecessor had been for the Emperor. Sobieski was bound to France by early associations, by the influence of his wife, Mary d'Arquien, and by his identification during recent years with the French party in Poland. Louis naturally sought to make the most of what might prove invaluable assistance in the east. He sent the Marquis of Béthune, who had married an elder sister of the new Queen of Poland, to carry his congratulations to Sobieski; and on June 11, 1675, a treaty of alliance was signed between France and Poland. The Polish King was to receive a subsidy of 200,000 crowns, and French assistance in the design of restoring Polish suzerainty over East Prussia. In return, he was to allow recruiting in his dominions for the French service and to give a helping hand to the Hungarian rebels. Thus Louis had it in his power to stir up formidable difficulties which would divert the forces of Austria and also those of the Elector of Brandenburg, who had rejoined the coalition against France. On May 27, 1677, Béthune signed a treaty with Apaffy and his allies by which, in return for French subsidies and aid from Poland, an army of 15,000 men was to make war upon the Emperor

¹ Charles Leopold of Lorraine succeeded his uncle Charles III in 1675 in the titular duchy which he never ruled. Although he failed in his candidature for the Polish Crown, he married the Archduchess Eleonora Maria, the widow of King Michael, in 1678. The grandson of this marriage, Francis Stephen, became the husband of Maria Theresa and the ancestor of the later House of Lorraine-Habsburg.

under the command of Teleki. Between these two dates, great efforts were made by France to bring about peace between Poland and Turkey. So long as the war lasted, neither Power could give effective assistance to Hungary; but its termination would enable France to bring either the Turks or the Poles into the field against the Emperor. The task was a difficult one, because Kiuprili refused to surrender any of the conquests of 1672, and Sobieski could only hope to make the Crown hereditary in his family by freeing Polish soil from the infidel. In 1675 the Polish King won a second brilliant victory at Lemberg. But the Turk had the more lasting resources, and in 1676 Sobieski found himself hemmed in by superior numbers. In October he agreed to the Treaty of Zurawna, by which the Turks retained the greater part of Podolia with the town of Kameniec, but recognised Polish suzerainty over western Ukraine.

In spite of all this diplomatic activity, the Hungarian revolt gained little from foreign assistance, and exerted far less influence upon the western war than had been anticipated at Versailles. Apaffy found it necessary to regulate his actions in accordance with the will of the Porte, which was not yet prepared for an open rupture with Austria. Ahmad Kiuprili, who had extended the empire of Turkey to its furthest bounds in Europe by the inclusion of Neuhausel in its Hungarian dominions and by the acquisition of Podolia and Crete, died a few days after the signing of the Treaty of Zurawna. His successor, Kara Mustafa, had by his energy and strength of will gained the confidence of the two Kiuprilis and the favour of the Sultan. He had become son-in-law of Mohammad, and thus brother-in-law of Ahmad Kiuprili. In all his actions he displayed that hatred and haughty contempt for the Giaours which had been handed down from the days of Turkish triumph. Already, as Kamakam (deputy of the Vezir), he had persuaded Mohammad IV to express to the French Minister his willingness to make war upon the Emperor as soon as peace was made with Poland. This momentous decision was formally approved by the French Council of State, and the conclusion of the Treaty of Zurawna was welcomed with enthusiasm at Versailles. But, though Kara Mustafa never abandoned his design, he was compelled to postpone its execution. The Cossack Hetman Doroszenko, profoundly disappointed by the Treaty of Zurawna, appealed to the Tsar for assistance against his recent allies. In 1677 the Turks found themselves involved in a war with Russia—the one Christian Power for which they entertained a vague but real respect. So long as this war continued, it was hopeless for France or any other Power to expect Turkish intervention. Apaffy found it advisable to restrain his enthusiasm for the Hungarian rebels. In 1678 his representative, Teleki, withdrew of his own accord from the command of the insurgent forces and adroitly suggested as his successor Emeric Tökölyi, who was betrothed to his daughter. The new Hungarian leader possessed all the personal qualities which gain affection and loyalty; and his name still holds a high place in the traditions of his countrymen.

But, in spite of his fiery courage, his persuasive eloquence, his constancy in misfortune, and the dramatic vicissitudes of his career, it is clear that the hatred of Austria which he inherited from his father was stronger than his devotion to the real interests of his country, and that his action on more than one momentous occasion was determined by personal ambition. It was of evil omen that he celebrated his acceptance of the national leadership by the issue of coins which had on their reverse the legend, "*Tökölyi princeps partium Hungariae dominus*," and on their obverse, "*Ludovicus XIV, Galliae Rex, Protector Hungariae*."

The disappointment caused in France by the failure of the Turks to take up arms against Austria was neither so bitter nor so lasting as the resentment excited by the defection of Poland. Both personal and political motives combined to bring this about. The grasping Mary d'Arquien complained that the pension given her as Queen was no larger than that which she had received as the wife of the Grand Hetman, and demanded the elevation of her father, a dissipated elderly nobleman, from the rank of marquis to that of duke and peer of France. Louis XIV refused to grant this impudent request, and excused his apparent parsimony by recalling the large sums which he had expended in the Polish election. Sobieski himself, while as a doting husband he supported his wife's demands, felt that Louis had, for his own reasons, urged him into the Treaty of Zurawna, though he could have extorted better terms if he had waited for Russian assistance. Besides, Poland was overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, and its clergy, as well as the Pope, opposed the giving of aid to the Hungarian Protestants. In truth, had Sobieski followed the dictates of France, he must have incurred the hostility of his subjects. Although he received the crown on less onerous terms than his predecessor, he was only the first magistrate of a republic. Thus, in spite of the efforts of Béthune, the Polish King drifted further from France and nearer to the Emperor, who held out a prospect of his daughter's hand being given to Sobieski's son, and of the King's father-in-law becoming a Prince of the Empire and being endowed with lands in Silesia. In 1677 Sobieski pledged himself to give no aid to Leopold's rebellious subjects, and went so far as to prohibit the departure of troops which Béthune had recruited in Poland for aiding the Hungarians.

In 1679 Leopold, after a good deal of hesitation, followed the example set by his allies, Holland and Spain, in making the Treaty of Nymegen with France. His troops had at the end of 1678 driven Tökölyi from his strongholds in Upper Hungary; he was secure from opposition on the part of either Poland or Turkey; and, now that his hands were free in the west, it was naturally expected that he would complete the task of subjugating Hungary, which he had begun in 1670 and which had been interrupted in 1673 by his war with France. But the Emperor, though slow and timid, was not without intelligence, and what his mind had once grasped was not readily forgotten. He had learned

one lesson thoroughly since 1668. The dream that the peace of Europe could be assured by a friendship between Bourbon and Habsburg had proved wholly illusory. Leopold realised that the ambition of France could only be satisfied by the ruin of his own House, and that all other interests, even that of religion, must be subordinated to the supreme necessity of fighting his relentless enemy. He had learned yet another lesson also, but this less thoroughly. He was convinced, for the time at any rate, that his policy of harshness and persecution in Hungary had been ill-judged and unsuccessful, and he was prepared to try the alternative method of conciliation. He was further impelled in the same direction by the dictatorial measures of Louis XIV, the Chambers of Reunion, the ominous annexation in 1681 of Strassburg and Casale, and the difficulty of inducing the States of Europe or even of Germany to take any active measures against the monstrous encroachments of France. Under these circumstances it was eminently desirable to adopt any means of healing the open sore in Hungary. And so, in 1679, Leopold recalled Ampringen, whose rule was as distasteful to patriotic Catholics as to oppressed Protestants. In the next year he concluded a truce with Tökölyi which was later extended for two years. In 1681 he convened a Diet at Oedenburg, at which very great concessions were offered. The office of Governor was abolished, while that of Palatine was restored and conferred upon the popular Paul Esterházy. A complete amnesty was promised for past disloyalty, and even the Catholics consented to a decree that no Hungarian should henceforth be molested in the free exercise of his religion. A large number of towns and villages were named in which the erection of Protestant churches was allowed. The Emperor was to observe his coronation oath with regard to the maintenance of foreign troops, and was to take the advice of a Hungarian council upon Hungarian affairs.

Substantial as these concessions were, and extremely distasteful to the Catholic party, they failed to satisfy either the extreme Protestants or the extreme nationalists. Emeric Tökölyi declined to attend the Diet at Oedenburg, rejected its decrees as inadequate and insincere, and at the close of 1681 sent three envoys to Constantinople to offer to the Sultan the suzerainty over Hungary. His motives and their justification will always be open to dispute. From the Austrian point of view, he acted as the hireling of France and as an ambitious and unscrupulous rebel who was resolved at all costs to gain a principality for himself. From the opposite point of view, he was the resolute defender of political and religious liberty who refused to be deluded by the deceptive promises of an intolerant despot—promises which were only extorted by the fear of France and Turkey and would be withdrawn as soon as that fear had disappeared. The truth probably lies between the two extremes, and the desire to avenge the deaths of his father's associates in 1671 may

have weighed quite as much with Tökölyi as the love of liberty or personal ambition.

The conduct of the Imperial Government in the year 1682 displayed equal short-sightedness and irresolution. In the previous year the Turks had concluded the war with Russia by abandoning the Ukraine and leaving Kieff to be a Russian city. In January, 1682, the envoys of Tökölyi received the definite assurance of Turkish support. Kara Mustafa never wavered in his intention of undertaking the direct attack upon Vienna which he had planned six years before. The very fact that the plan was opposed by rival aspirants to the Sultan's favour made him the more resolute to insist upon a policy which had become essential to the maintenance of his own ascendancy. But, in spite of warnings, Leopold and his Ministers refused to believe in the imminence of danger from the east. They had decided at the end of 1681 to send Count Albert Caprara as a special envoy to demand the prolongation of the Truce of Vasvar, which would expire in 1684. Although their resident ambassador warned them that a special mission would be interpreted as a proof of fear and weakness, they had little doubt as to the acceptance of their demand. They continued the policy of conciliation in Hungary, and carried complaisance so far as to give approval to a marriage between Tökölyi, who had repudiated his betrothal to Teleki's daughter, and Helen Zrinyi, the widow of Francis Rákóczy. A representative of the Emperor attended the wedding, which was celebrated on June 15, 1682, at the bride's castle of Munkács. By this marriage Tökölyi strengthened his hold upon the patriotic party, and brought under his control not only the greatest inheritance in Hungary but also the person of his stepson, Francis Rákóczy II, the heir to a great name and an inspiring tradition.

In the summer the confidence of the Austrian Ministers received a rude shock. Caprara reported that the Turks evaded his demands by suggesting impossible conditions for the renewal of the treaty, and that in his opinion the Vezir was resolved upon war. Tökölyi, once secure of his bride (who was fourteen years his senior), concluded a treaty with the Pasha of Buda, raised the standard of revolt in the name of "God and liberty," and overpowered the surprised garrisons in Upper Hungary. But blindness still prevailed in Vienna. In September the truce with Tökölyi was renewed, leaving him in possession of his recent conquests; and the triumphant rebel was actually accepted as mediator to endeavour to bring about the prolongation of peace with the Turks. Under the influence of the Spanish ambassador, Marquis Borgomainero, more time was spent in discussing the measures for checking the distant aggressions of Louis XIV than in providing for the defence of Austria and its capital. Meanwhile Kara Mustafa was deceiving Caprara by artfully spaced-out interviews, and was employing the time in making elaborate preparations for a campaign which might, so far as official

intimations went, be directed against Austria or Poland or the republic of Venice. It was not until December 21 that the mask was finally thrown aside. In a last interview Caprara was informed that the Turks would not renew the treaty unless Leopoldstadt were razed, a number of towns near Neuhausel surrendered, and Tökölyi recognised as King of Upper Hungary under Turkish suzerainty. Such demands were equivalent to a declaration of war from a State which refused to respect the rules of international etiquette. In the spring of 1683 the nucleus of an enormous army was collected at Adrianople; and on March 31 the Sultan and his Vezir started on their eventful march. At Belgrade Mohammad IV entrusted the sacred banner to Kara Mustafa, who now assumed the supreme command. As the army advanced, it received recruits from all the vassal provinces of Turkey; and, by the time it reached Essek on the Drave, its numbers had swollen to over 250,000 men.

Once convinced that Austria was again threatened with a Turkish invasion, the Imperial Ministers showed no lack of energy. Agents were sent to all Christian States to urge them to combine their efforts against the common foe. Although, as Louis XIV sneeringly remarked, crusades had gone out of fashion since the days of St Louis, the response was not wholly discreditable to the fellow-feeling which still feebly survived in Christendom. It is true that some States held selfishly aloof. Charles II of England was the pensioner of France, and had had quite enough of wars and of parliaments. William of Orange was powerless, against the opposition of the republican party, to send aid to an ally whose overthrow would be as fatal to Holland as to Austria itself. Frederick William of Brandenburg was playing his own game, and it was not the correct move at the moment to support a prince who disputed his claims in Silesia and who would not agree to help him to drive the Swedes from Pomerania. Spain was too anxiously watching France to be able to spare assistance even for her closest ally. But Innocent XI worthily discharged the duties of the first bishop of western Christendom. He sent money to Austria, and fatherly exhortations to all the rulers who belonged to his communion. Venice eagerly promised help against its old oppressor. The sluggish Germanic Diet voted money, and among the Princes who promised to lead their troops to the defence of their suzerain were Maximilian Emanuel of Bavaria, Leopold's prospective son-in-law, John George of Saxony, and the young George Lewis of Brunswick-Lüneburg, afterwards King George I of Great Britain (four of whose brothers likewise served against the Turks). But the nearest and most invaluable ally was the most experienced and successful of living combatants against the Turk, the King of Poland. On March 31, 1683, John Sobieski signed the momentous treaty by which he undertook to furnish a force of 40,000 men. The French envoy, Vitry, resorted to the tactics which Louis XIV had prescribed as the only safeguard, if Poland were alienated from

France, and tried to stir up opposition in the Diet. But he had to deal with a King who knew all the methods of French diplomacy in the past. His letters were discovered, and he was dismissed with contumely from Warsaw. Louis had to pay a heavy penalty for his creditable refusal to bestow unmerited rank upon the Marquis d'Arquien. For, after all, the French King was as keenly interested in the Turkish invasion as the Emperor himself—not that, as some thought, he had brought it about. Constantinople was the only European Court at which his influence counted for nothing. The most haughty and imperious of rulers in insisting upon the privileges of his representatives, he could not protect his envoys from contemptuous treatment and even from imprisonment at the hands of the Turks. But he had known of Kara Mustafa's design in 1676, had welcomed the Turkish peace with Russia as enabling the Vezir to put it into execution, had planned his aggressive Reunions in the confident hope that his foremost opponent would be paralysed by the task of defending his own country. Louis XIV would never have admitted that he was a traitor to the Christian cause. The Turk, according to Louis' purpose, was to be a tool and not a master. As soon as he had swept the Habsburgs out of the way and advanced with his hordes to the upper Danube, Germany must appeal to the Most Christian King, and Louis as the victorious champion of the Cross would recover that imperial dignity which, according to the belief and teaching of French historians, had been wrongfully wrested from their kings as the heirs of Charlemagne. Crusades would have come into fashion again, when they fitted in with the interests of France.

The criminal blindness of the Austrian Government had delayed the appeal for help so long that it nearly came too late. For some months the Habsburg dominions had to provide their own defence. The veteran Montecuculi, who had so often urged the maintenance of a standing army as the one defence against the Turks, had died in 1681. His last service was to persuade his master to retain some 30,000 of the troops which had been raised in the recent war with France. These formed the nucleus of the Imperial army which was placed under the command of Leopold's brother-in-law, Charles of Lorraine, and which was joined by the youthful Eugene of Savoy, among other volunteers. For a moment the Imperial general meditated aggression as the best method of defence and advanced to attack Neuhausel. But the risk of being cut off from the Austrian frontier was too great, and the Duke fell back to cover Vienna. On July 7, the Emperor with his wife and family quitted his capital amidst the murmurs of his subjects, to seek a safer refuge in Passau. Only at the last moment were measures taken to destroy the defenceless suburbs and to strengthen the neglected fortifications of the city. If Kara Mustafa had hurried his advance, he could hardly have failed to carry Vienna by storm. But he lost several precious days on the way, and it was not till July 17 that he completed the blockade of

the city, which was to last for two anxious months. Charles of Lorraine had left a garrison of 13,000 regular troops, but had himself withdrawn with his main force, in order to harass the besiegers until the arrival of foreign aid should enable him to make a strenuous attempt to force the raising of the siege.

The story of the defence of Vienna is the most heroic page in the stirring annals of the city. Grateful recollection has preserved the memory of all who played a prominent part in the obstinate resistance which was offered to the overwhelming force of the enemy, from the Governor, Count Rüdiger Starhemberg, to the leader of the corps of University volunteers. Local tradition preserved a record of every sally, of the desperate struggles which raged round each bastion. Kara Mustafa might have taken the city over and over again, if he had pressed the attack with that obstinate determination and that disregard of human life which had been shown by Mohammad II in the storming of Constantinople. But he preferred to wait until exhaustion, plague, and famine compelled an unconditional surrender. And even so he came within measurable distance of success. The limits of human endurance had almost been reached, when on September 11 the relieving army appeared on the slopes of the Kahlenberg. Charles of Lorraine had played his part manfully. He had impeded the supplies and interrupted the communications of the besiegers, and he had successfully defended Pressburg from the attack of Tökölyi. But his chief care had been to hasten the assembling of the relieving forces from Germany and from Poland. In response to the Duke's urgent appeals, John Sobieski commenced his march with only 26,000 men, instead of waiting for the collection of the full contingent fixed by the treaty. At Hollabrunn he was joined by Charles of Lorraine, who accompanied him to Tuln, where a bridge of boats had been carefully protected to secure the crossing of the Danube. To Tuln came the Bavarians and Saxons with a number of German volunteers, who had already assembled at Krems. On the southern bank of the river the whole Christian force, numbering nearly 70,000 men, was marshalled, and without delay set out on the difficult march through the Wiener Wald to the hills commanding a view of the city of Vienna and the eastward plain. Some fears had been entertained that difficulty might be caused by the jealous rivalry of a King, two Electors, and an Imperial general. To avert this, the Emperor actually started down the river with the intention of assuming the command in person. But his arrival would certainly have irritated the Polish King, whose superior rank and experience were not disputed by his colleagues. It was under his supreme command that the army was drawn up on the morning of the eventful September 12. On the left, nearest the river, were the Imperial troops under the Duke of Lorraine; in the centre were the Germans under the two Electors; while the right wing was formed by the Poles with an Austrian contingent.

It was no easy task which lay before them ; but it was facilitated by the gross ignorance and incompetence of Kara Mustafa. He had refused to believe till the last minute in the arrival of the Poles, and he had taken no precautions to cover the besieging army. He could easily have detached sufficient troops to destroy the bridge at Tuln or to hold the passes of the Wiener Wald. Even when the enemy was in sight, he refused to follow the advice of Ibrahim, the Pasha of Buda, to withdraw his seasoned troops from the trenches and to fortify a strong position on his western front. Between the Kahlenberg and the plain were a number of valleys formed by streams running into the Danube. Each of the intervening slopes might have been held by the Turks, and days must then have been spent in forcing an arduous path to the city walls. But all precautions had been neglected. The left wing of the allies, which had the hardest task, swept away the Moldavian and Wallachian auxiliaries, and the whole line threw itself with the impetuosity of assured success upon the Turkish camp. The Vezir was carried away with his panic-stricken troops. The Janissaries, surprised in the trenches between the relieving vanguard and the exultant garrison, were cut to pieces. Darkness was setting in, when the eight hours' combat came to an end, and the relief of Vienna was accomplished. The victors had so little anticipated such a speedy and complete triumph that they remained under arms all night, in the belief that the Turkish retreat must have been of the nature of a stratagem. It was not till day dawned that they discovered that the vast encampment which surrounded Vienna was deserted. As a matter of fact the flight of the Turks was so hasty that by 10 o'clock the next morning the foremost fugitives had reached Raab, a journey which it had taken the army eight days to cover on its advance.

It is saddening to turn from a heroic deed of arms, in which all worked together with complete enthusiasm and harmony, to the pitiful misunderstandings which followed. To a coalition success is almost as disintegrating as defeat. The Elector of Saxony stayed to escort the Emperor to the thanksgiving service in St Stephen's on the 14th, but started homewards with his troops that very evening, declaring that Protestants were regarded with little favour in Vienna and that the Saxons had no share in the spoils. He had some grounds for the complaint that the saving of Vienna was celebrated rather as a Roman Catholic than as a Christian victory. More serious was the want of concord between the Emperor and the King of Poland, and yet it was almost inevitable. Leopold, grateful as he was, could not but feel that he was dwarfed in his own and in his subjects' estimation by the magnificent achievements of his preserver. He had been willing to take the command, but had feared to come forward, lest he should hurt the susceptibilities of his ally ; and now he was an outsider in the celebration of the defence of his own capital. The susceptible Viennese had crowded to kiss the hands of Sobieski ; they looked with some coldness on the

ruler who had been safe on the upper Danube during both the siege and the final battle. John III of Poland, on his side, was eager for fame, greedy of praise, and inclined to resent anything which seemed to suggest an inadequate recognition of his own or his soldiers' services. But he could not prevent people from saying, with truth, that the Poles (through no fault of their own) had had less fighting to do than the Germans, and, with equal truth, that they had taken a larger share of the booty. From this it was easy to deduce the insulting insinuation that they were more efficient plunderers than soldiers. The two rulers did not meet till the 17th, and their interview did not make them better friends. Leopold strove to be cordial; but it was not in his nature to unbend, and he was bound by the strictest rules of imperial etiquette to remain covered and to withhold the coveted title of "Majesty." The King naturally thought that it was an occasion when strict etiquette was rather out of place; and he was still more annoyed when his eldest son on his approach failed to attract the notice of the preoccupied Emperor. He withdrew rather sullenly to his tent, and left his marshal to do the honours of the Polish camp to his visitors.

Incipient quarrels, and the miasma emitted by the imperfectly cleared battlefield, made it imperative to remove the troops from Vienna; and on September 18 the pursuit of the enemy was begun. It was, however, too late to overtake the Turkish army. At Raab Kara Mustafa had put to death Ibrahim Pasha, whose advice he had rejected, and whose accusations before the Sultan he had good reason to dread. Thence the defeated Vezir made his way to Buda. Meanwhile, the Christian army had crossed the Danube at Pressburg by the bridge of boats which had been brought down from Tuln, and after a few days' rest continued their march along the north bank. Near Parkány the Poles, who were in advance, were routed on October 7 by a superior Turkish force; but their flight was stopped by the arrival of the Imperial cavalry under Charles of Lorraine. Two days later, when the infantry had come up, the Turks were again attacked and completely routed. This victory was followed not only by the surrender of Parkány, but also by the capture of Gran, the frontier fortress of the Turkish dominions on the right bank of the Danube. This disaster, the first in which an actual possession of the Turks had been regained by a Christian force, completed the alienation of the Sultan from his Vezir. Kara Mustafa, instead of attempting to relieve Gran, had continued his retreat to Essek and Belgrade. The blame for the defeat at Parkány he laid upon Tökölyi, who had been within easy march of the battlefield but had rendered no assistance to his allies. The Hungarian leader, whose following had been diminished by a well-timed offer of amnesty from the Emperor, and whose efforts to make terms for himself through Sobieski had failed, was now absolutely dependent upon Turkish assistance. To defend himself against the charges of

the Vezir, he risked his safety by a personal visit to the Sultan at Adrianople. His eloquence, strengthened by the support of Kara Mustafa's numerous enemies, prevailed with Mohammad IV. Not only was he allowed to depart with renewed promises of aid, but his personal enemy was removed by death. On December 25 the emissaries of the Sultan carried to Kara Mustafa at Belgrade the fatal bowstring, and the immense wealth which his avarice had accumulated was confiscated by his sovereign.

No sooner had the glorious campaign of 1683 closed, than the Emperor Leopold was confronted by the same momentous question which had been so hotly debated by the Austrian Ministers in the previous year. Were his most vital interests in the east or in the west? Would he transform a war which had been forced upon him for the defence of his own dominions into an aggressive crusade for wresting from the Turks the Christian lands which had so long groaned under their rule? Or would he make peace with the disappointed invaders of Austria, and turn his whole strength to the task of resisting Louis XIV, who remained in possession of Strassburg, and who, at the time when Vienna was in its greatest straits, had renewed the attack upon Luxemburg, which with a parade of magnanimity he had suspended in 1682? On the one side was the influence of the Spanish ambassador at Vienna, Borgomainero, who hoped to gain the support of Charles of Lorraine for a scheme which might lead to recovering his lost duchy. On the other side were the urgent representations of Pope Innocent XI and of the victorious generals, including the chivalrous Duke of Lorraine, who placed the interests of Christendom far above the recovery of his own inheritance. Leopold, with equal wisdom and docility, followed the guidance of the Church. On March 5, 1684, at Linz, where the Emperor resided while his capital was purified and rebuilt, was signed the Holy League between Austria, Poland, and Venice. The three Powers pledged themselves to carry on war against the Turks and to conclude no separate peace with the infidel. Each State was to retain any conquests which it might make. The Pope was recognised as the patron and protector of the League, and a solemn oath to carry out its terms was transmitted to him from each of the members.

From this treaty dates the continuous war which lasted till the Peace of Carlowitz (1684-98), which finally freed Europe from the Turkish terror, and which assured to the Austrian Habsburgs a foremost place among the Great Powers. The contributions of the three allies to the ultimate success were unequal in merit and in extent. That of Poland was unquestionably the least. John Sobieski did little to maintain, and nothing to enhance, the fame which he had won at Khoczim, at Lemberg, and in the relief of Vienna. He was not unfaithful to his allies, but he was fatally hampered by domestic difficulties, by the opposition of interested partisans of France among the nobles

of Poland and Lithuania, and by the influence of his wife, who returned to her old love for her native country. These troubles broke the spirit and clouded the later years of the hero-King. Sobieski died in 1696 without having achieved either of the objects dearest to his heart. He had failed to drive the Turks from Kameniec and Podolia, and he did not succeed in securing the succession of his son to the throne of which he was the last illustrious occupant.

In the case of Venice, on the other hand, the war was signalised by many creditable achievements. Taking full advantage of the fact that the main Turkish forces were occupied in the north, the Republic organised simultaneous attacks upon the Dalmatian coast and upon Greece. In the latter the chief command was entrusted to Francesco Morosini, the hero of the defence of Candia. He began the campaign in 1684 by capturing the island of Santa Maura and the town of Prevesa. In 1685, with the help of an army of German mercenaries, he commenced his great enterprise, the conquest of the Morea, which gave him the name of "the Peloponnesian." Koron was taken in August, and the fall of Kalamata made him master of the peninsula of Maina. In the next year the Turks were defeated in an attempt to relieve Nauplia by Count Königsmarck, who commanded the German troops; and the surrender of the garrison gave to Venice almost complete mastery of the southern Morea. The campaign of 1687 is the most famous in the history of the war. In July the Turkish entrenchments near Patras were carried by storm, and an entry was secured into the gulf of Corinth. Accompanied by the fleet, the army marched along the coast to Corinth, which was occupied on August 7. After fortifying the Isthmus, the Venetian forces proceeded into Attica and laid siege to Athens. The bombs of the besiegers reduced to ruin the Parthenon and the Propylaea, and the Turks surrendered the city on September 28. With the fall of Athens the record of uninterrupted success came to an end. In 1688 the city was evacuated, partly on account of an outbreak of plague, and partly in order to concentrate all the forces of the Republic on the conquest of Negropont. This enterprise ended in complete and disastrous failure. Königsmarck died in September; and on their departure from Negropont in October the German troops were disbanded and sent home. The later history of the war is comparatively uneventful. Morosini resigned his command in 1689; and in the next year Monemvasia, the last Turkish stronghold in the Morea, was starved into surrender. But all attempts to extend or retain Venetian domination beyond the Isthmus ended in failure. Morosini tried to encourage his fellow-countrymen by returning to Greece at the age of seventy-five; but he died at Napoli (January 16, 1694) before he had time to put his reputation to a new test. His successor Zeno attacked Chios, but was completely defeated by a Turkish fleet and was punished for his incompetence by imprisonment in Venice. The Turkish Government

was steadily improving its naval and military forces as the war went on; and the Republic owed the retention of most of its conquests in Greece and Dalmatia to the obstinate exertions of Austria.

As compared with her allies, Austria bore the brunt of the war, and to her fell the largest and the most durable share of the spoils. Four eminent commanders, Duke Charles of Lorraine, the Elector Max Emanuel of Bavaria, Margrave Lewis of Baden-Baden, and Prince Eugene of Savoy, had taken part in the relief of Vienna; and they became the protagonists in the great eastern struggle. With the exception of 1684, when an over-confident attack upon Buda ended in the complete repulse of the besiegers, each of the early years of the war was marked by at least one distinguished feat of arms. In fact the superiority of the German arms and tactics, thanks largely to the teaching of Montecuculi, was so great that some contemporary critics complained that the successes gained were not more rapid and complete. For this they blamed the lateness of the season in which the campaigns were begun, and the jealousy with which both the Elector of Bavaria and the Margrave of Baden regarded the Duke of Lorraine. But it must also be remembered that, in addition to the main campaigns, the Austrians were fighting against rebels in northern Hungary and against the Turks in Slavonia and Bosnia; that the central war was mainly a war of sieges; and that the Turks, if inferior in the open field, were still stubborn opponents behind walls or entrenchments. A series of almost unbroken victories began in 1685 with the siege of Neuhausel. The Turks, instead of attempting to effect a direct relief, marched to attack Gran, where they were defeated with great loss by Charles of Lorraine with his main army (August 16). Three days later Aeneas Caprara, who had been left with a small force to maintain the siege till the Duke's return, succeeded in storming the fortress which had been originally constructed by Ferdinand I, and had been the great prize of Ahmad Kiuprili in 1663. In the next year the Imperial army, to which volunteers now flocked from all parts of Europe, advanced to the second siege of Buda. The garrison offered as obstinate a defence as before, and the Vezir Kara Ibrahim led a large army to its succour. But the Duke of Lorraine pressed his attack in spite of many disappointments, and on September 2, after a siege of ten weeks, the ancient capital of Hungary was added to the dominions of the Habsburg King. Equally gratifying to Leopold and almost equally important were the successes gained in 1686 in Upper Hungary. Tökölyi, defeated by General Schulz near Eperies, appealed for aid to the Pasha of Grosswardein, who received him with royal honours and then sent him in chains to Adrianople. Although he was subsequently released and even restored to favour, his cause had suffered a blow from which it never recovered. By the end of 1686 Eperies, Kaschan, Tokay and a number of other towns had submitted to the Emperor. Only the fortress of Munkács held out

under the command of Helen Zrinyi, a more obstinate rebel even than her husband.

The campaign of 1687 opened with a reverse. Max Emanuel of Bavaria had long urged that he was entitled to a separate command by his rank as a great German Prince and as the Emperor's son-in-law. The fear that his discontent might lead to the withdrawal of the Bavarian contingent compelled the Austrian Government to divide the army between the Duke of Lorraine and the Elector. Their imperfect cooperation helped to bring about the repulse of an attack on the important fortress of Essek, where the great bridge over the marshy valley of the Drave was the main link in the line of communication between southern Hungary and Belgrade. But the failure was no unmixed evil, since it encouraged the Vezir to follow the retreating army and to risk a pitched battle at Harkány, near Mohács. Here the Turks suffered a crushing defeat (August 12), which did more than any other single event to overthrow that Turkish ascendancy in Hungary which had been founded upon Solyman's great victory at Mohács more than a hundred and fifty years before. General Dünewald, following the fleeing enemy, took Essek and Peterwardein, and thus opened the way into Servia. In the north Erlau surrendered, and Charles of Lorraine, entering into Transylvania, received from Apaffy an acknowledgment of vassalage to the Habsburg King of Hungary. Earlier in the year a special Court had been erected at Eperies under General Caraffa to enquire into the guilt of Tökölyi's associates, and its severity had for the moment intimidated the malcontents. On October 31 a Diet was opened at Pressburg, which recognised the Hungarian Crown as hereditary in the male Habsburg line, and repealed the famous clause in the Golden Bull of 1222, supposed to give the Hungarians a right of armed insurrection in defence of their liberties. The concessions to Protestants made at Oedenburg in 1681 were confirmed. Leopold celebrated his triumph in the formal coronation of his nine year old son, Joseph, on December 9. A few weeks later Munkács was at last forced to surrender, and Helen Zrinyi with her children became the Emperor's prisoner.

But the most important results of the battle of Harkány were felt in Turkey. A mutiny broke out in the retreating army, and the mutineers demanded the head of the Vezir. When this was conceded, they proceeded to insist upon the deposition of Mohammad IV, who had preferred the pleasures of the chase to the tasks of government and of military command (November, 1687). Solyman II, whose life had, contrary to all precedents, been spared by his brother, now emerged from his prison to mount the throne. He was wholly unable to control the disorderly troops; and for months Constantinople was given over to anarchy and lawless pillage, until the citizens themselves rose and put the ringleaders to death. So great was the disorder that an easy

triumph seemed to be assured to the Imperialists if they were prompt to move in 1688. But precious time was wasted in an intrigue which ended in the transfer of the supreme command from the Duke of Lorraine to the Elector of Bavaria. It was not till July that the latter joined the army, and not till August that he advanced from Peterwardein to besiege Belgrade. Fortunately for him, the Turks had not taken full advantage of the respite given to them; and on September 6 the famous fortress at the junction of the Save and the Danube was carried by storm. The capture of Belgrade, as Leopold himself said, opened the way to Constantinople, and pious churchmen began to anticipate confidently the complete expulsion of the infidels from the soil of Europe. But they reckoned without the Most Christian King. Louis XIV had watched with ever-increasing chagrin the progress of the Austrian arms. Every defeat of the Turks and the Hungarian rebels diminished his chances of gaining the Spanish succession for his House. It became necessary for him to strike before the Eastern War was at an end; and, in spite of the twenty years' truce which he had concluded in 1684, he now recommenced those acts of aggression which in the next year involved the Western Powers in another great war. But he nearly overreached himself. William III joined Spain in urging the Emperor to accept the peace which the humbled Turks had more than once offered in vain. The negotiations, however, which were conducted in the winter of 1688-9 came to no result. The Turks became less yielding, when they discovered that France was about to make a diversion in their favour; and Leopold was obstinately loyal to his allies in Venice and Poland. To the intense chagrin of Spain and the Maritime Powers, the Emperor decided to continue the war against the Turks.

It was a courageous but a rash decision. The outbreak of war with France, which compelled Leopold to send considerable forces under Charles of Lorraine and the Elector of Bavaria to the Rhine, restored the balance in the eastern struggle which had hitherto been so decisively adverse to the Turks. In 1689 the change was not yet apparent. In addition to their wars with Poland and Venice, the Turks had to face a new enemy in the Russians who invaded the Crimea. Lewis of Baden, who had succeeded to the command of the Imperial army, was able to overrun Servia, where he made himself master of Nizza and Widdin. But in the winter the Sultan gave the office of Vezir to Mustafa Kiuprili, the brother of the famous Ahmad. Mustafa displayed all the reforming zeal which characterised the members of his House, while he surpassed them in religious tolerance. His great desire was to deprive the enemies of the Porte of the advantages which they had hitherto gained from the discontent of the subject Christians. At the same time, he set himself to reorganise the military organisation and to rekindle discord in Hungary. The death of Apafly in April, 1690, was followed by the

recognition of his son as Prince of Transylvania. But the Turks, in exercise of the suzerainty which they had never relinquished, nominated Tökölyi and sent him into Transylvania to revive the old spirit of hostility to the House of Habsburg. Taking advantage of the diversion thus caused, the Vezir attacked the Austrian garrisons in Servia, recaptured Widdin and Nizza, and by supreme good fortune succeeded in reducing Belgrade (October 8, 1690). The loss of this great fortress endangered all the Austrian gains in Hungary, but fortunately Essek still blocked the passage over the Drave. In 1691 Kiuprili led his army from Belgrade against Peterwardein. Lewis of Baden, who had in the meantime driven Tökölyi from Transylvania and compelled that province to renew its submission to the Emperor, now hurried southwards to the defence of southern Hungary. At Szalankemen (August 19) he won the greatest of his victories and the Vezir, who had held office for barely two years, was among the slain. But the Austrian army was too exhausted to attempt to cross the Save or to attack Belgrade.

The battle of Szalankemen marks a turning-point in the history of the war. Both sides relaxed their efforts. The intrigues of France in Constantinople succeeded in preventing the conclusion of peace. On the other hand the influence of the Emperor's western allies, and especially of William III, induced him to abandon all ideas of further conquest and to stand on the defensive in Hungary. Lewis of Baden succeeded in taking Grosswardein in 1692, but in the following year he was despatched to the Rhine. For four years the Imperialists, under the successive commands of Croy, Caprara and the young Frederick Augustus of Saxony, achieved practically nothing, and more than once narrowly escaped disastrous defeat. Meanwhile changes of rulers occurred in Constantinople. On the death of Solyman II in 1691, his brother Ahmad had ascended the throne. The latter's death in 1695 was followed by the accession of his nephew Mustafa II, the son of the deposed Mohamnad IV. The new Sultan was a young man in the prime of life and eager for military fame. Instead of entrusting all responsibility to a Vezir he undertook the command of his army in person. The Turks, always responsive to the call of an energetic leader, displayed their old warlike spirit. In 1695 and 1696 they defeated the Imperial forces in Hungary and recovered some of their lost predominance in the *Ægean*. It seemed as if events would justify the solemn warning of Montecuculi that his master should never wage a long war against the Turks, as their power remained unshaken by defeat. In 1697 the Sultan at the head of a formidable army marched from Belgrade up the valley of the Theiss in the direction of Szegedin, whence he could throw himself by way of the Maros into Transylvania. Frederick Augustus of Saxony, with all his physical strength and courage, possessed neither the character nor the capacity needed for a great general, yet it was impossible for the Emperor to dismiss an ally who had brought an independent force to his

service. From this dilemma Leopold was saved by events in Poland. In 1696 John Sobieski died after thirteen years of disappointment and chagrin. For the third time within thirty years there was a scramble for the still coveted Crown. The most prominent candidates were at first the young James Sobieski, who had married the sister of the Empress, and the Prince of Conti, who was backed by all the influence of France. Neither could prevail against the other; and the choice of the Diet fell in 1697 upon the Elector of Saxony, who changed his religion to gain a kingdom which remained in his House for two generations. Augustus II (as he was now called) quitted the army to repair to Poland. The vacant command was at once conferred upon Prince Eugene, who had been set free by the termination of the war in Italy on the defection of the Duke of Savoy in 1696 from the Grand Alliance. Eugene had expected an attack upon Peterwardein, and was at first disconcerted by the Sultan's northward march. With great promptness, however, he set out in pursuit up the Theiss and overtook the Turks as they were crossing the river at Zenta (September 11, 1697). Only two hours of daylight remained when Eugene's main army joined the cavalry which had ridden on in advance. Arranging his troops in a semi-circle, he ordered a simultaneous attack upon the imperfect entrenchments which covered the Turkish position. The vigour of the onslaught carried all before it, and the defenders were driven back in headlong flight to the temporary bridge. As the river was low, the right wing, by taking advantage of sand-banks in the channel, succeeded in closing the access to the bridge. This converted the rout into a massacre. The Turkish soldiers who escaped the sword of the enemy were forced over the steep bank to find a watery grave in the Theiss. Twilight was setting in as the great victory was completed, and Eugene declared in his report that "the sun refused to set, until its last rays had witnessed the complete triumph of your Imperial Majesty's glorious arms." The Sultan, who had witnessed from the further bank the annihilation of his army, fled in despair to Temesvar, and thence to Belgrade. Eugene, after a brief raid into Bosnia, proceeded to Vienna, to receive the thanks of his grateful employer.

Events now tended rapidly in the direction of peace. In November, 1697, the allies concluded the Treaty of Ryswyk with Louis XIV; and this, added to the recent defeat at Zenta, put an end to the obstinate determination of the Turks to continue the war. They were once more exposed to attack from the undivided forces of Austria, and they had another formidable enemy in Peter the Great, who had conquered Azoff in 1696, and eagerly desired to make Russia a maritime Power by extending his rule to the Black Sea. On the other hand, Leopold had long abandoned the ambitious designs which had been entertained at the time of the capture of Belgrade; and any inclination to renew them was removed by the pressing interest of the approaching succession in

Spain and by the strenuous appeals of the Maritime Powers that he would put an end to the distracting troubles of the eastern war. The youthful rulers of Poland and Russia were less peacefully inclined; but both had begun to form plans against Sweden which required that they should have their hands free. In October, 1698, the Turks, for the first time, sent envoys to a general European congress at Carlowitz between Peterwardein and Belgrade. Under the mediating influence of Lord Paget, the English representative, actual possession at the time was taken as the basis of negotiations, and it only remained to determine what exceptions to the general rule should be admitted. As between Austria and the Porte the difficulties were not considerable. The Austrians desired the surrender of Tökölyi, who since his expulsion from Transylvania had served in the Turkish ranks. The Sultan was eager to retain at any rate some shadow of his long-established authority over Transylvania. Both demands were ultimately withdrawn, and the Emperor allowed the Turks to retain the *banat* of Temesvar, enclosed between the waters of the Theiss and the Maros. With that exception, the whole of Hungary was left to the House of Habsburg. To Poland, whose chief service had been the bringing of Russia into the Christian alliance, Podolia and Kameniec were restored; and Venice was confirmed in its conquests in Dalmatia and the Morea. The three treaties in which these stipulations were embodied were signed on January 26, 1699. Russia, though represented at the congress, only concluded a truce for two years by which she remained in occupation of Azoff. A special agreement between Austria and the Turks stipulated that Tökölyi should be interned in Asia Minor; and there, far from the scene of their former exploits, he and his wife spent the remaining years of their lives.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE TREATIES OF PARTITION AND THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.

DURING the long reign of Philip IV a great change took place in the European position of Spain. This King renewed the warlike policy of Philip II, and Spanish troops again fought on the battlefields of the Continent. More than once during the Thirty Years' War, the ambassador of the Catholic King exerted a decisive influence on the actions of the Court of Vienna. Thus, the whole career of Wallenstein can only be realised by keeping in remembrance his relations to the King of Spain, who supported him in the epoch of his greatest power and was one of the chief authors of his fall. The actual turning-point in the development of Spain was the war in which she contended against the combined strength of England and France. The French Marshal Turenne and the English Admirals Blake and Stayner put an end to the predominance of the Spanish Power by land and sea. The French monarchy under Louis XIV wrested from Spain her military ascendancy, while her maritime power, already weakened in her eighty years' war against the United Provinces, was dealt still heavier blows by the navy of the Protector Oliver Cromwell.

About the same time Philip IV lost the sway over the neighbouring kingdom of Portugal acquired by his grandfather Philip II. The union of the two countries had always been highly unpopular with the Portuguese—the more so, since it had drawn on them the enmity of the Dutch. In the East and in the West, the Portuguese colonies had to sustain the attacks of their Dutch rivals, who succeeded in despoiling Portugal of the most valuable of her possessions in India and South America. It was thus only natural that the support of the people of Portugal was easily gained for the rights of John IV, of the House of Braganza, who in 1640 took possession of the Portuguese throne. From this time onward, Portugal never again submitted to the Spanish yoke. Philip, indeed, tried to maintain his inherited rule; but the defeat of his armies obliged him to renounce his claims. If to this is

added the lowering of Spain's prestige by the definite separation from her of the northern Netherlands, whose independence she had to acknowledge shortly before the Peace of Westphalia, as well as by the losses she suffered in the Treaty of the Pyrenees, it will be clear how much less formidable the power of Spain was when the melancholic King Philip IV shut his eyes, than it had been at his accession.

The new King was Charles II, the only son of Philip IV. At the time of his father's death he was a weakly child of four years; and no one believed that he would grow up and one day take into his own hands the government of his vast dominions. The question of the Spanish Succession became urgent since the very day of Charles II's accession, and remained so through the whole of his reign, which extended over not less than thirty-five years.

Spain was a great monarchy without a monarch, says Ranke, referring to the condition of Spain in 1665. This saying admirably characterises the entire epoch of Charles II. In his name the government of the country was conducted in turn by the favourites of the Queen-Mother, who by the will of Philip IV was called to the regency, and by several Prime Ministers nominated by the monarch himself. Nothing that might be called a personal policy of Charles II ever became manifest. Even when the great question of the Succession, which was of immediate interest to himself, had to be decided, he failed to act with any energy. The result was a continuous increase of the influence of the *Grandees* of Spain, who may be said to have, for the time of Charles' reign, acquired a decisive voice in the conduct of the domestic as well as of the foreign policy of the kingdom.

"Every *Grandee* is a sort of Prince," says a foreign observer. The government of Spain seemed to have changed from a monarchy into an aristocracy. The contrary might have been asserted of France. The superiority of the absolute monarchy established by Richelieu over the declining power of Spain had shown itself already in the long struggle terminated by the Treaty of the Pyrenees. However, the enmity between the two neighbours did not end with the conclusion of the Peace. Two years after Charles' accession war broke out anew between them. Wholly unexpected by the Spanish Government, whom Louis XIV's quite recent show of friendship had deceived, French troops in May, 1667, invaded the Spanish Netherlands; several fortresses were easily taken; and the whole country would have been subjected to a French conquest, if the help which Spain was unable to lend had not come from another quarter. The famous Triple Alliance between England, Holland, and Sweden obliged Louis to conclude the Treaty of Aachen, by which he had to give up his claims on the Netherlands and to restore *Franche Comté*, which had been already conquered by Condé. However, he was allowed to keep possession of twelve places in Flanders; and the position of Spain as towards France had after all

been considerably weakened, for it was less by her own efforts than by those of the Triple Alliance that the march of the French armies had been stayed.

The Spaniards were equally unsuccessful in the management of their political and military affairs during the ensuing War, in which Spain formed part of a coalition against France. Louis XIV, in his deep hatred of his Dutch enemies, had entered into a negotiation with Spain with the professed purpose of partitioning the Dutch Republic between them. For one moment only the Spanish statesmen seemed inclined to accept such a proposal. Soon enough they were brought to recognise that they were threatened with a greater danger by the growing ascendancy of the French monarchy than by the ancient subjects of their country. Spain therefore joined the enemies of Louis XIV. The War, the events of which are related elsewhere in this volume, ended with new losses for Spain. In the third War against Louis XIV in which Spain took part, the Spanish armies also fought with little success. If by the Peace of Ryswyk the French King had to restore nearly all the conquests made by him in the course of the War, it was by the strength of her allies, not by her own efforts, that this result was secured for Spain.

This extraordinary diminution of the weight which Spain could cast into the balance of Europe is of course attributable to the general decay of the country, of which the reasons are not far to seek.

"Loyalty and superstition," writes Buckle, "were the leading principles which influenced the Spanish mind and governed the march of Spanish history." "When there were able sovereigns," he says again, "the country prospered; when there were weak Princes it declined." Thus, the weakness and the mistakes of the Crown, together with the increasing power of the Church, account for the rapid decline of Spain in the seventeenth century. King Charles II, owing to his infirmity of body and mind, throughout his reign paid little attention to public affairs. It was accounted a great thing, and a rare occurrence, if he worked four or five hours in a day, and people knew it must be a very extraordinary business which one morning in May, 1694, made him miss his dinner, served punctually at noon. The whole administration was lazy and indolent. William III had told Alexander Stanhope, before sending him in 1690 as envoy to Madrid, that he must arm himself with great patience, if he meant to submit to the slowness of movement awaiting him at that Court. "They manage," writes Stanhope, "all their own affairs with the same phlegm, seldom resolving anything till the occasion be past." "This country," he says on another occasion, "is in a most miserable condition. No head to govern, and every man in office does what he pleases, without fear of being called to account." Very frequently the officers in high position were quite old men, who had done good service in former years. When Stanhope, one day, reminded the Secretary of State for the North, a man more than fourscore years old, of a piece of

business that had previously been treated between them, the Spaniard did not remember to have ever heard of it.

The weakest point of the administration was the public finances. Every means had to be tried to fill the royal coffers. Year by year, the *flotas* came from Mexico and Peru laden with bullion; but, owing to the large assignments granted beforehand, little of it came into the King's coffers. The bills sent abroad by the Government were often returned protested. In 1693, no branch of the public revenue could exhibit a credit of 100,000 crowns. In order to get money, the dignity of a Grandee of Spain was sometimes sold; so were, generally, the viceroys and Governments in the Indies, as well as some of the high offices at home. The wages and salaries of all Ministers and officers were, in 1693, reduced by one-third of their amounts. The revenues were already anticipated for many years. Even the worst of all means for procuring money for the Government was applied; namely, a depreciation of the coinage. No wonder, if on so weak a basis it was not possible for Spain to maintain the high position which she had formerly held among the great Powers of the world. Her army, once the best in Europe, was now in a very miserable condition. The troops fighting in Catalonia in 1699 are described as "all starving and deserting as fast as they can." The navy was no better. When Stanhope first came to Spain, it owned, he says, eighteen good men-of-war, which in 1693 were reduced to two or three.

While the Government and the people of Spain became poor, the Church continued to grow richer. Her deciding influence was felt through the whole life of Spanish society. The greatest power in the country was the Inquisition; it was greater than the King's, and menaced the safety of all—not only the subjects of the King, but also foreign Protestants living in Spain. When Oliver Cromwell had demanded liberty from the Inquisition for the English merchants, war with Spain had ensued. Since that time the power of the Inquisition had risen still higher. In 1691, a Swiss Protestant whom Stanhope had taken into his service was carried away prisoner by orders of the Inquisition, and everybody told the English envoy that he could have no remedy. Three years later, he tried to intercede for some French Protestants without any success. The King himself told Stanhope that he never meddled in any proceedings relating to matters of religion, even if instituted against his own domestics. At Palma in Majorca three *autos de fé* took place in the course of one week in 1691, Jews and heretics being the victims. They were the richest men of the island, and of course their property was forfeited. The fanaticism of the people against all Protestants was boundless. "It is a hard matter," writes Stanhope, "for a heretic to learn any truth among them, when they think the cause of their religion concerned." In 1691 the body of Stanhope's chaplain, after being buried with the utmost secrecy, was torn out of its grave and mutilated.

Since, in 1609, the Church in Spain had won her greatest triumph by the expulsion of the Moriscos, the industrious descendants of the Moors, the wealth of the Spanish nation had constantly been declining. The Moriscos had been the best agriculturists in Spain; they had been the principal cultivators of rice, cotton and sugar; in their hands lay the manufacture of silk and paper. The products of their energy were all but entirely destroyed, as were some other branches of manufacture that had flourished in the sixteenth century. Industry and commerce were reduced to the narrowest conceivable scale. Populous and wealthy cities became thinly peopled and poor. Madrid, in the course of the seventeenth century, lost half the total of its inhabitants. Still greater was the ruin of the ancient wealth and the reduction of the population at Seville and Toledo, at Segovia and Burgos. In several parts of Spain wide districts were totally deserted. James Stanhope, travelling from Madrid to the east coast, found Aranjuez, where the Court resided, as pleasant a place as any in Europe. But after quitting it he made no stay anywhere till he reached Alicante, "there being not one good town or good inn in all the road; and we went sometimes above forty English miles without meeting with so much as one house except a wretched *venta*." Poverty and misery increased in Spain from year to year. The total ruin of the nation seemed the inevitable result of the system of administration under Charles II. The scarcity of corn more than once led to a famine. In 1699 the common people were reduced to the utmost extremity. The British Minister could only with difficulty procure the bread required for his table. His secretary saw five poor women suffocated by the pressure of the crowd before a bakehouse; and 20,000 beggars from the country flocked into the capital, in order to be saved from starvation. It was this want of bread that caused two dangerous risings in Madrid and Valladolid, the earlier of which was of the highest political importance, since it brought about the fall of the Minister Oropesa, and the rise of the French party at Court. The rabble assembled before the royal palace, and forced the ailing monarch to appear before them and promise the change of Government for which they clamoured.

"The hinge on which the whole reign of Louis XIV was turning," is the phrase applied by the French historian Mignet to the great question of the Spanish Succession. This question originated in the fact that the two mightiest dynasties on the Continent simultaneously laid claim to the inheritance of the Spanish kings of the House of Habsburg. Two daughters of Philip III had been married to Princes of the Houses of Bourbon and Austria; the elder becoming the wife of King Louis XIII of France, the younger of the Emperor Ferdinand III. The marriage contract signed in 1660 by the Ministers of France and Spain contained several articles, concerning the intended marriage between Louis XIV, King of France, and Maria Teresa, daughter of Philip IV, King of Spain.

The future Queen of France had to renounce all her hereditary rights on the dominions of her father; she and her descendants male and female were never to succeed in the kingdoms and other territories under the sceptre of his Catholic Majesty. She had to profess this for her own part by two formal acts of renunciation. It might still have been doubtful how far the rights of her descendants were in reality annulled by such a declaration; and the French Court at least was resolved not to acknowledge that the renunciation possessed such a force. The Spanish consort of Louis XIII had signed a similar renunciation, which nevertheless had not been considered in France as a matter of great consequence. However, this question seemed not to be very urgent at the time of Philip's death in 1665. For he left a son, born to him four years before, by his second wife. This son was Charles II, the last scion of the Habsburg dynasty in Spain. He married twice, but had no children. Thus, after the renunciation of the eldest, it was the second surviving daughter of Philip IV, Margaret, in whose person would be embodied the rights to the Spanish throne after the death of Charles II. This was expressly stated in the testament of Philip IV. Margaret became in 1666 the wife of the Emperor Leopold I. Of her children only one daughter grew up, Maria Antonia, who married Maximilian Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria. It was the only son of this couple, the Electoral Prince Joseph Ferdinand, whose title to the succession to the Spanish throne, derived by him from his grandmother, Margaret, and restricted by no act of renunciation, was the most valid and therefore seemed to have the best chance of being generally acknowledged. Maria Antonia, indeed, had likewise been induced by her father, the Emperor Leopold, to transfer her Spanish claims to himself and to his sons by another marriage; but the force of such a resignation was more than doubtful, and certainly it could not touch the rights of her own posterity. Thus, midway between the French and the Austrian pretensions, stood, superior to both, the claim of the Electoral Prince Joseph Ferdinand. This claim was likely to be neglected so long as the great military Powers of France and Austria were each of them inclined to lay its hand on the whole inheritance for a member of their respective dynasties; but it was not less likely to come to the front and meet with general acceptance, if at any time either of these two Powers despaired of entering into possession of the inheritance in defiance of the rival claimant.

However, there were not only the diverging claims of three European dynasties which had to be settled. What made the question of the Spanish Succession really difficult, was the interest which the Maritime Powers took in its solution. The English and the Dutch, who had been rivals in their commercial enterprises for a hundred years, who had at different times fought each other as open enemies since the days of Oliver Cromwell—these two nations nevertheless stood together in the common

interest of their commercial policy. Both of them wished to exclude French competition from the trade they carried on with the Spanish monarchy. Thus they were both alarmed at the prospect of the change that would occur in the economic condition of Spain, when the rule over the monarchy of Philip II should pass from the weak tenure of her present King, to be placed in the hands of the mightiest Prince in Europe.

"The preservation of the commerce between the kingdoms of Great Britain and Spain was one of the chief motives that induced our two royal predecessors to enter into the late long, expensive war, and one of the principal benefits expected by our people from the conclusion of a peace after such a glorious and uninterrupted course of successes, and is of the greatest importance to the interest of our subjects, and to the riches of our dominions." These words occur in the instructions given in 1716 to Paul Methuen, the first British Minister accredited at Madrid after the close of the War of the Spanish Succession. They were intended to express the purpose which England had followed throughout all the successive stages of the Spanish question, both in peace and in war.

The commercial intercourse which England and Holland maintained with Spain and her dependencies was indeed highly important. Yet, for the reasons indicated above, the industry of Spain had never reached any very considerable height—not even, as some believe, in the sixteenth century, when her influence in European politics had attained to its highest point. It was therefore only natural that an enormous amount of foreign manufactures was imported into Spain. England, Holland and France were the principal nations trading in the many articles of European industry. Especially between England and Holland there was constant emulation as to their respective shares in the commerce with Spain and her colonies. During the whole of the seventeenth century, it had been doubtful which of the two Maritime Powers would derive the greater advantage from this trade. Before the English Civil War, the competition of the Dutch having ceased in consequence of their war with Spain, the English had become, as Roger Coke said, "proprieters of the trade with Spain and by consequence great sharers in the wealth of the West Indies." But, when Oliver's breach with Spain followed, the relation between the two nations seemed altogether inverted; the English trade to Spain stopped, while the Dutch, having made their peace, were the masters of the Spanish commerce. After the Restoration, however, the English Government succeeded in restoring the trade on the ancient basis. The old privileges were renewed; the English merchants were enabled to take up their old position in Spanish commerce, and held it in competition with the Dutch through the lifetime of Charles II of Spain.

Looking back to the time before the War of the Spanish Succession, William Wood, in his *Survey of Trade*, states that the goods exported

by the English to Spain were different kinds of cloths, stuffs, cotton and silk, fish and other commodities. The goods imported from Spain in return were wine, oil, wool, iron, and other articles, and the balance paid to England in bullion had been very great. A considerable number of British merchants at that time lived in Cadiz and other ports of Spain, which were the marts of the English manufactures for the Indies.

Besides this, a great carrying-trade was carried on by English ships between Spain and other countries. Even the intercourse between Spain and her colonies in the West was, under the names of Spanish firms, in a great measure carried on by English and Dutch merchants. If to this are added the numerous legal and illegal advantages gained by British and Dutch merchants, the large smuggling trade in progress between the West Indies and the American continent, the deficiencies of the Habsburg administration in Spain as compared with that of nations much further advanced in their economic development, it becomes evident why the British and Dutch merchants derived the greatest benefit from the colonial possessions of Spain. To the Crown not much was left besides the trouble of administration. The enormous amount of bullion brought over every year by the silver-fleets from the New World only reached the Spanish ports in order to fill the pockets of the foreign merchants.

Ever since the testament of Philip IV, confirmed by the Cortes of Spain, had been drawn up for settling the Succession to the throne, this great question had continued to occupy the minds of the Spanish people as well as the Cabinets of Europe. The weak physical constitution of Charles II seemed to presage a premature death. He was never healthy and often so ill that his life was despaired of. The well-known Habsburg type seemed in him exaggerated to a caricature. His lower jaw stood out so far that the two rows of teeth could hardly meet. His diseases were so many that even at his Court there were some persons, and the doctors among them, who would repeat the saying common among the superstitious people, that his sufferings were caused by witchcraft. Whenever his health improved, the recovery was ascribed to a miracle. In his dangerous illness in 1696 the King was cured by the intervention of St Diego of Alcalá, whose body had been brought to him in his greatest extremity.

Every fit of illness that befell Charles II alarmed Europe. But still the Powers postponed during many years any decisive resolution on the point, the more so since the policy of Louis XIV set difficult problems enough to European diplomacy. Nothing had been settled, when the Congress was at work at Ryswyk to secure anew the peace of Europe. Indeed, the great question more than once threatened to confuse the labour of the diplomatists—especially in the autumn of 1696, when not only Charles II, but also his Queen, who had been believed of late to be with child, was dangerously ill. A few weeks later William III had to oppose

the Imperial Court, which wished the Spanish Succession to be fixed by one of the articles of the Treaty to be concluded. Practically no serious negotiation had been opened on the Spanish question, and no decision had been taken in regard to it, when the peace instruments were signed at Ryswyk.

In any endeavour to describe the development of this question from the Treaty of Ryswyk onward to the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession, it is necessary to distinguish between the proceedings and events which took place at the Court of Madrid, and the political transactions among the European statesmen outside Spain. For neither could his Catholic Majesty alone make an arrangement sure to satisfy all and therefore to meet with a general assent, nor were the other Powers likely, even if they came to an unanimous conclusion, to obtain for it the approval of the Spanish nation. Castilian pride would never admit the possibility that the monarchy of Philip II could be dismembered, or give room to any doubt, except as to whether the sole heir of the monarchy of Charles II should be a Bourbon or a Habsburg or a Bavarian prince; and, further, held it indispensable that the choice should be determined within Spain itself. On the other hand, the political pretensions and commercial interests of the Powers concerned in the first or in the second line were so diverse that it seemed hardly possible to find a satisfactory solution without proceeding to a partition of the vast empire.

More than at any former period in the life of Charles II, the intrigues as to the Succession began after the Peace of Ryswyk to perturb court life at Madrid, where each candidate had his own party—where at one day the French, at another the Austrian or Bavarian, influence seemed to prevail. Next to these, the hereditary right of the Duke of Savoy, whose great-grandmother had been a daughter of Philip II, was also much discussed. Indeed, in addition to these European dynasties, the pretensions of certain noble personages in Spain were also occasionally brought up who could lay claim to at least one or another part of the great inheritance. Among these was even the bearer of the great name of Montezuma.

During the greater part of the following year, while the health of Charles II was in a very desperate state, the general inclination in Spain seemed to be in favour of a French Prince. The ambassador of Louis XIV made all imaginable endeavours, squandering great sums of money, to strengthen the French sympathies among the common people. His influence grew stronger every day. "The French ambassador," wrote Stanhope, "dares all this Court, as a hawk does larks." It might be expected that no opposition would be attempted, if after the death of the invalid monarch a Bourbon prince should come into the country as his successor. And this single condition only had to be fulfilled, that the two neighbouring monarchies should remain distinct from each other.

The Austrian party at the Court of Madrid consisted at this time

only of a few persons, among whom Queen Mary Anne, Charles' second wife, was the most important. She was a Palatine princess and sister-in-law to the Emperor Leopold, whose ambassador, Count Harrach, was her regular adviser. For some months they struggled hard against the French influence, trying to obtain a recognition of the claims of the Archdukes in Spain. But the King's growing weakness seemed to indicate an approaching crisis. Under these circumstances, when, as one authority tells us, the French gained and the Germans visibly lost ground every day, Queen Mary Anne was prudent enough to make her peace with the French party. Moreover, she had been disappointed of late by the conduct of the Court of Vienna towards herself. The Austrian ambassador had come so seldom to ask for an audience, and the letters of the Emperor had been so dry, that she believed he would not lend her his assistance. Her constant fear was lest, after the King's death, she might be locked up in the convent of Toledo, the usual place of retirement for the royal widows in Spain. She did not believe in the assurances of Count Harrach, that, in case she would lend her aid in bringing one of the Archdukes into Spain, she would really govern and the new monarch would be dependent on her; moreover, she had lost all hope of ever seeing the succession settled on an Austrian prince. On the other hand, she had every reason to set her hopes on Louis XIV. The French ambassador, and still more his lady, to whom the Queen was much attached, made her the most far-reaching promises. She should continue in her position even after Charles' death; indeed, the question was discussed whether she might not become the Queen of a Bourbon King of Spain, as she had been the consort of a scion of the House of Habsburg. She was additionally confirmed in her French feeling by Louis XIV seeming in return inclined to make concessions concerning certain territorial questions disputed between him and the Queen of Spain's brother, the Elector Palatine John William. In consequence, she was now as much in the French interest as she had before been in the German. Indeed, after these successes of the French policy, one might have expected that immediately after Charles II's death a descendant of Louis XIV would have appeared in Spain and, amidst the applause of the *Grandees* as well as the common people, ascended the vacant throne.

At the same time, however, while his affairs in Spain wore so favourable an aspect, Louis XIV was labouring at a solution of the Spanish question in a wholly different sense. Since the first month of this year, 1698, negotiations were in progress between him and William III, with the purpose of partitioning the Spanish monarchy. From the language held by the Earl of Portland, the favourite Minister of the British monarch, Louis became convinced that a Bourbon Succession in Spain would meet with the opposition not only of Austria, but also of the Maritime Powers. A European war would be the inevitable consequence of any attempt to bring about this Succession. The French King,

therefore, began to listen to proposals coming from the British statesmen, aiming at the succession of the young Electoral Prince of Bavaria.

"What!" exclaimed Marshal Tallard, who negotiated with William III by order of Louis XIV, "Spain, India, Italy, the Netherlands—all this to fall to a son of the Elector of Bavaria!" But soon afterwards the opposition of France to such a scheme was laid aside. It is not easy to say what were the real motives that induced the King of France to prefer the Bavarian candidature to the succession of one of his grandsons—or perhaps we should rather ask, was this really his preference? If the Electoral Prince became King of Spain, as it was proposed by the English, this would in itself be more advantageous to France than the succession of an Archduke, which to Louis was the most disagreeable of all possibilities. In such a solution France, moreover, would find her profit, since it was intended that some parts of the great inheritance should be detached from the main body to enlarge the Austrian as well as the French dominions. While, therefore, Louis' dynasty was interested in the Bourbon Succession, France would gain through the Bavarian candidature. If to this is added the natural wish of the French monarch, when only a few months had passed since the Peace of Ryswyk, to preserve France from a new war, there were reasons enough to incline Louis to the plan of a Partition implied in the British proposal.

During six months, from spring to autumn, 1698, French policy seemed to be working at the same time for two different purposes. Harcourt, the ambassador in Spain, tried his utmost and spared no money to bring about the entry of a Bourbon King at the moment of the daily expected catastrophe. In France, England, and Holland, meanwhile, statesmen were endeavouring to find out another expedient by proclaiming the young Joseph Ferdinand heir of Charles II, though not without detaching some portions of the inheritance for the benefit of the other pretenders. One only of these schemes could be realised. Did Louis XIV deceive William III, intending merely to amuse him in order to be the better able to execute his plans in Spain? Or, as some think, were Harcourt's endeavours meant only to make an impression on the Maritime Powers, to give them a high opinion of the influence which France possessed in Spain, of her sympathies with the Spanish people, of the good prospects awaiting her candidate in Spain, in case France should proceed to extremities? No doubt, all this is very probable; and not less probable is it that the splendid military reviews held near the French capital in summer, 1698, in the presence of Portland and Wassenaer, the two intimate friends of William III, the confidants of his policy in England and Holland, were intended to inform the world how rich and powerful France still was after the conclusion of the War; what large resources she possessed—while a great part of the British army had of late been disbanded; how valuable an ally and how formidable an enemy she would be in any future war; and how advisable,

therefore, it was to make acceptable proposals to the King of France in the treaty to be negotiated.

But if we must allow that of the two different schemes of policy with which Louis XIV was occupied in 1698, only one could in the end be realised, it by no means follows that the King did not take both schemes seriously. He seems to have desired that either way should be left open to him, so that he might choose the one or the other, according to the course of events. If the death of Charles II had occurred in 1698 and the French preparations had been finished, Louis would assuredly not have hesitated to send a Bourbon prince as the new King to Spain, and to defy the Powers and their Partition Treaty. This is exactly what he did afterwards—in 1700.

In 1698, indeed, the preparations of his ambassador in Spain had not reached the degree of perfection requisite for success, in case King Charles should die. Louis had therefore to observe the greatest caution. His intentions are clearly explained in a letter to Harcourt, written on September 15, 1698, when the negotiation with William III was drawing near to its conclusion. With all goodwill on the side of the Spaniards, Louis finds things not yet ripe to build his entire policy on the future succession of one of his grandsons. For it is only the people that wish it—none of the Grandees, except Cardinal Porto-Carrero, whose timid nature, moreover, does not allow him to give any but general assurances. No force is ready in Spain to support the French claim. Nay, even if the troops of Louis XIV should succeed in entering Spain and in establishing his grandson on the throne, it would still be necessary to take by force the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the Indies, Milan, the Netherlands, and the other territories belonging to the monarchy of Spain; for the other Powers would certainly form a league against France still stronger than the last. So King Louis proposes to conclude on special terms a treaty with the King of England. This treaty, however, is not to be published during the lifetime of the present King of Spain. If Charles should die, and if Porto-Carrero and other well-intentioned persons should then ask whether Louis would not send one of his grandsons to Spain, Harcourt was to make answer as follows. All the King of France had hitherto been able to do was to move his troops near the Spanish frontier—which was indeed the principal measure that must precede the sending of the Bourbon prince in person—but now he, the ambassador, had to inform his master what facilities and what assistance his troops would find on their way through Spain; what places of safety would be delivered into their hands; what confidence might be placed in the several viceroys and governors; and that only in reply to such information could his master give him his orders, so that within a few days they might receive the answer desired by them.

This time, however, the sick King survived, and the expected catastrophe in Spain did not happen. This only added to the importance

of the negotiations between Louis and William; they were protracted through many months, a considerable number of offers and demands being exchanged. All these labours at last terminated in the First Treaty of Partition, signed at the Hague on October 11, 1698. By this Treaty neither France nor Austria, but the Electoral Prince, was declared though not the sole yet the principal heir of the Spanish monarchy. Spain proper, India and the Netherlands, which latter were already under the governorship of the Elector of Bavaria, were assigned to his son, Joseph Ferdinand. The Italian dependencies, however, were detached from Spain proper. The French Dauphin was to receive the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the places belonging to Spain along the coast, Tuscany and the marquisate of Finale; together with the Spanish province of Guipuzcoa, contiguous to France. The duchy of Milan was to fall to Archduke Charles, the second son of Leopold. This agreement was, after the exchange of the ratifications, to be communicated to the Emperor and to the Elector of Bavaria, in order to obtain their approbation.

The Treaty of the Hague did not long remain unknown to the Spaniards. Some time since, the Court of Madrid had been alarmed by the familiar intercourse of Tallard with King William, as well as with the foremost Dutch statesman, the Pensionary Heinsius. From Holland, where no political negotiation could be kept secret, news reached Madrid, through different channels, of an intended Partition of the Spanish monarchy. Vehement indignation arose among the Spanish people. "They will rather," wrote Stanhope, "deliver themselves up to the French or the devil, so they may go all together, than be dismembered."

Thus it was as an immediate consequence of the Partition Treaty—not, as Ranke says, independently of it—that the idea arose in Spain of securing a recognition of the rights of the Electoral Prince by the Government, not indeed in the sense of Louis and William, but as a means of transferring the dominions of the Crown of Spain undiminished from Charles II to his successor. Herein lay the fundamental distinction between the two schemes for settling the Spanish question. In a letter from Louis XIV to Harcourt, he clearly explains the difference. He considers that the Electoral Prince, when of age, will not object to the renunciations imposed on him by the Partition Treaty, if this treaty should be the sole source of his right; but that, were he appointed by a royal will, his title would be much stronger, and he might on some future day declare that, during his minority, the Powers had done him injustice, alienating from him part of his inheritance. Harcourt was therefore to do his utmost to prevent a will being made by Charles II.

In this attempt, however, he failed. On November 14, 1698, the Spanish monarch assembled his councillors round him in his palace. He said that he had called them together on account of the most considerable matter that could concern the monarchy; that, since his

last fits of illness, he had been advised to dispose of the Succession before his death; which, in consequence, he had done, and so would have them know his last will before God should call him. In the document, then read by his secretary, the King had appointed the Electoral Prince of Bavaria his successor to the Crown, confirming at the same time the testament of Philip IV. In case of a minority of the future King, Queen Mary Anne was to hold the regency together with a Junta of six persons. And, when the King should have become competent to take the government into his own hands, she was to have a fixed income of 800,000 dollars, and liberty to live in any town in Spain that she might prefer. The councillors, after hearing all this, retired without giving an opinion or even making a reply.

This will of Charles II was the counter-stroke of Spain against the policy of the Partition Treaty, an attempt to save the integrity of the monarchy, to deliver it from the danger of being dismembered which threatened it from the agreement between France and the Maritime Powers. Charles had ordered his councillors to keep the secret; but the solemn act performed in the royal palace could not fail to command general attention. A fortnight later, Harcourt was able to send exact details to France; within a few weeks the news had spread through Europe, and everywhere it caused the greatest excitement in the diplomatic world. Those who were ignorant of the contents of the Partition Treaty, as the Ministers of the Emperor still were at that time, were inclined to believe "that this great transaction could not have been accomplished without the previous knowledge and consent of France"—the more so since the French Ministers seemed to be well satisfied with the news from Madrid. Others, familiar with the intentions of William and Louis, like Grand Pensionary Heinsius, declared that France would never consent to the will, and that her ambassador in Spain would doubtless hand in a note of protest. Marshal Tallard went so far as to assert that, if this intelligence as to the will should prove true, he was sorry to say that a new war was imminent. In England the public looked with indifference, or even with satisfaction, on the supposed settlement of the great Spanish question, being delivered from the fear that a French prince might succeed in Spain, and glad not to be disturbed in their trade with that country and its colonies.

Who can say whether by the succession of the Electoral Prince, had it taken place in one form or another, a general war would really have been avoided? In Austria at least, there was little inclination to submit either to the Partition Treaty or to the will of Charles II. But now an unexpected event happened. The young Joseph Ferdinand suddenly died (February 5, 1699). The cause of his death was officially said to have been small-pox; but reports were spread—and the Elector himself seemed to believe in them—to the effect that some sinister design had ended the life of his son.

The political situation was once more totally changed. How often the immediate decease of Charles II had been foretold! But now the ailing monarch survived, and his youthful heir was dead. A new arrangement had to be devised.

In London, in Paris, at the Hague, the unexpected news caused the greatest consternation. Pensionary Heinsius for some hours refused to see anybody. Next day, speaking to the Imperial ambassador, he said, "This reminds us how transitory worldly affairs are." His fear was that France might now recommence her intrigues in Spain. The two monarchs of England and France hesitated openly to declare themselves, each of them being desirous of knowing what the other would do, before he gave his own opinion. "You will, in fact," wrote Louis to Tallard, "wait for his answer before making any overture to him on my part." Tallard answered that he was requested by William to send a courier to his master to know his opinion about this important event. "But," Tallard's letter concluded, "either I am much mistaken or they will again enter into negotiations." This proved indeed to be true. The first question was whether, after the death of the person in whose interest it was principally designed, the Treaty of Partition still practically existed. There was annexed to the Treaty a secret Article, which appointed the Elector of Bavaria, in case his son should die without children, the heir of Joseph Ferdinand in all the kingdoms and States assigned to that Prince. Could this secret Article remain in force although, contrary to its supposition, the Prince had died before the King of Spain, whose dominions he was to inherit? Or, in other words, could the Elector be considered as the heir, not only of his son's property, but also of his rights of inheritance? At first, the answer seemed not to be quite clear; but later, on the part both of the French and of the English, the conclusion was reached that the secret Article became inoperative. William read it over attentively, and convinced himself that new engagements must be entered upon.

Before we attempt to describe the ensuing negotiations and their result, the Second Treaty of Partition, it may be useful to recall William III's difficulties in England, to which reference has been made in an earlier chapter, and the hindrance they proved to the freedom of his actions abroad. Now that the War was over, public opinion in England was expectant of a lasting peace, and the old aversion against a standing land-army, dating from the military rule of Oliver Cromwell, had been revived. On the other hand, the requirements of European politics, the necessity of maintaining the position England had won by the War, of opposing the dangers that threatened from Louis XIV and from the question of the Spanish Succession, of which the solution might be near at hand, were not yet generally felt in England. In December, 1697, his Ministers suffered a resolution to be passed in the Commons that all the land forces raised since 1680 should be disbanded; but William, by means

of his Civil List, succeeded for the present in keeping more troops under arms than he was allowed by the said parliamentary resolution. Hence in the negotiation for the First Partition Treaty Louis had to observe a certain moderation in his demands. When, however, in December, 1698, a new Parliament had assembled, in which the Opposition was still stronger, the Commons resolved that the land forces should be reduced to 7000 men, and consist only of English-born subjects. This meant the dismissal of several thousands of Dutch troops whom the King had brought over with him from Holland and who were still in his pay.

William, both disappointed and affronted, thought at least for a moment of leaving the country, since it would be no longer in his power to secure for England the position in Europe which he had crossed the sea to assure to her. The draft of the speech in which he indicated his intention, not of abdicating, but of absenting himself till his presence should become necessary for England's defence, still exists, though the speech was never delivered. William remained at his post.

His new move, made after some months, to the same purpose as before, by means of a message to the House asking for a retention of the Dutch troops, met with a flat refusal, in what he called a "very impertinent" address, to whose *doctrinaire* constitutionalism he had, however, to submit. But events told for him. As if to encourage Louis in his resistance against the demands of William, Marshal Tallard wrote to his master: "All that has passed this year in Parliament, and the discontent of several Lords, have so weakened the royal authority that there is hardly any more attention paid to it."

The rebuffs which William met in England could not but diminish the weight of his power in the balance of Europe; and they must be remembered in order to understand the character of the negotiations as to the Spanish Succession reopened between England and France after the death of the Bavarian Prince. The pretensions now set up by Louis XIV went much beyond those which he had previously advanced. William, unable to risk a new war, was obliged to accept them. The principal heads of a new Partition Treaty were arranged, and together with Louis, William sought to win for them the assent of the Emperor, not without the fear that a separate agreement might be concluded between the Houses of Bourbon and Austria. Louis himself was to such a degree master of the situation that not only did he seem able to choose between William and Leopold, but, at the very time when these negotiations were going on, and after the Treaty was signed, his party in Spain was at work to secure the whole inheritance of Charles II, without any dismemberment, for his grandson.

It was seen above that the Treaty of October 11, 1698, was held to have become inoperative after the death of Joseph Ferdinand. Nevertheless, William had in mind the possibility of adhering, or rather of returning, to this Treaty, by taking up, in accordance with its secret

Article, the claim of the Elector, Joseph Ferdinand's father. The King of England and the States General, as Tallard reported, were not averse from making a new treaty; but, if this should not succeed, they desired the liberty of requiring the execution of the Treaty of the Hague. Thus, soon after the death of Joseph Ferdinand, the same persons who had accomplished the First Treaty of Partition are found again at work to find the basis for a new agreement. If Max Emanuel, in spite of the secret Article, could not take his son's place, there were obstacles of a different kind to prevent the succession of other claimants whose names were again brought forward. The Duke of Savoy would never receive the support of England since he had deserted his allies in 1696, while France was equally disinclined to countenance the claim of Portugal, which she did not want to see once more united to Spain. In these circumstances, the Powers negotiating as to the Spanish Succession naturally confined themselves to the two principal candidates; or, to put it more plainly, they examined the problem how the whole of the Spanish inheritance might best be divided between the Houses of Bourbon and Austria.

Such was the origin of the Second Treaty of Partition. Louis XIV made the earliest proposal, laying down his opinion in a letter full of political spirit, written to Tallard in February, 1699, a few days only after the death of Joseph Ferdinand. "The partition of the monarchy of Spain," he began, "divided by the Treaty of the Hague among my son and two other claimants, is naturally reduced to a division between two by the death of the Electoral Prince of Bavaria....The question has, therefore, to be settled how a partition can be made into two equal halves and in a manner to assure the public tranquillity." He goes on to say that Europe would be alarmed to see his power rise above that of the House of Austria. But, on the other hand, he declares the power of the Emperor to have been so much augmented by the advantageous Peace lately concluded with the Porte at Carlowitz, that the general interest would, in case of a further increase of this power, require that France should be enabled to counterbalance it.

According to this principle, the meaning of Louis' proposal was to distribute the dominions which by the First Partition Treaty had been assigned to Joseph Ferdinand. With seeming disinterestedness, he was ready to give Spain and the Indies to the Archduke, adding to the Dauphin's portion, as it had been settled by the First Treaty of Partition, only the duchy of Milan. This acquisition would not, as he put it, cause any jealousy on the side of England or the States General, since it did not increase the power of France by sea; so that from this source there could not arise any disturbance of the trade of the Maritime Powers. Louis also dwelt on the geographic position of Milan, which, should Spain fall to the lot of the Archduke, might furnish a communication between the dominions of the two branches of the House of Austria so easy as to be prejudicial to the interests of the remainder of Europe.

But he foresaw how difficult it would be to obtain the consent of England for a French acquisition of Milan, and therefore suggested at once as an expedient that this duchy might be given to the Duke of Lorraine, whose territory would in exchange be transferred to France. A similar arrangement was indicated as to the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, with the possibility that the French dominions might be still further enlarged by the duchy of Savoy and the county of Nice. With regard, in fine, to the Catholic Netherlands, they were to fall neither to the Dauphin nor to the Archduke. The question was left open which of four possibilities might be preferred when the time came for a decision.

The foundations were herewith laid for a fresh agreement between the two Kings. It is manifest how the pretensions of France had increased since the conclusion of the First Treaty of Partition. Louis could dare so much, because he knew of William's difficulties in his last parliamentary campaign. How could William refuse what Louis demanded, when he had no hope of carrying his Parliament along with him to a war against France?

The result of some months' negotiations between William and Tallard was the project of a new Partition Treaty, which received the approval of the two Kings and was signed on June 11, 1699. The States General, to be sure, had not yet given their assent, and much less the Emperor. If the two Kings could, during the lifetime of Charles II, have brought their project into the form of a definite treaty, signed by the four Great Powers of Europe, there would have been a chance—the best within reach—of avoiding a general war. For Spain alone was too weak to oppose the will of Europe; and even Louis XIV would hardly have ventured to violate a treaty bearing the signatures of England, Holland, and the Emperor, besides his own. According to this project, the Dauphin was to have as his share the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the places along the coast of Tuscany, hitherto belonging to Spain, the marquisate of Finale, and the province of Guipuzcoa. To these acquisitions was to be added, in exchange for Milan, the duchy of Lorraine, or, if the reigning Duke Leopold Joseph Charles should be unwilling to give it up, another adjacent province, such as Navarre or Savoy or Luxemburg; so that in any case a considerable aggrandisement of France proper would have resulted from this treaty. Spain, however, with all the rest of the inheritance of Charles II, was to fall to Archduke Charles, younger son of the Emperor Leopold; and care was to be taken that the two branches of the House of Austria always remained separated.

This project was sent to Vienna; and it was hoped, since the Archduke was intended to be the principal heir of Charles II, that it would meet with the approval of the Emperor. "I am glad," wrote William to Heinsius on July 6, 1699, "Mr Hop has begun the negotiations at Vienna, and that no bad impression seems to have been made at the outset." But hereupon we hear of complaints as to the delays at the Imperial Court, which William feared might lead to the consummation of the

great work without the Emperor. Nevertheless, the Powers were already discussing the place where the further negotiations should be carried on; and it was uncertain whether this should be Vienna, which King William thought best, or the Hague, as preferred by Louis. As in other points, so in this, William was ready to yield; "but however," he says, "if France will not have it otherwise, it must be so."

Hop had in his negotiations at Vienna not at once communicated the project of the new Treaty of Partition. The Emperor at that time still adhered to the idea that the whole inheritance must come to his House. When he learned what had been agreed on between England and France, he seemed, indeed, not so very much disappointed, for he saw his share would be large. He did not, however, yet know the exact nature of the stipulations. Thus, in the conference held by his Ministers on August 31, 1699, it was resolved to remonstrate against the injustice of these propositions, and especially to observe that the Emperor could not afford Milan. In vain William hoped to come to an understanding with Vienna, offering some additional concessions to the Emperor in compensation for Milan. When the news reached the Austrian capital that the Court of Spain had solemnly protested against the Partition Treaty, and that the Marquez de Canales had communicated to the Lords Justices in London a paper so extraordinary both in its contents and in its language, that he was ordered to leave England within eighteen days, the effect on the Imperial Court was a growing antipathy to any partition policy. At the same time it was hoped, at Vienna, that a favourable impression would be created in Spain, if the Emperor seemed to stand firm against any dismemberment of the Spanish monarchy. Would not Charles II, in his indignation against the policy of William and Louis, be easily induced to make a will in favour of the Archduke as the only possible way of avoiding a Partition?

It was clear enough that the Treaty had to be concluded without the Emperor, if it was to be concluded at all. The negotiations with Holland were continued until March, 1700, when, on the 25th, the instrument had received the signatures of the plenipotentiaries of England, France, and the States General. Article VII stated that the Emperor should be invited to accede to the Treaty within three months, and, if, after this term had elapsed, he should refuse to enter into it, the three contracting Powers would join in nominating a Prince to whom the share now assigned to the Archduke would then be given. But still the Emperor refused to accede to the Partition Treaty, never ceasing to hope that his son would obtain the Spanish inheritance undiminished. He would have the whole of Spain, or he would have war.

As to all essential points, the Second Treaty of Partition in its definite form was in close accord with the project of the previous year. Spain, the transatlantic possessions and the Netherlands were assigned to the second son of the Emperor Leopold, and were never to pass into

the hands of the Austrian line of the Habsburgs. The Spanish possessions in Italy were to be transferred to the Dauphin, although Milan was to be exchanged for the duchy of Lorraine. The other possible methods of dealing with Milan, mentioned in the project, were this time treated in a secret Article, with the evident intention of its not being disclosed to the Austrians when the rest of the Treaty should be presented in Vienna. In this secret Article it was also provided that, beyond the three months allowed by Article VII for the accession of the Emperor to the Treaty, his assent should still be accepted within two months after the official announcement of Charles II's death by the Most Christian King.

In May, 1700, the Second Treaty of Partition was officially communicated to the Courts of Vienna and Madrid. Charles II, we are told, "flew into an extraordinary passion, and the Queen in her rage smashed to pieces everything in her room." Some days of general excitement followed. The King came from Aranjuez into his capital, to show his people that he was still alive. In the Council of State a very tumultuous scene was enacted. Charles wrote letters full of sorrow and complaints to the Emperor, to the Pope, to the petty Princes in Italy, with the view of touching the hearts of them all, and of gathering them round him against the Powers which had made a treaty for the dismemberment of the monarchy handed down to him from his ancestors. Most naturally, the unhappy Prince turned his eyes especially towards Austria. Charles and Leopold seemed to be natural allies against the Partitioning Powers. Queen Mary Anne promised Count Harrach that she would persuade her husband rather to lose all than to suffer the monarchy to be dismembered and himself alienated from Austria, by assenting to the infamous project of France, England, and Holland. Indeed, some preparations were made to place the Austrians in possession of the Spanish dependencies either during the lifetime of Charles II or immediately after his death. Strict orders were sent from Madrid to the several Governors and commanders to maintain a state of constant defence and to remain in contact with the Court of Vienna, so as to be able, if necessary, to obtain assistance from it. A considerable augmentation of the army was actually resolved on by the Emperor. On the other side, Louis XIV had for some time been gradually increasing the French troops near the Spanish frontier, so that he was able to march an army into Spain within a very short space of time.

If all this looked like the preparations for a war between Spain and Austria, on the one side, and the Powers which had concluded the Partition Treaty on the other—a war which might perhaps break out even before the death of the King of Spain—it was Louis XIV who averted this danger in a very skilful way. He promised the Courts of Vienna and Madrid to enter into no hostility against Spain, and to

take no step in the matter of the Succession, so long as Charles II lived, on condition that the Emperor likewise desisted from sending any troops into Spain or Italy. This proposal was accepted in Vienna.

About this time, when the political situation seemed no longer to indicate the imminent outburst of an European war, affairs were hurried on to a speedy decision in Spain. Charles II had seldom been seen so strong and in such good spirits as he was in August, 1700. A few weeks later the disease that had never left him assumed a more serious character than it had ever shown before. The last hour of the King of Spain, who had so often looked death in the face, was clearly at hand. Some weeks of the greatest excitement followed—the last efforts being made on the side of each Government to secure the victory of its own policy; the Partitioning Powers seeking, in the twelfth hour, to bring the Emperor into their Treaty; Leopold still hesitating, with the hope of securing the whole; Louis XIV openly professing to adhere to the method of his Treaty with William III, and at the same time watching with the greatest attention the strife of parties in Spain. It was at this critical period that, independently of all these endeavours, of all diplomatic labours and of all political intrigues, the die was cast as to the question of the Spanish Succession, and of peace and war in Europe; and the decision was made in Spain itself, by the last action of its dying monarch.

For the last time a German and a French party are to be found at the Court of Madrid, each at work on behalf of its candidate. The Council of Castile had addressed a supplication to the King, as being in a fragile state of health, to confer on his loyal subjects the benefit of nominating a successor to his Crown. Queen Mary Anne, supported by Count Harrach, tried hard to induce her husband to make a will in favour of the Archduke. For some days she seemed to have won her game; the instrument was ready; and nothing was wanting but the signature of the monarch. Nay, it is possible that even the signature had been added, when the adverse party succeeded in bringing about the burning of the will. Hereupon Cardinal Porto-Carrero, the head of the French faction, won a deciding influence over the dying King. He represented the feelings of the whole clergy in Spain, all of whom wished to see a French prince ascend their throne. These feelings had been further strengthened, inasmuch as the Pope had, some weeks before, written a letter to Charles II to recommend the succession of the Duke of Anjou. The King's confessors worked together with the Cardinal-Primate. Thus the power of the Church contributed towards bringing the Crown of Spain to the grandson of Louis XIV. The will of Charles II, bearing date October 2, 1700, was signed by the King on the following day. His sufferings were still prolonged for nearly a month. On the last of October, when the Nuncio had bestowed the Papal benediction on the moribund King, the Grantees of Spain were introduced into the

adjacent chamber. They were told by the King's confessor—for his own voice was extinct—in the King's name, to be obedient to his will, to pay respect to her Majesty, his consort, and to keep unity among themselves, for so he hoped to keep the monarchy undivided. Touched to their hearts and with tears in their eyes, the assembly listened to the last message of their unhappy King. On the following day, November 1, 1700, Charles II had breathed his last.

In presence of a large number of nobles, who had come to be present at their King's death, the will was opened at once. Its purpose and contents were in accordance with the aims pursued by Spanish policy during the preceding forty years. It was the final attempt to hand over the monarchy of Philip II, with all its world-wide interests and possessions, undivided to the coming generation—the last protest against the policy of the Partition Treaties. The will prescribed that no part of the monarchy should be alienated from its main body, and that this should never be united with any other foreign State. One prince was to inherit the whole, and this was to be Duke Philip of Anjou, second son of the Dauphin of France. To make his right clear, it was declared that the renunciations of the two Infantas, married to princes of the House of Bourbon, had only been made in order to prevent the union of the two kingdoms, and that, so long as this danger was avoided, these renunciations could not detract from the natural right of inheritance. Failing the Duke of Anjou, his younger brother, the Duke of Berry, was named successor; Archduke Charles only in the third place; and, after him, the Duke of Savoy. Article XIII expressed a pious hope that the Duke of Anjou, the future King of Spain, might become the husband of an archduchess, and daughter of the Emperor, so that by this means the peace and tranquillity of Christendom might be secured. A Council of Regency, of which Cardinal Porto-Carrero was to be the most important member, was to carry on the government of Spain until the arrival of the new King.

When the will became known in Spain, the people's joy was general, as the danger of a dismemberment seemed happily to be avoided. However, the great question was not yet decided. This decision had to be given in France, at the Court of Louis XIV. Nobody could say, which way this monarch would prefer—whether he would adhere to the Treaty with William III or accept the Crown of Spain for his grandson. Till the news of Charles' death reached the French capital, no definite resolution had been taken. It would be unjust to say of Louis XIV that his intention had been from the beginning to throw over the Partition Treaty, so soon as a will favourable to his House should be in his hands. Even when he was sure of such a will, while King Charles was still alive, he ordered his ambassador in Holland to assure the Pensionary that it was his intention to adhere to his engagements, rather than accept any offers that might be made to him. In addition to this, he still continued

his efforts to obtain the accession of the Court of Vienna to the Treaty of Partition. No doubt, if he could have succeeded in this endeavour, the situation would have been very different from what it proved to be immediately on the death of Charles. As it was, however stringent the engagements of Louis were towards England and Holland, the work of the Partition Treaty still remained incomplete.

It was this side of the question which had to be considered when the courier brought the news from Madrid that Charles had died (November 1, 1700), and that Philip of Anjou was, by the royal testament, appointed to be King of Spain. The Emperor, who had hitherto refused to accede to the Partition Treaty, would certainly be still less inclined to do so now. For, in case Louis declined the proffered Crown for his grandsons, which of course he would have to do, if he adhered to the Treaty, this same Crown would be offered at once to the son of the Emperor. The Spanish ambassador in Paris was instructed by the Junta, in case of a French refusal, to bid the courier, who had brought the will to Paris, continue his journey to Vienna without delay, in order to make the same offer there. The Archduke would certainly be acknowledged as King in all the Spanish dominions, in accordance with the provisions of the deceased King's will. Louis would therefore have to face the alternative—either of allowing the power of the House of Austria, hostile to France as it was, to be immensely increased by the accession of an Archduke in Spain, and the monarchy of Charles V, against which his ancestors had struggled in so many bloody wars, to be renewed, without any advantage accruing to France, or of seeking to secure for himself the benefits stipulated by the Partition Treaty. This, indeed, meant a war against the united strength of Austria and Spain. It was at least doubtful, whether in such a war Louis would have had the assistance of England and Holland, who had joined him in the Partition Treaty for no other reason but because they wished to avoid a new war. Moreover, if Spain should call a French Prince to her throne, did this imply so great an injustice to France that she should declare war against Spain? "If war was inevitable, it should be made to defend the justest cause; and certainly such was the cause of the will." Thus wrote Torcy, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who took part in the memorable conferences held among the intimates of Louis XIV under the King's own presidency. Moreover, another consideration may have had its effect on the mind of Louis. If the Spanish marriages of himself and his father had really been prompted by the idea of establishing a right on the part of their dynasty to the Spanish throne, should he now, when the hour of fulfilment had come, disdain to gather in the fruits of the policy consistently pursued by France during more than half a century?

Such were the motives that induced King Louis to accept the will and to break the Treaty. If this was contrary to right, yet there were reasons enough to serve as an excuse. And, certainly, it was not the

worst violation of international justice which history has to record in the reign of the great King Louis.

The acceptance of the will was announced to the world with all the solemnity which the *Roi Soleil* liked to show on important occasions. He called his grandson into his cabinet to tell him what his new dignity was. The Spanish ambassador was sent for to pay homage to his new sovereign as the first of his subjects. Then the folding-doors were flung open that communicated with a large saloon, where the whole Court was assembled. The old monarch's eyes, with a look full of majesty, scanned the numerous company before he began to speak. "Gentlemen," he said, pointing to the Duke of Anjou, "you see here the King of Spain. His descent called him to this Crown; the deceased King so ordered it by his testament; the whole nation desired it, and earnestly entreated me to give my assent; such was the will of Heaven; I have fulfilled it with joy." Then he turned to his grandson: "Be a good Spaniard; that is now your first duty; but remember that you are born a Frenchman, and maintain unity between the two nations; this is the way to make them happy and to preserve the peace of Europe." After the shouts of joy from the company had ceased, Louis once more addressed his grandson. "Let us now give thanks to God; may it please Your Majesty to attend Mass." The two Kings then proceeded to church; Louis desiring his grandson to walk on his right and thus conceding to Philip the honour due to a foreign monarch.

"I never," wrote William to Heinsius on November 16, 1700, on hearing that the will had been accepted by Louis XIV, "relied much on engagements with France; but I must confess, I did not think they would on this occasion have broken, in the face of the whole world, a solemn treaty before it was well accomplished." Not less concerned was the Emperor Leopold by the news from Madrid and Paris. But soon he regarded the future with better hope, since the last step of Louis XIV must doubtless have the result of bringing back to him the Maritime Powers, his old allies against France. Such was indeed the actual course of events. Very soon negotiations were begun with the purpose of renewing the Grand Alliance of 1689. William and Heinsius were at once convinced of the necessity of war; and so was the Emperor; although some time passed before the English and Dutch nations acquired the same perception. In all countries pamphlet-writers were at work to bring public opinion into accordance with the intentions of the Governments. In Austria they showed that the renunciations of the two Infantas had not lost their validity and could not have been set aside by the will of Charles II; that this King, who had been an enemy to France through all his life, would never, while in the full possession of his mental powers, have made a will in favour of a French Prince. At the same time they had information that, when the dead King's body was examined, his brain and heart had been found totally destroyed by disease, so that

his signing the will a few weeks before his death could not have been an act done with freedom of will and mind. If therefore the testament was null and void, and the renunciations were in force, the right of the House of Habsburg was proved beyond all doubt. English writers upon the subject, among whom Daniel Defoe in his *Two Great Questions considered* was the most prominent, likewise denied the right of the Duke of Anjou, and dwelt more fully on the consequences which his succession would entail for England—especially the ruin of the commercial interests in the Mediterranean, the Baltic, the East and West Indies. They recommended the renewal of the alliance with the Emperor. Defoe became one of the principal advocates in England of a war against France; and when, on account of the above-mentioned pamphlet, he was reproached as being more Dutch than English in his feelings, he gave his answer in his grim satire *The True-born Englishman*, published in January, 1701, which gained him the confidence of William III.

Louis XIV himself did much to facilitate the task of William III and Heinsius, which consisted in bringing the nations of England and Holland to understand that their own interests were menaced by the Spanish kingship of Philip of Anjou. The famous words, "*Il n'y a plus de Pyrénées*," generally ascribed to King Louis, were indeed not spoken by him, but by the Spanish ambassador in Paris, who by the phrase merely meant to indicate the close relations between the two countries, caused by the accession of a Bourbon King in Madrid, without contemplating the thought of a total union between France and Spain. It was of more consequence, that, in December, 1700, Louis thought fit, with solemn expressions, to reserve the eventual rights of the new King of Spain to the Crown of France. Very likely even this did not imply anything beyond the wish to avert the result that a Prince of his House should be placed under a disability as to the succession in France, in case other claimants should fail. And even then, according to the opinion of Louis, it did not follow that his grandson would rule over the united kingdoms of France and Spain. The question for him was only to secure a King to France in any and every emergency, whatever might one day become of Spain; for, after all, France was nearer to his heart and always the principal object of his care. If this be a just, as it certainly is a benevolent, interpretation of the French King's actions, yet they were not very prudent, inasmuch as contemporaries might easily see in them a proof of his intention to prepare the total union of France and Spain.

For six months it was still doubtful whether peace or war would ensue on the last steps of Louis XIV. William had to observe the utmost caution towards the Parliament, opened in February, 1701. He had to deal with a Tory majority, little inclined for a new war, and so little dissatisfied with the succession of Philip of Anjou, that they thought it much preferable to the policy of the Partition Treaties. And, since

these treaties, as indeed their character seemed to require, had been kept secret from Parliament, nay, even from part of the Ministry, they were now criticised in a very unfriendly manner in both Houses. The Commons resolved to impeach before the Lords several of the King's principal counsellors, among whom were Portland and Somers, for the part they had taken in those treaties.

But the events and the rashness of Louis XIV were the best allies of William in his parliamentary campaign. In February, 1701, the fortresses in the southern Netherlands forming the Dutch Barrier against France had, in full peace and quite unexpectedly, been taken by French troops. The Dutch garrisons had, for the present, received orders to retire.

In March negotiations were opened at the Hague with the French Minister d'Avaux. They showed very speedily that France was not willing to make any concessions. Instead of the Treaties of Partition, the Peace of Ryswyk was to be the basis of any agreement between France and the Maritime Powers. No Dutch Barrier and no compensation for the Emperor would be granted.

In this condition of things William contrived in masterly fashion to draw advantages from his double position as English sovereign and as Stadholder General in Holland. He induced the States General, according to his wont, to be silent or to represent in writing the dangers which threatened both nations from Louis XIV. The consequence was that by degrees public feeling in England underwent a change. The English became aware that it was unwise to separate the policy of England from that of Holland; they began to see the dangers from the union of the French and Spanish navies; they heard that companies were being formed in France to turn to the best advantage the facilities of commerce with Spain; many pamphlets were written; and, as an expression of the widely prevalent feeling, the so-called "Kentish Petition" was delivered to the Commons, to implore them to have regard to the voice of the people, and to enable the King "powerfully to assist his allies before it is too late." The Lords, among whom the Whigs predominated, showed themselves more eager than the Commons to support the King in his foreign policy. But, as the Tories began likewise to see the necessity of a war against France, the Lower House ceased to withstand the demands of the whole nation; and, when Parliament had been prorogued on June 24, 1701, William could feel sure of every support for which he could wish in this quarter, in case of a breach with France.

From this time forward William had no longer to be afraid of any serious opposition to his policy from the two nations whose destinies were entrusted to him. In July, 1701, the negotiations with the Emperor were opened in form at the Hague. Leopold had, for several months past, been endeavouring to bring about a renewal of the Grand Alliance of 1689, by the secret Article of which the Maritime Powers had been bound

to support the Emperor and his line in their claims on the Spanish inheritance. But he was ready to renounce part of it, if only the balance of Europe were not disturbed. He wished to secure for his House the Italian possessions of the Spanish Crown. For the Maritime Powers, indeed, it was of greater consequence not to allow Spain herself and her transatlantic territories to fall under the control of France. Nevertheless, the negotiation was opened on a basis not greatly differing from the Emperor's standpoint. William and Heinsius wished that only the restitution of the Belgic Provinces and Milan might be demanded from Louis, so that this moderation might display their peaceful intention and convince the world, should these demands be refused, that war was unavoidable. The Austrians were not satisfied with such an arrangement. Belgium, they said, would be valuable as a barrier against France only for the States General; for the Emperor it would be an embarrassing task to govern these Provinces. And as to Italy, the security of the House of Austria's possessions would be endangered if it received only Milan, while Naples and Sicily were left to France. The Maritime Powers yielded to Leopold's demands, chiefly through the influence of Marlborough, who acted as English plenipotentiary in these negotiations. They consented that Austria should obtain the whole of the Spanish possessions in Italy; while the Emperor had to assent to the insertion in the Treaty of an Article by which any conquests that the Maritime Powers might make in the West Indies should be assured to them.

Such was the basis on which the Treaty of the Hague, called the Grand Alliance, was signed on September 7, 1701. In the second Article the three Powers declared that nothing was more essential to the establishment of the general peace than that the Emperor should obtain satisfaction for his claims to the Spanish Succession, and that England and Holland should for their part acquire security for their dominions and for the navigation and commerce of their subjects. These two principles contain the essence of the whole transaction. The coming War would, on the side of the Maritime Powers, be carried on in furtherance of their commercial interests, on the side of the Emperor for his political aggrandisement. And, although to him were assigned only the Italian possessions of Spain, yet he had no intention of hereby giving up his pretensions to the whole Spanish Succession. When, therefore, the two words "*inter alia*" had by mistake been left out in the Latin translation of the French text, the Austrian ambassador, Count Wratislaw, did not rest till they were added again. Belgium was to become a barrier for the security of the States General against France. Nothing was said of Spain proper; but the silence as to the main portion of Charles II's inheritance seemed practically to include the acknowledgment of Philip V, though the Emperor could not be expected to accord it in form. Indeed the doubtful tenour of the treaty left open the possibility of a demand being preferred at a later

date by the House of Austria for a larger share than that originally contemplated. An interval of two months from the day of exchanging the ratifications was to be allowed for securing, if possible, the ends of the treaty by amicable means. But nobody any longer believed in such a possibility. On the other hand, it is worth while to notice the similarity which existed between the articles of the Grand Alliance, and those of the Treaty of Utrecht, which set a final period to a European War of twelve years. A partition of the Spanish inheritance, not unlike that at which William III had aimed, proved ultimately to be the most satisfactory solution of the problem.

No sooner had the Grand Alliance been concluded, than Louis XIV took a further step by which, more than by any other, he aroused the hostile feelings of the people in England. In September, 1701, when the growing weakness of James II seemed to indicate his approaching end, Louis appeared at the death-bed of the exiled King, to announce the formal declaration that his royal friend might die without anxiety about his son, the Prince of Wales, since he, the monarch of France, was willing to acknowledge him as King of England, Scotland, and Ireland. Louis kept his promise. When James had died, his young heir, called James III by his adherents, was treated and honoured as King of England by the French monarch and his whole Court.

Notwithstanding all this, Louis had no intention of breaking the treaties or of provoking William III. Though since 1697 William had been acknowledged by French diplomacy as King of Great Britain, yet this acknowledgment had been given only implicitly, not expressly, by Article IV of the Treaty of Ryswyk between France and England, which provided that his Most Christian Majesty would not disturb the King of Great Britain in the free and full possession of his kingdoms. This form had been chosen in 1697, in order that it might be possible for King Louis to continue to give the title of King to James II for the future, as he had hitherto done. Now, in 1701, it was asserted on the French side that King Louis meant strictly to observe the said Article, and that the title of King of England, accorded to the son of James, would not secure to him any other support from France except what was needed for his mere subsistence—indeed, nothing beyond what had been granted to his father. There was, however, little probability that these arguments, artful as they were, would be understood in England. William himself was deeply mortified when he heard the news from St Germain. Being at table with some other persons, he pulled his hat over his eyes, so as to disguise his emotion. In England the patriotic indignation rose to a height which it had seldom reached before. It was the year in which the Act of Settlement had declared the Protestant Succession a principle never to be abandoned. And now the King of France had ventured to demand that England should accept from his hand a Catholic sovereign, just as he had bestowed a King on

Spain. In all parts of the kingdom meetings were held and resolutions passed to express the confidence of a loyal people in their King, and their willingness to assist him in his action.

In these circumstances the negotiations with France prescribed by Article III of the Grand Alliance were not so much as begun. No one any longer believed that peace could be preserved in Europe. Towards the end of his life, in his last Parliament, King William met with every support he could desire. He opened the session, as Tindal says, with the best speech that he, or perhaps any other Prince, had ever made to his people. It was answered by addresses of the two Houses, full of fervour and resolution. The Commons, moreover, in a special address required the King to add an article to the Treaties of Alliance, to the effect that no peace should be concluded with France until reparation was made for the indignity offered to the nation by the French monarch in declaring the Pretender to be King of England, Scotland, and Ireland. The forces of England, it was further resolved, were to be 40,000 soldiers, and the same number was voted for the sea service. In the spring of 1702 everything was prepared to guarantee the success for the coming War, in which England would be the leading Power. King William, indeed, did not live to see his life's work crowned by the humiliation of Louis XIV. But, when in March, 1702, he felt his last hour come, he said he had looked at death on all occasions without any terror; sometimes he would have been glad to have been delivered out of all his troubles; but he confessed that he now saw another scene, and could wish to live a little longer.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.

(1) CAMPAIGNS AND NEGOTIATIONS.

IF the action of Louis XIV in accepting the will of Charles II of Spain had proved insufficient to rouse England and the United Provinces to war, at Vienna its effects had been greater. The Emperor had steadily rejected the compromise of a partition, because he had always trusted that a will would leave the whole inheritance to the Archduke, and he was not inclined to swallow this disappointment without a protest or to acquiesce without resistance in the accession of Philip V. Yet the prospects of successfully disputing Philip's claim were not of the brightest. A great war was impending in the Baltic; the Emperor's hereditary dominions were still feeling the strain and exhaustion of the recent wars in east and west; Hungary, quite recently reconquered from the Turk, was seething with discontent; and the lukewariness displayed by the Princes of Germany in the defence of the Empire against Louis promised ill for their support of Leopold's claims on the Spanish inheritance. And as, moreover, the Maritime Powers hung back and compelled the reluctant William III to recognise the new King of Spain, it is not wonderful that a party among the Emperor's advisers, headed by Margrave Lewis of Baden-Baden, should have counselled submission. These counsels were, indeed, so far followed that overtures were made in order to discover if any compensation could be obtained. Moderation and slight concessions might have avoided war; but Louis, blinded by the success he had already achieved, adopted an uncompromisingly aggressive attitude, and, by rejecting the idea of providing a "satisfaction" for the unsuccessful claimant to the Spanish inheritance, drove the Emperor over to the war party in his "conference," of whom Prince Eugene of Saxony and Archdukes Charles and Joseph were the leaders.

Accordingly, in the spring and early summer of 1701, while Austria's diplomats sought to rouse Europe in the Emperor's cause, a considerable army was gradually collected in southern Tyrol to contest the French occupation of Lombardy. Here the connivance of the Dukes of Savoy and Mantua had enabled the French to secure the Spanish possessions in the valley of the Po; and Marshal Catinat was able to push forward to

Lake Garda and there take up his position, in order to bar the advance of the Austrians from Tyrol upon Lombardy. Deficiencies of transport and organisation for the time rendered the Imperial army immobile; but it appeared most probable that, when Eugene's energy and administrative talents should have overcome these obstacles, his advance would follow the Adige. A more direct advance on Milan by the Engadine or Valtelline would involve the passage of more difficult country and the violation of Swiss neutrality; a move west of Lake Garda on Brescia meant taking an equally unsatisfactory route; and, though the Venetians, whose territory separated Tyrol from the Milanese, had not absolutely refused a passage to the Imperialists, it was understood that they had forbidden them the use of the country between the Adige and the Adriatic. Catinat, at any rate, trusted Venetian neutrality to protect his right flank, which rested on the Adige, and, relying on this, confidently awaited an attack. This was some time in coming, for Eugene's force was far short of the numbers promised him; and it was not till the end of May that, under cover of a feint down the right bank of the Adige against Chiuse, he carried the bulk of his 6000 horse and 16,000 foot over Monte Baldo by difficult and little-known mountain-paths, and, moving by Verona (May 28) and thence down the left of the Adige, established himself on Catinat's flank.

Eugene had thus scored the first trick in the game; but Catinat might have restored matters, had he either fallen on Guttenstein's exposed division, which had threatened Chiuse, or concentrated his troops, and, imitating his adversary's disregard of the neutrality which Venice seemed powerless to defend, crossed the Adige to force a decisive battle on the inferior force opposed to him. He did neither; but, harassed by Eugene's feint and unable to discover whether he intended to strike west across the Adige or southward over the Po against Modena or Naples, he scattered his army in detachments along the Adige from Rivoli to Carpi, a front of over 60 miles. Eugene did not miss such a chance. On July 9 he fell in force on Saint-Fremont's division at Carpi, and drove it and the reinforcements which Tessé brought up from Legnago back on Nogara with heavy loss, thus piercing the French line and forcing Catinat to recoil behind the Mincio, where the French rallied, their right at Mantua, their left at Goito. But this position also Catinat failed to maintain. A move north-west enabled Eugene to rejoin Guttenstein (July 15); and, crossing the Mincio almost unopposed at Peschiera (July 28), he again placed himself on Catinat's flank, threatening his communications with Milan. To cover Milan, the French fell back to the Oglio (August 16), Eugene pressing on westward by Brescia, and being on the point of forcing this line also near Pontoglio, when he heard (August 24) that Marshal Villeroi had arrived from France and superseded the unfortunate Catinat. The Imperialists thereupon fell back to Chiari, where, on September 1, they sustained the attack of

Villeroi's superior numbers, inflicting on them a sharp repulse. This success allowed Eugene to retain his position unmolested; and, when with November both sides went into winter-quarters, the Imperialists were left in possession of the greater part of the duchy of Mantua, though a closely blockaded French garrison held out in the capital. The winter was made memorable by Eugene's celebrated raid on Cremona and capture of Marshal Villeroi (February 1, 1702)—an exploit which, though the town was finally recovered, compelled the French to fall back behind the Adda, leaving their magazines to Eugene, who also occupied the territory of Parma. The Dukes of Modena and Guastalla now declared for the Imperialists; and the outbreak of an insurrection in the Emperor's favour in Naples compelled the Spanish contingent with the French army to withdraw thither.

Meanwhile the diplomats had not been idle, and, when the campaign of 1702 opened, hostilities were no longer confined to Italy, but had assumed the dimensions of a general European war. The arrogance and aggressions of Louis had effected what the warnings of William III and Heinsius had failed to do. By securing for French traders the *Asiento*, or monopoly of the supply of slaves to Spanish America (August), Louis so roused England, that William felt able to conclude with the Emperor the Treaty of the Hague (September 7), which pledged the Emperor and the Maritime Powers to secure Europe against the union of France and Spain, and to obtain territorial compensation for the Habsburgs and commercial concessions for the Maritime Powers. The recently recognised kingdom of Prussia was already bound by the "Crown Treaty" to support the Emperor, and during the winter of 1701-2 the majority of the German Princes were enlisted on the side of the Grand Alliance—among them the Electors of Mainz and Trier, the Landgraves of Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Darmstadt, and the Electors John William of the Palatinate and George Lewis of Hanover, with his uncle, Duke George William of Celle. The Franconian and Swabian Circles at first contemplated declaring themselves neutral, but they were soon won over to unite with the two Rhenish Circles, the Austrian, and the Westphalian; and a conference of these Circles held at Nördlingen in March, 1702, promised to put into the field a joint force of 54,000 men. The Baltic Powers held aloof from the Coalition; but, thanks to the intervention of England and Holland in the conflict between Denmark and Sweden in 1700, the troops both of Denmark and of Holstein-Gottorp were available for hire by the Maritime Powers.

Not all the German Powers, however, were mustered among the adherents of the Coalition. Hatred of his Lüneburg cousins inclined Antony Ulric of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel to take the side of Louis, but Celle and Hanover overpowered him; he was put to an ignominious flight, and his brother Rudolf Augustus (with whom he ruled conjointly) had to conclude an "accord" which allowed the Brunswick-

Wolfenbüttel troops to be taken into the Emperor's service. More useful to Louis were the two Wittelsbach brothers, Electors Maximilian Emanuel of Bavaria and Joseph Clement of Cologne. Maximilian, hitherto one of the most consistent opponents of Louis, had been acting as Governor of the Spanish Netherlands since 1695; but he had not opposed the occupation of that country by French troops, and, after carrying on simultaneous negotiations with Louis and the Coalition, decided, in March, 1701, to throw in his lot with France, though he was not to commit any overt act of hostility until a suitable opportunity.

In addition to his Wittelsbach followers, Louis could also reckon among his allies two States whose adhesion to his cause was dictated by fear rather than by enthusiasm. Duke Victor Amadeus II of Savoy, true to the family policy of balancing dangerous neighbours against each other, had been suspected of supplying information to Eugene as to the movements of Catinat's army with which the Savoyard troops were serving, while Portugal had thrown in her lot with Louis, mainly to avert attack from Spain. In that kingdom Philip V had been readily acknowledged, save only in Catalonia, and the resources of Spain's Indian possessions were thus placed at the disposal of Louis.

Thus, at the outset of the War, the forces of the two sides seemed by no means unequally matched. Against the superior numbers and financial resources of the Coalition France could set the great advantages of unity of command and purpose, while her central position gave her the strategic asset of operating on interior lines. Moreover, certain special features of the strategical situation were greatly in her favour. By securing without opposition military possession of the Spanish Netherlands, she at once menaced the United Provinces with invasion, and placed herself in a strong position on the lines of communication between the Maritime Powers and Austria. At the same time, the alliance with Bavaria secured to her armies an open door into the Danube valley, the easiest and most direct line of advance against Vienna; and, though the alternative route, by the valley of the Po and the head of the Adriatic, was disputed by Eugene's army, the situation in northern Italy added to the tasks and difficulties of Austria. Further, though the joint naval forces of England and Holland considerably outnumbered those of France, the fact that the harbours of Spain and the two Sicilies were under French control, and that those of Portugal were closed to the Maritime Powers through her alliance with France, seemed to secure Louis against that advent of a superior hostile fleet in the Mediterranean by which William III had turned the scale against France in the previous war. On land things were more equal: it was not till the later campaigns of the war that Louis XIV ceased to oppose approximately equal numbers to the armies of the Grand Alliance; and, even when the Allies enjoyed a slight numerical superiority, it was balanced by the advantages of homogeneity. Before 1702 the

prestige of the French armies had not yet been seriously challenged, and, though Luxembourg was gone, France seemed to have successors worthy of him in Villars, Boufflers, Catinat, Vendôme and Berwick. The real weakness of France and the great asset of the Allies were only to be revealed by war. The French administration, formerly, under Louvois, the direct cause of the triumphs of Louis XIV, was no longer what it had been: Chamillart, conceited, incapable, though personally honest, was a poor substitute for the great organiser, and deficiencies in supplies and equipment hampered the French throughout. The mantle of William fell on worthier shoulders. Marlborough possessed all the resolution and endurance which had sustained William through so many disappointments; he had also a marvellous power of managing men, whether in the council-chamber or in the field, which William had never possessed. As a general too William had failed in execution, being without that capacity for careful attention to details which is essential to the securing of success. But it was precisely in this that, with all his brilliance, Marlborough's greatness lay. Both as a strategist and as a tactician he was to prove himself superior to all of his opponents; nor is there any soldier of his time whom it is possible so much as to compare with him except his colleague, Eugene. Unruffled by the interference of Dutch deputies and by the failure of half-hearted Princes of the Empire to fulfil their promises, Marlborough was always resourceful, always ready for the unexpected, quick to perceive and to utilise his enemy's errors, careful of his men, but prepared to demand necessary sacrifices from them. He had readiness, alertness and an originality which rose superior to the conventional strategy of the day; while at the same time his soundness of judgment and great common sense saved him from recklessness or from rash attempts at the impossible. An adroit and accomplished tactician, it was perhaps in the domain of strategy that his preeminence was most marked; here his broad grasp of the general situation, combined with his great capacity for dealing with the details of administration, enabled him to frame great enterprises and to carry them to a successful conclusion. And, almost alone among great generals, he showed a singular insight into naval affairs, inspiring the strategy by which the Allies obtained and utilised the control of the Mediterranean. In this, as in other respects, he may have learnt from William; but his use of his lessons was all his own.

The campaign of 1702 was opened in Italy. Here Eugene, ill supported by the inefficient War Council at Vienna, found himself outnumbered by Vendôme and forced to choose between evacuating Italy altogether and allowing the French to sever his communications with Vienna. He chose the latter course; and it was no small achievement that he nevertheless succeeded in maintaining his position in the Modenese throughout the campaign, even though severed from his base, subsisting on the produce of the country, and inflicting a sharp check

at Luzzara (August 15) on the greatly superior forces of Vendôme and Philip of Spain, who had brought up a strong division from Naples. One reason for the lack of assistance he experienced is to be found in the fact that, when rather late in the year reinforcements were about to start for Italy, they had to be diverted to southern Germany. There the command of the Allies, a motley and not very efficient force provided mainly by the Swabian and Upper-Rhenish Circles, with an Austrian contingent, had been entrusted to Lewis of Baden-Baden, a veteran of the Turkish wars. Fortunately for him, the diversion of the main efforts of France to the Netherlands caused Catinat's army of Alsace to be in even worse plight. Indeed, when in June the Allies crossed the Rhine and laid siege to Landau, Catinat was too weak to relieve the fortress, which, after a valiant defence, capitulated on September 11. Here the successes of Lewis of Baden were rudely checked, for the Elector of Bavaria, suddenly throwing off the mask of neutrality he had hitherto assumed, had declared for France and attacked and captured Ulm. The Allies, finding their communications with Vienna in grave peril, hastily recrossed the Rhine; and Villars, superseding Catinat, not only managed to gain a passage at Hüningen, but, advancing into the Black Forest, engaged and defeated Lewis of Baden at Friedlingen (October 14). However, it was too late in the year for the victors to effect a junction with their Bavarian ally; and the Elector was prevented from attacking Upper Austria by the troops which were to have joined Eugene and were instead diverted to hold the line of the Inn.

Meanwhile Marlborough had taken the field in the Netherlands (July), where the main body of the Allies, some 40,000 strong, was lying in front of Nymegen to cover the siege of Kaiserswerth on the lower Rhine, which 25,000 Dutch and Prussians were assailing, and to protect the south-eastern frontier of Holland against 60,000 Frenchmen quartered in the bishopric of Liège under Marshal Boufflers. Skilfully taking advantage of the undue extension of the French lines, Marlborough drew Boufflers back from Cleves to the left bank of the Meuse by threatening to cut him off from Brabant; and, though the intervention of the Dutch deputies twice prevented a battle when Marlborough seemed to have Boufflers at his mercy, the French had to withdraw behind the Demer (August 23). Marlborough was thus able to successively besiege and reduce Venloo (September 16), Ruremonde (October 7), and Liège (October 23); Boufflers making an unavailing attempt to anticipate the Allies at Liège, but retreating at once when he found the position he had meant to take up occupied by Marlborough's covering army. These successes gave the Allies control of the lower Meuse, while the capture of Kaiserswerth (June 15) and Rheinberg did the same for the lower Rhine, so that the work of securing the communications between the Maritime Powers and Vienna was well started. In the next summer, Marlborough invaded the electorate of Cologne, overrunning it and

capturing Bonn (May 18, 1703). But, before he could gain complete strategic freedom, it was necessary to remove further from the neighbourhood of the Dutch frontier the menace of the French occupation of the Spanish Netherlands. A well-conceived scheme for an attack on Antwerp was spoilt by the disobedience of one Dutch general and the rashness of another, resulting in the defeat of Obdam at Eekeren (June 30); and Marlborough had to content himself with securing the Meuse below Namur by the capture of Huy and other minor fortresses and with forcing the French back behind the lines of the Méhaigne, where they remained passive spectators of the fate of these places. These achievements, though less than he might have achieved if unimpeded, cleared the country between Meuse and Rhine of the French and set him free to carry to Vienna the help so urgently needed there.

With the spring of 1703, the French prepared to utilise the path to Vienna thrown open to them by Bavaria's action. In March Villars secured Kehl, and, pushing across the Black Forest by Villingen, joined the Bavarian Elector near Ulm (May 9), unimpeded by Lewis of Baden, who lay inactive in his celebrated lines of Stolhofen, watched by another French corps under Marshal Tallard. The Elector would not have been there for Villars to join, had but Styrum, who commanded the troops of the Franconian Circle, cooperated with the 19,000 Austrians under Schlick on the Inn. Their failure to unite had allowed the Elector to capture Ratisbon, and to inflict on Schlick's isolated corps a sharp reverse at Seharding (March 11).

Vienna was now in dire peril. Had Villars and the Bavarian Elector pushed on down the Danube, it is difficult to see how the city could have been saved. Lewis of Baden was helpless, Marlborough fully occupied in the distant Netherlands, Hungary actually in insurrection; and not even Eugene could prevent the army of Italy from being pressed back through Tyrol by Vendôme's superior forces. But, like his son Charles Albert thirty-eight years later, Maximilian Emanuel missed his chance. Intent on securing communication with much-coveted Milan, he turned aside into Tyrol, leaving Villars, much to the French commander's chagrin, to cover his operations against Lewis of Baden, who had come up from Stolhofen with most of his corps and joined Styrum (June). But the conquest of Tyrol did not prove so easy as the Elector anticipated. Though opposed by the peasantry, he reached Innsbruck (July 2) and even pushed a detachment forward to the Brenner Pass, only to find that Vendôme had not arrived. The latter, indeed, never started for Trent till July 20; and, by the time he reached it (September 2), the Bavarians, harassed by the Tyrolese mountaineers, who cut off their detachments and threatened their communications, had given up hope of his coming and had beaten a costly retreat to Bavaria (August). During this time Lewis of Baden and

Styrum had let slip the chance of combining their forces against Villars, who, profiting by their separation, parried the Margrave's attack on Augsburg by falling on Styrum's weaker force at Höchstädt (September 20) and completely defeating him. This checked Lewis, who had to abandon Augsburg and retire into winter-quarters, just north of the Lake of Constance. Even at this late point in the campaigning season Villars was anxious to try a dash at Vienna, now seriously menaced by the Hungarian insurgents; but the Elector's refusal to contemplate the project led to violent quarrels between him and Villars, and to the recall of the latter before the next campaign.

Meanwhile, on the Rhine things had fared ill for the Allies. Thüngen, whom Lewis of Baden had left at Stollhofen, failed to prevent Tallard from taking Breisach (September 8) and besieging Landau. Reinforced by a corps from the Netherlands under the Hereditary Prince Frederick of Hesse-Cassel, he attempted the relief of Landau, only to suffer a disastrous defeat at Speyerbach (November 13), on which Landau surrendered (November 21). Thus, with 40,000 French wintering in Bavaria, their communications with Alsace greatly improved by Tallard's successes and the forces of the Maritime Powers apparently committed to operations in the Netherlands, the prospects for the Emperor looked bad indeed. The only gleam of satisfaction was that the Duke of Savoy, always distrustful of the sincerity of his French ally's promises, had been in secret communication with the Emperor for some time, and now, urged to the step by Vendôme's demand that he should hand over Turin and Susa to the French and suffer the disarming of his troops, definitively threw in his lot with the Allies and signed a treaty with the Emperor (October 25). On this, Starhemberg, who had maintained Eugene's old position on the lower Po during the summer, hastened with his 15,000 men across the Parmesan and joined Victor Amadeus on the Tanaro (January, 1704)—a move which Vendôme, who had evacuated southern Tyrol after his fruitless advance to Trent (September), completely failed to prevent. Savoy's defection meant that Austria was secure from attack on the side of Italy, at any rate until the French had secured their communications with France, which this change of sides had menaced.

But, even so, Vienna's peril was great; and, when in April strong reinforcements crossed the Black Forest by the Höllenthal and joined the Elector of Bavaria near Dillingen (May 19), unhampered by Lewis of Baden, it seemed futile to hope that even Eugene, who had replaced Styrum, would be able to stem the advance of the Franco-Bavarians down the Danube. Tallard, with over 30,000 men, took up a position near Kehl to protect the French communications with Bavaria and to hold Lewis of Baden in check; while Villeroy, with yet another army, was expected to keep Marlborough occupied in the Netherlands. Luckily for the Allied cause, Marlborough had realised the critical condition of

affairs; and his great design of bringing the British and their auxiliaries to the Danube had been planned and discussed with Eugene during the winter. But to obtain the consent of the cautious Dutch to a scheme so daring would have been impossible, and the first stages of the march were accordingly carried out on the pretext that he intended to turn the French position in the Netherlands by a move up the Moselle. Under the colour of this pretence, the British and their auxiliaries left their cantonments towards the end of April, and, pushing across the Meuse to Jülich and thence (May 19) to the Rhine, made their way up that river. It was soon evident that something more than a campaign on the Moselle was afoot. Marlborough's appearance at Mainz (May 29) brought Tallard back to the left of the Rhine to cover Alsace; but the English commander merely made a feint of being about to cross at Mannheim and pushed on south-eastward across the Main, up the Neckar by Ladenburg (June 3) and Mondelheim (June 10), on by the Pass of Geislingen through the hills which divide the Neckar from the Danube until, on June 22, he joined the corps of Lewis of Baden at Ursprung, a little north of Ulm. On the way, Eugene and Margrave Lewis had joined Marlborough to discuss plans; and the result of their deliberations was that Eugene proceeded to Stollhofen to contain Tallard, while the Margrave and Marlborough cooperated against the Elector and the French under Marsin, Villars' successor. A week later (June 28) the arrival of the British infantry with Marlborough's guns brought up the Allied force to 202 squadrons and 96 battalions, about 70,000 men in all. The march had changed the situation: the dangerous weakness of the Allied position was remedied; until Marlborough's army was beaten, Vienna could not be attacked. But the strategic insight which had determined Marlborough's course of action, and the daring with which he planned what was practically a flank movement right across the French front, are really less remarkable than the care with which the details of the move had been calculated and the success with which his object had been concealed from watchful foes and timid friends alike.

The first task before the Allies was to secure a passage over the Danube. To this end Marlborough moved upon Donauwörth, and on July 2 succeeded after a desperate struggle in storming the strong entrenched camp of the Bavarians on the Schellenberg. The losses, though heavy, were justifiable; for Tallard was reported to be coming up from the Rhine, and it was important to capture the post before the garrison could be reinforced. This success gave the Allies Donauwörth and its bridge, opening Bavaria to them, and forcing the Elector and Marsin to abandon the line of the Danube and retire southward up the Lech. Marlborough was thus enabled to place himself between the Franco-Bavarians and Vienna, Bavaria being exposed to his raiding parties. However, reinforcements were on their way to join the Elector; for no sooner

had Villeroi found that Marlborough's feint at the Moselle was only the cloak to greater designs than he had pushed across to Alsace and joined Tallard. This allowed Tallard to cross the Rhine at Kehl (July 6) and carry 40 battalions and 60 squadrons through the Black Forest to Villingen (July 16), and, after wasting five days in a futile attempt on that town, to join the Elector near Augsburg on August 6. This delay was important. Eugene had been restrained from impeding Tallard's march by the presence of Villeroi's superior numbers; but, when he found that Villeroi showed no signs of taking the offensive, he set off with 78 squadrons and 18 battalions, nearly 20,000 men (July 23), and by forced marches reached Höchstädt on the Danube on the day Tallard joined his colleagues. This reinforcement made it possible to detach Margrave Lewis, whom Marlborough had found a somewhat uncongenial colleague, with 22 battalions and 34 squadrons of Austrians, amounting to some 15,000 men, to besiege Ingolstadt, the one strong place on the Danube below Donauwörth still in the hands of the Bavarians, and a fortress of great importance to the Allies because of its position on their direct line of communication with Vienna. Immediately after his departure (August 9) the enemy, hoping to find Eugene isolated, crossed to the north of the Danube at Dillingen and moved downstream. But, though Marlborough had remained posted south of the Danube so as to cover the siege of Ingolstadt, if necessary, he was not out of supporting distance of Eugene. A forced march brought his army into line with Eugene's on the Kessel (August 11); and, two days later, the Allies, anxious not to let slip the chance of a battle, attacked the Franco-Bavarians behind the Nebel. The position was strong: the fortified villages of Blenheim (Blindheim) and Lutzingen protected its flanks, that of Oberglauheim covered its centre, and marshy banks made the Nebel a formidable obstacle. But Marlborough was quick to see that it had weak spots: that Blenheim and Oberglauheim were too far apart for mutual support; that, as the result of the two armies being posted separately, the actual centre of the Franco-Bavarians was formed of cavalry; that the cavalry who formed their centre were too far back from the Nebel to dispute the passage; and that the massing of Tallard's infantry in the villages left very few available to support his centre. Accordingly, Eugene's army worked round to the right through the woods to attack Marsin and the Elector, who were on Tallard's left from Oberglauheim to Lutzingen; Marlborough, after delaying till past mid-day to give Eugene time to get into place, drew Tallard's attention to the extremities of his line by vigorous, if expensive, attacks on Blenheim and Oberglauheim, under cover of which he pushed his cavalry forward to attack the hostile centre, from which reinforcements had been drawn off to Blenheim. Covered by the fire of the infantry and artillery which Marlborough brought up to support them, the Allied cavalry crossed the marshy Nebel, repulsed with the aid of Lord Orkney's infantry a belated charge by the French

horse, and then, reinforced by their reserves, delivered a smashing blow against Tallard's centre. The French cavalry, not having enough infantry to succour them, were routed and driven headlong, the few battalions of their centre being cut to pieces. Thus Tallard's whole army was shattered; and, though up to this point Marsin's had held Eugene at bay, the valiant efforts of the Imperial general's infantry being ill-supported by his horse, Marlborough's blow was decisive. Marsin, his right flank uncovered by the defeat of his colleague, could not hold his ground; Oberglaubeim had already been carried; the 28 fine battalions in Blenheim were completely cut off and forced to surrender; and though Marsin withdrew his army in good order, Tallard's had ceased to exist as an efficient fighting-force. At a cost of 12,000 casualties the 52,000 Allies had routed a rather larger force in a strong position, inflicting on them 14,000 casualties, capturing over 100 guns and 11,000 prisoners, and had by this crushing blow shattered the great reputation of the French arms. The effect of this great victory was seen in the precipitate retreat of the French behind the Rhine, and in Villeroi's failure to interfere with the siege of Landau, which the Allies, who crossed at Philippsburg on September 8, invested a week later. On November 23 Landau fell; and on the same day Trarbach surrendered to Marlborough, who had pushed up the difficult valley of the Queich to the Moselle and occupied Trier (October 26).

Thus in the year 1704 the situation was completely reversed in Germany; Vienna was delivered; the French invaders were expelled; the Elector of Bavaria was a fugitive, his dominions being placed under Austrian control by the Convention of Ilbersheim (November 7); and French prestige destroyed by a blow without a parallel since Condé had destroyed the Spanish reputation at Rocroi. Nor could Louis XIV balance this disaster with any success elsewhere. In Italy, Victor Amadeus, though sore beset and isolated, still maintained his ground in Piedmont; in the Netherlands nothing had been done since Villeroi's departure; and in the new theatre of operations in the Pyrenean Peninsula and the Mediterranean the advantage had remained with the Allies.

In the negotiations as to the Partition Treaties the question of the Mediterranean had been one of the most important issues. William, fresh from the experience of the last war, had seen that, were Spain to pass to a Bourbon, England would be excluded from the Mediterranean unless she could secure a base within the Straits. He had fought hard to obtain Minorca for England; and, but for the reluctance of Rooke to venture out so late in the season, a squadron would probably have been despatched to Cadiz in the autumn of 1701 to forestall the French in occupying that all-important position. William was pressing on the preparations for such an expedition, when his death, which threw all arrangements out of gear, caused a serious delay in its departure. The instructions issued to Rooke leave no doubt that the expedition was

aimed at Cadiz, not as the commercial centre of the trade of Spanish America, but as a strategic point capable of being made the base from which a British fleet might control the Mediterranean. But Rooke never liked or appreciated the scheme. In his eyes the intercepting of the returning Plate fleet was of far greater importance; and, owing partly to his lack of energy, but even more to Ormond's mismanagement and the bad discipline of the troops, the attack on Cadiz (August 15—September 15) proved a fiasco, which was only partly redeemed by Rooke's exploit on the homeward voyage. He found the Plate fleet sheltering in Vigo, and attacked and destroyed it with the French squadron which formed its escort (October 12). By this means he managed to return with one useful achievement to his credit, though the greater scheme had miscarried, and for want of a Mediterranean base the naval operations of the Allies in 1703 were of little effect. Still, by forcing the French to lie quiet all that summer in Toulon, Shovell proved to Portugal that England could cover her against France. This demonstration directly furthered the negotiation of the Treaty of May 16, 1703, by which Portugal was detached from the side of Louis and enrolled among the adherents of the Grand Alliance¹.

One important result of Portugal's change of sides was that, when the Emperor decided to transfer his rights over Spain to his second son, Archduke Charles, and to despatch him to the Peninsula to prosecute his claim, a good base was secured for the operations of the troops which England and Holland sent out to assist him (February, 1704). Philip V was, however, prepared for the attack; and by land little was accomplished. It was at sea, not ashore, that took place the principal operations of the Allies in southern Europe in 1704. Seeing clearly that the capture of Toulon would be the most damaging blow that could be inflicted on France, Marlborough had planned that, after Rooke had escorted Archduke Charles to the Tagus, he should carry his fleet to the Riviera and there gain touch with the Duke of Savoy, who was to furnish the land forces needed to cooperate with the British navy in this great enterprise. Unfortunately for the Allies, it was at this time wholly out of the power of the Duke of Savoy to spare any troops for an attack on Toulon. Accordingly, Rooke had to fall back on his alternative task of assisting the operations of the Archduke, and returned to the Straits. On the way home, he unluckily just failed to intercept the French squadron from Brest, which the Count of Toulouse was bringing

¹ This Treaty, signed by Paul Methuen, must be distinguished from the famous "Methuen Treaty" concluded by his father John (formerly Lord Chancellor of Ireland) on December 27, by which Portugal was commercially tied to England. Greatly to the damage of the general commercial and industrial interests of Portugal, her wines were admitted into England at a duty lower by one-third than that levied upon French wines, while the importation of English woollens into Portugal was permitted.

to the assistance of the Toulon squadron, sighting them without being able to overtake them (May 27). At the Straits, Rooke found reinforcements awaiting him from the Channel Fleet, sent southward as soon as the destination of Toulouse was known, which brought his fleet up to over 50 sail of the line. Thus reinforced, he decided to carry out an enterprise which English strategists had been contemplating for some time past. The capture of Gibraltar (August 4) was, like the destruction of the Plate fleet at Vigo, a useful rather than a brilliant achievement, for both garrison and defences were weak; but, if Rooke's merits in this matter are sometimes overstated, he has not generally received proper credit for the action which he fought three weeks later—the only encounter of the main battle fleets during the War. Believing that Rooke was going to attack Barcelona, Toulouse had put to sea with about 50 sail of the line (July 29); and, on hearing of the loss of Gibraltar, he hastened to the Straits to see if he could do anything to retrieve the situation. Rooke was cruising to the eastward of Gibraltar, to cover his prize from any attempt to recover it; and on August 24 he fell in with the French off Velez Malaga. The odds were approximately equal; for, if the Allies had a slight superiority in ships, they were very short-handed, and were also seriously handicapped by the great expenditure of ammunition in the capture of Gibraltar. It was a hard-fought encounter—"the sharpest day's service I ever saw," Rooke called it—of which tactically the Allies had by no means the worst, preventing Toulouse's efforts to break their line, and ultimately forcing the French to draw off so roughly mauled that next day, when he had the wind, Toulouse made no attempt to renew the action but withdrew to Toulon, leaving the Allies in possession of the fortress they had fought for. Strategically, there was no doubt about the victory; and during the rest of the War the French made no serious effort to challenge the Allied control of the Mediterranean, their fleet retiring into the shelter of Toulon whenever the British appeared in any strength. Shortly afterwards, it is true, when the lateness of the season had forced Rooke to depart homeward with the bulk of his fleet, Gibraltar was vigorously assailed by land by the Marquis of Villadarias with a large Franco-Spanish army, supported by a small squadron under de Pointis; but the siege proved ineffectual, and in March, 1705, Leake finally raised it by destroying the blockading squadron off Marbella Point (March 21).

For the campaign of 1705 Marlborough had planned an invasion of France by the line he had pretended to be about to use in 1704—that of the Moselle and Saar. His aim was to penetrate to Metz, thereby turning the fortresses of the Netherlands and also cutting off Alsace from the interior. However, neither the States General, who had promised to fill his magazines, nor the Rhenish Electors on whom he was relying for transport, performed their obligations; and, when the death of the

Emperor (May 5) caused the recall home of the Austrian contingent, Marlborough, not relishing the prospect of a campaign with a colleague so unsympathetic to him as Lewis of Baden, decided to transfer himself and his army to the Netherlands. Here Villeroi had already taken the offensive by capturing Huy (May 24); but Marlborough's return sent him back to his lines, out of which the Duke, despite the constant interference of Dutch deputies, proceeded to manœuvre him by a series of adroitly planned and skilfully executed enterprises. Feints against the extremities of the lines diverted Villeroi's attention and allowed the Duke to pierce their centre near Tirlemont (July 18); but the obstruction of the Dutch spoilt more than one fair chance of victory, and the campaign ended with the levelling of the lines between the Méhaigne and the Demer as the only thing accomplished. This, however, caused a strong detachment to be called up from Alsace, so that Villars was reduced to the defensive (August), just as he had taken Weissenburg and seemed likely to recover the line of the Lauter. In Italy, rather more had been accomplished. Eugene, taking the field in April, forced Vendôme's brother, the Grand Prior of France, to abandon the line of the Oglio and retire hastily behind the Adda by appearing on his flank and rear at Brescia (June 23). However, at Cassano (August 16) Vendôme checked Eugene's advance somewhat sharply; and the Austrians had finally to retire towards Tyrol for the winter. Still, Eugene's activity had greatly relieved the pressure on Piedmont, enabled Turin to hold out, and kept the half-hearted Duke of Savoy true to his new alliance.

The next campaign opened badly for the Imperialists in Italy. In April, 1706, Vendôme made a sudden attack on their cantonments round Brescia, driving them back into Tyrol in confusion, just as Eugene returned from his labours at Vienna, whither he had gone to obtain reinforcements and a supply of money for the army in Italy.

Had the Allied commanders been able to have their own way, Eugene would have been accompanied by Marlborough and a British contingent; for the Duke, ever looking towards Toulon, hoped in concert with Eugene to sweep the French from northern Italy, and then, assisted by the British fleet in the Mediterranean, to deal the blow hitherto forbidden by the want of a land force at his disposal. It was a scheme more brilliant even than the march to the Danube in 1704 and exhibiting to the full Marlborough's strategic insight and comprehensive grasp. However, just as he seemed about to win the consent of the States General, the sudden retreat of Lewis of Baden behind the Rhine (April) revived their apprehensions, and prevented the great design from being carried out. But an English subsidy of £250,000 furnished Eugene with 24,000 troops from Hesse-Cassel, Brandenburg, Saxe-Gotha and the Palatinate; and, thus reinforced, he moved down the left of the Adige (July 5), disregarding Venetian neutrality as in 1701, outflanked Marsin, the new commander of the French army of Italy, and crossed to the south of the Po

(July 18). Once on that bank, he pushed on at great speed, outpacing as well as outflanking the French, who moved parallel up the left bank. Not even at Stradella was any resistance offered; and, on August 31, the junction with the Duke of Savoy was effected at Villastellona. It was promptly followed up by an advance on Turin, and by the complete defeat of the investing army after a stubbornly-fought battle (September 7), in which the superior numbers of the French were neutralised by Eugene's skilful handling of his troops and prompt improvement of his tactical opportunities. So far as Italy was concerned, the victory was decisive. The French at once evacuated Piedmont, withdrawing to France by Pinerolo and leaving to their own resources their garrisons at Mantua, Alessandria, and in the Milanese. These resisted stoutly, but vainly; and by the end of the year hardly a fortress still held out. The completeness of the French defeat may be judged from the conclusion of the Convention of Milan (March, 1707), by which Louis abandoned northern Italy and withdrew all his troops to France, thereby obtaining a reinforcement which was greatly needed elsewhere, for the French disasters of 1706 had not been confined to Italy.

After having to abandon his scheme for helping Eugene in Italy Marlborough had laid his plans for forcing the lines of the Dyle behind which Villeroi was lying, as he hardly anticipated that the French Marshal would take the offensive. However, Villeroi, hearing that the Prussian and Hanoverian contingents had not yet joined Marlborough, boldly left his lines on May 19 and pushed across the Great Gheete by Tirlemont to Judoigne on his way towards Liège. A rapid concentration at Bilsen and a forced march south-westward enabled Marlborough to plant himself across Villeroi's path, with over 60,000 men, British, Dutch, and Danes; and, early in the morning of May 23, the two armies came into contact on the high ground which serves as the watershed between the Gheete and the Méhaigne. Villeroi, though surprised to find the Allies on the move, promptly took up his position for battle, resting his right, mainly composed of cavalry, on the Méhaigne at Tavières, posting his centre at Ramillies and Offuz and his left between Offuz and Autre Église, its front being covered by the marshes in which the Gheete rises. The position was strong and the French army hardly, if at all, inferior in numbers to the Allies. But the marshes also forbade a counter-attack by the French left; and Marlborough, realising this, contained that wing by a feint with the first line of his right, the rest of which was diverted under cover of some hills to support the left and centre in their attack on the French right. The move was a complete success. Tavières, too far from Ramillies for effectual support, was stormed; a great cavalry combat on the slopes between the Méhaigne and Ramillies ended in the defeat of the French; and their effort to form a new line, with its left resting on Ramillies, was frustrated by the capture of that village. Next, the Allied cavalry, pushing on, outflanked the new French right in the direction of

the Tomb of Ottomond; some British battalions crossed the marshes and assailed Autre Église; and the whole French army gave way in complete disorder, losing nearly all their guns and suffering treble the 5000 casualties of the Allies.

In some respects Marlborough's most brilliant victory, Ramillies was remarkable for the relentless vigour of the pursuit, which did not allow the French to rally behind the Scheldt, but forced them to retire hastily up the Lys to Courtray, to avoid being cut off from France. Within a fortnight of the battle, all Brabant and most of Flanders was in Marlborough's hands: Antwerp (May 26), Ghent, Bruges, and Oudenarde were among the towns which capitulated at the first summons, and the capture of Ostend (July 6) gave him a more direct line of communications with England, which he subsequently secured by the successive reduction of Menin (August 22), Dendermonde (September 5), and Ath (October 2). Moreover, his victory paralysed the French in other quarters. Villars lost his chance of following up the retreat of Lewis of Baden from Alsace, because he had to detach 30,000 men to the Netherlands and was reduced to the defensive: Eugene's task was made easier, when the recall of Vendôme to replace Villeroy left him with only Marsin to face.

In the Pyrenean Peninsula also things had gone well for the Allies. After Leake's relief of Gibraltar (March, 1705), Galway advanced into Estremadura from Portugal, taking Valenza and forcing Tessé to evacuate Andalusia to save Badajoz. Meanwhile Shovell's squadron carried a British force round to the east coast, where Peterborough was thus enabled to inaugurate his remarkable career by the escalade of Monjuich (September 12) and the reduction of Barcelona (October 9, 1705). This was followed by the adoption of the Habsburg cause by Catalonia and Valencia; and, though in the following spring, in the absence from the Mediterranean of the bulk of the English fleet, a French army under Tessé invaded Catalonia and besieged Barcelona (February), the return of Leake's fleet in full strength sent the Toulon squadron which had been covering the operations flying back to harbour, and forced Tessé to raise the siege (May 11) and beat a disastrous retreat to France. Valencia was again cleared of the French; and, on June 26, Madrid passed into the occupation of the Allies. Galway, with an Anglo-Portuguese force, had taken Ciudad Rodrigo in May and advanced by Salamanca on Madrid, Marshal Berwick retiring before him. But outside Catalonia and Valencia hardly a Spaniard was for Charles: Castile rallied to Philip; Berwick returned with reinforcements; and Galway, after a brief stay, found it necessary to evacuate Madrid: while, though joined by Peterborough (August 6), he had finally to retire into Valencia, on the borders of which province he took up his winter-quarters, Peterborough having, shortly before that, left Spain for Italy. Still, despite the failure to hold Madrid, 1705 was a great year for the Allies,

and so early as the middle of August Louis made overtures for peace—apparently the first serious overtures which have to be noted in a long succession of efforts. These overtures, which indicated his willingness to consent to the cession of Spain to Archduke Charles, if Philip's rule over Milan, Naples and Sicily were recognised, were addressed through the French diplomatists Chamillart, Torcy, and the veteran d'Avaux, to the States General. They were offered (what to them was of paramount importance) a good "Barrier"—i.e. the surrender into Dutch keeping of a cincture of Belgian fortresses; and ulterior suggestions were added as to the annexation of the "loyal" Provinces as a whole, besides commercial advantages at the expense of all-suffering Spain. On communicating the substance of these proposals to Marlborough, Heinsius was quickly given to understand that England was not prepared—as in truth neither the Whigs, nor the Queen and public opinion, at the time were—to listen to any mention of the partition of the Spanish monarchy; while a significant hint was conveyed to him and his Government, that the nature of the ultimate Dutch "Barrier" would largely depend on the fidelity of the United Provinces to the Alliance. Thus this first attempt at peace negotiations, which had been repudiated by the Imperial as well as by the English Government, broke down; although, in view of what was to follow, it cannot be said to have been made wholly in vain.

One circumstance which had encouraged Louis to hold out for better terms than the Allies would grant him also contributed largely to hamper Marlborough's operations in 1707. The course of affairs in north-eastern Europe had established the victorious army of Charles XII of Sweden within the boundaries of the Empire at Altranstädt in Saxony; and Louis hoped that the days of Turenne and Wrangel were come again, and that the advance of the Swedish veterans into the Austrian dominions might effect what the direct attack on Vienna by the Danube had failed to do. There were reasons for this hope. Joseph had infuriated Charles by assisting Augustus II, while the Silesian Protestants were appealing to the Swedish King for protection against Austrian oppression and persecution. Throughout central Germany alarm and consternation prevailed; the Princes prepared to retain for their own defence the troops they would otherwise have hired out to the Maritime Powers; and so serious was the outlook that Marlborough found it necessary to go in person to Altranstädt to see whether his diplomatic skill could prevent Charles from intervening in western Europe (April, 1707). However, he found his cause half won, for Charles, though anxious to do something for the Silesian Protestants, had preoccupations more pressing than that of embroiling himself with the Maritime Powers in order to assist Louis XIV; and Marlborough was soon able to return to the Netherlands, secure in the knowledge that Charles on breaking up from Altranstädt would not march on Vienna. Nevertheless, his advance into the Empire had certainly been of use to

France; for several of the north-German Princes, dreading this unwelcome neighbour, had failed to produce the contingents that should have served with Marlborough in the Netherlands; so that his force fell short of what was required, and the campaign of 1707 proved disappointingly barren of results. The strength of the French frontiers, all "covered by very strong towns and well fortified," while those of the Allies were open, made it essential that the Allies should outnumber the French by about 25,000 men, in order to provide a besieging force and escorts for convoys and trains over and above the field-force needed to cover sieges. The numerical superiority, however, was with the French, and Vendôme, adopting a most cautious defensive, would give no opportunity for a battle. Moreover, when at last Eugene's invasion of Provence, described below, caused the French to detach troops thither from Flanders, and so transferred the superiority to Marlborough, the untimely intervention of the Dutch deputies prevented him from bringing Vendôme to action on favourable terms, near Waterloo; and soon afterwards unusually wet weather brought the campaign to an abortive close.

Elsewhere, the Allies had done even worse. The campaign of 1706 had been Lewis of Baden's twenty-sixth and last; worn out by many years of hard service, he died in January, 1707. Although his military talents were not of the highest order and in the school of generals to which he belonged precision and method were apt to degenerate into pedantry and formalism, he had done good service in trying to reorganise the army of the Empire, and had been unrivalled as a constructor of fortified lines. Marlborough and Eugene had found him no very congenial or efficient colleague. Yet his successor in command, Margrave Charles Ernest of Brandenburg-Baireuth, was certainly his inferior. The campaign of 1707 on the Rhine illustrates admirably the utter inefficiency of the defensive arrangements of the Empire. The "Unarmed Members" endeavoured to shirk their obligations to provide funds; while the "Armed Members" preferred to hire out their troops to the Maritime Powers rather than employ them at their own cost in the common cause. Thus, when, in May, Villars unexpectedly took the offensive, crossing the Rhine and assaulting the famous lines of Stolhofen (May 22), he found them weakly held, and had little difficulty in capturing them. This success allowed him to push forward into Swabia, requisitioning and plundering freely in all directions. His raiding parties spread terror throughout south-western Germany, levying contributions on Würtemberg, Baden, the Palatinate, and the Swabian Circle. However, in July, ten battalions and twelve squadrons had to be detached to Provence; and on the supersession of the incompetent Margrave of Baireuth by the Elector George Lewis of Hanover, who brought with him some 6000 men, the French retired across the Rhine (September), having, in the words of an angry colonel in Marlborough's army, "overrun the lazy and sleepy Empire and not

only maintained and paid a great army in it all the year, but by vast contributions sent money into France to help the King's other affairs."

But these reverses on the Rhine were trifling, compared with the disastrous turn affairs had taken in Spain. Hoping that Galway's army might be utilised to cooperate with Eugene in the attack on Toulon, which now seemed at last practicable, Marlborough had despatched reinforcements to the Peninsula. Unfortunately a disagreement between Galway and Archduke Charles led to a separation; and the Archduke's departure for Catalonia left Galway with only 15,000 men, a bare third of whom were British, while half were Portuguese and the rest Dutch and Huguenots. Endeavouring, with this motley force, to defeat Berwick before the Duke of Orleans could reinforce him, Galway gave battle at Almanza (April 25, 1707), and, largely through the misconduct of the Portuguese, suffered a complete defeat, which lost Aragon, Murcia and Valencia to the Allies, and for the rest of the year reduced them to a mere defensive in Catalonia. Worse than this, no troops could be spared to assist Eugene's invasion of Provence, a task which had to be undertaken with most inadequate forces, inasmuch as the Emperor foolishly insisted on detaching some 13,000 men under Daun on the quite subsidiary errand of the reduction of Naples, when success at the critical spot, Toulon, would have been the surest road to the ultimate acquisition of southern Italy. Daun easily achieved his task; the Neapolitan population was bitterly hostile to the Bourbons, whose weak garrisons, cut off from all chance of succour by the English command of the sea, merely offered a feeble resistance which came to an end in September. But this success could not compensate for the failure of Eugene's attack on Toulon. Moving by the Col di Tenda, Eugene had crossed the Var on July 11, and, although hampered by the negligence and inefficiency of the Duke of Savoy, had reached Fréjus, and was in touch with Shovell and the British fleet, by the 16th. But the Duke's procrastination caused further delays, and gave time for the troops which Berwick was sending home from Spain to reinforce Marshal Tessé at Toulon before the arrival of the Allies (July 26). On August 14, Tessé retook the all-important heights of Santa Catarina, which the Allies had stormed a week earlier; and Eugene, finding his retreat menaced and little chance of taking Toulon, had to abandon his attempt (August 22), and fall back across the Var, having lost 10,000 men in this ill-fated enterprise. Its only fruit was that, in order to prevent their ships falling into the enemy's hands, the French had sunk their whole squadron of more than 50 sail in the harbour, and thereby put it quite out of their power to contest the English control of the Mediterranean.

French diplomacy, whose superiority to its rivals in this period was still as incontestable as till recently had been the military preeminence of France, had not ceased from its efforts since their failure in the

autumn of 1706. Already in October and November of that year, an attempt had been made to influence the Imperial Court in the direction of peace through Pope Clement XI; and, when the campaigns of 1707 had conspicuously demonstrated not only the weakness of the Empire in itself, but also the dubiousness of Archduke Charles' prospects of establishing himself on the Spanish throne, the labours of the French agents recommenced with a better chance of success. During the winter of 1707-8 seductive suggestions of mercantile advantages were again made at Amsterdam and Rotterdam by Nicolas Mesnager, deputy of Rouen in the *Conseil de Commerce* at Paris and an expert in colonial and general trade affairs, who from this time onward plays an important part in the negotiations for peace, and by the Belgian Count Bergeyck, on behalf of Philip V. But Marlborough's star remained in the ascendant; and in December, 1707, by passing in the House of Lords an amended resolution that no peace could be honourable or safe which allowed the House of Bourbon to retain any part of the Spanish monarchy, the Whig party blocked all peace proposals incompatible with this declaration.

For the campaign of 1708 it had been proposed that Marlborough should occupy Vendôme and the main French army, over 80,000 strong, in the Netherlands, while a joint advance was made by George Lewis of Hanover upon Alsace, and by Eugene by the Saar and Moselle. But George Lewis, through no fault of his own, could not carry out his share of the design. The failure of many of the principal German Powers, notably Saxony and Prussia, to provide their proper contingents made it impossible for the army of the Empire, whose available force was under 20,000, to take the field; and Eugene had accordingly to fall back on the alternative plan, which had all along been contemplated, of transferring to the Netherlands his 76 squadrons and 33 battalions, in all some 35,000 men, mainly Austrians, Hessians and Palatines. Here Vendôme had been beforehand with the Allies, taking the field at the beginning of July, and by rapid movements securing the line of the Scheldt, the gates of Bruges and Ghent being opened to him by French partisans within. Too late to save western Flanders, Marlborough took up his position at Assche, to cover Brussels and await Vendôme's next move or Eugene's arrival. After the fall of the citadel of Ghent (July 8), Vendôme decided to besiege Oudenarde, the possession of which would greatly improve the communications between Ghent and Bruges and the French frontier; and, to cover this operation, he moved up the Dender towards Lessines (July 9). This was Marlborough's opportunity. Though Eugene's troops were not yet up, and his own army was more than 10,000 weaker than Vendôme's, he never hesitated. By a great forced march, which carried his vanguard over the Dender at Lessines on the evening of the 9th, he interposed between Vendôme and the French frontier and caused the French commander to fall back to the north-

westward, so as to cover Bruges, making for Gaveren, where he proposed to cross the Scheldt. But again Marlborough's mobility baffled his adversary. The Allied vanguard under Cadogan pushed forward again and, early on July 11, secured the passage at Eyne, just below Oudenarde and some six miles above Vendôme's proposed crossing-place. Finding the Allies so near and their vanguard only across the Scheldt and in apparent isolation, Vendôme determined to fall on it and crush it, in defiance of the opinion of his colleague, the Duke of Burgundy, who would have preferred to take up a defensive position behind the Norken, a few miles to the west. The battle began with an advance against the Allied position near Eyne by Vendôme's vanguard, which, being left unsupported by Burgundy, ended with a disastrous repulse. Then, when the main body of the Allies was rapidly arriving and prolonging Cadogan's original position to left and right, Burgundy gave the order for a general advance. The battle was stoutly contested, the French attempts to outflank the Allied left being repulsed, though they in turn prevented the Prussians from gaining ground in that quarter. Marlborough, however, sustained the Prussians with Danish and Dutch troops; and, pushing forward the cavalry of his left under cover of a hill, not only outflanked the French right, but took it in the rear, just as the French left, which was at last pushing forward, was driven back in disorder by the British cavalry. Only nightfall saved the bulk of the French forces from capture, and it was a beaten and demoralised army which rallied behind the Bruges canal near Ghent.

The victory of Oudenarde exhibits clearly Marlborough's wonderful power for fighting an impromptu battle and his remarkable eye for ground. The physical feat performed by his troops in fighting such a battle, after covering nearly fifty miles between 2 a.m. on the 9th and 2 p.m. on the 11th, is also noteworthy; but what is most striking in connexion with his victory of Oudenarde is the daring use to which Marlborough would have put it, could he have obtained the consent of the Dutch and of Eugene, who had himself arrived in time to share in the victory, and whose army arrived a few days after the action. Marlborough would have boldly pushed on into France, merely masking the great fortress of Lille, and have thereby transferred the war to French territory; while the descent upon Normandy of a corps under General Erle would have provided him with a new line of communications with England. He counted on the invasion of France for bringing about automatically the evacuation of western Flanders by the remnants of Vendôme's army. The scheme was, however, too unorthodox even for the enterprising Eugene; and it was decided that the Prince's army should proceed to besiege Lille, Marlborough covering the operation against interference by Berwick, who had come up from the Moselle with 20,000 men and was endeavouring to join Vendôme. About the middle of August the siege was begun, and, despite the stout defence of the veteran Boufflers,

was steadily pressed. Vendôme quitted Ghent, and on August 30 joined Berwick near Tournay; but, instead of venturing another general action with Marlborough, they took up a position between Lille and Brussels, hoping to raise the siege by interrupting the Allied communications with the Belgian capital. Ostend was, however, open; and a vast convoy of ammunition and stores was conducted thence by Cadogan and by Webb, whose brilliant success over de La Mothe at Wynendael (September 28) contributed largely to its safe arrival. On October 22 the town fell, and on December 9 the citadel also surrendered. The siege had cost the Allies over 15,000 casualties; but the prize was of great value. Indeed, the straits to which the French had been reduced is evident from their evacuation of Bruges and all western Flanders, and their retreat within their own frontier, as well as from the terms of peace which Louis now declared himself ready to accept.

As in 1706, so in the spring of 1709 Louis made his first overtures to the Dutch; but Heinsius, who, so late as December, 1708, had declared the adherence of the States General to the principle of the renunciation of the entire Spanish monarchy by the House of Bourbon, would hear nothing of any separate negotiation. Thus, before the *pourparlers* between Rouillé, who was soon joined by Torcy, and the Dutch delegates, Buys and van der Dussen, which began on March 17, had proceeded far, a clear understanding had been reached between Heinsius and Marlborough. The concessions which the French envoys were empowered to make might well have satisfied the Allies, if they had been prepared to entertain any notion of a partition of the Spanish monarchy. Louis was prepared to be satisfied with the retention by Philip of Naples and Sicily only; all the rest of the Spanish inheritance was to be given up; and Mons, Namur, and even Strassburg, were to be surrendered, Lille alone being restored to France. After an interview at the Hague between Marlborough and Torcy on May 17, at which the French envoy attempted to obtain lower terms by bribery on a grand scale, he on the 19th informed Heinsius that he was empowered to offer the cession of the entire Spanish inheritance. Louis XIV had some weeks earlier consented to recognise the Protestant Succession in England, and it was understood that no objection would ultimately be made to the cession of Newfoundland to England, on which Marlborough had in addition insisted, or to the satisfaction of Savoy. The real difficulty lay in the question of the guarantee which Louis could furnish for Philip's surrender of the Spanish monarchy. The Dutch, with unerring instinct, proposed that the three French towns, Valenciennes, St Omer, and Cambray, should be pledged to the States General; and this solution was supported at the Hague by the veteran authority of Portland (Bentinck). But, recognising that it was England upon whom it would devolve to settle affairs in Spain, the English Government, represented by Townshend at the Hague, demurred; and the Emperor and Savoy now raised their demands.

Thus, the Preliminaries presented on May 28 to Torcy on behalf of the Allies as an ultimatum, provided for a return to the conditions of 1648, including a greatly improved "Barrier" for the Dutch and the retrocession of Alsace and Franche Comté, the demolition of the works of Dunkirk, the recognition of the Hanoverian Succession in England and the expulsion of the Pretender from France, and added the demand that Louis should, by August 1, obtain the surrender by Philip of the Spanish monarchy, or, in case of this not being effected, take measures, in conjunction with the Allies, for effecting it. The truce between the belligerents was, in the event of the surrender of the Spanish monarchy within the period fixed, to last till the conclusion and ratification of peace—in other words, Louis might eventually find himself obliged, with diminished possessions and reduced resources, to resume the war. Torcy at once pointed out the necessity of the ratification of peace preceding any efforts which Louis might make to bring about the cession of the Spanish monarchy—for how, he asked, could the King use force towards his grandson? It was, in truth, a concession which not even Oudenarde and Lille, following upon Turin, Ramillies and Blenheim, could wring from Louis; and, as Madame de Maintenon declared, France would not have been France, had the nation failed to support the King in his refusal. Torcy, though preserving perfect calmness, promptly took his departure from the Hague on May 28, and on the same evening from Brussels intimated to Prince Eugene that the King had rejected the Preliminaries. On June 3 the news reached Villars' headquarters that the war was to proceed; nine days later Louis issued from Versailles his manifesto to his people, denouncing the Allies as having dishonoured France by their demand, and invoking the Divine protection for himself and his army.

It is now known that on July 10, 1709, writing most confidentially to Heinsius, Marlborough, whose ambition has been held largely accountable for the unreasonable demand made on Louis XIV by the Allies, avowed that "were he in the place of the King of France, he should venture the loss of his country much sooner than be obliged to join his troops for the forcing his grandson." The accusation, commonly preferred against Marlborough, of having prolonged the war for his own benefit, is untenable; but he had not at the right moment asserted his more rational views against the obduracy of Townshend, the calculations of the Dutch, and the self-centred obstinacy of the Emperor, who is probably to be held largely responsible for the breakdown. It must, however, be allowed that the cession of the Spanish monarchy—which was still regarded as an indispensable condition of peace—was nugatory without guarantees. While both in Holland and in England there was an outburst of indignation against the defiant resolution of France, Marlborough and Prince Eugene were, not perhaps very fairly, blaming Dutch statesmanship for having found no better way of securing from Louis a satisfactory guarantee of the Spanish cession; and Heinsius was exhibiting his

willingness to formulate next time less harsh demands. But, though Marlborough inclined to the revived alternative of a barrier of French fortresses, the Whig leaders held that the only pledge of the sort to be contemplated was a series of fortified places in Spain itself!

Meanwhile, in the negotiations which still dragged their length along, the question of a Dutch "Barrier" of Belgic fortresses remained as if it were a fixed point. It will, perhaps, be most convenient to review the whole question of this provision for the protection of the Dutch frontier in connexion with the third and final Barrier Treaty of 1715. Here, therefore, it will suffice to say that the first Treaty known by this name with the States General was signed by Townshend on October 29, 1709. It was, so to speak, an open secret. The United Provinces by it acquired the right of garrisoning nine fortified places in the Spanish Netherlands, together with ten others, should they be retaken from the French; and were thus constituted by England the guardians of southern Belgium—and, as it seemed to Prince Eugene, the eventual masters of the whole of the Belgic provinces. The protests of the Emperor were made in vain, for it was quite clear from this time onwards that, if the Maritime Powers held out by each other, the House of Habsburg was reduced to passivity as to this part of any ultimate settlement.

The exorbitant demands of the Allies had in the early summer of 1709 enabled Louis to make a stirring appeal to the dignity and patriotism of his subjects. Summoned to save France from a Coalition bent on her humiliation and ruin, all classes rallied round their aged monarch with wonderful alacrity and enthusiasm. Recruits flocked forward to replete the diminished ranks; nobles imitated the King in sending their plate to the Mint; the incompetent Chamillart was dismissed from the Ministry of War; and, by dint of astounding efforts, a tolerably well-equipped army of some 90,000 men was placed at the disposal of Villars, the only French Marshal who had not yet suffered defeat at the hands of the Allies. Moreover, the long delays over the negotiations provided the French with a welcome respite, which Villars utilised to reorganise and reanimate the troops and to construct fortified lines from Douay to St Venant, covering Arras and barring the line of advance between the Lys and the Scarpe. Not till June did the rupture of the negotiations allow the Allies to begin operations, and by that time Villars had made his lines so strong that even Marlborough shrank from a frontal attack, proposing to turn them by an advance into France along the coast, in which he would have used the British fleet as his movable base. But this daring design did not meet with Eugene's approval; and in July the Allies set about the more orthodox task of besieging Tournay, in order to secure the line of the Scheldt. Tournay was ably defended and occupied the Allies until the beginning of September; but Villars, too weak to risk a battle, had to remain inactive in his lines until reinforced by a strong division from the upper Rhine. There it had been

intended that the army of the Empire should invade Alsace, while Dauphiné was simultaneously attacked by Daun and Victor Amadeus, who had in the previous year secured Piedmont by the capture of Fenestrelles. However, while the Duke of Savoy made no effort to fulfil his share of the scheme, Daun and the Austrian contingent with the Piedmontese could effect nothing unsupported, so that these troops, who might have done good service elsewhere, spent the year in complete inactivity. The usual difficulties delayed the assembly of the army of the Empire so long that the French could safely send detachments to the Netherlands (July), and when at last the Austrians under Mercy impatiently crossed the Rhine near Basel without waiting for the Elector of Hanover, they came to grief at Hüningen (August 26), after which both sides relapsed into cautious inaction.

After the fall of Tournay (September 3) the Allied forces were immediately set in motion towards Mons, the movement being covered by a feint on Douay to distract Villars. But the Marshal was not to be deceived; and, though the Allies anticipated him in seizing the passage (September 7) by Jemmappes through the great forest which lies westward of Mons, he was able to seize the southern passage by Malplaquet, occupying so threatening a position that the Allies found they must drive him away before they could form the siege. Unfortunately, Marlborough's proposal to attack immediately was not adopted; Eugene seems to have believed that Villars was merely demonstrating and would not fight, and the Dutch deputies urged that the attack should be deferred until the arrival of the last detachment of the besiegers of Tournay. Hence the attack was not made till two days later (September 11), and Villars had utilised the delay to the best purpose, erecting field-works of a most formidable character to cover his naturally advantageous position. His main body was posted on a ridge less than two miles long, flanked to the right and the left by the woods of Lasnières and Taisnières, while the wood of Sart projecting in front of his left flanked and enfiladed the direct advance against his front. Seeing that this wood of Sart was the key to the French position, Marlborough and Eugene resolved to make their main attack in this quarter, merely demonstrating on their left against the wood of Lasnières. Unfortunately, a blunder of the Prince of Orange converted this demonstration into a real attack, which resulted in a disastrous repulse for his Dutchmen, who lost very heavily. This allowed Villars to reinforce his hard-pressed left from his right, and a counter-attack drove the Allies back until it in turn was checked by a column under Withers, which had worked round through the woods and now fell upon the extreme left of the French. Boufflers, now in command as Villars had been badly wounded, had therefore to weaken his right centre in order to hold Withers in check; and this gave Marlborough his opportunity. Orkney's British and Hanoverian infantry were pushed forward against the French entrenchments, carried them,

and so opened a way for the Allied squadrons. Then followed a great cavalry combat, which fluctuated until the Allies put in the last word in the shape of Eugene's Austrian horse, and the battle was won. Boufflers, with his left turned and his centre pierced, did well in extricating his army in good order, only 16 guns and 500 prisoners being left behind. The most costly of the great battles of the war—for the Allies had nearly 20,000 casualties and the French 12,000—Malplaquet was nevertheless an important success for the Allies, even if the French could fairly claim to have shared the honours. Villars' army, despite the prodigious efforts which it represented, had been ousted from an extremely strong position, and so roughly handled in the process that it could do nothing more for Mons, which had to surrender on October 9; so that the campaign closed with the complete reduction of the French to the defensive, while the Allies were firmly established on the upper Scheldt and their conquests in Brabant and Flanders well covered.

Meanwhile, the events of 1708 and 1709 had done little to shake Philip's hold on Spain. Early in 1708 Galway had returned from the east coast to Portugal, as it had been resolved to employ in Catalonia in place of the untrustworthy Portuguese German troops set free by the armistice in Italy. However, before the Germans under Starhemberg could arrive, the Franco-Spaniards had taken Tortosa (July 15, 1708) and cut the communications between Catalonia and Valencia; and even when the Germans did arrive they failed to prevent the reduction of Denia (November, 1708) and of Alicante (April, 1709), the only places left to Charles in Valencia. The one success gained by the Allies in this region in 1708 was the capture of Minorca by Leake and Stanhope (September 14-30, 1708)—a well-conducted enterprise, which at a small cost secured for the English fleet the one thing of which it had hitherto stood in need, a harbour in the Mediterranean where a squadron could winter and be properly refitted. For Marlborough, seeing the ill-success of his designs on Toulon, had fallen back on the less satisfactory expedient of maintaining a squadron permanently in the Mediterranean, to mask the Toulon fleet and so furnish the Allied generals with that secure naval support for which they were always asking. The expedition had been undertaken at his urgent request, and the equipment of Port Mahon with the stores and appliances needed for a dockyard was at once set on foot. However, little was done in 1709 to advance the Habsburg cause in the Peninsula: even after all the French troops had been recalled from Spain to succour Louis in his great emergency (August) Starhemberg effected nothing beyond the capture of Balaguer (September), which facilitated the next year's advance; while Galway, invading Spanish Estremadura, suffered a sharp reverse on the Caya (May 17), through the rashness of his Portuguese colleague, de Fronteira. Philip's hold on the Peninsula was unshaken, and even the successes of the Allies in 1710 only served to confirm it.

Thus, in the course of the campaigns of 1709 there seemed to be a balance of loss and gain between the adversaries such as might justify renewed attempts at negotiating peace. Spain was practically out of the control of the Allies; and the Government of the United Provinces, with its own future secured by the Barrier Treaty, was for peace; though the question of the ultimate definition of the Barrier made it less feasible than ever for the States General to proceed to a settlement without their Maritime Ally. Thus the overtures made by Torcy in November, 1709, as to a resumption of negotiations on the basis of the May Preliminaries, led to a meeting of Dutch and French plenipotentiaries at the Hague (January 18, 1710) and to a declaration by Louis (February) that he was prepared to assent to the proposed basis, subject to a fresh consideration of the question as to the guarantees of the cession. On March 10 conferences were actually opened in nominal secrecy at Gertruydenberg (or rather on a yacht between that place and Mierdyk), and they were continued at intervals till near the end of April. France was represented by Marshal d'Huxelles and the Abbé (afterwards Cardinal) de Polignac, who found more than their match in Buys and van der Dussen. England and the Emperor at first held aloof; though the former Power still controlled the action of her Maritime Ally. It is, however, tolerably clear that from the outset Marlborough and Townshend agreed with the Dutch statesmen in contemplating a partial cession only on the part of Philip, and that even the Whig Government at home was wavering. The Emperor's estrangement from the Maritime Powers increased in proportion as England's attitude altered. Joseph, very unreasonably, objected to a partition of the Spanish monarchy, and the proposal to give Sicily to Philip was vehemently opposed by Savoy—though Godolphin and Marlborough, as well as Heinsius, would have agreed to this. Moreover, the wish, certainly cherished at this time by Louis, that his grandson should yield, met with no response on the part of Philip; and no result seeming attainable at Gertruydenberg, the conferences were, on the proposal of the Dutch, interrupted for some time. The campaigns of 1710 had already begun, when Louis went so far as to offer the Allies a monthly subsidy of 150,000 *livres*, to be eventually doubled, for their coercive operations in the Pyrenean Peninsula. The proposal was rejected by the Dutch plenipotentiaries on their return to Gertruydenberg. It was more clear than ever that the result depended on the decision of England, whether in return for liberal trade concessions by Spain and the transfer of Newfoundland by France, she would assent to a partition of the Spanish monarchy which would leave Spain alone to Philip. The Dutch would in the end be content with a good Barrier; and the Emperor would have to be content with what he could get. Savoy, who vehemently opposed the cession of Sicily to Philip, could not turn the balance.

But, though the decision lay with England, Marlborough was no

longer likely to direct it. Already in 1709 the course of affairs was undermining a position from which he might otherwise have looked forward with the highest expectations to the campaign of 1710. He was losing ground at home; Prince George of Denmark, his constant supporter, had died in October, 1708; and now Anne was rapidly slipping away from the influence of the Duchess of Marlborough, and signs were not wanting that the country was beginning to tire of the Whig monopoly of office and to grow weary of a War of which the end appeared as far off as ever, in spite of the great efforts made and the great successes won during its course. In the summer of 1710, Marlborough and Godolphin were aware that their downfall was approaching, and showed no intention of attempting, as they had directed the great War, to determine the peace by which it should be concluded.

Thus, in July, 1710, the inflexible attitude of Buys and van der Dussen rendered a continuation of the Gertruydenberg Conferences hopeless; and the French plenipotentiaries withdrew with an angry protest, to which the States General replied by an elaborate argument representing the King of France as alone responsible for the continuance of the struggle. But a memorandum handed in by the French was not without its effect upon the peace party in the United Provinces; and both there and in England the feeling grew that the real reason for the breakdown of the negotiations had been the excessive demands of the Maritime Powers.

Even before the Conferences were over, in July, 1710, Starhemberg, whose strength reinforcements from Italy had raised to a total of 25,000, took the offensive, invaded Aragon, beat Philip's army at Almenara (July 27), and more decisively at Saragossa (August 19), after which he pushed on to Madrid, which for the second time in the war was occupied (September 23) by the Habsburg claimant. But, as in 1706, Castile rallied to Philip; no help was forthcoming from Portugal, for Vendôme, sent by Louis to command his grandson's armies, had moved into the Tagus valley by Valladolid, Salamanca (October 6) and Talavera (October 19), interposing between the Allies in Madrid and their friends in Portugal. As in 1706, Madrid soon proved untenable. During the retreat of the Allies to the coast one of their divisions was defeated and forced to capitulate at Brihuega (December 8), the other securing a safe withdrawal by the battle, tactically indecisive, of Villa Viciosa (December 10). Thus once again the Habsburgs were confined to Catalonia, and even this was hardly secure, for in January, 1711, Gerona surrendered to de Noailles.

Operations had begun in the Netherlands with a sudden concentration of the Allies at Tournay (April 19), followed by a dash across the lines of La Bassée, which caught the French unprepared and allowed Marlborough to form the siege of Douay (May 5). The place made a most gallant defence, but Villars could give it no help; he could not risk the last army of France in a pitched battle, and therefore set

himself instead to build the famous fortified lines from the mouth of the Canche to the Sambre, which he boasted would check even Marlborough. Douay, left unaided, fell on June 26; and, before the end of the campaign, Béthune (August 28), St Venant (September 29) and Aire (November 12) had shared its fate; the whole line of the Lys was in the possession of the Allies; and the chances of a successful invasion in the following year had been greatly improved. These were not very brilliant results to show for the 15,000 casualties which the capture of Vauban's fortresses had cost; but Marlborough had good reason to complain of the slackness of his Allies. The contingents of the German Princes had been late or below their due strength, and Archdeacon Hare wrote that though there were "scarce 40,000 men in all the other armies of France...such are our Allies that we hope for nothing from the Rhine or Savoy, though the Empire make the greatest difficulties about peace, and Savoy be the greatest gainer in the war." Moreover, Marlborough's tenure of his command had become so insecure that he feared to run any risk, lest his enemies should make the least mishap an excuse for recalling him. For what he had feared had come about. The Whig Ministry, whose position had been already undermined by Anne's change of favourites, had fallen before the storm raised by the Sacheverell affair, and their places had been taken by Tories, with Harley at their head. Feeling that, with such a Government in power, he could no longer count on cordial support at home, Marlborough contemplated resigning; but, at the urgent entreaties of Eugene and Godolphin, who hoped that another campaign might prove decisive and bring about a satisfactory peace, he decided to retain his post.

Before, however, the operations of 1711 could be opened, the best chance of a decisive campaign had vanished with the sudden death (April 17) of the Emperor Joseph. This event completely altered the European situation, as it left Archduke Charles the head of the Habsburg family and the obvious successor on the Imperial throne. It was hardly possible that the Grand Alliance, which had been formed in order to prevent a cadet of the Bourbon family from ascending the Spanish throne, should continue the war to reunite the dominions of Charles V under the head of the Austrian Habsburgs. Joseph's death thus provided the Tory Ministry with an additional justification for their determination to bring the war to an end, and to meet the growing feeling that an annual expenditure which had steadily risen in the course of ten years from nearly four to nearly seven millions sterling had become intolerable. According to William III's settlement England had bound herself to furnish two parts out of every five of the land forces required of the war, and five parts out of every eight of the sea forces; and yet it was estimated that above these quotas, England from first to last expended twenty millions sterling to cover the military and naval deficiencies of her Allies.

Yet, though there could be no pretence that the war was any longer

carried on as against the preponderance of the power of France, and though the burden of it had become unendurable, neither of these considerations could justify the English Ministry in the methods which they had from the first pursued in negotiating for peace. It was in 1710 that Torcy, who had never ceased in his labours towards this end, found the requisite agent for his purpose in the Abbé Gaultier, who, prescient of his future usefulness, had remained in London ever since he had first been attached to Marshal Tallard's embassy to the Court of William III in 1698. Through the Earl of Jersey, a member of the Privy Council but a Jacobite at heart, Gaultier had been introduced to Shrewsbury and Harley; and in January, 1711, "M. de Lorme" arrived in France on the first of his journeys to the French Court, in the interests—ultimately disentangled—of peace and the Pretender. Torcy was apprised by him of the fact—which of course was no secret to the French Minister—that the new English Government was desirous of peace, while the Dutch sincerely regretted the breakdown of the Gertruydenberg Conferences. Gaultier was informed that the King was prepared to enter into negotiations with England, but not with the States General, though it was subsequently understood that French proposals might be communicated to them by the English Ministers. On this footing the business proceeded, being much expedited so soon as St John was in a position to take a direct part in the proceedings. Early in June Matthew Prior, who, in the spirit of his saying that "Swords conquer some, but words subdue all men," was most desirous of distinction in diplomacy, secretly accompanied Gaultier to Paris, being chosen as a servant of the State who might if necessary be disavowed; and, three months later, Mesnager, of whom and whose abilities mention has already been made, appeared in London, still secretly, as agent of the French Government, with elaborate instructions (dated August 3). They show that a change had come over the spirit of French diplomacy and of the sovereign whom it so admirably served, and who now, as his Ministers stated with engaging frankness, looked for concessions in return for his sacrifices. The English Ministers, for their part, in their eagerness for peace, took little thought of the interests of their Allies, unless perhaps of the House of Savoy. On October 9, St John, whose mind was quite made up, introduced Mesnager at Windsor, by the backstairs, to the presence of Queen Anne, who declared herself no lover of war, and ready to do all in her power to end the present conflict. Thus England was carried along by a variety of impulses—among which St John's hatred of the House of Austria, and the old mercantile jealousy of the Dutch, were alike to be reckoned—into a separate provisional agreement with France. In the same month the preliminaries of peace were virtually settled between the French and English Governments. They threw over the principle of preserving the Spanish monarchy for the House of Habsburg, giving only general assurances as to the demands of England's

Allies, while assuring to England herself the substance of what she actually secured in the Peace of Utrecht.

Apart from its influence upon the diplomatic situation, the death of Joseph had seriously interfered with the Allied plan of campaign for 1711. Eugene and the greater part of his army were called off to the Rhine, to cover the Imperial election at Frankfort from any possibility of interruption on the part of the French troops in Alsace; and Marlborough found himself at the head of a force nearly 24,000 weaker than the 88,000 with whom Villars was about to defend his celebrated lines. This masterpiece of military engineering ran almost from the coast of Picardy to the Sambre and Meuse, the Canche, the Scarpe and other minor rivers having been dammed in several places to protect tracts of country with inundations. It really appeared as if Villars' boast would be borne out and Marlborough had at last met his "*non plus ultra*." But Villars had yet to learn the full measure of his great adversary's talent. All endeavours to lure Villars from his position into another pitched battle having proved fruitless, Marlborough, after capturing (July 6) a fort at Arleux which commanded a causeway over the inundations of the Sanzee, moved westward on Arras, as though about to tempt destruction by making a frontal attack on the very strongest portion of the lines (August). Deceived by the feint, Villars, who had just retaken and destroyed Arleux (July 21), hastened to send reinforcements to his left. Marlborough's success was assured. Calling on his men for one of those great efforts he never demanded unnecessarily or in vain, he countermarched his troops from Arras to Arleux, covering forty miles in eighteen hours, pushed across the causeway almost unopposed, and thus pierced the lines on which Villars had so confidently relied (August 5). In vain Villars tried to catch Marlborough at a disadvantage; the Duke covered the bridging of the Scheldt by a demonstration against Cambray, after which he crossed to the right of the Scheldt and proceeded to invest Bouchain (August 8). As before, Villars would not fight a battle for a beleaguered fortress, and Bouchain fell on September 13 after what Archdeacon Hare characterised as "the best conducted siege we have made this war." The capture of Bouchain brought the Allies into an excellent position for an advance into France; but it was Marlborough's last exploit. The Tories had determined to overthrow him; and on December 31 he was summarily dismissed from all his employments, in order that he might be put on his trial on a charge of misappropriating public moneys which had actually been used for secret service and intelligence work.

The death of Joseph I, though it had thus neither created the desire for peace, nor been the starting-point of the negotiations to that end, justified the indifference of England—and of Holland, if but her "Barrier" were secured—to the continuance of the Grand Alliance. Lord Raby (soon afterwards Earl of Strafford), who had superseded

Townshend as British envoy at the Hague, joined with Heinsius in working for the transfer of the Spanish monarchy to Victor Amadeus II of Savoy, whose eldest son, the Prince of Piedmont, should marry an Austrian Archduchess. But the endeavours of Peterborough, who had arrived at Vienna in February to allay the suspicions of the Imperial Government, and now pressed this solution upon it, were only met by Count Wratislaw, the confidential adviser of Leopold I, by the suggestion of an English guarantee of the Habsburg tenure of Hungary. The estrangement between the English and Imperial Governments continued to increase. In July Count Gallas, the Imperial envoy at St James', demanded official information on the subject of the negotiations with France, and, when he was furnished with a copy of the preliminaries agreed upon with Mesnager, treated them with incredulous contempt. Meanwhile, Heinsius and his colleagues had early in May been informed of the French proposals; and an active correspondence soon ensued between the English and the Dutch Government, which revealed the fears of the latter for their "Barrier"; while Lord Strafford took up a high tone, and his Government kept in secret touch with the Dutch peace party through John Drummond, an English merchant at Amsterdam. Though Count Goëss, who had in September arrived at the Hague as Imperial envoy, made one more attempt to keep the Alliance together, he could not prevent the acceptance by the Dutch on November 21, 1711, of a Peace Congress to be held at Utrecht in the following January, with the French proposals as its preliminaries. Early in December the Emperor Charles VI crossed the German frontier on his way from Barcelona, where he had left his young Empress Elizabeth behind him as a pledge of his determination not to abandon Spain; on his journey through northern Italy he had had an interview with Victor Amadeus. At Innsbruck the Emperor, after deliberating the situation with Prince Eugene and Counts Gallas, Wratislaw, and Sinzendorf, resolved to adopt the suggestion of Marlborough that Prince Eugene should be sent to England on a special mission, and that in the meantime no plenipotentiary should be sent to the proposed Congress.

Yet its approaching meeting was announced in the Queen's Speech of December 11, in terms implying the existence of the most perfect harmony of purpose between the members of the Grand Alliance. It has been seen elsewhere how the address of the House of Lords declaring against any peace which should leave Spain and the Indies in the possession of the House of Bourbon was answered by the creation of twelve new Peers (December 31). Prince Eugene landed in London January 16, 1712; but he soon began to doubt the probability of success, though he continued his efforts to secure joint action on the part of the Emperor, the States General, Hanover, and the Whigs, and presented memorandum upon memorandum to the English Government. The last of these demanded a change in the Preliminaries of the Congress which—as a

succession of contrary winds had prevented him from being informed—had already assembled at Utrecht.

It was on January 1, 1712, that the open negotiations between the Allies and France began at Utrecht. The efforts of Count Gallas, the over-impetuous Austrian ambassador, had failed to shake the determination of the Tories and only produced his own recall; and Eugene's two months in London had been spent to no purpose. However, the meeting of the Conference was not accompanied by an armistice, and in planning his operations for the summer Eugene still counted on the assistance of the English and their auxiliaries, now under the Duke of Ormond. His scheme was to turn the French lines at the head of the Sambre, besiege Quesnoy and Landreies, and so open up the way to Paris by the valley of the Oise. In May he proceeded to put this plan into operation, and laid siege to Quesnoy, Ormond's corps covering the siege. Quesnoy fell on July 4; but, just as Eugene was about to invest Landreies, he was informed by Ormond (July 16) that an armistice had been concluded between Great Britain and France, and that in conformity with its terms he was about to withdraw his troops to Dunkirk, which was to be handed over to Great Britain as a pledge of French good faith. But when Ormond gave orders to his corps to quit the Allied camp only the contingents of Holstein, Liège and Saxe-Coburg, little more than 3000 men, followed him; the rest of the auxiliaries, some 118 squadrons and 44 battalions, of whom 6200 men were Danes, 10,400 Hanoverians, 4000 Hessians, 8700 Prussians and 5900 Saxons, all refused to leave Eugene and remained with him to the end of the campaign, although, on learning of their refusal to obey Ormond, England at once ceased to pay the subsidies for their support. Thanks to this action on the part of the German auxiliaries, Eugene, who had about 150 squadrons and 80 battalions of Austrians and Dutch, felt himself strong enough to continue his operations, and accordingly invested Landreies (July 18). It was a somewhat hazardous proceeding; for the departure of the English transferred the numerical superiority to Villars, who was able to safely call up troops from other points thus made secure; moreover, the refusal of the Dutch deputies to let the principal depot of the Allies be moved from Marchiennes to Quesnoy compelled Eugene to extend his lines beyond prudent limits. Still, to have remained inactive would have certainly discouraged his men, and it would have equally encouraged the French had he seemed disheartened. Villars was not slow to see his opportunity, and, after drawing off Eugene's attention by feinting at the main position of the Allies on the Escaillon, he hurled strong forces against the Dutch, who were guarding the bridge at Denain (July 24), and thereby covering the great magazine at Marchiennes. Surprised and outnumbered, the Dutch made but a feeble resistance to Villars' vigorous attack, and, long before Eugene could bring up reinforcements, they had given way in disorder and were

in full flight. The collapse of a bridge of boats over the Scheldt completed the disaster, and, at a cost to the victors of barely 500 men, the whole Dutch division of 12,000 strong was annihilated and Eugene's position forced. The first fruits of Villars' victory were the destruction of the Allied lines between the Scheldt and the Scarpe (July 25 and 26), the capture of the great magazine at Marchiennes (July 30), and the investment of Douay (July 31). Eugene had to raise the siege of Landrecies (July 29), to retire over the Scheldt at Tournay and to watch in inactivity the reduction (September 8) of Douay. Before the close of the campaign Quesnoy (October 8) and Bouchain (October 19) also passed into the hands of the French, and the year 1712 thus ended with the successes of the Allies checked and the prestige of French arms somewhat restored. Eugene, if perhaps ill-advised in investing Landrecies, was little to blame for the disastrous turn affairs had taken; he had been ill-served by his allies, for the Dutch made a poor resistance at Denain, and the value of the English alliance was never more apparent than in the hour when it was withdrawn.

The change of affairs in the field naturally affected the course of the negotiations at Utrecht. The Dutch were already weary of the "war," and were ending it if satisfied as to their "Barrier." The conclusion of a peace was further advanced, when Louis induced his grandson to abandon formally his claims on France, which had recently acquired increased importance through the deaths of the Dauphin (April, 1711) and of the Dukes of Burgundy (February, 1712) and Brittany (March, 1712). With this renunciation Bolingbroke (St John) also had to be content; though he would probably have preferred to see Victor Amadeus at Madrid. But Philip's hold on Spain was too secure to be shaken; and, in August, 1712, a suspension of hostilities in the Peninsula was arranged, though it was not till the following autumn that Starhemberg and his men finally evacuated Catalonia. Long before this the Peace of Utrecht had been signed. The patent divisions in the Allied camp, the knowledge that the English Ministry had made up their minds to conclude peace, and the improvement in his position wrought by Villars' success, allowed Louis to assume a stiffer attitude and to reduce the concessions he had to make; and, though the Emperor—Charles had been duly elected in October, 1711—was somewhat unreasonable in refusing to give up his claims on Spain and to content himself with the ample possessions offered him in Italy, it is easier to sympathise with his obstinacy than to condemn it. Finally, on April 11, 1713, the Peace (which is analysed elsewhere) was signed without the Emperor's assent.

On the conclusion of the Peace Eugene removed the Austrian forces, 67 squadrons of cavalry and 14 battalions of infantry, from the Netherlands to the upper Rhine to cooperate with the army of the Empire, which he found very much below its proper strength. Almost the only

contingents present were those of the "Associated Circles"—six in number—for, now that the subsidies of the Maritime Powers had ceased, the "Armed Members" were very backward. The great parade of zeal made by Prussia and other States was hardly borne out by their actual performances; instead of providing 9000 men over and above the 8000 promised by the "Crown Treaty," Prussia only sent 5000, who refused to proceed beyond Cologne; and she also claimed that the garrisons she had placed in Gelders and other newly acquired lands should count as acquitting part of her obligation. Similarly Hesse-Cassel and Mecklenburg would only allow their contingents to cover Mainz, while other States professed themselves willing to send men but unable to stir without funds. In vain Eugene pledged his personal credit: the army of the Empire, on paper 120,000 men, had only reached 25,000 in May, and never exceeded 40,000. Nor was the Austrian army in much better plight: Starhemberg's corps from Spain was not yet available; Hungary and the Italian lands held by Austria absorbed large garrisons; and, though the German provinces contributed readily enough, scarcely any financial assistance was forthcoming from Hungary, so that the Emperor's treasury was in its usual condition of vacuity. Thus it was that, with an army of only 115 squadrons and 85 battalions, Eugene was powerless against the 300 squadrons and 240 battalions of Villars.

In June French detachments pushed over the Rhine, occupying Speier and Mannheim, and so covering the siege of Landau, which Villars began on June 24. It proved a protracted affair; for, despite Eugene's inaction, the fortress held out till August 26 before surrendering. Villars then crossed the river at Strassburg, stormed the lines constructed to cover the Freiburg Pass over the Black Forest (September 20), and, pressing hard on the heels of the fugitives, invested the town. Again Eugene, too weak to risk a battle, had to be a passive spectator of a gallant but unavailing defence. Freiburg resisted till well into October; the castle held out till November 17. To blame Eugene for his inactivity would be absurd; like Wellington on the Portuguese frontier in 1810, he could not risk a fight because for political reasons he could not afford to be beaten; and the slackness of the German Princes, which left him in so hopeless a numerical inferiority, condemned him without appeal to the defensive.

But it was not on Austria only that the strain of war was telling; France was equally in need of a rest, and it was actually from Louis XIV that the next overtures for peace came. This time Eugene managed to wring from Charles VI permission to negotiate; and, thanks to the good offices of the Elector Palatine, a conference was ultimately opened at Rastatt on November 26 between Eugene and his old opponent, Villars. The negotiations were long and complicated, the chief obstacles to peace being the questions of the fortifications on the

Rhine, of the treatment of the Emperor's faithful Catalan partisans, and of the reinstatement of the two Wittelsbach Electors, on which Louis insisted, although Maximilian Emanuel of Bavaria seems to have been not disinclined to accept the Spanish Netherlands in lieu of his hereditary possessions. However, the Dutch would not hear of having an adherent of France on their frontier, and in the end his restoration to Bavaria was agreed upon, while Charles had reluctantly to abandon Catalonia to the tender mercies of Philip. On the Rhine, Louis kept Landau and Strassburg, but gave up Alt-Breisach, Freiburg, and Kehl. And so at last an agreement was reached, and on March 7, 1714, the plenipotentiaries signed the Peace of Rastatt, the provisions of which will be detailed below. One step yet remained before peace could be completely restored, the ratification of its terms by the Diet of the Empire—a more or less formal step which was finally taken at Baden in October, 1714.

In the War which thus, after many vicissitudes, at last came to an end there is one figure which certainly stands out preeminent. Marlborough had been the bond which had held the Grand Alliance together; and, if England can with some justice claim to have had the chief share in the defeat of Louis, it is on her great general's account. His army had, as a rule, contained but a modest contingent of Englishmen, averaging about 20,000 and at times rising to 25,000, though they had shown themselves by no means the least efficient portion of his motley host, and had distinguished themselves repeatedly. But the personal part of Marlborough in the long roll of successes had been a contribution of even greater value towards the revival of the prestige of the British arms. Eugene's reputation, happily for his memory, is unstained by the faults which tarnish Marlborough's glory; but it is no disparagement to Eugene's admittedly great merits to point out that Marlborough never suffered a Denain or a Freiburg, and that both in the originality and width of his strategic conceptions, as well as in tactical adroitness and resource, the Englishman surpassed even his accomplished and experienced colleague. His handling of all three arms showed how well he had grasped their possibilities, and seen how combination of all three would increase the efficiency of each. His use of his artillery was masterly; at Malplaquet in particular it was manœuvred to support both infantry and cavalry in a most daring manner, while the great successes which the British cavalry achieved in so many decisive charges were due to his urgent insistence on the importance of shock-tactics, whereas the French horse, adhering to the vicious system of the seventeenth century, relied not on momentum but on firing from the saddle. But, when the difficulties under which Marlborough had to plan and carry out his campaigns are remembered, the need for accommodating his plans to the interference of ignorant and timid Dutch deputies, and to the selfishness and obstinacy of petty German Princes, his strategic achievements appear even more

meritorious. Again and again he showed his capacity for rising above the limitations which fettered his contemporaries; his plans were laid to secure positive results, to gain victories, and not merely to avoid defeats. Where a Lewis of Baden spent weeks and months in the construction of the most elaborate fortified lines, looking upon them as the most important thing in war, Marlborough never let such erections detain or check him, and illustrated on many occasions the maxim that a vigorous offensive is often the soundest defence. Had he been so fortunate as to have secured a free hand from the beginning, the War might have been brought to a conclusion years before the overthrow of the Whigs left Marlborough at the mercy of his domestic enemies and prevented him from carrying to a successful conclusion his marvellous series of campaigns.

(2) THE PEACE OF UTRECHT AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY PACIFICATIONS.

The Peace of Utrecht, as it is commonly called, consists of a series of treaties signed at Utrecht on April 11, 1713, supplemented by others which may conveniently be ranged under the same heading. The entire body of these treaties constituted the bases of the peace of Europe for more than a generation—till the outbreak, in 1746, of the War of the Austrian Succession. For, apart from the last stages of the Northern War, all the armed conflicts of importance in Europe, and the efforts of diplomacy to avert or end them, during this period hinge upon the Utrecht settlement, and—if the Peace of Vienna of 1738 be excepted—left its main provisions untouched. These provisions, as was pointed out in an earlier chapter, corresponded with a completeness rare in diplomatic history to the intentions with which the War of the Spanish Succession had been undertaken by England and the Powers associated with her in her resistance to the dominance of France, and which had been clearly formulated in the Treaty of the Hague of September, 1701. Although the House of Bourbon retained Spain and the Spanish possessions in the New World, it lost a larger share of the Spanish monarchy than that which in the negotiations for the Grand Alliance William III had thought it necessary to take away from that House. What had been Spanish Italy became, through the pacifications which we are about to review, part of the Austrian dominions—with the exception of Sicily, of which Victor Amadeus II of Savoy became King, but which in 1720 he exchanged for Sardinia. In northern Italy that astute Prince recovered Savoy and Nice from France; and a counterbalance was thus provided in this part of Europe against the power of the House of Habsburg as well as against that of the Bourbons. On the north-eastern frontier of France

what had been the Spanish were henceforth the Austrian Netherlands; and the Emperor had in the end to accept an accession of territory which he had never been particularly desirous of acquiring—well aware as he and his statesmen were that the possession of these Provinces entailed the defence of them as the first line of resistance against any renewed French aggression in this quarter. For the Empire itself the Emperor, in the long course of the negotiations which began at Utrecht and ended at Baden, failed to recover more than part of the spoils of a long period of French aggression, and the whole of the left bank of the upper Rhine remained in French hands. But what cooperation could there have been between the dynastic ambition of the House of Habsburg and that of the chief Princes of the Empire, who, like the Electors of Saxony, Brandenburg, and Hanover, were intent upon the splendour or power of the royal crowns which they had acquired or were expecting, or who, like the Elector of Bavaria and the Catholic Elector Palatine, cherished high hopes, all of which they were fated to see ignored?

The United Provinces gained a strong Barrier, firmly planted in allied territory, against any renewal of the aggression of France. But though they contrived to secure, in addition, some commercial advantages from the Peace, their political position as a Great Power had gone from them for ever, passing, without any real resistance on their part, to the Power which had been their rival on the sea during many generations in times of war and in times of peace; and their mercantile supremacy was likewise at an end. The territorial gains of Great Britain herself consisted in Europe of a couple of Mediterranean ports; and though she extended and strengthened her power in the New World by her gains from France, the significance of this expansion was imperfectly realised at home, and the great European duel in the New World was still to come. On the other hand, England established the security of her Protestant throne; she obtained commercial advantages of the greatest importance by her treaties with France and Spain; and to the proofs which the War had given of her ascendancy in Europe, was added this last proof—that the Peace which ended it had been largely the work of her statesmen, and had, beyond all doubt, been made possible by her will alone.

In the following a brief summary of the provisions of the Peace of Utrecht will be attempted, without any detailed statement as to the course of the actual negotiations of which it was the result; and a brief account will be added of the pacifications by which it was supplemented.

It would be useless to discuss the instructions given to the Bishop of Bristol (John Robinson), Keeper of the Privy Seal, and the Earl of Strafford, English ambassador at the Hague, as English plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Utrecht, inasmuch as these instructions quite fictitiously assumed a close and consistent cooperation between England and her Allies, and excluded any idea of a partition of the Spanish monarchy,

though it was on this very process that the English and French Governments had resolved. It was peace which they wanted—and wanted, above all, for the sake of English trade, which revived with extraordinary rapidity even during the progress of the negotiations¹. In truth, the English Ministers had no intention of insisting on any of the demands contained in these instructions except those which concerned definite English advantages or gains. For this very reason, however, they treated the preliminaries signed by Mesnager on his visit to England (October 8, 1711) as open to change; whereas in the instructions given by Louis XIV to his plenipotentiaries at Utrecht, Marshal d'Huxelles, the Abbé de Polignac, and Mesnager himself, these preliminaries were treated as immutable. They had, after a long struggle, been accepted by the States General, under great pressure on the part of Strafford, on November 21, 1711; but no instructions to their plenipotentiaries at Utrecht are extant, perhaps because they were in immediate contact with their Governments. They were eight in number, two (Buys and van der Dussen) from Holland, and one from each of the remaining Provinces. On the other hand, the Emperor Charles VI instructed his ambassador at the Hague, Count von Sinzendorf, to oppose the meeting of a peace congress on the basis of the Anglo-French preliminaries, and if possible to revive the preliminaries of 1709, while decisively resisting the Barrier Treaty. The same instructions, which show how far the Imperial Government was from realising the actual situation, were given to Prince Eugene, then, as has been seen, on his way to England (December, 1711). Savoy was represented at the Congress by Count Annibale Maffei.

The Congress, the opening of which had been fixed for January 12, 1712, was not actually opened till the 29th. The Emperor had announced at the Hague that he was not prepared to take part in the Congress, until he had received an assurance that the Anglo-French preliminaries would not be regarded as binding. Early in February the French Government disavowed any such intention, and Sinzendorf duly presented himself at the Congress, being followed later by the second Imperial plenipotentiary, the Spaniard Count Corzana; the third, Baron Caspar Florenz von Cronsbruch, had appeared sooner; his place was afterwards taken by von Kirchner. Little progress was made in the first period of the sittings of the Congress, which ended on April 6. From this time forward the separate negotiations, carried on more especially in London or at the French Court, advanced the work of peace far more materially than such deliberations as continued to be held at Utrecht, where no general conference again took place till February 2, 1713. These negotiations were carried on by the British Government with fresh energy, after the deaths in the French Royal family (February and

¹ In 1710 the number of vessels cleared from English ports is quoted as 3550; in 1711 as 3759; in 1712 as 4267; in 1713 as 5807; in 1714 as 6614. The shipping in London is stated to have increased in these five years from 806 to 1550.

March, 1712) had brought so much nearer the danger, still not removed, of a union between the French and Spanish Crowns.

For the rest, it may be said that the Government of Philip V had no voice at the Congress distinct from that of France, and that the Bourbon King of Spain's personal action was of importance only at the particular point of the negotiations when he made up his mind to prefer the retention of a diminished Spanish to the expectancy of an enlarged French monarchy (May, 1712). Portugal was absolutely tied to England, and, instead of deriving any advantage from the entire course of negotiations, had to console herself with the heavy subsidies paid to her during the course of the War. Promises had been made and prospects held out which gained Savoy over to the side of peace. The States General had to concentrate their energies, as it had been all along intended by the English Government that they should, upon the question of their Barrier; on December 29, 1712, they finally agreed to accept the Anglo-French preliminaries. Thus, in the progress of the negotiations everything depended on the maintenance of the understanding between France and England; and for this purpose the conclusion of a truce between them was of the utmost importance. The cession of Dunkirk by the French before the conclusion of the peace enabled Ormond to proclaim this truce on July 16, 1712. An Anglo-French pacification was henceforth a virtual certainty; Bolingbroke's journey to France (August 7) and subsequent interviews with Torcy removed all remaining doubts; and, Savoy being more or less satisfied, the remainder of the negotiations chiefly turned on the satisfaction of the Dutch and of the Emperor. On February 2, 1713, the conferences were formally resumed. The Dutch were, as will be seen, not really contented till the conclusion of the Third Barrier Treaty, nearly eighteen months later; nor was the satisfaction of the Emperor at present accomplished. His demands remained unsupported by England; and, though on March 14, 1713, Sinzendorf had signed a truce at Utrecht by which the Emperor undertook to withdraw his troops from Catalonia and to concede the neutrality of the whole of Italy, he could not obtain the terms on which he insisted. A last attempt made on his behalf by Shrewsbury at Paris (March, 1713) fell through; and peace was signed at Utrecht without him (April 11). When the middle of June had been reached, and no message of acceptance had arrived from Vienna, the last of the plenipotentiaries quitted Utrecht; though the proceedings there were, as will be seen, not yet at an end.

The earliest in date, then, as well as the most important of the Treaties, which it is proposed now briefly to examine was the Peace between France and Great Britain (April 11, 1713). William III had bequeathed to Marlborough and Godolphin, the true inheritors of his statesmanship, a foreign policy which meant war with France, so

long as France was resolved to unsettle the peace of Europe in general, and the condition of things established in Great Britain in particular. The English nation had deeply resented the arrogant interference of Louis in the matter of the succession to its throne; and but for this interference, William would hardly have been able to screw to the sticking-point such warlike feeling as then existed in England. Thus it was appropriate that the first article of importance in the Anglo-French Treaty was concerned with the English Succession question. Whatever may be thought of the account given in the so-called *Minutes of the Negotiations of Mesnager* of the intrigues for obtaining, with Queen Anne's consent, the insertion in the Treaty of a secret clause relieving Louis from the obligation of keeping his promise to recognise the Hanoverian Succession "beyond the Queen's death," these intrigues, if they were actually carried on, broke down; and Article IV of the Treaty may be regarded as both sincere and conclusive. France in this Article recognised the order of succession in England established by the Act of 1702; and King Louis undertook, both for himself and for his descendants, never to acknowledge as King or Queen of Great Britain anyone claiming to succeed unless in the order thus settled; while taking every care that the son of King James II (the "Old Pretender") should not at any time or on any pretext return into the realm of France, from which he had departed—"voluntarily," according to the Treaty; in reality after many delays on his own part, and after much hesitation on that of Louis XIV, whose truly royal nature made it difficult for him to let his guest go.

Of superior, because of more pressing, importance was Article VI, which settled the *nodus pacis*—the cardinal difficulty of the Peace—the question which after passing through so many phases was now at last determined by the agreement between France and Great Britain. This Article recited the successive Acts of Renunciation precluding the possibility of a personal union between the French and Spanish kingdoms: the Act of Renunciation, performed by Philip V on November 5, 1712; its confirmation by the Cortes of Castile in the same month; and the Renunciations, also in November, performed by Philip's younger brother, Charles Duke of Berry (who died in May, 1714), and by Philip Duke of Orleans (afterwards Regent of France). It further recited the Reservation of the rights of Philip in the succession to the French Crown, declared by Louis XIV in December, 1700, when on the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession, and the Annulment of this Reservation—in other words, the solemn assent of Louis XIV to Philip V's abandonment of his claims to the French throne. These Renunciations were now hedged in by every possible solemnity of obligation; as it happened, owing to the unexpected survival of Louis' younger great-grandson, the future King Louis XV, there was never any question of contesting their validity. By the same Article, the King of France undertook never to accept in favour of his own subjects any advantage as to

commerce or navigation in Spain or Spanish America, without its being extended to the subjects of other Powers.

Article IX concerned Dunkirk, whose numerous vicissitudes had not ended with its sale to France by Charles II in 1662. Louis had greatly added to the strength of its fortifications, till it became beyond doubt a very serious menace to Great Britain's maintenance of her power in the Narrow Seas. It had now, as was seen, been evacuated by the French during the peace negotiations; and it was now stipulated that the King of France should within six months raze the fortifications and fill up the harbour, with an undertaking never to restore them. Louis XIV showed a want of good faith very dishonourable to him, by digging another harbour at Mardyk, a village near Dunkirk, which was intended to be deeper than that which had been filled up, and which was connected with a canal of considerable length. The complaints which at once arose in England obliged him to suspend the operations at Mardyk, on which not less than 12,000 workmen are said to have been employed; and under the Regency the works were demolished. The Dunkirk clause, to the importance of which English public feeling had shown itself so alive, made its reappearance in a succession of treaties before the Peace of Versailles in 1783, when France at last obtained its abolition.

Articles X, XII and XIII dealt with cessions made by France to Great Britain in the New World, which are justly regarded as the real beginnings of the expansion of the British colonial empire. The Hudson's Bay settlements, to which France had now finally to renounce her pretensions, were of French origin, though the Bay itself had been discovered by the English navigator whose name it bears; and the profitable fur-trade through Canada still remained largely in French hands. On the St Lawrence and in the wooded peninsula at the mouth of the great river French colonial enterprise had continued to progress, after in 1631 Richelieu had recovered both the earlier Canadian settlements and Acadia for France; and towards the end of the seventeenth century she claimed the entire region from the north of the Mississippi to the Great Lakes on the St Lawrence as her own—the title of New France being habitually given to it in the French maps of the time. It is therefore a notable event in the history of French and of English colonisation, and of the mutual relations between them, when the Utrecht Treaty once more assigned Acadia to England. At the same time recognition was given to her sole possession of St Kitt's (St Christopher's)—one of the Leeward Islands, forming part of the seventeenth century "Plantations." When, in 1660, England and France agreed to make a division between them of the West Indian Islands, St Kitt's, from which the Spaniards had at one time driven out the settlers of both nations, was retained by them in common; under William III each of the two nationalities had in turn worsted its rival, but the Peace of Ryswyk had reestablished the system of joint occupation. To this confusion the

Peace of Utrecht at last put an end. Article XIII provided in addition for the cession by France of Newfoundland and the adjacent islands; but Cape Breton Island and the other islands situate at the mouth of the St Lawrence were left in the possession of the French, who were to be still allowed to ply their fishing-trade north of Cape Bonavista, and to occupy the shore of Newfoundland for the purpose of curing their fish. The French fishing-trade in these regions thus continued to flourish, so that at the time of the Peace of Aachen in 1748 it very largely exceeded the English; nor was there up to the Peace of Paris in 1763—to say nothing of later times—any more constant source of irritation between the two Powers than this sore, which so many generations of diplomatists have exerted themselves to heal.

On the same day (April 11) was also signed a Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between Great Britain and France which, besides placing each of them, as towards the other, in the footing of the most favoured nation, contained certain stipulations of considerable significance for the progress of international law. The ordinance, issued by Louis XIV in 1681, when in his pride he already regarded himself as master of the seas, declaring any vessel a fair prize which should contain goods belonging to enemies of France, controverted the principle of “free ships, free goods,” which France herself had accepted in her Treaty with the Dutch of 1646, and to which England had agreed in a succession of treaties. A rude shock had thus been administered to a principle hitherto generally, though not universally, acknowledged; and during the ensuing period (including that of the War of the Spanish Succession) the further encroachment came into vogue, that all goods produced in an enemy’s land or by an enemy’s industry remained enemy’s goods, even if in the possession of a neutral, and were thus liable to seizure at sea. Finally, the interpretation was actually extended to the very ships of neutrals loaded in an enemy’s port and proceeding to a port not in their own country; and such ships were actually seized. To these interpretations or proceedings the Utrecht Treaty opposed the provision that, so far as British and French vessels were concerned, the flags of the nation to which they belonged should respectively cover all goods (except contraband of war), without distinction of ownership, even in the case of vessels bound for a port belonging to an enemy of that nation. Inasmuch as a treaty of the same purport was signed a few weeks later between France and the States General, maritime commerce might seem to have thus obtained an important boon at Utrecht. But, as a matter of fact, the question was still very far removed from a settlement. The pretensions of France had been negatived; but Great Britain, whose maritime ascendancy was now at last assured, paid very little attention to the principles which she had at Utrecht been instrumental in asserting. Though she could not ignore them altogether, she chose to treat them, not as the assertion of a general international principle, but as an agreement

with a particular Power which would expire with the particular treaty in which it was included. Though France had agreed on the same head with the States General, no analogous agreement was contained in any of the other compacts concluded by Great Britain at Utrecht, not even in her Commercial Treaty with Spain. The principle of the Commercial Treaty between Great Britain and France thus awaited its revival—half a century later—in circumstances very different alike for Great Britain and for Europe at large.

The Peace between Great Britain and Spain may conveniently be next considered, though it was not actually concluded till July 13, 1713. Obviously, the plenipotentiaries of Philip V could not make their appearance at Utrecht till the Treaties of Peace between France and Great Britain and the other principal negotiating Powers had been signed, and till Philip had been recognised by them as King of Spain. It is pointed out in the work of Koch and Schoell, to which this summary is throughout indebted, that this Treaty between Great Britain and Spain is the first international instrument to make mention of what had been the real question of the War—namely, the imminent danger which had threatened the independence and welfare of Europe through so close a union as that which had been brought about between the kingdoms of France and Spain; it was for this reason, as Article II recites, that both the King of France and the King of Spain had consented to the requisite precautions being taken, and that the latter had for himself and his heirs and successors renounced for ever his claims to the French Crown, which renunciation he now solemnly confirmed. In further Articles he expressly approved the succession established in Great Britain by Act of Parliament; and promised to prevent the transfer of any land or lordship in America by Spain to France or to any other nation.

Among the remaining Articles, that which confirmed the cession by Spain to Great Britain of the town, citadel, and port of Gibraltar is of special interest. Spanish pride and a well-warranted national feeling had to accept this sanction of an acquisition which, after having been made almost gratuitously, had been held with so much pertinacity. It was, however, accompanied by stipulations which guaranteed the free exercise of the Catholic religion in Gibraltar, and prohibited Jews and Moors from settling there, and by an engagement on the part of the British Crown securing the refusal of Gibraltar to the Spanish—should the British ever contemplate selling or otherwise alienating it.

By another Article (XI) the sovereignty of the island of Minorca, captured by Stanhope and Leake in 1703, was likewise ceded to Great Britain by Spain. The history of the acquisition of Minorca, with its fortified harbour of Port Mahon, differed greatly from that of Gibraltar, inasmuch as it underwent both recapture and recovery before it was finally given up at the Peace of Amiens in 1802, together with Malta, the retention of which has rendered the loss of it a matter of indifference to Great Britain.

In the same Treaty the King of Spain likewise agreed to a cession of which he had sought to delay as long as possible the formal acknowledgment. "Yielding to the request of his Britannic Majesty," he agreed to abandon to the Duke of Savoy the kingdom of Sicily—his Britannic Majesty promising to use his best endeavours for its restoration to the Spanish Crown, in default of heirs male of the House of Savoy. It was not, however, as will be seen elsewhere, a deficiency of this sort which a few years later (in 1720) obliged Victor Amadeus II to exchange Sicily for Sardinia.

The Anglo-Spanish Treaty contained two other clauses of moment, on which Englishmen cannot look back with the same sense of detachment. By Article XII Spain accorded to Great Britain and the British South Sea Company, whose history is summarised elsewhere, for a term of thirty years the sole right of importing negroes into Spanish America. England and her privileged Company were thus to enjoy the rights of the *Asiento* (or legal compact) under the conditions which in 1701 had been granted for the enjoyment of the same right for ten years by Philip V to the French Guinea Company; in other words, she undertook to furnish an annual supply of 4800 negroes to the Spanish colonies in America, paying certain dues on each imported slave and a sum in advance of 200,000 *livres*, to be repaid within the last ten years of the duration of the Treaty. But during its first five and twenty years as many negroes above the stipulated number of 4800 might be imported as was thought expedient, only half the dues fixed for those within that total being payable on account of those in excess of it. Certain other provisions favourable to the trading Company were reintroduced, besides the assignment of a share in the profits of the slave-trade to the sovereign; and a new provision was added (which was to prove of great political importance) granting British merchants the right of sending each year one vessel of five hundred tons' burden to trade with the Spanish colonies in America. The "ingenuity of British merchants" was thus enabled to evade the narrow bounds within which they were confined, and to secure for themselves (as the South Sea Company effectually did till the outbreak of the War with Spain in 1740) the greater part of the general commerce with these regions.

Finally, in Article XIII of this Treaty, the King of Spain declared that, by reason of his respect for the Queen of Great Britain, he accorded to the Catalans not only a complete amnesty, but also all the privileges at present enjoyed by the Castilians, "of all the peoples of Spain that which the King cherished most." The self-sacrificing loyalty of the Castilians might have warranted this expression of preference; but it must also be allowed that the Catalans, animated alike by an ardent attachment to their ancient *fueros* and by their bitter hatred of the Castilians, had done everything they could to intensify Philip's antipathy to themselves. In Peterborough's days (1706) the Catalans had both fought and suffered heroically for the cause of Charles III, which

Great Britain had made her own; it was among them that he had sojourned even after he had become Emperor, and to their care that on his departure he had confided his young wife. Yet at Utrecht they were, under cover of the hypocritical verbiage cited above, left to the mercy of Philip V, who barely took the trouble of concealing his—very explicable—hatred of them. The privileges of which they were “guaranteed” the enjoyment were those of the Castilians, not their own; and their “obstinacy,” as Bolingbroke chose to call it, was requited by their being left out in the cold. The cynical indifference with which the rights of the Catalans were thus ignored was all the more impolitic as contrasting with the consideration shown to them by France in the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659). The result was that which had been foreseen, and concludes the one shameful episode connected with the Peace of Utrecht. In July, 1713, after the Catalans had refused unconditional submission and set up a provisional Government of their own, Philip V’s troops invested Barcelona, whence after the departure of his consort the Emperor had, in accordance with a separate agreement concluded by him at Utrecht on March 14, 1713, in the same month withdrawn his troops under Starhemberg. His proposal of an independent Catalan republic was of course nugatory; and the real intentions of the British Government were revealed in August, by the despatch into the Mediterranean of an English squadron under the Tory Admiral Sir James Wishart, with instructions to put an end, if necessary, to the “confusion” existing at Barcelona. He was also instructed to reduce the inhabitants of Majorca by force, should they refuse the terms offered them; and it is quite clear that the two designs were to be carried out on parallel lines. So late as March, 1714, an address to the Queen was proposed in the Lords by Cowper, and, notwithstanding Bolingbroke’s sarcastic comment that her Majesty could not be held to be bound by her promises after Charles III had relinquished the Spanish throne, carried with an immaterial modification, urging the continuance of English interposition on behalf of the Catalans. It had at least the effect that Wishart was ordered not to appear off Barcelona for the present. The city gallantly held out against the attacks of its besiegers, who were reinforced by a French army under Berwick and a French fleet. At last on the night of September 11 a general assault began, and the fighting continued all next day in every street—it might almost be said in every house—of Barcelona. The fall of Barcelona, which has been aptly compared to that of Numantia, forms the tragic ending of the story; the survivors, sick and wounded, were sold into slavery; and the very standards of the Catalans were by special order of King Philip burnt in the public market by the common hangman.

Among the remaining Treaties comprehended under the general name of the Peace of Utrecht, which may here be dealt with quite summarily, that between France and the States General, signed April 11,

1713, may be noticed first. It has been sufficiently shown above how on the present occasion the hand of the Dutch had been forced by the preliminary agreement between France and Great Britain, as to which they had not been consulted, and which they were, as a matter of fact, powerless to resist. In the Treaty with the States General, France undertook to transfer to them so much of the "Spanish" Netherlands as still remained in her hands, to be by the Dutch handed over to the House of Austria, so soon as the Imperial Government should have concluded a satisfactory arrangement with them concerning their "Barrier." A portion of Gelderland, surrendered to Prussia by France, was excepted from this arrangement; and a further exception of a minute and curious kind was made in the case of a petty district to be taken out of Luxemburg or Limburg, and settled on the Princess Orsini (des Ursins) and her heirs. This last provision, which had never been carried out, was omitted in the Peace of Rastatt; and an annual allowance of 40,000 *livres* from the French Government was the whole recompense ultimately received by this extraordinary woman for services which had materially contributed to bring about the Bourbon succession in Spain, to popularise King Philip and his Piedmontese consort, Marie-Louise, in their new kingdom, and to create those relations between the Spanish Bourbons and their people which long outlasted the War of the Succession. She had afterwards aroused the displeasure of Louis XIV, but had in the end gained both his goodwill and that of Madame de Maintenon (1705), and had returned to Madrid, with full powers, as it were, to sway the Spanish Court and monarchy as the most faithful friend and supporter of the French Crown. Her subsequent experiences belong to a later chapter of this work.

Article IX of this Treaty revoked Philip V's cession, ominous for the diplomatic history of the eighteenth century, of the Spanish Netherlands to Bavaria (made in pursuance of an agreement, concluded in 1702, between Louis XIV and the Elector Maximilian Emanuel); France undertaking to obtain from Bavaria a cession to the House of Austria of her claims to the Belgic Provinces. In return for the surrender to the States General for ultimate transfer to the House of Austria of certain places in French Flanders (they in fact included some of those forming part of the proposed Dutch "Barrier"), the States General undertook to obtain the restoration to France of Lille, on which she had during the negotiations set the utmost store, and of certain other of her former possessions.

In a Treaty of Commerce concluded with the States General on April 11, 1713, France granted the same important concession with regard to the rights of neutrals as that which had been made by England to the Dutch, who still held so much of the carrying-trade of the world. France also undertook to obtain for the United Provinces from Spain the rights which she had granted to them at Münster in 1648, when she first acknowledged their independence.

The Peace between France and Savoy, signed April 11, 1713, restored to the latter Power Savoy and Nice, and in general any part of the Duke's dominions taken from him by the French arms. By means of a series of reciprocal cessions, the chain of the Alps became the boundary-line between the French and the ducal territory, while the plateau of these mountains was divided between the two Governments. The Duke of Savoy was acknowledged as the legitimate King of Sicily, its possession being guaranteed to him by the King of France, to whom this arrangement had been specially repugnant; the stipulations as to the succession in Spain of the male line of the House of Savoy, in default of posterity of Philip, either male or female, may be passed by as never having come into operation. On the same day was signed the Treaty between Spain and Savoy, of which only those provisions possess a wider interest which referred to the cession of Sicily by the King of Spain to the Duke of Savoy, and to the confirmation of certain cessions made to the latter in northern Italy by the Emperor Leopold I in the Peace of Turin (1703).

France and Portugal also concluded a Treaty on April 11, having, five months earlier, agreed to a suspension of arms. The historical importance of their agreement is colonial. The Portuguese settlements on the banks of the Amazon were now recognised as wholly appertaining to the State by which they had been established; while France renounced any right on the part of her colony of Cayenne to trade in the mouth of the river. As a matter of fact, however, the Brazilian trade had since the middle of the seventeenth century more and more fallen into English hands, the Portuguese acting for the most part as agents or factors only; so that these so-called Portuguese gains must be counted among the provisions of the Peace most profitable to Great Britain.

Finally, France and Prussia agreed to a separate Peace on the same date (April 11); though it is noticable that as Elector of Brandenburg, King Frederick William I still continued at war with France. Through the diplomatic activity of France, Spain had in this instance once more been obliged to compensate a member of the Grand Alliance for his exertions against the Bourbon claimant to her throne. The bulk of Upper, or Spanish, Gelderland was ceded to France, in order by preconcerted arrangement to be made over by her to Prussia, on condition that the Catholic religion should be maintained there as it had been under the Spanish rule. Upper Gelders, the nucleus of the entire duchy, had remained with Spain when Lower Gelders had concurred in the Union of Utrecht (1579); but in the course of the War of the Spanish Succession the King of Prussia had laid claim to it as Duke of Cleves. This claim was to a large extent conceded in the Peace of Utrecht, though lesser portions of Upper Gelders went to the House of Austria, and to the Elector Palatine, as Duke of Jülich and Berg. A fresh division of Gelders—into four parts—was made in the Barrier Treaty of 1715, to be mentioned below, but it will be seen later

that, before the century was out, they were alike swallowed up by France, and that it was not till the Vienna Treaties of 1814–5 that Upper Gelders was, in part at least, restored to Prussia.

At Utrecht the King of Prussia's sovereignty over Neuchâtel and Valengin was likewise acknowledged. Neuchâtel (Neuenburg) was an ancient countship, whose chief civic community had been connected with the Swiss Confederation by a series of treaties of alliance, and had at times been under the actual control of the Confederation itself. By right of inheritance the countship had been held by the ducal House of Longueville (a branch of the Orleans line) till its extinction in 1707, with the death of Marie de Longueville, Duchess of Nemours. Already during her lifetime Louis XIV, whose annexation of Franche Comté had made him the immediate neighbour of Neuchâtel, had put forward the claims of the Prince of Conti upon the inheritance. These claims had been strenuously opposed by the Swiss cantons—Bern, Luzern, Solothurn, and Freiburg—associated by written compact with Neuchâtel, where (whether or not with the intention of spiting France) a movement arose, headed by the former Chancellor, George de Montmollin, in support of Frederick I of Prussia's claims as representing the House of Nassau-Orange, which had formerly held sway at Neuchâtel. Bern, the most important of the members of the Swiss Confederation, and other cantons strongly supported these claims, which in 1707 were approved by the Estates of Neuchâtel, and in 1713 declared valid at Utrecht. The folly of the attempt to establish an intimate political connexion between two places so remote from each other as Berlin and Neuchâtel, especially at a time when all claims to Orange were renounced, was to avenge itself slowly, but surely. After undergoing the vicissitudes of the Napoleonic wars, Neuchâtel was not finally given up by Prussia to Switzerland, of which it is an organic part, till the precipitous changes of 1848.

As already observed, it was at this very time that an end was put to the political existence of the principality of Orange, which had come to be a mere archaic inconvenience. This principality, like the neighbouring city of Avignon and county of Venaissin, was a remnant of the old Burgundian kingdom. It passed successively under the sway of several dynasties, notably under that of the House of Nassau, René of Nassau having in 1530 become Prince of Orange as the nephew of the last Prince of the House of Châlons, and having, in 1544, been succeeded by his great cousin William. The little principality had then, in a series of wars, been seized by a succession of French kings, but had with the same regularity of sequence been restored to its owners at the pacifications ending these several conflicts. When, after the death of King William III, Frederick I of Prussia had on the strength of his kinship with the House of Orange-Nassau displayed some intention of putting himself in possession of the principality, Louis XIV had at once anticipated him. Now, at Utrecht, Prussia gave up whatever claims she possessed, and in the Peace of Rastatt

in 1714 France definitively absorbed Orange; while the neighbouring papal dominions were retained by the Holy See, till in 1791 they too were overtaken by their destiny, and became part of the one and indivisible Republic.

It remains to note that, by a clause which, had Frederick I of Prussia survived till the actual signature of the Franco-Prussian Treaty, would in his eyes have surpassed all the rest of it in importance, the King of France, in his own name and in that of the King of Spain, promised to acknowledge the royal dignity of his Prussian brother.

Viewing the Peace of Utrecht as a whole (though it was actually completed by certain additional treaties signed in 1714 after the conclusion of the Peace of Baden), we are of course confronted by the conspicuous gap caused in its settlements by the missing consent and cooperation of the Emperor, on whose behalf the great struggle had for twelve eventful years been carried on. Perhaps, had the campaign conducted by Prince Eugene in 1712, after his British allies had sheathed their swords, ended more successfully, the Emperor Charles VI might have played an important part in peace negotiations conducted on an altered basis; but by the autumn of the year the hopes of such an issue had grown small; and though the interests of the Emperor and the Empire were not altogether left out of sight at Utrecht, they were more or less neglected, as opposed, in different ways, to the interests both of France and of the United Provinces, and a matter of indifference, if not of aversion, to Bolingbroke and his colleagues. On the evening of the day on which the Anglo-French and some of the other pacifications noted above had been signed, the British plenipotentiaries handed to Count Sinzendorf the ultimatum of Louis XIV—consisting of conditions very different not only from those which France would have held herself fortunate in obtaining at various stages of the War, but even from offers transmitted by Louis to the Emperor in the course of the Utrecht negotiations themselves. France now declared herself prepared to accept the settlement, not of the Peace of Westphalia, but of the Peace of Ryswyk, based on a *uti possidetis* far more favourable to France. The Rhine was to form the frontier between France and the Empire—which of course involved the severance from the latter of Strassburg, though not of Kehl, of which, however, as in all cases of fortified places included in the arrangement, the works were to be razed. The offer of Louis XIV to recognise Charles VI as Emperor, and George Lewis of Hanover as Elector, was very coolly received by them. On the other hand, Louis XIV demanded the full and entire restoration to their rights of his allies the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne—though the Upper Palatinate was to be left in the possession of the Elector Palatine. The Elector of Bavaria was to be indemnified for his renunciation of the Spanish Netherlands by the transfer to him of the island of Sardinia with the title of King; while, until his restoration to all his hereditary dominions (except the Upper Palatinate), he was to remain in absolute sovereign possession of Luxemburg, Namur, and Charleroi. France consented to the assignment to the Emperor of Naples, Milan, and the “Spanish” Netherlands,

demanding only that Italian territories not dependent on either Naples or Milan (in other words, those of her allies the duchies of Mantua and Mirandola) should be restored to their lawful owners. These terms Louis XIV declared himself ready to keep open till June 1; but, as he refused to assent to a cessation of arms even up to that date, it is quite clear that he looked to a further continuance of French successes in the field for a modification of his proposals in his own favour. In April and May, the first and second Imperial plenipotentiaries respectively quitted Utrecht, the latter having for the present failed to gain over Bavaria by the offer of the hand of an Austrian archduchess for the young Electoral Prince Charles Albert, who might thus become heir of the whole Habsburg dominions. Bavaria, in the existing condition of things, had to thank Austria "for nothing."

The Imperial Government—after the fashion of what not in England alone was a preeminently pamphleteering age and, in the particular instance of the Peace of Utrecht, a preeminently pamphleteering occasion—issued a German pamphlet designed for popular consumption; together with a more temperately written *apologia*, elaborated, in accordance with Sinzendorf's instructions, by the learned Jean Dumont, both in Latin and French, under the title of *A Letter to an Englishman*. But even the French-born Imperialist historiographer ventured to reproach the British nation with its servile submissiveness to the authority of the Crown, and to warn Queen Anne of the risk she ran of incurring the fate of her father. Thus, though abandoned by his Allies, and labouring under the lack of resources chronic to his dynasty, the Emperor Charles VI showed himself immovable in his resolution to carry on the War. When he turned to the Diet at Ratisbon, he obtained without much difficulty a vote for the continuation of the War on the part of the Empire and for a contribution of four million dollars. But the money came in at a snail's pace; the proclamation issued, or rather caused to be issued at second-hand, by the Emperor, fell flat; and the prospects of a war carried on without British or Dutch subsidies revealed themselves in all their nakedness. The Imperial Government remained blind to the fact that Great Britain's commercial interests would not suffer from a breach with the Empire, which must follow upon a political rupture between the two Powers; and that it would therefore be practically ignored in the settlement which the British and French Governments were at one in hastening to a conclusion.

The events of the campaign on the Rhine in 1713 showed that no choice was left to Prince Eugene but the adoption of a purely cunctatory strategy; while the Emperor was on all sides surrounded by misfortune. The French had once more crossed the Rhine; Catalonia was lost, or virtually so; and at Vienna there was an outbreak of the plague. As in the course of the War, when, after holding his entry into "his capital," Charles had seen province after province slip from his

grasp: so now, when his arms were carrying on the struggle alone and to no purpose, nothing could disturb the grandiose self-control—or the immovable phlegm—of the Emperor. But gradually he began to recognise the futility of the efforts which were being continued on his behalf; and he allowed communications to be opened through British mediation between Prince Eugene and Marshal Villars. Full powers were granted to them by the Emperor and the King of France; and formal peace negotiations accordingly began between these two sovereigns on November 27, 1713, at Rastatt—a castle near the right bank of the Rhine, belonging to the widow of Margrave Lewis William of Baden. Great secrecy was observed in the negotiations, Prince Eugene conferring with nobody but Villars in person. The King of France had, on the strength of the successful campaign just ended, by no means lowered his conditions, though he finally desisted from the demand that Philip V should be included in the Treaty. Villars had asked that not only should Landau be left in the possession of France, but that the costs of the prolongation of the War should be made good by the Emperor—a proposal logical in a sense, but in the circumstances quite unreasonable. On the other hand he would not listen to the Imperial demand for the restoration to the Catalans of all their privileges. In addition, there was the perennial difficulty concerning the Elector of Bavaria, whom France desired to see restored to his rights as well as compensated for his losses. The upshot was that Prince Eugene declared the French propositions inadmissible, and early in February, 1714, quitted Rastatt for Stuttgart, Villars taking his departure for Strassburg. Hereupon Louis showed a more yielding disposition, especially after the vote of the Diet already mentioned; and negotiations were resumed.

After all, it was the safety of the Germanic Empire rather than, except in an outlying part of them, that of the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria, which was endangered by the French demands; and the sensitiveness of that House has not always been as keen for the former as for the latter. The Peace as to which negotiations were in progress could not in any case be actually concluded without the consent of the Diet; although to wait for the actual participation of its representatives might delay *ad infinitum* the prospect of reaching a settlement. Both at Gertruydenberg and at Utrecht the Diet had intended to be represented by a Deputation which should watch over the interests of the Empire; but the necessary formalities, and the usual difficulty of balancing the representation of the Catholic and the Protestant Estates respectively, occupied a long time, and nothing was ultimately done. Thus at Rastatt, where he concluded peace with France on March 7, 1714, the Emperor took upon himself to agree to a series of provisions in the name of the Empire without having been authorised to do so by the Diet; the entire agreement being treated as if it only formed preliminaries, although it actually constituted the Treaty itself and was ratified by the Emperor “in the undoubted confidence, that the

Electors, Princes, and other Estates would not hesitate" to follow suit. He excused himself for these high-handed proceedings towards the Empire by a "Decree of Commission," in which he sought to throw the responsibility of his action upon Villars, and offered the Diet the choice between at last naming its Deputation, or empowering him to conclude peace in the Empire's name. The Catholic Estates were prepared to grant him these powers; but not so the Protestant—and for a very significant reason, into which it is necessary to enter rather more fully.

The hesitation of the Protestant Estates at this point arose out of an article in the Rastatt preliminaries, affirming that the Treaties of Westphalia and of Ryswyk should form the bases of the intended Peace. Now, Article IV of the Treaty concluded by France with the Emperor and the Empire at Ryswyk had contained a clause, against which the Protestants had persistently protested and which they regarded as having been rendered invalid by the outbreak of the European War that had put an end to the Treaty containing it. The Article itself had provided for the restoration to the Empire of all the districts occupied by France outside Alsace—a loose designation which, however, need not be further criticised in the present connexion; for it is the clause added by France to the Article which is in question, and which plays an unhappily prominent part in the diplomatic history of the first quarter of the eighteenth century. During the French occupation of the Palatinate in the iniquitous "Orleans War" (1688-90) it had seemed good to the French Government, the standard-bearer of intolerance at home, to espouse the interests of the Catholics in those districts where no Catholic worship had been established, by introducing there the exercise of it side by side with that of the Protestants, forcing the latter either to share the use of their churches with the Catholics or to give up to them the chancels. These proceedings amounted to a palpable violation of the settlement made in the Peace of Westphalia, according to which the established Church (representing any one of the three recognised Confessions) in any given district was to be that which had been the established Church there in the year 1624. In the Peace of Ryswyk, however, France sought to force her new provision upon the frontier-districts restored by her to the Empire under Article IV, by means of the clause declaring that in the territories so restored the Roman Catholic religion should remain in the condition in which it was at the present time—in other words, where a simultaneous Catholic worship had been established by the French, it was to be maintained for ever. The insertion of this clause in the Peace not having been opposed by the Imperial plenipotentiary at Ryswyk, it was accepted by the Catholic Estates of the Empire, on the plea of the imperative necessity of concluding the Peace; but of the Protestant Estates only a few attested their signatures to the Treaty; and soon afterwards the entire *Corpus Evangelicorum* entered their solemn protest against the manifest violation of the Peace of

Westphalia. Finally, though to the resolution of the Diet approving of the ratification of the Peace of Ryswyk (November, 1697), there was added a postscript intended to safeguard the Protestants against any application of the clause to their disadvantage, this postscript was ignored by the Emperor in accepting the resolution; and the result was a protracted quarrel between the Protestant and Catholic Estates at the Diet which led to a stagnation of all business in that assembly and recalls, in its complications, the evil days of the *Reservatum Ecclesiasticum*. Nor can it be said that in the later instance the whole dispute was a tempest about nothing; for the number of places whose religious condition was involved in it amounted to little short of 2000 (1922). When in 1714 the matter came up again at the Diet in connexion with the Emperor's proposal that he should be empowered by it to conclude peace in its name, the Protestants used all the forms at their disposal to obtain the insertion in the decree of their demand that the obnoxious clause should be held to have been abrogated for ever. Charles VI refused to accept powers thus restricted; and the Protestant Estates had to content themselves with a fresh protest, which when the terms of peace were actually settled at Baden was, as will be seen, coolly passed over.

When, therefore, on June 10, 1714, a peace congress opened at Baden (in Switzerland), there was really very little for it to accomplish. It was attended by plenipotentiaries of the Emperor and of France, of Duke Leopold Joseph Charles of Lorraine and of several Princes of the Empire and of Italy, and of the Pope. No warmer friend of France, it may be observed, has ever worn the tiara than Clement XI (1700-21); but he had at an early date in his pontificate found it necessary to come to an understanding with the Emperor Joseph. Yet the Peace of Utrecht had deprived him of certain portions of his temporal dominions; and Clement, who regarded this unprecedented act as a personal affront, was neither able to obtain redress nor to suffer in dignified silence. The Peace between France and the Empire was concluded at Baden on September 7, 1714.

No essential difference is accordingly to be noticed between the Treaties of Rastatt and Baden, unless it be that the earlier of the two was drawn up in French, and the later in Latin. The Treaty of Ryswyk was, together with those of Westphalia and Nymegen, taken as a basis of the Peace of Baden; and the protestation mentioned above was passed over after an unctuous French declaration as to the King's devotion to the Catholic faith, which had been fortified by two hortatory briefs from the Pope. The provisions of the Peace, which was signed on September 7, were entirely concerned with the relations between the Empire and France, and mainly with the regulation of their frontier. Hence the mediation offered by Great Britain, and the participation in the negotiations desired by Spain, had been alike declined. Alt-Breisach and Freiburg, with the fort of Kehl—all on the right bank of the Rhine—were restored to the Empire; while Landau, further to the north on the left bank of the river, was, with its dependencies, ceded

to France. Various petty Princes, temporal or spiritual, of the Empire recovered the possessions taken from them by France since the Peace of Ryswyk; on the other hand, her allies, the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne, were replaced in the position in which they had stood at the beginning of the War. "In the event"—so ran one of the Articles of the Peace—"of the House of Bavaria finding some exchange of its States in conformity with its interests," France would raise no objection. But the supposition is untenable that in this Article an exchange of the whole of the Bavarian dominions was contemplated, as was seventy years later contended by Joseph II when he sought to exchange for Bavaria the Belgic Netherlands, which the Peace of Baden recognised as belonging to the House of Austria, together with the dominions left to it in Italy by the Peace of Utrecht.

The Peace of Baden was, however, by no means a mere repetition of the Peace of Utrecht; for at Baden the Emperor did not acknowledge the rule of Philip V in Spain, and Philip in his turn gave no consent to the dismemberment of the Spanish monarchy in favour of the Austrian Habsburgs. There are other points of difference—notably as to the treatment of the Elector of Bavaria, who at Baden profited greatly from the late successes of his French ally, and from the magnanimity with which on this, as on other occasions, Louis XIV supported the interests of his friends. The Peace of Baden was ratified by the Diet of the Empire, but not till after many difficulties had been raised and surmounted; for while the Protestant Estates recorded a protest against the maintenance of the notorious clause of the Fourth Article of the Peace of Ryswyk, other protests were recorded by several Italian princes, and by the Pope himself, against other sections of the present treaty.

As indicated above, two further treaties have yet to be noticed in this survey, concluded respectively a little before and a little after the Peace of Baden. The Peace between Spain and the United Provinces, which was signed at Utrecht on June 26, 1714, had been delayed so long on account of the persistent refusal of the Emperor to assent to the Article in the Peace between France and the United Provinces in favour of the Princess Orsini. Philip V was now at last persuaded to give way, and in this same year the ascendancy of the Princess itself came to an end after the death of Philip's Queen, Marie-Louise. Certain other reasons had contributed to delay the conclusion of the Spanish-Dutch treaty. Its most important provisions as a matter of course had reference to trade, as to which Spain placed the United Provinces on the footing of the most favoured nation, with the exception of trade with the Spanish American colonies. This remained closed to all European nations except, in so far as the *Asiento* was concerned, to Great Britain. The attempt of the Spaniards to secure the cession of Maestricht and certain other districts, which in a critical moment of

their fortunes (1673) the States General had promised to make over to them so as to secure their aid against the invasion of Louis XIV, inevitably broke down, since the Belgian Netherlands as a whole were now to pass, not to Spain, but to the House of Austria.

Portugal and Spain likewise concluded peace at a date so late as February 6, 1715. The lasting hatred between the two neighbour peoples goes a long way to account for the delay; but it must also be allowed that Portugal, who, as has been seen, had faithfully adhered to the Grand Alliance since British diplomacy had induced her to join it in 1703—notwithstanding the dangers and damages to which her colonial empire had been exposed in consequence—might justly have expected a fuller consideration of her claims in the Peace than she had succeeded in obtaining. She was left very much to make her own terms with Spain; and, though in the end she reduced her demands to the single city of Badajoz and the abandonment of the Spanish claims (upheld by the valour of Indians trained by Jesuits) in the colony of St Sacrament in Uruguay, to whose strange history reference is made elsewhere, the Government of Philip V was provided with further counter-claims of its own. When, however, it became apparent that the Emperor had resolved to conclude no peace with Spain at present, the Spanish negotiations with Portugal were resumed; and, under pressure from her ungenerous British ally, Portugal was brought to sign the Peace—both the contracting Powers making it very evident through the behaviour of their plenipotentiaries, that they and their peoples were affectionately disposed towards each other. On the whole, the conditions of this treaty were necessarily favourable to Portugal. The home frontier was regulated in accordance with the *status quo ante bellum*; and Spain gave up the disputed colony of St Sacrament to Portugal, unless she should within eighteen months have found and accepted a suitable equivalent. The later changes in the history of the colony were as numerous as the earlier, but cannot occupy us here.

This account may fitly be concluded by a few words concerning the “Barrier Treaties,” of which the third and last finishes the series of transactions calling for notice here. Article IX of the Treaty of 1701, in which the lines of the Grand Alliance were laid down, had contained an assurance to the United Provinces of a barrier against France. The importance of such a protection to the Provinces was of course patent. Nature had done little or nothing for the Low Countries in the way of barrier or boundary; and the repulse of the French invasion of 1672—one of those great crises in the history of a nation which must end either in the destruction or in the preservation of a nation’s existence as such—had so far only proved that, but for an extraordinary effort of national patriotism under a great national leader, the Dutch Republic might have sunk under the waters, instead of emerging from them.

The question of the Dutch Barrier had accordingly become a theme

of protracted discussion between the States General and the Imperial Government, which of course began with treating the Spanish Netherlands as part of the dominions of the Habsburg candidate for the Spanish throne, Archduke Charles. In the course of these discussions the States General advanced claims which the Imperial Government resisted; but, as during the progress of the War that Government became aware of the danger (sufficiently illustrated in the previous section), that Louis XIV might seek to tempt the Dutch by offering to conclude a separate Peace with them, Count Sinzendorf was in 1708 sent to the Hague by the Emperor Joseph to negotiate an arrangement on the subject with the States General, through the mediation of Marlborough. At that date there was no difficulty in settling that the States General would listen to no peace propositions that should fail to ensure the indivisibility of the Spanish monarchy under the House of Habsburg; but as to the question of the "Barrier" it was not so easy to arrive at an agreement. The contention of the Imperial Government—reasonable enough if alliances were designed to last for ever—was that, if the Austrian claimant to the Spanish monarchy were secured in the possession of the Spanish Netherlands, there was no necessity for any "Barrier" at all—for why should the Dutch have the right of garrisoning a series of fortified places in a friendly territory? The Dutch, however, taking a less trustful view, actually designated the fortified places of which they would like their Barrier to consist, and which at first included not only Ostend, Nieuport, and Dendermonde, but even Antwerp. This liberal selection, however, in its turn naturally excited on the part of Great Britain both jealousy and apprehension of the results which might follow in the not absolutely impossible event of a future Anglo-Dutch conflict.

When, however, as was seen in the earlier section of this chapter, the peace negotiations of 1709-10 broke down, and the War had to be resumed by the Allies, both Great Britain and the United Provinces perceived that the vexed question of the Barrier ought to be got out of the way, even though the Emperor, for the benefit of whose claimant the Spanish Netherlands were being contested against France, might take no immediate part in the transaction. The result was the so-called First Barrier Treaty, concluded on October 29, 1709. In this compact the British Government undertook to secure to the States General the right of garrisoning nine strong places which belonged or had belonged to the Spanish Netherlands, namely Nieuport, Furnes, Knoque, Ypres, Menin, Lille, Tournay, Condé, and Valenciennes, in addition to ten others (including Charleroi, Namur, and the citadel of Ghent) in case of their being recaptured from the French, in whose hands they at the present remained. A million of *francs* was to be annually paid to the Dutch out of the revenues of the Spanish Netherlands for the maintenance of the fortresses and garrisons aforesaid.

This Barrier Treaty, which in fact amounted to a renewal, by way of reassurance, of the defensive and offensive alliance between Great Britain and the United Provinces, in terms favourable beyond precedent to the latter, was decried in Parliament as unfavourable to England as well as to France; and this complaint was echoed in the country at large. A strong popular feeling against the Dutch had survived from the ignoble factiousness of the reign of William III, and it was probably augmented by some genuine fears as to the consequences of strengthening the position of England's chief mercantile rival. Thus, notwithstanding the Barrier Treaty, or partly in consequence of it, considerable soreness ensued between the two peoples and Governments; and, when, in December, 1711, Marlborough was dismissed from his public employments, the States General made over the command of their troops, not to his successor, the Duke of Ormond, but to the Imperial Commander, Prince Eugene. Party feeling took advantage of these relations to undermine the Grand Alliance by such semi-official manifestos as Swift's *Remarks on the Barrier Treaty* (1712).

Thus, during the progress of the peace negotiations of 1711 and 1712 between the British and French Governments, the former were found quite ready to meet the wishes of France as to a revision of the Barrier Treaty, of which it is certainly not too much to say that it seriously impaired the force of the compact. Several of the Barrier places on which the Treaty had insisted being now promised to France, it became necessary for Great Britain, if her present policy was to be carried out, to conclude a Second Barrier Treaty with the States General, and this was accomplished at Utrecht on January 30, 1713. In this Treaty, by which the First was formally revoked, it was settled that the States General should have the right of keeping garrisons in Knoque, Ypres, Menin, Tournay, Mons, Charleroi, Namur, and Ghent; but Lille, Condé, Valenciennes and Maubeuge, which were included as Barrier places in the First Treaty, were not so included in the Second. Great Britain was to furnish 10,000 and the States General 6000 men, and each of the two Powers the same number of vessels, for the maintenance of the Treaty. Upper Gelders, which the First Treaty had assured to the United Provinces, was passed over in the Second, it being, as has been seen, intended to dispose of it otherwise (in favour of Prussia).

Now, though the Treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt, and Baden had alike kept in view the transfer of the "Spanish" Netherlands to the House of Austria, yet they had all provided that these Belgic Provinces should remain in the occupation of the States General, until they should have arrived at a satisfactory understanding with the Emperor on the subject of their Barrier. With a view to such an understanding, a conference was held at Antwerp between representatives of the Imperial Government and of the States General, General Cadogan, who after Queen Anne's death had been reinstated as Lieutenant-General and appointed

envoy at the Hague, acting as mediator. The Dutch, whose influence among the Allies had as a matter of course been much depressed under the Tory rule of the last four years of Queen Anne, had now regained a much stronger position; and it was improved by the exertions of Cadogan, who was active in keeping up a good understanding between the Whigs and the German States friendly to the Hanoverian Succession. Thus the Third Barrier Treaty, concluded at Antwerp on November 15, 1715, was more favourable to the claims of the United Provinces than might have seemed possible during the course of the Utrecht negotiations. They obtained the Barrier places desired by them, namely Namur, Tournay, Menin, Furnes, Warneton, Ypres, and Knoque, together with the right of joint garrison at Dendermonde. 35,000 men were to form the garrisons of these places—three-fifths of the cost involved being furnished by the Imperial Government, and two-fifths by that of the States General, to whom certain of the revenues of the now Austrian Netherlands were to be pledged as a security for the Austrian share of the expense. Furthermore, in Upper Gelders Venloo was, together with certain smaller places, ceded to the States General; and there was also a small cession of territory in Flanders which would be useful to them in time of war, in the event of their desiring to place the country between Meuse and Scheldt under water. Great Britain guaranteed the whole of the Treaty, and, in the case of any attack upon the Barrier places mentioned in it, undertook to furnish towards their defence a force of 10,000 men and twenty ships of war; and, should these prove insufficient, to apply all further requisite efforts, and if necessary to declare war against the aggressor.

On the whole, therefore, the Dutch had by their tenacity, and by taking advantage of the favourable opportunity which had at last come to them, obtained a guaranteed agreement which not only effected their main object, the establishment of a well-protected frontier as towards France, but even (in the words of a Dutch historian) placed what were now the Austrian Netherlands in a relation which was in some degree a relation of dependence as towards the Free. For by the Third Barrier Treaty the States General at once gave up to the Emperor all those portions of the Netherlands which had been in the possession of King Charles II of Spain; but they retained under certain pretexts those districts which France had restored to the House of Austria in the Treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt, and Baden. These were likewise delivered up to the Emperor by virtue of a supplementary convention signed at the Hague on December 22, 1718. The unity of the monarchy of the Spanish Habsburgs, which the will of Charles II had sought to preserve, had received its final blow; and under the guarantee of Great Britain the head of the House of Austria had reentered into the possession of one of the fairest of the jewels in the crown of his great namesake.

CHAPTER XV.

PARTY GOVERNMENT UNDER QUEEN ANNE.

THE death of William placed on the throne an English princess, who at once secured, by the mere fact of her birth, the popularity which all the extraordinary abilities of the foreign ruler had never won for him. Anne was a well-intentioned but not over-wise woman, who, while holding high ideas of her own prerogative and thinking but meanly of party government, was by the irony of fortune always at the mercy either of court intrigue or of party faction. At her accession the former force predominated, and Sarah, Countess of Marlborough, whose influence over Anne was almost boundless, was able to place her great husband in supreme authority. The Earl of Marlborough, who was now made Captain-General of her Majesty's forces, had been employed by William in high military commands during the first years of his reign, and in important diplomatic negotiations at its close. But, despite the recognition which his great qualities had already won for him, it was as much upon court intrigue as upon them that his power ultimately depended. Anne's husband, Prince George of Denmark, was technically *generalissimo* of the forces and Lord High Admiral; but the supreme direction of military and foreign affairs really lay in the hands of the man who was to show that he could out-match King Louis and his agents in diplomacy, and rival Prince Eugene in war.

Marlborough declared that he would not command the army until he saw Godolphin at the Treasury; and thus were associated the two men who were to form and to control a Ministry whose record is one of the most glorious in English history. Neither of them escaped condemnation in his own day; but modern criticism has passed by the meanness of Godolphin to assail the glory of Marlborough. Yet an application of the same critical standards to both would place Marlborough on a far higher plane. The most shameful transaction of Marlborough's public life is admittedly that concerned with his giving information to James about the despatch of an English expedition to Brest (1694). But, inasmuch as a portion of the expedition started the day after the date of his letter, Marlborough may plausibly be assumed to have astutely

communicated intelligence which he knew to be worthless. He may also have been aware that the whole plan had already been disclosed by Godolphin, and was known at Versailles at least three days before he began to write his own letter. The perfidy of Godolphin is enhanced by the fact that he was at this moment a Minister and favourite of William, while Marlborough, having been dismissed from all his offices, and imprisoned, had every reason for personal resentment. Hence in this transaction, always reckoned the most questionable of his acts, the guilt of Marlborough cannot be proved, while that of Godolphin is established in all particulars. In other respects Godolphin has a worse than doubtful record; before the Revolution he had been the Minister of James and the correspondent of William; after it he was the correspondent of James and the Minister of William. He had tried so often to balance between the two Kings and the two parties, that at length very few, except Marlborough himself, thoroughly believed or trusted him. Nevertheless, this insidious schemer was now to impair his private fortune in the public service, and to show financial talents, not indeed comparable to the bold genius and resource of Montagu, yet not unequal to the problems created by a gigantic debt and a great financial crisis.

Godolphin was a shrewd and plausible man of affairs; Marlborough possessed at once a finer character and a greater mind. Criticism has ceased to question the domestic virtues and the religious sincerity of Marlborough, but still assails his political character. Yet, under William, his secret correspondence with St Germain cannot be treated too seriously; under Anne, it was chiefly addressed to his nephew Berwick and is largely personal in character. When he does touch on politics, as in a letter of July 17, 1708, he assures Berwick that he would serve the King (the "Old Pretender") with all his heart, without prejudice to the interest of the (English) nation; "*mais qu'il faut toujours s'opposer à tout ce qui est de l'intérêt de la France.*" That Power must in no way benefit from a Stewart Restoration. Subsequently (August 24, 1708) he airily explains that he will only be ready to act, "*quand le Roi sera appelé par la nation.*" It is obvious that Marlborough could, by advancing one or other of these saving-clauses, discountenance almost any Jacobite attempt. Hence he was, in all probability, merely deluding Berwick with polite expressions of regret and hope, which would doubtless have served as evidence of his loyalty to the Jacobite cause, had the "Pretender" ever obtained the throne. These intrigues seem therefore to be ignoble attempts to make the best of two political worlds, rather than acts of real treason to the *de facto* sovereign. No one desires to credit Marlborough with the political purity of a Chatham; but, by the standards of his own age, he must be held superior in political virtue to Godolphin, the two Sunderlands, Bolingbroke, or Russell.

The supreme gifts which never failed Marlborough in leading an army

or in conducting a negotiation were not conspicuous in his management of party. Nor can the excuses be advanced that absence, lack of time, or the temper of his Duchess explain his failure; for the main principles upon which he proceeded were fundamentally unsuited to the Parliament of the day. The survival of the idea that the Ministers were the personal and individual servants of the sovereign, the lack of unity in the Ministry, the absence of sympathy between leaders and followers, made the art of government particularly difficult. But it had been evident, on the whole, under William that Parliament was most easily managed when party discipline was good, and when the Ministry was in political sympathy with the majority of the Commons. These lessons were now forgotten; the pursuit of a policy which was national and not partisan suited alike Anne's timid jealousy of her authority and Marlborough's bold confidence in his own powers. Like William, Halifax and Harley, they believed in a national party, to be formed by the combination of moderate Whigs and Tories. Anne wished to avoid being the servant of a faction, Marlborough to hold his course along that central line which each party sometimes approached, but which neither rigidly pursued. Hence their policy was to balance between extremes, in order that, as violent politicians fell out, the nation might come by its own. But, however agreeable to Marlborough and to Anne, this idea was difficult to carry into effect.

A consideration of the circumstances of the time seems to show that two methods of government were possible—personal government by the sovereign, and party government, depending in the main upon a Ministry agreeable to a majority in the Commons, a type similar but not coincident with that in practice in England to-day. The sovereign possessed immense indirect power, since at least one hundred members of the Commons depended absolutely on the Crown for the enjoyment of places and sinecures. Any member who held such office and proved recalcitrant could be dismissed at once by the sovereign. If the two parties were evenly balanced, or if the Commons were broken up into a number of groups or small parties, the Crown held the balance and had the casting-vote in all affairs of importance. It was by thus playing off one group against another in a divided House of Commons that George III afterwards broke the tyranny of parties, and became King in fact as well as name. But Anne had not equal advantages; owing to her sex she could not personally direct affairs, or administer patronage in minute detail; again, she had not to contend with a group-system, but with a system of two parties, divided from one another by great principles, and tolerably homogeneous in their respective composition. It would have been difficult, in her day, for even the most careful parliamentary tactician to break loose from party ties, and to avoid strengthening one party at the expense of the other. Though the experience of William's reign was unfavourable to this system, it was none the less steadfastly

pursued, if not always realised, by both Marlborough and Godolphin. William had already shown that a balancing policy was all but impossible; Marlborough, Godolphin, and Harley, illustrated the same lesson at a later date and on a larger scale. Their comparative failure, as contrasted with the temporary success of Bolingbroke and the long ascendancy of Walpole, seems to point the moral. Bolingbroke and Walpole introduced the system of unsparingly enforcing party discipline, and carried their principles so far as to deprive political opponents of military commissions and commands. Their proceedings were founded on the principle that lukewarm supporters or deserters should receive no quarter. The great soldier who governed Anne confined his military discipline to the battlefield, only to discover that his gentler parliamentary methods were unsuited to the temper of the Commons, the violence of party spirit, and the general character of the age. It was only the steadfast support of his sovereign, the disunion of his opponents at home, and his dazzling triumphs abroad, that secured Marlborough so long from the disastrous effects of a policy, which was in its very nature one of tacks and shifts, of balances and adjustments, of expediency and opportunism.

At first the political heavens were unclouded. A Tory majority had voted for the war, a Whig majority had confirmed their decision. The moment was therefore as favourable to the balancing policy as it ever could be. Marlborough and Godolphin, though Tories in name, were moderate in both principle and action. Marlborough had always aimed at having no enemies; Godolphin had for long been the only Tory in a Whig Ministry under William, and, though a strong Churchman, had befriended Dissenters. Hence, though the Ministry was at first composed mainly of Tories, Marlborough and Godolphin refused to dismiss all Whigs from the higher offices, or to purge the departments of Whig clerks and tide-waiters, as the ultra-Tories suggested. The feelings of patriotism stimulated by the accession of a Queen who declared her heart to be entirely English, and by the successes of an English general, rendered all opposition for a time ineffective. After the moderate success of the campaign of 1702, Parliament passed a vote that "the wonderful progress of your Majesty's arms, under the conduct of the Earl of Marlborough, has signally retrieved the ancient honour and glory of the English nation." Carried away by insular patriotism, the majority of the Commons thus levelled an undeserved insult at the fame of their late ruler. Marlborough almost immediately afterwards received a dukedom and a pension of £5000 for life. Many people held him to be very well paid for his services; but when this national investment produced its dividends in Blenheim and Ramillies, the carping voices were hushed. English pride swelled high when a hundred French flags were borne through the streets of London to celebrate a victory as renowned as that of Agincourt. For some years after Blenheim the

War was genuinely national and popular; and debates in Parliament were mainly concerned with maladministration in the army or navy, with quarrels between the two Houses, or disputes about Occasional Conformity. Only one solid measure affecting internal politics (save the most important Act of Union elsewhere described) was passed. Parliament repealed two futile clauses in the Act of Settlement—one excluding all place-holders and pensioners under the Crown from sitting in the Commons, and the other forcing all Privy Councillors to sign the measures they advised and approved. Had the first remained law, the Commons would have become merely a house of critics; had the second gone unrepealed, the development of the most subtle and illusive of modern constitutional forms, the Cabinet, would have been indefinitely retarded. Apart from these wise measures, which attracted little attention, the subjects of debate in the Commons were the prey of faction. On but a single object, though that was the most important of all—the prosecution of the war—was there genuine national agreement between 1702 and 1708.

Such being the case, the chief internal interest centres in the obscure ministerial negotiations and in the dark intrigues of palace and closet. Here the first event of prime significance was the resignation of Nottingham. As a leader of the High Churchmen, less bitter and partisan than Rochester, who had resigned in 1703, he commanded great respect, and his fall was connected with their cause. One of the measures, most constantly urged by them, was the Occasional Conformity Bill, intended to prevent Dissenters evading the Test Act and thus securing to themselves civil rights. In 1703 the measure, which had passed the Commons, was thrown out by the Lords. Accordingly in 1704 Nottingham instigated the Commons to "tack" it to the Land Tax Bill, in order to force the Lords to pass it. A Commons majority voted against the "tack"; whereupon Marlborough announced that he would give no quarter to the supporters of the tack. On May 18, 1704, therefore, Nottingham and two other Tory Ministers were forced to resign. Their places were filled by Robert Harley, at this moment Speaker of the Commons, who became Secretary of State, and Henry St John, who was made Secretary at War. The latter was a young man, supposed to be a moderate Tory, whose parliamentary talents were already giving him a personal influence in the Commons which no man had equalled since the days of Pym. Harley was a veteran intriguer, of much the same kind of placable temperament and political moderation as Godolphin. Neither he nor Marlborough realised that the two politicians, whom they now admitted to the Ministry, were to be the chief instruments of its downfall.

The Ministry, which had at first been almost wholly Tory, was now turning into a coalition between moderate Tories and moderate Whigs. The Queen, whose natural inclination, tempered by a desire for her own

independence, was for Toryism and the Church, began to scent danger. When the Great Seal fell vacant in 1705, she wrote an "apprehensive" letter to Godolphin, suggesting a moderate Tory for the post. "The Whigs have had so many favours showed them of late, that I fear a very few more will put me insensibly into their power...but I hope in God you will never think that reasonable." Godolphin's reply to this appeal to "keep me out of the power of the merciless men of both parties" was to give the Great Seal to Cowper, an excellent lawyer, but also an excellent Whig. The drift was now unmistakable; and the general election of 1705 made the Whig majority more pronounced. Then a more decisive step was taken, to which even Marlborough's incomparable powers of persuasion nearly failed to reconcile Anne. The third Earl of Sunderland, Marlborough's son-in-law, but a violent and bitter Whig, replaced the Tory Sir Charles Hedges as Secretary of State (December 3, 1706). To this step Anne most reluctantly consented, expressing her alarm lest she should lay a lasting foundation for faction and become rather a slave than a queen. No sooner had Sunderland been installed than his influence on Godolphin became apparent; and the moderate Tories in the Lower House were deprived of places or threatened with the loss of sinecures.

At the beginning of 1707 a counter-influence to that of Godolphin and Sunderland began to be exercised by Harley. He was able to enwrap his political convictions and even his actions in a veil of mystery which few ever penetrated, and behind it to carry on various subterranean intrigues. Through his relative Mrs Masham, a Woman of the Bedchamber, he contrived secret interviews with Anne, at which no doubt the Queen lamented the growing unkindness of the Duchess of Marlborough, the violence and bad manners of Sunderland, and the danger of falling into the power of the Whigs. The result seems to have been that the Queen, in league with Harley, often successfully opposed the measures of Godolphin. At first Harley covered up his traces by professions of the deepest humility and loyalty to Godolphin. But he at length showed his hand by intriguing against the Union with Scotland—that measure which Godolphin had done so much to secure. After his return to England during the winter months of 1707 Marlborough induced Godolphin to take resolute measures. At the last moment they were greatly aided by the discovery that one Gregg, Harley's clerk, had engaged in treasonable correspondence with France, a fact which naturally, though it seems unjustly, attached suspicion to Harley himself. On January 16, 1708, Gregg was convicted of high treason, and on February 11 Marlborough obtained the dismissal of Harley. St John also left the Ministry, the Whig Robert Walpole took his place as Secretary at War, while Somers entered the Cabinet, and was eventually made Lord President of the Council. Thus the Ministry, with the exception of Marlborough and Godolphin, was now entirely Whig in character. The Whig party though now triumphant

was not so well organised as when the famous "Junto" had directed its affairs under William. The electioneering campaigns of Wharton had been to some extent curtailed by his elevation to the peerage. The Earl of Halifax (Montagu) was a melancholy and disappointed man, who exercised but little influence on politics. Somers, who had managed political combinations with the dexterity of an art and the precision of a science, was broken in health and prematurely old. His advice still shaped the political strategy of the Whigs, but their tactics were entrusted to other hands. Stanhope was soldier and diplomatist rather than politician; Sunderland damaged rather than aided the Whig cause by the violence of his partisanship. But two younger men, Townshend and Walpole, were beginning to rise in influence. The sturdy honesty of the one and the shrewd common sense of the other were soon to make them the real leaders of the Whig party.

As if by an irony of fate, just when the Ministry, which had first been formed mainly of Tories, and then been a mosaic of moderates, had at last become pure Whig, it began to collapse. Events had forced the balancers to govern on purely party lines, and when they at last pursued the right plan, they found that it was too late. The Ministry was weakened in various ways during 1709. Sunderland sometimes diverted himself by praising republicanism, for which he had an academic enthusiasm, in the presence of the Queen; the conduct of Duchess Sarah towards Anne passed from mere rudeness to open flouting. Even Marlborough made one of the few diplomatic mistakes of his life, and pressed Anne to make him Captain-General for life, a request which she very properly refused. Though ambition contributed to the making of this demand, it was probably also due to a reasonable desire to be secured from party dissensions in the management of the war and in its final settlement. But no proposal could have aroused more suspicion, and the exaggerated terror then felt by all Englishmen for established militarism in any form made many cry out that Marlborough was Cromwell in disguise. This circumstance, together with the slaughter at Malplaquet (unjustly regarded as a Pyrrhic victory), the swelling expenses, and the tedious prolongation of the war, produced a growing dissatisfaction with the Whigs. A further cause was weakening them. Harley—the mole of contemporary politics—had continued his burrowings, and was gradually undermining the Ministers in the favour of the Queen. Under his influence and that of Mrs Masham, the Queen interfered, took her own line decisively both in politics and in patronage, and assigned bishoprics, sinecures, regiments and commissions, often without reference or in contravention of the wishes of Marlborough or Godolphin. At this crisis royal disfavour and a growing parliamentary opposition were suddenly and dramatically assisted by the one other thing necessary to complete the downfall of the Whigs—an overwhelming outburst of popular disapproval.

To understand and gauge aright the strength of the torrent which was now to sweep the Whigs away in disaster, it is necessary to distinguish the currents composing it. Some we already know—vague unrest; popular dissatisfaction; the censorious spirit, which carps at great men and great deeds without understanding the immediate difficulties of the one or the ultimate benefits of the other. Two other causes are however apparent. One is the assistance derived from the unparalleled activity of the Press and the perfect literary precision with which every grievance was expressed by public writers. The other is a deeper and more real motive—the dissatisfaction of the Church with the existing Ministry, and the violence of religious bigotry evoked by the trial of Sacheverell. The freedom of the Press and of public discussion was not indeed new; but under the reign of Anne their influence and importance in public affairs were developed to an astonishing degree. The first daily paper appeared under Anne; the weeklies quadrupled in quantity; the pamphlets were legion. Addison wrote (October 12, 1710) “there is scarce a single head that does not teem with politics,” and the number of distinguished literary men who wrote about them at this time has never been surpassed and probably never equalled. Literary success was a sure passport to political advancement, as Locke, Somers, Prior, Steele, Swift and Addison all showed in different ways. The connexion of literature with politics was never at any time so close. Somers was the friend and patron of Addison, Montagu of Steele, St John of Prior and Pope, Harley of Swift and Defoe. Of the literary pamphleteers Defoe was the most versatile, the most prolific and the most popular, and as such was employed by Harley on behalf of the Government so early as 1706. In his *Review* (1704-13) and *Mercator* (1713) and in innumerable pamphlets he gave a powerful, though in some measure independent, support to each successive Ministry. The exquisite urbanity of Addison supplemented the rugged vigour of Defoe in pamphlets of easy and graceful advocacy, and, at the beginning of 1709, the literary honours still rested with the Whigs. But all the impressions produced in their favour by a score of brilliant pamphlets were destroyed at a blow by a single sermon, and literature in the persons of Addison and Defoe was vanquished by religion in the shape of Dr Sacheverell.

The age of Anne is frequently regarded as one in which little or no religious feeling prevailed either within or without the Established Church. The fierce enthusiasms associated with the names of Laud, Cartwright, and Knox, were indeed no more. But, while the religious movements of the new age were affected by political movements and degraded by sectarian intolerance, energy and enthusiasm of a nobler kind were not wanting. The reign witnessed a tightening of discipline among the parochial clergy, an immense growth in charity schools and in church building in London, and an early though imperfect development of important missionary enterprise. The clergy themselves were divided into Latitudinarians

and High Churchmen. The former, who were mainly Whigs, held most of the bishoprics; the latter, who were almost exclusively Tory, composed the vast majority of the clergy as a whole. It is not surprising that, under these circumstances, the two Houses of Convocation should have wrangled even more fiercely than the two Houses of Parliament. So embittered, indeed, did their disputes become that, in 1717, Convocation was prorogued for a period of almost a century and a half. The attitude of the Whig Bishops was however less odious to their clergy than that of the Whig political leaders, for the former were at least not so often suspected of easy tolerance towards Dissent and cold indifference to the Establishment. The influence of the Established clergy at elections was specially noticeable, for the sermon was at once a more popular, a more important, and a more widely diffused vehicle of propaganda than any pamphlet or news-sheet could be. When the High Church clergy proceeded to inflame the minds of their parishioners against the Whigs, their influence penetrated to villages reached by no literature save the monthly news-letter, and to men who could not read Defoe and would not have understood Addison. All these elements of unrest were focused into one by an explosive sermon delivered in St Paul's on the appropriate date of November 5, 1709.

With coarse but powerful eloquence, Sacheverell railed violently at the Ministry, sounded the war-cry of "the Church in danger," denounced the toleration allowed by law as unreasonable, and appeared to assert uncompromisingly the old Church and Tory doctrines of non-resistance and passive obedience. It is possible, though not certain, that the Whigs would not have interfered but for the last assertion. Violence or scurrility in the pulpit was one thing, but to deny the right of resistance was quite another. By this means the whole Revolution Settlement could be attacked and undermined, at a moment which was particularly dangerous. The supporters of legitimacy had increased since the death of William; and Anne, as herself a Stewart, was paradoxically though intelligibly regarded by many Jacobites as the rightful heir of her father. But this inconsistency did not in their eyes exclude her brother from the throne, or prevent them from refusing to think of the Hanoverian Successor. Sacheverell's denial of the right of Resistance appeared to support these views, to assert the doctrines of heredity in their most rigid form, and thus imperil the Protestant Succession. This was the real offence that induced the Whigs to proceed to an impeachment, which began early in 1710. The Whigs had a difficult task before them, for they had to admit that resistance to Government was lawful and that it had been practised in 1688, and on the legal side their difficulties in proving these propositions were naturally immense. Sacheverell's advocates wittily requested their assailants to produce the Original Contract and to point out their doctrines in Magna Carta. They knew as well as the Whigs that, in point of fact, Locke had really rested his justification for resistance

on "the appeal to Heaven," and had made it exceptional and, in a sense, *ultra leges*. They made one mistake in quoting the Revolution of 1688 as an example of "non-resistance"; on the plea that, as Parliament had acquiesced in all William had done, the "supreme power" had not been resisted. This was wretched sophistry, but it was only one logical fallacy against several. But the Whigs had superiority in force as well as in fallacy; for the larger number of the Peers were of their party. None the less, they were so shaken by the popular clamour that a nominal sentence was only passed by a small majority. Sacheverell—who had posed as the martyr of the Church—was released amid the wildest acclamations. His portrait was seen in dozens of coffee-houses; scurrilous lampoons in his favour and against the Ministry were sold by every hawker in the street. Mobs marched about shouting and rejoicing, even following Queen Anne in her chair to express a hope that she was in favour of Dr Sacheverell.

Anne's conduct soon proved that she had determined to punish the Whigs for daring to meddle with the Church, even when attacked in the questionable shape of Sacheverell. In April, 1710, Shrewsbury, once a Whig but now a moderate, who had voted for Sacheverell's acquittal, was made Lord Chamberlain. Then, to the consternation of all, Sunderland was dismissed (June 14, 1710). It was in vain that deputations of bankers and merchants from the City waited on Anne to implore her not to dismiss the Whigs, in vain that even the Electoral Prince of Hanover remonstrated. On August 8, the Queen sent to Godolphin bidding him yield up his Treasurer's staff. Cowper, Somers, Walpole and other leading Whigs soon followed him into retirement. Harley, who had advised these steps, became Chancellor of the Exchequer, and formed a Ministry of Tories, in which St John was naturally included. Parliament was dissolved on September 26, 1710, and at the general election a strong Church and Tory majority was returned. So overwhelming was the victory that even Harley was induced to act with unusual vigour and severity. Before the assembling of the new Parliament (November 25, 1710) hardly a Whig retained even a minor post in the Administration; no change of Ministry had ever been so sudden or complete. But St John—the right hand of Harley—was not content with the superiority of Tories in the Church, Commons, or Cabinet. He turned to literature as a fresh region to conquer. Defoe, the first of journalists, changed opinions as the Queen changed Ministers, and St John started a weekly paper, the *Examiner*, to uphold his own views. It was in vain that Addison countered by some vigorous articles in the *Whig Examiner*; it ran only for five numbers (October). In November Swift began to contribute to the Tory *Examiner*; his matchless ease and vigour soon overpowered the grace of Addison, and to St John's delight the Tories were able to assert and maintain their supremacy even in the realms of literature.

On October 30, 1710, Harley submitted to the Queen a "Plan for conducting the Business of the Public." "In all places," he declared, "'the Faction' (i.e. the Whigs) have been for many years possessed of the power." Yet the "true strength and inclination of the people" was obviously Tory, and the High Church majority of the clergy had long been coerced by a minority in high places. The Bench and the Bar were also full of Whigs, and means must be taken to let them know the power of the Crown. All difficulties with the majority of the Commons would vanish, so soon as the wishes of the "Queen, who is the centre of power and union," were known. In other words, places were to depend on services to the Ministry in which the Queen placed complete confidence. Lastly, with regard to the navy and army, the officers were to be made "dependent on the Crown." The Queen was recommended to institute as a standing order that tenure of command for general officers, "Flags," and captains was only to be annual, and to be arranged every year by the sovereign, who was not to allow anyone to "dispose of regiments but herself." Thus the spoils-system was to be introduced nakedly and shamelessly into every department of State, under the pretence of securing the authority of the Queen. Indeed, in the flush of his election victory, Harley recommended measures drastic enough to rejoice the heart of St John himself. But, at the very moment when he was concocting this plan, he was secretly corresponding with Somers and Halifax, requesting them to join the Ministry, and assuring them that "a Whig game was intended at bottom." To the last he balanced and intrigued alike with Whigs, Low Churchmen, and Dissenters. His ideal of government really resembled that of Marlborough, and aimed at the moderation of extremes and the formation of a party of the centre. But party passions ran too high for reconciliations even of moderate men, and the time for mixed Ministries of this type had gone by. Had Harley really adhered to his "plan" his party would very possibly have avoided much of the disaster in which he was now to involve it.

In May, 1711, Harley assumed the office of Lord High Treasurer, and received the title of Earl of Oxford. The qualities, which had served him so well up till now, were not, however, sufficient to make him a great Minister. His enigmatic manner, his tolerance and moderation, the cautious, balancing habit of his mind would have in any case caused him to incur the charge of duplicity; but his policy and actions show that the accusation was not always unjust. With him was associated as Secretary of State St John, a man of brilliant genius, who swayed the Commons at his will by the dazzling eloquence and passion of his oratory. Restlessly ambitious, ardent and resolute in temperament, impatient of control, St John was a complete and paradoxical contrast to his colleague. But for the present they were agreed in their policy, and on the expediency of securing favourable terms of peace as soon as possible. The first difficulty was Marlborough, who,

though not a Whig, had chosen and supported the last Ministry. In the field his services were regarded as indispensable; but it was soon found that old party connexions still influenced him. In the spring of 1711, Harley began secretly negotiating with the French without informing Marlborough. When the Duke discovered this, he revenged himself by negotiations with the Whigs, as to which he was equally silent. The upshot was a most discreditable transaction by which he and his Whig allies purchased the support of Nottingham and other bigoted Tories: With the support of the Whigs, Nottingham amended the address approving the Preliminaries of peace, by adding a clause that no peace would be safe or honourable, which left Spain and the Indies in the hands of the House of Bourbon (December 17, 1711). The Duke of Marlborough, as he rose to support this amendment, bowed to the Queen who was sitting in the Gallery, and his speech aimed as obviously at convincing her as at influencing his brother-peers. The amendment, which he had instigated, was carried. His move was in direct defiance of the ministerial policy, as was proved by its rejection in the Commons by a majority of over a hundred. Nottingham now claimed the price of his support, which was the passing of the Occasional Conformity Bill by the Whig Lords, who had repeatedly rejected it in the past. Though the measure bore hardly on Nonconformists whom it deprived of civic rights, and though the Whigs were famed for their tolerance, Nottingham held them to their promise and passed the Bill. Oxford had deeply resented Marlborough's action with regard to the peace, and, being tolerant towards Dissenters, was still more angry at his acquiescence in this second shameless political job. Marlborough was not only supporting the Whigs, but was inducing Tories to join in his defection and trying to catch the ear of the Queen. Only resolute measures could avert disaster. The first move was to hurry on the publication of a report charging Marlborough with financial malversations. The second was to dismiss the great Duke from all his offices (December 31, 1711). The third was a *coup d'état*, which intimidated the Lords into passing the peace clauses, by the creation of twelve new peers in a single day (January 1, 1712). This measure went very near to revolution, and it eventually formed one of the counts on which Oxford was impeached.

That the charges of peculation against Marlborough were flimsy and unjust and that he was ill-rewarded by the existing Ministry for his matchless services is clear. It must also be remembered that Swift had attacked Marlborough in his pamphlets, with the hardly disguised approval of Oxford. None the less it appears certain that, on an immediate though not on an ultimate issue, the Duke was opposing the peace. It is true that, in supporting the amendment, he was only making good the promise openly made by St John and Oxford to the Dutch, that the House of Bourbon should not retain both Spain and the Indies. But neither Treasurer nor Secretary would consider it the duty of their colleague to

remind them of their broken pledge. Hence Marlborough's dismissal, though attended by discreditable circumstances, was by no means unjustifiable. The field was now clear for the conclusion of that peace, over the details of which divergence first appeared between Oxford and St John. In these negotiations they have both been suspected of intrigues with James Edward, the "Old Pretender," and each subsequently brought that charge against the other. But the terms of his letters to them both upon May 3, 1714, seem to show that no written communications could have passed between him and either of them. About verbal communications there will always be mystery, dispute, and perhaps genuine misunderstanding. Oxford, with his accustomed dissimulation, probably held out hopes to the Pretender, with the object of inducing him to influence the Jacobite Peers at home to accept the peace. But, while it was characteristic of Oxford to be entangled in an intrigue without ever committing himself, the same cannot be said of St John. It is upon the conclusion which can be formed as to his real designs, that the whole internal history of the last years of the reign turns. If, at the beginning of 1714, Anne and Bolingbroke were really intriguing for a Stewart Restoration, the quarrel with Oxford and Bolingbroke's short-lived triumph are easily explained. Oxford was not the man to move without a distinct parliamentary majority in his favour; and the Parliament of 1714, though divided, appears to have been on the whole opposed to the Pretender, at least so long as he remained Catholic. Bolingbroke was of a different mould; he scorned to follow, aspired to lead, and knew well enough that a vigorous minority, hallooed on by one who shows them game, can educate a supine or wavering majority. Hence, while Oxford hung back, Bolingbroke pushed on, induced Anne to dismiss his rival, and was preparing a *coup de main* on behalf of the Stewart, when Anne's death intervened. On these assumptions, everything becomes clear; on any other, the historian is lost in the labyrinths of doubt.

The theory which assumes that Bolingbroke was committed to the cause of the Stewart is, however, confronted with two difficulties. In the first place, d'Iberville, of the French embassy, who carried on most of the Jacobite intrigues, wrote to Torcy on May 19, 1714, that Bolingbroke would not support the Pretender, unless he changed his religion to that of the Church of England. Even so late as July 21, Bolingbroke was still holding this language to Tories in England. As it was known that these were terms which the Pretender would not consider, it seems to follow that Bolingbroke was not absolutely committed. In the second place, Bolingbroke certainly contemplated a Hanoverian succession as a possibility, while at the same time he was strongly of opinion that England would not long submit to be governed by a German. Thus he had not found the real key to the situation—the intense hatred of the Hanoverian party towards him; and the fact suggests that his policy in 1714 was not a desperate attempt to bring in the Stewart. His stern proscription

of opponents, his feverish race for supremacy, may be explained on the ground that he knew Anne's health to be failing, and that he desired to be in supreme power before her death. Once in the seat of acknowledged authority, Bolingbroke might be able to dictate terms to the Hanoverian Prince who came to assume the Crown. Even so late as August 16, 1714, Bolingbroke still hoped to regain his power through his influence with his party. It is thus possible that, though deep in Jacobite plots, he was not absolutely given over to them, and that his immediate object in 1714 was not the grandiose scheme of restoring the "Pretender," but the far humbler one of overthrowing Oxford.

It must, indeed, have been maddening to St John to find that his official chief, though approving of strict party-discipline in principle, refused to practise it. With the insight of real genius, St John perceived that the day of half-measures was over, and that the political campaign must be waged on very different lines from the sort of civil war comprehensible by Oxford. There can be little doubt that he read the situation aright, and that the increase of party-discipline was the only way of strengthening the Ministry. But, for the moment, St John still went too fast. The High Church clergy disapproved of his morals, and the Tory squires were suspicious of his orthodoxy. Few of them, indeed, understood Oxford, but still fewer trusted St John; and they followed the one in hope till forced to resort to the other in necessity. For a time, Anne's great affection for Oxford, and his personal popularity, rendered vain all the efforts of his more brilliant rival to overthrow him. But, gradually, St John's extraordinary talents, his ascendancy in the Commons, the ingenuity, allied though it was to rashness and duplicity, with which he negotiated, made him the foremost man in England. In July, 1712, after piloting the most important parts of the treaty through the Commons, he was created a peer—with the title of Viscount Bolingbroke. The eagerness with which he seized on the distinction, is an illustration of his impetuous character. Bolingbroke was soon to find, like Chatham and Brougham in after days, that the oratory which had been irresistible in the Commons was merely impressive in the Lords, and that the parliamentary leader who takes to himself a coronet barter power for dignity.

Immediately after receiving his peerage, Bolingbroke proceeded in person to France to conclude his negotiations. On his return (September) he was brought into closer relations with Anne, whom he seems to have captivated by his personal charm. His position was still insecure, the peace was in some respects unpopular, and important commercial clauses, which would have resulted in a freer trade with France, were defeated in Parliament, possibly with the connivance of Oxford. During the spring of 1713, Bolingbroke addressed to his colleague a series of passionate appeals, bidding him in turn make a push for government; separate the chaff from the wheat; and get on the box and use the whip.

He had indeed good reason for remonstrance; for, in 1713 and up to the very moment of his fall in 1714, Oxford was proposing coalitions to Halifax and Somers. The Tory Moderates now began to distrust the mysterious Oxford, and to prefer the resolute, even if unscrupulous, Bolingbroke. Their opinions must have been confirmed by the general election, which went disastrously for the Government. The Whigs came back in a slight majority in England; Addison had gained some support to the Whig cause by the stately declamations on liberty in his tragedy of *Cato*, produced in April, 1713. Though the Government's supporters in Scotland turned the scale against the Whigs, a large number of them were Jacobites in name and fact. The danger was accordingly extreme; for, not only could the Ministry plausibly and popularly be accused of trafficking with the Pretender abroad, but they might really be forced into considerable concessions to the Jacobites at home. Now, if ever, the safety of the party lay in Bolingbroke's policy of "Thorough," in the rigid enforcement of party-discipline, and in the filling-up of official posts—both civil and military—with men absolutely devoted to the Ministry.

The Whig leaders now entered into those closer and more secret negotiations with the Elector of Hanover, of which more will be said in a later volume. The irrevocable alliance between the Whigs and the Hanoverians must from this point onwards be regarded as a most important factor in the political situation. At the opening of Parliament, in 1714, the Whigs raised the cry of Jacobitism with considerable effect. On the Queen's birthday (February 6) the London mob burnt effigies of the Pretender, the Devil, and the Pope. Steele was expelled from the House of Commons for a pamphlet written in abuse of the Ministry; but in the debate he and Walpole made speeches which were vastly applauded. The Whigs were indeed gaining so much in popular opinion that Bolingbroke was at last able to enforce the execution of Oxford's "plan," though its author still shrank from drastic measures. Most of the important military commands were taken from their holders and given to stout Tories or to Jacobites. Other changes were effected elsewhere, especially among supporters who were vacillating or lukewarm. All these circumstances occasioned much bitterness, and the invective and violence not only of the press, but even of Parliament, transcended all bounds. Finally, a motion was brought forward demanding a writ for the Electoral Prince to come over and sit in the House of Peers as Duke of Cambridge. This was passed, thanks to Whig support, and led to a heated correspondence between Anne, the Electress and her grandson. Bolingbroke's counter-stroke to this attempt to embarrass Queen and Ministry was an attempt to harass Whigs and Dissenters. The Schism Act (May 6, 1714) forbade anyone to keep a public or private school unless he were a member of the Church of England and licensed by the Bishops. It was partly a cruel and reactionary measure aimed at

the Whigs, through the Dissenters, and partly a desperate bid for a whole-hearted support from the High Churchmen. That Bolingbroke, with his religious scepticism, should have proposed a statute at once so bigoted and so intolerably harsh shows to what lengths of unscrupulousness he could proceed.

One of the most dramatic scenes in English history was about to be enacted. For two years, or thereabouts, Oxford and Bolingbroke had been counter-working each other, and their contention now came to a sudden and startling climax. The heat of parties was so great, the political atmosphere so electric, that the moderate balancing policy of Oxford was clearly out of place. His failure was so obvious, his divergence from his colleagues so hopeless, that, though Anne declined to accept his resignation in June, all knew his fall to be only a question of time. When at length the Queen sent to him for the White Staff, Bolingbroke must for one brief moment have tasted the joys of realised ambition. But never was triumph so short, never was schemer so soon disillusioned. On July 27, 1714, Oxford was dismissed, on the 29th the Queen fell ill. All was at once in confusion, and Bolingbroke's schemes turned into unsubstantial shadows. Bolingbroke afterwards boasted that, but for the Queen's illness, his plans were so well laid, that within six weeks everything would have been within his grasp. This is by no means clear; for the inscrutable and enigmatic Shrewsbury was playing a crafty game. He had been ambassador at Versailles (October, 1712), had but just resigned the Lord-Lieutenancy in Ireland, and was still Lord Chamberlain. He had since 1710 been deeply in the confidence of Anne, and had acquired much influence in the Ministry by mediating between Oxford and Bolingbroke, while his popularity was so great in the country that he was called "the king of hearts." He had never been committed to the Pretender so far as Bolingbroke, or even as Oxford. His recent absence in Ireland made it clear that he could not have designed the Schism Act, to which he was believed to be strongly opposed. All this tends to show that he had a party in the Ministry, and to suggest that, even without the sudden catastrophe, Bolingbroke's aims might have been defeated.

On July 27, immediately after Oxford's dismissal, a Council met at Whitehall to discuss the formation of a commission for the Treasury. They were unable to agree, and the meeting was adjourned. It appears that Bolingbroke had designed Wyndham as First Lord of the Treasury, and meant to fill up the other posts with his own nominees. His projects were opposed by the Shrewsbury section of the Ministry, for the Lord Chamberlain, who had refused to be First Lord of the Treasury in 1710, now perhaps coveted that or even a higher office. It is significant that disputes too serious for adjustment had already broken out in the Council. On July 29, as was seen, Anne fell ill; on the 30th the Duchess of Ormond sent alarming news to the Council. The Privy

Council, which was sitting at Whitehall, adjourned to Kensington to discuss the situation. Upon this meeting the Dukes of Argyll and Somerset are supposed to have broken, though unsummoned. But Argyll had attended Council as recently as May, 1714, and Somerset, whose Duchess was at the bedside of Anne, may have received a summons at her suggestion. Whatever be the explanation, the Privy Council Register shows that they did attend, though it does not show that their presence caused the scale to turn against Bolingbroke. The opposition to him had already been considerable, and he was now confronted by the new and alarming danger arising from the Queen's illness. At the decisive Council this bold schemer appears to have lost his nerve and given way; at any rate the Shrewsbury faction triumphed. The story of the meeting, which has been adorned with the most legendary incidents, is best told in the brief entry in the Privy Council Register (July 30). "Their Lordships met in the Council Chamber and, considering the present exigency of affairs, were unanimously of an opinion to move the Queen that she would constitute the Duke of Shrewsbury Lord Treasurer." A deputation waited on the Queen to take her pleasure in the matter, and returned with a command that the Duke should wait upon her. Shrewsbury went to her bedside, and the dying Queen gave him the White Staff, bidding him, with an unwonted flash of regal dignity, use it for the good of her country. For the last time in English history, and from the last Stewart sovereign a subject received the staff and office of Lord High Treasurer. Probably with the view of marking her complete confidence, Anne refused to accept the Duke's proffered resignation of the Chamberlaincy; and he returned to the Council with the Chamberlain's wand in one hand and the Treasurer's staff in the other. Shrewsbury resumed his seat at the Board; and the Council drew up schemes for the defence of the kingdom and for the securing of the Succession under his guidance. On July 31 the Council was increased in numbers from 25 to 38 by the arrival of Whig Lords. On the next day Shrewsbury informed five other Lords of the Council at Kensington that "Her Majesty Queen Anne departed this Life at her Palace at Kensington at half an hour after seven this Morning"; upon which news they adjourned to St James'. There a Privy Council, to the number of 43, assembled, at which Bothmer, the Hanoverian Envoy, was present, and where the Commission of Regency was read. On the steps of Whitehall the heralds blew their trumpets announcing the accession of His Gracious Majesty King George the First. On August 10, news came to the Elector of Hanover sitting in his garden in the Orangerie, at Herrenhausen, that he had inherited three Crowns.

CHAPTER XVI.

RUSSIA.

(1462—1682.)

It is the purpose of this chapter to trace in brief outline the history of the Muscovite State during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to sketch the political and social circumstances of the Russia which Peter the Great reshaped, and to indicate the preparatory conditions without which his radical changes would not have been feasible. It is an error to suppose that the history of contemporary Russia can be understood by a survey which begins with Peter the Great. His reign marks the opening of a new era. But the abiding features which have differentiated Russia from the other States of Europe, some of the deeper tendencies of her domestic government as well as of her external policy, the spirit of her institutions as well as the direction of her expansion, were imposed upon her at a much earlier time.

The history of Russia may be divided into five periods. The first begins with the foundation, in the ninth century, of Slavonic States at Kieff and Novgorod organised by "Russian" adventurers from eastern Scandinavia; the second, with the reception of Christianity by Vladimir of Kieff towards the end of the tenth century; the third, with the Tartar conquest in the thirteenth; the fourth, with the reign of Ivan the Great in the latter half of the fifteenth; the fifth, with Peter. This division exhibits some of the determinant influences which guided the course of Russian history. The Scandinavians supplied the first political organisation and unity to the eastern Slavs; the conversion to Christianity, and close ecclesiastical connexion with the Eastern Empire, introduced the Byzantine features which marked Russian civilisation; the significance of the reign of Ivan the Great it will be our task to explain. But this scheme of periods fails to show the event which is the key to the whole later development, the settlement of Moscow in the middle of the twelfth century. When George Dolgoruki in 1147 founded a military colony by the Moscova in the middle of a Finnic population, he unconsciously turned the course of East Slavonic history into a new channel. The significance of the third period lies less in the fact of Tartar domination than in the growth of the Muscovite power in relation to the other Russian principalities.

Asiatic rule exercised a certain influence on Russian civilisation—an influence which has sometimes been exaggerated—but its main importance lies in the fact that it contributed indirectly and unintentionally to the aggrandisement of the princes of Moscow. The aim of these princes was to gather all the Russian territories under their rule and make Moscow the capital, her prince the monarch, of Russia. In their struggles for this end, steadily pursued and finally achieved, their success at decisive moments was constantly due to their skill or fortune in gaining the support of their Tartar suzerains.

This shifting of the centre of political gravity from Kieff far north-eastward to Moscow, was to impose a new rôle upon Russia and give the decisive direction to her history. It brought into play geographical influences to which her fortune and her misfortunes may be imputed. If the centre had remained at Kieff, there would not have been the same stringent necessity for the efforts of indefinite expansion; there need have been no divorce or protracted alienation from the rest of Europe; and there might have been no defeat of the growth of constitutional freedom. But for a State centred at Moscow endless expansion, ultimately into northern Asia, was an unavoidable consequence of its geographical situation in a land where there were no natural frontiers. Its great distance from the borders of the nearest western States was, as much as the circumstance of Tartar supremacy, a cause of the long isolation of Russia in regard to western Europe. And its origin as a military colony, insulated amidst an alien population, determined from the first the military character and spirit of its government. In other Slavonic States there was no tendency to absolutism; the spirit was rather republican. But at Moscow circumstances imposed a military organisation which fostered the power of the princes. And, as Moscow extended its rule over other Russian principalities and towns, this principle was ruthlessly applied. When Pskoff and Novgorod, and other cities, in which there had been a constitutional civic development, were brought under Muscovite sway, the civic element had to make way for a military organisation. The geographical position of Moscow determined the current of Russian history.

Ivan III (1462–1505), Great Prince of Moscow, deserves his title of Great, if the appellation be interpreted in the sense that his reign marks a new epoch. He brought to virtual completion, leaving to his successors only the task of rounding off his work, the two chief enterprises which had engaged the energies of his predecessors—the emancipation of Russia from the slackening yoke of the Tartars, and the gathering of Russian territory under the wing of Moscow. He helped to extend Russian power over enormous tracts, inhabited by barbarous tribes, in the north and north-east, and he laid the systematic foundations of imperial autocracy. A typical Muscovite ruler, embodying all the unattractive qualities which helped the upward progress of the sovereigns

of Muscovy, a profound dissembler, unscrupulous in breaking his word, trusting in tortuous and patient diplomacy, of which he was an accomplished master, rather than in arms, wanting in personal courage, unfalteringly cruel, exempt from the influences of affection and passion, he presents many points of resemblance with his contemporary Louis XI.

A military monarch would have seen in the condition of the Tartars an opportunity for a decisive struggle. If the great Mongol conqueror Timur postponed the fall of the Eastern Empire by the blow which he dealt to the Ottoman Turks, it may be said that he hastened the rise of Russia by his destruction of the empire of the Tartar khans. On the ruins of that empire several smaller States arose, Kazan, Astrakhan, the Crimea, all of them weak through mutual dissensions. The general policy of Ivan was to foment the divisions, to refuse tribute, but occasionally to send presents, and to remain on the defensive. Cultivating the friendship of the Khans of Crimea he bided his time for attacking the Tsar of Kazan, whose dominion corresponded to the old realm of Black Bulgaria. In 1487 he captured Kazan and its ruler, but he refrained from annexing it; taking himself the title "Prince of Bulgaria," he gave the throne to a nephew of the Khan of Crimea. The reign of Ivan marks the final emancipation of Russia from Asiatic lordship; the Tartars were still troublesome and dangerous neighbours, they were no longer in any form masters. The annexation of Kazan was effected by his grandson Ivan IV (1552); that of Astrakhan followed (1554); Crimea was to pass under Ottoman sovereignty before it was finally won for Russia in the reign of Catharine II.

The predecessors of Ivan had made it their aim, as we have said, to lay hands upon the neighbouring Russian principalities; but they had largely strewn with the left hand what the right hand had gathered, by adopting the policy of assigning appanages to their sons. Ivan discarded this principle, and so consolidated the unity of the State, which he almost doubled in territory by his new annexations. He reduced under his direct sway Tver and Novgorod the Great in the north-west, Viatka in the north-east, Chernigoff in the far south-west, as well as Iaroslavl and Rostoff in the north. His son Vasili completed the extension by winning Pskoff, Smolensk, Novgorod-Sieverski, and Riazan. Of these events, each an important step in the advance of Moscow, a particular interest is attached to the acquisitions of Novgorod the Great and Pskoff. The suppression of these two republics (as well as of the remote and less important republic of Viatka) removed the examples of popular freedom which still survived in the Russian world. The citizens of these States managed their affairs in the *veche*, or popular assembly, to which they were summoned by the bell in the market-place. They were the only places in Russia which bore any resemblance, in spirit and in well-being, to the prosperous towns of western Europe. Novgorod was a factory of the Hanseatic league and a resort of German merchants. Ivan

suppressed its *veche* and removed the bell (1478). He transported large masses of the citizens to distant places, and planted Muscovites in the city which he appropriated; his son pursued the same policy at Pskoff. It might be thought that the new ruler would have carefully fostered the foreign trade which had made the fortune of Novgorod; but with curious improvidence he put an end to it. He arrested the merchants (1495), and enriched his treasury for the moment with the plunder of their stores.

The occupations of Novgorod and Pskoff, beyond their importance as steps in unification, have a high significance as marking the elimination of a social element which might have modified the development of autocracy. The absence of free cities, which played so beneficent a part in the evolution of western countries, is a fact of fatal import in Russian history.

The acquisitions of Chernigoff and Smolensk have a different significance, involving the relations of Moscow to its western rival, the double State of Lithuania and Poland. The national unity of the Lithuanian tribes had been brought about in the thirteenth century, and in the fourteenth heathen Lithuania became a great political power under the able leadership of Gedimin, who not only maintained a successful struggle in the north against the German Knights of Livonia, but created an extensive State by conquering Russian territory. It extended far southward, including even Kieff; and Vilna, Gedimin's capital, was the political peer of Moscow. Western Russia was grouped round Vilna, eastern round Moscow, and the question was whether the separation would be permanent or either would annex the other. The situation was complicated by the hostility of Poland, which was endangered by the southward expansion of Lithuania; and a new turn was given to the course of events, when on the death of a king of Poland without male children (1386) the Poles terminated the strife by marrying his daughter to the Lithuanian prince Jagello. This was the origin of the Lithuanian dynasty of Poland, the line of Jagello, which was extinguished towards the close of the sixteenth century. Jagello adopted Christianity in the Roman form, and converted his heathen fellow-countrymen by compulsion; but he offended them by transferring his residence from Vilna to the Polish capital Cracow. The union was purely personal; it was very soon interrupted; and during the following century the two States were sometimes under the same rule, at others under different princes. From 1501 they were united, but the union remained personal; the Grand Principality of Lithuania was distinct from the kingdom of Poland. At last in 1569 they were more closely and permanently joined together by the Union of Lublin, of which more will be said.

To recover the Russian principalities which Lithuania had conquered was an important item in the Muscovite programme of gathering together Russian territory. Nor was any part of that programme so popular in

Muscovy; for it appealed to religious sentiment; it meant the winning back into the sphere of the Orthodox Church regions which had fallen under the pernicious influence of a heretical State. Nowhere more conspicuously than in this field of his work did Ivan display his consummate, unscrupulous dexterity. He defeated Lithuania all along the line, and yet avoided all but a very brief war till the later years of his reign. Here his friends, the Tartars of Crimea, did him good service. They invaded Lithuania and held it in check, while Ivan was dealing with the hostile Tartars in the east; and, when the Lithuanian war came, the friendly khan kept the hostile khans in check. On the other hand, Ivan pursued his end with eminent success by his intrigues with the vassal or "serving" princes, who under the lordship of Lithuania governed the lands which it was his object to acquire. The condition on which these princes held their possessions was that they submitted to the Great Prince in all matters of foreign policy, while in return he protected and maintained them in their principalities. If the Lithuanian Prince failed to observe his part of the obligation, the vassals considered themselves free to attach themselves to another protector. Here was the place where the diplomatist of Moscow could insert a lever. The princes were always at feud among themselves; and, by intervening at opportune moments and promising support to one or to another, Ivan succeeded in inducing prince after prince to accept his protection and in detaching district after district from the sway of Lithuania. Two stages in his westward advance may be marked. After a short war the river Desna was fixed as the boundary (1484), and peace sealed by the marriage of the Great Prince Alexander with Ivan's daughter. But the use of this alliance was in Ivan's design to supply new handles against his rival, in the shape of complaints that, contrary to express stipulation, attempts were being made to tamper with his daughter's faith. A new war broke out; the most important of the vassals, including the Prince of Chernigoff, deserted to Ivan; and Lithuania was only rescued from hopeless defeat by the aid of the Knights of Livonia. A precarious peace was procured in 1503 which fixed the boundary at the river Sozh. The struggle continued under Ivan's successor Vasili, whose principal achievement was the capture of Smolensk where the artillery which Ivan had introduced in Russia played a decisive part. At Vasili's death the Muscovite empire reached from Chernigoff to the White Sea, from the borders of Livonia to the river Kama.

The transference of the centre of the Russian world to Moscow had, along with the political dependence on Asia, brought about a separation and alienation from the rest of Europe. From the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, it may be said, she had her back turned to Europe, her face to Asia, and was a *terra incognita* to western Europeans. Hence the foreign travellers and merchants who visited Muscovy in the sixteenth century describe it as a newly discovered land, and it is not

untrue to say that one of the features of the history of Russia in that period was its rediscovery by the West. Here too Ivan's reign marks an epoch. He entered into relation with some European Courts; embassies were exchanged with Venice, the Roman Curia, Denmark, the Empire, and Hungary. He was ready in certain ways to learn something from the West and move in the direction of its progress, as for instance in the introduction of artillery. He invited Italians to his Court. The brilliant engineer and architect, Fioravanti degli Alberti (Aristotle of Bologna), busied himself at Moscow in the Great Prince's service; Pietro Antonio Solari of Milan built the palace of the Kremlin. These and a few other swallows of the Renaissance did not make a spring; their fine intelligences produced no lasting, nor perhaps any fleeting, impression on the Russian spirit; but they belong to the signs which mark the beginning of a new period of slow, hardly perceptible advance, which is to prepare the way for Peter the Great. Foreign physicians were also attracted to Moscow; but their calling was hazardous at an ignorant and barbarous Court; a Jewish doctor was beheaded for having failed to cure Ivan's son.

The most memorable result of this monarch's relations with the outside world was his marriage with a lady of the Imperial family of the Palaiologoi. Zoe (called Sophia after her marriage) was a niece of Constantine Palaiologos, the last Roman Emperor. Her father Thomas, driven from Greece, had betaken himself to Rome where he died, and the Popes acted as guardians of his children. The idea of uniting Sophia to the Great Prince of Moscow seems to have been first suggested by Cardinal Bessarion, one of the most zealous promoters of the transitory union of the Greek and Latin Churches at the Council of Florence. It was gladly accepted by the Pope. Two objects of the papal policy, then and for a long time to come, were the reunion of the Churches and the expulsion of the Turks from Europe. The suggested marriage seemed to offer the chance not only of compassing the desired reunion of the Greek Church with Rome, through a princess who at Rome had come under Latin influence, but also of stimulating the ruler of Moscow to join in a crusade against the Muslims. Ivan accepted the proposal, though without the smallest intention of gratifying the desire of Rome. For the present, an attack on Turkey lay entirely outside the range of policy of a cautious Muscovite sovereign. But a marriage with a princess of the Imperial House of Constantinople seemed calculated to augment the Great Prince's prestige. This, and this alone, was Ivan's motive; this, and this alone, was the result of the alliance.

For the greater part of what is commonly alleged as to important consequences, practical and theoretical, arising out of the marriage with Sophia (1472) is based on misconceptions. It has been asserted that her influence incited Ivan to renounce the yoke of the Tartars and

imbued him with a new ideal of Russian unity and Russian Imperial dignity. There is no evidence for this belief; emancipation from the Tartars and unification of Russia were aims which had been bequeathed from Ivan's predecessors; and it is inconsistent with all that we know of the ruler to suppose that his wife played the rôle of a political initiator. It has also been supposed that by virtue of this alliance Ivan claimed to be the heir of the Caesars, and therefore assumed the title of Tsar. It has been even held that his claim had a more formal basis, Sophia's brother Andrew Palaiologos having actually transferred to him the rights to the Imperial succession—the same rights which that prince made over to Charles VIII and bequeathed to Ferdinand of Spain. The fact that the sovereigns of Moscow never appealed to such a transference proves that no such act was ever executed. The coronation ceremony of the Great Princes does not show that they set up to be Augusti; it shows the reverse. It is distinct from the coronation ceremony of the East Roman Augustus; it resembles the coronation ceremony of the East Roman Caesar. In using the title of Tsar (*Tsesar* = Caesar) Ivan meant simply to declare his independence; it was not in his thoughts to usurp the title of Caesar Augustus; and, if he had contemplated such a claim, *Tsar* would have failed to express the idea. For Caesar was a title which the Emperors regularly conferred on barbarian princes whom they desired to honour or conciliate; and the Russians did not restrict *Tsar* to the designation of the Emperor, they applied it more widely, as for instance to some of the Tartar khans. And it is significant that Ivan adopted this style only in his intercourse with some foreign Courts; *Tsar* did not become the formal and proper title of the Great Prince till the coronation of his grandson Ivan IV.

Yet the union with Sophia may be said to have a symbolical significance, in connexion with a theory which became current during the reign of Ivan's son and successor. According to this theory, formulated by Philothei, a monk of Pskoff, Russia as the protectress of Orthodoxy was the heiress of the Eastern Empire, Moscow the successor of Constantinople. For through her iniquitous compromise with the Latins at the Council of Florence, Byzantium had forfeited her claim to the headship of the Greek Church; Moscow must step into her place as the third, and the last, Rome. The Church which had looked to the Emperors to protect her against Gentiles and heretics must now look to the Great Princes. This idea was illustrated and reinforced by a legend which was officially adopted. When Vladimir the Saint was converted to Christianity and married their sister Anna (989), the Emperors Basil II and Constantine VIII sent him royal insignia, in accordance with the Byzantine custom of bestowing insignia on client princes. This fact is the historical *motif* of the legend that Constantine IX Monomakhos sent the emblems of sovereignty to Vladimir Monomakhos

and caused him to be crowned at Kieff. The story, mentioned in the official coronation acts of Ivan IV and the subsequent Tsars, including Peter the Great, involves a double confusion of two Vladimirs and two Constantines, evidently due to the idea of bringing into connexion the Russian and the Byzantine Monomakhos, in spite of the fact that the later Vladimir was born only three years before the later Constantine died (1054). Among the insignia of the Great Duke was a crown, still preserved, known as the "hat" of Constantine Monomakhos; but it cannot claim to be the original crown received by Vladimir the Saint, for it is not Byzantine work or of such an early period. Another legend, that a white tiara, given by Constantine the Great to Pope Silvester, had been carried for safety's sake from Rome to New Rome, and thence for the same reason to Novgorod, symbolised the idea, which events justified, that the place which had been filled by the Church-state of Byzantium, in the Orthodox world, was now to be filled by Moscow. The foundation of the Moscow Patriarchate towards the end of the sixteenth century was an expression of this idea.

The growth of autocracy was favoured by the Tartar sway, which contributed to the decline of the *veche* or parliament. The election of the prince was one of the chief functions of the *veche*, and when the Tartar overlords took the appointments into their own hands its decline began. It is significant that the States in which the *veche* survived, Novgorod and Pskoff, were geographically furthest removed from Tartar control. But it was more important that the princes of the new States in central Russia, like Moscow, were soon able to dispense with a parliament, because they did not need the people for military service. Territorial conquest enabled them to allot land in return for military service, and thus they had a regular army at their disposal, without calling upon the host of freemen to follow them. The Russian army consisted of cavalry, but by the middle of the sixteenth century Moscow had also a body of infantry, the *strieltzy* (arquebusiers).

The authority of Ivan's predecessors was thus not limited by a popular assembly, but it was checked by another institution, the *Duma* of *boiars* or nobles. The name *Duma* connotes thinking; it was a deliberative body, like the Greek *Bulé* and the German *Rath*, which have a similar meaning. This Council consisted of men who held high posts in the administration and the army. The *boiars* formed the highest order in that class of society which was designated as the "men of service," a name characteristic of the growth of despotism. In the law Code drawn up by Ivan (1497) the only class distinction recognised is between the serving and the not-serving folk. But there were conditions attached which gave the servant a real independence in regard to his employer. When he accepted a post under a prince, it was understood that he was free to leave his service whenever he chose, and enter that of some other ruler; and a written contract was usually

drawn up, in which the conditions of service, binding on both parties, were stated. This system limited effectually the prince's power, and checked the growth of despotic authority. But the territorial growth of Moscow, and the absorption of the surrounding principalities, almost completed in the reign of Ivan, had the effect of counteracting this check, since the men of service had no longer a multitude of other States into which they could easily migrate when the Prince of Moscow displeased them. In the sixteenth century the only resort of the discontented was to leave Russia altogether and find refuge in Poland or Lithuania. Thus the unification of Russia, by doing away with the migratory system, removed a palladium of freedom, and permitted the establishment of a strong monarchical government. Ivan the Great could act more independently of his Duma and impress his will upon it with more masterful authority. But it remained a body which could assert itself in certain conditions, as in the case of a weak ruler or a minority. But when the Tsar was strong he had everything in his hands; and we may say that as an institution the Council had little restraining power. It met only when he chose, and no one had any right to be summoned; the master could call as many or as few of his servants as he chose. He had to consult and take into account the men who had to carry out his will; but that is simply a practical limitation to which every monarch, however constitutionally unchecked, is subject. The most unfettered autocrat is limited both by the consideration of public opinion and by the instruments which he has to employ. Like the Senate of Eastern Rome, the Duma can hardly be viewed as a constitutional check; it was a check because it consisted of the Tsar's instruments.

On the other hand, the boiars—among whom the old princely families which had been submitted to the power of Moscow occupied the highest position—held that they had an indefeasible right to share in the administration and fill the highest posts; and this claim was recognised in a form which amounted to a constitutional limitation of the Great Prince's power. In the records of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries we constantly meet the question of Precedence (*miestnichestvo*). We hear continually of disputes among the nobles, and complaints concerning what may seem trifling points of etiquette; and the stress laid on such matters would strike the uninitiated reader as characteristic of their narrow minds and their petty life. But more was involved in the system of Precedence than might appear on the surface. It was the palladium of the noble class, and constituted a check on the autocrat. It asserted the right of each member of the nobility, and of the men of service in general, to a place in the public service, assigned according to two principles: that no man could be appointed to a post inferior to that which his ancestors had held, and that no man could be asked to accept a post of lower rank than that of a man who

had a shorter ancestral line than himself. These principles were in themselves ridiculous and injurious to society; yet they were a privilege which guaranteed to the higher classes their political position. The system was worked and disputes decided by means of the Books of Rank (*razriadnyia knigi*), preserved in a special bureau which dealt with Precedence. It has been suggested that, in clinging tenaciously to this privilege, for which they were ready to defy the severest punishment, the motive of the nobles was perhaps less a conviction of its political importance than a sentiment of piety to the memory of their ancestors, a survival of days when the family was everything. It still counted for much, and this quasi-religious sentiment was a potent sanction of the system, and enabled it to survive. In time of war, Precedence was especially pernicious; disputes among the commanders led to defeat. Thus we find the Tsars, on the eve of campaigns, decreeing that while the army was in the field there must be a truce to such quarrels. It was not till the last quarter of the seventeenth century, in the reign of Theodore son of Alexis, that the system was finally abolished, and the Books of Rank were burned. It is to be observed that Precedence, in one way a check on the sovereign's power, in another way aided the growth of his autocracy; for it maintained divisions among the boiars and hindered the growth of a feeling of class unity solid enough to act effectively against his despotism.

The services of Ivan the Great to his country are summed up in the statement that he created a strong monarchy. He established lines of development and political order which saved Russia from ever becoming what her neighbour Poland became, where the liberty of the nobles was to give Europe an illustration of legalised anarchy. The misfortune of Russia was that no safeguards were imposed to prevent the change of the strong monarchy into an absolute autocracy. It would be absurd to impute the blame to the Tsars, who naturally sought to augment their own power, which, as a matter of fact, was the only organ of social order. The development of autocracy depended on the circumstance that the other elements in the State, the nobles and the people, had no organisation capable of legally resisting the monarch and effecting a constitutional balance. In other countries, kings, in establishing their own supremacy and reducing the independence of feudal nobles, had favoured and promoted popular institutions that were afterwards to become a check upon the royal power. But in Russia the old popular institutions had been swept away. In other countries, the nobles had a position independent of the monarch, and were capable of combining together, if the monarch sought to encroach too far upon their privileges. But in Russia they had no sufficiently strong sense of common interest to ensure successful cooperation; the only bond of unity was the common service of the monarch himself. The very rights of Precedence, which they prized so highly, only emphasised their

dependence on the master who allotted the posts which they disputed. Thus they were not in a position to extort a charter of liberties. The latter half of the sixteenth century is marked indeed, as we shall see, by a struggle between the Tsar and the boiars; but it was not a struggle for constitutionalism. It may even be said that the only measures which might have issued in a constitutional government were initiated by the monarch.

The one institution which might have seemed likely to exercise some control on the monarchy was the Church. Its possessions and privileges had been left intact by the policy of the Tartar khans, and in the days when Russia was a complex of numerous separate States it was the representative and mouthpiece of Russian unity, though it never sought to incite resistance to the Tartar rule. Its independence was largely secured by the fact that the Metropolitan owed ecclesiastical allegiance to a power outside Russia, the Patriarch of Constantinople. It was an important step in the upward rise of Moscow when, in the first half of the fourteenth century, the Metropolitan established his residence there. The Metropolitan always supported the unification of the land and the abolition of the independent principalities. The breach of the Russian with the Greek Church in the fifteenth century, in consequence of the efforts at reunion with Rome, reacted upon the position of the Metropolitans, who had no longer a support in the Patriarch, and led to the dependence of the Church on the secular power. The line between Church and State affairs tended to become obliterated; ecclesiastical matters were discussed at the Councils of the monarch; ecclesiastics were summoned to attend, and thus became enrolled in the common "service" of the State; the Church became part of the machine, just as religion had been a State department in the Eastern Empire.

The reign of Vasili III (1505-33) is an appendix to that of his father, continuing his work, increasing Muscovite territory and maintaining some relations with European Courts. Herberstein, as ambassador of the Emperor Maximilian, visited Moscow in 1517 and 1523, and wrote his famous description of Russia, which created a considerable sensation in the West. Vasili married Helen Glinskaia, a Lithuanian refugee, who after his death maintained her position, as regent for her infant son Ivan, amidst great difficulties, for five years. She died in 1538; and Russia, without a head, was exposed during the following years to the anarchical and tyrannous rule of the boiars. Two princely families and their factions, the Shuiskis and the Bielskis, disputed the power. Ivan IV was neglected, or encouraged in cruel sports and debauchery. He asserted himself in 1543 by the murder of Andrew Shuiski, and he always looked back with intense bitterness on his treatment as a child. He was crowned in 1547, with the title

of Tsar, having already shown that he was determined to be master. The details of his reign form a curious and repulsive chronicle; and his eccentric character has been a fascinating psychological study for Russian historians. His vices and atrocities are written large in the annals of his government; but his ability and originality are no less undeniable, and no judgment would be wider of the mark than to regard his reign as devoid of significance except as illustrating how great enormities might be perpetrated by a tyrant in Moscovia. In the West he will always be known as Ivan the Terrible; but the epithet is misleading; for the Russian word which it translates means "to be feared" in the sense in which we are bidden to fear God, as a stern master, not as an ogre. In cruelty he outdid his predecessors; but it is hardly for western Europe, which had seen for instance the treatment of Liège by Charles the Bold, and witnessed in Ivan's days the exploits of Spanish rule in the Netherlands and the tortures of the Inquisition, to exclaim at the spectacular massacre which he conducted at Novgorod and at his other outrageous cruelties, as if they had set Russia beyond the pale of civilised humanity.

The significance of this wonderful reign lies much deeper. Two fundamental discords in the structure of the State produced a complex crisis in the middle of the sixteenth century, which caused not only the eccentric policy of Ivan but the troubles in which the realm was involved for a generation after his death. On the one hand, there was the political contradiction between the autocratic power which in its absolute claim required a complete democratic levelling of all its subjects, and the necessity under which it lay of administering the State by an aristocratic class which asserted hereditary rights to participation in the government, while it admitted the autocratic principle. On the other hand, there was the social anomaly that, for the sake of the military needs of the Empire, since the wealth of Russia consisted entirely in land, the interests of the productive agricultural classes had been sacrificed to the interests of the class of service. Peasant owners were dispossessed, lands were seized, to supply fiefs for this class. But the constant wars laid weighty burdens on the men of service and the proprietors of land, whether allods or fiefs, and they were forced to press heavily upon their tenants; the consequence was that these tenants gave up their farms and sought new lands elsewhere, especially on the monastic estates, as the monasteries were the capitalists of the age and were reputed to be easier masters. The lands of boiars and of the whole class of service were thus left without a sufficiency of labour, while the public burdens weighed no less heavily than before. The gravity of the situation was reflected in curious pamphlets which appeared, urging on one side the confiscation of ecclesiastical property—an idea which had already floated before the minds of the sovereigns—and on the other the abolition of the whole system of military fiefs. The second proposal was

from the rest to have no communications with the "traitors." When he discovered that such communications were carried on he proceeded to more drastic acts of persecution, which caused many boiars to seek refuge in Poland; these flights evoked more tyrannical measures; and a reign of terror ensued. Notable among the princes who fled to Poland was Kurbski, because he gave verbal expression to the grievances of his order. His correspondence with the Emperor—for Ivan who was fond of argument condescended to enter into controversy—does not fathom the depth of the political situation, but portrays vividly the intensity of the hostility between the Tsar and the class on whom the administration of the State had depended.

Ivan at last invented a curious solution of the political problem, and proceeded to carry his design into execution in 1564. His solution was the notorious *Oprichnina*. Few people of the time understood his idea; he carefully abstained from explaining it; he invested it with such mystery that it seemed incomprehensible; and he carried it out with such a grotesque *mise en scène* that history has till recently regarded it as the wild caprice of an irresponsible madman on the throne. But, whatever judgment may be passed on its wisdom, the *Oprichnina* must be taken seriously, as a deliberate and carefully thought-out means of adapting the administration to the pretensions of autocracy.

The plan consisted in a division of the administration of the empire into two parts, and the establishment of a new Court, distinct from the old Court of Moscow. The new institution was called the *Oprichnina* or "Separate Establishment," over which the Tsar presided, and those who served in it were the *Oprichniki*. At the beginning large tracts of territory were set apart to maintain it, to the south-west, north-east, and north of Moscow, and during the following six or seven years new regions were continually being included in its sphere, until it embraced the greater part of the central provinces. The rest of the empire remained under the old system, governed by the Council of Boiars, and was distinguished as the *Zemshchina*. Geographically the lands reserved for the *Oprichnina* ran, like a wedge, from north to south into the lands of the *Zemshchina*, which included all the frontier provinces on the west, south, and east. In the central provinces, the lands of the two spheres interlaced each other, and Moscow itself was divided. Such a partition of territory between the sovereign and the Council of Boiars reminds us of the partition of the Roman Empire into Senatorial and Imperial provinces. But the purpose and principle were wholly different. While Augustus assigned to the Senate the more central and pacific lands, and appropriated to his own care all those which were exposed to danger, Ivan did exactly the reverse. It is also to be noted that all the chief roads of traffic from Moscow to the frontiers, with the towns that lay on them, were included in the territory of the *Oprichnina*, which thus commanded the tolls; except the southern roads, where the toll revenue was not great. But the appropriation

of the central regions was determined by the political aim which Ivan had in view. Here were the estates of the old princely families and the most powerful boiars. Ivan seized the allodial lands and converted them into feudal; and he assigned to the owners estates, subject to strict conditions of service and taxation, in other parts of the Empire. Whenever the *Oprichnina* seized lands, either allodial or feudal, the proprietors were uprooted, unless they were themselves enrolled in the *Oprichnina*. By this means the descendants of the appanaged princes, who were the most formidable members of the opposition, were detached from the places where they had power and influence, and removed to distant regions as simple men of service; while those who had hitherto "served" these princes as their liege-men became the immediate servants of the Tsar. The ancient local aristocracy thus received a crushing blow; and only a few who could convince the Tsar that they were harmless, such as Prince Mstislavski, or who joined the *Oprichnina* like the Princes Shuiski and Trubetskoï, maintained their positions. Such exceptions did not modify the general result, that men of simple boiar descent now succeeded to the influence of those who based their political claims on their princely origin. Thus Ivan accomplished in a more sweeping way the object which he had foreshadowed in the measure of 1550—the creation of a class of service completely dependent on himself and lacking the traditional rights and position which had formed the strength of the aristocratic resistance.

The execution of this policy, involving ubiquitous, rapid, and violent changes of ownership, caused a general upturning of society, enormously increasing the confusion and complication of the already complicated and confused relations between proprietors and peasants. Estates with their inhabitants flew from hand to hand, as has been said, "almost with the velocity of bills in a modern exchange." The peasants replied by flight to the hardships which were entailed upon them. The massive confiscations, violent and sudden, were alone sufficient to create consternation and alarm; but the administration of the *Oprichnina* was marked by such terrorism and savage cruelty, and rendered so infamous by the Tsar's debauches in his den of horrors at Alexandroff, that these accidental accompaniments disguised its deeper significance from contemporaries and made it appear as a measure of police rather than as an instrument of political reform.

The dualism between the *Zemshchina*, with the Duma, and the *Oprichnina*, with the Tsar, was not absolute, and it was no part of the Tsar's intention that they should be antagonistic to each other. The *Oprichnina* did not stand outside the State. The two administrations were directed to act in concert, and the cleft which ensued was not part of Ivan's plan, but was due to the way in which it was realised. There was no duplication of bureaux, but each bureau had officials belonging to both administrations. No official acts of the *Oprichnina* as such are preserved.

The Duma always referred foreign questions to the Tsar, and we find the boiars of both spheres consulting together and deciding unanimously on a Lithuanian question. In 1572 the *Oprichnina* ceased to bear this distinct name, and became simply the Court. Nor can any significance be ascribed to the temporary elevation of Simeon Bekbulatovich, a member of the princely House of the Tartars of Kazan, who was proclaimed Great Prince of Moscow and Tsar of all the Russias in 1575. Ivan's motive in exhibiting this comedy, which lasted for a few months, is mysterious, if it was more than a caprice: Simeon was a mere puppet; he had no real authority.

The temporary dual system may appear a roundabout and clumsy way for accomplishing the Tsar's aims; but it is intelligible as a compromise. It was his intention to preserve to the Duma its administrative functions, while he required a perfectly free hand to make and mar without its advice or interference. His plan secured both these ends. By severing himself from the Moscow Council and dividing the administration territorially he was able without constant friction and fear of treachery to carry out his revolutionary policy. When the political power of the old noble families was annihilated and their estates in the central provinces were converted into fiefs held on conditions of service, the use of the double system was over.

It has been often pretended that Ivan's reign witnessed the introduction of parliamentary institutions in a rudimentary form. This view can hardly be upheld. The *Sobor*, or Assembly, which was convoked at Moscow in 1550 to deliberate on remedies for the terrible condition to which the oppression of the recent boiar régime had reduced the realm, was not of the nature of a Parliament, but rather a body of administrative character. Its importance consisted in the fact that it was composed, not merely of the higher officials and boiars who belonged to the Duma, but also of representatives of the administrative class of all grades throughout the Empire. We do not know on what principle they were chosen. The *Sobor* was in fact no more than an extension extraordinary of the normal Duma. It had however political, though little constitutional, significance; it showed that Ivan did not intend to rely exclusively on the advice of the aristocracy of Moscow; it was a presage of the political tendency of his reign. This Assembly was preliminary to the promulgation of Ivan's Code, which revived the law-book of his grandfather, and introduced an important change in the civil administration. Justice and police were in the hands of governors, called *kormlenchiki* because they lived upon the land; and nothing could have been worse than their government. In some places the communes had the nominal right of assisting in the administration of justice through their heads or elders. The rural classes and the people of the provincial towns were organised in communes, presided over by elders or mayors whom they elected at their communal assemblies, and were collectively

responsible for the fiscal obligations of their members, the corn-tax and the hearth-tax. These communes may have been originally based on the old Slavonic *mir*; but although we find here and there cases of joint ownership of land which is characteristic of the *mir*, individual and not common ownership is the rule in the communes of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The design of the new legislation was to do away with the *kormlenchiki* and substitute judicial authorities elected in the districts; but the condition that the proffered charters of local autonomy could be obtained only by purchase hindered many communes from availing themselves of the reform. This step seemed, in the first instance, to contradict the general policy of centralisation which had guided Ivan III; but it was not long before the locally elected magistrates became officers nominated by the central Government, and the growth of serfdom effectually put an end to that of local autonomy which the Code of Ivan IV appeared to have inaugurated.

Another *Sobor* was summoned in 1566 for the special purpose of considering the relations of Russia with Poland. Besides boiars, functionaries of various grades, and ecclesiastics, there attended a number of merchants of Moscow and Smolensk, evidently invited on account of their special knowledge relating to the commerce between the two countries. There was no popular representation, and this *Sobor* has not more claim than the first to constitutional significance.

While Ivan was engaged in carrying out domestic reforms and terrorising his subjects, foreign affairs did not cease to importune him. The conquests of Kazan and Astrakhan have already been mentioned. These successes, especially the former, made a profound impression on the nation, redounding to the Tsar's prestige. It remained for him, his counsellors thought, to complete the work by destroying the Tartar power of Crimea, and so to reach the Euxine; and these advisers might have deemed their opinion justified when in 1571 the Crimean Khan invaded Russia and burned Moscow, except the Kremlin, to the ground. A second invasion in the following year was repulsed. Yet the subjugation of Crimea was a project which was perhaps premature. Ivan preferred to turn the strength of his arms north-westward, and by conquering Livonia to reach the Baltic. At this time Livonia had sunk into the last stage of decay, misery, and corruption, vividly described by Sebastian Münster; there was no national feeling or unity; the population was trodden down by the corrupt German colonists, the knightly Order which governed it; and it was a question whether it was to Poland, or Russia, or Sweden, or perchance to Denmark, that it would pass. For Russia it had a special importance, not only as the street to the Baltic, but also because, after the foolish policy of the Tsars in destroying Novgorod as a commercial centre, trade had retired to Riga and the Livonian towns. Ivan conquered the greater part of the country (1557-60); and the last High Master of the Teutonic Order, Gottfried

Kettler, having in vain sought active help from Poland and the Empire, transferred to Poland the rights of his Order in Livonia and resigned himself to the possession of the duchy of Courland for him and his heirs (1561). But the Russian occupation of Livonia was premature. For the next twenty years there was almost unbroken war with Poland, and, as Sweden and Denmark were interested, the course of events was complicated by a succession of political combinations among the four Powers. It was varied by the candidature of the Tsar for the Polish throne, first on the death of Sigismund Augustus (1572), when Henry of Valois was elected, and again, after his abdication, in 1575, when Stephen Báthory, the *Voivod* of Transylvania, supported with arms by the Sultan, won the crown. It is said that Ivan was favoured by the lesser nobility, but he threw away whatever chances he had by his want of deference towards the Diet. In the Hungarian, Stephen Báthory, Poland had gained an ambitious master, Russia a formidable foe. He created a powerful army and undid all that Ivan had done. But Livonia was only a minor question in the greater issue involving the very existence of Poland, which, if it was not to be crushed ultimately between German advance on the west and the power of Moscow on the east, must extend over Russia its sway, along with its civilisation and religion. The absence of geographical boundaries rendered the dilemma inexorable: either Russia or Poland must disappear as an independent State. Internal and external circumstances combined to postpone the final solution; but Stephen Báthory had grasped the truth and logically prepared to conquer Muscovy. He besieged and failed to take Pskoff, but he would not have ceased from his enterprise if Rome had not intervened. The Tsar had sought the mediation of Gregory XIII, and the treaty which was concluded in 1582 through the negotiations of the Jesuit Possevino surrendered Livonia to Poland. The Russians had not yet the strength to grasp either the Baltic or the Black Sea.

Besides the expansion of the Muscovite power to the Caspian by the capture of Astrakhan, which secured the command of the Volga from source to mouth and established authority more or less effective over the Cossacks of the Don, the reign of Ivan was also distinguished by a conquest which founded the Asiatic power of Russia. The Tsar had granted (1558) lands on the Kama to Gregory Stroganoff, member of an enterprising family which had done great service as pioneers of civilisation in the deserts north of Viatka. During the next twenty years Stroganoff and his colonists extended the sphere of their operations beyond the Ural and came into conflict with a Tartar kingdom recently founded, of which the capital was named Sibir (near Tobolsk). This State imperilled the enterprises of the Stroganoffs, and they had recourse to the somewhat hazardous expedient of hiring a band of Cossack brigands. With the Tsar's consent they engaged six hundred and forty Cossacks, who had hitherto been accustomed to waylay Russian traders.

Of their two chieftains one had been condemned to death; the other was Ermak Timotheevich, who showed that he had the qualities of a conquistador. He defeated the Khan, captured Sibir, and carried his arms beyond the Tobol between the rivers Irtysh and Ob. If Ermak had failed, no responsibility would have fallen upon Russia; but Ivan was not slow to reap the fruits of his success. He sent officers to take formal possession of the new acquisitions and recognised the adventurer's services by gifts. Ermak perished almost immediately after this (1584), in a night surprise, it was said, and when trying to swim the Irtysh in a coat of mail which was one of the Tsar's gifts. This Russian Cortes was raised by the people and the Church to the rank of a hero and almost of a saint. But though he helped effectively the eastern advance of Russia at a critical moment, the real task of subjugating Siberia was accomplished by the long and quiet toil of the peaceful colonists who carried on the work of the Stroganoffs.

The death of Ivan the Terrible (1584) delivered Russia from a nightmare of tyranny, but opened a period of unrest and civil strife which lasted for thirty years. The social and political discords threatened the realm with a struggle which could only be averted by a strong tyrant or by an able statesman armed with all the authority of legitimacy. But Ivan left no successor like to or better than himself. He had two sons by his first wife, Anastasia Romanova (from whose brother the present dynasty is descended). The eldest son Ivan was slain by his father's hand in a fit of fury (1582), a tragedy which produced a deep effect on the popular imagination, echoed in the popular lays. The second son Theodore was a weakling. By the latest of his other wives (he had no fewer than seven, though some were not recognised by the Church), Maria Nagaia, he had a son Dimitri who was an infant at the time of his death. The throne passed at once to Theodore, whose feeble intellect was unable to cope with, or even realise, the difficult problems of government and organisation which demanded the ruler's care, while his delicate constitution suggested disturbing uncertainties as to the continuation of the dynasty. He proved in fact the last of his line; but it may almost be said that the dynastic crisis began at his accession. The peculiar way in which the course of this important period of Russian history shaped itself was due to the circumstance that the catastrophe of the old dynasty coincided with a crisis of general social disorganisation. The unrest (*smuta*) which ushered out the old dynasty and ushered in the rule of the Romanoffs is marked by three stages, which have been designated as dynastic, social, and national. The first is a struggle for the throne among various claimants representing different interests; the second, a civil war between social classes complicated by the intervention of foreign Powers; the third, a national struggle with foreigners, issuing in the organisation of a new national Government.

Throughout the reign of Theodore, his brother-in-law, Boris Godunoff,

one of the new boiars of the *Oprichnina*, was the real ruler. At first he seems to have acted more or less in harmony with certain others who were naturally marked out to form the inner council of advisers and conduct the government of the *fainéant* sovrän—Prince Mstislavski, Prince Shuiski, and Nikita Romanovich Jureff, the Tsar's uncle. All these were alike responsible for sending the Empress-Mother and the infant Tsarevich Dimitri to Uglich—a measure which was not due to any actual conspiracy in the infant's favour, but intended as a precaution against possible intrigues on the ground that Theodore was incapable. Till his death (1585) Nikita seems to have united this inner circle by the ascendancy of his influence; but after his death a struggle between Boris and Mstislavski ended in the speedy disgrace of the latter, and two years later an attempt of the Shuiskis to overthrow Godunoff's power was followed by their exile. Special titles which were bestowed on Godunoff gave him a place apart in the Court; he had precedence over all dignitaries, and was officially empowered to conduct negotiations with foreign potentates. Foreign Courts recognised him as the actual ruler; the English called him Lord Protector of Russia.

The talents of Boris were confessed by his foes. Personally amiable, he was thoroughly honest and earnest in his purpose to govern well. Foreigners testify to a marked improvement during his *régime*; the country breathed again after the wars and atrocities of the Terrible. But he was faced by social problems, too complicated and radical to be solved by the alleviations to which he resorted, and which only postponed the civil struggle to which the profound antagonisms within the social organism pointed as inevitable. He could not conciliate the conflicting interests of the richer landed proprietors, the ecclesiastical owners, the middle and small classes of fiefholders, the free peasant proprietors, the vagrants who lived like Cossacks in the southern provinces. The general note of his policy was to favour the middle class. He inherited and continued Ivan's policy of depressing the old nobility and raising new men like himself to power and influence. He consulted the interests of the general mass of the men of service, and sacrificed to them the interests of the peasants. What the men of service wanted was to have not only a secure hold on their land, but also a guarantee that they should have men to till it. Accordingly his regency was marked by the formal introduction of serfdom (1597). To support and strengthen the middle class—this was his policy as Regent and afterwards as Tsar.

When Theodore's only child Theodosia died (1594), and it was recognised that he had no hope of leaving issue, it was clear that on his death the reigning dynasty would terminate. For his step-brother, Dimitri, had been found with his throat cut at Uglich in 1591. Mystery encompassed the child's death; a commission of inquest returned a verdict that it was a case of epileptic suicide; but there is little doubt

that he was murdered, and the opponents of Boris held him responsible for the crime. In anticipation of the vacancy of the throne they were not inactive; the idea of electing an Austrian Archduke was even ventilated. The Romanoffs were at this juncture the most formidable rivals of Boris, and it was said that the Tsar before his death (1598) expressed the wish that his cousin Theodore Romanoff should be his successor. There were other candidates, Bielski and Mstislavski; but probably the real conflict lay between Romanoff and Godunoff. The charge of having procured the murder of Dimitri was used as a weapon by the adversaries of Boris; but he succeeded in carrying through his own unanimous election at the *Sobor* which assembled to choose a tsar in 1598. The disgust of the great boiars at this election may be measured by the fact that they got up an agitation in favour of Simeon Bekbulatovich, the Tartar whom Ivan IV had decked with the brief semblance of sovereignty. Boris took the precaution of forcing Theodore Romanoff to become a monk, though no charge of conspiring seems to have been brought against him. We shall meet him again under the name of Philaret. His brother and the whole family were then disgraced and banished on a charge of sorcery; but other reasons must have lurked behind.

The struggle in which Boris was the leading actor had hitherto been purely dynastic; it did not touch the nobles as a class, only particular families were involved; and it did not directly affect the rest of society. With the rise of the famous Pretender, who impersonated the murdered Tsarevich Dimitri, the question at issue was still dynastic, but the interest in it spread to society at large, and soon created a movement in which the succession to the throne became secondary. The deeper rifts in the community widened into chasms, which threatened to engulf the State.

The identity of the Pretender, who appeared in Poland in 1603 and gave himself out as Dimitri, son of the Tsar Ivan, is held to be one of the unsolved mysteries of history. But a strong case has been made out for believing that the Tsar Boris was right in identifying him with Grishka Otrepieff, an unfrocked monk, who had formerly been in the service of the Romanoffs. He had carefully informed himself of the circumstances connected with Dimitri's death, and he told an ingenious story, which will not however sustain a critical examination, that a devoted tutor, foreseeing the evil design of Boris, had rescued him by substituting another child. The impostor gained the credence of influential persons in Little Russia, and became betrothed to Marina Mnischez, daughter of a Polish noble who took an active part in propagating Roman Catholicism. The influence of this atmosphere induced him to change his faith, and at Cracow, where he presented himself in March, 1604, he secretly joined the Roman Church. He had become the *protégé* of the Jesuits and wrote an ardent letter to the Pope.

King Sigismund was disposed to espouse his cause. It is not probable that the King was really convinced at any moment that the Pretender was the Tsarevich, but if Russia could be brought to accept him as such, the interests of Poland might be as well promoted as if he were genuine. The forcible policy of Stephen Báthory had been abandoned under Sigismund, who sought to bring his eastern neighbours under Polish influence by compassing a close union in commerce and religion. He found Boris resolutely determined (as Ivan IV had been, when similarly approached by Possevino) not to open any door to Latin propaganda in Russia. The result of his efforts was the conclusion of a truce for twenty years (1602). In the face of this treaty it seemed difficult to support in arms the rival of Boris. The two Great Chancellors of Poland and Lithuania were opposed to the idea; the nation was disinclined for a new war; and the Diet rejected the proposal to assist the Pretender. But the King succumbed to the temptation. He hoped to recover some of the territories which had been wrested from Lithuania, and to obtain Russian help for executing his cherished plan, the conquest of Sweden, his father's kingdom. He entered into a secret engagement with the Pretender, who readily promised what was asked; and on his part, although he could give no open or official help, he connived at the recruiting of Polish volunteers. Both the King and the Roman Church saw in Dimitri's enterprise a great chance for bringing about an ecclesiastical union. The Jesuits and the papal Nuncio Rangoni threw themselves enthusiastically into his cause, and played an important part in these events.

The Pretender took the field with an insignificant miscellaneous army of some 4000 men. The success which crowned his enterprise was due not to Polish help (his Poles deserted him in the middle of the campaign), but to the inhabitants of the southern and south-western provinces, which were ready to welcome any pretender, and to the enlistment in his cause of the Cossacks of the Don. The population of the south, consisting largely of emigrants from the north, peasants who had been raised to the rank of Imperial service, were thoroughly discontented with the new conditions, finding their last state as evil as their first. While Dimitri advanced from the south-west, the Cossacks moved simultaneously on the south. Without following the course of the campaign (1604-5), we may note the mistake which the generals of Boris made in fixing the base of their operations too far west, with the idea that their enemy had all Poland behind him, and thus leaving the way open for the rapid successes of his Cossack allies. The issue might have been different but for the sudden death of Boris in April, 1605, which led to a new development. The evidence does not justify the suspicion that the Pretender had originally been suborned or supported by boiar princes of Moscow; it is significant that the Galitsins, the Shuiskis, and Mstislavski were employed by Boris against him. But

on the Tsar's death these nobles saw that the prospect was favourable to reaction. Instead of supporting the Tsarevich, Theodore Godunoff, they declared for the Pretender, and through them the whole army took the oath to Dimitri. But the boiars did not believe that he was the son of Ivan. They accepted him merely for the temporary purpose of nipping the Godunoff dynasty in the bud. The Shuiskis showed their hand at once by a premature conspiracy against him, which led to their banishment.

The Pretender's reign at Moscow endured for a year and displayed his incapacity to control a most difficult situation. Surrounded by a circle of foreigners, Poles and Jesuits, who claimed that he owed everything to them, he soon alienated the sympathies of Moscow. He sought to base his power on the support of those families of the nobility which had been kept under by Boris. For instance he recalled the Romanoffs. Feeling that by this policy he was rousing the dissatisfaction of the old princely families, he recalled the Shuiskis, who as soon as they returned began to contrive his overthrow, in conjunction with the Galitsins. The Tsar was also suspected of heresy by the ecclesiastics, though he concealed his conversion; and when he celebrated his marriage with Marina, and Moscow was filled with Polish visitors who permitted themselves every licence, the bigotry of the Moscow populace was thoroughly aroused. The blow was struck a few days later; the Pretender was done to death (May, 1606); and Vasili Shuiski, who had been prominent in organising the plot, was elected Tsar. This reaction represents the last short-lived triumph of that princely class against which the *Oprichnina* was directed; the "aristocratic" principle was for a few years in the ascendant; and the new Tsar issued a manifesto which meant, not a limitation of his own Imperial prerogative in favour of the boiars, but his intention to return to the old administrative system of the days before the *Oprichnina*.

Such a policy was impossible. Vasili had against him an important circle in the nobility, to which the Romanoffs and Mstislavski belonged. The Moscow populace had been accustomed by recent events to making their voice heard in politics, and he found it impossible to quiet the mob, which had helped him to the throne, and which was now ready to believe that the late Tsar was really Dimitri. To meet this danger Vasili had the bones of the murdered child brought to Moscow; the son of Ivan was canonised as a martyr; an official declaration was promulgated in the name of the Tsar, the boiars, and Dimitri's mother; and a pamphlet, known as the "*Izviet of Varlaam*," was issued under Shuiski's inspiration, showing that the Pretender was Grishka Otrepieff. In those days, however, publicistic literature was not effective in Russia. The community was not ready to accept Shuiski's *régime*. Rebellion, beginning in the south-west, spread to the east and north-east, and to the west, assuming different characters in different regions. The same people who had before been against Boris were now against Vasili. The

centre of the movement was at Putivl (which had been the headquarters of the Pretender), and a leader arose in Ivan Bolotnikoff who impressed it with the stamp of a social revolution, issuing flyleaves inciting to attacks on property and the commercial classes. It was, in fact, avowedly a programme of rapine, and this marks a new stage in the *smuta*. The rebellion attracted ambitious members of the new families to whose career the reaction of Shuiski closed the door. A heterogeneous army recruited from the southern provinces, including Riazan, laid siege to Moscow (October, 1606); but it was a political coalition of social adversaries, and a month's association in camp convinced the more conservative elements, especially represented by the men of Riazan, that they could not work in harmony with the radical followers of Bolotnikoff. The siege was broken up, and there ensued a general rallying of the orderly classes to the government of Vasili, who then collected an army; a year later this revolutionary attempt was finally suppressed by the capture of Tula, its last stronghold. The Tsar discerned that the Pretender's success had been largely due to the support of the vagrant peasants; and it was this political motive which led him (1607) to renew in a stricter form the laws of serfdom which had been passed in the regency of Boris.

The reaction and the old order seemed thus to win the victory in the first bout. But before Tula had fallen a new Pretender arose in the Sieverski province. His name is unknown; he was generally called “the Robber.” His position was entirely different from that of his predecessor. The first “Dimitri” had guided a movement which was primarily in his own personal interests; the second “Dimitri” was a puppet serving the interests of political and social revolution and foreign designs. Supported by Polish adventurers, he gained such a strong following that in the summer of 1608 he won a battle close to Moscow, fortified himself at Tushino, and blockaded the capital. The revolt spread to the whole of the Moscow province, and north-westward to Pskoff. The north of Russia—the Pomore—had been almost untouched by the troubles and ferment which had begun with the *Oprichnina*. It was now faithful to the Tsar; Prince Skopin Shuiski created at Vologda a military and administrative centre, and, by the end of 1609, having succeeded in uniting forces with the general Sheremetieff from the south-eastern province, he cleared of the Robber's troops the regions north of Moscow. But before this was achieved, the Muscovite Government was confronted by a new enemy. King Sigismund had invaded Russian territory. The success of Skopin and the invasion of Sigismund brought about the fall of the two rival governments at Moscow and at Tushino in the course of 1610. The Robber fled from Tushino, and Sigismund entered into negotiation with the Tushinites, in whose counsels Philaret (Theodore Romanoff), their Patriarch, had a leading voice. A covenant of union was concluded (February, 1610) by which the Tushinites accepted Prince

Wladislaw of Poland as Tsar, with the condition that, while there was to be a close military union between the two countries, Russia was to be autonomous and its orthodoxy inviolable. This agreement reflects the policy and interests of those groups of the upper class which were opposed to the reaction of the boiar princes. The Tushinite leader entered into relations with the inhabitants of Moscow, proposing peace and the overthrow of Vasili. The army of the north, which had lost its leader by the death of Skopin, took no part in these events, and Shuiski and his party were overthrown (July, 1610) by the Moscow populace.

With the fall of the reactionary government the last stage of the domestic strife begins. It seemed as if the direction of affairs was now to be under the control of a foreign Power. The next three years (1610-2) are marked by attempts, both open and secret, finally successful, to restore order and create a permanent government. The first experiment, after a temporary administration by seven boiars, was the acceptance of Prince Wladislaw, who was elected to the throne by a *Sobor* under boiar influence—"the last political act in the history of Moscow boiardom"; but when it became clear that his sovereignty was a mask for a military dictatorship, exercised by his father, Moscow attempted to substitute a national government. In the struggle with Sigismund which ensued, the Patriarch Hermogenes played an important part. To him the national and religious feelings of the Muscovite turned as to a sort of guardian. He stubbornly refused to recognise the foreign Tsar; he circulated letters denouncing Sigismund; and, when some of them fell into the hands of the Poles, he was kept under surveillance. But his letters bore fruit, especially at Riazan and Nizhni-Novgorod. An anti-Polish movement was organised by Prokopi Liapunoff; a national host was formed; and a new alliance was cemented between the middle classes and those who had been the adherents of the Robber. This unnatural union with the "Robbers" and the Cossacks, intent on rapine, was a policy doomed to failure. In the mixed army which besieged Moscow in 1611 there was neither unity nor discipline; the Cossacks plundered the land at will; and the attempt to organise an effective government was futile. The death of Liapunoff was followed by open discord; the rest of the army left the Cossacks and "Robbers" alone in the camp and went their ways. This ended the second attempt to create order; and the prospect seemed gloomier than ever. The control had passed to the Poles, on the one hand, threatening political servitude, and to the Cossacks and rural proletariat, on the other, threatening a social subversion. Sweden, too, alarmed by the election of Wladislaw, had appeared on the scene and occupied Novgorod-the-Great, putting forward on her side the candidature of a Swedish prince.

From this desperate situation Russia was rescued by the middle classes, who rallied together against the foreign and the domestic dangers. The brethren of the (Troitsa monastery, who) were active

during this crisis, urged the country to make common cause with the Cossack army against the Poles. But the Patriarch Hermogenes was firmly opposed to any union with the brigands, and his view prevailed in the towns of the northern provinces from which the deliverance came. The initiative was taken by Nizhni-Novgorod, where the leaders of the movement were Kuzma Minin, elder of the commune, who represented the bourgeois, and Savva Ephimieff, who represented the higher groups of society. To organise and lead the national forces which were to clear Moscow and her territory from the two foes, Prince Dimitri Pozharski was chosen, a member of an old princely family which had come down in the world. An adherent of the old traditions, he had, in the reign of Vasili Shuiski, shown decided military talent. Kazan joined the movement, and Pozharski anticipated the Cossacks in seizing Iaroslavl, which then, as the richest town in the regions north of Moscow, became the political centre of the national movement. A temporary Government was formed, consisting of a *Sobor* of the normal composition, while a council of war acted as a Duma; and, on April 7, 1612, a manifesto was issued calling on the land to unite against the foreign invaders and "the Russian robbers." Months were spent at Iaroslavl in organising, and negotiations, meant only to gain time, were carried on with Novgorod, which had acknowledged a Swedish prince. The Cossacks were driven from the towns which they had occupied; and, when the national army at last moved on Moscow, the Cossack leader Zarutski marched off with nearly half the host, and the rest submitted. Then Moscow was taken and the Poles driven out (October).

A national *Sobor* met at Moscow in January, 1613, to elect a new Tsar. The Shuiskis, Galitsins, and the princely Houses, even the deliverer Pozharski, had no influence at this election, and the choice fell on Michael Romanoff, son of Philaret, the first Tsar of the dynasty which reigns to-day.

The *smuta* was over. A durable settlement was achieved by the active combination of those conservative classes which had held aloof both from the revolutionary designs of the serfs and Cossacks, and from the reactionary policy of the prince boiars. It was the triumph of the men of service, who had neither been seduced into the den of "Robbers" nor drawn into the nets of foreign conspiracies, and of the peasants and bourgeois of the communes of the northern provinces, which had been least affected by the *Oprichnina*. The issue of the civil war solved both the political and the social problems, which had upset the fabric of the State, in the interest of the middle classes. Politically, the *smuta* completed the work of the *Oprichnina*, the power of the boiars was undermined, and the ground was cleared for the development of a bureaucracy recruited without regard for birth. Socially, the rebellion of the lower classes against the lot of serfdom was crushed; they were sacrificed to the middle class, and the policy of Boris was reinforced.

The political influence of the middle classes was felt throughout the reign of the first Romanoff, and for a time under his successor. It was expressed by frequent meetings of the consultative assemblies, which had been introduced by Ivan IV and since his reign had fulfilled the important duty of electing Tsars. The significance of these *Sobors*, as we have already observed, is political rather than constitutional. They hardly give the reign of Michael the claim of being a "parliamentary epoch"; but they served as a check on the acquisition of excessive influence by the nobles. We find the *Sobor* giving assent to taxation, nominating a Patriarch, deliberating on the question of going to war with Poland. In 1642 it was summoned to consider whether Azoff, which had been captured by the Cossacks, should be retained by Russia. This *Sobor* consisted of the Council of nobles, the higher clergy, and 195 representatives of other classes. Through it public opinion influenced the Tsar's decision. The statements of the lesser nobility, the merchants, and the delegates from the rural districts, as to the widespread misery and exhaustion from which the country was suffering through taxation, military service, and the exactions of governors, convinced the Tsar that a war with Turkey was impossible; and the Cossacks were bidden to abandon Azoff. In the reign of Alexis a *Sobor* was summoned (1648) for the preparation of a new law Code. This Code (*Ulozhenie*) and the work of this *Sobor* represented another success for those classes which had raised the Romanoffs to power. They were dissatisfied with their economical conditions; wars, taxes, the competition of foreign commerce pressed heavily upon them; and so far as the *Ulozhenie* was not mere codification, it attempted to satisfy their needs, by sharpening the laws on serfdom, by restricting the acquisition of lands by the Church, and by enactments against foreign trade. Again in 1653 a *Sobor* was consulted on the question of war with Poland. This was the last, and it was seemingly due to the influence of the Patriarch Nikon, of whom more will presently be said, that the institution disappeared.

The weak character of Michael (1613-45), a man of no talent, threatened Russia with evils similar to those which it had suffered in the minority of Ivan IV. This calamity was averted by the return, in 1619, of his able father, Philaret, from Poland, where he had been kept as a hostage. Philaret was created Patriarch and assisted the Tsar in the cares of government. Until his death (1633) he was virtually the colleague of his son; his name appeared along with the Tsar's in public Acts. The secure establishment of the new dynasty on the throne was largely the result of his prudent guidance and firm control. The Government had in the first place to deal with those foreign Powers which had fished in the troubled waters. The cession of Ingria and Carelia bought off the claims of Sweden and procured the restoration of Novgorod (Peace of Stolbova, 1617). Poland had made a formidable

effort to realise the design of Báthory. For her it was a question of life and death, and her failure may be said to have meant the loss of her last chance. Wladislaw, indeed, did not abandon his pretensions; he marched on Moscow (1618), and his repulse only led to a truce by which Poland retained Smolensk, Chernigoff, and Sieverski. On the death of Sigismund III in 1632 the war was renewed, this time by Russia; and Wladislaw, now King of Poland, renounced his claims to the throne for a sum of money, by the Treaty of Polianovka, 1634.

The reign of Alexis (1645-76) witnessed not only the recovery of the recent acquisitions of Poland, but also the annexation of some of the border-lands, which in race, language, sentiment, and religion were Russian, but in consequence of the Lithuanian conquest had become part of the composite Polish-Lithuanian State. This Russian Lithuania, including White Russia in the north and Little Russia in the south, had formed a State distinct from Poland itself until 1569, when the Act of Lublin, to which reference has already been made, established a common Diet and Senate with a common political capital, and made Little Russia, as distinct from White Russia, part of Poland, though Poland and Lithuania (with White Russia) retained their separate laws, armies, chancellors, and other chief functionaries. The Orthodox religion was safeguarded; but the increase of Polish influence in the Russian lands led to Roman propagandism actively carried on by Jesuits, and to a long persecution of the Orthodox by those who aimed at union. In the north this policy might ultimately have succeeded, but it was disastrous in the southern steppes of the Ukraine, where there was a military population, of free habits, impatient of authority, and devoted to the Orthodox faith. These "Cossacks" of the towns, distinguished from the Zaporogian Cossacks who lived in absolute freedom beyond the Falls of the Dnieper, were organised in regiments under the general supremacy of the Hetman of Little Russia, who was appointed by the King. Smarting under the oppressive rule of the Poles, who treated them as an inferior race, the Little Russians were fully prepared for revolt, when a leader appeared in the person of the Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki, a man of ability, bravery, and some education. The war which he commenced (1648) against the Poles was marked by savage atrocities on the part of his followers, who displayed particular fury against the Jesuits and the Jews; and not less cruel reprisals were practised by the Polish nobles. After the first slight successes of his insurrection, Chmielnicki sent to Warsaw a formal list of complaints of the ill-treatment and injustice suffered by the Cossacks and people of Little Russia. At this juncture King Wladislaw died, and his successor, John Casimir, was prepared to treat. But the struggle continued, broken by negotiations and truces, until in 1651 Chmielnicki experienced a crushing defeat. He had counted on the support of the Khan of Crimea, but the Khan had proved a treacherous ally.

Hopeless of carrying on the contest alone, he now turned to the Power which seemed the natural protector of the Orthodox and sent an embassy to the Tsar (1652). Alexis called a *Sobor* to discover whether the realm was prepared to resume the strife with Poland; the assembly declared for war; and a commission was sent to receive oaths of allegiance from the Hetman and the Little Russians (1653). This war, in which Moscow won the stake, was waged by the Tsar with a measure of humanity and moderation which it was unusual for a Muscovite army to practise, and was attended with a success which would almost certainly have led to the annexation of White Russia, if another Power had not intervened. Charles X of Sweden came down from the north, seized Posen, Warsaw, and Cracow, and entered into relations with Chmielnicki, whose real desire was not subjection to Russia, but independent sovereignty. In the situation thus created Alexis saw that his only course was to come to terms with Poland, and make common cause against the Swede. In this enterprise he was successful; he conquered a great part of Livonia, though only for a brief term. The Peace of Kardis (1661) restored to Sweden the Livonian fortresses which the Russians had occupied; but the danger of a Swedish Poland was averted for the time. The Poles, however, having driven out the Swedes, refused to execute their treaty with Alexis, and war was renewed. It lingered on till 1667, when the Treaty of Andrusovo restored to the Tsar Smolensk and the other places which had been ceded in 1634, and also gave him Little Russia up to the Dnieper, along with the sacred city of Kieff.

This was a gain which at first caused to Moscow as much trouble as it had caused to Warsaw. The Cossacks were not inclined to enter into the strict conditions of the life of an organised State; and during the next years Ukraine was the scene of trouble and disturbance. At the same time the Cossacks of the Don, hitherto at rest, rose under Stenka Razin, who formed a huge army of brigands recruited by fugitive adventurers from the Dnieper regions. His authority and his rapine ranged to the shores of the Caspian, and he won an enormous reputation, as a hero whom enchantments had rendered invulnerable, through south-eastern Russia. The Government thought to paralyse the movement by offering him a pardon; he accepted it, but soon resumed his career of rebellion, and his rule reached from Astrakhan to Nizhni-Novgorod. At last he was captured and put to death, in 1671. The steppes of southern Russia, inhabited by an unruly and shifting population, were an impediment to the progress of civilisation; and the same conditions still prevailing produced a hundred years later the formidable insurrection of Pugacheff in the reign of Catharine II. It must be added that the Little Russian lands on the right bank of the Dnieper were contested with Poland by Turkey (1672-6); then the Hetman threw himself into the arms of Russia, and a short Turkish war was followed by the Treaty of

Bakchi-serai (1680) with the Sultan and the Crimean Khan, whereby the Ukraine and Zaporogia were left to Russia.

The reign of Alexis was agitated by ecclesiastical dissensions, a struggle between the Tsar and the head of the Church, and a struggle within the Church itself. The Patriarchate of Moscow had been founded in 1589 with the consent of the Patriarchs of the East, and it had not failed to add to the prestige of Russia, especially in those countries which belonged to the Greek confession. We saw the part which Hermogenes played at a critical juncture, but the dignity of the office was considerably enhanced when Philaret filled it and helped his son to govern the realm. But the Patriarchs were generally the creatures of the Tsars. The history of the Patriarchate embraces little more than a century, for it was abolished by Peter the Great; and of the ten who discharged its duties in that period only two were men of great prominence and ability, Philaret and Nikon. The power and influence which were associated with the office in the hands of Philaret endangered the principle laid down by Ivan the Terrible, that it is the business of monks to hold their tongues, inasmuch as Church and State are separate spheres. The conflict of Alexis with Nikon showed that the dyarchy of Michael and Philaret could not be repeated.

Nikon owed his appointment as Patriarch (1652) to the sincere friendship of the Tsar, who genuinely admired his stronger will and superior intellect; and it seemed that he might be to the son what Philaret had been to the father. When Alexis left Moscow to take part in the war for Little Russia, he made Nikon his vicegerent in secular affairs. The nature of the Patriarch was hard and despotic, and he made himself generally hated by his arrogance. He assumed the title "Great Ruler," which had been borne by Philaret, not however as Patriarch but on account of his relationship to the Tsar. Alexis returned in 1656, but he was no longer the same man. Life in the camp and experience of military operations seem to have developed his character and made him more manly, independent, and self-confident. The results of this development were not compatible with the continuation of Nikon's power. The temper of Alexis was mild, but Nikon had no tact—he was spoiled by his extraordinary success, and, as a Russian historian has said, "was not one of those who know where to stop." The old friendly relations gradually cooled. A conflict was inevitable, when Nikon began to brandish the same theory which had been so often used by the Bishops of Rome, the immeasurable superiority of ecclesiastical to secular authority. Nikon's numerous enemies, including the Tsaritsa (Maria Miloslavskaia), fanned the mutual distrust; and in 1658 Alexis took a decisive step by requiring him to explain how he came to designate himself "Great Ruler." This was equivalent to a rupture; Nikon withdrew to a monastery, probably expecting to be recalled; but the Tsar, although, profoundly devoted

as he was to the Church, his victory must have cost him dear, remained firm; and Nikon by intrigues with the oriental Patriarchs laid himself open to the charge of compromising the government in the eyes of foreigners. It was considered that his aim was to establish a popedom in Russia. He was tried at a Church Council (1667) and condemned to deprivation and confinement in a monastery. To the suppression of this exceptionally able ecclesiastical potentate it was due that the Church was kept in her own sphere, and subordinate to the State, and Peter averted the rise of another Nikon by abolishing the Patriarchate.

But, if Nikon failed in the attempt to usurp secular power, he was successful in an enterprise of Church reform, which had momentous consequences. The Russian Church, through its dead formalism, through the ignorance of its clergy, through a bigotry seldom equalled and never surpassed, was and still is one of the most effective obstacles to progress. Its formalism may be imputed to its Byzantine parentage; but, had it profited more by the influence and example of Byzantium, it would at least have appropriated some theological learning. The rule of the Tartars does not explain the gross ignorance of the ecclesiastics; for, through the astute policy of the tolerant khans the Church had been the one favoured institution, and consequently had never attempted to organise a national resistance to their yoke. If Greek had originally been made the ecclesiastical language, theology would have been in a different position; for the writings of the Fathers would have been known in a country where the clergy were forced to learn Greek; but as the liturgy was in Old Slavonic (the language of the Macedonian Slavs, which, though not identical with Russian, was easily learned), practically no training was necessary for the peasants who became priests (popes) or monks. Yet heresies, which are always a sign that the life of a Church is not extinct, did not fail to arise. A man occasionally appeared who, having come in contact with a wider world, lit a dim candle in the darkness. In the reign of Ivan the Great, Nil, a brother of the monastery of the White Lake (*Bielo ozero*), had wandered as a pilgrim in the East, learned Greek, and sojourned on Mount Athos. When he returned, he could not endure the spiritual deadness of his old cloister, and he built himself a cell, some twelve miles away, on the banks of the Sora; whence he was known as Nil Sorski. Some comrades joined him, and the anchorite's dwelling grew into a little community of a primitive monastic type. Nil laid no weight on external forms or outer works of piety, which may lead, he said, to the worst of sins, pride; the only thing that mattered in his eyes was the state of the thoughts and the spirit. Better, he said, to drink wine with reason than water unreasonably. At a Synod held in 1503, he proposed to disendow all Russian monasteries on the ground that those who renounced the world had no business with worldly property. Such views raised up hosts of enemies, who sought to destroy

him by charges of heresy. They alleged that he criticised the texts of the Slavonic Lives of Saints and stigmatised some passages as interpolations. Russian churchmen regarded the Slavonic versions of Scripture and ecclesiastical literature as sacrosanct, and an enlightened man—*rarissima avis*—who suggested that being translated from Greek they might contain mistranslations, was considered a dangerous blasphemer for questioning the authorised version. Vassian, a pupil of Nil, applied similar criticism to the Slavonic version of the Byzantine *Nomokanon* (collection of canon laws); and a long struggle ended in his banishment (1531). In his critical labour Vassian was aided by a man more famous than himself, Maxim the Greek. The "heretics" had at all events convinced the Orthodox that it would not be amiss to have on their side men of some learning, and also that it might be desirable to augment the ecclesiastical literature by new translations from the Greek. For this purpose the great Duke Vasili imported from Mount Athos an Epirote Greek named Maximos. He had visited Italy in his youth, had associated with Aldus the printer at Venice, and at Florence he had heard sermons of Savonarola, whose spirit and ideals made an abiding impression on him. But he was not at home in the atmosphere of the Renaissance—pagan, he thought, and demoralising—and had sought the solitude of the Holy Mount. He set out for Moscow, resolved to imitate the high example of the Florentine monk, and expose sin and error, regardless of consequences. Engaged at first in translating Greek commentaries, with the help of two Russians who knew Latin, he proceeded, when he had learned Russian, to examine the service-books. He discovered false renderings, and thereby set his feet on a perilous path. He was told that by such a suggestion he offended the Russian saints who had used these books and now, on account of their holiness, were enabled to perform miracles. The schismatic sects use the same argument to this day. Maximos went on to criticise severely the clergy and the monks. His career ended in incarceration in a monastery (1531); he had learned too much about the secrets of Muscovy to be allowed to return to Mount Athos.

The correction of the liturgy, which Maximos suggested to the great scandal of the Orthodox, was again proposed by an archimandrite of the Troitsa monastery in the reign of Michael; but it was reserved for Nikon, with the approval of the Tsar Alexis, to carry it out. The attention of Nikon was directed to various differences and innovations which had crept into the Russian Church by Paisios, Patriarch of Jerusalem, who visited Moscow in 1649. For instance, it was the custom in Russia to make the sign of the Cross with two fingers, in Greece and the East with three (symbolic of the Trinity). A commissioner was sent to the East, whose report confirmed the criticisms of Paisios. In Little Russia, where there was some theological learning, it was known that the service-books were faulty. On his appointment as Patriarch, Nikon

at first hesitated, for he well realised the difficulties; but further study convinced him of the necessity of undertaking a reform, and he asked the Tsar to summon a Synod, which met in the palace in 1654, and resolved, though all its members were not sincere and some refused to sign the Act, that the books must be conformed to the Greek and ancient Slavonic manuscripts. A second Synod (1655) revised the liturgy and ordained that other ecclesiastical books should be similarly corrected; a third (1656) enacted that the sign of the Cross should be made with three fingers. But there was a large discontented faction, who objected to these changes, drew up a petition to the Tsar against "the great disturber Nikon," and asserted that the Greek books had been corrupted by the Latins. Discussion was futile, and Nikon obtained the degradation and banishment of the leaders of the opposition. The fall of Nikon did not lead, as his enemies hoped, to the undoing of his reforms. But it caused a renewal of the agitation, and Alexis, weary of the petitions of monks and clergy, called a Synod in 1666 "against the schismatics and troublers of the Church who have recently sprung up." Among these the most prominent leader was Avvakum, protopope or rector of a Moscow church, of whom we possess a remarkable autobiography. This assembly generally approved the changes, and another (1667) formally and finally anathematised those who did not accept the reforms which it enumerated. The violence of the opposition in monastic circles is illustrated by the obstinate refusal of the great Solovetski monastery in the White Sea to accept the revised books; the monks stood a siege for several years; and, when the place was taken, many were put to death for their defiance of the Tsar.

The changes introduced by Nikon were trivial; but they led to a consequence of far-reaching importance, the *Raskol*, or great schism. The *Raskolniki* or schismatics are those who severed themselves from the Church and would have nothing to do with the inessential alterations made obligatory by the Synods of 1666 and 1667. The spirit of the schism was a product of the ignorance of the people, caused by the stagnation of secular culture, which produced a childish devotion to trivial externalities. In this respect the official Church and the schismatics were on one level, equally unable to distinguish the essential from the inessential. Both parties believed that the soul's salvation depended on the number of fingers with which the Cross was signed; and if the student of the history of religion were not prepared for any and every absurdity, he would find it hard to believe that such a question as the precise spelling of the name "Jesus" in Russian should cause as hot a conflict as if the order of the universe depended on the presence or absence of a single letter. The *Raskol* was not due to degeneration in the Church; there was no decline, for there had been no better time; the reform merely called into active resistance a mass of ignorance which would otherwise have continued its slumbers. It was in

Great Russia, especially in the north and the Volga regions, that the *Raskol* chiefly spread. The schismatics lived in the past, considering the days before Nikon and before Peter as the ideal age of their country. They have been compared by a Russian novelist to Lot's wife, who, looking back, became an immovable pillar. "Yet," writes a German historian, "in this protest against the established Church and State, in the energy of the mystic apocalyptic symbolism with which the *Raskolniki* defend their doctrines, and in the material means which are at their disposal, lies a force which presents the greatest difficulties to the State and the official clergy. Here, at all events, in this stubborn opposition, the people show that it is not the indifferent herd of sheep for which it is generally taken." The people of the old faith represent the spirit of antagonism to progress and European culture. It is a passive spirit, though stiff-necked, but it is the more effective, in proportion as they are more industrious, thrifty, and sober than the Orthodox. The movement was too widely spread, and had its roots too deep in the national character and traditions, for the Church and State to check it. The schismatics were simply maintaining the prejudices which the Church had always displayed towards change, erudition, and the influence of foreign ideas—"abominable German customs." In one of the schismatic pamphlets which have been preserved it is stated that God forbade the imitation of foreign dress, since all illicit stitched garments are disgusting in His eyes. Tracts were published against "tobacco, that devilish herb, cursed and abhorred of God." It was believed that the Redeemer and His mother appeared to some Russian women, and warned them that, as soon as Christians began to "drink" tobacco, lightning and thunder, frost and ice would be their punishment. Nikon's reforms were declared an attempt to replace Greek orthodoxy by Latin heresy. One of his leading opponents asked despairingly, what would happen if east and west should mix. The fanatics deemed it a heinous crime that the children of the Tsar Alexis should be allowed to gain some knowledge of astronomy, philosophy, and medicine. One of them wrote an insulting open letter to the Tsar. "How dare you keep at your Court men who have the hardihood to measure with a yard-rule the tails of the stars? You feed the foreigners too well, instead of bidding your folk cling to the old customs." The schismatics offered bitter resistance to the policy of Peter the Great; they looked on him as Antichrist, on Moscow as Babylon.

The extent of undeveloped territory in Russia, the immeasurable waste reaches on its periphery, north, east, and south-east, facilitated the expansion of the *Raskol*. The schismatics could flee from persecution into the impenetrable forests and boundless steppes, and find places beyond the supervision of the Government. In this way they helped in the work of colonisation, founding villages and monasteries, and reclaiming land. With a nomadic instinct they united the habits

of industry, and the camps of rebels were transformed into settlements, where agriculture and trade thrived. Here—and it was the case with Russian monasteries in general, notably that of Solovetski—fanaticism was joined with attention to material interests. In Nikon's time the *Raskolniki* were counted by hundreds of thousands, at the present time they perhaps exceed fifteen millions. But this does not mean merely the people of the old faith. The name *Raskol* was extended to all varieties of dissidents and sects who alike repudiated the State Church, so that the men of the old faith are only one of numerous groups, which, as dissent is always hydra-headed, soon sprang up within, as well as beside, the communities of the original dissidents.

The *Raskol* expressed a protest against change in general, and thus had a much deeper significance than might seem to be involved in the religious questions which led to the schism. It uttered the suspicions aroused in the people by the far from enthusiastic willingness of the Tsar himself, and the more pronounced zeal of a few others, to learn something from peoples beyond the borders of their land. In tracing the influence of Western Europe upon Russia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there is danger of exaggeration. The process does not resemble a development; Russia under Alexis was, as regards civilisation, the same at heart as under Ivan the Great. In manners and modes of thought there had been no general alteration among the higher classes. The description of Adam Olearius in the seventeenth century presents the same picture as the reports of the travellers of the sixteenth. Yet a Peter the Great and his reforms would have been inconceivable a hundred years earlier. The West had come to Russia; it began to come in the sixteenth century, it was there in the seventeenth. But the process was not an internal development, but rather like the laying of a mine, which did not outwardly affect the land till Peter had the courage to explode it. The decisive step had been the admission of foreigners to reside at Moscow; and thus Western ideas, although they made no way except with a few isolated individuals, were there, on the spot, in the foreign or "German" suburb of Moscow, waiting to be assimilated. The increasing intercourse, both commercial and political, of Russia with Western countries, and the grudging and restricted hospitality extended to resident strangers, which marked the period with which we are dealing, were an indispensable condition of Peter's work, of its conception as well as its execution.

The mental stagnation of Russia was due mainly to her isolation from Europe in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries. We have already observed that this isolation was due partly to the displacement of the centre of power from Kieff to the forest of Suzdalia and the tributaries of the Volga, and partly to the Tartar conquest. Another cooperative event may be found in the dismemberment and decline of the Eastern Empire (after 1204), through constant intercourse with

which the Russian State had been kept in touch with a higher civilisation. But how was it that in the sixteenth century Russia should have been so completely beyond the horizon of Western Europe that the books of Paolo Giovio and Herberstein created a sensation as if a new land had been discovered, seeing the position which it occupied in relation to Poland, Lithuania, and Livonia? How was it that information about the Muscovite realm did not filter through more freely? The answer is that it was the deliberate policy of the intermediate States, which were continually at war with Moscow and jeopardised by her ambition, to keep the Russians at as low a level of civilisation as possible, to hinder them from improving their army in accordance with West European ideas, to prevent them from competing in industries; and they did what they could to shut Russia away and check intercourse with the West. This policy began to break down in the sixteenth century, but it was still a maxim. In 1547 the young Tsar Ivan made arrangements for the importation of engineers, mechanics, artists, and physicians from Germany; but the scheme was frustrated through the machinations of Livonia. Some years later, when commercial relations were established between England and Moscow, the King of Poland, deeply alarmed, wrote to Elizabeth urging that such intercourse was dangerous, and protesting, "in the interests of Christianity," against giving Russia, "the enemy of all free nations," the chance of obtaining munitions of war and of becoming initiated in European politics.

The interest of the West in Russia, which began in the sixteenth century, was not at first for its own sake, but in order to find an overland route to the East and destroy the monopoly of the Indian trade which the Portuguese enjoyed through their discovery of the ocean route. This was the object of the visits of the Genoese Paolo Centurione, in the reign of Vasili. They led to no result except indirectly to the publication of Giovio's book on Muscovy. In this book (1525) the notion was entertained that China might be reached by way of the ice sea. But it was not through the direct influence of Giovio or of Herberstein's later work (1549) that in 1553 three ships sailed from London, under the command of Sir Hugh Willoughby, to discover the northern passage. After passing the North Cape the vessels were separated by a storm. Willoughby's and another reached the coast of Lapland, where the crews, inexperienced in the hardships of an arctic winter, succumbed to cold and hunger. The *Edward Bonaventure*, of which Richard Chancellor was captain, had better luck. Carried to the White Sea, he sailed to the mouth of the Dvina and met a friendly reception from the astonished inhabitants. The Englishmen who set out to find China had alighted by chance on Russia. It was a quite unexpected discovery to them that here was the Muscovite realm, and that Ivan, son of Vasili, was its ruler. Provided with horses, they

travelled to Moscow and were received by the Tsar. Ivan proved readier than might have been expected to favour commercial relations with England, and sent Chancery back with a letter to Edward VI professing willingness to open negotiations. "If you send one of your Majesty's counsel to treat with us, whereby your country's merchants may with all kinds of wares make their market in our dominions, they shall have a free mart." Thus an accident led to the establishment of the English "Muscovy Company," of which Sebastian Cabot was the first Governor. English enterprise did something almost immediately towards beginning the development of the natural resources of Russia, by establishing manufactories for boiling tar, burning potash, making ropes; and the privileges conceded by Ivan gave the Company an advantage over other countries for some years, though in the following century Dutch rivalry, which had already begun by 1583, was here as in other fields successful.

The series of Western accounts of Russia was continued in the seventeenth century. We have the book of a French officer, Margeret, who took service in the Russian army; the work of the Dutch merchant, Isaac Massa, who lived at Moscow in the disturbed years 1601-10; the great description of Adam Olearius, who was attached to an embassy sent to Russia and Persia by Duke Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, at whose Court he was astronomer and librarian, in the reign of Michael; we have the account of Dr Samuel Collins, physician to Alexis; we have the more penetrating work of the Saxon, Laurence Rinhuber, who saw in Russia not merely a field for trade or for scientific investigation, but for a civilising mission. The *Travels of Olearius* (1646) present us with a full picture of the surface of Russian society, illustrated to the eye by views of towns and costumes, and even the inspection of these affords a vivid impression of the great gulf dividing the country from Western Europe. The invincible ignorance and incredibly rude manners of the higher classes and their cringing servility to the Tsar, the gross superstition and the shameless drunkenness (largely due to the conditions of the climate) which prevailed among all classes, the universal mendacity, the detestation of new ideas, were features which impressed all travellers, and their testimony is borne out by one of the exceptional Russians who had come to see their own society as others saw it. Kotoshikhin, who in the reign of Alexis fled to Sweden to escape from the hostility of powerful officials, embraced Protestantism and wrote a remarkable work contrasting Russia with Europe. The Russians, he says, are arrogant and incapable, because they get no education except in pride, shamelessness, and lying. They will not send their children abroad to learn, fearing that if they came to know the mode of life and the religion of other folks and the blessing of freedom, they would forget to return home. It was indeed one of the *arcana imperii* of the Tsars to hinder their subjects from travelling, lest they should behold the spectacle of

liberty elsewhere; but the law against leaving the country was one which few desired to violate, since converse with heretics was held to be unedifying, and there was the risk of dying in an ungodly land, which seemed to an orthodox Muscovite a horrible fate. The Tsars themselves were saturated with arrogant self-satisfaction and contempt for the rest of the world. When they sent an embassy to a foreign Court, they deemed that they were conferring a favour on the sovereign to whom it was sent. They had no idea what disgust and amusement the appearance of the clownish boiars—destitute of rudimentary conceptions of decency but devoted to pedantic ceremonial, knowing no language but their own, sometimes unable to pay their way—excited in the European capitals. On the Emperor Alexis it seems to have dawned that his nobles were not heaven-sent diplomatists, and he often employed foreigners as ambassadors—a transition from the rude Muscovite envoys to the well-qualified native diplomatists of the eighteenth century.

A word must be said of the tyrannical means, and disastrous for national economy, to which rulers resorted for raising revenue. They are described by Elizabeth's ambassador, Giles Fletcher. Messengers, he says, are sent into the provinces where the special commodities of the land grow. "There they forestall and engross sometimes one whole commodity, sometimes two or more," taking them at low prices fixed by themselves and selling at an excessive rate to their own or foreign merchants. "If they refuse to buy them, then they force them unto it. The like is done when any commodity, thus engrossed by the Emperor and received into his treasury, happeneth to decay or mar by long lying, or some other casualty. Which is forced upon the merchants to be bought by them at the Emperor's price, whether they will or no. This last year 1589 was engrossed all the wax of the country, so that none might deal with that commodity but the Emperor only." The Tsars augmented their revenue by acting as publicans and encouraging their subjects in indulgence in strong liquor. "In every great town of his realm," says Fletcher, "the Emperor hath a *cabák* or drinking-house, where is sold *aquavítæ*, mead, beer, &c. Out of these he receiveth rent that amounteth to a great sum of money. Some yield 800, some 1000, some 2000 or 3000 roubles a year." It may be noted that the total yearly revenue of the Tsar in the reign of Theodore Ivanovich, arising from indirect sources, custom duties and fines, as well as from the direct imposts, the corn-tax and the hearth-tax, including the products of the Imperial domains, amounted to 1,430,000 roubles.

The fiscal expedient of monopolies was not peculiar to Russia, but their excessive nature is remarkable. Similar excess marked the monetary policy of Alexis when he depreciated the coinage as a last resort in the financial difficulties in which the Polish war had involved him. No civilised ruler stepped further on this disastrous path. All silver money

was confiscated; the Government paid, but refused to accept, copper for silver; sixty soldiers could now be maintained for what it had cost before to maintain one. As a result, illicit mints were established all over the country. Prices inevitably rose; the Government forbade their augmentation; but here the autocrat was powerless. Hunger and misery ensued, and in 1662 the people of Moscow rose in despair and threatened the Tsar's life. Torturing and burning were the answer of Alexis, and thousands perished.

The strict Oriental seclusion of women of the upper classes has often been considered a consequence of Tartar rule, but it was rather due to Byzantine influence. Byzantine too was the custom of the bride-show. The most beautiful maidens of the land were assembled at Moscow and reviewed by the Tsar for the purpose of selecting his consort. In law and justice we can also see the action of ideas derived from the Eastern Empire. The early Code of Iaroslav reflects the primitive judicial institutions of the Slavonic tribes. The Code of Ivan the Great reflects a complete transformation. Homicide is punished by death, theft by scourging; torture is applied; corporal chastisements are prominent. This change was due not to Mongolia, but to Byzantium. After the conversion of Russia the influence of Constantinople was immense, exercised especially through the Church. Greek clergy went to Russia, bringing literature and ideas. They introduced the Roman principles of inheritance, by which a man's property went to his offspring, and we can trace the conflict between this principle and the Slavonic custom which devolved property not upon the son, but upon the eldest of the family. In criminal law, the clergy threw all their energy into abolishing the system of pecuniary composition and introducing penalties of death, mutilation, and scourging. The primitive system gradually gave way, but we find in Ivan's Code some survivals of old customs. It may be noted that the punishment which the Code (*Ulozhenie*) of Alexis ordained for taking snuff, amputation of the nose as the offending member, is characteristically Byzantine in spirit. It is to be remembered that the little literature which the Russians possessed came from Greek sources, and Byzantine influence has even been traced in the curious *Domo-stroi*, a book on household management partly written by Silvester, the councillor of Ivan IV.

It cannot be proved that the machinery of central administration, the system of *Prikazy*, was due to influence from the same quarter. These bureaux, of which there were more than forty in all, and which were abolished by Peter, appear in the sixteenth century, but the date of their introduction is unknown. Like some of the palatine offices of the later Roman Empire they have the character of domestic rather than of state departments. The *Prikaz* for embassies dealt with foreign relations, but was of minor importance before the reign of Michael, and it was not till the reign of Alexis that, by the appointment of the able

statesman Ordin-Nashchokin, with a special title, to the headship of this bureau, Russia had a regular Minister for foreign affairs.

Some of the Tsars (Ivan IV and Boris) had shown themselves personally less prejudiced against things foreign than the mass of their subjects. The horizon of Philaret had been enlarged by his enforced residence in Poland, and Michael is said to have been fond of Englishmen. Alexis broke some of the old traditions, and in his reign presages of future change may be discerned. These slight signs were mainly the consequence of the opening of Russia to foreign merchants, and of the German quarter in the capital; but this influence was augmented by the acquisition of Kieff, which through its long connexion with Poland was intellectually at a far higher level than Moscow. Two Kieff scholars (Slavinetski and Satanovski) were called to Moscow in 1650 to translate the Greek Bible into Russian. It was a west-Russian monk whom Alexis employed as tutor of his children, Simeon Sitianovich, known as Polotski, who knew Latin and Polish, and has been described as a walking encyclopaedia. He exposed the prevailing ignorance and preached the necessity of education. But more remarkable than he was the learned Servian, Iuri Krizhanich, an enthusiastic exponent of the idea of the solidarity of the Slavonic peoples, who set himself the task of furthering their progress by the improvement of their languages so as to render them as adequate as other European tongues to express general ideas, and sought to vindicate the Slavs against foreign calumny and scorn. But the importance of this pioneer of Panslavism lay not in his Slavophil programme, but in what he did by exhibiting the backwardness of Russia, making war upon its spirit of contempt for foreigners, and inculcating the need of enlightenment, in the book of *Political Ideas* which he dedicated to Alexis.

The new ideas, preached by strangers, did not pass by two leading men of the day who held the post of Foreign Minister. Ordin-Nashchokin was alive to the importance of a fuller knowledge of Europe, of acquiring books from abroad, and of developing commerce. Artemon Matvieff, who succeeded him as chief of the foreign *Prikaz*, had married a Scotchwoman, and assimilated European ideas. His wife was not submitted to the seclusion of Russian ladies; occidental fashions were affected in his house and the conduct of his household. His adopted daughter Natalia Naryshkina became the Tsar's second wife (1672), and the mother of Peter the Great. She displayed the fruits of her bringing up by appearing publicly in her litter with the curtains raised. Her marriage led to the disgrace and exile of Matvieff on the accession of Theodore (1676), whose mother's relatives, the Milaslovskis, were his enemies. It is characteristic that the charge alleged against him was sorcery.

The Tsar Alexis was not a great statesman. Like Philip II of Spain, and Joseph II of Austria, he was diligent in attending to the

details of public business. But he was susceptible of the influence of minds more powerful than his own, and he knew how to value and to choose Ministers of exceptional ability. During the first half of his reign, his chief guide was his capable kinsman Boris Morozoff, while in subsequent years he entrusted the helm, as we have seen, to the progressive statesmen Ordin-Nashchokin and Matvieff, both of them new men who had risen from obscurity. His old-fashioned piety did not hinder him from supporting the reasonable reforms of Nikon, and his old-fashioned learning enabled him to sympathise with the efforts of those who desired to improve education. Kindly and sociable in disposition, he was open in his later years to the superficial influence of Western ideas; and their progress at his Court was particularly displayed in the performance of dramas with dancing and music, in the presence of himself and the Tsaritsa Natalia—spectacles which at the beginning of his reign he would unreservedly have condemned.

Thus, during the reigns of the first three Romanoffs (Michael, Alexis, and Theodore), access to Western ideas was within the reach of Russians, and this explains the fact that a Peter the Great could arise. The foreign merchants at Moscow, the foreign officers, Scotch and others, in the army, the political negotiations with foreign Courts (especially the French) interested in the Turkish and Polish questions, were insensibly preparing the way for Russia to turn her face in a new direction, though the country at large seemed still impreguably barricaded behind a Chinese wall of prejudice and conservatism. The abolition of the *miestnichestvo*, already noticed, in Theodore's reign was a not unimportant breach in the old order; and it was significant that Orthodoxy, feeling itself endangered by the presence of heretics—Romanists, Calvinists, Lutherans—in the foreign quarter of Moscow, came to see that its best defence might be learning and education. It was the Tsar Theodore, pupil of Polotski, who, desiring as he said to imitate Solomon and the Greek Emperors in their love of learning, founded a Moscow Academy, at which Greek and Latin were to be taught as well as Slavonic, in the interests of the Church.

Theodore died in 1682, and his step-brother Peter, destined to regenerate Russia on lines which the later years of his father's reign had to some extent, though only faintly, indicated, was proclaimed Tsar.

CHAPTER XVII.

PETER THE GREAT AND HIS PUPILS.

(1689—1730.)

THE reform period of Russian History began in the generation immediately preceding Peter the Great. His amiable and inquisitive father, Tsar Alexis, was peculiarly susceptible to new impressions. He also possessed, in a high degree, the royal gift of discerning genius, and the Patriarch Nikon, who renovated the Russian Church, and the enlightened boiars Athanasius Ordin-Nashchokin and Artemon Matvieff, who first turned the Russian nation westwards, were the beloved friends and the directing counsellors of Alexis. Their great merit was to prepare a suitable atmosphere in Russia for the new ideas which were finding their way into the empire—the reforms which, under Theodore III, Alexis' eldest son and immediate successor (1676–82), took root in the soil and became substantial facts. By far the most important of these reforms was the abolition, at the suggestion of another enlightened boiars, Prince Vasili Vasilevich Galitsin, of the ancient and mischievous abuse *miestnichestvo*, or “family precedence,” described in the preceding chapter. By a single stroke of his pen the hopeless invalid Theodore III had, in 1681, removed an abuse which, for centuries, had appeared unsailable. He was, indeed, as thorough and devoted a reformer as a man who was obliged to issue his orders from his litter or his bedchamber could possibly be. The mere fact that, on his very deathbed, he could so easily remove so deep-lying and far-reaching an abuse, is a striking testimony to the steady, if silent, advance of liberal ideas in Muscovite society, even since the death of Alexis.

But a still more emphatic demonstration of the progress of the new ideas was the appearance in public, surrounded by her aunts and sisters, of the Tsarevna Sophia, acting as Regent for her little brothers, Ivan and Peter, on July 5, 1682 (O. S.), on the occasion of the revolt of the *Strieltzy* and their allies the Old Believers. Sophia, seated on the throne, not only confronted the schismatic rebels, but quelled their insolence and refuted their arguments. For the first time in Russian history, the women of Muscovy had boldly quitted the claustral seclusion of the

terem (women's apartments), to preside over a public assembly. Sophia, like her brother Theodore, had had a relatively superior education, under the guidance of learned monks from Kieff. Even Theodore's great foundation, the Academy of Sciences in the Zaikonnospasky monastery, was intended to be as much a bulwark of Orthodoxy as a university. Thus the chief difference between the Theodorian and the Petrine reforms was that the former were primarily for the benefit of the Church, the latter for the benefit of the State. The government of Sophia (1682-9) began with a grievous blunder, the murder of Artemon Matvieeff, the chief Muscovite representative of Western culture in its practical form. Matvieeff had been banished from Moscow, in 1676, for advocating the election to the Tsardom of the healthy and vigorous Peter, then in his fourth year, instead of the sickly Theodore. Summoned back from exile, on the death of Theodore, in May, 1682, he found that Peter had been declared sole Tsar by his mother's family, but that a dangerous rebellion already threatened the young sovereign. In courageously attempting to quell this rebellion, Matvieeff was literally hacked to pieces by the *Strieltzy* as he clutched desperately at the sleeve of little Peter for protection.

This recollection never forsook Peter; and there is a pretty general agreement that the convulsions from which he suffered so much in later years must be partly attributed to the effect of this violent shock on the very impressionable child. From the day of his father's death to his tenth year, when he was first raised to the throne, Peter shared the miseries and the perils of the rest of his family. On the other hand, he had peculiar advantages. From his very cradle he must have been made acquainted with Western ideas, for his mother, the Tsaritsa Natalia, had been the favourite pupil of Matvieeff, though she does not seem to have been very intelligent. After the triumph of Sophia, Natalia was altogether excluded from the conduct of affairs, and lived for nine months out of the twelve at Preobrazhenskoe, on the outskirts of the capital. During this period Peter was rarely to be seen at Moscow, except when he and his semi-imbecile brother, Ivan V, had to undergo the ceremony of receiving foreign ambassadors at the Kremlin. The boy soon felt cramped and stifled in the dim and close semi-religious atmosphere of Natalia's *terem*, and escaped from it, as often as he could, into the dirty streets of Moscow. There was no one near him of sufficient character and authority to keep the passionate fiery nature within due bounds.

From his tenth to his seventeenth year, Peter amused himself in his own way at Preobrazhenskoe with his "blackguards," as Sophia dubbed the lads of the rougher lower classes whom he gathered around him. But it was not all amusement. Instinct was already teaching him his business. From the first, the lad took an extraordinary interest in the technical and mechanical arts, especially in their application to military science. From his twelfth year onwards he used to build wooden fortresses on

earth foundations, with walls, ditches and bastions. One-half of his band of lads would then defend "Preshpur" (Pressburg) as he called it, against the other half headed by Peter himself. About the same time, he learnt the rudiments of geometry and fortification from the Dutchman Franz Timmerman. In his fourteenth year, Peter began to take an absorbing interest in boats and ships, the final result of which was to be the creation of the Russian Navy. After preliminary experiments with small craft, he practised sailing on a larger scale at the Lake of Pereyasavl, eighty miles from Preobrazhenskoe, where the German shipmaster Brandt built larger boats for the indefatigable young navigator. To wean him from these dangerous pursuits and accustom him to domesticity, his mother, in January, 1689, compelled him to marry Eudoxia Lopukhina. The match was most unfortunate. The tempers of the spouses were quite incompatible. The bride, brought up in the strict old school, though beautiful and pious, had no attraction for the young groom of seventeen. Three months after the wedding, Peter broke away from her and returned to Pereyasavl. The revolution of 1689, which overthrew Sophia and placed the government of Muscovy in the hands of Peter's kinsfolk, made no difference in his mode of life. Most probably at the beginning of 1690, he had found a new friend in the Swiss adventurer François Lefort, a reckless soldier of fortune, infinitely good-natured and amusing. We are told that "things impossible to describe" went on in the large hall, added at Peter's expense, to Lefort's house in the German settlement. But he was a shrewd as well as a pleasant scoundrel. For his own sake, he felt bound to divert Peter from mere amusement to serious enterprises which would place both the Tsar and his "jolly companions" in a more favourable light. It was this drunken, disreputable mentor who first persuaded Peter to undertake the expedition against Azoff, and then to go abroad to complete his education—in a word it was Lefort who put "Peter the bombardier" in the way of becoming "Peter the Great."

By this time Peter had tired of the Lake of Pereyasavl and even of the White Sea, which he had already visited twice, on the second occasion launching the first vessel built by "skipper Peter" which he christened *St Paul* (May, 1695). But the White Sea, frozen nine months out of the twelve, had become too narrow for him, and he was looking about him for more hospitable waters. All sorts of projects were forming in his head. At first he thought of seeking a passage to India or China by way of the Arctic Ocean. Next he turned his eyes in the direction of the Baltic; but the Baltic was closed to Muscovy, and the key to it was held by Sweden, still the strongest military monarchy of the North. The Caspian remained; and it had long been a common saying with foreign merchants that the best way of tapping the riches of the Orient was to secure possession of this vast inland lake. But, so long as Turk, Tartar, and Cossack nomads made the Volgan steppe

uninhabitable, the Caspian was a possession of very doubtful value. The first step towards security was to build a fleet strong enough to overawe those parts, for the anarchy of which the presence of the hordes of the Khan of Crimea was mainly responsible. But the Khan, to whom Muscovy actually paid tribute, was himself the tributary of the Grand Turk—it was therefore necessary for the Muscovite authorities to attack the Turks direct. War against the Ottoman Porte was therefore resolved upon; and, the experience of Vasili Galitsin, in 1687 and 1689, having demonstrated the unpromising character of a Crimean campaign, the Turkish fortress of Azoff, which could be approached by water from Moscow, became the Russian objective. Early in 1695 the army of the new order, and the *Strieltzy*, or arquebusiers, 31,000 strong, proceeded partly by land and partly by the rivers Moscova, Oka and Volga, to the Cossack town of Panshino on Don, reaching Azoff by the beginning of July. The bombardier regiment was led by “bombardier Peter.” The Russian batteries were opened on July 19, bombardier Peter directing the guns himself for the first fortnight; but no impression could be made on the fortress. In the beginning of August, the Turks surprised the Muscovite camp during its mid-day siesta, captured five guns and ruined the Russian siege artillery. After two subsequent fruitless attempts to storm Azoff, the siege was abandoned (September 27), and on November 22 the young Tsar reentered Moscow.

Peter’s first military expedition had ended in unmitigated disaster; yet from this disaster is to be dated the reign of “Peter the Great.” Fully accepting his failure, he determined to repair it by a second campaign. On his return from Azoff we hear no more of revels in the German settlement, or of sham fights at Preobrazhenskoe. Immediately after his arrival, Peter sent to Austria and Prussia for as many engineers, sappers, miners, and carpenters as money could procure. He meant to build a fleet strong enough to prevent the Turkish fleet from relieving Azoff. A model galley was ordered from Holland. All the workmen procurable were driven together in bands to Voronezh and other places among the forests of the Don, to fell timber. In the course of the next few months, 26,000 labourers, working night and day, turned out hundreds of barks and smaller vessels. Difficulties multiplied at every step. Thousands of workmen deserted; other thousands dawdled on the road; many of them never appeared at all. Forest fires destroyed the shipping sheds; severe frosts at the end of March, heavy snowstorms in the beginning of April, were fresh impediments. Yet, by dint of working all through Lent and Holy Week, a fleet of two warships, twenty-three galleys, four fire-ships, and numerous smaller craft, were safely launched in the middle of April. “We have finished our task, because, like our father Adam, we ate our bread in the sweat of our brows,” wrote Peter to his uncle, Peter Stryeshneff. His own portion of

this bread of labour had been eaten in a small two-roomed wooden hut at Voronezh, where he lived among his workmen, himself the most strenuous of them all.

On May 14, the "sea-caravan" sailed from Voronezh, Peter, now captain, and commanding eight galleys of the flotilla from the galley *Principium*, built by his own hand. Nor was all this labour in vain. The new Russian fleet prevented the Turks from relieving Azoff by water; and in the daily fighting, the advantage was always with the besiegers. On July 29 the fortress surrendered. Its capture was one of those triumphs which strongly appeal to the popular imagination. It was the first victory ever won by the Muscovites over the terrible Turks. On October 11 the Muscovite army made its triumphal entry into the capital. The procession was headed by Admiral Lefort and Generalissimo Shein; and behind their gilded sledges marched Captain Peter, with a pike across his shoulder.

Peter now felt able to advance along the path of progress with a quicker and a firmer step. At two councils held on October 31 and November 15, 1696, it was resolved to consolidate the victory by converting Azoff into a fortress, by establishing a new naval station at the head of the Sea of Azoff, to which the name of Taganrog was given, and by building a national fleet under the supervision of foreign ship-builders at the national expense. But it was necessary to guarantee the future as well as to provide for the present. It was therefore resolved to send a grand embassy to the principal Western Powers, to solicit their cooperation against the Turk. At the same council it was decided that fifty young Muscovites of the best families should be sent to England, Holland and Venice, to learn the arts and sciences of the West, especially shipbuilding, fortification, and foreign languages, so as to make Russia independent of foreigners in the future. The experiment had already been tried, on a smaller scale, by Tsar Boris Godunoff (1598-1605). It failed, because the young Muscovites refused to return from civilisation to barbarism. Peter proposed to obviate this by being the pioneer as well as the ruler of his people. He would, first of all, be a learner himself, that he might be able to teach his people afterwards. But Peter's ideas, just because they were so much in advance of his age, scandalised the respectable classes of Muscovy. Their sense of dignity was shocked by the spectacle of the *Gosudar* ("Sovereign") walking behind the sledge of a drunken Swiss adventurer; and they disliked the notion of sending their sons abroad to learn new-fangled practices from foreign heretics. Amongst the *Strieltzy* too, we notice the first symptoms of discontent which, a year later, was to burst forth in open rebellion. All these causes together led (March 16, 1697) to a secret conspiracy against Peter's life. It was repressed with the ferocity of panic fear. Six of the ringleaders were executed. Under torture they had confessed that the Tsar's uncle, Ivan Milaslovski, had counselled Sophia to murder

Peter. Ivan was beyond Peter's vengeance; but his corpse was dug up, dragged by swine to the foot of the block at Preobrazhenskoe, and defiled by the warm blood of the decapitated traitors. This is the earliest instance of the would-be regenerator's frequent relapses into savagery, under the overpowering stress of terror or hatred.

On March 21, 1697, the grand embassy, under the leadership of Lefort and Golovin, set out on its travels. Peter attached himself to it as a volunteer sailor, "Peter Mikhailoff," so as to find greater facilities for learning shipbuilding and other technical sciences. The details of this adventure are so familiar, that there is no need to recapitulate them here. Though Peter completed his technical education in the dockyards of Deptford and Saardam, and so far was the gainer by his expedition, the embassy itself failed, as it was bound to fail, in its main object of obtaining the help of the Western Powers against the Turk. All Europe, divided into two hostile camps, was anxiously awaiting the death of the childless Charles II of Spain; and neither France nor the Grand Alliance pitted against her by William III was willing to plunge into the distant eastern War, with an armed conflict as to the Spanish Succession at their very doors. So far, indeed, were the allies from intervening in the Turkish War, that it was their earnest desire to bring about a peace between the Emperor and the Porte, in order that the forces of the Empire might be exclusively employed against France. For the same reason, the prospect of the prolongation of the Russo-Turkish War was by no means disagreeable to England and Holland, as thereby the Porte would be prevented from giving assistance to Louis XIV.

Peter was about to go on to Venice to persuade the Seignior to cleave firmly to the fast dissolving Holy League, when he was suddenly recalled to Russia by tidings of the revolt of the *Strieltzy*. Analysed into its ultimate elements, the dissatisfaction of the *Strieltzy* with Peter's administration was the protest of indolent, incapable, ultra-orthodox, and excessively privileged troops against a new system which demanded from them more work and greater efficiency. When then, on June 6, 1698, a letter, supposed to have been written by the Tsarevna Sophia, urging them to join her in force at the Dyevichesky monastery, was read to them, the *Strieltzy*, 2200 strong, resolved to march forth with against Moscow, and to begin by destroying the German settlement there as the source of the new heretical ideas and projects. The importance of this rising has been much exaggerated. Three volleys from Peter's foreign mercenaries under Shein and Patrick Gordon sufficed to scatter the *Strieltzy* on the banks of the Iskra (June 17, 1698). In an hour's time all the rebels were in the hands of the Tsar's troops, of whom only one man was mortally wounded. It was only after the battle that the carnage began. Peter had ordered the authorities to deal "severely" with the rebels, as nothing but "severity" could extinguish this fire.

In Muscovy "severity" meant cruel severity; "severe" capital punishment pronounced against rebels meant breaking on the wheel, or impalement. Peter himself arrived secretly at Moscow on August 26, and, after spending a riotous evening at Lefort's house in the German settlement, had slept in his little wooden hut at Preobrazhenskoe. That very night he had determined to drown all contradictions in torrents of blood. The new era of enlightenment was to be inaugurated by a reign of terror.

Peter was well aware that behind the *Strieltzy* stood the sympathising masses of the Muscovite people, whom it was his mission to reform against their will. His foreign tour had more than ever convinced him of the inherent superiority of the foreigner; and, this superiority once admitted, imitation of the foreigner was, to his mind, inevitable. Any such imitation had, necessarily, to begin with externals; and Peter, with characteristic insight and thoroughness, at once fell foul of the long beards and Oriental costumes which symbolised the archconservatism of Old Russia. Other enlightened Princes, Boris, Theodore III, and the first pseudo-Demetrius for instance, had, in some respects, anticipated him. But all their more or less tentative efforts had foundered against the tyranny of ancient custom, and the strong opposition of the clergy. The famous protopope Avvakum had refused to bless the son of the boiar Sheremetieff, because he presented himself in indecent guise—in other words with a shorn head, after the Polish fashion. Beardless officials had small chance of promotion. More than one Patriarch had excommunicated members of their flocks who shaved. Against this powerful superstition Peter struck with all his might on the day after his return. On August 27, 1698, the chief men of the Tsardom were assembled round his wooden hut at Preobrazhenskoe; and Peter, emerging with a large pair of shears in his hand, deliberately clipped off the beards and moustaches of his chief boiars. After thus vindicating the claims of common-sense, he prudently condescended to a compromise. He decreed that after September 1 (the Old Russian New Year's Day), 1698, beards might still be worn, but a graduated tax was imposed upon their wearers. Thus the beard ceased to be an object of worship in Muscovy; but the people were not provoked too far, and a new source of revenue had been found for the Treasury.

And now, without giving the reactionaries time to recover from this rude shock, the Tsar proceeded to horrify them by a strange and awful series of bacchanalia. From the middle of September to the end of October, 1698, banquets and orgies alternated with torturings and executions, in which the Tsar and his favourites played the parts of inquisitors and headsmen. During these six weeks, no fewer than a thousand of the captive *Strieltzy* were done to death with every refinement of cruelty. At the same time, Peter seized his opportunity of breaking definitely with the past. The death of his half-brother Ivan V, in 1696, had left

him sole Tsar ; but Sophia in her monastery had been a possible source of danger. He determined that she should be such no longer. An intention on Peter's part to implicate her in the conspiracy is transparent from the first ; but the utmost that the most excruciating torments could wring from the wretched *Strieltzy* was the admission that Sophia had sympathised with the movement and would have helped it if she could. The letter supposed to have been sent by her turned out to have been written by her elder sister Martha. Both the Tsarevnas were shorn as nuns, and imprisoned for life under military surveillance. But Peter's most cruel act of tyranny was his treatment of his unhappy wife. Eudoxia was guilty of no offence. She had nothing to do with the rebellion. But Peter, profiting by the general consternation and imbecility of the reactionaries, gladly shook off an encumbrance whose very presence was a nuisance and a reproach. While still in London, he had attempted to persuade Eudoxia voluntarily to embrace the religious life ; but, the gentle creature proving unexpectedly obstinate, she was, on his return, shut up in the Pokrovsky monastery at Suzdal (September 23, 1698). So convinced were the ecclesiastical authorities of the uncanonicity of the whole proceeding that, for nine months, they hesitated to shear the Tsaritsa. Then the Patriarch bowed before the first gust of Peter's fury, and in June, 1699, the Tsaritsa Eudoxia disappeared from the world beneath the hood of "Sister Elena."

The terrible deeds of September and October, 1698, were not without an injurious effect on Peter himself, and, more than once, his nervous irritation exploded in tempests of frantic passion. Thus, at a banquet at Lefort's, on September 14, a dispute with General Shein over some trivial matter caused the Tsar to lose all control over himself. He rose from the table, drew his sword, fell furiously upon the company, and would have murdered them all on the spot, but for the soothing influence of his new friend, Alexander Danilovich Menshikoff. This extraordinary man was of so obscure an origin that it is doubtful whether his father was an ostler or a bargee. He first emerges into history as a vendor of meat-pies in the streets of Moscow. Lefort took him up and introduced him to Peter ; and, on the death of Lefort, in 1699, Menshikoff succeeded him as prime favourite. Ignorant, brutal, grasping and corrupt, Menshikoff, nevertheless, well deserved the confidence of his master. After Peter, there was not a more alert, lucid, unprejudiced and versatile intellect than Menshikoff's in all Muscovy, while his energy was boundless and inexhaustible. He could drill a regiment, build a frigate, administer a province, and decapitate a rebel, with equal facility. During the Tsar's first foreign tour, Menshikoff worked by his side in the dockyards of Amsterdam, visited all the Dutch workshops, and at the same time acquired a thorough knowledge of colloquial Dutch and German.

Two days after the punishment of the *Strieltzy* Peter wrote to his friend Andrei Vinius : "The shadow of a doubt crosses my mind. What

if the fruit of my labours be delayed, like the fruit of the date-palm, the sower whereof sees it not?" Evidently the disquieting suspicion that the work of regeneration would remain undone, unless he did it himself, spurred him on to fresh efforts. To save the people from the gross and notorious exactions of the *voivodui*, or provincial governors, and, at the same time to accustom them to self-government, burgomasters and town-councils, on the Western model, were now introduced. But the inherent corruption of Muscovite officialdom at once asserted itself. The *starostui*, or elders, whose duty it was to see that "good and worthy men" were chosen, systematically excluded from voting those of the electors who refused to pay for the privilege. In order to extirpate these corrupt practices by flogging and banishment, and to prevent their recurrence, Peter appointed a new order of officials, the *Pribuilschiki* (Inspectors), who were to provide for the purity of public life, and look after the interests of the Government. The first of them was Alexis Kurbatoff, who had studied commercial and financial questions abroad, and was an intelligent man of many expedients. Shortly after his appointment he suggested to Peter as a new source of revenue, the introduction of stamped paper into Muscovy. Peter was so pleased with the idea that he straightway appointed Kurbatoff his confidential financial adviser. At the same time Peter established trading companies in Muscovy, for the better protection of the native merchants against foreign competition. The last year of the seventeenth century saw another notable reform, which drew a sharp line of demarcation between old and new. By the ukase of December 20, 1699, it was commanded that henceforth the new year should not be reckoned from September 1, supposed to be the date of the Creation, as heretofore, but from the first of January, *Anno Domini*.

Peter had brought home with him in 1698 the conviction that he must conclude peace with the Porte. This conviction was accompanied by the melancholy reflexion that such a peace would mean the relinquishment of the Black Sea, and the hope of a Russian navy along with it. But, if the Black Sea were abandoned, why should he not compensate himself on the shores of the Baltic? The Baltic was nearer both to Russia and to Western Europe than the Euxine, and, consequently, a much more desirable possession. On the other hand, if it were impossible to continue the Turkish War without allies, they were still more indispensable in a war with Sweden, the great Power from which the Baltic littoral was to be wrested. With these ideas already germinating in his mind, Peter, on his homeward journey in 1698, encountered the lately elected King of Poland, Augustus II, at Rawa. The inexperienced young Tsar was enchanted by the worldly wisdom and the exuberant jollity of this facile and self-indulgent potentate. The Baltic question seems to have been discussed over their wine-cups, and Peter was delighted to find that Augustus was willing enough to

meet his ambitions half-way. Charles XI of Sweden, whose genius had enabled Sweden to recover the rank of a great Power, had died the year before; and the Swedish Government was now in the hands of his son, an untried youth of sixteen. If the Baltic Provinces were to be stolen at all, now was the time. But no definite agreement was reached on this occasion. Augustus had not yet matured his plans, and Peter could not embark on a new war till he had terminated the old one.

On returning to Moscow, Peter at once set about concluding peace with the Porte. It was his good fortune, at this period, to possess a Minister of foreign affairs of the highest ability in Theodore Golovin, who, like so many others of his countrymen in later times, had learnt the business of a ruler in the Far East. On Lefort's death he succeeded him as Admiral-General. The same year he was created the first Russian Count, and from 1699 to his death in 1706 he was the premier Minister of the Tsar. Golovin's first diplomatic achievement was the conclusion of peace with the Porte. The Turks, worsted by the Imperial troops in Hungary and on the Danube, were themselves anxious to come to terms with Muscovy. A preliminary truce for two years had been concluded in 1698, and in 1699 two Muscovite plenipotentiaries were sent to Stambul to convert the truce into a definitive peace. Everything was done both to mollify and to impress the Turk. The ambassadors were provided with 5000 roubles' worth of precious furs and 10 *poods* (400 lbs.) of walrus ivory, for bribing purposes; and they were not to go by land as heretofore, but by sea. A man-of-war awaited them at the new arsenal of Taganrog, and they were escorted out of the Sea of Azoff by a fleet of nine war-ships and two galleys. On August 28 a Russian line-of-battle ship sailed for the first time into the Golden Horn, fired a salute, and cast anchor at the very gates of the Seraglio. The Russian plenipotentiaries demanded peace on a *uti possidetis* basis, and the Turks were willing at first to accept the terms offered; but unfortunately Russia now found all the Western Powers arrayed against her. Great Britain and Holland feared the commercial competition of Russia in the Euxine and the Levant, while France dreaded her political rivalry. Thus it came about that the Divan, secretly encouraged by the foreign Ministers, grew more and more exacting and peremptory. Not till July, 1700, was a truce for thirty years concluded between Russia and the Porte. By the terms of the truce the Azoff district and all the land extending from thence to the Kuban district were ceded to Muscovy, who undertook on her part to demolish all the extra-Azovian forts. On August 8, 1700, Peter heard from his chief plenipotentiary, Emelyan Ukraintseff, that peace had been concluded with the Porte. On the following day his army received orders to invade Livonia. The great Northern War had begun.

Hitherto historians have regarded the great Northern War, of which an account is given in a later chapter, too exclusively from a military point of view; yet, from the Russian standpoint, it was not so much an arena for the strife of heroes as, in the first place, a training-school for a backward young nation, and, in the second place, a means of multiplying the material resources of a nation as poor as she was backward. Peter the Great entered into the war with Sweden, in order that Russia might gain her proper place on the northern Mediterranean. The possession of an ice-free sea-board was essential to her national development; the creation of a fleet followed, inevitably, upon the acquisition of such a sea-board; and she could not hope to obtain her due share of the trade and commerce of the world till she possessed both.

But, in the meantime, Russia had to be educated so far as possible up to the European level, in order that she might be able to appreciate and utilise the hardly-won fruits of Western civilisation. And thus it was that, during the whole course of the great Northern War, the process of internal reformation proceeded slowly but unceasingly. The whole fabric of the State was gradually changing. Brand-new institutions, formed on Western models, were gradually growing up amidst the cumbrous, antiquated, worn-out machinery of old Muscovy, and new men, capable and audacious, brimful of new ideas, were being trained, under the eye of the great regenerator, to help him in his task, and to carry it on when he himself should have vanished from the scene. At first, indeed, the external forms of the administration remained much the same as before. The old dignities disappeared of their own accord; for the new men, those nearest to Peter, did not require them. Between 1701 and 1703, the naval, artillery, mining, and coining Directories sprang into existence. The great drag on the wheels of the Government—a drag which grew more and more acute as the war proceeded—was its penury. The expense of the fixed embassies at foreign Courts (one of the earliest of the Petrine innovations) was a particularly severe strain upon the depleted treasury. Every expedient to increase the revenue was eagerly snatched at. Taxation was made universal. The sale of spirits became a government monopoly. A great impediment to commerce was the deplorable state of the currency. The only coins in circulation were the well-worn silver *kopeks* and half-*kopeks*, most of which were further deteriorated by bisection and trisection. In many places, goods were paid for by leather and other tokens. The currency was reformed by the coinage ukase of March, 1700, which established mints for the stamping and testing of gold, silver, and copper coins by qualified masters. Before 1700, only from 200,000 to 500,000 coins had been annually struck in Russia. In 1700 the number rose to 1,992,000, in 1701 to 2,559,000, and in 1702 to 4,534,000.

Peter's two great objects at this period of his reign were external security and internal prosperity. The former he had obtained by the

creation of a new army on the European model; the latter he hoped to promote by a whole series of administrative measures. In April, 1702, he issued the celebrated ukase for facilitating the immigration of foreign specialists into Russia, on a scale never before contemplated. The invitation was made as tempting as possible, all such visitors being allowed free ingress and egress, full liberty of worship, and permission to be tried by their own tribunals. To the better sort of Russian Dissenters, also, Peter was very tolerant. Religious persecution, indeed, he abominated; thus, when he could not prevent the Church from persecuting heretics, he always endeavoured to give to the proceedings a political motive. His attitude towards the *Bezpopovshchina*, or "priestless community," is characteristic of his general policy. The enterprise and organising genius of this wealthy body enabled it practically to monopolise the rich fisheries and hunting-grounds of the White Sea, while the abundant harvests, which filled its granaries to overflowing, ultimately gave it the command of the corn-market of St Petersburg, which, in the course of 1703, began to spring up among the thickly-wooded marshes of the Neva. All danger from without was avoided by a composition with Peter, the community agreeing to pay double taxes and work, at set times, for nothing, in the state mines and foundries at Povyenets. In return for such services, the practical Tsar, in a ukase of 1703, permitted these lucrative nonconformists full liberty of worship with the use of the ancient rites and the old service-books. The only people to whom he denied toleration were the Jews, whom he regarded with the liveliest hatred.

From the first, Peter did much to promote education, especially education of a practical sort. Schools of mathematics and navigation were established, about 1702, at Moscow, and in 1703 another school was founded there, at which geography, ethics, politics, Latin rhetoric, the Cartesian philosophy, dancing, and the elements of French and German were taught. Great efforts were made to provide cheap books for the new schools. The chief worker in this field was the Protestant Pole, Ilia Kopienski, who set up a press at Amsterdam and, having the privilege of printing all Russian books, issued a considerable number. In 1698, by Peter's special command, he printed an abridgment of Leo the Philosopher's *Art of War*, and in 1700 a version of *Æsop*, remarkable as being the first Russian translation from an ancient classical author. In 1703 the first Russian Gazette appeared, entitled *News of military and other events worthy of knowledge and remembrance*.

Undeterred by repeated failures and the most discouraging relapses, Peter, though himself a semi-barbarian, laboured hard to civilise those who were even more barbarous than himself. In 1702, in order to reduce the number of conflagrations, a ukase directed that all houses were to be built of brick instead of wood, and fire-hose were introduced. In 1704, ukases were issued forbidding midwives to kill misshapen children, and

ordering the construction of stone bridges at Moscow. Other ukases of the same period endeavoured to raise the tone of public morality, and inculcate self-respect. Thus the ukase of April, 1704, sternly prohibited compulsory marriage, which had been one of the chief scandals and miseries of old Muscovite life, released women from the captivity of the *terem*, and compelled their husbands and fathers to admit them to all social entertainments. The ukase of December 30, 1701, forbade falling on the knees before the Tsar, or doffing the hat before the Imperial Palace. "What difference is there between God and the Tsar, if equal honour be shown to both?" asked Peter on this occasion.

In 1700 died the Patriarch Adrian. His administration had, latterly, been so negligent, that his enemies accused him of sleeping away his time, and eating up his revenues. Adrian's dilapidations could be repaired only by a very energetic successor, but where was a Patriarch in sympathy with the reforming Tsar to be found? An energetic but unfriendly Patriarch would be the natural leader of a whole army of malcontents; he would be a most dangerous rival, a second Nikon. In January, 1701, therefore, the administration of the temporalities of the patriarchate was entrusted to a layman, Count Ivan Musin-Pushkin. His appointment was the first step towards a rigid inquisition into the government and revenues of the Russian monasteries, which resulted in the ukase of December, 1701, depriving the religious houses of the control of their estates, and making the monks the salaried officials of the State. The care of the spiritualities was confided to a Little Russian prelate, Stephen Yavorsky, with the title of Exarch of the Most Holy Patriarchal See, whom Peter now promoted to the archiepiscopal see of Riazan. The ignorant Great Russian clergy detested this more enlightened Little Russian interloper, and such pressure was brought to bear upon him that he hid himself in a monastery on the day appointed for his consecration, declaring that he could not accept his new dignity so long as his episcopal brethren accused him of simony, heresy and wine-bibbing. But Peter, well aware that the same people who repudiated Yavorsky called him (the Tsar) Antichrist, overruled Yavorsky's objections, and insisted on the consecration of a man whom he already rightly regarded as a fellow-worker.

All this time, the popular disaffection against the Tsar was steadily growing. As the War proceeded, as the burden of taxation became more grievous, and the number of the recruits ever larger, the murmuring of every class of the population grew louder and louder. "What manner of Tsar is this?" they said, "who takes us all for soldiers, and gives us no rest, and makes our wives and children widows and orphans? If he lives much longer he will ruin the whole land. He is a *miroyed*, he eats up the whole world." The people explained to their own satisfaction Peter's fondness for the Germans. He was the supposititious child of a stray German mother. He was the son of Lefort. The real Peter

had remained abroad. In fact, Antichrist now sat on the Muscovite throne. On January 4, 1700, the Tsar still further irritated the reactionaries by issuing the ukase directing the general use of short Saxon or Magyar jackets, and French or German hose. This was followed, in 1701, by the ukase forbidding from henceforth, under heavy penalties, the wearing of the cumbrous old Muscovite garments. The European nations of the West had long since discarded the long, heavy, flowing garments customary among Asiatics. Muscovy still clung to Oriental costumes as well as to Oriental ideas; and, by substituting for these Western dress, Peter emphasised in the most public and striking manner his intention of completely Europeanising his still semi-Asiatic subjects. This latest innovation was bitterly resented as both indecent and irreligious. In Moscow itself open resistance was out of the question; but in July, 1705, a dangerous rebellion broke out at Astrakhan, under the leadership of Cossack officers and ex-*Strieltzy*. It was only suppressed on March 13, 1706, when Sheremeteff, with a regular army, took Astrakhan by assault, and three hundred and sixty-five of the rebels were sent to Moscow to be broken on the wheel and decapitated.

After 1703 the reform movement necessarily proceeded more slowly. Peter, now constantly at war, had no time to give to domestic affairs. Yet never for a moment was the great work of progress suspended. In 1705, a ukase ordered the paving of Moscow. In 1706, the first modern hospital and medical training-school was built on the river Yanza, close to the German settlement at Moscow. In February, 1706, sanitary inspectors for Moscow were appointed, one for every ten houses. In 1707, a commission was appointed to devise the best means of dealing with the wholesale vagabondage and highway robbery which was the perennial curse of Muscovy. Peter had already done much to promote education; in 1707, he proceeded a step further by introducing into Russia the so-called "civil script." Hitherto, the old Cyrillic alphabet of forty-eight letters (still used in liturgical books) served for all Russian books. Peter deleted eight of the more cumbersome letters, simplified the remainder, and sent to Holland to have the new alphabet cast into type. It was brought back to Russia in 1707 by the typographer Anton Dernei, and, with some few later modifications, has been in use ever since. This simplification of the old alphabet was the first step towards the composition of the modern Russian written language, and therefore a reform of capital importance for civilisation. The first three books printed in the new script appeared at Moscow in 1708. Peter himself corrected the proofs and supervised the translations of the earlier books, which included a history of Russia down to his own times, issued by his express command.

In 1708 Russia was divided into eight "governments"—Moscow, St Petersburg, Kieff, Smolensk, Archangel, Kazan, Azoff, and Siberia—in order that the country might be administered "in a more orderly

and tranquil manner." The chief duty of the eight "Governors" was to see that the taxes were duly collected and transmitted to Moscow. On January 27, 1710, the first imperial budget was framed, when it was discovered that the annual revenue amounted to 3,016,000 roubles¹, or, taking a three years' average, 3,133,000 roubles, while the total expenditure came to 3,824,000. Thus expenditure exceeded revenue; but it is indubitable that the revenue would have been much larger but for the wholesale speculation which diminished the amount in transit. According to these estimates, the army cost 1,252,000, the navy 444,000, the diplomatic service 148,000, ordnance 84,000, and the garrisons 977,000 roubles.

Absorbed as he was at this period by the Swedish and Turkish wars, which required his prolonged absence from Russia, Peter could not properly attend to the details of the domestic administration; but, as it could no longer be neglected, he instituted (by the ukase of February 22, 1711) a supreme governing board to which he gave the name of the "Administrative Senate." It was to take the place of the Tsar during his absence, and to receive the implicit obedience due to himself. In a word, it was responsible for the whole burden of the administration. In order to facilitate the communications of the Senate with the governors and the fiscal functionaries, the office of Revisor General of Ukases was instituted in November, 1715. In 1717 Colleges or Departments of State were introduced. The idea of this administrative reform was first suggested to Peter by Leibniz. By the ukase of April 18, 1718, the "Colleges" were to be, in all points, exactly on the model of the Swedish "services"; so that Peter may be said to have learnt the science of government as well as the art of war from his Scandinavian rivals. As finally constituted, these new public offices were nine in number, and corresponded roughly with the Ministries of Western Europe. The Presidents of the Colleges were the principal Senators, all of whom were Russians. Most of the Vice-Presidents were foreigners. Peter invariably acted on the patriotic principle, not always followed by his immediate successors, that natives should always fill the highest posts, and that no alien should occupy any place that a Russian was equally capable of filling.

Efforts were also made to simplify local government as much as possible by subdivision of labour. Thus the various governments were split up into counties or districts (*uezdui*), each district having its own president assisted by a council of assessors, called *Landrätthe*, elected by the gentry. In 1720 *nadvorníue sudbui*, or Courts of justice, were established in every town, and *zemskie kontorui*, or land-offices, where public accounts had to be regularly kept. In April, 1718, the old *ulozhenie*, or Code of laws, was remodelled according to the existing

¹ A rouble was at that time the equivalent of nearly six shillings English.

Swedish Code. By the ukase of June 15, 1718, insolvent debtors were compelled to work off their debts in public institutions, at the rate of a rouble a month, during which time they were to be fed at the expense of the State like convicts. A new law of succession was also introduced. The old practice of partitioning real estate was abolished, and the custom of primogeniture introduced. Henceforth, however, younger sons were to be allowed to buy landed estates after seven years' civil or ten years' military service. By the ukase of January 16, 1721, all officers in the army, whatever their origin, and their children after them, were declared to be noble, and entitled to patents of nobility. But education had previously been declared to be the indispensable qualification for advancement in every branch of the service. Thus the famous ukase of January 20, 1714, ordered professors from the mathematical schools to go the round of the provinces, and teach the children of the gentry arithmetic. No gentleman was henceforth to marry unless he had first been properly educated. The Guard was to serve as a training-school for inferior officers, while the sons of eminent persons were to be sent abroad to learn the science of war from famous generals.

Now, as formerly, the poverty of the Government was its chief impediment. There was no money to pay shipbuilders; yet ships had to be built, if the sea was to be held; and the command of the sea was necessary for the growth of commerce, the increase of which would, eventually, recoup the Government its expenses. But, if trade is to be promoted, traders must be encouraged and taken care of. Peter fully realised this. In November, 1711, half a dozen mereantile experts were transferred from Moscow to St Petersburg, to advise and assist the Government in concluding a new commercial treaty with England and Holland. A further effort to promote trade and industry is seen in the institution of the *glavnyy magistrat*, or chief magistracy (ukase of January 26, 1721)—a supreme local government board, subordinated to the Senate, consisting of the members of the St Petersburg civic authorities, half of whom were foreigners, the Tsar himself nominating the President. The "chief magistracy" was to appoint and superintend the magistrates in all the Russian towns, which were now divided into categories, according to wealth and population.

Great efforts were made by the regenerator to utilise Russia's latent resources. All landed proprietors were urged to search for and work the minerals on their estates, or the Government was to do it for them. In 1719 we find the silver mines of Nerchinsk, the iron mines of Tobolsk, and the copper mines of Kungura in full working order. At Tula and Kashirsk, about the same time, Alexis Narushkin founded iron-works. Still more lucrative were the Lipski iron-works, which were bound by contract to turn out 15,000 small arms of all sorts, including 1000 pistols, *per annum*. The Olonets iron-works were important because

of their proximity to St Petersburg. No improvement was too small for the attention of the Tsar. Thus in May, 1725, he ordered that corn should, henceforth, be reaped with scythes instead of with sickles. The cloth manufactory of Moscow had engaged Peter's attention since 1705, and he at last committed it entirely to private firms, both to save expense and to accustom the Russians to commercial enterprises. The manufacture of sails was introduced into Russia in 1702, but languished till taken in hand by Prince Odoevsky in 1716. The leather trade had always been of the utmost importance. In 1716 alone 135,467 *poods* were sent to Archangel for export. Peter did much for the leather industry. Master-tanners were sent from Reval to Moscow to teach the people there how to tan the leather properly; and, after two years of such instruction, those of the Moscow tanners who persisted in the old way were liable to imprisonment and confiscation of property.

The needs of the Government compelled it to use forced labour, and recruit its artisans as well as its soldiers from the peasantry; and the period of reform was too close to the old Muscovite period of peasant serfdom to admit of any amelioration in the general condition of the serfs as regards the State. Yet the Government did what it could to protect the serfs from "their worst enemies, those drunken and disorderly masters who deteriorate their estates, laying all sorts of unbearable burdens on their peasants, and beating and tormenting them so that they run away from their grievous burdens, for which cause waste lands multiply and the arrears of taxation increase." All such masters were to be placed under restraint as lunatics; and their property was to be administered by their nearest relatives, or by the State. Moreover, by the ukase of April 21, 1721, proprietors were forbidden to sell their serfs separately; they were only to be sold in families.

But there was worse than poverty to contend with. Peter knew well that the emptiness of the Treasury was very largely due to peculation, that ancient and ineradicable vice of Russian society. The Russian official had come to regard the public service mainly as a source of personal income. Having no regular salary, he looked to his underlings "for nourishment," as the phrase went, and he took from them according to his needs, most liberally interpreted. Peter was not the man to leave the improvement of public morals to the gradual operation of time; and, as he always adopted the most energetic measures by preference, he was speedily committed to a struggle with the robbers of the Treasury, almost as bloody as his struggle with the rebellious *Strieltzy*. The vileness of some of the expedients which he found it necessary to adopt is eloquent of the extent and virulence of the evil with which he had to cope. By the ukase of August, 1713, informers were invited to report all cases of defalcation to the Tsar, and promised the rank and property of those whom they denounced. The ukase of December 24, 1714, further encouraged delators to come forward, and not be afraid of reporting

against even their official superiors. The ukase of January 23, 1721, instituted an order of official public accusers, the so-called Imperial "Upper-fiscals," whose principal duties were to protect the revenue and supervise the administration of the Senate. The fiscals were to warn the Senators thrice of any dereliction of duty and, if the third warning was disregarded, they were to report the matter to the Tsar direct. In consequence of a sermon preached by Stephen Yavorsky, Archbishop of Riazan, on March 17, 1712, vigorously attacking the whole system of official espionage and pointing out its consequences, the ukase of March 17, 1714, was issued. This ukase imposed upon any fiscal or delator convicted of a false accusation the penalty which would have been imposed upon the alleged delinquent if he had been found guilty; but mistakes arising from carelessness were only lightly punished.

Villainous as the system was, it certainly brought much rascality to light. One of the most active and courageous of these delators was the Upper-fiscal Alexis Nestoroff, who, in 1711, reported to the Tsar that the Governor of Siberia, Prince Gagarin, was plundering the Treasury and had succeeded in monopolising the lucrative China trade. Nestoroff sent a whole chestful of incriminating documents to the Senate for investigation, and the Senate promptly destroyed them all. But the indefatigable Upper-fiscal set about collecting fresh evidence, and in 1717 he presented a still stronger case against Gagarin and his abettors. The case was ultimately transferred to a committee of the officers of the Guard, when it was proved conclusively that Gagarin had not only systematically corrupted all the Siberian officials to wink at his depredations, but that many of the Senators and heads of Colleges were his accomplices. Finally, Gagarin made a free and full confession of his crimes, and petitioned for leave to pass the rest of his days in a monastery. Peter sent him to the gallows instead.

The recrudescence of highway robbery led to the policing of the Russian towns, and civic guards were chosen from among the male inhabitants. The police were also to see that no wares unfit for food were exposed for sale, to examine and test all weights and measures, and to act as firemen. Science was promoted by the ukase of February, 1710, encouraging, by a system of rewards, the collection of natural objects. Especial attention was paid to geography; and in 1719 the geodesists Evreimoff and Luzh were sent to survey Kamschatka, and decide the question whether north-east Asia and America were united or not. By this time St Petersburg was emerging from its scaffolding, and foreigners were beginning to speak well of it. Already it could boast some fine buildings. The imposing Nevsky Prospect, built entirely of stone by gangs of Swedish prisoners, was especially admired.

Extraordinarily difficult during this period of transition and transformation was the position of the Russian Church. As the sworn guardian of Orthodoxy, she was bound, in many respects, to observe a

conservative attitude; yet patriotism equally obliged her not to oppose the beneficent civilising efforts of a reforming Tsar. But the Church herself was very much in need of discipline. The number of unworthy priests had greatly increased in consequence of the influx into the ministry of many members of the gentry who evaded military service by becoming candidates for holy orders. This abuse was met by the ordinance directing the Bishops not to ordain anyone under twenty-five a deacon, and anyone under thirty a priest. Efforts were also made to raise the religious tone of the community. The ukase of 1716 commanded everybody, under heavy penalties, to go to confession at least once a year. The ukase of 1718 went further still. It compelled all parishioners to attend church every Sunday and holyday, and absentees were henceforth to be ineligible for public offices. The real motive of this ordinance was that the people might hear the ukases read after divine service, as, in those days of general ignorance, comparatively few could read the ukases posted up on the gates of the towns.

The patriarchate still remained unoccupied, and Archbishop Yavorsky found some difficulty in filling up the vacant bishoprics, because he could not always agree with the members of the Senate who were associated with him in the election. Yavorsky's position at this time was somewhat anomalous. He had alienated the Tsar by openly espousing the cause of the unfortunate Tsarevich Alexis. He had frequently alluded in his discourses to "the raging waves" beating continually against "the solid shore"; and, after he had explained "the solid shore" to mean "the law of God," his hearers readily guessed whom he meant by "the raging waves." He was presently eclipsed by Theophan Prokopovich, prefect of the Kieff Academy, who won Peter's favour by his brilliant sermon on "the most glorious victory," *i.e.* Poltawa. At last, the regenerator had found a priest after his own heart, a man of vast learning, brilliant gifts, and great force of character, who fully sympathised with the reform movement and was determined to promote it. The "Light of Kieff" was consecrated Bishop of the opulent see of Pieskow, despite an accusation of crypto-Calvinism brought against him by the indignant Yavorsky. When Peter, for the better regulation of church affairs, proposed the establishment of a "Spiritual Department," Theophan alone was entrusted with the drafting of the project; so that he may be regarded as the creator of what was subsequently known as "the Holy Synod." In January, 1721, an imperial manifesto formally established the "Spiritual Department." The new College was to spread enlightenment and the knowledge of God's law, and extirpate superstition by composing and publishing books on the dogmas of the faith, and the duties of every order of men, and collections of sermons from the Fathers, explanatory of dogmas and duties generally. Henceforth, in filling up a vacant see, the Tsar was to elect one of two candidates presented to him by the "Spiritual Department."

The strong and terrible reforming Tsar had triumphed over every obstacle—triumphed so thoroughly that any interruption of his work during his lifetime was inconceivable. But, in the midst of his triumph, the thought perpetually haunted him: "Will my work survive me?" His health was uncertain, his half-taught pupils were few and divided, the adversaries of his reforms were many and of one mind, and they believed, and believed rightly, that in the heir to the throne, the Tsarevich Alexis, they possessed a secret sympathiser who would, one day, reverse the whole policy of the Tsar-Antichrist and restore the old order of things.

Peter's sole surviving son, Alexis, born on February 19, 1690, was utterly ignored by his father till he was nine years old. Peter's son, who loved his mother, could have little affection for a father who had ever been her worst persecutor. Only after the disappearance of Eudoxia into a monastery did Peter take his son in hand. He confided the care of his education to learned foreigners like Neugebauer and Huyssens, who taught him French, history, geography, and mathematics. In 1703, in order that he might practically apply his lessons, Alexis was ordered to follow the army to the field as a private in a bombardier regiment; and in 1704 he was present at the capture of Narva. At this period, Huyssens had the most favourable opinion of his pupil. He reported that the Tsarevich was of a precocious intelligence, and a singularly amiable disposition. He had already read the Bible six times—five times in Slavonic, and once in German; he had mastered the works of the Greek Fathers, read all the spiritual and profane books translated into the Slavonic tongue, and could speak and write French and German with facility. Of the ability of Alexis there could be no question; unfortunately it was not the sort of ability of which his father could make use. The Tsarevich was, essentially, a student, with strong leanings towards ecclesiology. The quiet seclusion of a monastic library was the proper place for this gentle, emotional dreamer, who clung so fondly to the ancient traditions, and was so easily moved by the beauty of the Orthodox Liturgy. To a prince of this temperament, the restless, vehement energy, the racket and bustle of his abnormally active father, were odious. Yet Peter, not unnaturally, demanded that his heir should dedicate himself to the service of New Russia, and help to fashion his future inheritance. He demanded from a youth with the nature of a recluse, practical activity, unceasing labour, unremitting attention to technical details, the concentration of all his energies on the business of government, upon the herculean labour of maintaining the new State at the high level of greatness to which it had already been raised. In consequence of these stern paternal demands and his own invincible repugnance against carrying them out, Alexis, quite apart from the personal antipathies already existing, could not but regard his father in the light of a tormentor. Moreover, Yavorsky and the other arch-pastors of the

Russian Church openly expressed their disapprobation of the Tsar's new and strange ways; and, as a loyal son of the Church, the Tsarevich gladly listened to those who had the power to bind and loose. He even told his confessor, Yakoff Ignateff, whom he had promised to obey as "an angel and apostle of God," that he had wished for his father's death, and Ignateff encouraged him in such sentiments.

After the marriage of Alexis to the Princess Sophia Charlotte of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel (October 25, 1711), Peter made a determined effort to tear his son away from what he conceived to be a life of indolent ease. Three weeks after his wedding, Alexis was hurried away by his father to Thorn to superintend the provisioning of the Russian troops in Poland. For the next twelve months he was kept constantly on the move. In April, 1712, a peremptory ukase ordered him off to the army in Pomerania; and, in the autumn of the same year, he was forced to accompany his father on a tour of inspection through Finland. On his return to the capital, Peter, in order to see what progress his son had made in mechanics, asked him to produce for inspection his latest drawings. His father's command threw Alexis into a state of panic; and, to escape the ordeal of such an examination, he resorted to the abject expedient of disabling his right hand by a pistol shot. In no other way could the Tsarevich have offended his father so deeply. He had behaved like a cowardly recruit who mutilates himself to shirk military service, and, for a time, Peter washed his hands of his son.

Alexis had the great advantage of knowing that, in any case, the future belonged to him. Most of the magnates, all the higher clergy with a single exception, and the mass of the Russian nation were on his side. All he had to do was to sit still, keep out of his father's way as much as possible, and await the natural course of events. But Peter could not afford to leave anything to chance. All his life he had been working incessantly with a single object—the regeneration of Russia—in view. All that he now required from his successor was sympathy and goodwill. But what if that successor refused to tread in his father's footsteps, or, still worse, tried to destroy his father's work? By some such process of reasoning as this, must the idea of changing the succession to the throne, by setting aside Alexis, have first occurred to the mind of Peter.

The subject was first broached by the Tsar in his letter to Alexis on October 22, 1715, the day of the funeral of the Princess Charlotte who had died four days after giving birth to a son (the subsequent Peter II). This letter was severe and menacing; yet the Tsarevich was asked to do no more than acquiesce in his father's plans. "It is not work I want from you, but goodwill," wrote Peter; "I have thought well to address this last appeal to you, and wait a little longer, to see if, perchance, you will turn from the error of your ways. If you do not, be quite sure that I will deprive you of the succession; I will cut you off as though you were a gangrenous swelling."

Peter naturally expected that this final appeal would have led to a personal explanation, followed by reconciliation and an effort at amendment; but again Alexis acted abjectly. He wrote a pitiful reply to his father, offering to renounce, on the grounds of sickness and general incompetence, the succession in favour of his infant half-brother Peter, born on the day after the Princess Charlotte's funeral, but only to die a few months later. Rage and mortification, and the effort to drown them in a debauch, brought on a serious attack of Peter's old malady, epilepsy. So ill was he that the Senators were hastily summoned and slept all night at the Palace, and the last sacraments were administered to the Tsar. Not until January 19, 1716, was he able to reply to his son's letter; and he now offered Alexis the choice between amending his ways or becoming a monk. Alexis consulted his friends, who advised him to submit to the tonsure and await better times in a monastery. Hereupon Alexis wrote to his father for permission to become a monk, signing the letter "your slave and useless son Alexis." Still Peter did not despair. On the eve of his departure for the Pomeranian and Mecklenburg campaign he visited Alexis, who was ill at the time, and urged him to do nothing in a hurry. On August 26, 1716, he wrote to him from abroad commanding him, if he desired to remain Tsarevich, to join the army without delay.

Alexis at once saw a chance of escaping from his false position altogether. Accompanied by his mistress Afrosina, a Finnish peasant-girl, and four servants, he fled to Vienna and placed himself under the protection of his brother-in-law, the Emperor, who sent him for greater security to the fortress of St Elmo at Naples.

Peter's agitation was extreme. The flight of the Tsarevich to a foreign potentate was a reproach and a scandal. He must be recovered and brought back to Russia at all hazards. But the operation was one of exceptional difficulty, and it was therefore confided to the most subtle, astute and unscrupulous of all the Muscovite diplomatists, Count Peter Tolstoi, with Captain Alexander Rumyantseff as his assistant. On September 24, 1717, Tolstoi and Rumyantseff arrived at Naples. They were to assure the Tsarevich that, if he returned home with them at once, everything would be forgiven, and he would be restored to favour and have perfect liberty; but, if he refused to return, his father, as his sovereign, would publicly denounce him as a traitor, while the Church would simultaneously excommunicate him as a disobedient son, in which case he might be sure that he was doomed, both in this world and the next. They found Alexis almost insane with terror. He declared, outright, that he was afraid to face his father's wrath. Tolstoi reported that only the most extreme compulsion could, as he brutally phrased it, "melt the hard-frozen obstinacy of this beast of ours"—and we can imagine what such words meant in the mouth of a man who had not hesitated to remove an inconvenient secretary by poison at Stambul.

The unfortunate Tsarevich knew, instinctively, that he was fighting for his life. At first, however, relying on the Emperor's solemn promise of protection, he stood firm and refused to depart. But the most villainous expedients, remorselessly employed, compelled him at last to surrender. He promised to return to Russia with Tolstoi, but only on two conditions: his father was to allow him to marry Afrosina and retire into private life. To these terms Tolstoi agreed, and Peter himself solemnly confirmed them in a letter to his son in which he swore, "before God and His judgment seat," that, if Alexis came back, he should not be punished in the least, but be cherished as a son.

On January 31, 1718, Alexis reached Moscow. On February 19 the names of his accomplices were extorted from him. His wretched confederates, torn from their hiding-places and dragged to the torture-chamber, supplied the prosecution with evidence which would not be accepted in any modern Court of justice. On the conclusion of the "Moscow Process," as it was called, the most salient feature of which was the trial and condemnation of the ex-Tsaritsa Eudoxia for adultery, the impalement of her alleged paramour, and the degradation of many of her friends, including Dositheus, Bishop of Rostoff, there was a lull in the prosecution of the Tsarevich's affair. Alexis, on the supposition that something was now due to one who had unhesitatingly confessed everything required of him, bent all his efforts to obtain the fulfilment of his father's promise that he should marry Afrosina. The girl arrived at St Petersburg in April, 1718; but, instead of being taken to the arms of her lover, as she had expected, she was suddenly brought before the Tsar's inquisitors. As the mistress and confidante of Alexis, she was the chosen depository of his secrets; and those secrets the prosecution, which so far had failed to establish a charge of conspiracy, was determined to get hold of. The helpless woman's revelations did not amount to much, but were sufficient to destroy Alexis. He had told her that, when he was Tsar, he would order things very differently. He would live at Moscow and let St Petersburg remain a mere provincial town. He would have no ships, and keep the army solely for defensive purposes. He predicted that, on the death of his father, a civil war would break out between his own partisans and those of his little brother, in which he would ultimately prevail, because the Russian people would not endure the government of women.

Immediately after this "confession" had been obtained, Peter sent for Alexis, confronted him with it, and reproached him for concealing material facts and thereby forfeiting his pardon. To save the miserable remnant of life which his tormentors might allow him to call his own, Alexis now said "yes" to everything. He had wished for his father's death; he had rejoiced when he heard plots against his father; he had been ready to accept his father's throne from rebels and regicides. All had now been said. The worst was known at last. True, there were no

facts to go upon. The Tsarevich had, so far, done nothing, whatever he might have intended to do. Nevertheless, Peter henceforth regarded his son as a self-convicted and most dangerous traitor. His life was forfeited, the future welfare of Russia imperatively demanded his extinction.

But now a case for casuists arose; and Peter himself was casuist enough to recognise that it was a case of unusual and peculiar difficulty. Even if Alexis deserved a thousand deaths, his father had sworn by the most solemn of oaths to pardon him and let him live in peace, if he returned to Russia; and it was only on these conditions that Alexis (very foolishly, in the opinion of his friends) had placed himself once more in his father's hands. The question whether the enormity of the Tsarevich's crime absolved the Tsar from the oath which he had taken to spare the life of this prodigal son, was solemnly submitted to a grand council of prelates, senators, ministers, generals and other dignitaries, on June 13, 1718. Five days later, the clergy presented their memorial. It is a cautious, non-committal document, plainly inspired by fear, but unmistakably inclining to mercy, and finally leaving the matter entirely in the Tsar's hands. But the clergy entirely passed over the strongest, the most irrefragable argument in favour of Alexis, namely, the Tsar's solemn promise of forgiveness to his son, although Peter had explicitly exhorted them to relieve his conscience on this very point.

He was now in a dilemma. There can be little doubt that he had at last determined to rid himself of his detested son; but he certainly shrank from a public execution, the scandal of which would have been enormous and its consequences incalculable. The temporal members of the council helped him out of his difficulty by expressing a desire to be quite convinced that Alexis had actually meditated rebellion against his father. This seems to have been a pretext for bringing the Tsarevich to the torture-chamber, where he might very easily expire, as if by accident, under legal process. The most ordinary mode of administering the question extraordinary was by the knout, and there were few instances of anyone surviving thirty strokes of this terrible punishment as then administered. On June 19, Alexis, never very robust and severely reduced by mental suffering and prolonged anxiety, received five-and-twenty strokes with the knout, and betrayed the confidences of his confessor, Ignateff, who was also savagely tortured. On June 24, Alexis received fifteen more strokes; but even the knout could now extract nothing but feeble protests from the mangled wretch. The same day the Senate condemned the Tsarevich to death for "imagining" rebellion against his father, and for "hoping for" the cooperation of the common people, and the armed intervention of his brother-in-law, the Emperor. The solemn promise of the Tsar, which the clergy had ignored, was sophistically explained away by the Senators. He had, they said, promised his son forgiveness only if he returned willingly; he had returned unwillingly, and had therefore forfeited the promise.

This shameful document, the outcome of mingled terror and obsequiousness, was signed by all the Senators and Ministers, and by three hundred persons of lesser degree. Two days later, June 26, 1718, the Tsarevich died in the Trubetskoi guard-house of the citadel of St Petersburg. The precise manner of his death is still something of an enigma, most of the existing documents relating to it being apocryphal; but a careful examination and comparison of the only two extant contemporaneous and genuine Russian documents, seems to warrant the following conclusion. At eight o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1718, the Tsar, accompanied by some of the chief dignitaries of the Empire, proceeded to the fortress; and Alexis was produced and placed before them within a *zastyenok* (partition). His death-sentence was then, suddenly, read to him. The shock, acting on an enfeebled frame, and crushing the last hope of life with which the poor wretch had hugged himself in the midst of his awful sufferings, brought on a swoon which lasted some hours. On his recovery, he was carried into the close-adjoining Trubetskoi guard-room, where he died. Abominable, unnatural as was Peter's conduct to his unhappy son, there is no reason to suppose that he ever regretted it. He argued that a single worthless life stood in the way of the regeneration of Russia, and was therefore forfeit to the common weal.

But, however its foundations had been cemented, the Russian Empire was now an established and imposing fact. Its official birthday dates from October 22, 1721, when, after a solemn thanksgiving-service for the Peace of Nystad, in the Troitsa cathedral at St Petersburg, the Tsar proceeded to the Senate and was there acclaimed: "Father of the Fatherland, Peter the Great, and Emperor of All Russia." Some would have preferred to proclaim him Emperor of the East; but Peter himself adopted the more patriotic title.

Prussia, the new ally, and the United Provinces, the oldest friend of the Tsar, were the earliest among the European States to recognise Peter's imperial title; but in other quarters the novelty was received with disfavour, especially at Vienna, where the emergence of a second Empire which threatened to overshadow the Holy Roman Empire gave great offence. Curiously enough, the friendship of Prussia, which might have counterbalanced the hostility of the Emperor, was imperilled by Peter's withdrawal from Berlin of the gigantic grenadiers whom he had previously lent, or given, to Frederick William I. Peter in consequence contracted an offensive and defensive alliance, for twelve years, with his ancient enemy Sweden, which, under the pacific administration of Count Arvid Horn, was being gradually nursed into political convalescence. By the Treaty of Stockholm (February 22, 1724) Russia contracted to assist Sweden, in case of need, with 12,000 infantry, 4000 cavalry, nine ships of the line, and three frigates; while Sweden undertook to assist Russia, in similar circumstances, with 8000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, six liners and two frigates.

The relations between France and Russia had also become much more cordial than heretofore. It was a favourite ambition of the Tsar to marry his second surviving daughter, the Tsesarevna Elizabeth, to the young King of France, Louis XV. But Bourbon pride proved an insurmountable obstacle; and equally abortive were the efforts of successive French Ministers to bring about a better understanding between Great Britain and Russia.

For some years after the termination of the War of the Spanish Succession Great Britain was, indisputably, the dominant Power of Europe. To prevent a renewal of the Anglo-Austrian alliance, and to isolate the Emperor, were now the chief aims of the French Ministers, especially in view of the break-up of the Austrian dominions in the event of the death of the sonless Charles VI, who, by the Pragmatic Sanction, had settled the succession on his daughter, Maria Theresa, now a child of eight. France, moreover, was anxious to keep Russia free from complications elsewhere; so that her troops might be available against Maria Theresa at the proper time, and a reconciliation between Great Britain and Russia was considered at Versailles to be the best way of steadying and restraining Peter. But such a reconciliation was extremely difficult. George I had an ancient grudge against the Russian Emperor; Peter's supposed friendship for the Jacobites was an additional obstacle. But Fleury, still at the height of his authority in France, believed himself capable of performing successfully the part of political peace-maker. He assured Prince Kurakin that the best thing for Russia at the present time was reconciliation with England; indeed he made an Anglo-Russian reconciliation the condition precedent of a Franco-Russian alliance. Peter himself was anxious to come to terms with England; but, on the other hand, he did not want to quarrel with the Tories; indeed, the extreme Tories, or Jacobites, now hailed him as their prospective deliverer, and expected more from him than from any other European potentate. In April, 1722, the Pretender's agent, Thomas Gordon, informed the Tsar that the English nation was ready to rise for its lawful King, if only they had 6000 men and arms for 20,000 more. In June of the same year, the Old Pretender wrote to Peter expressing his gratitude for the sympathy of his Imperial Majesty, and transmitting a plan for the invasion of England. But, as Peter would not embark on so vast an enterprise without the cooperation of France, and as France desired to unite England and Russia instead of dividing them, the Jacobite project never had the remotest chance of success, even if the Persian campaigns of Peter had not, at this very time, engrossed his attention. It should also not be forgotten that the Tsar had now obtained all he wanted in Europe; for, from first to last, he had aimed solely at the conquest of the Baltic Provinces. During the last four years of his reign, his policy was predominantly Oriental.

Well aware that Russia was the natural commercial intermediary

between the East and the West, Peter never lost sight of the necessity of establishing and extending his influence in Asia. In 1719 Captain Lev Izmailoff of the Guards was sent to Pekin as the first Russian envoy extraordinary; but he was not allowed to establish an embassy or consulates, nor could he even obtain a commercial treaty.

The first Russian expeditions into Central Asia were disastrous failures owing to the ignorance or incapacity of their leaders. In 1716 Colonel Buchholtz was sent to build a fortress on Lake Yamuish, but was driven back by 12,000 Calmucks. In the same year Prince Alexander Cherkasky set out to explore the mouths of the Amu Daria and the shores of the Sea of Aral, to win over the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara to the Russian interest, and to attempt to open up a way to India. In February, 1717, he returned to Astrakhan, after planting a few forts in unsuitable places. This expedition excited a general rising of Tartars, Bokharans, and Khivans, and, in attempting to suppress it, in 1717, Cherkasky was defeated and slain. In the vast plain lying between the Euxine and the Caspian Russia, Turkey and Persia were equally interested. The beginning of the Russian influence in these parts dates from the appointment of the capable Artamon Voluinsky as Russian Minister at Ispahan, in 1715. It is clear from his instructions, written by Peter's own hand, that he was sent rather as a pioneer than as a diplomatist. He was to find out which rivers fell into the Caspian "and to which places on these rivers we can get by sea, and whether there are any rivers flowing into this sea which rise in India." He was also to take note of Gilyan and the other Caspian Provinces, and, if possible, with the assistance of the Armenians, divert the raw-silk trade from Turkey to Russia through Persia. Voluinsky quitted Ispahan in September, 1717, after concluding a commercial treaty with the Shah very advantageous to Russia. On his return journey he wintered at Shemak, where he had excellent opportunity for still further spying out the nakedness of the land. Voluinsky persistently urged Peter to invade Persia, and events played into his hands. In September, 1721, two Lesghian princes revolted against the Shah, seized Shemak and plundered Russian merchandise in the bazaar to the value of 500,000 roubles. In the beginning of 1722 the state of affairs in Persia became still more favourable for Russian intervention; for the Afghans invaded the devastated land, defeated the Persian troops in two pitched battles, seized Ispahan, and dethroned the Shah in favour of his third son Tokmash. Peter hesitated no longer. On May 3, the Guards left Moscow. On July 18, Peter sailed from Astrakhan to Derbent with an army of 22,000 infantry, 9000 cavalry, 20,000 Cossacks, 20,000 Calmucks, 30,000 Tartars and 5000 sailors. On September 3, the Governor of Derbent delivered up the silver keys of the city to the Russian Emperor. Owing, however, to difficulties of transport, and the persistence of a fierce north wind which wrecked half the transports on the

sand-banks of the Caspian, the campaign proved abortive. In December, 1722, however, a Russian army corps, under Colonel Shipoff, seized the great trading centre of Rescht; and, almost simultaneously, General Matyushkin stormed Baku, which, as the key of the south-western Caspian district, Peter had been very anxious to capture. On September 12, 1722, a Persian embassy, then at St Petersburg, was forced to sign a treaty of peace, ceding Baku, Derbent, and the provinces of Gilyan, Mazandevan and Astrabad. The Persian Government refused, however, to ratify the treaty. Only by Peter's threat of a league of partition against her between Russia and Turkey was the Shah's Government finally brought to consent to the cession of these provinces.

These acquisitions and the subsequent intrigues of the Russian Government with the Armenians, with whom Russia now came into direct communication for the first time, seriously disturbed the Porte. In August, 1722, the Grand Vezir told the Russian ambassador, Nepluyeff, that Russia had better declare war against the Porte at once, and then they would know where they were. The whole of the Tsar's reign, he added, had been one uninterrupted war, in which he gave no rest to his neighbours. Subsequently Nepluyeff reported to his Court that the Turks intended to conquer Persia and Georgia, and drive the Russians out of Daghestan. He earnestly advised the Emperor to be ready for war, as immense stores of ammunition were being constantly sent to Erzerum and Azoff from Stambul. Fortunately, Turkey was not ready for war, and the acquisition of the Caspian Provinces by Russia was a matter of comparative indifference to the Sultan. It was the spread of Russian influence in the Caucasus that he really feared. Still, throughout 1723, the aspect of affairs was very threatening. Peter regarded the Caspian provinces as indispensable; and Nepluyeff was instructed to inform the Porte that the Russian Emperor would allow no other Power to approach the Caspian Sea. The English Government used every expedient to induce the Porte to declare war, and even held out the hope of simultaneous cooperation on the part of Great Britain and Denmark. In the beginning of 1724 Nepluyeff demanded his passports; but, on June 12, by the Treaty of Constantinople, a compromise was arrived at: Shemak was to belong to a vassal of the Porte; but the region extending from Shemak to the Caspian was to be divided into three parts, two of which, adjacent to the Caspian, were to belong to Russia, while the third, stretching southwards from Derbent, was to be divided between Russia and Persia.

The reform of the internal administration engaged Peter's attention immediately after the termination of the Swedish War (1721). He began with the highest tribunal of all, the Administrative Senate. Experience had already shown that the Senators, following the old Muscovite *laissezaller* principle, were apt to neglect business, disregard the laws, and quash all complaints from inferior tribunals against themselves personally. To

obviate this, Peter, at the beginning of 1722, instituted the office of the Procurator General, whose duty it was to sit in the Senate and see that the Senators performed their duties "in a faithful, zealous and orderly fashion, according to the direction of the standing rules and ukases." The worst cases were to be reported direct to the sovereign, if the admonition of the Procurator General was of no avail. "He is in fact to be our eye," ran the ukase. It required no ordinary courage and resource to occupy an office which must necessarily embroil its holder with all the highest dignitaries in the State; but Peter found the man he wanted in Paul Yaguzhinsky, the son of the Lutheran organist at Moscow, whose geniality and capability had long endeared him to Peter and who was the only man in Russia who could stand before the Tsar, when in his worst moods, without trembling.

To keep a watchful eye upon defaulters and malingerers among the gentry, the office of Herald-master was instituted, in 1721. This functionary had to keep lists of all the landowners in the Empire, showing who were in the service of the State and who were not, and giving the fullest details as to their families and occupations. A third newly established functionary, the "Master of Petitions," had to examine all the petitions presented to the various departments of State and see that they received proper attention.

But it was of small avail to simplify and specialise the administration, and fence it about with safeguards, so long as the new institutions were infected by the fatal maladies of the old. The most inveterate of these maladies was the universal corruption for which Muscovy had always been notorious; and Peter himself, though he cauterised it freely, could not wholly eradicate the evil. In the course of 1723 and 1724 he made terrible examples of two of his most confidential and meritorious servants, Vice-Chancellor Shafiroff and the Upper-fiscal Nestoroff.

Despite a constant if gradual increase in the revenue, the financial needs of the Government, owing to the expenses of the long war, were heavy, and led to all sorts of ingenious but oppressive fiscal experiments. It was even found necessary, at last, to cut down all official salaries by one-half. The difficulty of housing the soldiers properly led to the introduction of barracks into Russia. At the end of Peter's reign the army numbered 210,000 men, besides 109,000 irregulars. The fleet consisted of 48 ships of the line, with 787 galleys and smaller vessels, whose full complement of crews was 27,939 men. There was also a considerable increase in the mercantile marine, and native Russian merchants now began to appear in the principal non-Russian Baltic ports.

Much also was now done to develop and improve the local administration. In all the towns magistracies were formed, consisting of a president, two burgomasters, and four councillors, whose duty it was to gather all the traders and artisans together and prevent them from drifting into the ranks of the untaxable by flying to the steppes. The

whole body of citizens was divided into three classes; the first guild, consisting of the chief merchants, doctors, apothecaries and cloth manufacturers; the second guild, consisting of the petty traders and artisans; and, thirdly, the common people.

By the ukase of January 13, 1724, the foundations were laid of an Academy of Sciences, which was to be a university, a gymnasium, and an elementary school at the same time. The tolls levied on merchandise in the towns of Narva, Dorpat, Reval, and Arenberg were set apart for its maintenance. The Academy also relieved the Synod of the duty of translating and circulating books. After the death of its first President, the Metropolitan Yavorsky, the office of President of the Synod was abolished, but it received a civil assessor in the person of the "Upper procurator of the Synod," May 22, 1722. Another official, the Proto-inquisitor, or, "Chief-fiscal in spiritual matters," was to exercise the same supervision over the Synod as "the Procurator General" already exercised over the Senate.

Towards the end of the reign, the question of the succession to the throne caused the Emperor some anxiety. The rightful heir in the natural order of primogeniture was Grand Duke Peter, a child of six; but Peter decided to pass him over because, as the son of the Tsarevich Alexis, any acknowledgment of his rights would, infallibly, have excited the hopes of those people who had sympathised with his father, and the fears of those who had had a hand in the murder of Alexis. Who, then, was to succeed the reigning Emperor? His own daughters, Anne and Elizabeth, were still mere children, and his nieces, the daughters of his brother Ivan, had married foreign princes and were living abroad. The Tsaritsa Catharine alone remained. About 1702 he had picked up Martha Skovronskaya at Menshikoff's house. She had been first his mistress, then, after her conversion to Orthodoxy under the name of Catharine Aleksyevna, his wife. He now resolved to secure the throne for her also. That curious document, the *ustaff*, or ordinance, of 1712, heralded this unheard-of innovation. Time-honoured custom had hitherto reckoned primogeniture in the male line as the best title to the Russian Crown; in the *ustaff* of 1722 Peter denounced primogeniture in general as a stupid, dangerous, and even unspiritual practice. He concluded by declaring the succession to the Russian Empire to be, in future, absolutely dependent on the will of the reigning sovereign.

The succession *ustaff* was but a preliminary step to a still more sensational novelty. In 1723 Peter resolved to crown his consort, the Tsaritsa Catharine, Empress. The whole question as to what were the proper titles of the Emperor's family had previously been submitted to the consideration of the Senate and Synod, which decided that Catharine should be called Imperatritsa, or its Slavonic equivalent Tsesareva, while the princesses were to be no longer Tsarevnas (daughters of a Tsar) but Tsesarevnas (daughters of an Emperor). On November 15, 1723, Peter

issued a second manifesto, in which he proceeded, at some length and in very affectionate terms, to cite the services rendered to him by his Tsesareva in the past, especially during the Turkish War. "Wherefore," proceeds the manifesto, "by the authority given unto us by God, we have resolved to reward such great services of our consort by crowning her with the Imperial crown." The whole nation listened aghast to the manifesto. The only princess who had ever enjoyed the same distinction was Maria Minszka, the consort of the first pseudo-Dimitri, in the sixteenth century, and, heretic as she was, she had at least been of noble birth. The present Empress had come to Russia not merely as a stranger, but as a captive; yet now, forsooth, she was to wear the Imperial crown and sit on the Imperial throne! On this point, however, Peter was utterly regardless of the feelings and the prejudices of his people. And, in truth, Catharine, coarse and ignorant as she was, had inalienable claims upon his gratitude and affection. An uncommonly shrewd and sensible woman, endowed with an imperturbable good-humour, and an absolute indifference to the hardships of a roving life, she was an ideal wife for a rough and ready peripatetic Russian soldier. But, more than this, she was, on the whole, the least unsuitable of Peter's potential successors. Her frank *bonhomie* had won for her the devotion of the army, every member of which regarded her as a comrade; while a vivid consciousness of the peril of her position had made her deliberately adopt, betimes, the rôle of an habitual protectress of all who incurred the displeasure of the Emperor; so that most of the men of the new system had already made up their minds to stand or fall with her. On May 18, 1724, the coronation of Catharine took place in the cathedral of the Assumption at Moscow, with extraordinary pomp and splendour.

In the course of the same summer the state of Peter's health caused grave anxiety. His labours and his excesses had already undermined his splendid constitution; and, though not yet fifty-three years of age, he was already an old man. On October 3 he had another very violent attack of his paroxysms. Yet in the same month, ignoring the advice of his physicians, he undertook a long and fatiguing tour of inspection of the latest of his great public works, the Ladoga canals, proceeding thence to inspect the iron-works at Olonets, where he dug out a piece of iron ore, 120 lbs. in weight. In the beginning of November, at Lakhta, perceiving a boat full of soldiers on a sand-bank, in imminent danger of being drowned, he plunged into the water to render them assistance and was immersed to his girdle for a considerable time. He reached St Petersburg too ill ever to rally again, though he showed himself in public so late as January 16, 1725. After a long and most painful agony, he died at six o'clock on the evening of the 27th. All that could be deciphered of his last message, painfully scrawled with pen and ink on a piece of paper, were the words "*otdaite vse!*" (forgive everything!).

When Peter I expired, prematurely and somewhat suddenly, at the

beginning of 1725, it was the confident expectation of the politicians of Europe that his work would perish with him. During the last thirty years, the terrorised Russian nation had been compelled to break with the traditions of centuries and accept a whole series of social and political reforms secretly loathed by it as so many abominations; but, now that the master-mind was withdrawn, a recoil seemed inevitable and, to the enemies of Russia, desirable. But for the promptitude of the half-dozen capable men whom Peter, with singular felicity, had gradually selected and trained up to assist him in his work, and carry it on after his death, a lapse into "the quagmire of Byzantinism" must inevitably have taken place. The stern and ever increasing severity of the late Emperor's system of government had produced universal discontent—a discontent the more bitter and intense because, hitherto, denied an outlet. The vast majority of the clergy, at least half the Senate (though that was a purely Petrine institution) and all the old boiar nobility without exception, were ripe for revolt, and they made no secret of their intention of elevating to the throne the infant Grand Duke, Peter Aleksyevich. The reactionaries included more than a half of the wealth of Russia, and nearly all the influence that unofficial rank still retained in that country; but their faction was much weakened by internal dissensions and possessed no leader of sufficient force of character. On the other hand, Peter's pupils, as we may call the opposite party, led by Alexander Danilovich Menshikoff, Peter Andryevich Tolstoi and Paul Ivanovich Yaguzhinsky, were men of extraordinary energy, sufficiently enlightened to understand perfectly the real needs of their country, and well aware that a moment's hesitation on their part would mean the subversion of Peter's system and their own ruin. These three men detested each other as rivals; but common interests and a common danger now drew them together, and they were agreed that the only way of preserving the new system was to raise to Peter's throne the widowed Empress Catharine Aleksyevna. The energy and presence of mind of her partisans overawed all opposition. Only a few moments after her consort had breathed his last in her arms, a deputation from the Senate, army and nobility petitioned her to occupy the vacant throne, and on February 22, 1725, Catharine I was solemnly proclaimed autocrat of all Russia.

Her short reign (February, 1725 to May, 1727) was chiefly remarkable for its humane and conciliatory measures at home, and its cautious, pacific, but, nevertheless, dignified, consistent and independent policy abroad. Something was done to mitigate the suffering of the nation. The grinding poll-tax was reduced; a large part of the army was disbanded; many of the restrictions upon commerce imposed during the last reign were removed; attempts were made to stimulate the copper, iron and other industries. But at home the Government was able to effect but little. Time alone could teach the nation at large

gradually to assimilate so much of Western civilisation as was necessary for its development and welfare. From this time to the great awakening which followed upon the disasters of the Crimean War, the history of Russia is mainly the history of her diplomacy, and of the wars which resulted from it. She had to assert herself in Europe, in order to remain European. Thus Russia's foreign conquests, her aggressions and her usurpations, during the eighteenth century, were but the successive phases of a determined struggle to carry out the programme of Peter the Great in its entirety. The other great Powers would have confined this semi-Asiatic interloper within her native steppes; she herself, as represented by her ablest rulers, saw in every fresh advance, westwards and southwards, an additional guarantee of her present stability and her future progress.

For at least fifteen years after the conclusion of the great Northern War, continental diplomacy was dominated by the influence of the foreign Prince who sat upon the English throne. George I had succeeded in rounding off his Hanoverian electorate by despoiling Sweden in her direst extremity; but his territorial acquisitions had been so recent and so extensive, that he was nervously apprehensive of losing them again. The readiest allies of George I were those States which, like himself, had snatched something from the general scramble for Sweden's continental possessions, such as Prussia and Denmark. France, exhausted by the War of the Spanish Succession, was pacifically inclined. The Empire and Sweden were doubtful Powers. Spain, on the other hand, was hostile to England. The interests of Russia were regarded as inimical to the House of Hanover, and Peter's matrimonial alliances had also fluttered the German Courts. One of his nieces, Catharine, had married Duke Charles Leopold of Mecklenburg-Schwerin; her younger sister, Duke Frederick William of Courland. Then, too, the new great Northern Power Russia was an object of distrust and jealousy to England, especially as the English Baltic trade had already suffered severely from the arbitrary restrictions imposed upon it by Peter. Finally, Russia had given an asylum to the exiled Duke Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, and had appeared to support his interests, especially after he had become the Empress' son-in-law by his marriage with the Tsesarevna Anne (June 1, 1725). George I feared above all things the reopening of the Schleswig-Holstein question. He had purchased Bremen and Verden from Denmark, on the secret understanding that Denmark should be put into possession of Schleswig. If Denmark were forced to surrender part of the duchies, his own enlarged electorate might be endangered. The effects of the "Hanoverian Alliance" (Treaty of Herrenhausen, September 3, 1725, N.S.) between England and France, to which Prussia immediately acceded, were first felt by Russia. In the spring of 1726, the British Government, startled by unfounded rumours that the Empress Catharine was massing troops in Finland,

and equipping her fleet to promote the interests of the Duke of Holstein, sent into the Baltic a squadron, under Admiral Wager, which anchored before Reval. Wager was the bearer of a letter from George I in which his Britannic Majesty declared that the armaments of Russia, in times of profound peace, could not but arouse the suspicions of Great Britain and her allies. "Our fleet," continued this despatch, "has been sent to preserve the peace of the North and prevent your fleet from putting to sea." The Empress protested with energy and dignity, and the British fleet was withdrawn; but the able Westphalian Andrei Ivanovich Osterman, who had entered Peter's service in 1717, and as Vice-Chancellor was to control the foreign policy of Russia for the next sixteen years, instantly took the precaution of throwing himself into the arms of England's enemies. On August 6, 1726, he advised the Empress Catharine to join the Austro-Spanish League, each of the three contracting parties engaging to guarantee each other's possessions, while Austria and Russia were to help each other, in case of need, with 30,000 men.

Thus the Hanoverian Alliance found itself confronted by an Austro-Russo-Spanish League, and both began forthwith to compete for the support of the rest of Europe. Denmark acceded to the Hanoverian Alliance by the Treaty of Copenhagen (April 16, 1727), concluded for four years, whereby both England and France promised to assist her against Russia, and assure her the tranquil possession of Schleswig. Sweden took the same course, despite all the efforts to the contrary of the Russian ambassadors Michael Bestuzheff and Vasily Dolgoruki.

The one great administrative innovation of Catharine I was the formation of the Supreme Privy Council. The idea was Osterman's. It was not, as the French ambassador Campredon supposed, a move in the direction of limited monarchy, by associating the leading magnates in the Government, after the model of an English Cabinet Council, but rather an attempt to strengthen the executive, by concentrating affairs in the hands of a few persons, instead of leaving them, as heretofore, to the care of a turbulent and distracted Senate. After much deliberation between the Empress and her advisers, the ukase of March 9, 1726, established the Supreme Privy Council. It was to consist of not less than six, and not more than nine members, under the presidency of the sovereign. No ukases were in future to be issued, till they had received the approbation of the Council. The control of the War Office, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Office was transferred from the Senate to the Council; and, subsequently, the Council received authority to revise the work of all the other departments of State; even the election of Senators was subject to its approval.

Towards the end of 1726 Catharine's health began to fail, and for a time she was seriously ill. Early in January, 1727, she recovered; but her partisans had received a severe shock, and thought it high time to begin to look out for themselves. The position of Menshikoff in

particular was highly critical. During the last four months he had ruled almost like an absolute sovereign, and some were even inclined to believe that he aimed at the imperial crown for himself. On the other hand, his enemies were "as numerous as the hairs of his head," and his violence and tyranny had revolted them to the last degree. He knew that if he made a single false step he was lost. At this juncture, he was approached by the Austrian ambassador, Rabutin, with a project for securing the succession to the Grand Duke Peter. Menshikoff eagerly snatched at the project. He stipulated for himself, however, the first vacant electorate in the Empire, and for his daughter Maria the hand of the young Grand Duke. To these conditions Rabutin cheerfully agreed. Osterman, who all along had represented the impossibility of keeping the Grand Duke out of his rights, joined Rabutin and Menshikoff, not so much from interest as from conviction, and it was his secret but powerful influence which ultimately secured victory for the Austrian faction. A desperate attempt of Peter Tolstoi (who had even more reason to dread the accession of the Grand Duke than that of Menshikoff himself) to counteract the plans of Menshikoff by elevating the Tsesarevna Elizabeth to the throne with a Council of Regency, came too late. On January 21, 1727, Catharine caught a chill at the ceremony of the benediction of the waters of the Neva. She rallied at the beginning of April; but on the 21st the fever increased, and her frequent fainting fits left but little hope of her recovery. Menshikoff at once took his measures. He surrounded the dying Empress with his creatures, so as to make it impossible for anyone else to approach her. On April 26, she was seized by so violent a paroxysm that the end was momentarily expected. On the same evening Tolstoi and his associates were apprehended. When, contrary to all expectation, Catharine rallied once more and lived eleven days longer, Menshikoff, acting nominally under her orders, succeeded in crushing a conspiracy aimed against himself. A special ukase banished Tolstoi and his associates to the shores of the White Sea, or to Siberia. This ukase was issued on the morning of May 16; on the same evening Catharine I expired.

Early on May 17, the members of the Imperial Family, the Supreme Privy Council, the High Senate, the Holy Synod, and the chief officers of the Guard, assembled at the Palace to hear the will of the late Empress read. Although it was supposed to have been signed by her, it is doubtful whether she ever saw it; but it so exactly expressed the wishes of the nation that its authenticity was never questioned. It declared the Grand Duke Peter Aleksyevich her successor. During his minority, the Government was to be in the hands of a Regency composed of the Supreme Privy Council, the Duke and Duchess of Holstein, and the Tsesarevna Elizabeth.

Peter II was still only eleven years old, but unusually tall and well proportioned for his age. From his childhood he had been kept in the

strictest seclusion. His grandfather, who hated him because he was his father's son, had systematically ignored him; but had not, as some have supposed, allowed his education to be absolutely neglected. To do Menshikoff justice, it was now his first care that the young Emperor should be trained in a manner more befitting his exalted rank and his sovereign responsibilities; and to the learned and experienced Vice-Chancellor Osterman the care of the education of Peter II was wisely committed. He had, moreover, another more intimate and affectionate mentor in his sister Natalia, who had been the sole companion of his lonely infancy. Although only twelve months older than her brother, Providence had endowed her with wisdom and prudence, and other choice gifts of heart and mind.

During the first four months of the new reign, the Government was entirely in the hands of Menshikoff, who, despite frequent acts of tyranny, on the whole acquitted himself well of his enormous responsibilities. It is true that old enemies or troublesome rivals were, with small compunction, removed to a safe distance. But, on the other hand, Menshikoff tried to attach to himself all able officials who were not over-ambitious and to win over such members of the old boiar families as were not too exacting in their demands. Foreign affairs were left entirely in the hands of Osterman. The chair in the Supreme Privy Council vacated by Tolstoi was given to Prince Vasily Lukich Dolgoruki; and Menshikoff's old colleagues were not a little disgusted to find that his new friend, Prince Demetrius Galitsin, had as much to say in the Council as themselves. All the Dolgorukis and Galitsins were arch-conservatives and deeply attached to the family of the new Emperor. At the same time, the Emperor's grandmother, the Tsaritsa Eudoxia, was released from her prison at Schlüsselburg. In the beginning of August, the Duke and Duchess of Holstein were requested to quit Russia, and the Tsesarevna Elizabeth was kept in the background.

Tyrannous as it was, there can be little doubt as to the vigour and economical efficiency of the administration of Menshikoff. The humane and conciliatory policy of the last reign was continued. Peter I's export duty of 37 per cent. on hemp and linen yarn was reduced to 5 per cent.; a commission for enquiring into the state of commerce was appointed by Osterman; the trade in Siberian furs was made absolutely free. As a first step towards softening the barbarous customs of the day the ukase of July 21, 1727, ordered the immediate removal and destruction of the stone columns and iron hooks on which the heads and limbs of executed criminals had hitherto been exposed in the great square of St Petersburg.

But, salutary as the rule of Menshikoff was, it was still a usurpation. The will of the late Empress had transferred all her authority to the Supreme Privy Council, and the Council was now treated as if it did not exist. Menshikoff ruled because he was so much stronger than anyone

else. One of his first acts had been to kidnap the young Emperor by carrying him off to his palace in the Vasily Island. Shortly afterwards, Osterman announced to the Council his Majesty's intention to wed Menshikoff's eldest daughter, Maria. But he was never to become the father-in-law of Peter II. The young Emperor, who had a will of his own, already began to chafe against the constant and often petty interference of the dictator. At this juncture, Menshikoff was suddenly prostrated by the pulmonary complaint from which he had long been suffering. On his return to Court six weeks later, he found that the young Emperor had flitted to Peterhof, taking Osterman and the Dolgorukis with him. Menshikoff precipitated his fall by quarrelling with Osterman, his only friend, of whom he was growing jealous, even going the length of threatening to have him broken on the wheel for his insolence. On September 19, 1727, an ukase, issued in the name of the Emperor, forbade obedience to any orders proceeding from Menshikoff; on the 20th, the Supreme Privy Council deprived him of all his charges and emoluments on the charge of conspiracy against the Crown; and on the 21st he and his family were expelled from the capital and ultimately banished to Berezoff in Siberia, where he died in 1730.

The triumph of Menshikoff's enemies was the triumph of the reactionary old Russian nobility, as represented by the princely families of the Galitsins and the Dolgorukis. At the head of the Galitsins stood Prince Demetrius Mikhailovich, a thoroughly honest, upright man, whose many good qualities were ruined by an inflexible haughtiness and an insatiable ambition. He had always regarded the Petrine reforms with hatred and suspicion. The most conspicuous of the Dolgorukis were Prince Vasily Lukich, who had now a considerable reputation at half the Courts of Europe for diplomatic adroitness, and Prince Vasily Vladimirovich, the military celebrity of the family, though as a general he had been outshone by Prince Michael Galitsin. The domination of these men might have proved highly injurious to Russia, but for the counteracting influence of the Vice-Chancellor. To the Dolgorukis and the Galitsins Osterman was detestable both as a foreigner and as the ablest pupil of Peter I. The Dolgorukis tried at first to poison the mind of the young Emperor against him; but Peter II told them plainly that he would not abandon Osterman; on the other hand, he requested Osterman not to interfere with the Dolgorukis. A sort of tacit truce thereupon ensued. The Dolgorukis carried Peter off to Moscow, where the young Emperor was crowned on March 4, 1728. The lion's share of the coronation honours naturally fell to the dominant old Russian party, especially to the Dolgorukis who were gradually usurping an authority unattainable by Menshikoff in the plenitude of his power. Peter II, who had learnt to regard the new capital as a prison, was charmed by the superior natural attractions of the old capital, and gave himself up entirely to hawking and hunting, forbidding those about

him even to mention the name of St Petersburg. The conduct of affairs was left almost entirely to Osterman. Fortunately, the reforms of the last two reigns were now beginning to bear good fruit. Trade was reviving, money was beginning to flow steadily, if slowly, into the Treasury; the people were happier, and the land was much more prosperous than it had been for many years. Abroad, too, such political changes as had taken place were, on the whole, favourable to Russia. On the death of George I, the English Government had politely hinted (through Horace Walpole at Paris to the Russian Minister there, Prince Kurakin) that the new King desired nothing so much as the reestablishment of friendly relations; and, shortly afterwards, an unofficial political agent, Claudius Rondeau, came to Russia to find out how the land lay. The chief political event of this period was the attraction of Spain to the Hanoverian Alliance by the Treaty of Seville (1729), whereby her Italian possessions were guaranteed to her by England and France; and England received some important commercial concessions. But the only result of this defection was to draw Austria and Russia still more closely together; and their growing influence in the east of Europe counterpoised the influence in the west of "the Allies of Seville," as the Hanoverian Alliance now began to be called. The two Powers maintained the integrity of Polish territory against Prussia, frustrated the dynastic schemes of Augustus II, by dissipating the Diet of Grodno, and succeeded in keeping Maurice of Saxony out of Courland. England was, as usual, suspected at Moscow of intriguing at Stockholm to bring about a war with Russia; but a violent quarrel between the Swedish King Frederick and his premier, Count Arvid Horn, told rather in favour of Russia, and was skilfully taken advantage of by her ambassador Golovkin.

The chief domestic event of the period was the death of the Grand Duchess Natalia on December 7, 1728. The influence of the Dolgorukis over Peter II was, henceforth, uncontested; and they now bent all their efforts to bring about Peter's marriage with Catharine, daughter of Alexis Dolgoruki. They were actually betrothed, with the greatest solemnity, on December 11, 1729, and the wedding was fixed for January 30, 1730, when the whole design was frustrated by the death of Peter II from small-pox on the morning of what was to have been his wedding-day.

From midnight on January 30 till five o'clock the next morning, the members of the Supreme Privy Council had been in anxious consultation behind closed doors. Death, or misadventure, had reduced their number to five persons; and the most sagacious, but also the least courageous, of the five, Vice-Chancellor Osterman, was prostrated by an attack of gout. Of the four remaining Councillors, the aged Grand Chancellor, Count Golovkin, was practically a nonentity; while the two Dolgorukis were too diffident of themselves and of each other, to propose

anything definite. All the more readily, therefore, did they listen to the one man of character among them. Prince Demetrius Galitsin, after patiently awaiting his opportunity for more than thirty years, was now to rule Russia for something less than thirty days. His theory was that all the ills of Russia were due to that odious system of low favouritism which had enabled stable-boys, flunkys, pie-vendors, and the dregs of the German settlement to monopolise all the offices and dignities of the State, while the Russian aristocracy was kept at arm's length. His remedy was the abolition of autocracy. Let the monarchy be limited, and favouritism must disappear. Only thus could the national nobility take its proper place round the throne. In the second daughter of Ivan V, Anne, the widowed Duchess of Courland, Galitsin fancied that he had discovered the candidate he wanted for the throne. He easily brought round his colleagues, as well as a general assembly of the Synod, the Senate, the Guard and the nobility, to his opinion; whereupon the election of Anne was announced to the troops and a deputation was sent to Mittau (January 31) to offer the Crown to Anne, conditionally upon her subscribing in their presence nine articles which the Supreme Privy Council had drawn up for her signature. By these articles she was solemnly to engage to govern solely through the Council; not to marry, or appoint her successor, without its consent; to relinquish the rights of declaring war and concluding peace, with that of conferring any military appointment above the rank of a colonel, and that of bestowing gifts of land or money; to surrender the command of the army and the guards to the Council; not to degrade any member of the nobility without legitimate cause; not to impose fresh taxes, and finally to agree to everything which should be for the good of her subjects. In a word, she was to sign away her whole authority, in exchange for a high-sounding title.

On February 21 the Council was relieved of much anxiety by the arrival of a courier from Mittau, with the articles signed by the new Empress, who had further added beneath her signature the words, "I hereby promise to observe everything herein contained unreservedly." Her obsequious alacrity on this occasion was due to the fact that she had been warned by Paul Yaguzhinsky of the secret machinations of the Council, and had resolved to take back her word on the first opportunity. Meanwhile, Galitsin's public announcement of his audacious political innovation had been received with chilling silence, and only by the use of the most extreme measures were "the Republican gentlemen," as Roudeau called the Galitsin faction, able to keep the capital quiet till the arrival of the Empress.

From February 26, when she made her public entry into Moscow, till March 8, Anne was kept under the strictest surveillance by the Council. But Osterman, whose keen political instincts told him that a limited monarchy in eighteenth century Russia was impossible, was secretly

working against them; while Prince Alexis Cherkasky, the richest nobleman in the empire, was entrusted with the practical management of the impending *coup d'état*, which was fixed for March 8. Early in the morning of that day, 800 noblemen and 150 of the officers of the Guard boldly ascended the staircase of the Palace in the Kremlin, and demanded an audience of her Majesty, whom they found seated on her throne surrounded by her Court. General Usupoff of the Guards, on behalf of the deputation, thereupon presented a petition to the Empress, begging her to cancel the “Articles of Mittau”; and, after some hesitation, and despite the respectful protests of the Council, she cancelled the Articles accordingly. At four o'clock after noon, the nobility returned with a fresh petition, imploring Anne to accept the absolute authority as possessed, from time immemorial, by her ancestors of glorious memory. On the same evening, the accession of the new autocrat, amidst the roll of drums and the firing of salvos, was proclaimed; a new oath of allegiance was duly administered to everyone in the capital; and couriers were despatched to the provinces, to announce the glad tidings. Nowhere was there the slightest symptom of opposition.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE SCANDINAVIAN KINGDOMS.

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THE struggle between Denmark and Sweden under Charles X left abiding marks upon the national life of both adversaries. While in Sweden, as has been shown in an earlier chapter, the Regents were negotiating a general peace of the north, the Danish Estates assembled at Copenhagen to repair the ruin wrought by war (September, 1660). So terrible had been its disasters that a great part of Denmark lay waste, and the Crown was compelled to repudiate part of its debt and to sell one-half of its vast estates to pay the remainder. The clergy and burghers, uniting in a new feeling of enthusiasm for the King who had heroically defended his capital, were more bitter than ever against the nobles, to whose selfishness they might well ascribe the devastated and defenceless state of the country, the triumphant establishment of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and the loss of many provinces by both Denmark and Norway beyond the Sound. That some five or six hundred families should monopolise the chief places in Church and State, own half the soil of Denmark, enjoy freedom from taxation, and evade the burden of national defence, was a political situation which, after the heroism of the King and of the capital, men could not but regard as anomalous. It remained to be seen whether there existed in Denmark any force capable of effecting a reform.

Frederick III had already manifested his consciousness of augmented influence. He had ruled with the aid of secret advisers, kept great offices vacant, left seats in the Council unfilled, departed from its recommendations, and, in defiance of the nobles and of the Peace of Roeskilde, laid hands upon his treacherous former Minister and favourite, Count Korfits Ulfeld. Oligarchical rule, however, still appeared to flourish; and in Denmark, as in Sweden, the *Rigsraad*, or permanent Council, was an organ of the nobility. The monarchy and the people, alike enfeebled by the long ascendancy of the nobles, had not learned to act in concert. Of the lower Estates, moreover, some enjoyed privileges

of their own which formed a bar to common action. As to freedom from taxation, the Bishops, the capital, and Kristianshavn ranked as nobles. It is therefore probable that, although the King's power had been increased by the War, although he was ready to strike, and although popular leaders were not wanting who would support him against the nobles, some patriotic self-sacrifice on the part of the First Estate might yet have averted revolution.

At the Diet, however, which had been summoned to sanction a complete change in the national system of taxation, the members of this Estate showed that they had learned nothing. In place of the old direct taxes, the Government proposed a wide system of indirect taxes on commodities in daily use, together with duties on certain movables and contracts. The nobles at once claimed exemption for themselves and their villeins; and to the former demand they clung firmly during heated negotiations between the several Estates. It therefore became possible for the leaders of the clergy and burghers, Hans Svane, the Bishop of Zealand, and Hans Nansen, the Burgomaster of Copenhagen, to strike a great blow for the monarchy and for the nation. By inducing the Bishops and citizens to lay down their privileges, on condition that the nobles and university did the same, they confronted the *Rigsraad* and nobles as a solid Opposition, which advanced a far-reaching claim of equality before the law. At the end of September the oligarchical party capitulated. The struggle had, however, demonstrated afresh both the selfishness and the weakness of the caste lampooned as "hares and wasters of the realm." With an ambitious Queen by his side, and Hans Svane and Hans Nansen as his allies, Frederick determined to follow up his advantage with a *coup d'état*.

A bloodless campaign of six days, October 8-13, 1660, sufficed to give to the feeble monarchy the prospect of becoming the most absolute in Europe. On October 8, after much secret preparation, the clergy and burghers resolved to offer Denmark to Frederick III as a hereditary kingdom, and called upon the nobles to concur in a joint resolution of the *Rigsraad*. On the 10th, after some stormy scenes, the First Estate refused and prepared to quit the Diet. Thereupon, the Opposition turned to the King. Frederick was a student and an alchemist rather than a leader of men, and at this crisis many conflicting influences were at work upon his mind. At last, relying on the army and on the citizens of Copenhagen, which was placed in a state of siege, he resolved to break the resistance of the aristocracy by armed force. The threat sufficed; and, on October 13, Denmark became in due form of law a monarchy hereditary in both the male and the female line of the reigning House.

The establishment of hereditary monarchy was neither in letter nor in spirit the establishment of absolutism. Both the instrument which was signed by the priests and burghers and the formal letter in which the *Rigsraad* declared its unanimous agreement with them provided that

the privileges of all men should be maintained. The invaluable alliance of Copenhagen had in great part been inspired by ambition for civic privilege. Neither the *Rigsraad* nor the Estates dreamed of putting a period to their own existence. From the morrow of the King's triumph until his death in 1670, however, the history of Denmark is that of her transformation into an absolutist State. The Charter, by the grant of which according to custom Frederick had purchased the dwindling remnants of royal power, was now surrendered to him in return for a mere promise to rule as a Christian king to the satisfaction of every Estate. Within a week, the existence of the *Rigsraad* as an independent power had come to an end. Before the end of the year, the Estates had quitted Copenhagen, with no security for their privileges save the royal word. In January, 1661, a document was drawn up for general signature, in which the subscribers made an unconditional declaration that they had solemnly committed to the royal line absolute rule over Denmark and Norway. The pretensions of the King and the ostentation of the Queen grew unceasingly. Five years after the revolution the quintessence of autocracy was formulated in the *Kongelov* (King's Law), which remained a royal secret until after Frederick's death.

Meanwhile, both in Denmark and in Norway, absolutism was taking the customary means for preserving itself. Those who, like Ulfeld, might imperil the dynasty were punished with a violence born of panic. After a generation of frequent and disastrous wars, foreign policy was directed towards the preservation of peace. Frederick sought a good understanding with Gottorp and an alliance with France, which might give him security against both Gottorp and Sweden. A new administration was built up, for which talent and royalism were necessary qualifications, and which was no longer the exclusive property of the nobles. Many high offices, both civil and military, were filled by Germans. The *Rigsraad* received the name of Royal Council and became a Court of law. After the Swedish fashion, Colleges or Departments of State were established, and the kingdoms of Denmark and Norway were divided into districts each governed by a sheriff with a fixed salary. The central Government showed itself active, but always paternal. Essayng no social revolution, it left the nobles opulent and the commons depressed. The former soon accepted the autocracy, and the latter did not repudiate their royal ally. Offices were now open without distinction of birth; and Copenhagen, though baulked of its high ambitions, added to its privileges and doubled its population. Norway, too, gained in independence and privilege, though falling short of the height of her desires.

During the later years of Frederick III the Government was profoundly influenced by one of the few brilliant statesmen to whom Denmark has yet given birth. Peter Schumacher, a cosmopolitan young citizen of Copenhagen, an eye-witness of the English Restoration and of the dawning autocracy of Louis XIV, entered Frederick's service in 1663.

His ability soon gave him great influence over his master and all others with whom he came in contact. It was he who, in November, 1665, expressed in the *Kongelov* the autocratic ideals of the King, and who became the custodian of a document which might by its absolutism have displeased the people, and which by its rules for the succession would certainly have displeased the Queen. When, in February, 1670, Frederick III was succeeded by his son Christian V, Schumacher soon displaced the German Minister Christopher Gabel and became the real ruler of the State. A disciple of Hobbes, he inspired and facilitated the wider development of autocratic power. The *Kongelov* was published, and its author received a grant of arms and the title of Count of Griffenfeld—a name which Louis XIV declared to be that of one of the world's greatest Ministers. Under Griffenfeld's influence there was established a new high nobility, in which he himself accepted a place, a new order of merit, that of the *Dannebrog*, a new system of titles, and a new aristocracy of service. At the same time, under the impetus given by Griffenfeld and by his friend Ulrik Frederik Gyldenløve, a son of Frederick III, the Government showed great activity at home. The finances were reformed, provision made for trade and industry, immigration facilitated, and the army reorganised so as to increase its Danish constituents and diminish the foreign. The navy became one of the largest in Europe, and Kort Adeler, the Norwegian naval hero who created it anew, found an apt pupil in Niels Juel, who was named Admiral at twenty-eight. At the same time, the administration both central and provincial was systematised, and a new Privy Council of seven members was established at its head. In Norway, under Gyldenløve, the action of Government was equally vigorous. The seat of power remained at Copenhagen; but in administration, defence and material well-being the land made progress during the years of peace.

The prime object of Griffenfeld always was to secure power both for himself and for his country by keeping the peace. In 1673 he became Grand Chancellor and thenceforward devoted himself to the foreign policy of the State. Here, for a few years, his adroitness in dealing with the manifold difficulties of the time called forth universal admiration. He restored the prestige of his country, gained subsidies without fighting, and maintained peace with both Gottorp and Sweden, the apparently irreconcilable foes of Denmark. He was wise enough to see that the secular enmity between the Scandinavian nations was injurious and unnecessary. In many respects, however, he played the part of Wolsey to his master. Christian V, who much resembled his grandfather Christian IV, was a shallow and dissolute, but popular and vigorous, young soldier, who was burning to win back the lost provinces with the sword. In 1675, as will presently be shown, he seized the opportunity of fulfilling his engagements to the opponents of France and at the same time assailing Sweden. The enterprise prospered; and in the following year

Griffenfeld was sacrificed by the autocracy which he had helped to rear. From 1675 to 1679 the so-called War of Scania raged between Denmark and her Scandinavian neighbour, whose fortunes during fourteen years of peace may now be traced.

II.

In 1661, when Sweden made peace at Kardis with Russia, the last and most obstinate of her foes, it became clear how vast was the advance which she had made in fifty years. When Gustavus Adolphus ascended the throne, it had just been demonstrated by war that her power was less than that of Denmark. Charles X, on the other hand, had treated Denmark as insolently as Napoleon treated Spain. With the exception of Norway, always separated from her neighbour by a broad belt of desolation, the Swedes were masters of the vast Scandinavian peninsula. Towards the south, in Pomerania and Bremen-Verden, they had secured large outworks beyond the sea, and had thus become a formidable constituent of the Empire, with the estuaries of two great German rivers in their grasp. In the east, not only did they hold provinces enough to prevent Russia from launching a boat upon the Baltic without their leave, but they had compelled Poland to renounce her claim to much that she had regarded as rightly hers. By half a century of warfare Sweden had thus acquired the unquestionable primacy of the north.

This imposing empire, however, was reared upon a foundation whose fissures were open to every man's view. A political structure so heterogeneous bristled with problems, national and international. The international dangers of Sweden, indeed, began on her own side of the sea. Norway, which successive Swedish warrior-kings strove in vain to conquer, still menaced Sweden's flank. Yet more ominous, as events were soon to prove, was the fact that the fertile lowlands of the south, which had lately been wrested from Denmark, had not ceased to look across the Sound for their overlord. In Norway and in Scania, therefore, Denmark possessed two dangerous auxiliaries for the war of revenge which might naturally follow upon a turn such as in 1660 had been given to a struggle more ancient than the Vasa line. That she would watch her opportunity, was, moreover, rendered yet more probable by the connexion—still represented in the person of Hedwig Eleonora, the consort of Charles X—between Sweden and the House of Holstein-Gottorp, whose interests seemed irreconcilable with those of the Danish dynasty. There were other reasons which made Sweden suspect her neighbour. Her German possessions, Bremen and Verden on the one hand, and western Pomerania on the other, might well appear to Frederick III, as they had appeared to Axel Oxenstierna, in the light of so many parallels advanced against Denmark. The peace of Scandinavia, it was clear, had not been assured in 1660; yet for her discord meant weakness. So long as Sweden and Denmark remained consistently hostile, foreign nations would never fail

to play off the one against the other, and Sweden could never obtain that naval supremacy which was the first essential of a Baltic empire.

In the wider sphere of Europe, Sweden occupied a position of greater insecurity than in Scandinavia. Her outworks in Germany, for which she had striven so long, afforded her some security, but at the cost of some danger. With the city of Bremen she had already had one armed conflict, and was soon (in 1666) to enter on another. Her lands between Weser and Elbe were standing provocations to several German Princes, while those to the west of the Oder challenged others, of whom the Great Elector was the chief. The dominion of an alien race in one part of Germany affronted the whole Germanic body, and by binding the Swedes to the House of Habsburg aggravated the difficulties of their international position. In an age of rivalry between France, her old ally, and the Emperor, it was a serious matter for Sweden that she had now become a German Power. So far as Poland was concerned, it seemed as though the quarrel which had endured for two generations had been settled at Oliva. But the Baltic Provinces, inhabited inland by a turbulent native nobility and a population of serfs, offered difficulties of their own. Peace with the Tsar, moreover, could never be deemed safe so long as the Swedish empire was flung right across the path of Russian national aspiration; and for some years it was anticipated that the treaty which had cost so much labour at Kardis would be broken. To hold the gates of Russia was, moreover, to hazard conflict with the Maritime Powers; while the Dutch were particularly sensitive to the efforts of Sweden to transfer her commerce into the hands of her own subjects.

The dangers of Sweden's international position, however, might well be deemed less formidable and less acute than those which menaced her nearer home. Many of her potential enemies might be foiled by diplomacy, or embroiled with each other, or even be forced at the end of a successful war to make further sacrifices to Sweden. But the social and economic diseases which were afflicting the body politic would yield only to treatment which must be perilous and which might be fatal. The Swedish State was young, and its constitution could not yet be deemed mature. Though raised to greatness and in a measure ordered and organised by Gustavus Adolphus and Oxenstierna, its basis was changing before its structure had been firmly built. The Church still asserted great independence of the State. The nobles still maintained that no law could survive their veto. Charles XI, a sickly child, formed the sole barrier against a disputed succession. The testament of his father, Charles X, provided for a regency; but, at the risk of civil war, the will was so far set aside that Adolphus John, the brother of the late King, was excluded from all share in the Government. For twelve years, until the King's majority (December, 1672), Sweden had to endure an administration which possessed ill-defined powers, was uncertain as to

the division of power between the Regents and the Council (*Råd*), and was compelled to submit to the uncertain interference of Estates which were themselves engaged in an internecine struggle. The approach of Queen Christina, who more than once showed a disposition to resume her Crown, sufficed to throw both Church and State into a panic.

In its dissensions and uncertainty, moreover, the administration did but reflect society in Sweden. Now, as under Christina, peace brought out the national defects. War, it has often been asserted, was at this time the most lucrative industry of Sweden. It is untrue, indeed, that in any given year the State had drawn pecuniary profit from her campaigns. Individual soldiers, such as the Wrangels, had grown rich; but the peasants and the Treasury looked to peace for financial salvation. It is none the less true that the sole national enterprise in which Sweden excelled was war, and that peace soon made it apparent that the moral fibre of the nation had softened. Many of the nobles had become luxurious, arrogant, and rapacious. Jealous of every vestige of wealth and power in non-noble hands, they quarrelled among themselves about precedence with a violence that made every festival a likely occasion for strife. Industry and commerce, inchoate in almost everything except furniture of war, but feebly adjusted themselves to the changed conditions. There was hardly a section of the population without a long list of grievances against every other section. And, when the levies of Charles X were disbanded, the homesteads which should have supported them in time of peace were found too often to have been alienated to private persons by the Crown.

The decay of the political structure designed to sustain the army formed but part of the formidable problem with which the Regency was confronted. Despite her imposing empire and the pomp of a few great nobles, Sweden remained one of the poorest and least populous countries of Europe. Her exchequer was empty. Her bank was tottering. Her civil service had long remained unpaid. To meet the most pressing claims of the army, disbanded in 1660, the Councillors were obliged to pledge their private credit, while the sum of 30,000 dollars for the English sailors was raised by pawning the cannon from the fleet. The National Debt approached 10,500,000 dollars, at a time when Crown lands to the annual value of some millions had passed into the hands of the nobles.

The Regency of five great Officers of State under the nominal presidency of the Queen Dowager, which took the reins after a sharp conflict between the noble and the non-noble Estates, contained no statesman of commanding genius. The youthful Queen Hedwig Eleonora was a dilettante rather than a politician. But in the aged and unbending aristocrat Per Brahe, who had sat in the Council since the days of Gustavus Adolphus, the Regents possessed a Steward worthy alike of the honoured name which he bore and of the almost regal patrimony which had long prospered under his paternal hand. The Treasurer, the

taciturn but efficient Gustaf Bonde, proved himself likewise a stubborn patriot, and his budget of 1662 came to be regarded as a pattern from which it was almost treason to depart. Brahe and Bonde, with three colleagues, formed the Regency which gave Sweden peace with all her enemies, arrived at a settled plan of government, exerted itself for the advancement of trade and justice, and met the Diet of 1664 with a record of four years' active and equitable administration.

Although the administration of the Regency in its early years is entitled to fair credit, yet signs were not wanting that the kingdom lacked a king. The Regents owed at least a nominal responsibility to the Council, and both Regents and Council were substantially delegates of the nobles. The familiar weaknesses of party government therefore made their appearance. Crown lands were bestowed upon the Regents and their friends, while in three years more than forty families received ennoblement. Worst of all, the Chancellor and the brother-in-law of the Queen, Count Magnus Gabriel de La Gardie, attained to an influence which only the weakest of kings would have allowed. Himself of French ancestry, La Gardie shed over the rugged Swedish Court something of the lustre of Versailles. Rich, handsome and urbane, he knew no rival as an orator and as a man of feeling. All his contemporaries pronounce his talents and his person brilliant. He was the *Maccenas* to whom Sweden owed many of the literary and artistic achievements which mark the age. In forming and consolidating his political influence he proved adroit, while on occasion he showed himself both penetrating and energetic. But there was in him something too superficial for his station and his times. A lover of dignified ease, he would abandon politics for months together. During four months of the year 1672 he spent twelve days at Stockholm. When stoutly opposed he yielded, and in the hour of disaster he collapsed.

For nearly fifteen years, however, La Gardie was the cynosure of Sweden. His power, it is true, depended on a majority in the Council; and this was by no means always at his command. But, on the whole, his influence was predominant, and under it the national ruin was almost consummated. At the beginning of the year 1661 the National Debt amounted to some ten and a half million dollars—a sum which mocked at mere retrenchment. Financial equilibrium could not be honestly established in the near future except by special votes of supplies or by substantial resummptions of the alienated Crown lands. But the former was refused by the Diet, and the latter—the “Reduction” resolved on in 1655—broke down. In vain Bonde struggled with the passive resistance of Brahe and the active hostility of La Gardie. The common vice of oligarchy proved too strong. The endowment of the State was now firmly regarded as the inheritance of a caste. Those who had as yet received none of the Crown lands demanded that they should not be left out in the cold; and the annual protest of the Treasury fell on deaf ears.

In 1667 Bonde died. No longer opposed by this champion of Swedish honesty and independence, La Gardie held the Treasury at his mercy. To the end of his career he never understood how facts could be too hard for graceful words; and he now turned inevitably to financial jugglery, in order to meet the heavy annual deficit. "Cease paying off debt," he urged, "and borrow, anticipate, take foreign subsidies; and not a doit of deficit will remain."

Warning voices were heard in opposition to a policy so ruinous in time of peace. Per Brahe, the quasi-monarch of mid-Sweden, urged retrenchment, but in vain. Year by year, the finances grew more involved, until at last their chaos spread to the department of foreign affairs. Bonde had struggled hard to keep expenditure within the limits of revenue and had even contrived to pay off a small part of the debt. In 1667, however, a Commission reported a deficit of over three million dollars—the result largely of the gifts, exemptions, and privileges lavished by the Regency upon themselves and their supporters. It was under the pressure of financial necessity, which Regency, Council, and Diet would make no sacrifice to meet, that in 1672 La Gardie embarked Sweden on the venture, equally dishonest and disastrous, of an alliance with France.

For the next quarter of a century the efforts of France to make Sweden her dependant created the chief problems of Swedish foreign policy. A series of skilful diplomatists—Pomponne, Feuquières, Béthune, d'Avaux—formed and maintained at Stockholm the party of Louis XIV. But the French connexion, in later years accepted or rejected by the King after careful consideration of the national interest, was now accepted by the Regency in the fatuous belief that France would pay liberally for services which Sweden was unwilling, if not unable, to perform. "Let us act like merchants," said one of their number, "so as to get money enough and do naught else for it than sit still; but let us have our troops ready for all emergencies." In this spirit they prepared to bargain with the King of France. At this time Louis XIV wished to complete the isolation of the Dutch by paralysing their German allies. He therefore offered to Sweden an annual subsidy of 400,000 crowns in time of peace, and 600,000 in time of war, on condition of keeping 16,000 men for eventual action in Germany. La Gardie, an optimistic amateur in statecraft, hoped to line his own pockets and to avert the need for retrenchment at the cost of a mere promise. Sweden had joined the Triple Alliance of 1668 in the hope of receiving subsidies from the enemies of France at a time when peace was imminent. Now, by a new and equally censurable speculation, the Chancellor set in motion forces destined to overwhelm himself and to bring his country to the verge of destruction. On April 3, 1672, Sweden closed with France; and on the next day she concluded with England, the client of France, a treaty to the prejudice of the Dutch. Yet the States General were immediately assured

that Sweden would not deviate one hair's-breadth from her previous compact with them. Three days later, 200,000 Frenchmen crossed their frontier.

The Treaty with France had still nearly ten years to run when, in December, 1672, Charles XI became of age to govern. For a time, his reign seemed to be merely a prolongation of the Regency. Though the Estates were disposed to take a far less favourable view, the young King received the report of the Regents with a grateful declaration that they and their heirs were for ever freed from further indictment on account of their actions.

The sovereignty, though in name no longer fettered, had passed to a youth so untutored that later generations believed him still unable to read or write, and so shy that a foreign ambassador declared it cruelty to make him speak. His enthusiasm was for field-sports, especially for mimic war. In all else, La Gardie, his uncle, seemed to be his tutor. Under such auspices, Sweden advanced gaily along the road to ruin. In the Swedish polity, however, it was impossible that any change connected with the throne should remain void of constitutional effect. Two grave consequences swiftly resulted from the majority of the King. La Gardie, rejoicing to govern through a docile youth instead of through a fickle assembly of forty members, began to withdraw portions of public business from the consideration of the full Council, and to transact them with the King and a few Councillors and Secretaries. Thus the Chancellor's dislike of criticism and the King's of ceremony caused a royal Cabinet to come into being. More immediately apparent, however, was the influence of the King in the departments of revenue and of war. A soldier cherishing a deep reverence for the royal office, Charles found himself a King who could neither borrow money, nor pay his servants—nor provide for the support of his army in time of peace. Unhampered by that regard for persons which had hitherto rendered it almost ineffective, he turned naturally to the “Reduction” (the origin of which has been explained in an earlier volume) to banish such infamy. Incited by the rough giant John Gyllenstierna, he pressed the claims of the Crown with so much vigour that in 1674 nearly 3000 homesteads were recovered. Many of these were assigned to the support of the army and navy; but even more important than the immediate relief to the services was the demonstration of the power of the Estates to decree, and of the Crown to procure, relief for the penury of the State at the expense of private persons.

Whither this might have led, how the King's character might have developed while the need of the State and the clamour of the people beat against the rampart of aristocratic power—these things can only be surmised. The “fourteen years in which it had pleased the Most High to vouchsafe that our dear fatherland should sit at peace” were drawing to a close. Early in 1674, Sweden found herself manœuvred by

France into a war which she desired to avoid, and which she was to prove herself beyond all expectation incompetent to conduct. The young King, who had been trained for war and not for peace, dreamed of leading Swedish troops to fresh victories on German soil. La Gardie, corrupted by French gold, still hoped to gain subsidies by a show of arming. But the nation, heroically ready for sacrifice on behalf of its religion or its independence, loathed the conflict into which it was now betrayed. La Gardie raised an army which Sweden could not maintain unassisted, in order to receive without fighting subsidies which Louis soon refused to pay on these terms. In vain the duped Chancellor struggled to break through the net in which he had enmeshed his country. He tried to induce England to mediate for peace, Louis to change his policy, Holland to purchase Swedish neutrality, and the Great Elector to desist from war. As Feuquières had foreseen, however, the army transported to Swedish Pomerania to menace the Emperor was soon compelled, by lack of supplies, to cross the frontier of Brandenburg, so that in December, 1674, Sweden found herself at war with the Great Elector, the Emperor's ally. She sought in vain an alliance with Denmark; and, six months later, the Dutch joined the number of her foes.

The events of 1674 had shown the depths to which Swedish diplomacy had sunk since the days of Axel Oxenstierna. The campaign of 1675 was to show that Swedish strategy had sunk as low since the days of Charles X. The Council was for giving foreign Powers the least possible offence, while Wrangel, though full of martial ardour, was no longer capable of constructing a plan of operations. Midsummer was scarcely past, when the slow uncertain movements of the Swedish forces were rudely interrupted by the Great Elector's victory at Fehrbellin, described elsewhere, which at one blow changed the position of Sweden in Germany. For a quarter of a century to come, the military prestige of Sweden was shattered. Wrangel's army sank to 7000 men; and, unless a new host could cross the sea to his assistance, the whole of Pomerania was lost. Christian V suddenly overwhelmed the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp and declared war upon Charles XI. La Gardie fell into a political stupor. The Estates, assembled at Upsala, plucked up courage to call in question the policy of the Regents. Confronted by the prospect of an investigation, the Council showed itself timorous and divided. Per Brahe declared with tears that, though he had been at forty Diets, he had never heard the like; but the King undertook to comply with the wish of the Estates. At Michaelmas they dispersed, having placed a powerful weapon in the hands of the monarchy, and having voted men and money to the utmost of their ability.

In the hour of national disaster Charles XI began to play the dictator. But the most fevered energy could not remedy in a moment the military decay for which the Regency was to blame. In October, stimulated by the King's threats, a Swedish fleet put to sea, but only

demonstrated its incompetence in navigation. Secure against invasion, the Danes took Wismar, and made preparations, both in Zealand and in Norway, to attack Sweden; while the Great Elector, the Brunswick-Lüneburg Dukes, and the Bishop of Münster rapidly overran Bremen, Verden, and Swedish Pomerania. The early months of 1676 merely developed the situation reached in 1675. In Germany, Königsmarck, with some 6000 ill-found troops, concentrated his efforts on the defence of Stralsund, Rügen and Stettin. Meanwhile a naval disaster off Öland (June 1, 1676) confined the main force of Charles XI to the peninsula and enabled the Danes, at the end of June, to launch a triple invasion against their lost provinces.

During two eventful years the fate of Sweden hung upon the struggle in Scania. Its earliest phase revealed the revolution in the comparative strength of the combatants which sixteen years of autocracy on the one side and aristocracy on the other had brought about. Instead of besieging Copenhagen, the Swedes were compelled to despatch troops in all haste to man their decaying fortresses, and to withdraw the remnant of the army, less than 6000 strong, out of the invaders' reach. While one force marched south from Norway under Gyldenlöve and another landed at Ystad in southernmost Sweden, Duke John Adolphus of Holstein-Plön crossed the Sound with 14,000 men. He soon proved his own quality and that of his men by capturing Landskrona, an invaluable base of operations, and by storming in two hours the fortress of Kristianstad, which was reputed impregnable. These successes made Scania once more a Danish province. The exulting peasants fell upon the estates and other property of the Swedish nobles and officials, and began a bitter guerilla warfare which Charles found it well-nigh impossible to extinguish.

The young King seemed for a time paralysed by events which belied the experience of two generations, and for days together would speak to no one. Feuquières, who tried in vain to cajole him into returning to Stockholm, reported that his crown was in peril. Then, suddenly, he rushed to the rescue of Halland and West Gotland. He had formed a fixed idea, which greatly embarrassed Helmfelt and his other generals, that he must deliver Sweden by a pitched battle. At Fyllebro near Halmstad he crushed a Danish detachment under Major-General Duncan, and took up a position which had the effect of frustrating the invasion of Gyldenlöve. He had now moreover become intimate with the patriot John Gyllenstierna, whose harsh genius gave him fresh inspiration against the national enemy and against the aristocracy which had brought his country so low. With the aid of Gyllenstierna and Erik Dahlberg, he assembled a national army more than 15,000 strong and engaged in a winter campaign of manœuvres. To regain Scania, however, proved a terribly difficult task. Operating in a hostile country, the Swedes, mainly through disease, dwindled to some 8000 men. The

King, however, was determined not to quit Scania without a battle. At last, on the night of December 3, the vigilance of the Danes relaxed and they found themselves compelled to fight near Lund. A confused and desperate struggle ensued. Helmfelt and Charles, who fought like a hero of old, crushed the Danish left under King Christian, but rode so far in pursuit that their weary comrades of the centre and left were brought to the verge of destruction. Gyllenstierna and Feuquières fled from what seemed to be a lost battle, but the troops bravely stood their ground until the King cut his way back to them and gained a complete victory. Nearly half the combatants, 5000 Danes and 3000 Swedes, had fallen, and Charles captured 2000 men with the Danish camp and artillery.

The victory of Lund rescued the Swedes from a well-nigh desperate plight and led to the recovery of Helsingborg, Kristianopol, and Karlshamn. Above all, it made Charles XI the hero of the army and of the nation. Scania, however, was by no means regained. The Danes still held Landskrona and Kristianstad. No severity could stamp out the guerilla warfare. A victorious invasion by the Norwegians under Gyldenlöve assisted the Danes. In May, 1677, Christian took the field with 12,000 men, while the Swedes had less than half that number in the field. The strategy of Charles was still to march straight at the enemy, sword in hand; and, but for a mysterious error on the part of his opponent, he must have been crushed. When wiser counsels prevailed on both sides, the Danes found themselves masters of central and southern Scania; and in June and July the victories of Niels Juel off Femern and in the bay of Kjöge confirmed their command of their sea. But Malmö remained Swedish; its assailants fell out among themselves; a great assault failed; and at the end of June the Danes were compelled to abandon a siege which had cost them some 4000 men. These losses contributed greatly to give Charles the victory in a pitched battle near Landskrona (July 14), when, after eight hours' fighting, he drove the Danes from a field where 3000 of their number had fallen. After this disaster, Christian was content to stand on the defensive near Landskrona, and actually detached some 5000 men to help the Great Elector in Pomerania and Rügen. In spite of the continual guerilla warfare and the dangerous incursions which Gyldenlöve and his Norwegians renewed in 1677 and 1678, the mainland had been saved by the victories of the Swedish King.

The campaigns of 1677 and 1678, however, for the time, cost Sweden the remnants of her dominions in Germany. The wonderful though unavailing defence of Stettin, the triumph of Königsmark over the Danes in Rügen, and the stoical retreat of Horn from the borders of east Prussia to Riga, added lustre to the Swedish arms without checking the advance of the Great Elector. But the victories of Louis XIV in war and diplomacy atoned for the failure of his ally. Since the spring of 1677, negotiations for a general peace had been carried on at Nymegen. There Bengt Oxenstierna displayed a futile readiness to join with any

Power that could promise advantages to Sweden. While the ambassador offered to betray France, his master most obstinately insisted that the French should invade Germany in order to compel the restoration to Sweden of every acre that she had lost. The issue deeply wounded Charles XI. In February, 1679, France and Sweden made up their quarrel with the Emperor and the Empire, and Louis and Leopold undertook to mediate between the northern Powers. The former, acting as the self-constituted guardian of Sweden, at the same time made peace at Celle between Charles XI and the three Brunswick-Lüneburg Dukes. The disgusted monarch, whose subsequent severe illness was attributed to chagrin, was powerless to resist, and next month averted a similar slight by coming to terms with the Bishop of Münster. The greatest boon, peace with the Great Elector, was however flung to Sweden by Louis XIV. At the end of June, 1679, by the Peace of Saint-Germain, she recovered all her possessions in Pomerania except a strip of territory on the right bank of the Oder.

Two months later, although Jens Juel and Gyllenstierna were negotiating in the cathedral at Lund, Louis dealt with Christian V as he had dealt with the Great Elector. By the Treaty of Fontainebleau, Denmark restored her conquests to Sweden and received only an insignificant sum of money in exchange. Finally, in October, the state of nominal war between Sweden on the one hand and Spain and the Dutch on the other was brought to an end.

The chances of war and politics had thus fixed the balance of power in Scandinavia where the great Gustavus, Oxenstierna, and Charles X had left it. For a moment indeed it seemed as though the ideal of abiding Scandinavian concord, which Griffenfeld had conceived and Gyllenstierna developed, might be realised. The formal Peace concluded between Denmark and Sweden at Lund was accompanied by an intimate commercial and military alliance. In the spring of 1680 a common coinage for the three Scandinavian kingdoms was decreed, and the new unity found expression in the marriage of Charles XI with Ulrica Eleonora, the pious sister of Christian V. The untimely death of Gyllenstierna in June, 1680, may therefore be regarded as a misfortune for Scandinavia as a whole. Gyllenstierna died at the moment when his ideas for both the international and the domestic policy of Sweden seemed likely to prevail. Although there was none to take his place as the architect of Scandinavian unity, the peace between the weary Danes and Swedes remained for two decades unbroken. Within the Swedish realm, moreover, men were groping their way towards a goal which his eyes had clearly seen. To make the King an autocrat, to arraign the Regents, to resume the alienated Crown lands, to restore order in the finances and to establish a territorial army—these had been to him means as valuable as the *entente* with Denmark towards the supreme purpose of making Sweden strong and independent. During the War, especially at the Diet held at

Halmstad early in 1678, demands for a new "Reduction" had been heard, and the Estates had laid before the King a statement of the faults and infirmities from which the constitution of the realm was suffering. At the same time every possible rival to the monarchy had been swept away by the War. La Gardie, the high nobility, and the Council were discredited or paralysed. War had made Charles XI virtually a dictator; and the nation, save perhaps a few great nobles, looked expectantly towards a King who might maintain the same ascendancy in times of peace.

No period illustrates better than the years 1675 to 1697 the truth that the history of Sweden has been the history of her Kings. It was Charles XI who transformed the Swedish Crown, created Charles XII and bequeathed them to each other. Having rescued the State by force of arms, he remoulded her by laws and administration. His heir he endowed with many of his own qualities, trained in his own school, and invested with the purple mantle of absolutism. Yet the personal life of the King who raised monarchy so high was that of a peasant. For months together he dwelt remote from his capital and inaccessible to all save a few Ministers and servants. The French ambassador, who more than once stalked the royal quarry to his lair, got little profit by intruding upon a Prince who rivalled Louis XIV in kingly pride. Charles delighted in feverish rides of from seventy to ninety miles in a day; and in his wide and sparsely peopled realm these could be performed almost in solitude. On the parade ground, where few words save those of command were needed, he gladly played his part, and was wont to hew asunder faulty harness with his own sword. But the usages and pleasures of society he detested; he was married on an obscure manor, and forbade all festivity at the birth of his first-born son. He preferred a written petition to an audience, and a midnight drive into Stockholm to torch-bearers and triumphal arches. Thus few of his contemporaries enjoyed an opportunity of penetrating his mind or estimating his capacity. To some he seemed a stupid, gullible tyrant; to others, the wise and resolute father of his people—and neither view can be pronounced wholly wrong.

In seeking the master-key to the history of the reign which the character of the King supplies, several facts seem clear. Unlike his father, Charles XI had not reached maturity when called upon to save the State. Before the War he was a backward youth whom de La Gardie kept in leading-strings. The shock of 1675 made him a man; the storms of 1676, a veteran. Thenceforward until 1693, when the death of his Queen banished all peace from his mind, he appears, while gaining experience of affairs, to have suffered from the corrupting influence of absolute power. Like all autocrats, he was liable to be imposed upon by flattery, but a puppet he never was. During the War he overruled his generals. From 1676 till 1680 he may have accepted Gyllenstierna as his tutor in politics; but it is idle to maintain that through all the developments of

the next seventeen years he had no fresh source of inspiration. He always believed himself to be master in his own realm, and the attitude of his later Ministers, Klas Fleming, Nils Bielke, and Bengt Oxenstierna, suggests that his belief was well founded. Hating diplomacy, he readily entrusted others with the conduct of foreign affairs, but only on condition that certain guiding principles should be carried out to his own satisfaction. Ignorant, of unattractive appearance, mediocre talent, and limited outlook on life, his unexampled political success was to prove how a firm will combined with simple honesty, courage, and common sense may constitute greatness in a king.

At the close of the War, Charles found the Council discredited, Sweden half-ruined, and himself the hope of the nation. Under these conditions he met the Estates at Stockholm in October, 1680. The Diet of 1680, followed by that of 1682, was to effect nothing less than the transformation of Sweden from a limited to an absolute monarchy. This revolution appears to have been thought out beforehand, facilitated by the appointment of formidable nobles to posts overseas, and accomplished by parliamentary strategy. Feuquières observed that the Guards were quartered in Stockholm, while five or six thousand men, chiefly under Livonian or foreign officers, lay close at hand. The whole movement was directed by a King whose nature impelled him, in debate, in negotiation, and in war alike, to rush straight towards his unconcealed goal. Charles was indeed not destitute of advisers. Gyllenstierna, with his plans for an army of 80,000 men and an alliance with Denmark, had doubtless sowed fruitful seeds in his mind. Louis XIV had counselled him to remain in the background and merely to accept the profitable proposals of the Estates. Klas Fleming, as strenuous as the King in the public service and an able opponent of the high nobles, obeyed the royal command to act as president (*Landtmarskalk*) of the First Estate, and must have stood in relations of peculiar intimacy with his master. Hans Wachtmeister, the most conspicuous of a group of old comrades in war whom Charles always trusted, was regarded as expressing in his many and passionate speeches ideas at least acceptable to the King. It is difficult, however, to resist the conclusion that the victorious result must be ascribed to Charles himself, and that its secret lay, not in craft and astuteness, but in a will firm even to fanaticism, an unbounded sense of duty, and the irresistible logic of the situation.

The forms of deliberation indeed contributed much to the triumph of national need and popular resentment over wealth and privilege. The four Estates (nobles, clergy, burghers and peasants) met separately and corresponded with the King and with one another chiefly in writing and through formal embassies. Thus, although the nobles were ready to claim an authority not inferior to that of the three non-noble Estates combined, and although the peasants sometimes declared themselves incapable of forming any opinion on high politics, the Crown could

normally make use of the unanimous votes of three Estates to overcome the reluctance of one. Even if this procedure were not practicable, a royal proposition could be laid before the four Estates severally and their answers severally received. From these four documents it was Charles' wont to distil a single answer in the sense desired by him and to return it to the Estates for signature, which no individual dared to refuse. In dealing with the First Estate, moreover, the Crown possessed the inestimable advantage of selecting its president. Not only did Klas Fleming act as both official channel and mediator between King and nobles, but it also lay in his power to prevent unacceptable motions from being put to the vote, or to withhold the shelter of the ballot from those who might have ventured to give a secret vote against the Crown. Dissensions between the members of the Council and the remainder of the high nobles, and others, far more acute and permanent, between the greater and the lesser nobles, helped to complete the ascendancy of the King.

Thus aided, the Crown obtained its ends with unprecedented thoroughness and speed. The familiar torpor of the executive, indeed, afforded no clue to the pace of the deliberative assembly of Sweden. The Council had been wont to break off for months together, and when it was nominally in session an attendance of two, or even of one, of the forty members was not unknown. Feuquières complained that to procure the transaction by it of a piece of business was as hard as to make two Popes and three Kings of Poland. Ten years after the death of Gyllenstierna, the correct basis on which to calculate his salary as ambassador was still in question. The Estates, on the other hand, unhampered by complex forms of procedure, anxious to return to their homes, confronted with simple questions to which their class interests suggested the answer, and in a sense presided over by the Crown, were ready to sanction the most weighty enactments in a few days. The King first asked for means to establish the independence of the State, and Hans Waechtmeister declared to his brother nobles that this could be accomplished without a new grant, if only the Regents were brought to book. A storm of conflicting passions was thus let loose; but within six days Charles and the Estates had decreed that those persons or their heirs who had been responsible for the government during the minority should be tried by a Great Commission. This body, which was appointed on October 26, 1680, and took the place of the Commission of enquiry appointed in 1675, consisted of nine members from each of the four Estates chosen by that Estate in concert with the Crown. The fortunes of 118 great Houses depended on its deliberations.

Immediately after the appointment of the Great Commission, the three non-noble Estates joined in petitioning the King for a new and more comprehensive Reduction. The tempest which this demand aroused would have cowed a monarch less resolute than Charles. The whole

military staff clamoured for redress. The Council came in a body to implore him to intervene. Civil war, if not revolution, seemed imminent. But the King, courtcously expressing his disbelief that any party could desire other than the public good, declared his willingness to confirm the measures on which the four Estates should agree. Neither the Council nor the majority in the House of Nobles ventured to carry resistance to greater lengths than noise and disorder. Before the end of November, the nobles had consented to the resumption by the Crown of all counties and baronies and all other of the alienated royal domains whose rent exceeded 600 dollars. The carrying-out of this vast Reduction was entrusted to a Commission, whose members, like those of the Great Commission, received a written indemnity from the Estates. Though the business of the Diet was now at an end, Charles kept it assembled, in order to remove any impediments which the two Commissions might encounter. Before the Estates finally dispersed, they gave proof that their struggles had prepared the way for autocracy. By allowing the attack on the nobles to come from their social inferiors, Charles had commended the monarchy not only to the party who thus became victorious, but also to their victims, who would rather trust to a king than to a mob. When therefore he enquired of the Estates how far he was bound by the Form of Government, and whether the Council was in truth, as it had made some pretence of being, a separate Estate of the Realm, they were unanimous for absolutism. The King, they declared in December, 1680, was bound by no form of government, but only by the law of Sweden. In ruling his hereditary realm, he need consult his Council only when and how he pleased, and was responsible to God alone. They further besought him to make provision for the government in case of his own decease.

For several years after 1680, the two Commissions were busily transferring the wealth of the nobles to the coffers of the State. Charles had the most pressing reasons for the eagerness with which he spurred on the Commissions. His precise integrity could not but feel humiliated when his ambassador, after emptying his own pockets in the public service, vainly besought the jewellers of Copenhagen to supply trinkets for the King of Sweden to present to his future Queen. The poverty and consequent peril of the nation at a time when a European conflagration was daily expected, and when Denmark and Brandenburg were leagued with France, forms the best apology for the tyranny of the Commissioners. The Councillors adjudged responsible for public acts during the King's minority were condemned to make good the injury which these acts were deemed to have inflicted on the State, together with interest which in many cases was fixed at twelve per cent. The heirs of Bonde, the patriotic apostle of retrenchment, were thus mulcted of nearly a quarter of a million dollars. The *Råd* or Council, however, divided and leaderless as it was, discredited by its futility the argument of the

learned Rudbeck that Rådman and Rhadamanthus were the same. Charles settled every disputed point at his pleasure and several times altered the procedure. Before the end of May, 1682, the Great Commission pronounced the last of its verdicts, and a commission of settlement was at work upon details. By 1689 the main harvest had been garnered in. Some 4,000,000 dollars passed from the great Houses to the Crown, and this enormous sum sufficed to turn the balance of political power. The birth of the Commission had proved that the Estates were superior to the Council. Its work rendered the Crown superior both to the Council and to the Estates.

While the great Houses were thus enduring the blows of the Great Commission, they were exposed to still heavier chastisement from the Commission of Reduction, which the King likewise inspired and over which the untiring Klas Fleming presided until his death in 1685. The great surrender of 1680 had been made by the nobles in the full expectation that this would be the final sacrifice exacted from them by the Crown. At the Diet which met at Stockholm in October, 1682, they were undeceived. Many of the great Houses had now been laid low. Their *latifundia* were reverting to the Crown. The Council of the Realm had become, in composition and in name alike, a Royal Council. But the hostility of the non-noble Estates remained unquenched, and they clamoured for a further Reduction as the only means of paying the debts of the State. As in 1680, therefore, both sides were brought to commit all authority over the Reduction and much else into the willing hands of the King. From this Diet Charles emerged a full-fledged autocrat. He claimed, with slender limitations, the right to make laws, to order the succession, to abolish freedom of speech, to levy taxes, to direct education, administration and the Church, and under one or another branch of the Reduction to repudiate most of the debts due from the Crown to its subjects, while appropriating most of their property at will. At the same time, a standing army was in contemplation which, when complete, would render the King wholly independent of the Estates. Sweden, it seemed, in guarding against oligarchy, had abjured her ancient freedom.

From 1682 to the King's death in 1697, the Swedish nation had experience of benevolent despotism—the appropriate prelude to the career of Charles XII, who was born in the former year. During this period Sweden's political record is marked by few events of special significance. For more than fourteen years, however, all was done that royal power and energy could do to realise, both by foreign and domestic policy, the ideals of Charles XI. For Sweden the indispensable condition of future strength was rest, and the monarch who delighted in the life of a soldier therefore made himself an unbending opponent of war. Diplomacy, which he was said to regard as “an unnecessary scholastic,” he delegated to Bengt Oxenstierna, and accepted the ideas of his Minister on condition that Sweden kept clear of vassalage to France and of war.

Under the guidance of Oxenstierna, he had, in September, 1681, joined with the Dutch in the so-called Hague Treaty of Guarantee, by which the two Powers engaged to defend for twenty years the Treaties of Westphalia and Nymegen, which were then being violated by Louis XIV. Despite the efforts of the French party at Stockholm to overthrow the Minister, his policy of diplomatic opposition to France as the disturber of Europe continued to prevail. Swedish troops played so limited a part in the War of the Grand Alliance that Charles XI could act as mediator in the negotiations for its close.

In internal affairs, Sweden derived benefit from a foreign policy which often appeared cowardly and insincere. In many branches of the national life progress became possible. Although Church and State were uniting to massacre witches, and although the King was too ignorant and too practical to play the patron, science, literature and art flourished as never before in Sweden. The nation seemed to be struggling to fit itself for the great position which it owed to the fortune of war and politics. It strove to incorporate with itself the non-German provinces which it had won, and at the same time to increase the strength and culture which afforded the only basis of empire. In education, in worship, and in law, Scania was made Swedish. The serfs of Livonia were safeguarded against the nobles, at a time when the Reduction was pressing upon that province with a severity which drove Patkul to rebellion. A national army and a national fleet grew up; yet the revenue exceeded the yearly needs of the State. But all initiative came from the Crown, and every class was taught to look to the King alone. The Council had become a law-court, the Diet an echo, while the governmental offices or *Collegia*, which were now regularly paid, fell into the position of unambitious instruments of the royal will. The ascendancy of the great nobles had vanished with their estates. Charles succeeded, moreover, where the great Gustavus had failed, in bridling the Church. In 1686 a new Ecclesiastical Law enforced the supremacy of the State, and the King took care to make this supremacy real. A new Swedish service-book, catechism, hymn-book, and Bible were the fruits of his zeal for reform.

For industry and commerce Charles did all that benevolent despotism could accomplish. By incessant journeys of inspection he gained insight into the resources of the land and the needs of the people. He preserved peace, improved the administration of justice, began a revision of the law, and resorted to the well-known contrivances of the Mercantilists for creating trade by legislation, and for preserving Sweden for the Swedes. The industries which made the greatest advance were however those of cloth, iron and shipbuilding, which supplied the needs of the King's greatest creations—the army and the fleet.

Among the proudest achievements of Charles XI the *Indelningsverk*, or establishment of a system of territorial tenures for a standing army of

some 38,000 men, ranks high. A principle which existed in the time of Gustavus Vasa, and which had been developed by Charles IX and Gustavus Adolphus, became in consequence of the King's triumph over the nobles the basis of the national force. Its essence lay in the assignment of Crown lands to the direct and permanent support of soldiers. Some estates were granted to officers, others enjoyed free of dues on condition of supporting a cavalryman and his horse. To escape the conscription, by which, in time of war, every tenth peasant had to become a soldier, most of the rural districts agreed to provide land on which in time of peace an equivalent number of soldiers could subsist as peasants. Thus Sweden gained security at home, while the spoils of the nobles enabled her to garrison her conquered provinces by hiring some 25,000 mercenaries. A similar territorial system provided for the support of most of the men who were required to man the national fleet, which was organised by Hans Wachtmeister at the new naval station of Karlskrona. Thirty-eight ships of the line, manned by some 11,000 men, had been built before Charles died.

The first years of autocracy were thus for Sweden years of activity, order, and growth. Yet even under the sway of Charles XI many of the familiar vices of absolutism made their appearance. Personally the most unassuming of mankind, Charles claimed and obtained for his office the most subservient renunciation of popular freedom. He could pardon a drunkard who gave battle to the royal suite, but he could not pardon criticism of his father's testament recorded a quarter of a century before. Ruling with the aid of a few secretaries and friends, he became the unconscious centre of faction and of intrigue. The Reduction, which gave rise to a regular government department and added some two and a half million dollars to the annual revenue, developed into an offensive tyranny. No land except such as could be proved to have never belonged to the Crown was secure against confiscation, and small inquisitorial commissions were despatched to determine whose inheritance should be taken and whose left. As was almost inevitable, corruption spread. In a year and a half (1701-2) the family of Königsmark expended a sum equivalent to nearly £6000 of our money in bribing the officials of the Reduction. Charles had solved the problem of dealing with the great nobles; but he bequeathed to Sweden the still greater problem of settling the position and powers of the Crown.

III.

Christian V survived his brother-in-law by little more than two years. The fall of Griffenfeld, who was charged with treason and condemned to life-long imprisonment in 1676, extinguished the glory of his reign. In the War of Scania, as well as at home, Denmark became a prey to faction and intrigue. The despicable clique which had overthrown Griffenfeld allied itself with the King's mistress, who was presented with some of the late Minister's estates; and public policy was thus made subservient to

private gain and spite. In the early stages of the War, while the Duke of Plön was still dominant and successful, Christian V's hopes had been as buoyant as those of his grandfather in 1625. He dreamed of recovering the lost provinces, of crushing Gottorp, of acquiring Bremen, Lübeck, Wismar and Rügen, of enjoying the Sound Dues unimpaired by the Swedish exemption, and of controlling the commerce of the Elbe—in short, of establishing a position on the Baltic which might transfer to Denmark the commercial empire of the Dutch. The later campaigns, however, brought not merely disappointment to the King, but also exhaustion to the kingdom, which had supplied men and money for the War, and which, in both war and peace, was burdened with a costly imitation of the splendour of Louis XIV.

After the Peace of 1679, however, the need of the Treasury and the ambition of the King prompted a reorganisation of the country. In area and in social structure, Denmark had been rapidly transformed. The financial basis of the army was now reconstructed, and the land underwent a survey which facilitated a revised scheme of taxation, the most scientific in Europe. Despite the opposition of the clergy, Huguenots were brought in with the right to non-Lutheran worship. Trade and industry were overwhelmed with government regulations. Most famous of all, in 1683 there was published the "Danish Law of King Christian V"—a codification compiled under Frederick III and revised under his successor—and from this Code, which was common to all the provinces, both autocracy and popular convenience gained much. These reforms were in part the work of new men. The bureaucracy, composed largely of German burghers, was gaining rank and influence. The punishment of Olaf Rosenkrans for his *Apologia nobilitatis Daniae* (1681) bore witness to the decline of the old nobility, while the influence exercised by the incorruptible aristocrat Jens Juel from the close of the War to 1697 proved that autocracy was not entirely dependent on its creatures.

The foreign policy of Denmark from the Peace of Lund to the death of Charles XI (1679-97) led to little positive result at the moment, but helped to bring on the great convulsion of the north under Charles XII. Baffled on the side of Sweden, Christian and his advisers turned their eyes southward, and would gladly have accepted intimacy with the conquerors of Scania to secure a free hand in Schleswig-Holstein. Charles XI, however, adhered with honourable pertinacity to the Gottorp cause; and his steadfastness, together with the trend of European politics, frustrated the designs of Christian V. In 1684, the Danes, acting in the French fashion of the hour, seized the portion of Schleswig belonging to the House of Gottorp, and hinted, not obscurely, that the recovery of Scania was predicted by the stars. Five years later, however, after a congress at Altona (1687-9), they were compelled to disgorge. In 1694, on the accession of Duke Frederick IV, the Gottorp question once more became acute. In place of a weary voluptuary, Denmark was confronted

by an ambitious young soldier who threatened to cross the plans of Christian by forestalling the Crown Prince Frederick in the competition for a Swedish bride.

It was the Gottorp question which, as a matter of fact, determined the policy of Denmark. Christian desired nothing better than a double marriage between his children and those of Charles XI, provided that his designs on Gottorp were thereby furthered. In default of an understanding with Sweden, however, he was ready to incite Tsar Peter against her Baltic provinces, and to intrigue with her famine-stricken peasants and with the victims of the Reduction. In 1697, when a Regency came into power at Stockholm, he sent into the territory of the Duke an army which demolished his new fortifications. The attitude of Sweden and of the numerous enemies of France compelled him to recall the troops, and next year Duke Frederick married Hedwig Sophia, the favourite sister of Charles XII. The issue of this marriage, male or female, would stand dangerously near the Swedish throne. Frederick, moreover, became Swedish *generalissimo* in Germany, and proceeded to restore his fortifications with Swedish aid. Christian accordingly continued his negotiations with the Tsar and lent an ear to the adventurous proposals of his nephew, Augustus II of Poland. Patkul thus found abundant material for a conflagration of the North.

The intimacy between Charles XII and Duke Frederick constituted a standing menace to Denmark. In August, 1699, another active young autocrat, Frederick IV, succeeded his father at Copenhagen. A defensive treaty with the Tsar had been signed on the previous day, and, early in November, Augustus, Peter and Frederick agreed to make a combined attack upon the Swedish empire. In the spring of 1700 this design ripened into the great Northern War, the course of which is related elsewhere. The part played in it by Denmark may therefore be traced here very briefly; while an account of the peaceful activities of Frederick IV is reserved for a future chapter.

While Denmark and Sweden were deliberately preparing to fight, neither could calculate exactly the extraneous support which the other would receive when hostilities began. Frederick, trusting in his strong fleet to command the Sound and in his eastern allies to distract Sweden, despatched his main army against the Duke of Gottorp in April, 1700. His allies proved less active, and his own success less rapid, than he had hoped; and he was soon brought to a standstill by the walls of Tönning and the troops of Brunswick-Lüneburg under the Elector George Lewis of Hanover, the future King of England. The campaign, thus checked, swiftly ended in failure. Frederick had left his navy under the command of Ulrik Christian Gyldenlöve, a royal bastard aged twenty-two years, and a timid Board of War. They permitted the English and Dutch, impatient of a northern distraction which might favour Louis XIV, to send ships to the Sound, where they were joined, after a daring piece of

navigation, by Charles XII and his fleet. Thus master of the sea, the young King swooped down upon defenceless Zealand. To his disgust, however, the Danish War was extinguished, and Copenhagen saved, by the Peace of Traventhal (August, 1700).

The Peace of Traventhal marked another failure on the part of Denmark to curb Gottorp and Sweden, but failed to cut the roots of their hostility. With the House of Gottorp the King of Denmark remained in a state of perpetual friction, and the alliance of that House with Sweden and Brunswick-Lüneburg survived the death of Duke Frederick on the field of Klissow (July 19, 1702). By forming a militia, by hiring out his mercenaries to fight against Louis XIV, by diplomatic efforts and by care for the finances, the King prepared for a struggle which seemed inevitable, while the prospect of it was rendered doubly formidable by the triumphs of Charles XII.

In 1708, however, the Swedish army was entangled in Russia. Frederick, a self-indulgent prince, who was more than once guilty of bigamy, ventured to seek his pleasure in Italy for the winter. At this time Peter was clamouring for Danish help and the coalition of 1700 seemed likely to be revived. On his way homeward Frederick visited Saxony and came to an agreement with Augustus II (June, 1709). The two Kings bound themselves, conditionally upon the cooperation of the Tsar, to take up arms for the full restitution of their Polish and Scandinavian dominions. According to the published articles, Germany was to remain undisturbed; but a secret agreement provided for the annexation of part at least of Schleswig-Holstein and of Poland.

The confederates, however, failed to secure either an offensive alliance with Frederick I of Prussia or money from the Tsar. It was, moreover, hardly to be expected that the Maritime Powers would be more ready than in the days of Frederick III to tolerate a Danish empire on both shores of the Sound. Frederick's treasury was by no means full, nor was his army strong enough to assure a victorious invasion of Sweden. It might well happen, as so often in the history of the north, that the Swedes would gain compensation from their neighbours for disasters further afield. These arguments for peace were urged upon Frederick both in the Council Chamber and from the pulpit. A war party however existed, an autocrat was in power, and after Poltawa the verdict was for war. In October, 1709, Frederick and the Tsar entered into an alliance to confine Sweden within her rightful boundaries. Next month 15,000 men under Count Reventlow crossed the Sound, bearing upon their ammunition waggons the motto "*Aut nunc aut nunquam.*" This improvised expedition met with well-deserved failure. The men were ill-found and ill-paid; no simultaneous invasion from Norway came to pass; Reventlow fell ill; and, in March, 1710, Magnus Stenbock and his Swedes crushed the whole enterprise at Helsingborg.

Never since 1710 have the Danes crossed the Sound as foes of Sweden.

Fredrick, indeed, trusting in the traditional Danish superiority at sea, planned to bring a Russian corps to Zealand and to renew the attack in the autumn. In a series of naval movements, however, Hans Wachtmeister proved that his own work and that of Charles XI had made the Swedish fleet strong enough to frustrate the enterprise. Next year (1711) the Plague, which carried off more than one-third of the inhabitants of Copenhagen, paralysed the Northern War.

At this time, however, thanks to the imprudence of Charles XII, the Danes received encouragement on all hands to attack the Swedish possessions on their own side of the sea. The War therefore assumed a new form. While Norway cooperated by descents upon southern Sweden, and the Danish fleet strove to regain the command of the sea, the Danes, Saxons, and Russians invaded the scattered Swedish provinces in northern Germany.

In September, 1712, the Danes, with the help of the Saxon artillery, captured Stade and seized the whole of Bremen and Verden. Meanwhile Stralsund was attacked by all three allies, until in September Stenbock arrived there with more than 16,000 men at his disposal. To destroy this army must be the condition of further progress by the allies. It fell to Frederick, assisted by the Saxon cavalry, to make the first attempt; but Stenbock gained a great victory at Gadebusch (December, 1712). Frederick thereupon threatened to make peace, if Peter would not join him in Holstein, where the victor of Gadebusch threatened to repeat the exploits of Charles X. The Tsar obeyed the summons; and Stenbock, who had found shelter in the Gottorp fortress of Tönning, was imprisoned there by the forces of the three allies. In May, 1713, he capitulated to Frederick with some 11,000 men at Oldensworth. The Danes did not fully carry out the terms of the capitulation, which, owing to the anxiety of their allies to depart, were favourable to Sweden. Stenbock and many of his troops were imprisoned until death or peace set them free.

Despite the craft of Görtz, the movements of Stenbock had enabled Frederick to fasten a quarrel upon Gottorp. After the capitulation, therefore, the hope of making conquests where they were most desired by his dynasty spurred him on to great military preparations and diplomatic efforts. Favoured by the impracticable attitude of Charles XII, he captured Tönning early in 1714, and began to negotiate with Frederick William I and George I for the partition of the Swedish dominions in Germany. In April, 1715, while Charles XII defended Stralsund, the Danish fleet secured the command of the sea; and in the following month the compacts were made which, as Frederick hoped, would enable him to acquire the Gottorp portion of Schleswig and a sum of money for Bremen and Verden. For these prizes the Danish fleet contended at Stralsund. After the fall of the fortress at the close of 1715, Rügen and western Pomerania as far as the Peene were placed in Frederick's hands.

So long as Charles XII lived, however, a hard frost in the Sound might expose Copenhagen to the vengeance which it now became his fixed idea to wreak on his hereditary foes. Failing Denmark, he, in the winter of 1715-6, turned against Norway, and occupied the town of Christiania, but was driven from the fortress by the arrival of help from Denmark. At Frederikshald, on the border, he again met with a stout resistance; and in July a brilliant feat of the Norwegian naval hero Tordenskiold, who captured or destroyed 44 Swedish ships, compelled him to retreat.

Again, in the summer of 1716, Frederick contemplated invading Scania with Russian help, and a combined army more than 50,000 strong prepared to cross the Sound. In the autumn, however, the Tsar, perhaps fearing both the might of Charles and the treachery of Frederick, abandoned the enterprise; nor could he be induced to resume it. His defection alienated George I; and, while Charles was preparing a mighty army, Frederick could no longer reckon upon his allies for aggrandisement or even for defence.

In 1717 he despatched Tordenskiold against Swedish harbours, but without success; and next year the storm broke upon the outnumbered and ill-found Norwegians. The death of Charles in December, 1718, rescued Norway from peril and made it possible once more to negotiate with Sweden for peace.

The Swedes, however, were far from willing to purchase peace from Denmark. In 1719, Frederick made yet another campaign, in which he led a Norwegian invasion in person, while Tordenskiold with mingled audacity and good fortune captured the port of Marstrand and its strong fortress of Karlsten. Frederick, however, did not follow up this success.

The defection of George and Frederick William, and his own strained relations with Peter the Great threatened to leave Frederick alone face to face with Sweden. Thus his only hope of profit lay in a speedy peace. To gain Schleswig, he therefore accepted the mediation of England and France. In July, 1720, by the Treaty of Frederiksborg, his old boundaries were confirmed, while Sweden recognised his possession of Schleswig, which was guaranteed to him by Great Britain and France. He further received from Sweden 600,000 dollars and a renunciation of her exemption from the Sound Dues. Two great wars had thus established in Scandinavia an even balance of power.

CHAPTER XIX.

CHARLES XII AND THE GREAT NORTHERN WAR.

CHARLES XI had carefully provided against the contingency of his successor's minority; and the five Regents appointed by him entered upon their functions immediately after his death (April 15, 1697). The Regents, if not great statesmen, were, at least, practical politicians, who had not in vain been trained in the austere school of Charles XI; during the seven months in which they held sway no blunder was made, and no national interest was neglected. At home the Reduction was cautiously pursued, while abroad the successful conclusion of the great peace congress at Ryswyk was justly regarded as a signal triumph of Sweden's pacific diplomacy. The young King, a lad of fifteen, was daily present in the Council; and his frequent utterances on every subject, except foreign affairs, showed, we are told, a maturity of judgment far beyond his years. He had been carefully educated by excellent tutors under the watchful eyes of both his parents. His extraordinary courage and strength of character had, from the first, profoundly impressed those around him, though his dogged obstinacy occasionally tried them to the uttermost. His wise and loving mother had been at great pains to develop his better nature by encouraging those noble qualities—veracity, courtesy, piety, and a strong sense of honour and fair play—which were to distinguish him throughout life, while his precocious manliness was not a little stimulated by the rude but bracing moral atmosphere to which he was accustomed from infancy. Intellectually he was very highly endowed. His natural parts were excellent, and a strong bias in the direction of abstract thought, and of mathematics in particular, was noticeable at an early date. His memory was astonishing. He could translate Latin into Swedish or German, or Swedish or German into Latin at sight, and on his campaigns not infrequently dispensed with a key while inditing or interpreting despatches in cipher.

Almost from infancy the lad had been initiated into all the minutiae of the administration. When, in his later years, Charles XI went his rounds, reviewing troops, inspecting studs, foundries, dockyards and granaries, it was always "with my son Carl." For the science of war

the young Charles had a marked predilection, and always took an active part in the "sham-fights" in which Charles XI delighted. It is very probable that the influence of Charles XI over his son was far greater than is commonly supposed and may account for much that is otherwise inexplicable in Charles XII's character, such, for instance, as his precocious reserve and taciturnity, his dislike of everything French, and his inordinate contempt for purely diplomatic methods. Yet, on the whole, had the young prince been allowed the opportunity of gradually gaining experience, and developing his naturally great talents, for the next few years, under the guidance of his guardians, as Charles XI had intended, Sweden might still have remained a great Power. Unfortunately, a noiseless domestic revolution and the menace of a league of partition, defeated all the wise calculations of Charles XI.

On Saturday, November 6, 1697, the Swedish *Riksdag* assembled at Stockholm; and, on the following Monday, the Estate of Nobles, jealous of the authority of the Regents, and calculating upon the grateful liberality of a young prince unexpectedly released from the bonds of tutelage, sent a deputation to the King inviting him to take over the government of the realm. Charles received the delegates graciously, but suggested that on so important a matter the Senate should first be consulted. The Senate and the Regents, weakly determining not to lag behind the nobility in their devotion to the Crown, waited upon the King forthwith; and Chancellor Bengt Oxenstierna, acting as spokesman, begged his Majesty to gladden the hearts of his subjects by graciously assuming supreme power. Only when Charles had expressed his willingness to concur with the desires of his faithful subjects were the three lower Estates of the realm formally acquainted with the action of the nobility and invited to cooperate. The lower Estates proved to be as obsequious as the gentry, for a joint deputation from all four Estates thereupon proceeded to the palace; and, in answer to their earnest solicitations, Charles declared that he could not resist their urgent appeal, but would take over the government of the realm "in God's name."

A short period of suspense ensued, followed by bitter disappointment. The *Riksdag* was dissolved after a three weeks' session, and a humble petition of the nobility for a remission of their burdens was curtly rejected. The subsequent coronation was marked by portentous innovations, the most significant of which were the King's omitting to take the usual coronation oath and placing the crown upon his head with his own hands. The Government assumed more and more of an autocratic complexion. The French Minister, d'Avaux, describes Charles at this period as even more imperious in public than his father had been. Anti-monarchical strictures, however respectful or indirect, were promptly and cruelly punished. Many people began to fear "a hard reign." Yet the general opinion of the young King was favourable. His conduct was evidently regulated by strict principle and not by mere caprice. His

refusal to countenance torture as an instrument of judicial investigation, on the ground that "confessions so extorted give no sure criteria for forming a judgment," showed him to be more humane and more enlightened than the majority of his Council, which had defended the contrary opinion. His intense application to affairs was specially noted by the English Minister Robinson.

But, while Charles XII was thus serving his political apprenticeship at home with exemplary diligence, the political horizon abroad was darkening in every direction; and a league, of apparently overwhelming strength, had already been formed for the partition of Sweden. The person primarily responsible for the terrible conflagration known as the great Northern War was Johan Reinhold Patkul, a Livonian squire. A Swedish subject, he had entered the Swedish army at an early age, and was already a captain when, in 1689, at the head of a deputation of Livonian gentry, he came to Stockholm to protest against the rigour with which the land-recovery project of Charles XI was being carried out in his native province. But his representations were disregarded, and the violent and offensive language with which, in another petition, addressed to the King three years later, he renewed his complaints, involved him in what is known as "the great Livonian process." To save himself from the penalties of high treason, Patkul left the country, and was condemned *in contumaciam* to lose his right hand and his head. His estates were at the same time confiscated. For the next four years he led a vagabond life, but in 1698, after vainly petitioning the new King, Charles XII, for pardon, he entered the service of Augustus II of Poland.

There can be no doubt that Patkul was harshly treated by Charles XI. Moreover, he was an exile from Livonia so long as it belonged to Sweden. But we must be very cautious in speaking about the patriotism of Patkul. He acted exclusively from personal motives; his point of view was that of the German *junker*; and he had no thought for the liberties of the Livonian people, who to him were mere serfs. He did not care to whom Livonia might belong, so long as it did not belong to Sweden. The aristocratic Republic of Poland was, however, the most convenient suzerain for Livonian noblemen; and the present King of Poland, as a German, was peculiarly acceptable to them. Accordingly, in 1698, Patkul proceeded to Dresden, and overwhelmed Augustus with proposals for the partition of Sweden. The first plan was a combination against her of Saxony, Denmark, and Brandenburg; but, Brandenburg failing him, he was obliged to admit Russia into the scheme instead. This he did very unwillingly, shrewdly anticipating that the Tsar might prove to be the predominant partner. Peter was to be content with Ingria and Esthonia, while Augustus was to obtain Livonia, nominally as a fief of Poland, really as an hereditary possession of the Saxon House. Military operations against Sweden's Baltic provinces were to be begun

simultaneously by the Saxons and the Russians. As to the latter, Patkul insisted that "they were not to practise their usual barbarities"—a stipulation significant of the opinion then entertained of the Muscovite soldiery. Denmark, which had a real grievance against Sweden as the zealous protector of the Dukes of Holstein-Gottorp, was to draw off the Swedish forces to her western provinces, while Peter and Augustus simultaneously attacked her from the east. The allies succeeded in hoodwinking the unsuspecting Swedes completely. So early as August 24, 1699, a convention between Denmark and Russia had forged the first link in the chain of treaties which was to unite Sweden's three hostile neighbours against her. This convention was, originally, a league for mutual defence; but one of the earliest measures of the new King of Denmark, Frederick IV, was to conclude an offensive alliance with Augustus II against Sweden (September 25, 1699). The action of the Danish King had been accelerated by the marriage of Charles XII's favourite elder sister, Hedwig Sophia, to Frederick IV, Duke of Gottorp, for whom Charles soon conceived a strong affection. This treaty was, however, only to be binding if the Tsar acceded to it within three or four months.

Patkul, accompanied by the Saxon general Carlovitz, arrived at Moscow in September, 1699. They found that they had been preceded by a Swedish embassy sent by Charles XII to confirm the Peace of Kardis. Peter, on this occasion, went far towards justifying the accusation of inveterate duplicity so frequently brought against him afterwards. He was sufficiently superstitious, indeed, to avoid kissing the cross on the renewal of the treaty. But the temptation to secure the Baltic sea-board, with all its commercial and civilising possibilities, was too strong for his easy morality. He solemnly assured the Swedish envoys that he would faithfully observe all his treaty obligations; yet, at a secret conference, held at Preobrazhenskoe with the Saxon and Danish envoys, he had already signed (November 22, 1699) the partition treaty. Everything was done by Peter to allay the growing suspicions of the Swedish Minister, Knipcrkrona. When questioned point-blank as to the designs of Augustus, Peter professed incredulity and indignation. "If the King of Poland dares to seize Riga," he said, "I shall take it away from him myself."

During the remainder of 1699 both Sweden and Denmark vigorously prepared for war. A Danish army, 17,800 strong, assembled in Holstein; while Charles XII equipped his father's fleet, and mobilised a Swedish army-corps which was to penetrate into Holstein from Pomerania and Wismar. At this juncture, western Europe was startled by the tidings that the Saxons had invaded Livonia. But, in May, 1700, the troops of Augustus II, repulsed from Riga by the veteran Dahlberg, were defeated at Jungfernhof, and driven over the Dwina; the Livonian gentry showed no disposition to rise in arms at the appeal of Patkul; and the discomfited Augustus, already in difficulties, urged the Tsar to

fulfil his part of the compact by invading Ingria. This Peter at once proceeded to do. His objective was Narva, the key of the province, at the mouth of the Narova. The Russian army, about 40,000 strong, consisted, with the exception of the Guards, of three divisions of raw troops, levied so late as November, 1699. Theodore Golovin, now a Field-marshal as well as Prime Minister, commanded in chief, Peter occupying, as usual, a subordinate position. Narva was reached by October 4; but the siege artillery, delayed by the bad roads, could not open fire until the end of the month, and the commandant rejected every summons to surrender. At the end of November, the Russian camp was astounded by the intelligence that the young King of Sweden, who was supposed to be fighting desperately in Denmark, was approaching at the head of "an innumerable army." The incredible tidings were true. The timidity of the Danish admiral Gyldenlöve; the pressure upon Denmark of a combined Anglo-Dutch squadron sent by William III to the Baltic to localise the war; and, above all, the audacity of Charles, who, despite the protests of the most experienced seamen, had insisted on forcing the eastern channel of the Sound, the dangerous *Flinterend*, hitherto reputed to be unnavigable, had placed Denmark at his mercy; but by the Treaty of Traventhal (August 18, 1700) he had, as is related elsewhere, contented himself with bringing about a satisfactory settlement with Holstein-Gottorp. This brilliant *début* enabled Charles to give his undivided attention to the defence of his eastern borders; and he acted with that swiftness which was the secret of his greatest successes. On October 6 he reached Pernau, with the intention of first relieving Riga; but, hearing that Narva was in great straits, he decided to turn northwards against the Tsar. After a five weeks' sojourn at Wernburg to collect his forces, he set out for Narva on November 13, against the advice of all his generals, who feared the effect on untried troops of a week's march through a wasted land, along boggy roads guarded by three formidable passes, which a little engineering skill could easily have made impregnable. Fortunately, the first two passes were unoccupied; and the third, Pyhäjoggi, which Sheremetieff attempted to defend with 6000 men, was captured by Charles in person. On November 19, the little army reached Lagena, a village about nine miles from Narva, and early on the following morning it advanced in battle array.

Peter did not wait for his youthful antagonist. He knew that his wretched recruits could not be pitted against veterans; indeed, he would never have brought them to Narva at all had he conceived the appearance of Charles XII to be even a remote possibility. He could not help them if he stayed with them, while any mishap to himself would, inevitably, have brought about the collapse of the new Russia which he was so painfully uprearing. At all events, he fled away to Novgorod, taking with him Golovin, whom he also could not afford to lose, and leaving his demoralised army in the charge of a mysterious adventurer, presumably

of Magyar origin, calling himself Prince Carl Eugen de Croy or de Croie, who had had some military experience in the Austrian and Danish services. The result was a foregone conclusion. On November 20, Charles XII, with 8000 men, attacked the Russians behind their entrenchments in the midst of a snowstorm. In an hour the Muscovite left wing was broken, while their cavalry, which might easily have turned the Swedish flank, fled in panic terror. Only on the right did the Guards defend themselves obstinately behind their waggons till the end of the short winter's day. The unfortunate de Croy surrendered to escape being murdered by his own men, and most of the foreign officers followed his example.

The very ease of his victory was injurious to Charles XII. His best counsellors now urged him to turn all his forces against the terrified fugitives; establish his winter-quarters in Muscovy; live upon the country till the spring, and then take advantage of the popular discontent against Peter to make him harmless for the future. But Charles declared that he would postpone the settlement of the Russian quarrel till he had summarily chastised Augustus. "There was no glory in winning victories over the Muscovites," he said; "they could be beaten at any time." It is easy from the vantage-point of two centuries to criticise Charles XII for neglecting the Muscovites to pursue the Saxons, but, in the circumstances, his decision was, apparently, correct. Charles had every reason to think the civilised and martial Saxons far more formidable than the Muscovites; and he had good cause for hating Augustus more than his other enemies. The hostility of Denmark, on account of Gottorp, was perfectly intelligible; and so was that of Muscovy so long as Sweden held old territory formerly Muscovite and barred Muscovy from the sea. There was no excuse at all for the Elector of Saxony. Yet he had been the prime mover in the league of partition. He had deceived Sweden to the very last moment with false assurances of amity, and Charles could never trust him to remain quiet even if they made peace with each other. From this point of view Charles' policy of placing a nominee of his own on the Polish throne in lieu of the incalculable Augustus, was a policy, not of overreaching ambition, but of prudent self-defence.

Nevertheless, it saved Peter, who was immensely relieved by the withdrawal of his great rival. He had cut a sorry figure enough at Narva; after the defeat his tenacity and resourcefulness once more extort our admiration. Adversity always seemed to stimulate rather than depress him. He at once formed the nucleus of a new army out of the 23,000 fugitives who had escaped from Narva, and they were speedily reinforced by ten freshly recruited dragoon regiments of 1000 men each. An ukase directed all the churches and monasteries in the Tsardom to send him their bells to be cast into cannon to supply the place of the artillery lost at Narva; and, in less than twelve months afterwards, they

were converted into 300 guns at a cost of 10,000 roubles. But Peter's chief anxiety was that Augustus should keep Charles occupied. At a conference with Augustus at Birse, in Samogitia, at which Patkul also was present, the two allies resolved that neither of them should make a separate peace with Sweden. Peter further undertook to supply Augustus with 20,000 fresh troops, and 100,000 lb. of powder, and pay him for three years 100,000 roubles annually, which he had to raise by forced loans from the great monasteries and rich merchants like the Stroganoffs.

The troops left by Charles XII to defend the Baltic provinces amounted only to 15,000 men. In the most favourable circumstances these could not seriously hope to defend, against a tenfold odds, a frontier extending from Lake Ladoga to Lake Peipus, from Lake Peipus to the Dwina, and from the Dwina to the Gulf of Riga. And the circumstances were unusually unfavourable. Charles not only took his best men and his best officers away with him to Poland, but forbade the Senate, which ruled Sweden during his absence, to send any reinforcements to the Baltic provinces, so long as the more important Polish war lasted. Peter, he argued, could easily be kept in check by a few raw corps till Augustus had been dealt with. It was a fatal miscalculation.

With Pskoff as their starting-point, the Muscovites, during 1701 and 1702, made frequent incursions into Ingria and Livonia. On January 7, 1702, the Swedish general Schlippenbach was overwhelmed by Sheremetieff at Errestfer, losing 3000 killed and wounded, and 350 prisoners. Peter was in ecstasies. "Narva is avenged," he cried. Sheremetieff received his marshal's baton. Urged on incessantly by Peter, the new Field-marshal attacked Schlippenbach a second time, in July, 1702, at Hummelshof, and with a force of 30,000 men inflicted a still more terrible defeat upon him, the Swedes losing 5500 out of 8000 men. To intimidate the enemy still further, and prevent him from drawing upon the country for supplies, Sheremetieff, by the express command of Peter, proceeded, methodically, to devastate as much of Livonia as he could reach with his Cossacks and Calmucks. Between Pernau and Reval, and thence round by the sea to Riga, everything was obliterated. In September, 1702, Peter himself appeared at Ladoga, in order to superintend the conquest of Ingria. The little fortress of Nöteborg was taken by assault after a heroic defence by its garrison of 410 men against 10,000. Peter renamed it Schlüsselburg. On May 12, 1703, another small fortress, Nyen, or Nyenskans (renamed Slottburg), at the mouth of the Neva, was captured by Sheremetieff. Presently the woodman's axe was busy among the virgin forests in the marshes of the Neva, and a little wooden village began to rise up on the northern shore of the river. This little village was called St Petersburg. For the defence of the town on the sea-side, the fort of Kronslot, subsequently called Kronstadt, was

built on the adjacent island of Retusaari, from plans drawn by Peter himself. A harbour, large enough to enclose the rapidly increasing Russian fleet, which Peter was already constructing on the river Suiva, was also begun at Kronslot; and all the feeble and ill-directed attempts of the Swedes during the next few years to interrupt the work came to nothing.

In the spring of 1704 the Muscovites, after reducing all the open towns of Ingria to ashes, sat down before the two great fortresses of Dorpat and Narva. Sheremetieff, with 20,000 men, began the siege of the former place in the beginning of June, and it surrendered on July 24. Narva was besieged by the Scotch general Ogilvie, whom Patkul had picked up at Vienna and enlisted in Peter's service for three years. On August 20 the fortress was taken by assault, and a frightful massacre ensued, in which not even the women and children were spared. Peter arrived two hours after the place had fallen, and stopped the carnage by cutting down a dozen of the plunderers with his own hand.

Peter would now have made peace with Sweden, had he been allowed to retain St Petersburg. He was in possession of all he wanted, for, as yet, he had no intention of conquering Livonia for himself (hence his barbarous treatment of it), inasmuch as he still regarded it as Augustus' share of the spoil. But he required time to consolidate his position in the Baltic provinces; and for this purpose it was necessary to keep Charles "sticking in the Polish bog" a little longer, by actively assisting Augustus, who was again in serious difficulties. Meanwhile, Charles XII, after the campaign at Narva, had gone into winter-quarters round Dorpat, fixing his head-quarters at Lois Castle, midway between Dorpat and Lake Peipus, so as to be able to commence hostilities in the early spring.

Meanwhile, an event occurred which completely changed the face of European politics. In November, 1700, died Charles II of Spain, bequeathing the Spanish monarchy to Philip of Anjou, the grandson of Louis XIV, who thereupon openly repudiated the partition compact which he had made with the Maritime Powers. A war between France and the Maritime Powers was now inevitable, and both sides looked to Sweden for assistance. The competing French and Imperial ambassadors appeared in the Swedish camp, while the English and Dutch were equally busy at Stockholm. Oxenstierna saw in this universal bidding for the favour of Sweden a golden opportunity of ending "this present lean war, and making his Majesty the arbiter of Europe." But Charles met all the representations of his Ministers with a disconcerting silence. At last the urgent appeal of Baron Lillieroth, the able Swedish representative at the Hague, who stated that both William III and Heinsius were uneasy at the unnecessary prolongation of the Northern War and desirous of knowing the real sentiments of Charles, drew from him the reluctant reply: "It would put our glory to shame, if we lent ourselves to the slightest treaty accommodation with one who has so vilely

prostituted his honour." This obvious reference to Augustus convinced the western diplomatists that nothing was to be expected from the King of Sweden till he had chastised the Elector of Saxony.

On July 8, 1701, Charles transported his army across the Dwina, in the face of 30,000 Russians and Saxons strongly entrenched on the opposite shore at Dunamünde, routed them in a two hours' engagement, and followed up his victory by occupying Courland, then a Polish fief, which he at once converted into a Swedish governor-generalate. Then, after recapturing all the Swedish forts on the Dwina, and purging the land of Saxons and Russians, he established his winter-quarters round Würgen in western Courland (September to December, 1701).

Charles' proximity to the Polish border had greatly disturbed Augustus; and the Polish primate, Cardinal Radziejowski, had written to Charles reminding him that Poland was at peace with Sweden, forbidding him, in the name of the Republic, to cross the border; and offering to mediate between the two monarchs. Charles' reply excluded every hope of negotiation. He bluntly demanded the deposition of Augustus, threatening, in case of non-compliance, himself to punish the common foe. After this it is not surprising that a reaction in favour of Augustus began in Poland itself; and Patkul, who, in 1702, exchanged the Saxon for the Russian service, did all in his power to induce the Republic to join the anti-Swedish league. The Tsar also now concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Poland, and it became clear that, with the exception of the powerful Lithuanian family of Sapieha, most of the Polish nobles were still on the side of the King in possession.

In January, 1702, Charles established himself at Bielowice in Lithuania, and, after issuing a proclamation declaring that "the Elector of Saxony" had forfeited the Polish throne, set out for Warsaw, which he reached on May 14. The Cardinal-Primate was then sent for and ordered to summon an extraordinary Diet for the purpose of deposing Augustus. A fortnight later Charles quitted Warsaw to seek his enemy, and on July 2, with only 10,000 men, routed the combined Poles and Saxons at Klissow, on which occasion his brother-in-law, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, was shot dead by his side. Three weeks later, Charles, with only a cane in his hand, stood before the citadel of Cracow, and captured it by an act of almost fabulous audacity. Thus, within four months of the opening of the campaign, the Polish capital and the coronation city were both in the possession of the Swedes.

During the next two months Charles remained inactive at Cracow, awaiting reinforcements, and regarding impassively the chaotic condition of the unhappy Polish Republic. After Klissow, Augustus made every effort to put an end to the war, but his offers were not even considered. The campaign of 1703 was remarkable for Charles' victory over the Saxons at Pultusk (April 21), and for the long siege of Thorn, which

occupied the Swedish King for eight months, but cost him no more than fifty men, after which he went into winter-quarters round Heilsberg, in the diocese of Ermeland. Meanwhile, his Polish partisans had succeeded in forming a confederation, under the protection of the Swedish general Rehnskjöld, which assembled at Warsaw in January, 1704, and was energetically manipulated by Count Arvid Horn, Charles' special envoy, who persuaded it to depose Augustus. But months of fruitless negotiations ensued before Augustus' successor could be fixed upon, Augustus complicating matters by seizing the Sobieskis, the most acceptable candidates, in Imperial territory, and locking them up in the fortress of Pleissenberg. Charles finally cut the knot himself by selecting the Palatine of Posen, Stanislaus Leszczyński, a young man of blameless antecedents, respectable talents, and ancient family, but without sufficient force of character or political influence to sustain himself on such an unstable throne. Nevertheless, with the assistance of a bribing fund and an army-corps, Count Horn succeeded in procuring the election of Stanislaus (July 6, 1704), by a hastily gathered assembly of half-a-dozen castellans and a few score of the lesser nobility.

The insecurity of the new King was demonstrated when Augustus, taking advantage of a sudden southward raid of Charles', recaptured Warsaw (August 26). But his triumph was of short duration. In October, Charles routed the Saxons at Punitz, and, after chasing them as far as Glogau, returned to Poland, and pitched his camp at Rawitz, completely cutting Augustus off from Poland. There he remained for eight months, using every effort firmly to establish Stanislaus. A coronation Diet was summoned to Warsaw in July, 1705; an attempt to disperse it by an army of 10,000 Saxons was frustrated by the gallantry of the Swedish general, Nieroth, with 2000 men; the difficulty about the regalia, which had been carried off to Saxony, was surmounted by Charles himself providing his nominee with a new crown and sceptre; and, finally, Stanislaus was crowned King, with great splendour, on October 4, 1705. The first act of the new King was to conclude an alliance between Sweden and the Polish Republic, on the basis of the Peace of Oliva, whereby Poland agreed to assist Sweden against the Tsar.

Early in 1705, Peter, encouraged by favourable reports from his Minister, Peter Tolstoi, at Stambul, resolved to help Augustus by transferring the war to Poland. He had previously (August 30, 1704) put some heart into his ally, by making a fresh treaty of alliance with him in which the Republic was also included. By this treaty Peter undertook to provide Augustus with 12,000 Muscovite auxiliaries; to pay for the maintenance of an additional Polish army-corps of 26,000 infantry and 21,000 cavalry, and to furnish subsidies amounting to 200,000 roubles a year till the war was over. An attempt of the indefatigable Patkul to bring the King of Prussia into the anti-Swedish league failed because of Frederick I's fear of Charles and his jealousy of Peter's

progress on the Baltic shore. In June, 1705, Peter appeared at Polock, where 50,000 Russians were concentrated under Ogilvie and Sheremetieff. Sheremetieff was detached to reconquer Courland, but was so badly beaten at Gemaurhof (June 16) by the Swedish general, Adam Lewenhaupt, whose genius had, during 1704, saved Riga from the combined Russians, Poles, and Saxons, that Peter was obliged to hasten to his Field-marshal's assistance. Lewenhaupt thereupon fell back again upon Riga; and the Russians, after capturing Mittau and occupying Courland, went into winter-quarters round Grodno.

During the winter, Patkul made fresh efforts to gain the King of Prussia by holding out the bait of "Royal" or Polish Prussia; but the negotiations failed, because Russia had yet to show, by conquering the unconquerable King of Sweden, that she was able to fulfil her promises. From Berlin Patkul proceeded to Dresden to conclude an agreement with the Imperial commissioners for the transfer of the Russian contingent of troops from the Saxon to the Austrian service. The Saxon Ministers, after protesting in vain against the new arrangement, arrested Patkul, and shut him up in the fortress of Sonnenstein (December 19), altogether disregarding the remonstrances of Peter against such a gross violation of international law.

But the fate of Patkul was speedily forgotten in the rush of events which made the year 1706 so memorable. In January, Charles XII suddenly appeared in eastern Poland to clear the country of the partisans of Augustus, and attack the Russian army, under Ogilvie, entrenched at Grodno. But Ogilvie could not be tempted out of his entrenchments, and all that Charles could do was to cut off his communications with Russia and ruin his sources of supply. Augustus, meanwhile, had hastened from Grodno to Warsaw, and united his Russian and Polish troops with the Saxon forces under Schulenburg, for the purpose of crushing the little Swedish army stationed under General Rehnskjöld, in the province of Posen, intending afterwards to return and fall upon Charles at Grodno, while Ogilvie attacked him in front. This plan was frustrated by Rehnskjöld's brilliant victory at Fraustadt (February 3) over the combined forces of the allies whom he almost annihilated, only 5000 out of 20,000 succeeding in escaping. Fearing for his own army at Grodno, Peter thereupon ordered Ogilvie to retreat into the heart of Russia, burying his heavy guns in ice-holes, and breaking up his army into numerous detachments, so that at least some of it might escape. Ogilvie protesting, he was superseded by Menshikoff; and the Russian army, favoured by the spring-floods of the Niemen, which obstructed the pursuing Swedes, retreated so rapidly upon Kieff, that Charles was unable to overtake it, and abandoned the pursuit among the trackless morasses of Pinsk. Leaving his exhausted troops to rest for a few weeks in Volhynia, he hastened off to Saxony to finish with Augustus, to the intense relief of Peter in his "paradise,"

as he called St Petersburg. In the autumn of the same year, the combined forces of Augustus and Menshikoff defeated the Swedish general Marderfeld at Kalisch (October 29); but the victory came too late to repair the shattered fortunes of the Elector. On September 24, his Ministers at Dresden had concluded with Charles the Peace of Altranstädt, which was ratified by Augustus at Petrików in Poland (October 20). By this treaty, Augustus recognised Stanislaus as King of Poland; renounced all his anti-Swedish alliances, especially the alliance with Russia; and undertook to support the Swedish army, during the winter, in Saxony, and to deliver up Patkul. To the last he was insincere. Thus, while imploring Charles to keep secret the Peace of Altranstädt, as otherwise he would fear for his personal security, he privately assured the Tsar of his unalterable devotion, and negotiated at Berlin and Copenhagen for a fresh anti-Swedish league. Charles rent asunder this web of falsehood by publishing the treaty and compelling Augustus to ratify it afresh (January 19, 1707) and carry out all its stipulations, not one of which was of the slightest political advantage to Sweden. Patkul was now removed from his Saxon dungeon and handed over to Charles. He was broken on the wheel and then decapitated (October 10), Charles having rejected an appeal for mercy from his own sister, the Princess Ulrica Leonora, on the ground that one who had forfeited his life as a traitor could, for example's sake, not be pardoned. Charles' conduct on this occasion was legitimate if harsh, but that of Augustus was wholly infamous. He had deliberately handed over to a horrible death a man who, after serving him to the utmost of his ability, had trusted in his honour.

It was now that Peter seriously attempted to come to terms with his terrible opponent. This he could only do by soliciting the mediation of the Powers, as Charles steadily refused to have any direct communication with him. He began in London. At the end of 1706, Andrei Matvieeff was sent there from Holland to promise Peter's adhesion to the Grand Alliance, if Great Britain would bring about a peace between him and Sweden. If necessary, Matvieeff was to bribe Harley, Godolphin, Marlborough, and the other Ministers. "I know not whether Marlborough would be inclined thereto, as he is already immensely rich," wrote Peter privately, "but you may promise him £1000." After a long procrastination, Harley informed Matvieeff that the Queen could not at present afford to quarrel with the King of Sweden, especially as he had engaged not to attack the Emperor. On the Continent, Peter's Dutch agent, Huyssens, negotiated with Marlborough direct. The Duke promised to meet the Tsar's wishes if a principality in Russia were granted to him. Peter at once gave him the choice between Kieff, Vladimir, and Siberia, besides promising him, in case a peace with Sweden was concluded by his efforts, 50,000 thalers a year, "a rock ruby such as no European potentate possesses," and the order

of St Andrew in brilliants. But nothing came of it, although Peter now declared his willingness to surrender all his Baltic possessions except St Petersburg. In the spring of 1707 Peter negotiated for the mediation of France, through Desalliers, the French Minister at the Court of Francis II Rákóczy, Prince of Transylvania, whom Peter, for a moment, had thought of setting up in Poland as a rival to Stanislaus. Charles was approached on the subject of peace; but, recognising that the line of the Neva was really vital to the existence of Sweden's Baltic empire, he refused to cede St Petersburg, and insisted on Peter's restitution of all his conquests and the payment of a war indemnity. Meanwhile the Swedish Ministers at Vienna, the Hague, and elsewhere, insisted perpetually that, if Russia were allowed to increase, all Europe would be exposed to the peril of a second Scythian invasion; and all Europe was inclined to believe them. Prince Eugene, to whom Peter now offered the throne of Poland, refused the dangerous gift; and the Emperor hastened to recognise Stanislaus for fear of offending Charles. At Berlin, even the offer of 100,000 thalers could not tempt the Prussian Ministers to undertake the ungrateful task of mediation. Peter was evidently given up for lost.

All diplomatic expedients for pacifying Charles having failed, Peter prepared to bear the brunt of a war *à outrance* with the invincible Swede. At a Council of War, held at the village of Mereczko, in Lithuania, in 1707, he decided not to oppose the Swedes in the open field, but to retire before them, drawing them further and further from their base, devastating the country before them and harassing them as much as possible, especially at the passage of the principal rivers. He had previously commanded that all the country-folks should be warned beforehand of the approach of the enemy that they might have time to hide their stores of corn in pits, or in the forests, and drive their cattle into the trackless swamps. The Cossack Hetman, Ivan Mazepa, was entrusted with the defence of Little Russia and the Ukraine. Kieff, with its congeries of fortress-monasteries, was additionally fortified and well supplied with artillery. All the light troops, including the Cossacks, were to fall back behind the Dnieper.

Charles' departure from Saxony had been delayed for twelve months by a quarrel with the Emperor, against whom he had many just causes of complaint. The religious question presented the most difficulty. The Court of Vienna had treated the Silesian Protestants with tyrannical severity, in direct contravention of the Treaty of Osnabrück, of which Sweden was one of the guarantors; and Charles demanded summary and complete restitution in so dictatorial a fashion that the Emperor prepared for war. But political considerations prevailed. The sudden apparition of the King of Sweden and his "blue boys" in the heart of the Empire fluttered all the western diplomatists; and the allies at once suspected that Louis XIV had bought the Swedes. Marlborough was

forthwith sent from the Hague to the castle of Altranstädt, near Leipzig, where Charles had fixed his head-quarters, "to endeavour to penetrate the designs of the King of Sweden." He soon convinced himself that western Europe had nothing to fear from Charles, and that no bribes were necessary in order to turn the Swedish arms from Germany to Muscovy. Nevertheless Charles' presence in central Europe seriously hampered the movements of the allies; and the fear lest he might be tempted to assist France, the traditional ally of Sweden, finally induced the Emperor to satisfy all his demands, the Maritime Powers agreeing to guarantee the provisions of the Treaty of Altranstädt.

Delayed during the autumn months in Poland by the tardy arrival of reinforcements from Pomerania, Charles XII was not able to take the field till November, 1707, when he had under him an army of 24,000 horse and 20,000 foot, two-thirds of whom were veterans. The respite was of incalculable importance to the Tsar, who, at this very time had suddenly to cope with a dangerous Bashkir rising on the Volga, followed by a rebellion of the Don Cossacks under Kondraty Bulavin, against "the innovations." So hardly pressed was he as to be forced to employ barbarians against barbarians, Calmucks against Bashkirs, for want of regulars. On Christmas Day, 1707, Charles reached the Vistula, which he crossed on New Year's Day, 1708, although the ice was in a dangerous condition. On January 26 he entered Grodno, only two hours after Peter's departure. "For God's sake," wrote Peter to Menshikoff on this occasion, "entrust the command of the rear-guard to faithful men of our own people and not to foreign fools." The sneer is illuminating. It shows that even in the service of war the Muscovites were beginning to dispense with leading-strings.

On February 12, Charles encamped at Smorgonie on the Velya, one of the tributaries of the Niemen. Two courses lay open to him. Either he might recover the lost Baltic provinces before attacking the Tsar, or he might pursue Peter into the heart of his Tsardom, and dictate peace to him after destroying his army. His ablest officers strongly advised him to adopt the first course as being both "cheap and reasonable"; but the alternative appealed irresistibly to the young hero's love of adventure, and tempted him by presenting difficulties which would have been unconquerable by anyone but himself. And, unfortunately for Sweden, he adopted it. This plan was, apparently (for even now it is largely guess-work) first, after crossing the Dnieper, to unite with the army-corps of Lewenhaupt, which was advancing from Riga to join him, and then to winter in the fruitful and untouched Ukraine, whose fortresses were to be held at his disposal by the Cossack Hetman Mazepa. Simultaneously, the Finnish army under Lybecker, with the help of the fleet, was to take St Petersburg and recapture Ingria, while Stanislaus, aided by a third Swedish army under Krassow, was to quell all disaffection in Poland. In the summer of 1709, the three Swedish armies, reinforced

by the Poles, the Cossacks, and the Crimean Tartars, were to attack Muscovy from the north, south and east simultaneously and crush Peter between them. The realisation of such a scheme, which absolutely disregarded difficulties, and was built upon nothing but the most fantastic hypotheses, lay far beyond the bounds of possibility.

After a brief rest at Smorgonie, Charles XII resumed his march eastwards. The superior strategy of the Swedes enabled them to cross the first two considerable rivers, the Berezina and the Drucz, without difficulty, but on reaching the Wabis, Charles found the enemy posted on the other side, near the little town of Holowczyn, in an apparently impregnable position and evidently bent upon barring his passage. But his experienced eye instantly detected the one vulnerable point in the six mile long Russian line; on July 4, 1708, he hurled all his forces against it; and, after a fierce engagement, from daybreak to sundown, the Russians fell back with a loss of 3000 men.

The victory of Holowczyn, memorable besides as the last pitched battle won by Charles XII, opened up the way to the Dnieper; and four days later Charles reached Mohileff, where he stayed till August 6 waiting for Lewenhaupt. The Swedes now began to suffer severely, bread and fodder running short, and the soldiers subsisting almost entirely on captured bullocks. The Russians, under Sheremetieff and Menshikoff, would not risk another general engagement, but slowly retired before the invaders, destroying everything in their path, till at last the Swedes had nothing but a charred wilderness beneath their feet and a horizon of burning villages before their eyes. Moreover, the Muscovites now began to display an unusual boldness, attacking more and more frequently, with ever-increasing numbers, as, for instance, at Chernaya Napa (September 9), where they fell upon an isolated Swedish division which lost 3000 men and was only saved from annihilation by the arrival of Charles himself. By the time the frontier of eighteenth century Russia was reached at Michanowich (October 1) it was plain to Charles that he could go no further eastwards through the devastated land, and at Tatarsk he held his first council of war. Rehnskjöld prudently advised the King to wait for Lewenhaupt, whose reinforcements and caravan of provisions were becoming indispensable, and then to retire to Livonia, so that he might winter in his own lands. But Charles, partly from a horror of retreating, partly because of an urgent summons from Mazepa, resolved to proceed southwards instead of northwards, and to this resolution everything else was sacrificed.

And now began that last march of the devoted Swedish army through the forests and morasses of Severia and the endless steppes of Ukraine which was to be a long-drawn-out agony, punctuated by a constant succession of disasters. The first blow fell in the beginning of October, when the unhappy Lewenhaupt joined Charles with the *débris* of the army he had saved from the not inglorious rout of Lyesna, where the Russians, with

vastly superior forces, had interrupted and overwhelmed him after a two days' battle (September 29-30), in which the Swedes lost 8000 killed and wounded, 16 guns, 42 standards, and 2000 waggons of provisions, and the Russians 4000 killed and wounded. And Lewenhaupt was sacrificed in vain, for when, on November 8, Mazepa at last joined Charles, at the little Severian town of Horki, he came not as the powerful *Dux militum Zaporowiensium*, but as a ruined man with little more than his horsetail standard and 1300 personal adherents.

The unlooked-for collapse of Mazepa was a terrible blow to Charles XII. He had built his hopes of ultimate victory on his alliance with the Cossack Hetman; and, in justice to Charles, it must be admitted that this alliance, so far from being a mere mirage luring him on to destruction, as which Swedish historians generally have regarded it, was really the one solid and substantial element in his fantastic combinations. The fact has been quite overlooked that, in those days, the Hetman of the Zaporogian Cossacks was often the determining factor of Oriental politics. Chmielnicki had held the balance even between Poland and Muscovy for years. Doroszenko, as the ally of the Sultan, had, for a time, been more powerful than Tsar and King combined. Mazepa himself was not so much the subject as the semi-independent tributary of the Muscovite Crown. He ruled on the Dnieper with more than princely power. 100,000 Cossack horsemen were at his disposal. The whole Ukraine obeyed his lightest nod. The Khan of the Crimea addressed him as "my brother." If Charles X of Sweden, one of the astutest statesmen as well as the greatest warrior of his age, in the plenitude of his power considered it not beneath his dignity to seek the alliance of the Hetman Chmielnicki against Poland, why should not his grandson, Charles XII, have sought the alliance of the Hetman Mazepa against Muscovy, now that Poland also was on his side? The power and influence of Mazepa were fully recognised by Peter the Great himself. No other Cossack Hetman had ever been treated with such deference at Moscow. He ranked with the highest dignitaries in the State, sat at the Tsar's own table, and flouted the Tsar's kinsfolk with impunity.

Mazepa would doubtless have remained loyal, had not Charles XII crossed his path. At the very beginning of the great Northern War, the crafty old Hetman began to have his doubts how this life-and-death struggle, going on before his very eyes, would end. As Charles continued to advance, and Peter to retreat, Mazepa made up his mind that Charles was going to win and that it was high time he looked after his own interests. Moreover, he had his personal grievances against Peter. The Tsar was going so fast, that the arch-conservative old Cossack could not follow him; and he was jealous of the omnipotent favourite Menshikoff. More than once, some of his Cossack squadrons had been taken away from him to be converted into dragoons, and he deeply resented it. But he proceeded very cautiously. Not till September 27,

1707, when King Stanislaus wrote to him direct, practically offering him his own terms if he would take the anti-Museovite side, did he determine to do so. The crisis came when Peter ordered him actively to cooperate with the Russian forces in the Ukraine. Mazepa hereupon took to his bed, and sent word to the Tsar that he was on the point of death. The same day he communicated with Charles' First Minister, Count Piper, and agreed to harbour the Swedes in the Ukraine, and close it against the Russians (October, 1708). But Peter was too quick for him. He at once sent Menshikoff to see "the dying Hetman." Mazepa at once took horse, and "sped away like a whirlwind," for three days and three nights, to the nearest Swedish outposts. Peter instantly commanded Menshikoff to have a new Hetman elected, and to raze Baturin, Mazepa's chief stronghold in the Ukraine, to the ground. In the race to Baturin which now followed between Charles and Menshikoff, the Muscovites outmarched the exhausted Swedes; and when Charles, a week later, passed by the Cossack capital, all that remained of it was "a heap of smouldering mills and ruined houses, with burnt, half-burnt and bloody corpses" scattered all around.

At the end of 1708, the Swedes had to encounter a new and terrible enemy in the great frost, the severest that Europe had known for a century. So early as the beginning of October the cold was intense; by November 1, firewood would not burn in the open air and the soldiers warmed themselves over big bonfires of straw. But it was not till the vast open steppes of the Ukraine were reached that the unhappy Swedes experienced the full rigour of the icy Seythian blast. By the time the army arrived at the little Ukrainian fortress of Hadjach, which they took by assault (January, 1709), wine and spirits froze into solid blocks of ice; birds on the wing fell dead; saliva congealed in its passage from the mouth to the ground. The sufferings of the soldiers were hideous. "You could see," says an eye-witness, "some without hands, some without feet, some without ears and noses, many creeping along after the manner of quadrupeds." "Nevertheless," says another eye-witness, "though earth, sky, and air were against us, the King's orders had to be obeyed, and the daily march made." Never had Charles XII seemed so superhuman as during those awful days. It is not too much to say that his imperturbable equanimity, his serene *bonhomie*, kept together the perishing, but still unconquered, host. His military exploits were prodigious. At Cerkova he drove back 7000 Russians with 400, and at Opressa, 5000 Russians with 300 men.

The frost broke at the end of February, 1709, and then the spring floods put an end to all active operations for some months. The Tsar set off for Voronezh to inspect his Black Sea fleet; while Charles encamped at Rudiszcz, between the Orel and the Worskla, two tributaries of the Don. By this time the Swedish army had dwindled from 41,000 to 20,000 able-bodied men, mostly cavalry. Supplies, furnished

for a time by Mazepa, were again running short. All communications with Europe had long since been cut off. Charles was still full of confidence. He hoped in the ensuing campaign, with the help of the Tartars, the Zaporogians and the Hospodar of Wallachia, to hold his own till Stanislaus, with Krassow's army-corps, had joined him by way of Volhynia. On May 11 he began the siege of Poltawa, a small fortress on the western bank of the Worskla, and the staple of the Ukraine trade, so as to strengthen his position till the arrival of Krassow. But the ordinary difficulties of a siege were materially increased by the lack of artillery and ammunition¹, and by the proximity of the Russian main army, which arrived a few days later, and entrenched itself on the opposite bank of the Worskla. Peter himself was delayed by the resistance offered by the Zaporogian Cossacks at the instigation of Mazepa, in their *syech*, or great water-fortress, among the islands of the Dnieper; but on June 8, "this root of all the evil and the main hope of the enemy," as Peter called it, was stormed by the dragoons of Volkovsky and Galaghan. A week later the Tsar set out for Poltawa, arriving there on June 15.

At last Peter had resolved to make a firm stand. "With God's help I hope this month to have a final bout with the enemy," he wrote to Admiral Apraksin. Yet even now, though the Swedes were a famished, exhausted, dispirited host, surrounded by fourfold numbers, Peter decided at a council of war, held soon after his arrival, that a general attack was too hazardous. Charles XII had never yet been defeated in a pitched battle, and Peter was determined to take no risks. Only when the garrison of Poltawa contrived to let him know that their powder had run out, and the enemy's sappers were burrowing beneath their palisades, did he order his army to advance. On that very day a crowning calamity overtook the Swedes. While reconnoitring the Russian camp, Charles received a wound in the foot from the bullet of a Cossack patrol, which placed him *hors de combat*. On hearing of this mishap, Peter resolved not to refuse battle, if it were offered him. Charles was equally ready to fight, and at a council of war held on June 26, Marshal Rehnskjöld, whom he had appointed commander-in-chief in his stead, was ordered to attack the Russians in their entrenchments on the following day. The Swedes joyfully accepting the chances of battle in lieu of miseries of all sorts and slow starvation, advanced with irresistible *élan*, and were at first successful on both wings. After this, one or two tactical blunders having been committed, the Tsar, taking courage, drew all his troops from their trenches, and enveloped the little band of Swedish infantry in a vast semi-circle, bristling with guns of the most modern make, the invention of a French engineer, Le Mètre, which fired

¹ Nearly all the powder had been spoilt by the weather during 1708-9, and it is said that the report of the Swedish guns was no louder than the clapping of gloved hands.

five times to the Swedes' once, and literally swept away the Guards, the heart and soul of the army, before they could grasp their swords. After a desperate struggle, the Swedish infantry was annihilated, while the 14,000 cavalry, exhausted and demoralised, surrendered, two days later, at Perevolchna on the Dnieper, which they had no means of crossing. Charles XII, half delirious with pain, in his litter, escorted by Mazepa and 1500 horsemen, took refuge in Turkish territory. "The enemy's army," wrote Peter to his friend Romodonovsky next morning, "has had the fate of Phaethon. As for the King, we know not whether he be with us or with our fathers." To Apraksin he wrote: "Now, by God's help, are the foundations of Petersburg securely laid for all time." At the end of the year, on his return to "the Holy Land," he laid the foundation-stone of a church dedicated to St Sampson, to commemorate the victory of the strong and patient man who had at last vanquished his masters in the art of war.

The immediate result of the battle of Poltawa was the revival of the hostile league against Sweden. On hearing of Peter's victory, Augustus sent his chamberlain, Count Vizthum, to arrange for a conference; and the two monarchs met on a bridge of boats in the Vistula, a mile from Thorn, where, on October 17, 1709, a treaty cancelling all former compacts was signed. Peter undertook to assist Augustus to regain the throne of Poland; and, by a secret article, it was agreed that Livonia should form part of the victor's hereditary domains. Previously to this (June 28), an alliance had been concluded at Dresden between Augustus and Frederick IV of Denmark, "to restore the equilibrium of the north, and keep Sweden within her proper limits." Nevertheless, for fear of the Western Powers, which were amicably disposed towards Sweden, and by no means inclined to part with the Danish and Saxon mercenaries in their service, so long as the War of the Spanish Succession continued, the two Princes agreed to exempt Sweden's German possessions from attack unless their own possessions in the Empire were attacked by Sweden. The confederates then proceeded to Berlin, to persuade Frederick I of Prussia to accede to the new alliance; but the Prussian Minister, Ilgen, restrained his royal master from taking any decisive step. Consequently, "the league of the three Fredericks" was of so general a character that it did little more than engage the King of Prussia to prevent the passage through his territories of any Swedish troops bent on invading the territories of Denmark or Saxony.

And now Frederick IV, despite the angry remonstrances of the Maritime Powers, resolved to attack Sweden at the very time that the Tsar was harrying the remnant of her Baltic provinces. But Sweden was now to show the world that a military State, whose strong central organisation enabled her to mobilise troops more quickly than her neighbours, is not to be overthrown by a single disaster, however serious. She could still oppose 16,000 well-disciplined troops to the

Danish invader, and these troops were commanded by Count Magnus Stenbock, the last, but not the least, of the three great Caroline captains—the other two of whom, Rehnskjöld and Lewenhaupt, were now captives in Russia. Her fleet, too, was still a little stronger than the Danish fleet, and, besides her garrisons in Stralsund, Wismar, Bremen, Verden, and other places, she had Krassow's army-corps of 9000 strong in Poland. Then came the tidings of Poltawa, and, in an instant, the authority of King Stanislaus vanished. The vast majority of the Poles hastened to repudiate him and make their peace with Augustus, and Leszczyński, henceforth a mere pensioner of Charles XII, accompanied Krassow's army-corps in its retreat to Swedish Pomerania. On November 12, 1709, 15,000 Danes landed in Scania, but, after gaining some slight advantage, were routed by Stenbock at Helsingborg (March 10, 1710), and compelled to evacuate Sweden. Yet, failure though it was, the short Scanian campaign had been of material assistance to the Tsar. It had prevented the Swedish Government from sending help to the hardly pressed eastern provinces, and had thus given Peter a free hand there. On July 15, 1710, Riga, into which Peter personally had the satisfaction of hurling the first bomb, was starved into surrender. During the next two months Pernau and Reval fell. Finland had already been invaded; and in June the fortress of Viborg was captured.

But, suddenly, alarming news from the south interrupted the Tsar's career of conquest in the north. Immediately after Poltawa, Peter Tolstoi, the Russian ambassador at the Porte, demanded the extradition of Charles and Mazepa. This was a diplomatic blunder, as it irritated the already alarmed Turks. Tolstoi next reported "great military preparations made in great haste." In August he offered the Grand Mufti 10,000 ducats and 1000 sabres, if he would hand over the fugitives; but the Mufti gravely replied that such a breach of hospitality would be contrary to the religion of Islam. Evidently the Turks wished to prolong the Russo-Swedish War till they were ready to take the field themselves. Nor was Charles himself idle. For the first time in his life, he was obliged to have recourse to diplomacy; and his pen now proved almost as formidable as his sword. First he sent his agent, Neugebauer, to Stambul with a memorial in which the Porte was warned that, if Peter were given time, he would attack Turkey as suddenly and unexpectedly as he had attacked Sweden in 1700. The fortification of Azoff and the building of a fleet in the Black Sea clearly indicated his designs, and a Suedo-Turkish alliance was the only remedy against so pressing a danger. "Reinforce me with your valiant cavalry," concluded Charles, "and I will return to Poland, reestablish my affairs, and again attack the heart of Muscovy." These arguments, very skilfully presented, had a great effect upon the Porte; and, when Neugebauer was reinforced by Stanislaus Poniatowski, Charles' ablest diplomatist, the crisis became acute. At first, indeed, the Muscovite prevailed. In November, 1709,

the Russo-Turkish peace was renewed, on the understanding that Charles should be escorted to the Polish frontier by Turkish, and from Poland to the Swedish frontier by Russian, troops. But in January, 1710, Poniatowski succeeded in delivering to the Sultan personally a second memorial by Charles, convicting the Grand Vezir, Ali Pasha, of corruption and treason; and in June he was superseded by Neuman-Kiuprili, whose first act was to lend Charles 400,000 thalers free of interest. Kiuprili also would have avoided war, if possible; but the patriotic zeal of the semi-mutinuous Janissaries was too strong for him, and he had to give way to the still more anti-Russian Grand Vezir, Baltaji Mehemet. Peter, encouraged by his Baltic triumphs, now thought fit to take a higher tone with the Porte, and in October, 1710, categorically enquired whether the Sultan desired peace or war, and threatened an invasion unless he received satisfactory assurances forthwith. The Porte, unaccustomed to such language from Muscovy, at once threw Tolstoi into the Seven Towers; while the Grand Vezir was sent to the frontier at the head of 200,000 men.

On March 19, 1711, war was solemnly proclaimed, in the Tsar's presence, against "the enemies of the Cross of Christ," in the Uspensky Cathedral; and Peter immediately set out for the front. At Iaroslavl, on June 12, he concluded a fresh alliance with Augustus, confirmatory of the Treaty of Thorn. The petitions and promises of the Orthodox Christians in Turkey now induced the Tsar to accelerate his pace, and he concluded on his way a secret treaty of alliance with Demetrius Cantemir, Hospodar of Moldavia. Peter had expected that a general insurrection of the Serbs and Bulgars would have compelled the Grand Vezir to recross the Danube; but unexpected difficulties suddenly accumulated. On June 27, Sheremetieff, the Russian commander-in-chief, reported that the whole land had already been sucked dry by the Turks and he knew not where to look for provisions and provender. At a council of war, held at the end of June, Peter decided to advance still further, in order to support Sheremetieff and unite with the Orthodox Christians. On July 16 he reached Jassy, by which time the question of supplies had become so pressing, that all other considerations had to be subordinated to it. On the rumour reaching him that an immense quantity of provisions had been hidden by the Turks in the marshes of Fulchi, near Braila, Peter crossed the Pruth, and searched for these phantom supplies in the forests on the banks of the Sereth. On August 8 the advance-guard reported the approach of the Grand Vezir; and the whole army hurried back to the Pruth, fighting rear-guard actions all the way. On August 11 the Muscovites, now reduced to 38,000 men, entrenched themselves; and the same evening 190,000 Turks and Tartars, with 300 guns, beleaguered them on both sides of the Pruth. An attack upon the Russian camp on the same day was repulsed; but the position of the Russians, with provisions for only a couple of days, and no hope of

succour, was desperate. Had Baltaji only remained stationary for a week, he could have starved the Muscovites into surrender without losing a man or wasting a shot. Learning, however, from a Turkish prisoner that the Grand Vezir was pacifically inclined, Vice-Chancellor Shafiroff persuaded Sheremetieff to send a trumpeter to the Turkish camp with an offer of peace. It was the merest forlorn hope, and Sheremetieff himself remarked that the Grand Vezir would be the craziest person in the world to take half when, by waiting a little longer, he could have the whole. Nevertheless, after a second and more urgent summons, the Grand Vezir professed his readiness to negotiate; and on the same day, Shafiroff, with three interpreters and two couriers, departed upon what everyone regarded as a fool's errand. His instructions strikingly reflect the extreme depression of the Tsar. Peter was now ready to surrender virtually all his Baltic conquests, except St Petersburg; to recognise Stanislaus Leszczynski as King of Poland; and to give complete satisfaction to the Sultan. He also authorised Shafiroff to promise the Grand Vezir and his chief officers 230,000 roubles, if the Muscovite army were permitted to return home unmolested. Shafiroff acquitted himself of his difficult task with consummate ability. The terms of the Peace which he brought back with him on August 12 were, in the circumstances, amazingly favourable. The Russian army was allowed to retire, in return for a solemn engagement to retrocede Azoff, to dismantle Taganrog and the other fortresses on the Sea of Azoff, to interfere no more in Polish affairs, and to grant the King of Sweden a free passage to his domains.

The only person who took no part in the general rejoicing was the Tsar. After loudly declaring his intention of delivering the Christian population of Turkey from the Mohammadan yoke and driving the Turks out of Europe, he had signed a peace by which he abandoned the Sea of Azoff, and undertook to destroy the choicest works of his own hands, his fortresses, and his costly new-built fleet! Peter's despondency is clearly reflected in the letter which he addressed to the newly instituted Senate, while the negotiations with the Porte were still proceeding. In this letter he informs his Ministers that he is surrounded by a countless Turkish army, and, without a special manifestation of God's grace, sees nothing before him but a hopeless pitched battle or Turkish captivity "In the latter case," he continues, "regard me no longer as your Gosudar, and obey no orders from me, though they may be under my hand and seal, till I appear among you. And in case of my death, elect the worthiest as my successor."

Two days before the Russian army departed from the Pruth, Charles XII, who had provided the Grand Vezir with a plan of campaign beforehand, arrived on the scene of action. Only then did he receive the unwelcome news that peace had been concluded. Well might he denounce the conduct of Baltaji as a treason to the Sultan as well as to himself. "He seems to have more regard," wrote Charles, "for the

conservation of the enemy's army than for the advantage of the Ottoman Porte." Even now, however, Charles did not abandon the struggle. He was materially assisted by Peter's tergiversations. Skilfully taking advantage of them, Charles, at last, procured the dismissal of Baltaji; and his own friend, Jussuf, Aga of the Janissaries, became Grand Vezir in Baltaji's stead. War was hereupon once more declared against Russia; and the Sultan announced that, in the spring, he would in person lead his army against the Tsar. Then Peter so far gave way as to abandon Azoff and raze Taganrog, without waiting for the dismissal of Charles XII. But the danger was not yet over. Early in 1712, the influential French ambassador at Stambul began urging the Sultan to declare war against Russia for the third time. Peter, he argued, fairly enough, was not to be trusted, and, if only the Sultan sent Charles home with an escort of 30,000 Turks and 15,000 Tartars, all Poland would hail his advent. The persistent hope of obtaining such escort was the real cause of Charles' long sojourn in Turkey. But the British and Dutch Ministers now came to the assistance of Shafiroff whom Peter had been obliged to leave as a hostage in the hands of the Turks. They persuaded the Grand Vezir to accept a treaty, drafted by themselves, for a twenty-five years' truce between Russia and the Porte. Peter undertaking to evacuate Poland, and acknowledge the sovereignty of the Porte over the Cossacks (April, 1712). This treaty cost Shafiroff 84,900 Venetian ducats, of which the friendly Ministers received 6000 apiece. But the continuance of the Russian troops in Poland, long denied, could not be concealed for ever. Poniatowski presented a third memorial from Charles to the Sultan, emphasising and commenting on this flagrant breach of the April treaty; on November 1, a Turkish courier returned from Poland with confirmation of the fact; on December 21 the Sultan set out for Adrianople; and war was declared against Russia for the third time. Shafiroff reported that this change of front was entirely the Sultan's doing. He had never liked the Peace of the Pruth, and, egged on by the French ambassador, was resolved to reinstate Charles, to whom he had sent a present of 600,000 franes. In the beginning of 1713, however, more favourable reports arrived from Shafiroff. It now appeared that the Sultan had declared war for the purpose of extorting a cession of territory from the Poles; but, as they remained firm, and showed no disposition to reject Augustus since his last reinstalment, he had concluded that the Tsar was stronger in Poland than his rival, and that the French and Swedish Ministers had reported falsely. He also feared that, in the present temper of the Janissaries, disaster might mean his own deposition. He therefore requested Charles to depart from Turkey. Charles refused to budge and on February 1, 1713, was attacked at Bender. For eight hours Charles with only 40 men defended his unfortified house against 12,000 Turks with 12 guns. Two hundred Turks fell, ten by the King's own hand. It took a dozen Janissaries to

overwhelm him single-handed in his attempt to escape from the burning house. The negotiations with Russia were then resumed. But the eyes of the Turks had now, for the first time, been opened to the fact that the Polish and the Eastern questions were inseparable, and to its inevitable corollary that Russia's predominance in Poland was a direct menace to the Porte. The new Grand Vezir, Ali Pasha, now demanded tribute from Russia, with the obvious intention of provoking a rupture (June, 1713); and Shafiroff only averted a declaration of war by bribing the Grand Mufti. Finally, however, (July 16, 1713) the Peace of Adrianople, mediated by the Maritime Powers, adjusted all the outstanding differences between Russia and the Porte.

On retiring from the Pruth, Peter, after a brief visit to Carlsbad, proceeded to Krossen (November 13, 1711) to concert measures with his allies for the vigorous prosecution of the Swedish war, which was now transferred to Germany, where the long struggle for the dominion of the North was to be fought out.

By this time Sweden's position had distinctly deteriorated. In March, 1710, the Swedish Senate had concluded a neutrality compact with the Emperor, Prussia, Hanover, Great Britain and Holland, whereby Charles' possessions in northern Germany were guaranteed against attack, on condition that Krassow's army in Pomerania abstained from hostilities within the German Empire and was not employed either in Poland or Jutland. This guarantee treaty was, in the circumstances, a prudent act of statesmanship; but Charles incontinently rejected it, as interfering with his plans, thereby greatly irritating the Maritime Powers, already by no means so well disposed towards Sweden as heretofore in consequence of the depredations of the Swedish privateers in the Baltic. In 1712, the unwisdom of Charles' summary renunciation of a compact intended for his special protection became apparent. Not only did the Tsar and Augustus II determine to proceed against the Swedish possessions in Germany, but they persuaded Frederick IV of Denmark to join them. The plan of the allies was for the Danes to invade the Bremen and Verden territory, where Stade was the chief fortress, while the Russians and Saxons simultaneously attacked Stralsund. Stade capitulated (September 7) to the Danes, who thereupon occupied Bremen and Verden; but the allies failed to make any impression on Stralsund, and the abortive siege led to a violent quarrel between the Kings of Poland and Denmark which the Russian Ministers barely succeeded in composing.

But now a fresh danger suddenly threatened Peter and his allies. From the first the Maritime Powers had been far more amicably disposed towards Sweden than towards Muscovy. This anti-Russian bias was strongest in England, where the interference of semi-barbarous Muscovy in European affairs was felt to be far more offensive than the haughty aloofness of the Swede. Before Poltawa, Sweden was generally regarded as the natural counterpoise to Russia and entitled, so far as she

discharged that useful political function, to the support of the Maritime Powers. Hence, Great Britain recognised Stanislaus as King of Poland; and in London the Russian ambassador Matvieeff was treated with contemptuous indifference. His arrest (January 21, 1709), on a warrant obtained against him by two shopkeepers and a lace-merchant for a debt of £50, was the last straw. Though the much-ruffled ambassador was speedily released and promised every satisfaction, his arrest was reported by him from the Hague to Peter as the crowning outrage of "the Christ-hating English nation"; but the Tsar was in such straits at the time that he had to condone the offence. Even after Poltawa, the tone of the British Cabinet was persistently unfriendly. The British and Dutch Ministers at Copenhagen had done their utmost to prevent Denmark from acceding to the second coalition against Sweden; and Bolingbroke told van der Lit, the new Russian ambassador in London, that Great Britain never could put up with Russia's obvious intention of extruding the King of Sweden from German soil. In the course of 1712, the Maritime Powers offered their mediation in the Northern War in so threatening a manner that Peter declared this to be, not mediation, but intimidation. Nevertheless, he expressed himself willing to make peace on the vague stipulation that all the ancient Russian lands which he had reconquered should be retroceded to him. As, however, Charles XII refused to make any surrender, "whatever the conjunctures may be," all idea of mediation was finally abandoned.

This obstinacy was to cost Charles dear. At Bender he had elaborated a fresh plan of campaign too heroic to be practicable. Magnus Stenbock was to form a new army-corps in Sweden, convey it to Pomerania, and, invading Poland from the north, reinstate Stanislaus on the throne, and drive out Peter and Augustus, while Charles and the Turks cooperated from the south. On September 24, 1712, Stenbock succeeded in transporting an army of 9400 men, a park of artillery, and a quantity of transports laden with stores, to Rügen, despite the disturbing presence of a large Danish fleet which subsequently destroyed the greater part of the transports. After reinforcing himself from the garrison of Stralsund, he had at his disposal an effective army of 17,000 men. He rightly refused to accept the responsibility of plunging blindly into Poland, leaving Sweden's German possessions to their fate, especially as Prussia also now began to adopt a threatening tone; but, since it was equally impossible for him to remain at Stralsund, from lack of provisions, he marched westwards into Mecklenburg, reached Wismar in safety, and proceeded to live on the land. But, even here, he could not long remain in safety. The Danes were advancing against him from the south-west, the Russians and Saxons from the south-east; and, to prevent their junction, he resolved to attack the weaker foe, the Danes, whose army was little superior to his own. By forced marches he overtook the Danes near Gadebusch, before the Saxons could join them or overtake him, and won a victory

(December 20, 1712), which well deserved the congratulations bestowed upon the victor by Marlborough, but was of very little service to Sweden. Hoping to crush Denmark, as Torstensson had done in 1643, by occupying Jutland, Stenbock crossed the Holstein frontier on New Year's Day, 1713; and after, with wanton barbarity, destroying the defenceless city of Altona he marched northwards through Holstein, hotly pursued by the combined armies of the three Powers under the Tsar's command. Cut off from Jutland and surrounded on every side by enemies, Stenbock finally (February 14, 1713) took refuge in Tönning, the chief fortress of Holstein-Gottorp, Sweden's one ally. Three months later, after an unsuccessful attempt to break through the beleaguering force, Stenbock, with the assistance of the Holstein Minister von Görtz, capitulated at Oldensworth (May 6, 1713), obtaining honourable terms of surrender for his army, now reduced to 11,000 men, though he himself remained in Danish captivity till his death (1717).

No sooner was Stenbock safely shut up in Tönning, than Peter went in search of fresh allies. But neither the Elector of Hanover nor the King of Prussia, to whom he successively applied, would listen to him. Peter hereupon determined to conquer Finland in order “to break the stiff necks of the Swedes,” and have something definite to surrender, when the time for negotiation should have arrived. The necessary preparations were made immediately after his return to St Petersburg in March, 1713; and on May 21 the Russian fleet sailed. The defence of Finland had been entrusted to the incapable Lybecker, who heaped blunder upon blunder; and his gallant successor, Karl Gustaf Armfelt, with hopelessly inadequate forces, could do little but retreat skilfully northwards. His own and Finland's fate were finally decided on March 13, 1714, at the bloody battle of the Storkyro, when the Swedish general stood at bay with his raw levies against threefold odds and was annihilated. By the end of 1714 the whole grand-duchy was in the enemy's possession.

In Germany, during the summer of 1713, the Swedish fortress of Stettin had been besieged by the Russians and Saxons. It capitulated in September and was occupied by neutral Prussian and Holstein troops on the understanding that it was to be restored to Sweden at the conclusion of a general peace. “The Stettin Sequestration,” as it was called, was primarily the work of the Holstein Ministers von Görtz and Bassewitz. Their object was to tempt Prussia over to Charles; and the Court of Berlin actually agreed to drive the Danes out of Holstein and guarantee the neutrality of Charles' German possessions in the hope of subsequent compensation. But the diplomatists had reckoned without Charles XII, who at once denounced “the Stettin Sequestration,” naturally refusing to recognise the right of Prussia, a neutral Power, to occupy one of his fortresses under any conditions.

During the summer of 1714, owing to the incurable jealousy between Denmark and Saxony, the war languished; and fresh efforts were made

to bring about a general pacification at the Congress of Brunswick. Peter was willing to make peace with Sweden if all the territory ceded to her by Russia at the Peace of Stolbova were now retroceded. In case of emergency, he was even willing to restore Livonia provided that all its fortresses were previously demolished. But his principal object was to bind Denmark more closely to him. Now that the tide of victory had carried the Russian arms in triumph up to the head of the Gulf of Bothnia, while the Swedes were driven back to their native peninsula, any future operations against them would largely depend upon the possession of sea-power. But the Russian navy consisted, for the most part, of galleys, and consequently in any attack upon the great arsenal of Karlskrona, where the military and naval forces of Sweden were now concentrated, the cooperation of the Danish navy was indispensable. Peter therefore offered Denmark 150,000 roubles a year in subsidies and an auxiliary army of 15,000 men, maintained at his own expense, for a descent upon Scania, which Denmark now hoped to regain. But the Danes considered the proffered assistance inadequate, and they also imposed as a precedent condition the active cooperation of Prussia, who was to guarantee them the possession of Bremen and Verden, in return for a Danish guarantee of Stettin to Prussia.

In April, 1714, the Elector of Hanover came forward with a fresh scheme of partition. According to this project, Prussia was to have Stettin, while Bremen and Verden were to be assigned to Hanover, and Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark, who with Prussia should undertake to capture Stralsund, Hanover occupying Wismar, which was to be transferred to Meeklenburg. Peter warmly approved of the Hanoverian scheme; but it foundered on the hostility of Denmark, who naturally refused to part with her own conquests, Bremen and Verden. A simultaneous attempt by the Marquis de Châteauneuf, the French Minister at the Hague, to bring about an understanding between Peter and Charles failed because of the Tsar's profound distrust of France. At this juncture, an event occurred which profoundly affected northern politics—the death of Queen Anne (August 1, 1714). The Suedophil Tory Ministry disappeared; and the most unscrupulous of Charles XII's despoilers ascended the English throne as George I. Three months later, Charles XII reappeared upon the scene. On September 20 he had quitted Turkey, and, after traversing Austria, and making a long *détour* by Nürnberg and Cassel, to avoid the domains of the Saxon Elector, arrived unexpectedly, at midnight, November 11 (O. S.), at Stralsund, which, besides Wismar, was all that now remained to him on German soil.

The year 1715 was memorable for the conclusion of the so-called "English affair," which resulted in the formation of a third coalition against Charles XII. The author of this league of spoliation was the new King of England; and the preliminaries were arranged in February at Copenhagen. Prussia had all along been playing a waiting

game. Her final accession to the league was extorted by the categorical question of George I's Minister at Berlin, whether she was going to join the league, or not. In England the Whig Ministry felt obliged to support the monarch of its choice; and a British fleet was sent to the Baltic to cooperate, to a limited extent, with the Danes and Russians against Sweden. The treaties signed on May 2 and June 7, 1715, between Hanover and Denmark, and on May 17, at Copenhagen, between Denmark and Prussia, arranged all the details of the projected partitions. Wolgast and Stettin were to fall to the share of Prussia; Rügen and Pomerania north of the Peene to Denmark, which was also to have the absolute control of Holstein-Gottorp; and the duchies of Bremen and Verden to Hanover, which was to purchase them from Denmark for 600,000 rix-dollars. Charles formally protested against this traffic in property of which he was the real owner, and refused to have any dealings with his plunderers; and ultimately Hanover declared war against him (October, 1715). Thus, at the end of 1715, Sweden, now fast approaching the last stage of exhaustion, was at open war with Great Britain (Hanover), Russia, Prussia, Saxony and Denmark. For twelve months Charles XII defended Stralsund with almost super-human heroism. Again and again, at the head of his "blue boys," he drove the allies from the isle of Usedom, and when, at length, it was captured at a heavy cost, the delight of the Kings of Denmark and Prussia at their hard-won triumph knew no bounds. But the hostile forces proved overwhelming, and on December 23, 1715, Stralsund, now little more than a rubbish-heap, surrendered, Charles having effected his escape to Sweden, after evading the Danish cruisers, two days before.

It had become evident to all the members of the anti-Swedish league that, till Charles had been attacked in the heart of his own realm, the war might drag on indefinitely. But when it came to the execution of the plan of invasion, insuperable obstacles presented themselves. Saxony and Hanover were jealous of Denmark; and all three were incurably suspicious of the Tsar; yet, without Peter's active cooperation, Charles was practically unassailable. At the beginning of 1716, Peter justified their suspicions by his high-handed interference in German affairs. At the end of January, he punished the independent city of Danzig for trading with Sweden, even going the length of seizing all the Swedish vessels in the harbour, and compelling the Danzigers to build him privateers for nothing; but when, on May 11, by the Treaty of Danzig, he guaranteed Wismar and Warnemünde to Duke Charles Leopold of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, on his marriage with Peter's niece, the Tsarevna Catharine Ivanovna, the prospect of seeing Mecklenburg a Russian outpost infuriated George I and Frederick IV.

There can be no doubt that the Mecklenburg compact was a blunder. The most capable and experienced of Peter's own diplomatists, Prince Boris Kurakin, now at the Hague, had strongly dissuaded him from it.

The Duke was of notoriously bad character; and he was not even divorced from his first wife. Kurakin counselled his master at least not to imperil the profitable British alliance by aggrandising Charles Leopold at the expense of Peter's own allies. The Tsar disregarded this advice; and complications immediately ensued. Prince Repnin, sent by Peter with an army-corps to help Hanover and Denmark to reduce Wismar, was informed that his services were not required; and when the fortress capitulated (April 15) the Russian contingent was refused admittance. Peter was deeply offended. But his necessities compelled him to dissemble his wrath; and, at a meeting between the Tsar and Frederick of Denmark, at Altona, on June 14, the invasion of Scania, where Charles XII had established himself in an entrenched camp defended by 20,000 men, was definitely arranged. On July 28, Peter arrived at Copenhagen with his squadron; and 30,000 Russians and 23,000 Danes began to assemble in Zealand, in order to make the descent under cover of the English, Danish, and Russian fleets. But July passed by, and still the Danes held back. In mid-August, Peter cruised off the Scanian coast to examine the lie of the land, and discovered that the Swedes were very strongly entrenched. Peter was naturally cautious; and his caution had been intensified by the terrible punishment with which his one act of temerity had so severely been visited, five years before, on the banks of the Pruth. Charles XII, he argued, always formidable, would be doubly so at bay in the midst of his own people. Moreover Peter was growing more and more suspicious of his allies; and their prolonged delay in striking at the common foe, seemed to point to negotiations, or, at least, some understanding with Sweden. He submitted his doubts to two councils of Russian Ministers and generals on September 23 and 27 (O.S.); and they unanimously advised him to postpone the descent to the following year. Such was the real cause of the sudden and mysterious abandonment of the Scanian expedition.

Peter's resolution was duly communicated to the Danish and Hanoverian Governments, and produced a storm of indignation which nearly blew the league of spoliation to pieces. In October the Russian troops quitted Denmark, and went into winter-quarters at Mecklenburg. The same month Peter concluded a fresh defensive alliance with Frederick William of Prussia at Havelberg, whence he proceeded to Amsterdam, where he was joined by his six most eminent diplomatists, including Shafroff, Tolstoi, and Kurakin, and where he received tidings from London of the arrest of the Swedish Minister, Count Carl Gyllenborg, for alleged participation in a Jacobite conspiracy engineered by Charles XII, who was said to have sent, or to be sending, a fleet with an army of 17,000 men to Scotland. Such an escapade seemed to Peter just the sort of thing to which Charles XII was likely to put his hand. He anticipated a war between Sweden and England at the very least.

"Am I not right in always drinking to the health of this enterprising hero?" he wrote to Apraksin; "Why, he gives us for nothing what we never could buy at any price!" But the Tsar was wrong. The whole scheme originated in the fertile brain of Baron von Görtz, who in 1715 had passed out of the Holstein-Gottorp into the Swedish service; but it was sternly discountenanced by Charles. Indeed Peter's relations with George I now became worse instead of better, for George refused to have any dealings with Peter personally till Mecklenburg had been evacuated by the Muscovites.

Unable to obtain anything from England, Peter now turned to France, since the death of Louis XIV less hostile to Russia. The political outcome of Peter's visit there (May 7—June 20, 1717) was the Treaty of Amsterdam (August 15), between France, Russia, and the United Provinces, guaranteeing each other's possessions. But this treaty meant very little so long as Sweden continued to show a bold front against the divided league of partition; and after a fresh coldness had arisen between Peter and George, owing to the curt refusal of the latter to place fifteen British line-of-battle ships at the former's disposal "to bring the King of Sweden to reason," Peter resolved, at last, to treat directly with Sweden. The chief intermediary was Görtz, who, gifted with uncommon astuteness and audacity, seems to have been fascinated by the heroic element in Charles' nature. He owed his extraordinary influence over the King to the fact that he was the only one of Charles' advisers who believed, or pretended to believe, that the strength of Sweden was still far from being exhausted, or, at any rate, that she had a sufficient reserve of force to give impetus to a high-spirited diplomacy. This was Charles' own opinion. Charles was now willing to relinquish a portion of the duchies of Bremen and Verden, in exchange for a commensurate part of Norway, due regard being had to differences of soil and climate. Thus, his invasions of Norway in 1716 and 1718, so far from being mere adventurous escapades, were mainly due to political speculation. It was obvious that, with large districts of Norway actually in his hands, he could make better terms with the provisional holders of his ultramarine domains. But the exchange of a small portion of Bremen and Verden for something much larger elsewhere was the utmost concession he would make; and this was an altogether inadequate basis for negotiation. Anyone but Görtz would have retired from the affair altogether. But he trusted in his ability to persuade Charles into treating, and thus bring him over gradually to his own plans.

Görtz first felt the pulse of the English Ministry, who rejected the Swedish terms as excessive; whereupon he turned to Russia. Formal negotiations were opened at Lofö, one of the Åland Islands (May 23, 1718), Görtz being the principal Swedish, and Osterman, Peter's most astute diplomatist, since the disgrace of Shafiroff, the principal Russian, commissioner.

In view of the increasing instability of the league of partition, Peter sincerely desired peace with Sweden; but he was resolved to retain the bulk of his conquests. Finland he would retrocede, but Ingria, Livonia, Esthonia, and Carelia, with Viborg, must be surrendered by Sweden. If Charles consented, Peter undertook to compensate him in whatever direction he might choose. It was not only peace, but an alliance with the King of Sweden, that the Tsar wanted. "When all ancient grudges and sorenesses are over between us," wrote Peter privately, "we two between us will preserve the balance of Europe." Görtz was promised a gratuity of 100,000 roubles if peace were concluded.

Two things were soon plain to the keen-witted Osterman—that Görtz was hiding the Russian conditions from Charles, and that the Swedish feeling was altogether opposed to the Russian negotiations, rightly judging that nothing obtained elsewhere could compensate for the loss of the Baltic provinces. Twice the negotiations were interrupted in order that Görtz and Osterman might consult their principals. In October, Osterman, in a private report to the Tsar, accurately summed up the whole situation. The negotiations, he said, were entirely Görtz' work. Charles seemed to care little for his own interests, so long as he could fight. In the circumstances, it might fairly be argued that he was not quite sane. Sweden's power of resistance was nearly at breaking-point. Every artisan and one out of every two peasants had already been taken for soldiers. He strongly advised that additional pressure should be brought to bear by a devastating raid on Swedish territory. There was, however, a chance that Charles might break his neck, or be shot in one of his adventures; "and such an ending, if it happened after peace had been signed, would relieve us from all our obligations."

Osterman's anticipations were realised in an extraordinary way. On December 12, 1718, Charles XII was shot dead in his trenches while on the point of capturing the Norwegian fortress of Fredrikssten. The irresolution of the young Duke Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, the legitimate heir to the throne, sealed the fate of a party already detested in Sweden because of its identification with Görtz, who was arrested the day after Charles' death and executed for alleged high-treason in February, 1719. In March, Charles' one surviving sister, Ulrica Leonora, was elected Queen of Sweden, and the negotiations at Lofö were resumed. But the Swedish plenipotentiaries now declared that they would rather resume the war than surrender the Baltic provinces; and, in July, a Russian fleet proceeded to the Swedish coast and landed a raiding force which destroyed property to the value of 13 millions of roubles. The Swedish Government, far from being intimidated, hereupon broke off all negotiations with Russia (September 17); and pacific overtures were made instead to Hanover, Prussia, and Denmark. By the Treaties of Stockholm, November 20,

1719, and February 1, 1720, Hanover obtained the "bishoprics" of Bremen and Verden for herself, and Stettin and district for her confederate Prussia. The prospect of coercing Russia by means of the English fleet had alone induced Sweden to consent to such sacrifices; but when the last demands of Hanover and its allies had been complied with, she was left to come to terms as best she could with the Tsar. The efforts which Great Britain made at Vienna, Berlin, and Warsaw in the course of 1720-1, to obtain, by diplomatic means, some mitigation in favour of Sweden of Russia's demands proved fruitless, chiefly owing to the stubborn neutrality of Prussia; and though an English fleet was despatched to the Baltic to protect Sweden's coasts, it abstained from intervention, when, in the course of 1720, the Russian forces again descended upon the hapless land and destroyed four towns, 41 villages, and 1026 farms. In her isolation and abandonment Sweden had no choice but to reopen negotiations with Russia, at Nystad, in May, 1720. She still pleaded hard for at least Viborg; but a third Russian raid accelerated the pace of the negotiations, and, on August 30, 1721, by the Peace of Nystad, Sweden ceded to Russia, Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria, the province of Keksholm, and the fortress of Viborg. Finland west of Viborg and north of Keksholm was retroceded to her, and she was also granted an indemnity of two millions of thalers and free trade in the Baltic.

On September 14, a courier, with a sealed packet, containing the Treaty of Nystad, overtook Peter on his way to Viborg. On opening the packet the Tsar declared, with perfect justice, that this was the most profitable peace Russia had ever concluded. "Most apprentices," he jocularly observed, "generally serve for seven years; but in our school the term of apprenticeship has been thrice as long. Yet, God be praised, things could not have turned out better for us than they have done." And, indeed, the gain to Russia by the Peace of Nystad, which terminated a war of twenty-one years, was much more than territorial. In surrendering her choicest Baltic provinces, Sweden had also lost the hegemony of the North, and all her pretensions to be considered a Great Power.

CHAPTER XX.

THE ORIGINS OF THE KINGDOM OF PRUSSIA.

ALTHOUGH the complexity of the phenomena of modern history is such as to baffle any attempt to render them subservient to preconceived conclusions, yet it must be allowed that the theory of so-called historic missions has been very plausibly exemplified from the growth of the Brandenburg-Prussian polity. Not many European dynasties have furthered the interests of their dominions so steadily as the Hohenzollerns, both before and since they declared themselves the servants of the State; and few populations with whose history we can claim to be fairly well acquainted have been found more consistently ready to carry out the designs of their rulers than the inhabitants of the lands out of which has grown the most powerful monarchy of the present age. The subjects of the Electors of Brandenburg were, in the words of Lord Acton, "conscious that Nature had not favoured them excessively, and that they could prosper only by the action of their Government"; and, he might have added, the discipline to which they submitted with so exceptional a readiness was rendered easier to them after they had become possessed of a trained intelligence which at times enabled them to anticipate the action of their rulers. Yet it would be futile to ascribe to the insight or to the energy of either the Hohenzollerns or their subjects a controlling share in the shaping of their historic achievements. Rare as are the instances of States or dynasties that have accomplished more for themselves than Prussia and the Hohenzollerns, they have been conspicuously, and to all intents and purposes avowedly, the heirs of time and the beneficiaries of circumstance. But time and circumstance only rarely found the Brandenburg-Prussian State, as they had not often found either of its chief component parts, unprepared for the action demanded by them. In earlier days the necessity of expansion had been almost identical with that of self-preservation; in later times the traditions had definitely formed themselves, in accordance with which the ship of State, as if obeying laws that had become part of her being, continued her onward course.

The history of the Prussian monarchy cannot be surveyed as that of any particular tribe which in the end consolidated itself, together with

its accretions and acquisitions, into a State. Indeed, as a whole it lacks most of the elements which go to the making of a nation—unity of race, unity of creed, and the consciousness of a common history extending over the course of centuries. On the contrary, fresh affluents differing in origin or in some important feature from the main stream were constantly finding admittance into it by a continuous process, which was only interrupted in exceptional periods of depression. Nor again, can this history be written as the annals of a dynasty which systematically and without any serious break identified itself with aspirations that with its subjects had almost grown into a second nature. Apart from the fact that other dynasties preceded the Hohenzollerns in almost every part of their ultimate monarchy, we remember how, once more to quote Lord Acton, it was not till the accession of the Great Elector that the Brandenburg-Prussian dynasty “entered into the spirit of the problem” confronting the State; and the proportion of the Electors and Kings who since that date have “struggled intensely for the increase of their power,” has been, to put it bluntly, little more than one-half of the whole number.

I.

A very few pages must suffice, at a point so advanced as that which the course of this *History* has reached, to recall the most noteworthy stages in the growth and development of the two chief factors of the Brandenburg-Prussian State, before the time of their union in the first quarter of the seventeenth century. The Mark Brandenburg was the foundation of the great Saxon Duke who, as King Henry I, was the first to give to Germany so much of cohesion as could result from the general recognition of a vigorously asserted royal supremacy. But his more notable service to the German “name” was his actual assertion of his power from the Elbe towards the Oder. This implied, in the first instance, the subjugation of the Wends, who, seated in these regions from perhaps so early a date as the beginning of the sixth century, absorbed the remnants of the Germanic populations which held the country at the beginning of the Christian era. By the end of the ninth century—the birth-time of the national kingdoms of Western Europe—all the land to the east of the Elbe, besides not a little of it to the west, had come to be inhabited by Slavs; and it was as a bulwark against the great Slav inundation, which he had striven to drive back from the borders of his realm, that King Henry established (or reestablished on the lines of Charles the Great) the Northern Mark of the Saxons. Henry’s son, Otto the Great, developed the margravate system in his habitual grand style; and, while the Saxon Dukes themselves guarded the lower Elbe, the Counts of the Northern Mark steadily extended their authority eastwards from Brandenburg (Brennibor), a fastness which already Henry I had wrested from the Wends, over the marsh

and sand of the Havel and Spree country as far as the Oder. Thus the future Brandenburg-Prussian State was in its beginnings indisputably an offshoot of the Saxon duchy; but the seventeenth century was hardly historical enough in its susceptibilities to make much account of this fact in the perennial jealousies between the Houses of Saxony and Brandenburg.

Notwithstanding the episcopal sees set up by Otto I in the half-subdued Wendic lands (Havelberg in 946; Brandenburg in 949; Lebus cannot be traced with certainty further back than the early part of the twelfth century), and in spite of the advance of the Christianised kingdom of Poland, the struggle was maintained by the Wends and Paganism for the better part of two centuries. In accordance with the physical features of the country, the contest had little of grandeur about it, and no great missionary efforts imparted to it a heroic character. After the great insurrection of 983, the conquered lands between Elbe and Oder long remained lost to Germany and Christendom, while the fortress of Brandenburg repeatedly changed its masters. Thus things went on, till, in 1133, the Emperor Lothar conferred the vacant countship of the Saxon North Mark upon the man who was to become the real founder of the power of Brandenburg. Albert the Bear, of the House of Ballenstädt, which called itself the Ascanian, from the old castle (Aschersleben) where he set up his judicial tribunal, and which was afterwards known as the House of Anhalt, failed in his attempt to oust the Guelf Henry the Proud (the father of Henry the Lion) from the Saxon duchy. But in the end he succeeded in recovering his Northern Mark, now first called the margravate of Brandenburg from the definitive seizure of that fortress, and extending eastward several miles beyond the site of Berlin. Thus Albert the Bear illustrated the value of the ancient adage that the half is often greater than the whole; for the foundations of dominion laid by him proved more solid and enduring than the vast structure raised by Henry the Lion. Now that the Mark Brandenburg protected the Empire against both Scandinavian pressure in the north and Polish in the north-east, its guardianship of the frontier and furtherance of the Christian mission on each side of it had been changed into a settled territorial dominion. The changes of nomenclature which accompanied its growth need not detain us here¹. Unlike

¹ The original distinction between "Old" and "New Mark" as the territories on the left and on the right bank of the Elbe respectively was in course of time abandoned, as the acquisition of fresh lands continued; the New Mark then became the Middle Mark and the name "New Mark" was given to the lands north and south of the Warthe (first called "land beyond the Oder") and earlier districts south of the Oder. The Kurmark (which name of course came into use with the acquisition of the electoral dignity) comprised the whole complex of dominions with the exception of the New Mark—viz. the Old Mark, the Middle Mark, the Vormark (Priegnitz) and the Uckermark (the northern land of the Slavonic Ukri, of which the possession was long disputed between the Brandenburg Margraves and the Mecklenburg and

so many German dynastic creations, especially in the northern and central parts of the Empire, Albert the Bear's, although it received many augmentations and passed through various minor changes—the first of the innumerable partitions of Albert's inheritance took place on his death—was in substance permanent.

In the work of Germanisation the Margraves were greatly aided by the efforts of the Christian Church, and in particular of the Praemonstratensian and still more of the Cistercian Orders. The Wends were not annihilated; they were pushed aside into their villages, or absorbed by their conquerors, without being able to impregnate the language, manners, religion, or legends and traditions of the latter with any distinctive elements of their own. While the mass of the Wendic population, without being admitted by intermarriage into the communities of the towns, had thus to choose between serfdom and expatriation, all rebellion being rigorously repressed, the Slav nobles in the Mark were accorded an equality of rights with their German neighbours, on whom a large proportion of the land had as a matter of course been bestowed. Free intermarriage ensued; an accord of sentiment and opinion (there being no longer any religious barrier in the way) was gradually produced; and thus the upper or ruling classes peacefully amalgamated, some Slavonic family names being preserved among the landed gentry, while no analogous process was so much as attempted in the case of the lower orders. In this social sphere immigration, to which probably no ancient or modern State has been more largely indebted than the Brandenburg-Prussian in the successive stages of its progress, was welcomed by a country broken up by invasion and depopulated by revolt; but in these early times, as afterwards, it took place in small numbers or bodies, so that the authority of the Government was not impaired but strengthened by it. The Flemish, Dutch, Westphalian, and Franconian settlers, dependent as they were upon the hand of authority for the protection of their holdings, and for the security of the franchises granted to them in an environment of serfs, were steadily loyal to the Margraves. These considerations account on the one hand for the early growth of an arrogant and self-reliant *Junkertum*, a squirearchy rather than an aristocracy—for the subdivision of the Mark prevented the growing up of States General, or any other kind of comprehensive representative body capable of much beyond petty interference with expenditure—which only a strong hand could force into submission to the authority of the State. And, on the other hand, they explain how there grew up, as the best support of that authority, an industrious burgher class, whose intelligence was quickened by the perpetual struggle with the difficulties

Pomeranian Dukes). Curiously enough, the original Old Mark, having in 1807 been incorporated in the Napoleonic kingdom of Westphalia, was in 1816, instead of forming part of the Prussian province of Brandenburg, included in that of Saxony.

surrounding it. The Brandenburg towns were necessarily small and poor in comparison with those of the south-west and of the Low Countries; and there was no communal cohesion to disturb the monarchical system of government, which it is futile to regard as established for military purposes only.

The comparative remoteness of the dominions which had grown out of the Northern Mark allowed its rulers to pursue their own dynastic interests without seeking to take part in the European conflicts of the Hohenstaufen age. Nevertheless, the outlook of the Brandenburgers was always wide. The investment, at so early a date as 1186, of Margrave Otto II by the Emperor Frederick I with Pomerania created claims leading to an endless series of feuds, raids and disputes which, as has been seen in a previous volume, were not ended even by the Succession Treaty of 1529; and the complete union of Pomerania and Brandenburg was only established by the Vienna Treaties of 1815. Although, when in 1196 Margrave Otto II and his brother Albert II for ulterior purposes of their own commended all their possessions to the Archbishop of Magdeburg, this did not imply any diminution of their political power, their successors came to judge differently of the relation of dependence thus established, and it was ended in 1449 by the Hohenzollern Elector Frederick II.

Early in the thirteenth century the collapse of the Danish King Waldemar the Victorious at Bornhöved (1226) had led to the acquisition by the Margraves of the Spree district, in which the foundations of Berlin seem about this time to have been laid, and of the Uckermark. Their older possessions were about the same time multiplying their centres of civil and ecclesiastical life; it is from this period that, among other foundations, dates that of Lehnin, whose prominent position in the history of the Mark afterwards gave rise to a celebrated forged prophecy (the *Vaticinium Lehninense*) as to the interdependence of their destinies.

Conformably to the uncontrollable practice of German dynasties, immediate or mediate, partitions went on without ceasing in the House of Brandenburg, but with the prevailing characteristic that they were usually amicable, and always treated as revocable in the common interest of a clear-sighted dynasty. Early in the fourteenth century the power of the House had, in the person of its all but single male representative, Waldemar the Great, reached an unprecedented height, and, largely by means of a good understanding with the Church, extended from Danzig to Dresden.

But the death of the great Waldemar (1319) was followed by a period of trouble, in which the neighbours of Brandenburg fell upon the land to seize what they could of it. The victorious Emperor Lewis the Bavarian invested his son Lewis, a child eight years of age, with Brandenburg, together with Lusatia and other dependencies. For nearly half a century (1324–73) the Mark was nominally subject to the House of

Wittelsbach; and it almost seemed as if the centre of gravity of the territorial possessions of that House might come to lie in those northern lands whose future relations to the Empire were so wholly unforeseen. But the Wittelsbach rule had never struck root in the Mark; under Lewis it had been devastated by a Polish invasion, blessed by the Pope (John XXII); and after the death of the Emperor Lewis (1347) his three sons had to contend not only against the statecraft of Charles IV of Bohemia, now generally acknowledged as Roman King, but against a popular current of mysterious force. The story of the False Waldemar (1348-55), in whose favour almost the entire margravate (except Treuenbrietzen) renounced its Bavarian ruler, attests a tenacious loyalty of which Brandenburg-Prussian history was to furnish many later examples, but none more remarkable than this. The Bavarian sway over Brandenburg survived this shock; but it continued to be exposed to the hostility of the Imperial House and to the feebler efforts of the spiritual power of Rome. Finally, after a terrible devastation of the margravate by the Emperor's Bohemian soldiery (1371), the Elector Otto resigned his authority; and at Tangemünde (1374) the perpetual union of the Mark Brandenburg with the Bohemian Crown was proclaimed. Brandenburg had probably been thus preserved from disruption, but with the prospect of becoming, like Silesia, a mere element in the dynastic power of Bohemia, whose furthest advance in political importance, in economic prosperity, and in intellectual activity, is marked by the reign of Charles IV.

For more than a generation Brandenburg was subject to a Government which had been imposed upon it by methods as unscrupulous as those of Ferdinand of Aragon or of Louis XIV, but which gave to the province a fair share in the order and prosperity prevailing in the kingdom of Bohemia. The neighbours were pacified; and at home the insolence of some of the nobles was curbed, while at the same time the privileges of their order and of the towns were extended. Unfortunately, after the death of Charles IV (1378) the excellent intentions of his second son Sigismund, who succeeded in Brandenburg, were frustrated by his ambition; and, though in 1382 he ascended the Hungarian throne, he aimed at the succession both in Bohemia and to the Imperial Crown. In Brandenburg, under his lieutenants, the old dangers revived on the north-western frontier, and the old turbulence within. Being always in want of money, he in 1385 mortgaged the Old Mark to his kinsmen, Margraves Jodocus and Procopius of Moravia, in spite of the opposition of the Estates of the land, both spiritual and temporal; and three years later he threw into the mortgage his electoral dignity and the entire margravate with the exception of the New Mark, which, having been bequeathed to his younger brother John by their father, could not be alienated till John's death in 1402, when it was mortgaged to the German Order. Margrave Jodocus, although in time he became legal

owner of the greater part of Brandenburg, only appeared within its borders for the purpose of extorting money. The close of the fourteenth and the early years of the fifteenth century were evil times for Brandenburg—more especially by reason of the irrepressible turbulence of the native nobility, typified by the Old Mark family of the Quitzows, whose name has sometimes been given to the whole period in question. They took the lead in systematising—if the expression may be used—an anarchy by which the authority of State and Church, and the last remnants of prosperity in the towns, were threatened with utter collapse. In turn champions of native independence against the encroachments of neighbouring potentates, and leaders of a combination of native and foreign opposition to the authority of the Margraves, which at times they actually usurped¹, these protagonists of the *Junkertum* were not deposed from their ascendancy till after the advent of the Hohenzollerns.

With the investment of Frederick of Hohenzollern, Burgrave of Nürnberg, with the margravate of Brandenburg (he was appointed vicar and captain-general of it in 1411, made his first appearance there in 1412, practically settled matters with the Quitzows in 1416, and was finally invested in April, 1417), a new chapter begins in the history of the land.

Burgrave Frederick VI of Nürnberg, now Elector Frederick I of Brandenburg, was a descendant of the Alemannic Counts of Zollern, who are mentioned as early as the tenth century, and who soon afterwards had reached a prominent position among the magnates of Swabia. Early in the thirteenth century (1210), Count Frederick of Hohenzollern is proved by documentary evidence to have been Burgrave of Nürnberg; from his second son and namesake sprang the Swabian Hohenzollerns, whose rights as territorial Princes were resigned by them into the hands of their Prussian kinsmen more than six centuries afterwards (1849); to his eldest son Conrad II passed the newly acquired Franconian dominions. These latter would by partitions and donations to the Church have been reduced to almost nothing, but for the marriage of Burgrave Frederick III to the heiress of Meran, whose possessions included Baireuth and probably Culmbach. He was the right hand of Rudolf of Habsburg; and it should be added that the burgravate itself, as involving the guardianship of a large body of Imperial domains, was an important trust, by their loyal fulfilment of which the Franconian Hohenzollerns endeared themselves to the Habsburg Emperors, and no doubt greatly contributed to their own advancement. In 1420 Baireuth and Ansbach were once more united in the hands of Burgrave Frederick VI, the founder of the power of the House of Brandenburg.

¹ Bötzw on the Havel, afterwards renamed Oranienburg in honour of the good Electress Louisa Henrietta, daughter of Frederick Henry of Orange, was a castle of the Margraves held by the Quitzows for nearly a decade.

Frederick I, a soldier and a scholar, and gifted, as it would seem, with the supreme political faculty of distinguishing between things essential and non-essential, and suiting his action to this perception, knew how to bide his time. The services which he had rendered to Sigismund both in the field and in finally securing his election as Roman King sufficiently account for his being *in flagranti Caesaris gratiâ*, and for the transfer to him of the Electoral Mark Brandenburg on easy and practically (though perhaps not technically) permanent terms. Frederick's undertaking to renounce the fief, should he ever attain to the dignity of Roman King, at all events proves Sigismund's estimate of the importance of his friend in the affairs of the Empire.

But although Frederick, with the cooperation of the Archbishop of Magdeburg, with the aid of his own new artillery, and by judicious concessions to the main body of the Brandenburg nobles, pacified the Mark, his services to Emperor and Empire failed to secure a continuance of confidence between them. Frederick, although Brandenburg had suffered terribly from the Hussites, supported the policy of making terms with them; on the other hand, his design of becoming possessed of the Saxon in addition to the Brandenburg electorate, could not commend itself to the House of Austria. Still, the old feeling of loyalty, united no doubt to the sense of inadequate power, ranged him on the side of those who, after acquiescing in the election of Albert II as Roman King, agreed to that of Frederick III, whose long and impotent reign lasted for more than half a century (1440-93). Thus the founder of the new House of Brandenburg cannot be said to have either effectively promoted or vigorously resisted the beginning of an occupation of the Imperial throne by the House of Austria, which was to continue till 1740, just three centuries after his death.

The founder of the greatness of the Hohenzollerns necessarily moved within the limits of his own political horizon; and the testamentary disposition which he made of his dominions, although partly explained by personal considerations, fails to indicate that he was intent on securing a great future to his electorate, or even on preserving its territorial integrity. While his eldest son (John "the Alchemist") succeeded in Baireuth, it was to the second, Frederick II, that he left the inheritance of Brandenburg. The new Elector had, like his contemporary, Louis XI, to wage a hard struggle with a still disaffected nobility; but he also had to hold his own against the towns, sufficiently awake to their own interests to confederate themselves with the great Hanseatic League whose system was extended over northern Germany. Finally, he had to meet the claims of a Church naturally inclined Romewards; but, while he put a decisive stop on the feudal dependence of part of his dominions on the archbishopric of Magdeburg, he contrived to secure, in the spirit of his own age and in good time for the opportunities which that of the Reformation was to bring, the right

of nomination to episcopal sees within his electorate. Amidst all these internal difficulties Frederick II did not lose sight of the duty, present to so many of his line, of augmenting his dominions. In 1454 the New Mark, which had been pledged to the German Order, was repledged by it to the Elector, and conditions were soon added which in 1517 resulted in the renunciation of all rights to these territories hitherto reserved by the Order. He withstood, however, the temptation towards more remote gains (West Prussia and Bohemia); and his claim on the inheritance of the last Duke (Otto III) of Pomerania-Stettin, and the hope of thus extending the dominions of his House to the shores of the Baltic, were frustrated by King Casimir IV of Poland. Thus his prudent and on the whole prosperous reign ended in disappointment; and a year before his death he transferred the government to his brother Albert Achilles, who already ruled the Franconian principalities of the House.

Albert Achilles (1470-86)—his cognomen, like those of some of his successors, is redolent of the Renaissance sympathies of the age—was in certain other respects a Prince on the pattern of Maximilian I, who owed to the hereditary attachment of the Brandenburger his own election as Roman King. At home Albert Achilles conducted the government of his electorate with vigour, while he enlarged his dominions by the acquisition of parts of Silesia, and was definitely invested with Pomerania-Stettin, though he obtained no immediate possession of the duchy. The steady support which he gave to the decadent Empire was important, inasmuch as he was probably, at the time, its most powerful Prince. But, though, following in his father's footsteps, he contrived to assert his authority as supreme in Brandenburg, his heart was in his Franconian possessions; and the task of consolidating his inheritance weighed heavily on him, as it did on so many German Princes of his times. Thus his famous testamentary disposition—known hereafter as the *Dispositio Achillea*—was at once a compromise and an enduring fiat. It laid down *in perpetuum* the principle that, while his whole inheritance should at no future time be divided into more than three parts, the margravate of Brandenburg should henceforth never be subjected to partition. Thus Albert Achilles, in different circumstances, corroborated the critical action of Albert the Bear.

A prolonged tranquillity along their frontiers enabled the successors of Albert Achilles to give security to their territorial authority, which neither Poland nor Hungary, alike preoccupied by conflicts with the Turks, was disposed to menace. But the Elector John Cicero (1486-99) and his successors Joachim I and II and John George, whose reigns covered the ensuing century (1499-1598), were strong rulers as well as intelligent patrons of learning. (The foundation of the University of Frankfort-on-the-Oder, 1505, was almost contemporary with that of the University of Wittenberg, whose importance overshadowed that of her younger foster-sister.) John Cicero had to suppress a revolt of the

towns of the Old Mark; his successor strung up in a single batch forty members of the recalcitrant nobility—of that Köckeritz and Lüderitz, Kracht and Itzenplitz, sort, from which the litany of the peasants prayed the Lord to deliver them. The introduction of Roman law, coinciding with the establishment at Berlin of the Electoral Cameral Tribunal, was of much advantage to these processes of the executive. And at the same time the traditional policy of maintaining a close connexion with the central authority of the Empire was steadily maintained; and when, in 1514, Joachim I's younger brother Albert, Archbishop of Magdeburg and Administrator of Halberstadt, had been elected Archbishop of Mainz, the Brandenburg dynasty was in possession of two electoral votes. Never before had the House of Brandenburg loomed so large in the eyes of Europe; but it will suffice for our purpose to mention the election, in 1512, as High Master of the German Knights of the Franconian Margrave Albert, a grandson of the Elector Albert Achilles.

At a critical stage in the celebrated Imperial election of 1519 the Elector Joachim I, though by no means anti-Habsburg in sentiment, was gained over by the profuseness of the French promises to give his support to the candidature of Francis I. It was an age of bargains, but this particular move proved futile; and the accession of the new Emperor's brother Ferdinand to the kingship of Hungary and Bohemia (1526) for the first time brought the vastly augmented dominions of the Habsburgs into contiguity with those of the Hohenzollerns. A special germ of future complications lay in the fact that in the borderland of Silesia, now a dependency of the Bohemian Crown under Habsburg supremacy, a Hohenzollern Prince, Margrave George of Ansbach, had during the reign of King Lewis II of Bohemia (and Hungary) been invested with the principality of Jägerndorf (1523) and had acquired a reversionary interest in that of Oppeln (1528), thus materially advancing the long-continued efforts of the Brandenburg dynasty to establish a firm footing in Silesia. But, although Jägerndorf remained in Brandenburg hands for an entire century (to 1623), Joachim I failed to foresee the ultimate effect of these Silesian possessions and claims upon the relations of his dynasty with the continuously growing power of the House of Austria.

Equally little was it in his mind, as it afterwards came to be in the minds of his descendants, to identify the interests of his dynasty with the cause of the Reformation. It should be premised that the Margraves of Brandenburg had from the first stood in a quite peculiar relation to the Church, so that the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Electors in their dominions was not a work of the Reformation. The episcopal authority never reached the same development in the territories beyond the Elbe as that to which it attained in the older regions of the Empire; and, after its complete collapse and reestablishment through them, they continuously stood to it in a relation of protectorship. The

Brandenburg Bishops were nominated by the Margraves, and merely confirmed by the vote of their Chapters; and they were in all temporal matters subject to the territorial authority, sitting in the *Landtage* and not in the Imperial Diet. Indeed, if the relations of the Margrave-Electors to the monastic Orders within their dominions be taken into account, their authority may be said to have resembled that of the contemporary great monarchical Powers.

The reception of the Reformation in Brandenburg was, notwithstanding, one of those instances in which, contrary to a common assumption, the mind of the population of the electorate moved more rapidly than did that of its ruling House. All the neighbouring parts of Germany had passed, or were passing, over to the Protestant side, and no attempt at resistance to the current could be permanently successful. Although therefore Joachim I, without remaining insensible to the influence of the Renaissance, held out to the best of his power against the Reformation, joining the League of Halle (1533) and actually offering to renounce his claims on Pomerania if its Dukes would remain orthodox, he could not even unite his own House in the support of his religious policy. The Franconian Hohenzollerns were early adherents of the Reformation—among them Margrave George “the Pious” of Ansbach, to whose Silesian acquisitions reference has been made above, and his younger brother Margrave Albert, of whom, as the first Duke of Prussia, more will immediately have to be said.

On the death of Joachim I (1535) his son Joachim II Hector, to whom his father had left two-thirds of the margravate with the electoral dignity, did not, like his younger brother John, to whom passed most of the New Mark, at once declare himself a Lutheran; but he allowed the Reformation movement to progress freely in his electorate, while himself aiming at something of an Erasmian middle course. Thus, while the Brandenburg reformation received the Imperial sanction in 1541, Joachim II remained on friendly terms with the Imperial House, and commanded against the Turks in Hungary. So long, moreover, as that eminent pluralist, Joachim II's uncle, Cardinal Albert, Archbishop and Elector of Mainz, Archbishop of Magdeburg, and Bishop of Halberstadt, survived, Joachim's liberal conservatism was sure of a very potent support. His own attitude in matters of religion was probably in the first instance due to conscientious motives; but it is difficult to palliate his having entered, in the course of the Schmalkaldic War (1547), into an understanding with the future Emperor Ferdinand I, by which he actually undertook to send a small auxiliary force to the Imperial side, in return for the promise to one of his sons of the sees of Magdeburg and Halberstadt, between which and the electorate a connexion was thus preserved by him. Yet, though he agreed to the *Interim*, the unwillingness of his subjects to accept it, or some other cause, soon afterwards brought him to see the situation more clearly and

began to estrange him from the Emperor Charles V. He became a supporter of the bold policy of his neighbour, the Elector Maurice of Saxony; and as he continued to go hand in hand with Maurice's sagacious successor, Augustus, the conjunction between Saxony, Brandenburg, and Hesse, materially helped to bring about the Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555). The Brandenburg reformation was now carried through; but though the three episcopal sees within the electorate were secularised, and the administration of them was conferred upon princes of the dynasty, as few changes as possible were made in forms of worship, and the doctrinal teaching of the Swiss and other more advanced reformers was kept at a distance. Politically, the great achievement of Joachim II's reign was his success in securing the administration of the see of Magdeburg to his grandson, Joachim Frederick (1566), as the centre of gravity of the dominions of his dynasty was thus definitively fixed between the middle Elbe and Oder.

The conscientious and frugal John George (1571-98), though he over-governed his subjects, proved how well he meant by them by securing to them the peace in which alone they could prosper. In matters of religion he was, in accordance with the sterile inspirations of this age, a narrow Lutheran—as is shown by his waiving the claims of his dynasty on the inheritance of Jülich, Cleves, and Berg, if the prosecution of them was to involve joint action with the Calvinistic Netherlands.

His son, Joachim Frederick (1598-1608), who as Administrator of Magdeburg had completely carried out the reformation of the see, had been strongly impressed by the divisions among the Protestants which prevented them from making head at the Diet against their Catholic opponents, who refused to allow him to take his seat there on the Spiritual Bench. He thus came to accept the rigidly Lutheran *formula concordiae* as binding upon the whole of his electorate; but the necessity of this submission, and still more the persistent intervention of his Estates in the administration of the State, led him to cease convening them unless on quite exceptional occasions, and to appoint a Council of State (whose original members, nine in number, were the earliest of many generations of *Geheimräthe*) charged with the initiation of all except Church and judicial business. This Council may be regarded as the germ of the Prussian bureaucracy—if so slovenly a designation must be adopted for so strenuous a thing—assuredly one of the most important of all the factors in the political development of the Brandenburg-Prussian State. Joachim Frederick's successor, John Sigismund, quite early in his reign formally approved the principle already established in practice under his father: that the Elector would take no step in the affairs of his House or dominions without having previously sought the advice of his Privy Council. In other words, by about the second decade of the century the heads of the administration in Brandenburg

had already done what a generation later Strafford and his helpers vainly attempted to do in England—they had taken the real control of the government out of the hands of the parliamentary representation.

In his foreign policy, Joachim Frederick was not destined to see the results of his efforts in connexion with the affairs of the lower Rhine. The great issue, on the other hand, of the union between Brandenburg and Prussia he advanced by obtaining (1605) the administratorship of the latter duchy on behalf of its demented Duke Albert Frederick and by marrying one of his younger daughters (Eleanor), the eldest (Anne) having been married several years before to the Electoral Prince. But he made little way with the Prussian nobles; and in this direction also left the fruits of his steadfast endeavours to be gathered in by his son and successor.

John Sigismund (1608-19), though really a less remarkable man than his father, had the good fortune to advance signally the importance and power of his dynasty. Among the claimants of the disputed Jülich-Cleves-Berg inheritance, John Sigismund of Brandenburg was, as has been narrated in an earlier passage of this *History*, the first in the field; and his interests and those of the promptest among his competitors (the Palatinate-Neuburg Duke), when they obtained, first joint and then several, possession of the coveted territories, really coincided with the interests of European peace. Thus the House of Brandenburg virtually secured an important extension of its dominions, although not one which was throughout of unmistakable advantage to it. In the person of John Sigismund was also accomplished, on the death of Duke Albert Frederick in August, 1618, the all-important union between the Brandenburg electorate and the duchy of Prussia; so that, when his weary life came to a close, the eastern and the western limits of the future kingdom of Prussia in its earliest stage had already been reached by the dominions of the Brandenburg Hohenzollerns.

John Sigismund's reign had, however, left a distinctly personal mark upon the history of the State of which he had become one of the founders. Though first brought up as a strict Lutheran, he had been subjected to Calvinistic influences during his University life at Strassburg and Heidelberg, and at the latter place to that of the Electress Palatine, Louisa Juliana, the daughter of William of Orange, with whose House his own was later to become so closely connected. Thus, in 1613, at a most critical time for the future of his line (upon which the Jülich-Cleves succession difficulty might at one time have possibly brought down the ban of the Empire), he declared himself a Calvinist. Rarely in Hohenzollern annals has a head of his House found himself face to face with a resistance so irreconcilable as that provoked by this step both in Brandenburg, where its censors were encouraged by the neighbouring Lutheran rulers of Saxony and Pomerania, and in Prussia, where it provoked a resistance as bitter as it was unanimous. And

yet it led the Princes, and with them the population, of the State to accept and assimilate principles of toleration which, besides having signally augmented its economic resources, have come to be its priceless moral and intellectual inheritance. Thus, by the great designs which it was his lot to carry out, and by the consequences of an act of pure conscientiousness, John Sigismund's reign marks an epoch in the history of his land.

II.

No account, complete even in outline, can here be attempted of the history of the duchy of Prussia before its union with the electorate of Brandenburg. The Prussians who inhabited the region between Vistula and Pregel were more nearly akin to their Lithuanian neighbours on the north-east than to the Pomeranians, Poles and Russians on the south and the south-east; and it was Lithuanian support on which they had to depend in their struggle against Germanic invaders. For a long time, protected seawards by the sand-banks of the Haffs, and landwards by impenetrable marshes and forests, the seats of these old Prussians, in an isolation which still impresses itself on the traveller, remained impervious alike to the hostile attacks of their powerful neighbours and to the peaceable inroads of Christian missionaries. Neither the martyrdoms of St Adalbert (997), whose shrine at Gnesen afterwards became a kind of rallying-point against the German advance, and (rather more than a decade later) of St Brun, nor the sword of either Pole or Dane, could bend or break the resistance of this pagan people. By the middle of the twelfth century the sum total of the struggle seems to have been the reduction to dependence upon Poland of a small southern corner of Prussia, the *Culmland*. The efforts which resulted in the actual Christianisation and subsequent Germanisation of Prussia date from the following (thirteenth) century, and are associated with the name of Christian, a monk of the Cistercian convent of Oliva near Danzig, and afterwards the first Prussian bishop. The consequent insurrection of the Prussians led to the proclamation by Pope Honorius III of a crusade against them (1218). Various restrictions were imposed upon the participation in this crusade, and upon the application to be made of its results; in short, the intention appears to have been to make Prussia, when conquered, a kind of ecclesiastical province apart, under conditions revealing a singular loftiness as well as self-consciousness of purpose. But political considerations of all kinds, with which after the manner of the age religions were closely intermixed, obscured the prospect and delayed the accomplishment of the conversion of Prussia; and no real change was effected in its condition by the (virtually) Polish and Pomeranian crusade of 1222.

This failure had lost Poland a fair chance of definitively mastering the

destinies of Prussia. While Emperor and Pope each declared that the country owed allegiance to him alone, the power to which it actually became subject was that of the German Order of Knights. The youngest of the great Orders which owed their origin to the enthusiasm of the Crusades, had, like the others, taken its origin from small beginnings; in this case from the charitable efforts of German crusading knights cooperating with those of Lübeck and Hamburg merchants to provide for their afflicted countrymen in the course of the long siege of Acre (1190). Here the Order was afterwards duly established under its actual founder, Duke Frederick of Swabia, the second son of the great Barbarossa. Favoured by both Popes and Emperors, it had within a single generation distanced both the Templars and the Knights of St John, and was regarded as the most powerful association of Knights in the Western world. Its outlying settlements (*Balleien*) spread over both Italy and Germany; and its great days began with the election to the High Mastership of the Thuringian, Hermann von Salza (1210), whom his great patron, Emperor Frederick II, created a Prince of the Empire, the Imperial eagle thus finding his way into the Black Cross of the Order. He was not only a most able politician who in times of bitter hostility between Pope and Emperor was the friend of both, but also a great statesman who perceived that the task of the German Knights was no longer specifically in the East, but wherever they could render real service to the cause of Christianity and civilisation. In Transylvania they began in small the experiment which on a larger scale they were to repeat in Prussia. What Hermann von Salza could not know was that his Order was after all only an aftergrowth of the crusading spirit; and that chivalry, even if fired with religious enthusiasm, could no longer do more than supplement and aid in its expansive action the conquering impulse of commercial enterprise.

Starting from the Culm lands, made over to Hermann and his Knights in 1226 by the Duke of Masovia, a vassal of the Polish Crown, as its base of action, the German Order was to invade Prussia and conquer it to the honour and glory of God. But the High Master took care at the outset to obtain for himself and his successors investment with all the rights of a Prince of the Empire over all the Prussian lands of which the Order might possess itself. Its advance was promoted, while its design of controlling the eastern coast of the Baltic was indicated, by the union effected by him between his Order and that of the Sword, which had subdued Livonia (1237). Still, the conquest of Prussia, a process carried on by a small and compact body of assailants against a population which can hardly have reached a quarter of a million, occupied rather more than half a century. Neither the advance to the north-eastern corner, where to this day Memel is the north-eastern boundary-point of the German Empire, nor the subsequent construction (1255) in Samland of the fortress called Königsberg in

honour of the aid given to the advance of the Order by Ottokar II, King of Bohemia, contradicts the fact that the process was gradual, and its result achieved by an adherence to the principle of "pegging away."

This advance continued during the greater part of the thirteenth century. At every stage in its course—from Danzig to Narva on the Gulf of Finland—it was seconded by the mercantile instinct, which insisted on the foundation and organisation of centres of civic life. The terrific outbreak of the repressed Prussian spirit of nationality, which began in 1261 and rapidly spread through the whole Lettic group of populations, placed the Order on the defensive, and is rightly held to have given rise to its heroic period. A season of rigorous, and even cruel, repression and reorganisation ensued, which left its mark on the history of Prussia. The old nobility of the land virtually ceased to exist; while, with certain privileged exceptions, the entire population capable of bearing arms was obliged to take part, not only in defensive war, but in the *reysings* or excursions beyond the frontier which were an integral part of the regular work of the Order. In a word, its dominions were organised strictly on the footing of a military State, without any sustained attempt to raise the civilisation of the lower classes of the population, whose use of their own language lasted into the sixteenth century. Inasmuch, however, as the primary purpose of this State was the Christian propaganda, it rapidly arrived at a clear and definite understanding with the Church; so that the Prussian clergy (more especially as no archbishopric had been established within the borders of Prussia) submitted to the authority of the Order even after it had come into conflict with Rome. This authority was further strengthened by the fact that the German colonists who found their way to Prussia came from every part of the Empire—in the patient German fashion—seeking, rather than bringing with them, the elements of cohesion.

Scarcely had the conquest of Prussia been accomplished, when the Order cast an eager eye upon the territory of Pomerelia on the western bank of the Vistula. Pomerelia was under the rule of Dukes who were the vassals of Poland; but the Order was strong enough to assert its power in this direction without asking any cooperation from either the Dukes of Pomerania-Wolgast or the Brandenburg Margraves. In 1311 the Order established its authority over Danzig which was to become the wealthiest of the cities of the Baltic—its inglorious Venice; and for a generation the Knights were the masters of Pomerelia. This great advance of the power of the Order thus coincided with the widest expansion of the early power of Brandenburg under Waldemar the Great.

It was in this very period that the German Knights had once more to face the problem of their corporate future; for the Order of the Templars was abolished by the Council of Vienne (1313), and the younger Order did not escape the papal thunderbolts. Very wisely, it determined

to meet its destiny as a consolidated rather than as a dissipated Power, and to this end permanently fixed its seat in the centre of Prussia, between the Vistula and the sea—at Marienburg on the Nogent. Here, in the acropolis whence their Virgin patroness gazed forth upon the subject plains around, the German Knights seemed immovable and unassailable; and, when they sent forth their representatives to Avignon or other Courts, it was as a Power with which other Powers had to reckon.

Yet, already in the earlier half of the fourteenth century, the revival of the national spirit of the Poles under Casimir III the Great, the last in the male line of their national Kings, the Piasts, and the design of a union of Poland and Lithuania, threatened the overthrow of the German Order. But, after a protracted struggle, the Peace of Kalisch (1343) assured to the Order a dominion even wider than that to which it had laid claim. Now began its golden days, during which it was not only esteemed the high school of Christian chivalry, practising on the vast mass of Lithuanian heathendom, but also asserted itself—and this is the great age of the Hansa—as a notable commercial and maritime Power.

The land of "Spruce" was now something of a promised land, and the *sprusado* the militant darling of the age. The ulterior political designs of the Order were fully commensurate with its actual achievements; and if the partition of Poland which it negotiated was not actually carried out, it obtained possession, as has been seen, of the New Mark of Brandenburg in pledge from the still-vest Sigismund. At home it maintained the freedom of its government from all alien interference. No Peter's Pence were levied in Prussia; the Bishops, though their dioceses were of papal foundation, and the great convents of Oliva and Peplin, were subject to the territorial authority of the High Master. On the other hand, a large measure of liberty was left to the towns, of which in the fourteenth century a vast network, together with a multitude of German villages, overspread the land; the *Culmische Handfeste* became a kind of model charter of municipal rights.

The reason for the decline of so strenuous and prosperous a polity as that of the German Order cannot be examined here. The loyalty of the Knights began to give way, so soon as the religious basis of the Order became mere formalism; the allegiance of the towns, tired of being mastered by a garrison of monks, and jealous of their mercantile competition, had never rested on any foundation beyond the traditions of force; the military system of Europe was passing through a change to which the heirs of the crusaders could not accommodate themselves; and the real *raison d'être* of their actual position—the carrying on of warfare against the heathen—was at least not so self-evident as of old. Meanwhile Poland, the hereditary foe of the Order, was preparing for a resumption of the struggle.

The memorable attempt to extend once more the range of power and influence covered by the Slavonic nationality connects itself with the

dynastic ambition of the Emperor Charles IV, already noted in its bearing on the history of Brandenburg. The religious movement of which John Hus was the centre (though its dogmatic origin has to be sought in the speculations of Wiclif) accentuated the antagonism between German and Slav, till in the Hussite Wars its record was written in letters of blood on the face of the Empire. As a matter of course, this conflict declared itself in those northern borderlands, where German and Slavonic enterprise and ambition had been perennial rivals. Under the Jagello dynasty (1386-1572) Poland reached an unprecedented height of territorial power, though the seeds of her decay were sown when the control of the government was acquired by a nobility responsible to neither King nor people.

The German Order's real occupation had gone after, towards the close of the fourteenth century, it had completed the official Christianisation of Lithuania—a process bearing a most shadowy resemblance to a crusade, and rather resembling annual manœuvres, to which foreign visitors of distinction and adventurers “reysing in Littowe” were largely attracted. About the same period, the power of the Hanseatic League, the natural and all but indispensable ally of the Order, had, in face of the union between the Scandinavian States, visibly begun to decline. We pass by the successive attempts at resistance to the authority of the Order, the losses to which it was subjected by the decline of its maritime power and by the fickleness of the native Prussian nobility (the Knights of the Lizard) under the influence of unscrupulous Polish intrigue. The collision was only a question of time; and, as the Order was true to its chivalrous traditions in refusing to avoid the decision of arms, the contest might seem to have been at an end with the crushing victory of the Polish host at Tannenberg (1410). But the siege of Marienburg broke down, and, thanks to the resolution and sagacity of the new High Master, Henry of Plauen (from whose House are descended the Princes of Reuss), the whole of the territories held by the Order at the outbreak of the war, with the exception of Samogitia, were preserved to it in the First Peace of Thorn (1411).

Henry of Plauen endeavoured to strengthen the administrative system of the Knights by establishing a *Landrath*—a Council of Estates consisting of deputies of nobility and towns; but all his efforts were in vain, and his deposition, half-treason, and miserable end signified that the last shadow of its former greatness had departed from the Order. While its dominions had to suffer a series of inroads, which it sought rather to avert than to resist, the Slav peoples, excited beyond bounds by the Hussite successes, drew closer and closer together. The Order had, in a word, lived too long. As has been well said, being nothing but a corporation, it had not in itself the power of self-renewal which is inherent in a nation. It was no longer German in its composition; the Knights made no pretence of observing their vows of poverty or chastity,

or the High Masters of setting an example which no one would have cared to follow. To its subjects the Order was no longer a defence, only a danger; and, being unable to assimilate to its system either learned or lay, it had sunk into a thing of the past before it had actually come to an end. The so-called Prussian League or Alliance, of which the motive spring was to be found in the Danzig Patriciate, had thus become a State within the State; and in 1454 its members in town and country renounced their allegiance to the Order. When the fortress of Thorn and nearly threescore other castles had fallen into the hands of this League, it threw off the mask, and offered the dominion of Prussia to King Casimir IV of Poland. After his arrival in Prussia Danzig finally declared for the Polish Crown, which was thus placed in possession of the sinews of war.

It was in its dire distress and supreme need of funds for paying its mercenaries that the Order, as has been seen, sold the New Mark of Brandenburg to the Hohenzollern Elector, Frederick II; but the sum received proved quite insufficient for the purpose. The turbulent mercenaries (among whom there were many Bohemian Hussites) drove the High Master forth from the Marienburg (1457), which they incontinently sold to the King of Poland, though it was some time before he could succeed in taking the town. In the end both sides were exhausted, and the second or so-called Perpetual Peace of Thorn put an end to the thirteen years' war (1466). It divided Prussia into two parts. West Prussia, *i.e.* the country to the west of the Vistula and the Nogat, including Danzig, together with the land of Culm, Marienburg, the seaport of Elbing, and the bishopric of Warmia (Ermeland), became an integral part of the Polish kingdom, and was as such called Royal Prussia. East or, as it afterwards came to be called, Ducal Prussia, was restored to the Order as a Polish fief. Thus the humiliation of the Order, of which the League had refused to countenance the reconstruction on a new basis that would have placed it under German control, was shared with the Order itself by the Empire, then weak and shrinking, and under an Emperor (Frederick III) who had nothing to contribute to the situation but brave words.

The decay of the German Order was as sorry as its greatness had been deserving of admiration. Neither the Hansa, unable to stay the progress of Scandinavians or of Muscovites on the Baltic shores, nor the provinces and dependencies of the Order itself, were able to raise an arm on its behalf; and the inner constitution of its ruling oligarchy was a mere nest of jobbery. At length the obvious counsels of worldly wisdom found acceptance, and the Knights began to follow the practice of electing as their High Master a member of some important princely House, whose support in the struggle for existence might thus be conciliated. At Königsberg, whither the seat of the Order had now been transferred, Duke Frederick of Saxony from 1498 carried on the

government on the lines of an ordinary temporal principality; and on his death in 1511 Margrave Albert of Brandenburg-Ansbach, whose mother, the Margravine Sophia, was sister to King Sigismund I of Poland, and whose elder brother George held the principality of Jägerndorf in Silesia, was elected to the High Mastership.

Margrave Albert, through whose action the ultimate expansion of the dynastic power of the Hohenzollerns may be said to have been first rendered possible, was by his own confession inadequately trained for playing a part in times such as those in which his lot fell¹; and towards the close of his career he showed much moral weakness. But he was from the first animated by a determination to put an end to his relation of vassalage as High Master towards the Polish Crown. In this all-important design he was encouraged by the Emperor Maximilian I—whose actions, however, were not always on the level of his aspirations, and in this instance contradicted them. Albert's attempt to throw off his vassalage by his own strength, supported by such volunteer aid as he could obtain, failed; and, after making his peace with the Poles as best he could (1519), he fell back on another line of action, less heroic, but destined to prove more productive of results. This was the secularisation of the dominions over which he presided as head of the German Order. He had been more than once admonished from Rome, when the spirit of reform ruled in the person of Pope Adrian VI, to bring new life into the decayed and degenerate company of Knights; and at Nürnberg, where he had sought the countenance of the Diet, he had become subject to the influence of the rigorous Lutheran theologian Osiander, whom he afterwards designated as his "spiritual father." Thus, at a loss how to obey the papal injunction, Albert betook himself to Luther, whose advice to him and to his Order was administered in no spirit of restraint (1523). Luther opined that the High Master should cast aside the foolish rule of his Order, marry, and turn its dominions into a secular State; and this counsel was without much loss of time carried into execution by Albert.

In 1525, Albert was invested by Sigismund I of Poland with the secularised duchy of Prussia; the Black Cross vanished from his coat of arms, but the Black Eagle remained, with the suzerain's initials on his breast. In the same year Albert married Dorothea, daughter of Frederick I of Denmark. The recalcitrance shown by some of the Knights cannot occupy us here, nor the later vicissitudes of the German Order as an interesting relic of an irrecoverable past. West Prussia remained untouched by the results of Albert's action. Its feudal subjection to Poland continued, and the life of its population—the very names of its towns, Marienburg itself becoming Malborg—were

¹ His Renaissance sympathies were shown by the setting-up of a printing-press at Königsberg in 1524.

Polonised so far as might be, and the very existence of the Order was forgotten. Danzig—perhaps alone—derived great material advantage from this close connexion with Poland, of whose trade the city enjoyed an uncontested monopoly.

Duke Albert did his best to reorganise the administration of East Prussia; but unfortunately he gave deep offence to his subjects by identifying himself with a school of Lutheran theology (Osiander and the Osiandrists) to whose teaching the bulk of them were opposed with a fury of dogmatic partisanship such as would have been hardly explicable in any particular age, and with a less stubborn race. Thus the period of his rule ended in cruel differences and bitter disappointment (1568). The question of the succession had for some time been beset with a series of intrigues and demonstrations; and when on his death his son Albert Frederick (1568-1618) was invested by Sigismund II of Poland with the duchy of Prussia, the Brandenburg Elector, Joachim II, succeeded in obtaining simultaneous investiture for himself and his son John George. The Brandenburg tradition of making prospective acquisitions was never more signally justified. The unhappy orphan boy who had succeeded to Albert's troubled inheritance, distracted by political and religious discords, and by fears not wholly illusory of attempts on his life, lapsed into melancholy and before long became insane. In the very year (1573) in which he was married to Maria Eleonora, the heiress of Duke William of Jülich, Cleves, and Berg, he had to be placed under continuous personal control, and his cousin, Margrave George Frederick of Ansbach and Jägerndorf, was appointed administrator of his duchy with the title of Duke. Though his rule failed to conciliate the goodwill of the Prussian Estates, they seem on the whole to have favoured the ultimate union with Brandenburg, partly no doubt because the event seemed still remote.

The prospect of the union advanced with George Frederick's death in 1603, when the Elector Joachim Frederick of Brandenburg with much difficulty succeeded in being named Administrator of the duchy of Prussia, neither of Albert Frederick's sons having survived beyond infancy. He could not, however, obtain his investiture as eventual successor to the duchy from King Sigismund III of Poland; and it was only with great difficulty and under hard and humiliating conditions that after his death (1608) his son and successor, John Sigismund, after obtaining from the Polish King the guardianship and administration, at last, in 1611, secured the desired investiture for himself, his three brothers, and his heirs male. His rule was accepted most reluctantly by the Prussian nobility; and his adoption of the Reformed (Calvinist) faith stank in the nostrils of the orthodox Lutheran population. With the assistance of the Polish Crown, an organised Lutheran revolt against his government and a systematic persecution of his fellow-Calvinists were set on foot. So paradoxically irreconcilable were the relations

between ruler and ruled in Ducal Prussia, when in 1618—the year of the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War—the unhappy Albert Frederick died, and Ducal Prussia was unwillingly but, as it was to prove, inseparably united with Brandenburg.

John Sigismund, who had in circumstances so untoward united the long-coveted Prussian duchy with his electorate, and who had likewise established a hold upon the disputed duchies on the lower Rhine that was to bring first part and ultimately the whole of them into the possession of his House, died at the close of 1619, with his spirit broken. He had shown himself tolerant to Catholicism, and had taken up no decisive attitude towards the issues involved in the outbreak of the Great War, by whose course, as has been seen in a previous volume, no State was to be more continuously and more momentously affected than Brandenburg. But, as has been also shown, his son and successor George William (1619-40) was utterly incapable of making his augmented dynastic power felt in times so difficult and dangerous. As it seems necessary to repeat (for the plain fact is often lost sight of in judging the princes and magnates of this age), the failure of his career and of others such as his was due less to his inconsistencies, than to his consistencies—in other words, in his addiction to the diversions of the chase and the pleasures of the table. In justice to him, it should be remembered that his long-enduring and obstinate self-subjection to the ascendancy of his Minister Count Adam von Schwarzenberg was largely due to his own traditional regard for the Imperial House.

It is unnecessary to go back here to the difficulties in which the government of George William was involved, and the troubles brought upon his electorate, by the course of the war and the political changes consequent upon it, more especially after the landing in Pomerania of his brother-in-law, Gustavus Adolphus. The adherence of the Elector of Brandenburg to the Peace of Prague (1634) warranted the Dutch in occupying the Rhenish duchies, whence they and the Spaniards had been more or less excluded since the provisional compact of Xanten in 1614; and it had the more important consequence of a declaration of war by Brandenburg against Sweden (January, 1636). When, in the following year, the long-expected vacancy in Pomerania at last occurred by the death of Duke Bogislav XIV, the inheritor of the entire duchy, and the Estates were in favour of the union with Brandenburg, the Swedes were accordingly found in possession, and such attempts as were made to dislodge them proved futile. In 1638 George William finally abandoned any attempt to guide the fortunes of his electorate, and, abandoning the control of its affairs to Schwarzenberg, withdrew for the remainder of his days into Prussia.

Here, as fortune would have it, his rule benefited from the inevitable reaction against the uncompromising resistance offered by the nobility to his predecessor, and from the struggle of the "Protesters" (who

acquiesced in the concessions obtained under the ducal Government) against the pro-Polish designs of the "Querulants." Moreover, Prussian sentiment approved the line of policy ultimately taken up by him with regard to the war reopened between Sweden and Poland in 1626, which had led to the truce of 1629 and its subsequent renewal (at Stuhmsdorf, in 1635) for twenty-five years. Thus Prussia, instead of being exhausted by the visitations of the Thirty Years' War, had gained strength during its progress, and many fugitives from various parts of Europe had found a home in this peaceful corner. In reinvesting George William with the duchy of Prussia, King Wladislaw IV of Poland (who succeeded in 1632) had refrained from exacting any humiliating conditions. The proposal of a Spanish-Imperial-Polish combination, which Brandenburg was to join, for the control of the Swedish power in the Baltic, was manifestly premature, and broke down accordingly. It was primarily due to the maintenance by Sweden of the high tolls exacted by her at Pillau, Memel, and Elbing; but it also indicated the desire of Poland, which was indeed vital to her political future, to become a maritime Power, and the resumption by the Habsburg politicians of the ideas of Wallenstein as to the control of the Baltic. Under George William the policy of Brandenburg (as is shown by the Köpenick compact of August, 1638) readily accommodated itself to the designs, at this time largely concordant, of the Polish and the Imperial Government. But, partly in consequence of this tendency, the maritime trade of Ducal Prussia passed for the most part into the hands of Danzig. Thus, in this part also of his dominions George William's government had incurred much censure, when he died in 1640, after a reign of twenty-one years, full of misfortunes and of humiliations.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE GREAT ELECTOR AND THE FIRST PRUSSIAN KING.

FREDERICK WILLIAM, on whom his contemporaries bestowed the designation of the Great Elector, was born at Berlin on February 16, 1620—the year in which the star of the Palatine House, whose ambition it had been to stand at the head of Protestant Germany, seemed to be quenched for ever. If his father's weakness of character had been in a great measure accountable for his failure to make good the position achieved by the union of Brandenburg and Prussia in the reign of George William's predecessor, Frederick William himself rose, with a vigour and an elasticity alike rarely paralleled, above the conditions in which his own reign, in its turn, began. Even a historian so little given to dithyrambics as Ranke cannot without emotion attempt to summarise the achievements of this high-minded precursor of the Prussian Kings—who like Henry, the father of Otto the Great, toiled so incessantly and with so little thought of self, in order to lay sure the foundations on which his successor was to erect an imposing superstructure.

Fortunately for Frederick William, much of his boyhood was spent at a distance from his father's luxurious and self-indulgent Court, and out of contact with the shifts and changes of an unstable policy. At Cüstrin in the New Mark he was trained in manly habits and imbued with the deep religious convictions from which through life he never swerved. In 1631 he moved to Wolgast in Pomerania, where his aunt Queen Maria Eleonora of Sweden resided during her consort's German campaign, and where the young Prince was regarded as the future ruler of the duchy. Gustavus Adolphus was said to have taken an interest in the boy, and to have intended to bestow on him the hand of his daughter Christina; but the project, to which the Calvinism professed by the House of Brandenburg was an obstacle in the eyes of the Lutheran Swedes, remained in abeyance, though it was not relinquished by Frederick William till some years after his accession to his electorate. He completed his education at Leyden, whence he visited the Court at Rhenen of the exiled Queen of

Bohemia, of whose eldest daughter, the incomparable Elizabeth, he became a true friend through life; and then passed on to the Court and camp of his illustrious kinsman, Prince Frederick Henry of Orange. This sojourn was probably as important for his political as it was for his military training, and tended to alienate him completely from the House of Habsburg, by adhering to which, in accordance with the traditions of his own House, his father had gained so little. Instead of being, as he may have hoped to be, placed at the head of the Government of Cleves, he was in 1638 summoned to his father's Court at Königsberg, and during the remainder of George William's reign was excluded from all share in public affairs. Gradually he came to nurse the belief that the omnipotent Minister Schwarzenberg was plotting destruction to himself, the Electoral Prince, and treason in the event of his father's decease. When George William died in December, 1640, the new Elector Frederick William was, according to his own account, left friendless and without resources against his adversaries; while Prussia was secure and fairly prosperous, the electorate had been devastated; and even the allegiance of the troops that garrisoned its fortresses was doubtful, for George William had allowed them to swear fidelity to the Emperor as well as to himself.

The age was still an age of plots; and Schwarzenberg was suspected of maturing a great design for introducing Imperial troops into the Brandenburg fortresses, on whose commanders he was supposed to be able to rely. How far he had proceeded with his schemes is uncertain; but the young Elector, who had from the first made up his mind to break with the *régime* and the policy of Schwarzenberg, acted with both caution and firmness. While he temporised with the troops, he at once broke off a negotiation into which the Minister had entered with the Emperor for ceding part of Pomerania to Sweden, in return for a compensation elsewhere. The death of Schwarzenberg (March 14, 1641) saved Frederick William from having to institute proceedings against him. The Imperialist policy, which had been espoused by the Estates of the electorate as well as by the Elector George William, suddenly became a thing of the past; and to the next generation it had already become so unintelligible that Schwarzenberg's political career typified to it an unpatriotic ambition which shrank from no crime in order to compass its ends. But, whatever may be thought of his policy, his administrative influence had been altogether deleterious. His personal greed for money kept pace with his ambition, and infected the whole system of government with the spirit of financial corruption; while at the same time there was a competition in expenditure among the chief officers of State.

In foreign policy, Frederick William—instead of following in the wake of the diplomatic overtures of the Emperor—speedily took a line of his own towards a Power whose hostility was of greater importance to

his State than to any other in the Empire. He concluded with Sweden (July 14, 1641) the Truce of Stockholm, which, though at first extending to only two years, was prolonged to the end of the War. Although the Swedish occupation of Brandenburg was by no means wholly at an end, while that of Pomerania continued, he had thus withdrawn from the number of Sweden's open enemies; and this step may have helped to induce the King of Poland to accord him investiture with Ducal Prussia in the same year, without exacting any fresh concession. The right which by the Treaty of Köpenick, concluded with George William in 1638, Poland had acquired of appropriating a share of the income from the dues levied in the Prussian ports (Memel, Pillau, Elbing) was not yet given up. But the members of the Spiring family, who managed these dues and whom George William had taken over into his service, were dismissed by the new Elector; and in 1646 he put an end to the agreement on the subject with Poland, and to the last traces of her once formidable design of becoming a maritime Power. So far as Sweden was concerned, neither Frederick William nor the oligarchy that now ruled the kingdom had any wish for an *entente cordiale*, with or without a marriage between Queen and Elector. Indeed, he was both personally and politically drawn in a different direction. The House of Orange had greatly facilitated the settlement of the Brandenburg rule in Cleves; and the seal was set on the friendly relations between the two dynasties by Frederick William's marriage, in December, 1646, with Louisa Henrietta, the daughter of Prince Frederick Henry of Orange. Her influence, like that of other women of her House, proved signally enduring; and her spirit of practical piety found expression both in the Oranienburg palace, which in this reign and in the next became a seat of liberal culture in the midst of a prosperous district largely inhabited by immigrants and their progeny, and in wider spheres.

The results obtained in the Peace of Westphalia (1648) by the Brandenburg-Prussian State, and the course of its foreign relations in the period immediately ensuing, have been briefly indicated in a previous volume. The most important matter for the future of the State was the condition in which the Peace left the Pomeranian question. After the death (in 1637) of Duke Bogislav XIV, nothing stood in the way of the succession of the House of Brandenburg, whose claim was clear, except the certainty that here and nowhere else would the Swedish Crown seek its "satisfaction" for its long and deliberately protracted exertions in the Great War. The Emperor having ceased for some time to pretend to any objection against the payment of this part of the price of peace by Brandenburg, its Elector had to content himself with securing part of the eastern half of Pomerania (*Hinterpommern*), where Kolberg is the only port of any significance; nor was it till five years later (1653) that even this territory was actually evacuated by the Swedes. In addition, Brandenburg had at Osnabrück finally gained the bishoprics

of Halberstadt and Minden, together with the reversion (which in 1680 actually fell in) of the archbishopric of Magdeburg as a secular duchy.

In Brandenburg-Prussia, as in other parts of the Empire, the years which followed on the Peace were a period of more or less sturdy attempts at self-recovery. To the sense of the difficulty of the task which awaited Frederick William at home was added that of political isolation. His relations with the Emperor Ferdinand III were cold; and his close connexion with the Government of the United Provinces had come to an unexpected end with the death, in 1650, of William II of Orange, and with the transfer of power, for a term of twenty-two years, to an oligarchy little interested in supporting the interests, or espousing the quarrels, of Brandenburg in the Rhenish duchies.

Thus, at this early stage, Frederick William arrived at a clear conception of what was indispensable, if from the basis of his augmented but ill-cohering dominions he was to play an effective part in European politics. He must find allies in whom he could confide; but of this confidence it was a preliminary condition that they, in their turn, should trust him as the ruler of a loyal and prosperous State. To reach this end, it was necessary to reorganise the home government. The control of this his father had abandoned to Schwarzenberg; from Schwarzenberg it had descended to Conrad von Burgsdorf, who, though much valued and trusted by the Elector, and in the period of his ascendancy (1641-51) very nearly approaching the position of a Prime Minister, was very specially intent upon making his service profitable to himself. And after it had during a few eventful years been in the hands of Count George Frederick of Waldeck, it was in 1658 finally committed to the trustiest and most far-sighted of the Great Elector's Ministers—in a sense his master's *alter ego*—Otto von Schwerin, who was created Chancellor of the Electoral Mark, and Director of the Privy Council, and who effectively carried on the work of these combined offices for twoscore years. The reforms in the administration had begun about 1652, and were carried out with the aid of a reorganised Privy Council and a special Commission. They were directed to a more complete separation of the civil from the military administration, and of both from the Court, and to the subordination of the requirements of the latter to those of the State. The financial system in particular was put in better order; but, though steps were taken to ensure an early preparation of the budget (*état*) in each of the "provinces" (as they were already called), the determination of the provincial Estates to assert their powers of self-control had still to be very seriously taken into account.

Above all, a beginning was made (except in so far as it may be held to have been anticipated by George William in 1637) with the establishment of a standing military force—the future right arm of Prussia in the struggle which was to end in her becoming a Great Power, as her civil administrative system was to be the left. When Frederick William's

original difficulties with his troops, which he had solved by dismissing those levied in the Mark, are remembered, together with the unwillingness of an exhausted population to make fresh sacrifices for the purpose of setting on foot a new military establishment, he must be credited with extraordinary energy for having by 1651, when he had thought of trying conclusions on the battle-field, managed to muster an army of about 16,000 men—a total which, by 1656, had been increased by about 10,000 more. From this date onward, the Prussian standing army may be said to have had a continuous existence.

In his political action within and without the boundaries of the Empire it behoved the Elector, even after he had secured to himself a free hand, to proceed with the utmost circumspection. In the Peace of Westphalia he had made the best bargain he could for himself, without yielding to the seduction of a proffered French alliance. It has been seen in a previous volume how, in the transactions which intervened between that Peace and the Peace of Oliva he had striven gradually to assert the political influence of his State. He had failed in his attempt in 1651 to wrest Jülich and Berg by force from the Catholic Duke of Neuburg; but during the remainder of the reign of Ferdinand III he lost no opportunity of upholding at the Diet, or furthering by negotiation, the autonomy of the Princes of the Empire. Indeed, the very remarkable "plan of Union" elaborated by his far-sighted and high-spirited Minister Waldeck in December, 1653, though originally confined to Protestant Princes, really aimed at a general league of non-Austrian States very much on the lines of the *Fürstenbund*, set on foot a century and a quarter later by Frederick the Great.

But the chief political action of the Elector during these eleven or twelve years (1648-60) lay in a different direction. In this it was exerted with a most remarkable combination of energy and statecraft, which resulted, not only in preserving Ducal Prussia from falling into the grasp of either Poland or Sweden, but also, in accordance with the policy suggested by Waldeck, secured the duchy as an independent sovereign possession to the House of Hohenzollern. (It is no disproof of Waldeck's sincerity of purpose—only an illustration of the strangely shifting conditions of the political life of his age, that he should afterwards have himself passed into the Swedish service.) This acquisition, although its magnitude cannot palliate the diplomatic manœuvres—almost unparalleled in the brusqueness of their sequence and in the effrontery of their inconsistencies—was the chief gain which the Peace of Oliva brought to Frederick William. For he came forth from the two Wars (the Polish and the Danish) provoked by the ambition of Charles X of Sweden, without having gained the friendship of any one of the contending Powers, and with a sense of insecurity as against future encroachments on their part. And he had been obliged to relinquish the places in western Pomerania into which he had thrown garrisons, regarding the

process as merely an assertion of his rights to his own. But at least he was now master of the whole of the territories under his rule. It was an alien Power, France—who at the time of the negotiations for the Peace of Westphalia had dangled Silesia before his eyes as the price of his support—that had prevented him from driving out another alien Power, Sweden, from its foothold in Germany. But to this circumstance he was probably not unduly sensitive; though it is worth noting that in 1658 he had caused a pamphlet to be put forth, addressed to “honest Germans,” and striking a singularly modern national note as to the capture of the great north-German waterways by foreign nations. This appeal *ad populum* was widely read and reproduced in a series of editions.

For what Frederick William had achieved, or for aid in his endeavours to retain what he had been obliged to renounce, he owed no thanks to the House of Habsburg. Yet to his action had been principally due the election of 1658, when Leopold I was chosen Emperor in his father's stead—on condition, to be sure, that he would henceforth renounce all support of Spain in the Franco-Spanish conflicts in Italy and the Netherlands. On the other hand, Frederick William was so far from any present intention of joining the *Rheinbund*, that, vexed by its friendliness to Sweden, he denounced it as subjecting weak German Princes to strong foreign Powers.

With the year 1660 a new period opens in the reign of the Great Elector—a time of sorely needed rest and recuperation for his dominions. During the ensuing twelve years the army, to which (though the Estates had insisted on a reduction of its numbers) the Elector continued to devote special attention, was but once employed on active service. This was in 1663, when Brandenburg troops aided the Imperial Government in one of its numerous conflicts with the Turkish Power. But there was much to do at home. The Prussian Estates, who disliked the sway of the Brandenburg Elector, if only because he was a professed Calvinist, resented the changes introduced by him into the administration of the duchy; and it was only by a strong display of military force and punitive energy at Königsberg that he induced the Estates to do homage to him as their hereditary Duke (October, 1663). The settlement effected on this occasion was not again undone; though it was some time before the spirit of resistance, stimulated by the Polish environment of Ducal Prussia, came to an end there. It cannot be said that in his dealings with the Prussian Estates the Elector had shown any very scrupulous respect for the forms of law. Another remarkable example of the vigour of his transforming processes is that of the archbishopric of Magdeburg, which was not actually incorporated in his dominions till the death, in 1680, of the last Administrator, Duke Augustus of Saxony, but whose Estates he forced to do homage to him so early as 1666, and in whose chief city an electoral garrison had lain since 1650.

In his western dominions, also, Frederick William had to maintain a strenuous struggle on behalf of the state unity towards which he was intent upon steadily advancing. After, in 1660 and 1661, he had obliged the Estates of Cleves and Mark to accept *de facto* his full sovereignty, it was formally acknowledged, together with that over Ravensberg, by the Treaty of Cleves (1666), concluded by him with Duke Philip William of Neuburg. In this they agreed to a permanent division between them of the long-contested Rhenish duchies; and Frederick William, according to his custom, at once set about a thorough reorganisation of the administrative system of his western possessions.

But, while he was thus establishing the authority of his dynasty and securing its continuance in both the eastern and the western portions of his dominions, he was naturally not less anxious to promote the prosperity of his electorate, and to reinvigorate it by the infusion of new elements of population. The awful scourge of the 'Thirty Years' War had left the naturally sterile soil of the Mark Brandenburg desolate, with a population sunk to 210,000 souls—something between one-third and one-half of the earlier number of its inhabitants. Berlin was little better than the centre of a desert, through whose sands a traveller might plod by the hour without meeting either man or beast. The industry and trade of many parts at least of the country were practically extinct. Frederick William perceived that the primary and paramount need of the Mark was human life and labour; and, following alike the historical traditions of the territory, the lessons of his Dutch experience, and the inspiration of his deep-seated principles of religious tolerance, he engaged in a system of home colonisation which, as carried on by himself and his successors—the first three Prussian Kings—is almost without a parallel in modern history. It has been calculated that, at the close of a single century of immigration (1670-1770), not less than 600,000 persons—or one-sixth of what had then come to be the total population of the Prussian monarchy—were immigrants or the descendants of immigrants. Under the Great Elector, at all events, the foreign nationalities which contributed most largely to the formation of the "true-born Prussian" of later days—a type probably all the more vigorous and alert because of this intermixture—were the Dutch and the French. The Dutch, of whose aptitude for colonisation Frederick William had learnt something both in his juvenile experiences and from the tastes of his first consort, taught the impoverished and disheartened inhabitants of the Mark how to drain their lands, to manage dairy-farms (*Holländereien*) and to cultivate potato-fields; and their example stimulated the Brandenburg Government to dig canals for the diffusion of trade and industry—in particular, the Frederick William Canal, which with the aid of Spree and Havel

connects Oder and Elbe. Of equal importance, as advancing the material prosperity of the Brandenburgers, and of incomparable significance for the future intellectual life of the nation, were the French newcomers; though the full tide of their immigration sets in at a date in the reign later than the interval of peace after Oliva. Some French families had, however, so early as 1660, laid the foundations of the long-lived French colony at Berlin, where from 1672 onwards it celebrated divine service in its own church and in its own tongue. But the great influx came, after, in the "Edict of Potsdam" (November 8, 1685), "a sure and free refuge in all the lands and provinces of our dominions" had been offered to all persecuted French Protestants. Every facility was afforded to make good the ample promise of this both generous and politic summons; and by 1687 the number of French immigrants in the Elector's dominions was reckoned at 20,000. To this response and its sequel the future Prussian monarchy owed many benefits: it gave a stimulus, both direct and indirect, to many of the skilled industries (of which the woollen manufacture was only one) in the Mark; it encouraged horticulture; it led to the quick rise into prominence of Berlin, among whose inhabitants (nearly tripled in numbers during the reign) were numbered many French religious ministers, doctors, and lawyers whose names were to survive in those of descendants celebrated in science and art; finally, it brought about a very notable infusion of soldiers and officers into the electoral army, five infantry regiments of which were largely composed of French refugees, while these were specially numerous in the artillery, and the corps of the *Gardes Mousquetaires* was entirely composed of gentlemen of French descent.

The general industrial and commercial activity of Brandenburg-Prussia under Frederick William's rule did not reach its height till his later years, to which also belong the attempts made by him to carry out a colonial policy. Before his accession the foreign trade of his electorate and duchy were in the hands of other States, chiefly in those of Hamburg, to which so large a share of the mercantile enterprise of the Hansa had descended. Frederick William, who from the first had turned his attention to the opportunities of maritime trade, had already in 1647 taken up the question of the establishment of a Brandenburg East India Company; and, three years later, he entered into negotiations with Denmark as to the purchase of a site for a Brandenburg colony on the coast of Coromandel. But the essential was wanting—namely, capital; nor was it till 1675, when (as will be seen) Sweden had declared war against Brandenburg, that the Elector began naval operations, by approving the equipment of privateers under the Brandenburg flag, who soon brought in many prizes. The venture was undertaken by Benjamin Raule, a Middelburg merchant, whose reckless spirit of enterprise had involved him in difficulties nearer

home and who had in consequence become a refugee at Berlin. In the following year Raule was nominated "Director-General of the Navy," and ordered to make ready for sea a flotilla which was to sail under the Brandenburg flag, and to be commanded by his brother Jacob. The Peace of St Germain (1679) put no stop on the speculative ambition of Raule; for (in spite of personal drawbacks against which he had to contend through nearly the whole of his life) he was in the following year placed at the head of an "Electoral Board of Trade and Admiralty," established at Königsberg; and his privateers did excellent execution against the Spaniards, gaining on October 10 the "victory of Saint Vincent" over a supposed silver fleet. In the same year two merchantmen sailed for Upper Guinea and Angola; and in 1682 the Brandenburg African Trading Company was in due course established at Königsberg. (Pillau in East Prussia had been originally intended to be the base of its operations; and when Brandenburg seemed likely to take permanent possession of the coveted coastland of East Frisia, there seemed a prospect of transferring the seat of the Company to Emden.) Under the protection of a fort erected on the Guinea coast, and named Grossfriedrichsburg, a not inconsiderable trade appears to have been set on foot. The collapse of the undertaking cannot be investigated here. It was due partly to the jealousy of the Dutch East African Company, partly to suspicions, which proved unfounded, as to the proceedings of Raule; and, above all, to the fact that, after the death of the Great Elector in 1688, no support of any kind was to be expected from Berlin. The successor of Frederick William had other ambitions to gratify, and other expenses to meet; although, so long as Danckelmann was at the head of affairs, Raule and his schemes were not entirely dropped. In West Africa, the garrison of Grossfriedrichsburg had died out, and very little was left of the settlement of which it was the centre, when the accession of Frederick William I, who had neither thought nor money to bestow on such secondary ends, sounded the knell of his grandsire's interesting colonial scheme. In 1717 the isolated fortress that remained as a token of it was sold to the Dutch; and eight years later the negro chief to whom it had been made over in trust by the last Prussian commander withdrew inland. The Brandenburg African Company, which had been taken up by the Great Elector, survived him for a very brief time. As for the Brandenburg-Prussian navy, organised by the ingenious and much misunderstood Raule, though, like the English privateers of Elizabeth's reign, it had served the purpose of irritating Spain, it came to an early end.

The attitude of Frederick William towards questions of religion possesses a significance beyond its connexion with his economic policy. The wide range of his intellectual and spiritual interests forms one of his most valid claims to the epithet of "Great." In him breadth of mind was

coupled with a strong personal religiosity, and to both was united a constant reasonableness in action. His conception of the true relations between State and Church, and of the right of the individual to liberty of conscience, was the same as that which found so notable an expression in the treatise *De habitu christianæ religionis ad vitam civilem*, dedicated to him in 1687 by Samuel Pufendorf, who was afterwards to commemorate the achievements of the Great Elector in a work acknowledged to be one of the classics of earlier German historiography. Nothing in the public life of Frederick William—no catch resulting from all his “fishing in troubled waters,” as it was called by Lisola, one of the most capable of contemporary diplomatists—redounded so much to Frederick William’s enduring honour as his consistent adherence to the principle of religious toleration. With him this principle was by no means a deduction from the easy-going philosophy of indifference that had found a home at Heidelberg under Charles Lewis, and afterwards made its way from Hanover to Berlin. For this Frederick William still stood too near to the confessional conflicts of earlier generations. In 1662-3, he had actually arranged a religious disputation between Lutherans and Calvinists, which had proved as futile as many of its predecessors. Calixtus, whose wise teaching had probably inspired Frederick William’s earlier efforts for a religious reconciliation, had striven in vain, as Leibniz was to labour at a later date; and Frederick William himself was to discover, what his successor and namesake ignored half a century afterwards, that a population has to be educated into reason. Its sympathy is usually on the side of the resisters; and the Great Elector is popularly remembered rather for his “expulsion,” in 1666, of the bigoted Paul Gerhardt—Germany’s greatest hymn-writer since Luther—than for having cherished ideals to which that worthy was not, either before or after his return to Berlin, capable of rising. In Prussia, too, Frederick William’s appointment of “syncretist” incumbents actually brought down upon him the threat of an appeal to his suzerain at Warsaw.

It would, at the same time, be an error to suppose that Frederick William’s religious tolerance rendered him well-disposed towards Rome. On one occasion, Louis XIV enquired whether it was the Elector’s intention to pose as the Protector of the Protestants before the eyes of Europe; and, almost with his dying breath, Frederick William enjoined upon one of the Princesses of his House the duty of remaining true to the Protestant religion in which she had been nurtured. But he had never been a fanatic either abroad or at home. In his earlier days, the Elector had turned a deaf ear to Oliver Cromwell’s invitation, suggesting that he should place himself at the head of a kind of Protestant crusade. In his own dominions, he tolerated Arians, Socinians and Mennonites, and readmitted the Jews to Brandenburg, whence they had been excluded for more than a century. He frankly carried out the principle of a preference for Protestantism, but tolerated

Catholics, allowing them where necessary (as in Cleves) equality of rights, and even here and there opportunity for a little persecution. Brandenburg and Prussia were, as in his will of 1667 he "thanked God" that they remained, wholly free from popish abuses; so that it was not till the end of his reign that Jesuit influence in schools was directly prohibited. Still, speaking broadly, even Catholicism was in the main treated throughout his dominions on the basis of liberty of conscience, and of the admissibility to public offices of adherents of all creeds. It may thus be asserted that Brandenburg-Prussia was, during the period of the Great Elector's reign, the only country in Europe which upheld the principle of religious toleration—except the United Provinces, where it was honoured in name rather than in fact.

During the twelve years of peace (1660-72), so sorely needed for the advancement of prosperity in his own dominions, Frederick William vigilantly observed the course of events outside. In other words, he followed every turn in the aggressive policy of France, the Power which dominated contemporary European politics, and shaped his own conduct accordingly. In 1665 he mustered in his Rhenish lands a force of 18,000 men; on the strength of which, besides asserting, in the following year, the recognition of the permanence of his authority there, he induced the enterprising Bishop of Münster to desist from an armed inroad into the United Provinces, which would have given Louis XIV an opportunity of intervention on their behalf. The warlike prelate accepted the mediation proffered by the Elector; and any French interference in the dispute was thus rendered superfluous.

With England in particular, Frederick's relations were throughout friendly; and, in truth, the interests of the two Powers were continually making for a cooperation between them. Though the English Government had declined to guarantee the Peace of Oliva, it concluded, so early as July, 1661, a defensive alliance with Brandenburg, accompanied by a commercial treaty, which opened a long and varied series of political combinations between the two Powers. But, although there was so much to bring and keep them together, each had to deal, according to its own immediate point of view, with the situations successively created by the dominant action of Louis XIV. The records of the personal experience of Count Otto von Schwerin "the younger," who held the post of plenipotentiary at the Court of St James' from 1674 to 1678, illustrate this relation in a period of only less critical importance than that which had preceded it for the affairs of Europe at large.

In the War of Devolution (1667-8), which laid bare the ulterior as well as the immediate purposes of the policy of France, Frederick William remained neutral—actuated perhaps chiefly by jealousy of Sweden, with whom he declined to associate himself in forming what would thus have become a "Quadruple" instead of a "Triple Alliance" with England and the United Provinces, but probably also moved

by a desire to induce the French Court to abandon its support of the Prince of Condé's candidature for the Polish throne. He can hardly have remained neutral from any real fear of isolation, though neither of the two Habsburg dynasties at first showed any tendency to energetic cooperation with each other; and he certainly concluded (December 15, 1667) an agreement with the French Minister at his Court, by which, in return for the undertaking of the French Government to prevent the succession on the Polish throne of any French Prince, he promised to remain neutral in the Belgian war. So striking was the success of French diplomacy in keeping him out of the combination against France, that unfounded rumours spread as far as the willing ears of Charles II that Frederick William aspired to the hand of the *Grande Mademoiselle* (Louis XIV's cousin, the Duchess of Montpensier).

Although, as has been seen elsewhere, France was in the Peace of Aachen (1668) disappointed as to the fulfilment of her larger expectations, she continued to pursue them with the consistency which has always been proper to her diplomacy. Her policy owed an unavowed but extraordinary strength to the secret agreement as to the Spanish Succession concluded between Leopold I and Louis XIV in January, 1668, and confirmed by them in 1671. Both England and Sweden were, by arguments specious in both the one and the other case, gained over to cooperation in the projected French campaign against the United Provinces. Thus the amicable relations which had existed between England and Brandenburg since the conclusion of a defensive alliance and commercial treaty between them in July, 1661, proved of no avail. When, in 1672, that momentous campaign actually began, the Dutch Republic could look for no other ally besides the Elector of Brandenburg; and it was no doubt for this reason that the Emperor sent troops to support any action that might be taken by the Elector. No sooner, however, had French forces begun to occupy the Cleves territory, than Frederick William's resolution gave way, even though the Emperor did not withdraw his troops; and in June, 1673, the Elector executed one of the least creditable of his rearward manœuvres by concluding with France the separate Peace of Vossem, in which, by way of return for the evacuation of the duchy of Cleves, he promised to abstain from any future act of hostility against France, except in the event of a declaration of war against her by the Empire. But, in the very next year, such a declaration was actually issued; whereupon Frederick William duly took part in the demonstration intended to meet the extraordinary display of force by which Louis XIV sought to overwhelm the United Provinces; and the mission to England of Otto von Schwerin the younger, mentioned above, seemed to promise to draw the Protestant Powers together once more. But, though Frederick William put an army of 20,000 men in the field, the campaign of the German

auxiliary force proved a failure, owing both to the genius of Turenne and to the mutual distrust between the Imperial and the Brandenburg commanders. The Elector suspected treachery on the part of the former, Count Bournonville; but of the secret instructions which are supposed to have reached him from Vienna there is no actual proof. In January, 1675, after an unsuccessful fight at Türkheim, the German troops recrossed the Rhine and took up their winter-quarters. A few months earlier the Elector had lost his eldest son, Charles Emil, a virtuous and promising youth, whose death from fever at Strassburg (November 27, 1674) the father attributed to a French poisoner. His life was full of such morbid suspicions, and we are reminded how near we still are to the dark and ruthless age of the Thirty Years' War.

In the same month as that which witnessed the withdrawal of the German forces from the left bank of the Rhine, Sweden, instigated by France with a view to bringing about this result, invaded Brandenburg, and once more spread desolation through the land. The situation was full of peril for the dominions of Frederick William. The ambitious John Sobieski now sat on the Polish throne; and Louis XIV was seeking to engage him to take part in an attack upon his Prussian neighbour. On the other side of the Mark, the Brunswick-Lüneburg Duke John Frederick, the Catholic convert who held sway at Hanover, was eager to give proof of his sovereign independence by running contrary to the line of policy followed by the other Princes of his House, who loyally adhered to the Emperor in his conflict with France. Thus Frederick William was environed by foes actual or prospective, when in June, 1675, he set forth on the most celebrated campaign of his life, and the first great campaign in the annals of what may by anticipation be called the Prussian army.

On June 25 the Swedes were driven out of Rathenow on the Havel by the Brandenburgers; and on the 28th the Brandenburg vanguard, numbering barely 6000 men, chiefly cavalry, routed nearly double the number of Swedes on the famous field of Fehrbellin. The glory that has continued to surround the name of this battle is mainly due to the fact that it was a purely German victory over a wholly alien adversary; but there was much that was striking in the fight itself, and in the rapid march—an exploit like that of Cincinnatus of old—by which it had been preceded. From the day of Fehrbellin onward Frederick William was known to his people as the "Great Elector." The Ratisbon Diet was encouraged to issue a declaration of war against Sweden; and Frederick William openly avowed his intention of driving the Swedes out of Pomerania. His isolation was at an end; and his troops were joined by an Imperial force, including the contingents of the Brunswick-Lüneburg Dukes and of the Bishop of Münster. Denmark, too, always ready to "bite the heel" of Sweden, became a member of the alliance against her. In the course of

the autumn the war extended into western Pomerania, and operations were carried on round the two Haffs in 1676, when the Brunswick and Münster troops expelled the Swedes from the duchies of Bremen and Verden. But Stettin still held out; nor was it till after a siege lasting from the end of August to December, 1677, that the fortress, the most important position held by the Swedes on German soil, capitulated. In the following year the island of Rügen, Stralsund, and Greifswald were taken, and the expulsion of the Swedes from Germany was for the time accomplished. Their attempt to retaliate by an invasion of Prussia, proceeding in November, 1678, from Livonia, where they still maintained a footing, proved a failure; for in January, 1679, Frederick William with resistless energy led an expedition into his remote duchy, and drove out the foe.

But, unfortunately for the Great Elector, whose sword seemed at last to have secured the acquisition which he and his House had so long had at heart, his success had been achieved just when the allies whom he had abandoned at Vossem were making up their minds for peace; and Sweden's defeat by Brandenburg greatly helped to incline Louis XIV in the same direction. At the Peace Congress which assembled in 1676 at Nymegen, where England played the recognised part of the mediating Power, Brandenburg found herself once more in an isolated position. The failure of Frederick William to furnish effective aid to the United Provinces in return for the subsidies received from them now revenged itself upon him; and France would of course do nothing against Sweden, whom she had urged into a war which had proved so disastrous. Thus, when in 1678-9 the Peace of Nymegen was actually concluded, all the German territories assigned to Sweden in the Peace of Westphalia were once more restored to her. Frederick William, with whom Denmark alone held out against these conditions, hesitated long before accepting them; but at last he submitted to the inevitable, and, in June, 1679, concluded the Treaty of St Germain, by which western Pomerania with Stettin was given back to the Swedes. For the second time, and after a more complete and far more glorious conquest than that of nineteen years earlier, the prize had eluded his grasp.

The disappointment was severe; and its bitterness turned against the allies who this time had left him in the lurch—as he had before left them. The United Provinces were to be regretted not only as friends, but also as paymasters; England was of no value in either capacity, and might be left to carry on her game of balancing and trimming; the fulness of the Great Elector's indignation seems to have been directed against the Emperor. Leopold had given further offence by taking advantage of the extinction in 1675 of the Liegnitz line of the Lower Silesian Dukes (by the death of Duke George William) to confiscate the principalities of Liegnitz, Brieg, and Wohlau, held by that House as the last survivors of the native dynasty, descended from the Piasts of Poland.

The relations between the Hofburg and the young Protestant Power, which had quickly lost their traditional cordiality, were enduringly embittered by the complications that arose between them with regard to this Piast inheritance, and to another Silesian principality, that of Jägerndorf, which, though purchased by the House of Brandenburg, had escheated to the Emperor when in 1620 Margrave John George had been placed under the ban.

It was therefore in a spirit of something like spite as well as with his usual design of turning the actual situation to the best possible account that, in August, 1679, Frederick William concluded an alliance, which, with certain modifications, was renewed in the years ensuing. Thus began a period in the history of his policy upon which it is difficult to look with admiration from the national point of view by no means, as has been seen, ignored by Frederick William. He now entered into a system of entire cooperation with France. Not only did he grant to her armies the right of free transit through his dominions, including even resort to the protection of his fortresses, but he promised to support the Dauphin as a candidate for the succession to the Imperial throne. In connexion with these transactions, no excessive importance should be attached to the mere fact of his acceptance of an annual French pension of 100,000 *livres*; for the payment for services rendered, or about to be rendered, or about to be withheld, is an element never absent from any turn in the politics of this age, when the state-machine refused to move without constant greasing of the wheels. The subsidy which Frederick William had previously drawn from the United Provinces is to be regarded in much the same way.

In general, however, it cannot be denied that in the steadily advancing encroachments of France Frederick William had a very distinct share of responsibility, and that it is impossible to disconnect altogether from his course of action the "temporary" loss of Strassburg and the "reunited" places and districts, of which France was left in possession by the Truce concluded with her by the Empire at Ratisbon in 1684. Curiously enough, his policy had thus become alienated from that of England, who, although he had, in March, 1681, concluded a political and commercial alliance with her, was now disposed to turn away from France. With the Emperor himself Frederick William's relations became so strained that, in 1682, his offer of an auxiliary force of 12,000 troops, when Vienna seemed in danger from the Turks, was declined as dangerous. He employed it in occupying the disputed Silesian principalities.

But the nadir of his political course had now been reached. It was inconceivable that Frederick William's amicable relations with France, themselves the result of a reaction, should endure beyond a limited period of time; and happily their close announced itself before that of his

career. The final change in his policy, which during the last three years of his reign (1685-8) gave him an important place among the European Princes and statesmen who were preparing the great struggle against the enduring predominance of France, may without hesitation be attributed to the very noblest among the principles that actuated his public and private life. His hatred of religious intolerance and oppression was, as has already been seen, roused, together with his Protestant sympathies, by the persecutions that preceded the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and reached their height when that measure of blind bigotry was actually proclaimed. The Great Elector's treaty of alliance with the United Provinces, which marks a complete revulsion in his system of foreign policy, was concluded in August, 1685; his direct response to the actual Revocation has been already noted. The difficult diplomacy necessitated by the Elector's action was skilfully conducted by his ambassador at Paris, Ezechiel Spanheim (who was thoroughly imbued with the liberal Calvinism representative of the progressive spirit of the age); but the French subsidies were stopped for a time. Frederick William now actually came to be regarded as holding a position towards Protestantism somewhat resembling that held by Oliver Cromwell a generation before; and the remote Protestant cantons of Switzerland, apprehensive lest their turn might come next, sought his alliance.

But, with his extraordinary insight into the demands of the moment, he concentrated his attention upon his relations with the Maritime Powers. His kinsman William of Orange was rapidly assuming the character in which alone his memory remains immortal—that of the head and front of the European resistance to the aggressions of France. So far as England was concerned, Frederick William had quickly realised the prospects of the political situation which was developing there. During his exile after the death of Charles II, Monmouth had met with considerable sympathy in Protestant Germany; and his formal expulsion from Brandenburg was far from representing the view actually taken by the Electoral Government of his pretensions.

Meanwhile, with his usual impetuousness—a feature in his character which should not be overlooked in accounting for the mutability of his political action—Frederick William, in March, 1686, concluded a secret treaty of alliance with the Emperor, which once more bound closely together the interests of Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs. Effective aid was promised by the Elector to the Emperor against the Turks; and, while Frederick William, in order to leave no doubt as to his loyalty, renounced the claims of his House upon any other portion of Silesia, he received in return, or believed that he received in return, the cession of the Schwiebus Circle, which formed part of the principality of Glogau, and of which more anon. Hereupon, he drew up the strategical plan for the expected war with France, and became a party to the League of Augsburg, concluded for purposes of defence in June, 1686, by the Emperor

and several German Princes, and including, in that capacity, the Kings of Spain and Sweden. Negotiations were carried on, under the deepest secrecy, with William of Orange on the subject of his intended descent upon England. The correctness of the view that it was Frederick William who, having taken the project into consideration already in 1684, gradually convinced his kinsman of the necessity of this enterprise, depends on the evidence concerning the interviews between them at Cleves in August, 1686, in which Pufendorf erroneously states Marshal Schomberg to have taken part on behalf of the English malcontent lords. As the negotiations proceeded, the plan clearly evolved itself that Brandenburg and certain lesser German States were to protect the United Provinces during the English expedition. In these negotiations Count Waldeck, who was now at the height of his political activity, took a prominent part, and William's confidential friend Bentinck (afterwards Earl of Portland) visited Berlin; but the Brandenburg statesman on whom the chief responsibility of their conduct fell was Paul von Fuchs, who should not be forgotten among those who chiefly contributed to the success of the great political venture of 1688. It may be worth mentioning that at the time of Frederick William's death the whole House of Brunswick-Lüneburg was perilously near an alliance with France—probably in a great measure because of the neglect of the English Government to keep up a continuous diplomatic intercourse with these Courts, of which the importance was already becoming manifest.

Frederick William was not to live to witness the success of the project with which he had been so closely connected. He died on May 9, 1688. To the last, he was actively engaged in the work of government and in the prosecution of his political schemes, although the bodily sufferings undergone by him during many years had culminated in dropsy, and although the last period of his life was disturbed by domestic troubles. After the death of his cherished first consort, Louisa Henrietta of Orange, the ancestress of the royal House of Prussia, a wide-hearted and energetic woman, and a pious soul whom her husband's Minister Schwerin comforted with prayers and hymns in seasons of war, he had, in 1668, married Dorothea of Holstein-Glücksburg, the widow of Duke Christian William, the eldest of the Brunswick-Lüneburg brotherhood. This union, although in itself happy, led to quarrels between the new Electress and the children of the Elector's first marriage, and more especially the Electoral Prince Frederick, which had very serious consequences. The Electoral Prince, almost unavoidably, fell into intriguing hands; and, before his father entered into the agreement of March, 1686, mentioned above, of which the cession of the Schwiebus Circle to Brandenburg was supposed to form an integral part, had been induced to promise to return the town and district to the House of Austria on his own accession as Elector. The Court of Berlin once more began to be full of dark and distracting rumours. When, in 1687, one of the Great Elector's

younger sons, Margrave Lewis, died, there were rumours of poisoning; when, soon afterwards, the Electoral Prince Frederick fell ill, his malady was ascribed to the quantity of antidotes swallowed by him. The story, which long obtained credit, that the Electress Dorothea induced her consort in his later years to stultify the policy to which his efforts and those of his House had been so long directed, and to run counter to one of its fundamental laws, the *Dispositio Achillea*, needs correction. In the will made by him in 1680, of which he named the King of France executor, he was held to have broken up the cohesion of the dominions of his dynasty in order to benefit the four sons of his second marriage at the expense of the Electoral Prince, Frederick. But, to begin with, the first change made by him (so far back as 1664) in his previous testamentary dispositions was due to the wishes of his first wife, Louisa Henrietta, in favour of her own younger surviving son; and Dorothea, though like her husband she changed sides, and like his Ministers accepted gratuities, was devoted to his interests, and much maligned. But, as a matter of fact, Frederick William was throughout faithfully seeking to maintain the succession in his own line, which ran a serious risk of falling short of male heirs, should the younger Princes fail to marry. He wished the dominions added by him to his own inheritance to descend to his younger sons; but in each case he made a reservation of the full rights of sovereignty to the head of the House. Such seems to be the substance of his much discussed and much derided wills of the years 1680 and 1686—of which, for the rest, the interest is, in a sense, “academical” only, inasmuch as Frederick William’s last will was declared invalid by his successor.

Thus the career of the Great Elector came to an end, amidst troubles such as a Prince the beginnings of whose reign fall within the period of the Thirty Years’ War could not have expected to escape, but which he met with a clearness of purpose that no mutability of action on his part should be allowed to obscure. His steadfastness, even more than his flexibility, led on his monarchy towards a future of which he recognised at least some of the essential conditions. The methods pursued by him were and must remain open to comment and even to censure; but there rarely has been a great ruler and statesman in whom strength and breadth of mind were more closely united with depth of feeling. He was, moreover, far-sighted and even boldly speculative in fields far removed from the domain of politics; and, while actively interested in higher education as he found it (he founded the University of Duisburg for his western dominions, and was jealous of his sovereign rights in connexion with appointments of professors), could conceive of a University teaching all things knowable, without troubling itself as to the relation of its instruction to particular forms of faith¹.

¹ The charter of the *Universitas Brandeburgica gentium, scientiarum, et artium*, suggested by the Swede Benedict Skytte, was drawn up in 1667; but the existing resources proved inadequate.

At home, the Great Elector made an important advance towards the unity of his State by establishing throughout his dominions a body of officials chosen by himself, without undue regard for provincial privileges, out of the entire area of his territories, or from among the subjects of other German States and Protestant foreigners. He took away the political power of his nobility, while increasing the advantages enjoyed by them as landlords; he imposed a graduated income-tax upon all classes of his subjects; and he placed all their contributions for the support of his army under the control of what was to all intents and purposes his Minister of War.

Still, the chief significance of his career as a ruler was, after all, that he first taught the Northern and North-eastern Powers who impeded the growth of his State, and the Great European Powers to boot, that nothing save the interests of that State itself, as they might from time to time present themselves to its rulers, would in the future decide the course of its political action. And thus it came to pass that in the eyes of the German nation at large (which, even after the Thirty Years' War had paralysed its powers, was far from having shut its eyes completely to the remembrances of a better past or even to the possibilities of a greater future) his rule over Brandenburg-Prussia came to represent the principle of opposition to the occupation of German lands by the foreigner. Whether the foreigner were Protestant or Catholic, Swede or Frenchman, he would have in the end to reckon with the Great Elector and his army. Thus, although the course of his life cannot, speaking humanly, be called fortunate, and though he was not able to master all the difficulties by which it was beset, at least none of his successors nor the people to which the traditions of his reign descended in successive generations, could remain blind either to what he had done or to what he consciously left for them to do after him. A firm support of the Imperial policy, but not with regard to such purely dynastic objects as his father had aided the Habsburgs in pursuing; the steady maintenance of Prussian independence as towards Poland; a constant readiness to oust Sweden from the corner of Germany (no unimportant corner) which she still occupied; an intimate alliance against France with the House of Orange, the kinsmen of the Hohenzollerns, and with England, so soon as a change in her Government should have made her once more one of the Protestant Powers—these were the cardinal points of the political "system" bequeathed by him. For carrying out such a policy a vigorous army and a fairly prosperous state of things at home were indispensable. The former requisite he had provided; the prosperity of his electorate and of the kingdom into which it was about to grow was due to no other cause so much as to the spirit of tolerance which was the noblest element in his strong, and at the same time deeply religious, character.

The Great Elector's son, the Elector Frederick III (afterwards, as the first King in Prussia, known as Frederick I) was of an altogether different mould from that in which his great predecessor was cast. The son, too, was in a sense not devoid of the imaginative power which is so strong an impulse to action; but his aspirations long moved on the most clearly defined lines towards a single consummation. With the help, no doubt, of favourable circumstances, he accomplished the one end which he had in view during the earlier part of his reign. The main political purpose of his later years he was unable to achieve; for at Utrecht he had to accept the Upper Quarter of Gelders in lieu of the principality of Orange.

Born in 1657 at Königsberg (the scene of the fulfilment of the chief design of his life), he was of weakly bodily health and a passionate disposition. The training which imparted strength to his physical, and steadiness to his moral, nature he owed to Eberhard Danckelmann, a native of Lingen, which with other Orange territories was inherited by Frederick in 1702. The return of Danckelmann (who, after saving his pupil's life in the course of a serious illness, had gradually acquired a commanding influence over him) into the Brandenburg service seemed in itself ominous of future acquisitions; and his position at Frederick's Court and in the government of the State in the end became that of an omnipotent Prime Minister—a familiar type in this age of autocracy. On the whole, he seems to have served his master well, both before and after his accession as Elector, and not to have been personally open to corruption, though besides himself six brothers (hence “the Danckelmann Pleiad”) found their way into the Electoral service. Generally, he followed the political traditions of the Great Elector; and there seems no foundation for the suggestion that he inclined to France. It may be added that he had remained in ignorance as to the worse than dubious transactions with the Electoral Prince concerning Schwiebus before the Great Elector's death.

Immediately on his accession Frederick III began to take measures for upsetting his father's will. The assent of the Dowager Electress and her sons to this procedure was only obtained after four years' negotiation; but it was obtained, and in return for various compensations they renounced the territorial inheritances destined for them. The settlement of the Schwiebus question between the Imperial and the Brandenburg Government, on the other hand, occupied seven years, resulting in the restoration of the Circle to the House of Austria. The complications of this transaction, which from beginning to end illustrates a very degenerate phase of diplomacy, are not easy to unravel; but it is clear that the Elector's desire for a royal Crown, and consequent wish to conciliate the Imperial Government, counted for something in the solution.

But there was yet another side to the question. In return for the cession to him of the Schwiebus Circle, the Great Elector had, as has

been seen, in 1686 renounced the claims of his House upon the Silesian principalities of Liegnitz, Brieg, and Wohlau, and upon that of Jägersdorf. It was now contended that, with the restoration of Schwiebus, these claims necessarily revived; and they were actually asserted by Frederick III in a clause in the act of retradition. This view, however, was not accepted by the Imperial Government; and, though in 1695 the Schwiebus Circle was actually handed over to Austrian commissioners, the counter-claim was for the present left open, with what momentous consequences will be told at a later stage of this *History*.

Enough has been said to indicate how Frederick III's earlier policy was affected by the design upon which during these years his attention was concentrated. It can hardly be necessary to enter into an elaborate analysis of the Elector's motives in seeking a royal Crown; but some reference should be made to the high-strung princely ambitions which are generally characteristic of this age. The rapid changes in the territorial system of Europe, and of the Empire in particular, consequent upon the artificial settlements of the Peace of Westphalia and the ensuing series of pacifications, had fired the ambition, personal or dynastic, of many German Princes of the time. The resplendent exemplar of Louis XIV pointed the way to extremely expeditious methods of securing an appropriate extension of territorial power. His Court likewise became the model of lesser Courts—not perhaps so much in actual manners and ways of life (as to which the process of refinement through which Versailles itself passed was gradual) as in the determination of those perennial questions of etiquette, and more especially of precedence, which in the diplomatic negotiations of the age frequently seem to assume a paramount importance. A mere Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, of ancient descent but mediocre power, who had as yet not even completely united in his hands his line's moiety of the dominion of a bipartite House, had after long efforts obtained the Imperial sanction for his assumption of the electoral dignity (1692), and was known to be looking forward to the parliamentary sanction, actually accorded to them nine years later, of the claims of his consort and their descendants to the English throne. On that throne a Count of Nassau had seated himself a few years earlier (1688). Charles XII, when crowned King of Sweden in 1697, was only fifteen years of age; but speculations must have speedily arisen as to the chances of the Swedish throne passing, in the event of the death of this martial youth, to a son of his elder sister (for whose firstborn a very different fate was reserved), or (as actually happened) to a son of his younger sister and her future husband, who could hardly fail to be a German Protestant Prince. The Electoral Prince of Bavaria was, a few months before his premature death (1699), recognised by the King of Spain as the sole heir of his monarchy. Thus it seemed to be time for the Electors of ancient date, whose dynasties had long cherished the conviction that they were raised far above the level

of the Princes of the Empire at large, to see that they did not fall behind in the general competition. The Elector of Saxony (Frederick Augustus II), as has been narrated elsewhere, was in this connexion the earliest to achieve success, and, by renouncing the Lutheran confession, with which the House of Wettin had been identified in both good and evil times, to secure the Polish throne for himself (1697), with the probability of its descent to his successors in the electorate. More fantastic schemes illustrated the spread of these aspirations. It appears that the Elector Palatine (John William of Neuburg) towards the close of the century negotiated with a view to becoming King of a Christian Armenia.

The House of Brandenburg had rather longer to wait than the Albertine branch of the House of Wettin for its elevation to royal rank; though there is evidence to show that the Great Elector himself had at one time thought of assuming the title of King of the Wends, but had abandoned the project at the time of the Peace of St Germain, when it seemed impolitic to offend Poland. The Crown which the Elector of Brandenburg ultimately secured was purchased by no such sacrifice as that by which Frederick Augustus II forfeited the last remnants of Saxony's Protestant hegemony in the Empire, and completed the transfer of that hegemony to Brandenburg. Moreover, the Prussian Crown only symbolised the tenure of a dominion which the House of Brandenburg and its subjects had secured by a consistent policy and were prepared to maintain by the force of arms. The basis of the Elector of Brandenburg's claim to rank among the Kings of Europe was, in other words, the duchy of Prussia, for which he had done homage to no man, and the army which had virtually been created by his predecessor, and which had enabled the Great Elector to assert his State as a factor in great questions of European politics. The display which Frederick III made a point of keeping up at his Court, while it may have well suited both his personality and his times, was deliberately intended to show that the means were at his disposal for maintaining the external grandeur that befits a king.

The European situation at the time of the accession of Frederick III, and the part taken by his father in urging on the great design of which the execution was imminent, were alike propitious to the aspirations of the new Elector. This would of itself suffice to explain why he steadily carried on the policy of his predecessor towards the impending English Revolution of 1688. William of Orange, it is not too much to say, was enabled to invade England by Frederick III, who, in August, 1688, in accordance with a compact concluded at Celle, sent several of his best regiments—5300 foot and 660 horse—into the United Provinces, to protect them against any French inroad. These troops were commanded by Marshal Schomberg, who, after long and distinguished service in France had, by the religious policy of Louis XIV, and by personal experiences in the same direction in Portugal, been driven into

the service of the Great Elector and at once appointed by him to the territorial command-in-chief. Notwithstanding the jealousy of the Brandenburg officers, Schomberg had gained the same confidence on the part of the Elector Frederick III as that which had been bestowed on him by the Great Elector. The last two years of the Marshal's career belong to English history; but he represents some of the most characteristic traditions of German military prowess, with their frequent accompaniment of an unswerving loyalty to religious convictions.

The endeavours of the Emperor Leopold I in the War declared against France by the Empire in 1689 were actively supported by Frederick III, beyond the treaty engagements of his father. In this year 20,000 Brandenburg troops cooperated on the Rhine with Imperial forces of twice that number; and, in October, Frederick III, with the aid of Duke Charles of Lorraine (whom Brandenburg troops had assisted in the capture of Mainz), brought the arduous siege of Bonn to a successful issue. In 1690, after the defeat of Waldeck and the Dutch at Fleurus (July 1), the advent of the Brandenburgers under their Elector, and of other auxiliaries, in a measure restored the balance of forces; but it was not till 1695 that the electoral troops once more took part in an important action of the war—the recapture of Namur, which compensated William III for many failures in the Low Countries. Frederick III was at this time anxious to draw closer the bonds of alliance between himself and his kinsman by securing the hand of the widowed King for his daughter by his first wife, Louisa Dorothea Sophia. Another body of Brandenburg troops was in the same period aiding the Emperor in his perennial struggle against the Turks in Hungary.

But as yet the financial resources of Brandenburg-Prussia were so restricted that these efforts could not be made without the payment of subsidies by England and the United Provinces; and this fact to some extent explains the disappointing experiences of the Elector Frederick III at Ryswyk. Moreover, since the Emperor Leopold was entirely opposed to the conclusion of this Peace, while the paramount desire of Frederick III was to remain on the best possible terms with the Emperor, this could not fail to affect injuriously his relations with the other allied Powers. At one time he could not even obtain the subsidies promised to him, and bitterly complained of his wrongs. But, in the end, prudence gained the day, and, on September 21, his ambassador, Privy Councillor von Schmettau, notwithstanding the warlike language previously held by him, attached his name to the Treaty of Peace with France, signed at Ryswyk by the Dutch, English and Spanish plenipotentiaries. Neither the joint guarantee of the royal Crown on which the ambition of Frederick III was fixed, nor the fulfilment of William III's promise to secure to the Brandenburg dynasty the

inheritance of the House of Orange, had been obtained; and for once the Hohenzollern statesmen had ploughed the sands. The failure of the electoral Government to gain any compensation for the sacrifices entailed upon it in the war seemed complete, and has been thought to have helped to bring about the fall of Danckelmann, for nine years the Elector's almost omnipotent Minister, who so late as 1695 had become President-in-chief of all the ministerial colleges or boards now to all intents and purposes dividing among them the business of the State. Ranke has, however, on the evidence chiefly of the despatches of the active diplomatist George Stepney, whom William III had sent on a special mission to Berlin, shown that the cruel treatment meted out to Danckelmann was mainly due to the influence of the Elector's second wife, Sophia Charlotte, the daughter of the Elector Ernest Augustus of Hanover and the Electress Sophia. The influence of Sophia Charlotte upon the intellectual life of her husband's Court and people will be noticed below; her action in the matter of Danckelmann was entirely governed by her anxiety to serve the interests of her father's House. The relations between that House and her consort's were during a long series of years marked by a vigilant jealousy, to which neither the intermarriages between them, and more especially her own (1684), nor the occasional periods of political cooperation between the two future joint directors of the *Corpus Evangelicorum* (from 1720), were able to put an end. The House of Brunswick-Lüneburg, though until the achievement of the English succession much less powerful than the Hohenzollerns, deemed itself unquestionably their superior in descent and ancestral greatness; and the Emperor had been delighted to accept the services of the Hanoverian Elector, his son, and his brothers, against the French and against the Turks, as balancing the less cordially welcomed aid of Brandenburg. Prince Maximilian William, one of the surviving four sons of the Elector Ernest Augustus, had, after the death of his elder brother Frederick Augustus in the Turkish Wars (1691), followed his example in protesting against the principle of primogeniture which his father had proclaimed in a will confirmed by the Emperor, and, in pushing this protest had, among others, applied with success to Danckelmann. The Brandenburg-Prussian Minister had thus shown himself to be in opposition to the dynastic ambition of the House of Hanover, at the root of which lay the determination to maintain the unity of all its dominions.

It was for this reason that Queen Sophia brought about the overthrow of Danckelmann (1697). His property was confiscated, and he was placed under close arrest at Peitz. The rigour of his confinement was not abated for five years; nor was it till after another five years that a partial amnesty was extended to him. He died in 1722, after receiving many signs of respect and confidence from the new King, Frederick William I. It had been largely his doing that, at the cost of many sacrifices and much disappointment, the Brandenburg-Prussian

Government had adhered to the House of Orange and the European alliance against France. There is no ground for the notion that, towards the close of his ministerial career, an inclination towards that Power becomes perceptible; and after his death foreign affairs were for a time at least conducted on the same lines as his own, mainly by Paul von Fuchs, one of the principal promoters of the English alliance.

Within a very few years after Danckelmann's fall, Frederick III was enabled to accomplish the object which to him was of paramount importance. The rapidity with which the transactions concerning the assumption of a royal Crown were at last brought to a successful conclusion, contrasts with their tentative and purely personal beginnings. Before 1693, when the negotiations on the subject between Frederick William and the Emperor began, there is no indication of the Elector having discussed it with his Ministers; and then the scheme found little favour with those whom he consulted—Danckelmann, Fuchs, and Privy Councillor Franz von Meinders—or with the Imperial ambassador Fridag. Too much has probably been made of the characteristic excess of zeal displayed in the matter by certain papal agents. It is certain, however, that at an early date the Curia offered its assistance through the skilful Italian Jesuit and convert-maker, Father Charles Maurice Vota. He was opposed to the French interest, having given up that of the Stewarts as a lost cause, and he commended himself in more ways than one to the Electress Sophia Charlotte, who, having been brought up simultaneously in three "religions," could afford to be impartial. The earliest document in the Prussian archives concerning the quest of a royal Crown is an artistic argument by Vota on the royal dignity and the best means of reaching it—to wit, "reunion," not, of course, conversion. Another Jesuit, also of considerable reputation at the time, Father Wolff (Baron Friedrich von Lüdinghausen), was brought into this more or less ingenious plot; and Bishop Zakuski would have gladly been mixed up in it, with a view perhaps to anointing the King at his coronation. Father Vota afterwards opined that too many negotiators spoiled the design; as a matter of fact, Frederick was as sound a Protestant at heart as his father had been before him.

In 1694 the great project had become known at Vienna, and the Emperor Leopold's first comment upon it was a very plain-spoken *non possumus*. Though, as has been seen, much trouble had been taken to modify this view, a fresh estrangement between the two Courts occurred in 1697, on the occasion of the death without heirs of Duke Gustavus Adolphus of Mecklenburg-Güstrow and the disputes as to the succession. The Lower Saxon Circle, represented by Brandenburg, Sweden and Brunswick-Lüneburg, offered a determined resistance to the attempt to sequester the Duke's inheritance; and the Brandenburg Minister (Nicolas von Danckelmann) was recalled from Vienna. In 1698, however,

his place was filled again by Friedrich Christian von Bartholdi, a skilful diplomatist, whose excellent advice to the Elector—to assume the Crown and then negotiate with the Emperor—was, however, not followed. The feeling of the older Brandenburg statesmen was against sacrificing the advantages of a “real policy” for a mere bauble; but it may be doubted whether in this case the instincts of the Elector did not guide him aright. They were seconded by his new chief Minister, Johann Casimir Kolbe, afterwards Count von Wartenberg, an indolent but servile courtier, under whom the real conduct of business was in the capable hands of the Secretary of State, Heinrich Rüdiger von Ilgen.

Religious considerations could not in this transaction be paramount with the Emperor Leopold, although he was too much under propagandist influences not to be desirous of drawing advantage out of it for the Church of Rome. But on this head the Elector Frederick adhered to his rights and duties as a Protestant Prince; and, while he made a trivial concession as to allowing the Catholic services at the Imperial Embassy in Berlin to be continued even during the ambassador’s absence, the final “Crown Treaty,” as it was called, contained no reference to the religious question except an engagement on the part of the Elector not to take advantage of religious controversies in the Palatinate (where there was in these years much grievous persecution of the Calvinists under the Neuburg Elector John William) for reprisals on his own Catholic subjects.

But what finally determined the head of the Austrian Habsburgs to yield to the Elector Frederick’s suit, was a motive of very direct political interest and profit. As has been shown in an earlier chapter, the Emperor Leopold I, whose assent to the secret agreement of 1668 for partitioning the Spanish monarchy had crippled the vigour of the foreign policy of Austria for a whole generation, had no share in the so-called First Partition Treaty of October, 1698. The death, in February, 1699, of the Electoral Prince Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria, whose claims that Treaty had recognised, placed the Emperor in so much more favourable a position that he was unwilling to agree to the Second Partition Treaty, concluded by France, England and the United Provinces in March, 1700, although it offered much more than the First had conceded to the Austrian claims. But it was no secret to the Emperor that if he stood out for the whole of the Spanish monarchy, he would have to make good this claim by the sword.

Charles II of Spain did not die till November 1, 1700; and before his death negotiations had been carried on between the Emperor and the Elector of Brandenburg for the “Crown Treaty” (*Krontractat*), settling the conditions of the Imperial assent to the assumption by the Elector of the royal Crown. This compact, into which both sides had entered with a very clear idea as to the nature of the situation, was signed on November 16, before as a matter of fact the news of the death of the

last Spanish Habsburg reached Vienna. The negotiations had been interrupted by ministerial changes at the Imperial Court, and their resumption was due to general political reasons, not to the intervention of Father Wolff, the importance of which has been much exaggerated. The Crown Treaty assured to the Elector Frederick the Imperial recognition of his title and status as King in Prussia, in return for his entering into certain engagements. First, he promised to furnish in the expected war with France troops to the number of 8000 men. This figure appears to have been taken from the secret treaty concluded between the Emperor Leopold and the Great Elector in 1686; but in that case the Emperor promised subsidies in return. In both cases the number was of course in excess of the scanty contingent of 1200 men required (according to the estimate of 1688, the year of the "Magdeburg Concert") from an Estate of the Empire whose fighting power was loosely reckoned at 50,000. Secondly, the Elector of Brandenburg was in all future Imperial elections to give the preference to princes of the House of Austria, and, thirdly, he was, in all important questions arising at the Diet, to vote on the side of that House, in so far as the interests of his own permitted. When the Imperial Elective Capitulations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are remembered, it seems preposterous to stigmatise this "Crown Treaty" as "humiliating" to the aspirant, who actually gained what he desired and what was in truth an indispensable condition for the future progress of his State.

Frederick now had the wish of his heart; and at Königsberg, on January 18, 1701, he placed on his head the royal crown, and then a second on the head of his consort, Sophia Charlotte, who would not have been herself or her mother's daughter, had she been so greatly impressed as he was by the solemnity of the occasion. After the King had assumed the crown, the ceremony of unction was performed by two clerics, a Lutheran and a Calvinist, who, as if to exemplify the maxim "No bishop, no king," had been "episcopated" for the purpose. In point of fact, Frederick I, as he was henceforth called, assumed and wore his Crown in absolute independence of any ecclesiastical authority on earth; and it has been justly observed that, unless it were the self-coronation of the excommunicated Emperor Frederick II at Jerusalem in the year 1229, history has to tell of few coronations so frankly "unspiritual" as that of his Prussian namesake. For the rest, it is on record that thirty-thousand horses had dragged to Königsberg what was thought requisite in the way of material for the display. The obsequious Count Kolbe von Wartenberg was, immediately after the royal princes, decorated by the King with the new Order of the Black Eagle. The virtually defunct German Order, the badge of whose High Master had undergone this last adaptation, was galvanised into giving its solitary support to the action of Pope Clement XI, who issued a brief admonishing the Catholic Powers from recognising the

new monarchy. The papal brief might, in other circumstances, have had some effect in the Rhinelands, where, however (at Cologne), a retort was published against it by the Halle Professor von Ludewig, under a title which Luther himself might have inspired¹.

Frederick I had well chosen the time for his coronation, more especially as the festivities accompanying it were prolonged for months instead of weeks. In May, 1702, the Empire together with the other members of the now consummated Grand Alliance, declared war against France; and the new "King in Prussia" put into the field a force of 14,000 men. This still left him free to use the larger part of his military resources as he thought best in influencing the course of the Northern War, in which the interests of his monarchy were even more closely concerned than in that of the Spanish Succession. Whatever side the Great Elector might have espoused in a conflict between Sweden on one side, and Poland and Denmark on the other, it is a tolerably safe assertion that he would not have left the occasion of such a conflict unutilised. At the opening of the Northern War in 1699, the Elector Frederick III had rendered to Sweden the great service of refusing to allow transit through his territory to 8000 Saxon troops, intended to hold Hanover and Celle in check; and in 1700 the Maritime Powers continued their efforts to keep Brandenburg out of the war. The Suedo-Danish conflict having been brought to a conclusion, the question was whether Frederick would, consistently with his previous refusal to Poland, prohibit the march through his dominions of the Swedish army moving upon Saxony. To keep Frederick William firm, Augustus II had, at an interview with him in Oranienbaum (January, 1700), promised not only to recognise the royal dignity which he had in view, but also to aid him towards the "better support of that dignity" by the acquisition of Swedish Pomerania. Frederick IV of Denmark having agreed to these undertakings, a Prussian force actually advanced to Leuzen, in the north-western corner of the Mark, in his support. The outbreak of the war with Russia (September, 1700) gave a new turn to the struggle. After the rout of the Russians at Narva (November), Frederick III would have played the part of mediator between Sweden and Poland, had this suited the plans and the temper of Charles XII, who declined to recognise the royal dignity soon afterwards assumed by the Elector, till he should have given convincing proofs of his friendly intentions. The Prussian efforts at mediation were renewed after the Swedish occupation of Courland in 1701; but the Swedish occupation of Poland continued through 1702, and the War continued to run its course without his official intervention.

In 1704, on the failure of the attempt, made with the aid of Marlborough (who visited Berlin in November), to induce Charles to

¹ *Päpstlicher Unfug wider die Krone Preussen.*

conclude peace, Frederick, as Droysen puts it, tried "another way." He offered Sweden an alliance "for the common security of the two Crowns, and a suitable advantage for each of them"—the security consisting in the restriction of the limits of Poland by a partition of some of her territories—the King in Prussia to be, in addition, brought forward as successor to the Polish Crown. The proposal was Ilgen's, who thought that the motto "*Nunc aut nunquam*" had never been more in season.

This partition project was once more urged upon Charles XII in the critical summer of 1705; and the death of Queen Sophia Charlotte on February 1 of that year, which led to a complete estrangement between Prussian and Hanoverian policy, helped to incline Prussia towards Sweden. In December Marlborough paid a second visit to Berlin, in order to keep Prussia neutral in the Northern War; but the effect of the further successes of the Swedish arms was irresistible, and in August, 1707, a "Perpetual Alliance" concluded between Sweden and Prussia guaranteed an armed aid of 6000 men on either side in the case of an attack on the other. Earlier in the year, Prussia had recognised Stanislaus as King of Poland in return for the Swedish acknowledgment of the Prussian ownership of Elbing—which however was not evacuated by the Swedish garrison. A weaker compact than this—except in instances of dire necessity—it would be difficult to find in the course of Prussian history.

With "Poltawa's day" (July 8, 1709), however, the entire situation changed. A fresh partition seemed now at hand, in which Prussia, with a force of 50,000 men in readiness, might secure "Royal" (Polish) Prussia, with Warmia and a protectorate over Courland. But a meeting of the "three Fredericks," held at Potsdam before the month of July was out, was very far from leading to definite results; and even on the Tsar Peter, with whom he had an interview at Marienwerder (October), Frederick I could not prevail to accept his plan for a Polish partition (between Prussia, Russia, and Poland), which had thus early become a cardinal principle of the eastern policy of Prussia. Nor was the scheme given up on the temporary adoption (March, 1710) of Ilgen's plan of neutralising the Swedish dominions within the Empire, until the Tsar decisively rejected this expedient for securing to Prussia some of the fruits of the conflict without obliging her to take up a distinct side in it. In August, 1711, the Russian and Polish-Saxon troops (some 24,000 in all) gave proof of the resentment which the attitude of Prussia had called forth in their Governments by marching through the Mark to unite with the Danish troops in Mecklenburg, and Prussia was no nearer a choice of sides than ever. At no time had a more obvious duty lain upon her than in 1712 of insisting upon the termination of a War which was making the German north-east the cockpit of the combatants; yet she stood hesitating and facing both ways amidst the conflict of Danish, Polish, Russian and Hanoverian ambitions excited by the imminent

collapse of the Swedish Power. In the midst of this conflict, the reign of Frederick I came to an end (February 25, 1713).

Thus the King who by his royal title professed to place the centre of gravity of his power in Prussia had failed to hold his own in this part of his monarchy, or on its north-eastern borders. On the other hand, his military resources played a prominent part in the great contest in western and central Europe, which it taxed all the diplomatic resources of the age to keep at all events in substance apart from the complications of the Northern War. In the War of the Spanish Succession, narrated in an earlier chapter, Prussian troops were engaged in large numbers, the contingent furnished by Frederick I rising to the very considerable height of 40,000 men; and they gained distinction at Blenheim, Turin, Ramillies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet—at which last battle the Crown Prince Frederick William was present. Yet the Peace of Utrecht, which Frederick I did not live to see concluded, brought with it only a very imperfect compensation for the sacrifices which the new kingdom had made on one side of Europe, while undergoing humiliations on the other. Nor is it certain that even such gains as accrued to Prussia would have been secured in the settlement, had not a more energetic monarch than Frederick I occupied his throne.

At least, however, the foreign policy of Frederick I had in northern affairs avoided any action which might have led to the disruption of his composite monarchy; and in the great contemporaneous conflict in central and western Europe it had proved true to the best traditions of his House and to those of the last period of his father's rule. Nor had he forgone any opportunity of rounding off, or otherwise supplementing, the straggling body of territories of which the Prussian State was composed. After the prolonged negotiations on the matter of the Orange inheritance, he cannot but have been deeply disappointed, on the death of William III (March 8, 1702, O.S.), to find that the last Prince of Orange of the old line had named as his heir John William Friso, Prince of Nassau-Dietz and Hereditary Stadholder of Friesland. The youthful heir's grandmother, Albertina Agnes, was the second surviving daughter of Prince Frederick Henry of Orange (the grandfather of William III), whereas Louisa Henrietta, the mother of Frederick of Prussia, was his eldest daughter. All that the King gained by his renunciation of the inheritance in its entirety was the possession of the countships of Lingens and Mörs, which were contiguous to the duchy of Cleves, and to which he, in 1707, added by purchase the countship of Tecklenburg. A more important series of purchases was made by him from his prodigal Saxon neighbour, at a total cost of 370,000 dollars—including, among other acquisitions immediate or on reversion, the hereditary bailiiffship (*Erbvogtei*) over the abbey of Quedlinburg, of which Augustus' discarded mistress, the celebrated Aurora von Königsmarck, was thus prevented from becoming Abbess, though she ultimately attained to the dignity of

Provost, of the foundation. On the frontier of Ducal Prussia the progressive system of extension could not be carried further by Frederick; on the other hand, he in 1707 acquired the principality of Neuchâtel, with the countship of Valengin, by his inheritance of the feudal rights of the House of Châlons. It has been suggested that the Prussian acquisition of Neuchâtel was designed as a step towards the annexation of Franche Comté. But, though in 1709 the allies did invade Franche Comté, it would be difficult to show that this operation was conducted with a view to the aggrandisement of the Prussian monarchy. Although the first Prussian King had thus not very largely augmented his territories, he had undeniably contributed to the power of his State and the prosperity of its population in ways more direct than that of the acquisition of a royal Crown. It has been seen how he steadily followed his father in fostering the growth of a standing army, which he gradually raised from a total of 30,000, or thereabouts, to one of nearly 50,000 men. Of even superior significance for the future—though dropped by his successor, and not revived within the next two reigns—was the attempt of Frederick I to form a militia, or reserve for purely defensive purposes, which he intended to consist of about 10,000 men. In any case, it is specially noticeable that the organisation of its army gave the first practical expression to the idea of a Prussian monarchy. Formally, of course, no such monarchy as yet existed; it was only in one section of his possessions, and with reference to that section (which did not form part of the Germanic Empire), that the Elector of Brandenburg bore the appellation of King. But, from 1701 onwards, his entire army was termed the royal Prussian army; and, furthermore, the several parts of the Brandenburg-Prussian State from which the levies for this army were drawn were called Prussian provinces—a term of great historic import, but for a long time without legal foundation.

Hand in hand with the advance towards political independence marked by the assumption of a royal Crown and the creation of a royal army went the emancipation from Imperial control of the jurisdiction obtaining in any part of the Brandenburg-Prussian territories. In 1701, the *privilegium de non appellando*, in accordance with which no appeals in the Brandenburg electorate went beyond the electoral Courts, was extended to the whole of the King-Elector's dominions; in the ensuing year, a Supreme Court of Appeal was established at Berlin. Thus the only remnant of the Imperial authority which remained in Brandenburg-Prussia consisted of the relatively insignificant military obligations to which the Empire could still lay claim.

Connected alike with the needs of an enlarged territorial military system and with the increase in the general expenditure of his Government were Frederick I's sustained endeavours for the furtherance

of economic progress. They proceeded for several years (1700-10) on the lines suggested by Luben von Wulffen for the creation of hereditary peasant tenures, till official interests interfered with the continuation of the system—providing for the cultivation of waste lands, encouraging continuous immigration, and preparing the abolition of serfdom. It would be an error to regard the reign of Frederick I as a period of retrogression or stagnation in respect of important questions of home administration; his Government, like himself, well knew that their endeavours were being sympathetically watched by Leibniz, and chronicled for the edification of posterity by Pufendorf.

Undoubtedly, the aspect under which the reign of Frederick I of Prussia is most readily remembered is the splendour with which he surrounded his newly established royal throne. He was not a ruler of genius, or even of inborn grandeur, like Louis XIV—he was, in truth, too sensitive about his personal dignity to be capable of merging it in that of his royal office; and there was, moreover, something so frankly self-centred in his love of show that Queen Sophia Charlotte on her death-bed could take comfort in the thought of the satisfaction which he would find in the arrangements for her funeral. But his reign was marked by the foundation of institutions of lasting importance for the advancement of learning and research. Such were the University of Halle, founded in 1694, and destined, after passing through a first period of florescence and being twice closed by Napoleon, to be revived, and to absorb the University of Wittenberg; the Academy of Arts (1696); and the Academy of Sciences, founded in 1700, on the initiative of Sophia Charlotte and her great philosopher and friend, Leibniz, whose political activity often went hand in hand with his scientific interests. He delighted in his rôle of intermediary between the Hanoverian and Prussian Courts, and was at least as much valued at Berlin and Lützenburg by Queen Sophia Charlotte as he was at Herrenhausen by her mother, the more light-hearted and perhaps less strong-willed old Electress Sophia. It is noteworthy, that the objects of the Berlin Academy included the preservation of the purity of the German tongue. Yet the language of the Prussian Court was French; and, as has been hinted in an earlier chapter, it was perhaps well for the future of the national literature that the German tongue should have been taught something of freedom and ease of movement by the very influence against which the instincts of the nation were already beginning to revolt.

Manifestly, the taste for things French at the Court and in the Brandenburg capital was materially advanced by the continued influx of French refugees into the Mark. By the close of the seventeenth century their numbers there had reached a total of 20,000; and this important addition to the most useful classes of the population had exercised a beneficial effect in various ways besides refining the life

of the Court and intensifying the Calvinistic dogmatism of certain of the strata of society. The French refugees of this period consisted of nobles (frequently military officers), merchants, manufacturers of high standing, and skilled workmen of proved efficiency. Frederick I consistently upheld his father's principle of allowing as much liberty of conscience as possible; and the fact that the royal family were Calvinists, while the great body of the population in both Brandenburg and Prussia remained Lutherans, could not but tell in favour of toleration. Nor should it be forgotten that among the select spirits of the age the hope was growing that the day was not far distant when a Reunion might be accomplished between the several varieties of Protestantism, perhaps even between Protestantism and Catholicism. Here, too, the influence of Leibniz was actively exerted, and it found a reflexion in the elevated piety of Sophia Charlotte, for which her son Frederick William had so little understanding that he called her "a bad Christian." Apart from the training of her son, whose thoughts and tastes could not fall in with *Télémaque*, Queen Sophia Charlotte had some troubled experiences at Berlin—more especially at the time of the ascendancy of Christian Cochius, a court-preacher of a perennial type. His opposition to the Queen's mundane influence typified by her patronage of the opera, was unworthily fomented by the Minister, Kolbe von Wartenberg, whose wife enjoyed the particular favour of the King. There can at the same time be little doubt that Sophia Charlotte, whose mind had many features in common with that of the greatest of her descendants, Frederick II, was unable to sympathise with some of the qualities most deserving of admiration in the character of her husband. Frederick I had inherited deep and ardent religious convictions from the Great Elector, whom he also resembled in his broad application of these principles to his system of government. Like his father, he favoured Calvinism *ceteris paribus*, and hated popery; but both were equally averse from all persecution and forcing of consciences; and Frederick I desired that even Catholics should retain the rights which, more especially in his western dominions, they possessed. In this he was of course influenced by his wish to remain on good terms with the Emperor; but even in remote Neuchâtel the Protestant character of his government was unmistakably emphasised, and Father Wolff's proposal to marry the Crown Prince to an Archduchess never had a chance.

But, though a sturdy Protestant at heart and one who preferred the Bible to all other books, and though ready to counteract the intrigues of the Saxon Lutherans by appointing Pietists to the Lutheran parsonages of the Mark, Frederick I was himself no Pietist; and Spener gained no real influence over his Court. The King's own desire was for a union of the two Protestant confessions in his dominions; and, with the aid of Bishop Daniel Ernst Jablonsky, he moved on more

rapidly in this direction than seemed judicious to Leibniz, whose fears were justified by the event.

Thus, on the whole, the reign of the first Prussian King not unfitly continues the long period of progress through which his State had passed before his assumption of a royal Crown. The population of his dominions, notwithstanding many obstacles, was steadily increasing; the public revenue had all but doubled; the resources of the territory were being developed; there was every reason for looking forward hopefully to the future. At a time when Spain was in collapse, though still capable of periodical patriotic effort—when France was brought to the verge of ruin by the sacrifices imposed upon her by the ambition of her master—when among the German electorates Saxony all but exhausted her resources in order to meet the exactions of the selfish voluptuary through whose person she was tied to Poland and the Palatinate, after having been once more brought to the verge of material ruin, was terrorised by religious persecution—Brandenburg-Prussia, in spite of adverse circumstances, of defects of administration, and of vast unprofitable expenditure upon the gewgaws of the Court, steadily progressed. There was nothing of greatness in King Frederick I, or, except in a few leading principles, in either the home or the foreign policy of his Government. But the history of his reign illustrates at least one valuable truth: that an advance in civilisation and refinement is not incompatible with progress in material prosperity and with the consolidation of those foundations on which is built up the real strength of a State. Still, these foundations needed to be yet more firmly laid before a political structure could be erected upon them that might take its place among the Great Powers of Europe. The accomplishment of this last preliminary task was reserved for the reign of Frederick I's successor.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE COLONIES AND INDIA.

(1) THE COLONIES.

BEFORE the middle of the seventeenth century a new stage had been reached in the spread of European activity into the continents and islands of the West. The younger maritime Powers had made good their claim to share in the opportunities which this vast colonial field disclosed. Breaking in upon the prized monopoly which Spain and Portugal had won by their earlier enterprise and happy fortune, Dutch, English, and French had opened the door to a new series of experiments in colony-planting and colony-government. As they secured their footholds in the New World and began to mark out the spheres of their ambition, they created new arenas of contest and developed new rivalries; so that their common hostility to Spain gradually lost its former importance, and ceased to provide the central thread of interest in their doings. The years that elapsed between the Treaties of Westphalia and Utrecht were years of the greatest activity in colonisation; but they were years of transition, when old issues and conditions were giving place to new, and when the field was being prepared for the long struggle between England and France which the eighteenth century was to witness. None the less they form a period of a very definite character, and with a conspicuous place in the history of the New World. For they saw the foundation and growth of colonies possessing a vitality and strength of their own—offshoots for the most part of the northern nations of Europe, springing up in the vacant spaces of the continent, and on the islands abandoned or lost by Spain. Over the centuries the race was to be to the settler rather than to the soldier or even to the trader. The competition of colonising genius was to continue the transference of colonial power which the competition of maritime strength had begun. Hence, not the least momentous question to which the events of these years gave an answer was whether the methods of English, French, and Dutch—in founding dependent communities, in fostering commerce, in the exploitation of forest, mine, and field, in the treatment of aboriginal peoples, and in strengthening the mother country with the resources of new lands—

would be more or less successful than those of their predecessors had been, or under the stimulus of competition might yet be. In the East, supremacy was destined to pass to the Power that most surely increased its prestige amongst the races of Hindustan, and at the same time secured for itself the mastery of the sea; but in the West, to the peoples who knew best how to turn the resources of a young country to the service of civilised man, and so to build new societies possessing unity, and the powers of self-help and growth.

It was for this reason that the Portuguese, in spite of the decline of their maritime strength, maintained a high rank as a colonising nation. In the growing wealth and commercial activity of their settlements in Brazil they found some compensation for the disasters which had befallen them in the Eastern Seas. From unpromising beginnings Brazil was mounting to a position of considerable importance. The cultivation of the sugar-cane, introduced by Jewish immigrants, had been attended with great success, and had become the staple industry of the country. The dense vegetation and the difficulties in the navigation of nearly all the streams prevented the colonist from penetrating far inland; but along the Atlantic shore, within a belt of land some twenty or thirty leagues wide, a number of settlements had been established, a few towns had been founded, and the mansions of the planters had steadily multiplied. The mother country could not supply the emigrants needed to people even this coast-belt, apart from the vast interior of the continent which she claimed; and, what was more, sugar-planting, though it offered a fairly extensive field for the employment of capital, made but a small demand for European labour. Nevertheless, the progress of the colony had been continuous; and, at a time when the colonial empire of the Portuguese seemed likely to succumb beneath the weight of a defective administration and before the relentless rivalry of the Dutch, it became evident that in South America the race had planted firm roots. The story of Brazil shows how a young society, if allowed sufficient free play, may maintain itself in spite of the enfeeblement of the mother country, and even replenish the veins of her energy with its own life.

Nothing could have been more gratifying to King John IV than the part which his Brazilian subjects played in freeing themselves from the dominion of the Dutch West India Company. Their uprising had followed closely upon the return of the Dutch Governor, Count Maurice of Nassau, to Holland in 1644, and soon assumed a formidable character. Though some of the insurgents were mere desperadoes, they were led by men of undoubted ability and patriotism, and enjoyed the sympathy of every section of the community—so strong was the hatred which the Dutch, as conquerors and as Protestants, had inspired. With the mulatto, Fernandes Vieira, who was the soul of the movement, were associated the Indian Camarão, Vidal de Negreiros, a white, and the courageous negro Henrique Dias. Had it been possible for King John

to have intervened openly on their behalf, the success of the revolt might have been earlier assured, and years of devastating war spared the country. But Portugal, too weak to contend with a strong maritime Power for the recovery of her colonies while waging a war of independence with the Spanish monarchy, was bound to wait upon events. Meantime, in the Treaty of Münster, in 1648, the United Provinces asserted their colonial interests with no small success; and, among other concessions from Spain, received permission to regain, if they could, the ground which they were losing in Brazil. To Philip IV, intent on the subjugation of Portugal, it seemed good policy to let loose the Dutch on her possessions in America and elsewhere, provided that no injury was inflicted thereby on the commerce of Spain. But the course of events was slowly demonstrating that, in the suppression of the Portuguese rising, the Dutch Company was committed to a larger enterprise than it was capable of carrying through. From the time when, in 1647, Vieira decoyed a Dutch force into a narrow pass through the Guararapes hills, and inflicted upon it a severe defeat, circumstances began to combine irresistibly against the Dutch. In 1649, the Portuguese Crown so far departed from its traditional policy as to permit the establishment of a Brazil Company on the lines of the great commercial companies of the day, which enlisted private enterprise in the struggle for national possessions. When, three years later, the Dutch were involved in war with the English, the end was near. Vieira concentrated his efforts on the capture of Recife—through which the enemy received reinforcements and supplies—and, with the assistance of the new Brazil Company's fleet, reduced it in 1654, thus expelling the Dutch from their last foothold in Brazil. Yet not until 1661 did the Dutch resign themselves to their loss. Brazil, with its excellent situation for the commerce of the world, its convenient havens for recruiting ships and equipping privateering expeditions, its sugars, the best then produced, its rare woods, was too dear to the merchant's heart to be surrendered so long as the least hope of its recovery could be cherished. But, when both Charles II and Louis XIV, having resolved that the Dutch should not recover Pernambuco, threatened to intervene if the war were continued, the States made peace, and recognised the restoration of Portuguese rule in northern Brazil, in return for a payment of four million *cruzados* in money or commodities.

The Dutch had failed, primarily, because they had not mastered the difficult art of conquest. Factories and forts, and small islands with their few inhabitants, might easily be passed from nation to nation; but the problem of subjecting a European community to a foreign rule was of another character. It needed the imagination, tact, and statesmanship of Count Maurice of Nassau for its solution. So long as he remained Governor of the conquered provinces, all seems to have gone well. His liberal dealing with the Portuguese planters enabled them to turn their attention to the cultivation of their estates, instead of plotting rebellion.

His noble palace in the midst of spacious gardens "stored with all kinds of trees, fruits, flowers and greens which either Europe, Africa or both the Indies could afford" suggested the splendour of a new era of prosperity dawning on the colony with the advent of Dutch energy. While he sought to win the loyalty of the Portuguese, and warned the Company of the instability of a dominion based on force alone, he did not forget the importance of introducing a Dutch population into the country. But, on his departure, the Company returned to their original idea of the conquest as "a mere commercial speculation." In their desire for immediate profit they sacrificed their permanent interests. They weakened their military strength by frugal administration, and at the same time embittered their subjects by a harsh and oppressive policy. The result has been already told. Thus was terminated "the most striking and brilliant chapter in the annals of seventeenth century colonial enterprise." What was more, with the expulsion of the Dutch from Brazil, there perished the fairest opportunity that has ever existed for the planting of a Teutonic community in a continent where the Latin races have held continuous sway, for bringing Teutonic persistence and endurance, in close cooperation with Latin versatility, to exploit the great resources of South America.

From this time for thirty years the growth of the colony proceeded quietly enough. Such difficulties as the colonists encountered were chiefly of internal origin. The prosperity of the northern provinces had been seriously affected by the long and devastating struggle with the Dutch, and Bahia began to take the lead in agriculture and commerce. Sugar remained the staple product. Both climate and soil favoured its cultivation. The many small streams that intersected the coast rendered important service to the planters, driving their mills and making it easy to convey the produce to the sea. Negro labour was obtainable through the Guinea trade and was in great demand. At each sugar-producing *engenho*, or mill, from fifty to a hundred slaves were required. At first Indians had been employed, but they were unwilling workers, and before the middle of the seventeenth century their numbers in the older captaincies had been exhausted. Slave-driving expeditions into the interior were frequently made, especially by the inhabitants of San Paulo, to stock the slave-markets of the coast; but the planters were obliged to rely more and more upon negroes brought from Africa. In defence of the Indians against their conquerors the Jesuits fought a hard battle. They desired to see the various tribes settled in orderly communities under ecclesiastical and not civil control, and to free them from slavery and from indefinite exactions of work, tantamount to slavery, on the Portuguese plantations. In this design they had the sympathy of the Crown; but they were contending against the relentless nature of the Portuguese planter and the hard facts of the economic situation. It is difficult to say how far the position of the Indian was improved by the continual legislation on his behalf. The

authority of the mother country was not often at this time very strongly asserted in Brazil, and repeated enactments of laws argue repeated breaches of them. But the introduction of negroes in increasing numbers must have relieved the Indians, and in the course of the eighteenth century their freedom became a reality. Negro labour was not without its problems. In the cities, and later at the mines, the negroes seem to have enjoyed much liberty; but that their life on the plantations was not an easy one may be concluded from the numbers that escaped into the interior. For more than half a century runaway slaves were permitted to collect in strength at positions on the San Francisco River, called from the groves which surrounded them the *Palmairas*. Here they organised a formidable community, which, when it was broken up in 1695, was said to contain a population of eighty thousand.

Concentration on sugar production naturally affected other industries and other branches of agriculture. Tobacco-growing proved less profitable. The interesting experiments in the culture of spice-plants brought from the East Indies yielded little result, though for this the distraction from agricultural pursuits that followed the later gold discoveries was perhaps largely responsible. The wonderful facilities for horse- and cattle-rearing which parts of the country possessed were not much developed, though Nieuhoff spoke of this resource, together with "the great plenty of fish," as "the two main pillars of the State of Brazil." Large quantities of provisions had always to be imported from Portugal, the Azores, and the Canary Islands, and the cost of living was in consequence very high. But under the liberal commercial policy of the mother country the trade of the colony continued to flourish. No privileged Company at this time monopolised and limited it. Vessels sailed from Portugal in regular squadrons as from Spain; but they came in larger numbers, and called not at one or two but at several ports. Wines, some foodstuffs, and most kinds of apparel and utensils—for in Brazil there was little industry save shipbuilding at Bahia—were imported from Europe, and exchanged against the produce of the plantations, forests, fisheries, and mines of Brazil. A smaller class of ship traded with Guinea, "making very good returns." The mercantile spirit affected the whole population. Neither the clergy nor officials could be restrained from trading; and the latter, owing partly to their insufficient salaries, connived freely at the contraband with foreign vessels calling at the ports.

Though most of the noble houses of Portugal were represented in Brazil, there was no division into classes or castes such as existed in the Spanish colonies. Custom established firmly the idea of social equality. "Every barber, shoemaker and tailor struts with his sword and dagger, and looks upon himself as equal to any officer in the colony because his face is of the same complexion." So writes a French traveller in 1717. Printing was not permitted, and education was under the control of the Jesuits, whose college at Bahia was said to be "the largest, fairest and

most finished building in the city." The Church was rich and well organised; the clergy were exceedingly numerous; and there were many convents of the great religious Orders. The administration of justice was notoriously corrupt, and the authority of the Crown weak and often set aside. But, though order and security were at times wanting, the freedom from oppressive regulation which the colony enjoyed had been one of its principal attractions and had contributed to its progress in various ways.

It was partly in consequence of these political conditions that the peace of the provinces was occasionally broken. The Portuguese system of colonial government lent itself to oppression and corruption; and the colonists, possessing no representative institutions, expressed their sense of grievances in an uprising against the colonial authorities. It was seldom that they exhibited any disloyalty to the mother country. In 1684 a most serious outbreak—not the first—occurred in Maranhão, a young border settlement which lived a troubled life. The insurgents complained of a commercial monopoly in Maranhão and Para which had been granted to some Lisbon merchants, and of the influence of the Jesuits, who were endeavouring to protect the Indian population. In this case the difficulties of the home Government were complicated by the possibilities of French interference from Cayenne. In Gomes Freyre, however, whom they despatched to the province, they found an officer of tact and strength equal to the occasion. He restored the authority of the Crown, but recommended the abolition of the monopoly and the introduction of negroes to meet the scarcity of labour from which the plantations were suffering. More injurious to Brazil was the civil war which distracted Pernambuco in 1710–1, originating in a long-standing rivalry between Olinda and Recife. The latter, after several unsuccessful applications, had at last been promoted to the dignity of a town. Many of the Pernambucans resented the aggrandisement of Recife, with its population of commercial immigrants, and ruined themselves in an unsuccessful struggle against the will of the mother country.

In the last years of the seventeenth century the long-hoped-for gold discoveries were made in San Paulo. It had been perhaps no disadvantage to Brazil that for two centuries the inhabitants had remained undisturbed by mining enterprises, and had concentrated their attention on the resources offered by its fertile soil, thus laying sure the foundations of an agricultural colony. A large influx of population into San Paulo resulted. Settlers, allured by the gold, pushed their way up to the source of the San Francisco. Mining camps became villages, and before 1715 several towns were created. In 1710 San Paulo was organised as a province; and, in 1720, Minas Geraes, the mining region, was detached from San Paulo and declared a captaincy. As was to be expected, a period of great disorder at the mines followed the discoveries. The mining population was divided into two parties. On the one side, the *Paulistas*, or natives of the province, a strenuous independent race, sprung

from Portuguese convicts transported to Brazil, who had intermarried with the Indians, and whose numbers had been recruited by adventurers from all parts of South America; on the other side, the strangers who had flocked to the place, and who were collectively known as *Forasteiros*. Constant disputes between individuals of the two parties ended at last in a civil war, 1708-10, and in the improvisation of a Government by the leader of the *Forasteiros*, Manoel Nunes Viana. Finally, the Governor of the Rio, Antonio de Albuquerque, restored order; and the authority of the Crown was for the first time enforced in San Paulo.

The gold discoveries, though they did not prove of very great importance, affected the whole life of the colony. Planters found it difficult to procure labour for their plantations, and more profitable to employ their slaves at the mines. The cultivation of sugar, tobacco, and other agricultural crops suffered in consequence, and the exports of agricultural produce soon showed a serious falling off. This was of course much to the advantage of the West India Sugar Islands, whose great age began now to dawn. To the concern of the Portuguese, the gold which was conveyed to Europe passed on from Lisbon through the ordinary channels of commerce to the English and Dutch, who provided the larger part of the commodities which the colony imported. Moreover, when treasure fleets began to sail from Rio de Janeiro, pirates began to infest the coasts continuously. The Portuguese suffered especially during the War of the Spanish Succession. In 1710 a French expedition under Du Clerc made an attempt upon Rio. It failed disastrously, but in the following year a second expedition under the command of Du Guay Trouin, fitted out as a speculation by a syndicate of private persons, proved more successful. In the presence of a considerable Portuguese force the town was pillaged and held to ransom for 600,000 *cruzados*. This discreditable incident advertised the weakness of the colony, and it is not surprising that in 1714 the French prepared to repeat their venture. But Du Cassard, who commanded the third fleet, was content to molest some of the smaller sugar islands.

If the whole period be considered, Brazil was fortunate in its comparative immunity from attack, and in the expansion and definition of its boundaries. In the north, settlement was extended in Maranhão and Para, and the conquest of Piauí was undertaken. The apprehensions awakened by the French in this neighbourhood were removed; for by the Peace of Utrecht they resigned all claim to the country between the Amazon and the Wiapoc, and acknowledged the sovereignty of Portugal over both banks of the great river. Exploring expeditions in search of trade or slaves penetrated far into the interior, and disturbed and repelled the Jesuit missions to the Indians, which were advancing inland from Quito and civilising the tribes on the Marañon, the Huallaga, and the Ucayali. The design which the Spaniards had entertained in 1640 of occupying the valley of the Amazon, and using this great stream as

the means of outlet for the treasure of Peru, instead of the pirate-infested Caribbean Sea, had never been pursued, and was now completely frustrated. In the south the Portuguese wished the Rio Plata and the Rio Uruguay to form their western frontier, and in 1680 they established Nova Colonia to prevent the Spanish from colonising in the vicinity of the Uruguay. This post, however, was seized by the Spanish during their war with the Allies; and, though it was restored to Brazil in 1715, no settlement of the boundary question could then be reached.

That the colonial power of Spain continued throughout the seventeenth century to decline relatively to that of every other great colonising nation, there can be little doubt—whether the comparison be made on the basis of the prosperity and strength of the colonial communities which were being built up; or whether Spain be judged by her own ends, and the advantages which the colonies yielded to the mother country in tribute and trading profits, and as a field of employment for a needy aristocracy, be chiefly considered. The former standard Spain always and deliberately set aside. To plant active and self-dependent societies in the lands which she had conquered was an ambition alien to her genius and her history. In some respects her conception of colonisation was narrower than that of any other people of her time. All sought to utilise the resources of the new lands for the upbuilding of their own strength; but Spain continued to concentrate her attention on, and measure her success by, the volume of treasure transported to her from the New World. Learning little and forgetting little, though the art of colonisation was being rapidly transformed, she pursued throughout these years her historic course, adding new territory by the sword, exploiting principally its mineral resources, and seeking to administer it in such a manner that it would yield an ample revenue to the Crown. Her maritime power suffered a woeful decline, but she still retained her grip upon her vast dominions. The buccaneers raided exposed ports and preyed upon the routes of commerce; English, French, and Dutch seized outlying islands in the West Indies, and sometimes spread panic along the coasts; but no nation ever gained upon the mainland such a foothold as the Dutch acquired in northern Brazil. Cromwell conceived a joint attack by England and Holland on the colonies of Spain and Portugal; but his great scheme was never realised, and bore no fruit beyond the capture of Jamaica in 1655. Fertile fields for the energies of the younger maritime Powers were opening elsewhere. Colonisation and not conquest occupied their attention. Hence they ceased to covet the possession of Spain's immense territory, and, though they still disputed with her for a share in its commerce, desiring especially the precious metals of which it enjoyed so bountiful a store, they left her mistress of the great continental empire she had founded and of the large islands which lay unpeopled and undeveloped in the Caribbean Sea.

The domestic history of the Spanish colonies in the Viceregal period

was not eventful. Their political and administrative organisation had been completed in the sixteenth century, and is described elsewhere in this work. At Lima and Mexico the Viceroy ruled in state, endowed with absolute authority, though unable always to exercise it in the remoter parts of their vast dominions. Complaints of their actions might be presented to the Crown by the *audiencias*, the supreme judicial and administrative bodies; and, as was the case with all other colonial officials, their conduct was subjected to an enquiry on the conclusion of their term of office. The powers possessed by the *cabildos*, or town councils, and the *consulados*, or commercial chambers, of Mexico and Lima, were too slight to enable these bodies to modify the character and spirit of so carefully organised a system of absolute government. The life of the country was quiet, even stagnant; it moved in fixed channels, and lacked the elasticity of development that often marks the first stages of a young society's progress. The uprisings that disturbed the peace of Brazil, the murmur of political liberty heard in the English colonies were unknown in Peru and Mexico; though there was at times much turbulence in the mining districts, where an idle population assembled, and where speculators disputed for the possession of valuable claims. In 1667 the lawlessness of Potosí became a scandal, and the Count of Lemos, Viceroy at the time, was compelled to repair to the district, where he restored order with an unusual fierceness. It was difficult also, owing to the weakness of Spain at sea, to protect the coasts from the raids of enemies and to prevent contraband trading. But, as the Spanish population was comparatively small, and the greater part lived in towns, which were generally well garrisoned, the authority of the Viceroy over their subjects was maintained unquestioned. Equally unquestioned was the submission of the colony to the mother country. This was partly a result of Spanish methods of colonisation and of the attention lavished on the problem of governing dependencies. Without faith in her own offspring, Spain was more concerned to weaken than to strengthen her colonies, and precautions were redoubled to ensure their attachment to the empire. The authority of the Crown, the Church, and the nobility, the three principal agents in Spanish colonisation, followed swiftly in the footsteps of the conquering generals; and the political conditions of the mother country were speedily reproduced in the colony. A despotic Government, so organised that its different parts should act as a check upon each other, suspected by the Crown and suspicious of the Creole, laboured to raise a large revenue for transmission home. A wealthy Church, with numerous clergy and monastic establishments and magnificent buildings, pressed upon the productive resources of the country. The tribunal of the Inquisition, enjoying great power, sat in the capital cities, supervised conduct, and repressed heresy. A needy nobility shared out large portions of the land in huge estates. Amongst the people in general, law and custom combined

to stereotype a caste division, which fixed the social position of a man and his legal rights according to the shade of colour which his skin exhibited. The mother country encouraged the antagonism which thus separated the various classes of her subjects, and felt her authority the more secure on this account. But it was impossible to build a strong and progressive community by setting the home-born white against the native white, the white against the half-breed, the coloured man against the white man, the negro against the Indian.

In exploiting their transatlantic possessions the Spanish instinctively diverted much of their energy to the search for the precious metals. There were silver mines in Peru, at Potosí, Oruro, Corocoro, and Castro Vireyna, and quicksilver mines at Guancavelica. The mineral deposits of Mexico were richer still and more easily worked. The large mining population offered a considerable demand for foodstuffs, chiefly wine, flour, and maize, which were often transported over a great distance, as well as for utensils and clothing, which were manufactured, to some extent by the Indians, at Lima and other towns. But from various causes the general resources of the colonies were ill developed. The huge estates granted out to the nobility and the Church were an obstacle to the free disposition of land; and this, together with the absence of agricultural immigrants, the distaste for agriculture exhibited by the Creole, and the possibility of compelling the Indians and the numerous slaves to undertake all necessary cultivation, forbade the extension and prosperity of agricultural settlement. Moreover difficulties of transport and an unwise commercial policy limited the market for produce both at home and abroad. From the generations born in a country more is usually to be expected than from the immigrant. But the Spanish Creole was allowed no sufficient scope for his ability. Civil, military, and high ecclesiastical offices, the best professional positions, the leading branches of trade and manufactures, the high posts at the mines, the large plantations, were all monopolised by the home-born Spaniard. Partly because of this the Creole became apathetic. He scorned agriculture and aspired to belong to the lettered professions, the Law and the Church, to live idly, and to obtain some title commanding social rank. Hence it came about that so large a part of a small Spanish population was located in the towns, and consisted of clergy, officials, soldiers, lawyers, and merchants.

The government of the Indians offered a most difficult problem, to which a summary in a later volume will recur. Their labour was of great importance in the economic life of America. Indians were drafted into its mines, its industries, and its pearl-fisheries. They were the principal cultivators of the soil, carried out works of necessity such as road-making and bridge-building, and paid a tribute to the Crown which formed a considerable item in its income. Ever since the writings and appeals of Las Casas had thrown a lurid light on the fate of these unfortunate people, the Spanish Government had been

engaged in a long struggle on their behalf against the opinion, interests, and practices of its other colonial subjects. The Indians at this time generally lived in villages of their own, were governed by the descendants of their old lords, and for their better protection were maintained in a state of "perpetual minority." But the forced services which they had to render laid them open to the grossest maltreatment. The report of the licentiate Padilla in 1657 revealed terrible abuses still existing in the mining districts of Peru, and led to new ordinances being promulgated which the Count of Lemos laboured to enforce. The presence of Jesuit missionaries, the absence of mines, the introduction of negroes, were all circumstances that in different places contributed to improve the lot of the Indian, and to enable the will of the Government concerning him to take effect. But wherever economic needs provided the excuse, the heaviest burdens of all kinds were inflicted upon this most helpless section of the community. With the tribes in the neighbourhood of the Parana, the Jesuits during the seventeenth century carried out an interesting experiment in the treatment of weaker races and in state-building. Gathering them in villages and excluding all Europeans, they organised a socialist community under ecclesiastical management. They were not less active on the upper waters of the Amazon, where their explorations added much, and might have added very much more, to the boundaries of Peru.

The profits which Spain drew from her colonies suffered considerable diminution during these years. Wars with the Araucanians in Chili, and with the Indian peoples on the northern boundaries of Mexico, led to new additions of territory; but, together with the losses from the raids of the buccaneers and outlays for improving the defences of the ports and equipping cruisers to protect commerce and prevent smuggling, they often swallowed up much of the surplus revenue. Even under normal conditions, some parts of the empire scarcely repaid the cost of their government. In 1718 a third vice-royalty, New Granada, was carved out of northern Peru, in the hope that better administration would extract a larger income from this part of the continent. But what was really more unfortunate for Spain was the dwindling away of her colonial trade. In its broadest features her commercial policy had not been illiberal towards her colonies. No systematic effort had been made to shackle their industrial and agricultural progress in favour of producers at home. Skilled artisans were permitted to migrate to America, and the province of Quito numbered an industrial element in its population. If the Spanish colonies were economically backward, it was their social organisation and the character of their people that placed the greatest restraints on their productive powers. None the less, the manner in which the mother country conducted her commerce with her dependencies was most injurious both to herself and to them. The *Casa de Contratacion*, which administered the economic affairs of

America, pushed its regulations into the minutest details. Never perhaps has a Government lavished so much care only to repress the energies of its subjects and to ruin their commerce. Moreover, between 1503 and 1720 the trade of the Indies was a monopoly of the merchants of Seville, and, on the other side of the Atlantic, was controlled by a few business-houses in Mexico and Lima; both groups of merchants forming in fact, though not in name, a privileged Company, and consulting their own interests by limiting the exchange of goods in order to maintain high prices.

For the sake of security all goods were carried across the Atlantic by annual fleets sailing in two great divisions—the *flota*, to Vera Cruz, to supply the wants of New Spain; the *galleons*, to Cartagena and Portobello, where was transacted the business of Peru. No large commerce could be developed under these conditions. The tonnage of the two fleets, never exceeding 27,500, steadily decreased, and their voyages became more and more irregular. At the same time, an inviting opportunity was extended to traders of other nations, which, as Spain lost her power upon the sea, and Dutch, English, and French strengthened their positions in the West Indies, was eagerly grasped. Curaçoa, Jamaica, and St Domingo became centres of a contraband trade which gradually assumed large proportions and a regular organisation. Hence it came about that, under the pressure of circumstances, Spain was compelled to surrender parts of her cherished monopoly. During the War of the Succession she opened her American ports to the French, and by the Treaty of Utrecht she granted important privileges to the English—securing to them on the one hand, the *Asiento*, or monopoly for thirty years of the slave-trade between her colonies and Africa, which, since 1696, had been held first by a Portuguese and then by a French Company; and, on the other, the right to send one small vessel to the annual fair at Cartagena. In the struggle to retain her commerce against the superior activity of the younger maritime Powers she had failed more decisively than in the struggle to retain her territory.

But nothing contributed so much during these years to transform the aspect of the colonial world, as the great work of colonisation which the English and French had begun in the northern continent and the West Indian Islands. On the St Lawrence, the French after a hard struggle had overcome the initial difficulties of agricultural settlement. Their progress had at first been halting and slow, and, in 1660, the colony founded by Champlain at Quebec in 1608 still ran risks of starvation or of extinction at the hands of the Indians. But Louis XIV and Colbert, by systematic and unremitting attention, rescued the settlers from their precarious conditions, and to a few fur-trading posts and Jesuit mission stations added a small community of *seigneurs* and peasantry. Strange contrasts presented themselves in the life of the New France which they created. Constructed on the model of Old France, ruled absolutely and in petty details by a paternal government, under the control of a not less

exacting ecclesiastical discipline, it remained the nursling of the parent State; and yet it included a most lawless element in the *coureurs de bois*, who explored, traded, and carried French sovereignty far into the lakes and streams of the interior, as well as formed a nucleus from which French ambition and power began to expand across the continent. The mother country gave freely of her talent to the colony, which seldom wanted for pioneers, soldiers, or visionaries. Indeed, if imperial thinking would have sufficed to win an empire, the French in 1715 were on their way to success in America. But New France suffered from its inability to attract settlers. The decision to exclude the Huguenots destroyed the best chance of remedying this radical defect, and thus left it doubtful whether the French on the St Lawrence possessed or could obtain the necessary material basis for the realisation of their ambitious dreams—the great mass of rank and file, peasants, artisans, traders, mechanics, on whose efforts all solid dominion must ultimately rest.

Along the Atlantic shore, where groups of English settlements were clustered, the record of progress had been of a different character. The activity in colonisation which marked the reign of Charles II had resulted in the foundation of the Carolinas and of Pennsylvania, and in the conquest, in 1664, of the Dutch colony on the Hudson River. This last acquisition was of no small importance, as it secured to the English an uninterrupted control of the coast which they had chosen as the principal field of their enterprise. The barrier of the Alleghanies prevented the colonists from penetrating far inland, and narrowed the space upon which they worked out the origins of their history. Hence, perhaps, their lack of the imperial imagination of the French leaders at Quebec, and the concentration of their energies upon internal development, social, political, and economic. Located on the margin of the sea, they were becoming a maritime and commercial people, quick-witted and practical. Close settlement, the growth of towns and townships, fostered intercommunication and a progressive civilisation, besides encouraging an independent political spirit. Many circumstances contributed to their prosperity. They enjoyed a climate congenial and familiar, with a reliable rainfall; they possessed abundance of fertile land with satisfactory land laws; the resources of their country were very great and wanted only the strenuous labourer; dense forests provided the materials of a lumbering industry; there were rich fisheries in the adjoining seas; there were wide opportunities for commerce with each other, the mother country, and her West Indian dependencies. In addition, the religious troubles of Charles II's reign, conducing to a flow of emigration from England, furnished them with many excellent colonists. Hence, though they suffered, as almost every colony at an early stage of development suffers, from an inadequate supply of labour and capital, their progress was sure and continuous, and proceeded from a secure basis.

The ideas of colony-building which animated the Governments of

France and Spain found little counterpart in English policy. With the purely internal affairs of her colonies the mother country seldom interfered. She grew more and more determined during this period so to regulate their commerce and industry as to increase to the greatest extent possible her own strength and that of her dominions as a whole; but, save for this, she made few attempts to fashion their life in a particular mould. In the matter of colonial government she was not less original. Instead of following the example of Spain, England embarked on untravelled seas of political experiment. In America and the West Indies the colonists were permitted to develop their own institutions, and their political ties with the mother country were exceedingly slight. Hence the colonists formed townships and town-meetings, instituted juries, justices of the peace and popular assemblies, enjoyed a free Press, the *Habeas Corpus*, and the right of self-taxation; and they resisted the interference of Proprietors, Companies and Parliaments, confidently believing that they bore with them in their persons to the colonies the rights and liberties won by their ancestors in many historic struggles. By the commencement of the Hanoverian period the constitutional development of most of the colonies was complete. On the whole they had gravitated to a common type. The normal constitution consisted of a Governor appointed by the Crown, with an advisory council and an elective assembly; and the general tendency, since the British Government did little to give its representatives a position of dignity and strength in their respective colonies, was for the executive to be weak and the popularly elected body to be strong. The organisation of government was usually simple and free, and yet sufficiently complete to ensure order and security. Political conditions were thus eminently favourable to economic growth.

On the whole, then, the colonial methods of England were in advance of those of other nations. She sought treasure by mercantilist rather than bullionist methods. The strong side of her policy showed itself in the liberty of action which her colonists enjoyed; and, if we except those regulations which closed up for them the avenues of commerce, and which they could not evade, it was a policy well calculated to ensure their progress. Its weak side—as seen in the light of later events—was the neglect of the problem of attaching the colony to the mother country. A feeling of self-dependence was fostered in the daughter communities, while their relations to the mother country in some important respects were left without being exactly determined. At the same time, under the directing influence of a “national scheme of commercial and industrial policy,” a commercial pact, arranged by the mother country and frequently producing much irritation in her dependencies, was gradually elaborated, to form the chief bond between the component parts of the empire. No doubt, the strength of England in her struggle with France was by this means increased. No doubt, also, that the

loyalty of the Americans remained unshaken while they lacked much sense of unity, and lived in constant need of protection from the designs of their neighbours, the French. But it seems equally true that the English exhibited more genius for establishing colonies than for founding an empire. None the less it was the settlement of this great coast-belt of North America, more than anything else, which during these years raised England so high in the rank of colonising nations, enlarged her commerce, and built up her sea-power.

If, on the mainland, the French, in spite of their wider ambitions, secured less solid results than the English, they shared the honours more equally in the West Indies. Here, too, the Dutch, in the capacity of traders rather than of colonists, played a conspicuous part; and both Danes and Swedes, attracted by the profits of commerce and piracy, obtained a foothold. Since most of the small islands had been abandoned by Spain, and were seldom found to be occupied by hostile tribes of Indians, while the success of sugar and tobacco cultivation had demonstrated their great commercial value, the competition for their possession between the incoming nations, particularly between the French and English, was very keen, and the story of its progress is of great importance. In 1650 the Spaniards still held the inner and greater islands, Cuba, Hispaniola, Porto Rico, and Jamaica; though in Hispaniola French buccaneers were laying the foundations of the prosperous French colony of St Domingo. English, French, and Dutch divided amongst themselves the group of islands afterwards known as the Leeward Islands. The French occupied Guadaloupe and Santa Cruz, claimed Dominica, and shared St Kitts with the English and St Martin with the Dutch. The Dutch owned Saba and Eustatia. Antigua, Nevis, Montserrat, Anguilla had all been colonised by the English from St Kitts. To the Windward Islands the French had already paid considerable attention. They possessed Martinique, claimed St Vincent, and had attempted to settle Grenada and St Lucia. Near by was Barbados, the most flourishing of the English colonies, but not, like St Kitts, the mother of many new settlements. Further to the south Trinidad was still occupied by a few hundred Spanish, and Tobago, abandoned by the English, was in the hands of the Dutch. Such was the case also with Curaçoa, Oruba, and Buen Ayre, which lay some distance to the west, close to the Spanish Main.

The great European Wars waged during the next seventy years were one and all attended by conflicts in the West Indies; and yet on the whole they did not very seriously change the positions of the different Powers in these regions. In 1655 the English captured Jamaica, and entered the inner ring of the Spanish possessions, whence they were soon after enabled to secure a foothold on the Belize River and Campeachy Bay, two districts on either side of the peninsula of Yucatan famous for log-cutting and contraband trading. The Dutch War of 1664-7 was full of incident in the West Indies, as in many parts of the

world. By the Treaty with which it closed the English agreed, amongst other things, to hand over to the Dutch the colony on the Surinam River, on which Lord Willoughby, Governor of Barbados, had lavished his private fortune, and whence he afterwards transferred many of the settlers to Jamaica. The War, terminated by the Peace of Nymegen, brought seasons of great anxiety to the English islands. In 1677 Comte d'Estrées appeared in the Caribbean Sea with twenty splendid vessels, but after taking Tobago he was lured by the Dutch into a dangerous channel, where part of his fine squadron perished miserably. A few years of comparative peace followed. English and French disputed over the sovereignty of the Windward Islands, and at times talked of arranging a treaty of neutrality to apply to the West Indies. In 1689 a powerful French fleet again appeared and inflicted severe losses on both English and Dutch. During this first war of William III's, the English planned several great expeditions to America, hoping by a successful offensive stroke to destroy the French sugar-trade and to drive the French from Martinique, Hispaniola, and Canada. Yet all failed, owing to quarrels between the services and the gross mismanagement of the departments at home. In the Peace of Ryswyk Spain recognised the French occupation of the west of Hispaniola, as, in 1670, she had recognised the English conquest of Jamaica; and at the Peace of Utrecht the French surrendered to the English their part of St Kitts. The net result of these struggles may be summed up thus: the English consolidated their position in the Leeward Islands and almost expelled the French; neither English nor French made much progress in the Windward Islands; both made one serious inroad into the Spanish possessions; save that they had abandoned Tobago, which became for a time "a kind of No Man's-land," the Dutch remained much as they had been in 1650; Spain was induced to recognise some of the losses she had suffered at the hands of other Powers.

A noble record of progress in colonisation and of commercial development supplements this story of military vicissitudes. Neither the Spanish nor the Dutch concerned themselves much with the settlement of the islands under their control. The attention of the Spanish was too deeply engrossed by the mineral resources of Mexico and Peru. As for the Dutch, they seem never to have intended to colonise the West Indies—their aim was to establish factories; they therefore occupied only small islands conveniently situated for purposes of trade, whence they plied an active business with Caracas and Cumana, with the great Spanish islands, with English and French in the Lesser Antilles, in short wherever sure profits were to be made. Similarly the Danes, who had taken St Thomas in 1671, sought for the most part only a share in the carrying-trade to and from the plantations. It was the English and French who planted colonies. In some respects the French were the more successful, partly because they were more dexterous

in conciliating the natives where they were warlike and in handling the negro, and partly because—so Adam Smith believed—they were less hampered by the commercial regulations of the mother country. But both nations made considerable progress. Before the end of the century the French islands began to display signs of their later greatness and wealth. Their story is told elsewhere in this *History* and need not here occupy us further. Meanwhile, in the English islands the planters were forming communities which, though they differed somewhat in social structure from those that flourished on the mainland, on account of the important place which the negro filled in their economic life, nevertheless resembled them in their self-reliant spirit, their sense of local interests, and their strong political vitality. They drove a big trade with the mother country which was much valued by her, as it furnished produce that she would otherwise have purchased from foreigners. But they complained continually of the commercial regulations to which they were subjected—for they desired to trade freely with all nations—of the monopoly granted to the Royal African Company, of the duty on sugars imported into England, and very loudly when apprehensive of its increase; and they declared frequently, and not without truth, that their interests were subordinated to those of merchants at home.

However real these grievances were, perhaps the worst evils from which the islands suffered may be attributed to the general insecurity of their life. From a military point of view many of them were almost defenceless. In the West Indies, whoever commanded the sea might soon command the land also; for in few places could large enough garrisons be maintained to resist a strong invading force. In addition, there was a natural insecurity in the liability to devastating hurricanes and earthquakes, which might sweep away in a few hours the results of years of toil. Economic conditions also were in some ways precarious and unsound. The supply of negroes, on which the prosperity of the plantations came to depend, might be interrupted by war or limited by the action of a privileged company; and as the black population everywhere largely outnumbered the white, few of the colonies lived quite at peace while haunted by the hideous fear of a slave rebellion. A life full of the chances of gain or loss, made men restless and in a hurry to get rich; but so fertile was the soil of the islands, so genial their climate, so profitable the opportunities of the sugar-trade, that its uncertainties did not seriously affect the progress of settlement. In the early years of Charles II's reign the spirit of enterprise amongst the English was still strong, and they made rapid headway. Amongst their possessions Barbados, "that rare pearl in the King's Crown," stood out conspicuously; and already Jamaica was described as "one of the most hopeful of all the Plantations in the West Indies." The prosperity of Barbados soon suffered decline; but Jamaica more than fulfilled expectations. Enriched at first by piracy and contraband trade, it prospered not less when the

pirates were suppressed and its inhabitants turned their attention to agriculture. It resisted with determination and success the attempt made by the mother country in 1678 to destroy the power of the Assembly, by applying to the government of the island the principles of Poyning's law. In 1692 it was visited by earthquake and pestilence and reduced to "a very mean condition," and in 1694 it was exposed to an attack by the French from Hispaniola. But, weathering these difficulties, it continued to make progress, and in 1715 was the most valuable of the English colonies in the West Indies.

For purposes of administration, Jamaica formed a separate Government; and in 1671 the other islands were divided into two groups, the Leeward and the Windward Islands, each with a Governor of its own. In the officers whom the mother country sent out during these years was exhibited one of the best features of her control. The second Lord Willoughby in Barbados, Colonel Stapleton, and after him Christopher Codrington, in the Leeward Islands, are perhaps best remembered amongst those who, against great odds and with little support from home, laboured for the defence and upbuilding of a Greater Britain in these distant seas. The relations of the Governors with the colonial administrators at home were not always of the best. The man on the spot wanted his own way and took it ill if his advice were disregarded. Governor Atkins of Barbados made himself the voice of so many grievances in the system of colonial government that he was at last recalled in 1680. The story of his supersession is "only that of the first of many contests between the local legislature and the English merchants for supremacy in the administration, wherein the victory, in consequence of the defection of a part of the Assembly, lay with the merchants." As a matter of fact, the management of colonial business in England was at times far from efficient. Before the reign of Charles II information concerning colonial matters had been collected by special commissions appointed for the purpose. Charles II established a permanent Council of Trade and Plantations. It was not a success and was dissolved by Order in Council of 1675, its place being taken by a Committee of the Privy Council. For a few years the Committee displayed considerable activity, but towards the end of the reign its administration was marked by great procrastination and negligence. That this was due in part to the indolence of the King may be concluded from the renewed energy exhibited when James II, who understood colonial affairs, came to the throne. But there were other and more important causes in the inadequacy of the organisation for its work and the serious difficulties which had to be confronted. Of these the problem of imperial defence was perhaps the most acute. As the number of dependent whites in the West Indies declined, it became impossible to rely on the militia which they had formed for the defence of the islands; and hence the whole burden was gradually being transferred to the mother country.

Beneath the strain of the great War with which the century closed the Stewart system of colonial administration collapsed, and William III created a permanent Board of Trade.

Mention has already been made of the pirates whose exploits in the Caribbean Sea fill a large space in the early annals of West Indian history. They contributed in no small degree to break the maritime power of Spain and to open the doors of the New World to other nations. But they were the enemies of ordered government and exercised an injurious influence on the progress of settlement and commerce, for they seduced rich and poor alike from steady and honest enterprises to their hazardous and profitable adventures. Between 1660 and 1675 they were exceedingly active. Jamaica, La Tortue, and the Bahamas were their headquarters; and English and French Governors gave them letters of marque against the Spaniard. Though some of their great leaders were Frenchmen—such as Grammont, who took Maracaibo in 1679, Hamelin who cruised in the *Trompeuse* between 1681 and 1685, and Ducasse who sacked Cartagena in 1697—they were really an international confederacy, and numbered many English, Dutch, and Danes in their ranks. (Morgan, who led them to the attack on Panama in 1671, was a Welshman.) In time, general interests demanded their extirpation and the civilised nations combined against them. The age of the Buccaneers came to an end with the Peace of Ryswyk.

Closely connected with the West Indies through the slave-trade was the west coast of Africa. Here the French had occupied the mouth of the Senegal, the English the mouth of the Gambia, and both English and Dutch had planted themselves on the Guinea Coast. As the American plantations developed, the volume of the slave-trade increased, and to it on the Gambia and the Slave Coast everything else was subordinated. Other nations also, Swedes, Danes, and Germans, visited these parts. Before 1670 the Danes had established two stations, Christiansborg and Frederiksborg, on the Slave Coast; and late in the reign of the Great Elector, the Brandenburgers erected a fort, Gross-friedrichsburg, at Cape Three Points on the Gold Coast; but, though they experimented elsewhere and built other forts (one, it is said, as far north as Cape Blanco) neither they nor the Danes played a very great part in West African commercial history. Here as elsewhere the Dutch, English, and French were the chief disputants. The Dutch, who had ousted the Portuguese, claimed the whole trade “as their propriety” by right of conquest. They were strong, because their forces were concentrated in a single Company, the Dutch West India Company, and in this respect the English were compelled to follow their example. In 1662 the Company of Royal Adventurers trading to Africa, the third Guinea Company, was incorporated. Its life was short and painful. After bearing the brunt of the struggle with the Dutch which prevented the Guinea trade from falling wholly into their hands, it collapsed, and

in 1672 handed over its stations to the Royal African Company, which was financially a stronger association. It was conducted like the East India Company on a joint stock, and, unlike that Company, was regarded favourably in England, because it carried out English manufactures and assisted the plantations. Its sphere of operations extended from near Tangier to the Cape of Good Hope, but it found its principal business in the slave-trade, of which it received a monopoly. After the Revolution its exclusive privileges, which had never received parliamentary sanction, were disregarded, and it became involved in a continual struggle with interlopers, against whom it at last appealed to Parliament for relief. The result was that, in 1698, Parliament threw open the African trade to all British subjects, though, at the same time, ordering all merchants who engaged in it to contribute ten per cent. of the value of their cargoes towards the expenses of the Company's establishments in Guinea. This assistance proved to be insufficient, and the position of the Company, once flourishing, began to deteriorate. It could not face the severe competition as well as bear the burden of maintaining forts and stations, and in 1712 it was compelled to ask for legislative aid in effecting an agreement with its creditors.

Like the Dutch, the French appreciated the connexion between the West Indies and West Africa. In 1664, Colbert handed over the African trade to the reconstituted West India Company; but, when, ten years later, this body was dissolved, various small companies engaged in the trade, while the islands passed under the control of the Crown. West Africa was one of the few spheres of their colonisation where the French developed no vast schemes, but persisted steadily in what they had undertaken. Leaving the Guinea Coast to the English and Dutch, they consolidated their influence on the Senegal. In 1678 Goree, which had been captured in the previous year, was ceded to them by the Dutch. During the long wars with which this period closes they made several attempts to dislodge the English who had been making themselves masters of the Gambia; but, though Fort James was several times taken, the Peace of Utrecht left the two nations still side by side.

There is not much in the history of the early relations of the European peoples with the weaker races whom they found in new lands which commends itself to the conscience of the modern world. The years immediately under consideration witnessed the missionary efforts of the Jesuits and other religious bodies in America and Africa, the measures of the Spanish Government to protect the indigenous population of its colonies, and the inspiring example of William Penn. Against these must be set in all their darkness the annals of Indian slavery in Peru and Mexico, and the traffic in African negroes. This latter was introduced into Europe and the New World by the Portuguese; but it was the English and Dutch who were responsible for its great development. The Dutch, who excelled as carriers upon the seas, quickly

picked up the evil tradition as they displaced the Portuguese in Africa. The English began to compete with the Dutch, when they saw the connexion of the trade with the progress of their plantations. Use blunted the finer instincts which had once been expressed in an abhorrence of such a business. Negro slavery appeared to provide an easy solution of a great difficulty, and promised a strong stimulus to the industries of the West Indies. It created the gravest problems for the colonies into which it was introduced; but the planters of the time thought more of profit than of society building, and concerned themselves very little with the moral and social troubles they were bequeathing to posterity. In the last quarter of the seventeenth century the extension of the trade became a prominent object of British commercial policy. Its volume was very much increased when the monopoly of the Royal African Company was taken away; and with the privileges which the English received under the Treaty of Utrecht of supplying negroes to Spanish America it entered upon a period of great expansion.

An interesting contrast to the stations on the Guinea Coast, where the nature of the country and the nature of the trade prevented colonisation, was provided in the settlement which the Dutch East India Company was planting at the Cape of Good Hope. Here a mere watering-place for ships, a fort with its cabbage-garden, was silently growing into a colony. The years which saw the expulsion of the Dutch from Brazil and the conquest of the New Netherlands, also witnessed the beginnings of their occupation of South Africa, where alone they have left a lasting monument of their national genius for colonisation. In 1652 the Company decided to establish a port of call at the Cape of Good Hope for vessels engaged in the Eastern trade. Level-headed as ever, they nursed no extravagant schemes. But, after a time, some of the settlers were permitted to raise cattle and to penetrate a little way inland, in order to find sheltered spots where grains and vines could be cultivated. In 1682 the colony numbered 682 Europeans, chiefly "strong, gallant and industrious bachelors." In 1688-9 its strength was recruited by some French Huguenot families who sought refuge in South Africa. A healthy climate, fertile soil, good leadership, and freedom from distracting wars and rivalries—all favoured its growth; and at the beginning of the eighteenth century the farmers, who chafed under the autocratic rule of the Company, had begun to cross the neighbouring mountains, and lines of scattered settlements branched out into the interior.

Such in its brief outline is the story of colonial progress in the West during these years. New colonies had been planted; new parts of North and South America explored; new territory had been added by conquest to the dominions of almost every great Power. The course of events in Europe, where the fortunes and ambitions of nations rose and fell, had reacted upon their position in other continents. Most important of all had been the internal development of some of the young transatlantic

societies; and it is in their life and progress that we must seek the principal causes of the transformation which the colonial world had undergone since 1650. In North America the activity of French and English had paved the way for a great work of colonisation. South America remained the preserve of the older maritime Powers, save that the French and Dutch had planted themselves on the "Wild Coast" between the Orinoco and the Amazon. The West Indies had passed through their experimental stage as a field of settlement. They were no longer merely the vulnerable outworks of the Spanish empire—they had become a great centre of useful enterprise, where the spirit of the colonist had triumphed over that of the lawless adventurer. West Africa had been the scene of many keen contests; yet its history during this period is but the history of its commerce. To a great extent it had been sacrificed to America, since there could be no development of the resources of regions devastated by the slave-hunter. South and east Africa reflected the changes in the East rather than in the West. The Portuguese were losing their hold on east Africa as they gave ground in the East; and the Dutch, waxing powerful in the East, had included the Cape of Good Hope among their acquisitions. Some of the old contentions had been decided, some of the old rivalries were ended; and, as the scene shifted, the grouping of the Powers had changed. The combination, informal but real, of the rest of Europe against the Spanish House of Habsburg, which was still discernible in 1650, had slowly been dissolved as circumstances changed, and, in the struggle to determine the Spanish Succession, it had been replaced by the alliance of France and Spain against the other maritime peoples, and—particularly in North America, the West Indies, and the East—by the bitter rivalry between England and France. In the competition between the English and the Dutch, so keen in 1650, the English had distanced their opponents. The United Provinces did not emerge at Utrecht from their struggle with France as they emerged at Münster from their struggle with Spain. A heavy price had been paid for the safety of their frontiers. England, on the contrary, through all these years had gone steadily ahead. She had joined in the War of the Spanish Succession because Louis XIV had become a menace to Europe, and also because she could not allow a great colonial empire to pass from the weakened hands of Spain into those of a strong and militant nation like the French. That War lifted her on to a new plane as a maritime and commercial Power, both by its exhaustion of her rivals and by the concessions of trading rights and territory which she secured. The close alliance with Portugal and its accompanying advantages, the acquisition of stations in the Mediterranean, the special commercial privileges in South America, the cessions of territory round Hudson's Bay, the mouth of the St Lawrence, and in the West Indies, were all a part of her harvest from this protracted struggle. What was more, she gained thereby the victory in the

first stage of her contest with France in America, and with the ruin of the French navy and the waning fortunes of the Dutch she was left "*the sea Power without any second.*"

(2) INDIA.

A chapter in a former volume dealt with the history of the Portuguese, Dutch, and English in India during the earlier half of the seventeenth century. From the point then reached the narrative is now resumed. After the severe defeats inflicted upon them by the Dutch in Ceylon and on the coast of Malabar, in 1650-63, the Portuguese could no longer be looked upon as serious claimants for the Indian trade. The first western nation to appear in Hindustan, their incursion represents the final phase of the medieval struggle between Christendom and Islam rather than the new age of commerce and discovery. The stately national epic of the *Lusiad* has cast a somewhat misleading glamour over the crude facts of their eastern history. As the crusading spirit died down, corruption and incompetency everywhere made their appearance; and from 1650 their annals form a dreary record of degeneration. The conquerors were absorbed and degraded by the conquered, for the Portuguese more than other European nations intermarried with native races. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, petty disputes between the Viceroy at Goa and the English Governor of Bombay are almost the only visible records of the empire founded by Almeida and Albuquerque.

The rivals of the Portuguese, the Dutch, during the same period not only consolidated their position in the Spice Archipelago, but for a time, at any rate, obtained the preponderance on the mainland. Dutch fleets cruising in the Indian Ocean at this early stage were far larger in point of numbers than those despatched by England and France during the War of the Austrian Succession. Ryklof van Goens in his operations against Portugal in 1661-3 commanded a squadron of twenty-four vessels, besides a formidable land force. The Portuguese stations in Ceylon were finally conquered in 1658. The occupation of the Cape of Good Hope must have seemed likely to turn the line of Dutch expansion still more sharply inward towards the nearer east. Colonised under Jan van Riebeck in 1652, it was garrisoned thirteen years later; and by 1672 the Dutch had come to look upon it as the "frontier fortress of India." In 1664 the roll of their factories on the mainland included nineteen names. They had established posts in Bengal, Gujerat, Malabar, and on the coast of Coromandel. To contemporary observers it appeared probable

that Holland would combine dominion in the Malayan Archipelago with supremacy in Hindustan, and so become paramount in the East, from the Cape of Good Hope to the distant shores of the China Sea.

In 1672 Leibniz, in his curious treatise, the *Consilium Aegyptiacum*, anticipating a scheme of Napoleon, urged Louis XIV to win an eastern empire by occupying Egypt. He assumes as an incontrovertible fact that no European nation can hope to oust the Dutch by ordinary means; and the burden of the whole pamphlet is, "*Hollandia in Aegypto debellabitur.*" But within the next twenty years the power of the Dutch had begun sensibly to decline. To this effect many causes contributed, which have been traced in an earlier chapter. International complications weakened them at a critical time in their colonial history, and India has always in a certain sense been lost and won on European battlefields. They were fighting England in 1652-4, 1665-7, and 1672-4. After that date they were precluded from following their old aggressive policy on the Indian seas by the curious fate which made them for reasons of state policy allies in Europe of their most formidable rivals in the East. The Dutch were at war with France except for short intervals from 1672 till 1713, and, though they were allied with England during part of that time, the bulk of the fighting in India fell to their share. They drove the French admiral, de La Haye, from Trincomali in 1673, and captured St Thomé by storm two years later. In 1693 they captured Pondicherry after a twelve days' siege. But the drain on their resources from the long wars in Europe was tremendous, and signs of exhaustion made their appearance. It has been proved from records at the Cape that for many years after 1672 the number of ships sent to the Indies fell off considerably, hardly any sailing with their full complement of men. Much blood and treasure had been expended in seizing positions which, as the future proved, were not strategically of the first importance. It had cost them dearly to wrest Malabar from the Portuguese. As the spice merchants of the world the Dutch reckoned the pepper-trade of that district the greatest prize of Indian commerce. But the country was ruined by the break-up of the Moghul empire and by Maratha misrule; and before the middle of the eighteenth century almost every European settlement on the south-eastern coast had fallen into decay. The policy which was perhaps inevitable for the Dutch as an insular Power militated against their prospects of success on the broader arena of the mainland. In the Spice Archipelago they were engaged in constant wars and expeditions. The exigencies of their position obliged them to crush all opposition with a heavy hand. Too often they succeeded to Portuguese methods as well as to Portuguese territory. Such terrible reprisals as were practised after the Chinese rising at Formosa in 1652, the revolt in the Moluccas in 1672, and Governor Vuyst's attempt to make himself absolute in Ceylon in 1729, cast a malignant light on Dutch colonial policy. Of the four western nations that successively appeared in India,

it is noticeable that the final struggle lay between the two which used the more humane and sympathetic methods in their dealings with eastern peoples.

The petty militarism of the Dutch settlements was a weapon of doubtful efficacy in the hands of a trading body. The English Company in 1686 averred that the Dutch possessed 170 fortified places in the East, and could drive the English out of all India in one year; but they added that most of the forts were poorly manned and that, if it came to a predatory war, "they are a broader mark to hit than we are." The tradition of Dutch supremacy lingered long into the eighteenth century. In 1718 the English Company declared that the strength of the Dutch was greatly superior to their own and that of all other European nations joined together, "and nothing but the Powers in Europe make them afraid to prove it against any or all of their competitors in the trade of India." But this was to misread strangely the signs of the times. By stress of circumstances the two nations had been compelled to respect each other's sphere of influence. The hold of the Dutch upon the coast of India was gradually weakened; and they drew away more and more to the south-east where, after the fall of the English factory at Bantam in 1683, their supremacy was unchallenged. On the Coromandel coast the desolating war waged between Aurangzeb and the King of Golconda, in 1687, proved ruinous to their settlements, whereas the English were comparatively immune behind the walls of Fort St George. From Surat they were temporarily driven in the early years of the eighteenth century. In Bengal they suffered far more than their rivals from the welter of anarchy that ensued on the interregnum at Delhi in 1712-3. Though the death-blow to their hopes in India was not given till the capitulation of Chinsura to Clive in 1759, the very fact of their taking no part in the dynastic struggles which after 1748 threw southern India open to Europeans was a proof, if any had been needed, that the time of their great opportunity had gone by for ever.

We must now return to the position of the English Company in 1650. Involved at home in the cataclysm of the Civil War and harassed in India by interloping associations, they had almost given up the struggle in despair. But with the return to settled government there came an improvement in their prospects. They shared in the benefits of Cromwell's foreign policy and obtained from him a new charter, which a few years later they were eager to shuffle out of sight. The Protector extorted from Portugal a formal acknowledgment of England's right to trade in the East, and obliged Holland to pay a belated indemnity for the "massacre of Amboina." But the real prosperity of the Company dates from the Restoration. They became the willing creditors of the King and enjoyed his high favour, for Charles found in the Indian interest the only whole-hearted support for his championship of the French cause against the Dutch. His charter of

1661 granted the Company the right of coining money, commanding garrisons in the East, and exercising jurisdiction over the populations, native or British, gathered within the walls of their settlements. The foundation of Fort St George has been mentioned in a former volume. Bombay, which formed part of the dowry that Catharine of Braganza brought to the King in 1662, was made over to the Company in 1668, and their position on the west coast of India was greatly strengthened, for Surat was destined to lose its commercial and strategic importance. The first license for trade in Bengal had been received in 1633; and in 1651 a factory was established at Hooghley. Thereafter the factories in Bengal, though as yet subordinate to the Presidency of Fort St George, drove a thriving and increasing trade. A succession of able men, Gerald Aungier, Sir George Oxenden, and Sir Streynsham Master, presided over the growing settlements. Under these favourable circumstances the Company prospered greatly; and the value of their stock rose to an unprecedented height, being sold in 1683 at a profit of from £360 to £500 per cent. From that date, however, the Company's path was beset with difficulties. Keigwin's insurrection at Bombay, and the mutiny at St Helena in the following year, brought discredit upon them in England and serious loss in India. A still more sinister symptom was the appearance of disruptive tendencies in the outlying provinces of Aurangzeb's vast empire. The Marathas had long freed themselves from the control of the Moghul. Sivaji was with great difficulty repulsed from Surat in 1664; and ten years later, by their first treaty with the Maratha Confederacy, the English were driven to recognise the belligerent rights of a Power nominally in rebellion against the supreme Government. After 1683 Bombay was continually exposed to predatory raids; Madras was menaced by the desultory fighting in southern India, where the Emperor was waging war with the kingdoms of Goleonda and Bijapur; but the worst effects were felt in Bengal, where the defenceless English factories were oppressed by a semi-independent viceroy.

At this crisis in the Company's history a masterful personality dominated their counsels. Sir Josia Child was for many years almost supreme in Leadenhall Street; and his brother Sir John, Governor of Bombay from 1682 to 1690, ably represented him in India. The policy of the Court of Committees had hitherto been founded on the dictum of Sir Thomas Roe, "it is an error to affect garrisons and land wars in India." Their instinct was to confine their energies to commerce, avoiding so far as possible political entanglements and territorial responsibilities. Inevitably they sometimes failed to see where a policy, prudent in itself, required modification. All the capitals of British India were founded in opposition to their will. The name of Francis Day was entered in the Company's Black Book for building Fort St George. Bombay was reluctantly taken over from the King's control; and expenditure on its fortifications formed the subject of bitter

animadversions from home. Even after the change of policy, the establishment of Calcutta was only sanctioned "because we cannot now help it." In 1685, by stress of circumstances, and under the leadership of the Childs, the Company were driven for a time from their traditional attitude. They began to covet revenues and rents as well as trade profits, and to express a new-born admiration for the policy of the "wise" Dutch. In 1686 they steeled themselves to the point of declaring open war on the Moghul empire, and in words that seem almost to bear the stamp of prophecy they proclaimed their intention of laying the foundations of a "large, well-grounded, sure English dominion in India for all time to come." A fleet of ten sail with troops on board was despatched from England; but the expedition hopelessly miscarried. It was badly officered and hampered by instructions framed in grotesque ignorance of the political and geographical situation in India. The only results were the ruin of Job Charnock's early attempts to settle at Calcutta, the complete defeat of the English in Bengal, and their panic-stricken flight by sea to Madras. On the whole, however, the consequences were less serious than might have been expected. Harassed by his endless campaign in the Deccan, and anxious that the pilgrim route to Mecca should not be disturbed by the English fleet (for the sea-board was the vulnerable part of the Moghul empire), Aurangzeb chose to regard the war as a mere local disturbance in an outlying province of his dominions. When the Company's servants tendered their submission he granted them peace on humiliating terms, which stipulated for the payment of a fine and the expulsion of Sir John Child. The latter condition proved unnecessary; for the Governor of Bombay, worn out with his troubles, died a few days before the Imperial Order was issued. The English were granted leave to return to Bengal; and in 1690 Charnock permanently established at Calcutta the factory which was destined to grow into the capital of British India.

But the discreditable Peace was too good a handle against the Company to escape the notice of their numerous enemies at home. The period of prosperity after 1660 had raised up bitter rivals to their pretensions. Interlopers had for some time been active in India; and the drastic policy pursued by the Childs against all who invaded their employers' privileges aroused a fierce resentment. The most famous of the unauthorised traders was Thomas Pitt, the grandfather of Chatham, who having amassed an immense fortune by openly defying the Company, purchased on his return to England a great landed estate together with the pocket-borough of Old Sarum. A strong popular feeling was growing up that more Englishmen should be admitted to a share in the profits of the Indian trade—a feeling which took the form of an attack on the joint-stock principle and a demand for a company on a "regulated" basis in which subscribers would have the right to trade on their own capital. In deference to the prevailing sentiment, an attempt had even

been made by Thomas Papillon in 1681 to widen the scope of the Company from within; but his efforts came to nothing through the strenuous opposition of Sir Josia Child. The result was the formation of an antagonistic body, meeting at Skinners' Hall in Dowgate Street, which allied itself closely with the growing Whig party of William's reign, and looked to Parliament rather than the Crown for support. In 1693, by corruption organised on a gigantic scale, Sir Josia Child procured a new royal charter; but he failed to restrain the Commons from accepting the doctrine of the Company's enemies and carrying a resolution that only by Act of Parliament could any English subject be debarred from the trade with India. This was not only a rebuff to Child, but by implication an attack on the royal prerogative from which the Company derived all its privileges. A parliamentary enquiry in 1695 into the recent bribery and corruption further discredited their cause; though the chief agent in the transaction had been far too astute to commit himself personally and evaded all penalties.

The Dowgate association won their first victory owing to the needs of Charles Montagu, Chancellor of the Exchequer. On providing him with a loan of £2,000,000, they were in 1698 constituted by Act of Parliament a General Society with exclusive rights to the trade with India, saving the privileges of the Old Company, which were to expire after the three years' notice stipulated for in their charter. Lip-service having been done to the Regulated theory by the constitution of the "General" Society, the great majority of the subscribers at once formed themselves into a joint-stock under the title of the "English," as distinct from the Old or "London," Company. By the clever diplomatic move of subscribing largely in the name of their Treasurer to the funds of the General Society its members acquired the right to trade even after the three years to the amount of their subscription. Then ensued a desperate struggle between the two associations, which extended from the floor of the House of Commons, the polling-booth and the hustings, to the distant arena of the Indian littoral. In the Presidencies of Bengal, Bombay and Madras a threefold duel was fought out with bitter animosity, to the scandal of the English name. The victory, which was at best a Pyrrhic one, lay on the whole with the party already in possession; for, though at Bombay Sir Nicholas Waite ruined Sir John Gayer, the Old Company's Governor, by embroiling him with the native Powers, he did little thereby to further his own cause; and in the other Presidencies the issue went against the new-comers. Sir Edward Littleton in Bengal was worsted by John Beard, while Thomas Pitt, the converted Interloper, who had made his peace with the Old Company and was now their representative at Fort St George, made short work of his rival and relative John Pitt. To the vigorous initiative of the masterful President of Madras and his shrewd conduct of affairs the failure of the New Company was largely due. Their representatives were decked with baronetcies and

knighthoods and entrusted with powers grandiloquently described, by one of those who possessed them, as "Consular and Ministerial dignity and authority, constituted by His Majesty upon a Parliamentary and National establishment." Pretentious titles of this kind were but meaningless sounds in the ears of Moghul officials and aroused a contemptuous resentment amongst the Old Company's servants. The attempt to maintain a resident ambassador at the Imperial Court proved a dismal failure. Sir William Norris, a former member of Parliament, was sent out from England, and after many difficulties and hindrances succeeded in reaching the camp of Aurangzeb. His mission was ruined by the precipitate action of Sir Nicholas Waite, who had without authority pledged the Company to undertake the defence of the whole Moghul empire by sea—a task that was utterly beyond their power. Embittered by failure, the unfortunate ambassador returned to carry on an undignified squabble with Waite and to die on the voyage home.

The comparative success of the Old Company in India was however neutralised in England, where the issue had for the most part gone against them. Warned by significant hints from the King, they concluded a temporary Union in 1702, which was made absolute by Parliament in 1708, with the proviso that all matters still in dispute should be settled by the arbitration of the Earl of Godolphin. The privileges of the reconstituted Company were prolonged to March 25, 1726, after which date they could be terminated at three years' notice. The Company provided the Exchequer with a further sum of £1,200,000, the total of their loan to the State now amounting to £3,200,000. In the settlement both associations were called upon to make concessions; for, if the Old had to submit to a widening of the basis of the monopoly, the New saw the last vestiges of the General or Regulated Society swept away in the charter of the United Company.

After 1708 the English in India entered upon a period of steady and quiet prosperity. The great chartered Company—that unique instrument by which national resources and national energy were focused upon a continent thousands of miles over sea—had, after many experiments, found its appropriate niche in the fabric of British polity. An attempt had been made by the New Company, as we have seen, to emphasise the political aspect of their position in the East; but the Directors of the United Company wisely returned to the older tradition. They sent out plain men of business to preside over their settlements, and they made the increase of their trade their first concern, though, as the words of their opening despatch testify, they were not without premonitions of a higher destiny. "It is a duty incumbent upon us," they wrote, "to England and our posterity to propagate the future interest of our nation in India." Indeed the factory period was now finally closed. The Firman which was secured by the embassy to Delhi led by Surman in 1715-7 conferred upon the Company not only trade rights

but certain definite territorial concessions. It was the most complete and formal recognition yet made by the supreme Power in India of the status of a western invader. As Burke said, the East India Company then became an integral part of the Moghul empire. Unfortunately, the recognition came just before that empire subsided into impotence; and experience was to prove that grants of this nature often meant no more than permission for the Company to wrest the ceded territory, if they could, from the hands of the Emperor's enemies.

Of the European nations that were serious competitors for supremacy in India, France was the last to enter the arena of conflict. Henry IV, about the time when the English and Dutch were making their first voyages, tried to foster companies for eastern exploration; but France was too exhausted by the long agony of the Wars of Religion to respond with any effect to his appeals. The records of diplomacy preserve the tradition of one curious attempt on his part to attain his end by political means. In 1607 negotiations for a peace were pending between Spain and the United Netherlands. Henry, though traditionally the ally of Holland, instructed his envoy Jeannin not only to support the Spanish demand that the Dutch should renounce the Indian trade, but even to carry on a secret intrigue with Isaac Le Maire, a merchant of Amsterdam. He hoped to transplant the great Dutch East India Company to his own kingdom "*sous le nom et accueil de la bannière de France.*" But his disingenuous attempt to fish in troubled waters was defeated by the diplomatic skill of Oldenbarneveldt. Cardinal Richelieu did much to encourage schemes of colonial exploration; but the necessity of consolidating his position against internal enemies left him time before his death only to found the company which, under the leadership of Pronis and Flacourt, colonised Madagascar. The first French Company that traded with India proper was not founded till 1664. The circumstances of its inception contrast curiously with those that attended the birth of the English Company. While in England the merchants wrested their privileges step by step from the Crown, in France the monarch spurred on an unwilling people. The Company was started under the direct superintendence of Colbert, and received all that was possible in the way of royal patronage and state support. The King, the Court and the *noblesse* provided by far the greater part of the capital of 15,000,000 *livres*. Louis commended the interests of the Company to the mayors and provosts of provincial towns by 119 *lettres de cachet*. The elaborate organisation of the Directorate of the Company, which involved a sort of commercial federation of the provincial towns with Paris at their head, shows the determination of the King to make the trade a great national undertaking, and testifies to a certain breadth of conception which, in spite of his limitations, was characteristic of all the actions of the *Roi Soleil*. But official patronage of this kind, however enlightened, is a serious incubus on a trading corporation. The trail of

royal interference is over all the Company's early history. It is typified in their pledge of faith and homage to the King, their engagement to present a crown and sceptre at the beginning of each new reign, and the royal command that the Company should strive, not only for the advancement of commerce, but also for the grandeur of the French name and the propagation of the Christian faith. The fatal flaw, inherent from the first, was that the Company was suspect in the eyes of the mercantile community. In spite of royal pressure, their contributions were but a fraction of those provided by the bureaucracy and the *noblesse*. Merchants were not forthcoming to serve on the boards of direction; and in a very few years the Crown found it necessary to nominate the Directors; and the Company became almost a subordinate department of State. While the English factories only gradually and against the will of the Company grew into settlements, the French consciously aimed at colonisation. All the first fleets that left the ports of France carried out emigrants. The English pioneers as a rule were rough sea-captains and traders. The French sent out men of gentle birth. Souchu de Rennefort, de Beausse and de Montauban, who sailed for Madagascar in 1665, were men of rank. Mondevergue, who went out in 1666, was a Marquis; de La Haye who commanded the fleet of 1670 had been a distinguished officer in the French army.

The first expeditions of the Company were frittered away in the attempt to revive the colonising projects of Richelieu in Madagascar—an island that has always possessed a peculiar fascination for the French. In 1668 Caron, a renegade Dutchman, founded a factory in Surat; and another was established at Masulipatam in 1669. But in 1672 Louis allied himself with England against Holland, and thus gave the French in India a formidable enemy and only a very lukewarm ally. The defeats inflicted upon them by the Dutch in 1672 have been already chronicled. Though the French Company thus received a severe check at the outset of its career, François Martin laid the foundations of Pondicherry in 1674; and two years later a factory was established at Chandernagore in Bengal. Captured by the Dutch in 1693, Pondicherry was restored to France with greatly strengthened fortifications in 1697 by the Peace of Ryswyk, and under the fostering care of its founder who lived till 1706 rapidly grew into a flourishing town. Martin however appears to have received little support from home; all the resources of France were being exhausted in the War of the Spanish Succession; and India was forgotten at Versailles. The royal patronage having been withdrawn, the Company languished, for there was no vigorous commercial interest in reserve to take up the burden that slipped from the wearied shoulders of the King.

Before summing up the position of European nations in India in the early years of the eighteenth century, it may be well for the sake of completeness to refer to the episode of the Ostend Company, though it

partly falls outside our present period. This association had a strongly marked cosmopolitan aspect. It was the resultant of three forces. There was first the earnest desire of the Austrian Netherlands, now recovering from the War of the Spanish Succession, to regain their old participation in the Indian trade, which dated back to a time prior to the discovery of the Cape route. To this must be added the Emperor Charles VI's dream of an Imperial sea-power, based not only on the ports of the Low Countries but on those of the Adriatic, to counterbalance the maritime supremacy of the Protestant nations. In the third place the Association, being worked mainly by the aid of renegade English and Dutch factors, represented to some extent the old opposition to the sole-market theory of the Indian trade, which, having been defeated at home both in England and Holland, transferred itself over the frontier to organise one more assault on the great monopolist companies. The association was not formally chartered till 1722, though commissions for single voyages were granted so early as 1714. The letters of the English Company for many years breathe stern denunciations against all who should enter into relations with the "Interlopers." The existence of the Ostend Company gave rise to the thorniest of diplomatic questions; and England and Holland united in strong representations against its continuance. In the end the Emperor sacrificed the Company to his desire to see the Pragmatic Sanction ratified. It was suspended in 1727 and suppressed in 1731, after which date its two factories in Bengal and Madras fell into decay.

Save for this interlude, it was by 1720 already predetermined that the future struggle for preeminence in India lay between the English and the French. France, in Charles Davenant's striking words, had long stood by, "subtle, insinuating and liberal, ready either to court or to force a favour"; but as yet she was no match for her great rival, whose history in the East had been altogether longer and more continuous. With all its vicissitudes the English Company had never since 1657 sunk to the position of the French in 1700-20. It had at least paid its way and been self-righting even in the disastrous days of internecine strife; it had enjoyed long epochs of undoubted prosperity. On the other hand the French Company had to make many fresh starts; its cycles of disaster were dismally long, its periods of good fortune, spasmodic, fitful and brief. Over and over again in its annals, we find the curt announcement that for such and such a year no vessels returned from India. In truth the Company since its foundation had never stood on a sound financial basis. Subscriptions to the original capital were not fully paid up, in spite of royal proclamations and upbraidings. In the reign of Charles II, when the English were enjoying unprecedented success and driving roots into the soil that were destined to endure, the French had not emerged from the day of small things. Again, after 1708, when their rivals were striding forward under the impetus of the new unity at home, the

French Company eked out a precarious existence by subletting its privileges to some merchants of St Malo. In 1719-20 they were entangled in the grandiose schemes of the financier Law; the Company was reconstituted; and it was not till some years after that date that an improvement in their fortunes took place. From 1657, on the other hand, there had been no breach in the continuity of the English trade. Every year a great fleet of fifteen or twenty East Indiamen made their way to Indian ports. Far from being dependent on state subsidies, the Company had taken the Exchequer heavily into its debt. There is, in fact, at this period no comparison between the two Companies; the one gives an impression of solidarity, prosperity and power, the other of debility, bankruptcy, and decay.

The importance of the longer English tradition in the East has often been unduly underrated. Historians are perhaps too prone to concentrate attention on the acquisition of territory in Hindustan, too apt to look upon the Indian Empire as the work of highly gifted men, hampered and shackled by a carping body of unimaginative traders. That conception embodies a phase of the truth; but it can easily be overstated. The real base of operations was in England. Especially is this true of the time prior to our acquisition of the Gangetic province of Bengal. The strength or weakness of the Company is not solely to be measured by the roll of the garrisons in the Indian settlements or the thickness of the curtains and bastions that encircled their forts. It depends rather on the latent resources and political influence of the great corporation of Leadenhall Street, the volume of its steadily increasing trade, and the unbroken means of communication between East and West formed by the fleets that annually sailed from British ports. The causes that determined the issue of the conflict between England and France will be dealt with in a later volume. But an adequate appreciation of the difference between the resources of the two Companies during the seventeenth century, while it sets in high relief the brilliance of the French attack upon the British position after 1744, will also go some way to explain why that effort was not more prolonged and more successful. Burke declared that the constitution of the Company began in commerce and ended in Empire; and the aphorism rightly understood involves a *propter* as well as a *post hoc*. The more closely the history of the English East India Company is investigated, the more certain becomes the conviction that only because it was built up upon a broad basis of mercantile integrity, did it attain even higher powers, grow till it compelled the State to take it into partnership, and, in spite of many shortcomings and some deep stains, fulfil a unique and splendid function in British history.

CHAPTER XXIII.

EUROPEAN SCIENCE IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EARLIER YEARS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES.

(1) MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL SCIENCE.

THE seventeenth century is notable in the history of science for the development of those ideas which distinguish its modern treatment from that customary in the ancient and medieval world, and for the recognition of the principle that scientific theories must rest on the result of observations and experiments.

The influence of the Renaissance was felt in arts and letters a generation or more before it affected men of science; but towards the end of the sixteenth century mathematicians began to open up new fields of study, and a few years later the ideas current in Mechanics and Physics were subjected to the test of experiment. These researches were undertaken independently in different parts of western Europe; and the printing-press, the general use of one language (Latin), and increasing facilities for travel, rendered the dissemination of new ideas comparatively easy. For the first time in the history of science, British writers took a prominent part in its development.

In the early years of the seventeenth century the views of astronomers were recast; the principles of Dynamics were laid down; a science of Physics was initiated; and, lastly, new branches of Mathematics were created and applied to these and other subjects. Before the close of the period treated in this volume the language of Mathematics had been settled; the use of Analytical Geometry and the Infinitesimal Calculus had become familiar; the theory of Mechanics had been elaborated, and it had been shown that the planetary motions could be explained by the same laws as those affecting terrestrial bodies; a large part of the theory of fluids had been established; the geometrical and physical theories of Light had been worked out in considerable detail; something had been done towards creating a theory of Acoustics; and the fundamental problems of vibratory motion were being attacked.

We shall best be able to estimate the progress of mathematical and physical science during the seventeenth century, if we begin by noting the extent of the knowledge current about 1575 or 1580.

Turning first to the subject of Pure Mathematics, we may say that in Geometry the results attained by Euclid were then generally accessible, and the more elementary properties of Conic Sections were known; but the standard of knowledge was considerably below that of the Greeks. In Arithmetic the fundamental processes and the use of the Arabic symbols were well established, though the methods employed were cumbrous. Algebra was syncopated—that is, abbreviations were used for those operations and quantities which constantly recur, but such abbreviations were subject to the rules of grammatical construction. Lastly, the more elementary propositions in Trigonometry were known. This knowledge would seem to be but a scanty equipment for the attack of new problems; but in questions of Pure Mathematics it was used with more effect than could have been anticipated or than was supposed a few years ago. As to applied science, however, an astonishing ignorance still prevailed.

Of the several branches of applied science, the mechanics of rigid bodies is the oldest. The science of Statics, so far as it related to parallel forces, had been placed on a satisfactory basis by Archimedes, who rested it on the axiom that two equal weights suspended from a rigid weightless bar at equal distances from a fulcrum on which the bar rested would be in equilibrium. But the question of the resultant of forces, acting on a particle, had not been included in his discussions, and was still an unknown branch of the subject, with the exception of the result of the parallelogram theory for the particular case of two forces at right angles to each other acting on a particle. Dynamics as a science did not exist. It was indeed asserted on the authority of Aristotle, that the rate at which bodies fell varied directly as their weights—a statement which could have been easily disproved, had it been subjected to the test of experience; but no theory of the subject had been propounded even on this false premiss.

In Astronomy, the authority of Ptolemy was, about 1580, almost as well established as that of Aristotle in science, though here, at any rate, observations of the stars were available, due partly to the general interest in Astrology. According to the Ptolemaic theory the Earth was at the centre of the universe, and around it revolved in successive order the Moon, Mercury, Venus, the Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and the fixed stars. These bodies were supposed to move uniformly along the circumferences of circles (epicycles) whose centres revolved uniformly along the circumferences of other circles—the centres of the last-mentioned circles (eccentrics) being at points near, but not coinciding with, the centre of the earth.

As time went on, and more accurate observations were accessible,

additional epicycles had to be introduced to bring the theory into accordance with the facts, and it became increasingly complicated. In so far as Ptolemy and his followers supposed it necessary to resolve every celestial motion into a series of uniform circular motions, they erred greatly; but, if their hypothesis be regarded as a convenient way of expressing known facts, it was not only legitimate but convenient. The geocentric theory was generally accepted, but never received universal assent. The merit of finally overthrowing it must be largely attributed to Copernicus (1473-1543). He showed that the observed phenomena could be explained more simply on the hypothesis that the sun was at the centre of the universe, and that the earth and other planets moved round it; but he offered no proof that these views were correct, and his explanations suffered from the fact that he supposed the heavenly bodies to move uniformly in circles. It was not until Kepler and Galileo took up the subject that the majority of scientific men abandoned the Ptolemaic theory.

The only other subjects to which Mathematics had been applied and which need be here mentioned are Optics and Hydrostatics. In Optics the law of reflexion was known, and solutions of some of the more elementary geometrical problems connected with rays reflected at spherical surfaces were familiar through the writings of the Greeks and Arabs. In Hydrostatics the theory of floating bodies had been given by Archimedes, and probably his results were accessible to students. Of other branches of Physics, such as Sound and Electricity, we may say that the little that was known is not worth describing; in these subjects the authority of Aristotle was unquestioned. Lastly, such knowledge of Chemistry as existed was mixed up with Alchemy, and was practically worthless.

This rapid summary will bring out more clearly than any general statement the fact that the origin of physical science and modern Mathematics cannot be assigned to a date earlier than the close of the sixteenth century. Into a world whose knowledge was so slight and limited a ferment of new ideas was then introduced, and within a few years the position of the subjects was revolutionised, and the number of thinkers interested in them was greatly increased.

It will be most convenient to review the subjects considered in the present section science by science—and, first, to trace their development very briefly to the middle of the seventeenth century, and, then, to take up again the history of each science to the end of the first quarter of the eighteenth century, which marks the close of the period treated in this volume. We begin as before with the subjects of Pure Mathematics.

The power of Arithmetic in dealing with numerical calculations involving multiplication or division was greatly increased by the invention of logarithms. Their discovery was due to Napier of Merchistoun (1550-1617), who published his results in 1614, though he had privately

communicated a summary of them to Tycho Brahe so early as 1594. The principle depends on the construction of tables of the powers of some number (the base), such as will enable us to determine from the result the power to which the base was raised. Using such a table and the law of indices, we can by addition obtain the result of the multiplication of two or more numbers; similarly, division and extraction of roots are reduced to easy steps. Tables of the powers of the base corresponding to the sines and tangents of all angles in the first quadrant for differences of a minute were given by Napier. In numerical calculations the best base is 10: this was suggested by Henry Briggs (1561–1631) in 1616, and its advantage was recognised by Napier. Tables of the logarithms of natural numbers to the base 10 were issued by Briggs in 1617, and of sines and tangents of angles by Edmund Gunter of London in 1620, both then Gresham Lecturers in London. Fuller tables were issued later, and by 1630 a knowledge of logarithms was common. It is possible, with the aid of a table of logarithms, to construct a machine known as a “slide-rule,” by which the results of logarithmic calculations can be read off at once without calculation. Slide-rules were invented by Gunter in 1624, and are now in general use in laboratories and workshops.

The decimal notation for fractions was introduced about the same time as logarithms, and it was certainly used as an operative form by Briggs in 1617. A somewhat similar notation had been employed a few years earlier by Stevinus, Rudolff, Bürgi, and Napier, though probably only as a concise way of stating results. Up to that time fractions had been commonly written in the sexagesimal notation.

The introduction of these discoveries brought Arithmetic into its modern form, and subsequent improvements have been largely matters of detail.

At the close of the sixteenth century the art of Algebra began to assume its modern or symbolic form. In this it has a language of its own and a system of notation which has no obvious connexion with the things represented, while the operations are performed according to rules distinct from those of grammar. The credit of introducing this was mainly due to Francis Vieta of Paris (1540–1603). In his principal work, published in 1591, he used letters for both known and unknown positive quantities. In it he also introduced for the powers of quantities a notation which was a marked advance on that previously prevalent by which new symbols had been introduced to represent the square, cube, etc., of quantities which had already occurred in the equations. In a posthumous work published in 1615 Vieta dealt with the elements of the theory of equations, and in particular explained how the coefficients in an algebraical equation involving one unknown quantity could be expressed as functions of the roots. Similar results are found in the *Algebra* by Thomas Harriot of London (1560–1621), which was first printed in 1631. It is more analytical than any Algebra that preceded

it, and marks an advance both in symbolism and notation. It is not certain whether he made use of Vieta's results or discovered the results independently; but the former supposition seems the more probable.

Vieta's results were extended by Albert Girard (1595-1632), a Dutch mathematician. In 1629 Girard published a work which contains the earliest use of brackets, a geometrical interpretation of the negative sign, the statement that the number of roots of an algebraical equation is equal to its degree, and the distinct recognition of imaginary roots. Probably it also implies a knowledge that the first member of an algebraical equation can be resolved into linear factors. Girard's investigations were unknown to most of his contemporaries, and exercised but slight influence on the development of Mathematics.

A far more influential writer was Descartes (1596-1650). To his famous *Discours* on universal science, published at Leyden in 1637, were added three appendices on Optics, Meteors, and Geomtry. The last of these, to which we shall refer again when dealing with Analytical Geometry, contains a section on Algebra. It has affected the language of the subject by fixing the custom of employing the letters at the beginning of the alphabet to denote known quantities, and those at the end of the alphabet to denote unknown quantities. Descartes here introduced the system of indices now in use, though he considered only positive integral indices: probably this was original on his part, but the suggestion had been made by previous writers, such as Bombelli, Stevinus, Vieta, Harriot, and Herigonius, though it had not been generally adopted. The meaning of negative and fractional indices was first given by John Wallis of Oxford (1616-1703), in his celebrated *Arithmetica Infinitorum*, 1656. It is doubtful whether Descartes recognised that his letters might represent any quantities, positive or negative, and that it was sufficient to prove a proposition for one general case. He realised the meaning of negative quantities and used them freely. Further, he made use of the rule for finding a limit to the number of positive and of negative roots of an algebraical equation, which is still known by his name, and introduced the method of indeterminate coefficients for the solution of equations.

Elementary Trigonometry was also worked out with tolerable completeness, partly by Vieta, and partly by Girard, while the name of Napier is associated with some of the fundamental properties of spherical triangles.

In Geometry new methods of considerable power were introduced at this time. One of these was due to Gérard Desargues (1593-1662) who in 1639 published a work containing the fundamental theorems on involution, homology, poles and polars, and perspective. Desargues gave lectures in Paris from 1626 for a few years, and it is believed exercised great influence on Descartes, Pascal, and other French mathematicians of the time. But his system of Projective Geomctry fell into comparative

oblivion mainly owing to the fact that the system of Analytical Geometry introduced by Descartes was far more powerful as a method of research.

The Cartesian system of Analytical Geometry was expounded by Descartes in the tract on Geometry appended to his *Discours*. In effect, Descartes asserted that the position of a point in a plane could be completely determined if its distances, say x and y , from two fixed lines drawn at right angles in the plane were given, with the convention familiar to us as to the interpretation of positive and negative values; and that, though an equation $f(x, y) = 0$ was indeterminate and could be satisfied by an infinite number of values of x and y , yet these values of x and y determined the coordinates of a number of points which form a curve, of which the equation $f(x, y) = 0$ expressed some geometrical property—that is, a property true of the curve at every point on it. Descartes asserted that a point in space could be similarly determined by three coordinates; but he confined his attention to plane curves.

It was at once seen that, in order to investigate the properties of a curve, it was sufficient to select, as a definition, any characteristic geometrical property, and to express it by means of an equation between the (current) coordinates of any point on the curve—that is, to translate the definition into the language of Analytical Geometry. The equation so obtained contains implicitly every property of the curve, and any particular property can be deduced from it by ordinary Algebra without troubling about the Geometry of the figure. This may have been dimly recognised or foreshadowed by earlier writers; but Descartes went further and pointed out the very important facts, that two or more curves can be referred to one and the same system of coordinates, and that the points in which two curves intersect can be determined by finding the roots common to their two equations.

We need not describe the details of Descartes' work. His great reputation ensured appreciation of his investigations, and an edition of this tract with notes by Beaune and a commentary by van Schooten, issued in 1659, became a standard text-book; henceforth the subject was familiar to mathematicians. It should perhaps be added that it is probable that the principles of Analytical Geometry had been worked out independently by Pierre de Fermat of Toulouse (1601–65) at least as early as by Descartes; but, as they were not then published, we need not discuss this point further.

More than one writer at this time concerned himself with the division of quantities, such as areas and volumes, into infinitesimals, and with the summation of such infinitesimals, thus escaping the long and tedious method of exhaustions used by the Greeks. In this connexion we should in particular mention the names of Kepler, Cavalieri, and somewhat later that of Fermat. The most important exposition of the subject was that given by Wallis in 1656, in which he applied it to determine the quadrature of a curve whose equation could be expressed in the form

$y = \sum ax^m$. These investigations foreshadowed the introduction of the infinitesimal calculus by Newton and Leibniz towards the end of the seventeenth century.

Before leaving the subject of Pure Mathematics, we must in passing mention the theory of numbers and that of probabilities. The former, under the stimulus of the writings of one of the greatest mathematicians, Fermat, attracted considerable attention. The latter was created by Pascal (1623-62) and Fermat.

Pure Mathematics are a useful if not necessary instrument of research; but the general reader takes more interest in the history of their application than in their own—in results rather than in methods. We turn now to consider the development of applied science during this period.

As before, we begin with Mechanics. Simon Stevinus of Bruges (1548-1620), who died at the Hague, used, though he did not explicitly enunciate, the triangle of forces, which he treated as the fundamental theorem of Statics (1586). A similar position was taken up by Galileo (1564-1642). A year or two later the last-mentioned mathematician laid the foundations of the science of Dynamics. In 1589, when professor at Pisa, he made experiments from the leaning tower there on the rate at which bodies of different weights would fall. It was at once apparent that the generally accepted assertion of Aristotle was incorrect, and that, save for the resistance of the air, all bodies fell at the same rate, and through distances proportional to the square of the time which had elapsed from the instant when they were allowed to drop. Of this Galileo gave a public demonstration; but, though his Aristotelian colleagues could not explain the result, many of them preferred to assert that there must be some mistake rather than admit the possibility that Aristotle was wrong. The ridicule cast by Galileo on this argument caused friction, and in 1591 he was obliged to resign his chair. His writings at this time show that he had already formed correct ideas of momentum and centrifugal force. He had proved that the path of a projectile was a parabola, and was aware that the pendulum was isochronous. The last fact he discovered by noticing that the great bronze lamp hanging from the roof of the cathedral at Pisa performed its oscillations, whether large or small, in equal times. He nowhere stated the laws of motion in a definite form; but probably he was acquainted generally with the principles of the first two laws as enunciated by Newton. His astronomical work was accomplished shortly after he left Pisa, and to this reference is made below. Towards the end of his life he again took up the subject of Mechanics, and a book by him, published in 1638, has been described as a masterpiece of popular exposition of its principles. In it he describes his pendulum experiments, and the theory of impact. A year or two later he invented a pendulum clock, though the fact was not generally known at the time. Mechanics were discussed by Descartes in 1644; but he did not substantially advance the theory. The correct

theory of impact was given by Wren and Wallis. The next marked development of the subject took place under the influence of Huygens and Newton and is referred to later.

The most striking achievement of this period in the eyes of an ordinary citizen of the time was the establishment of the Copernican system of Astronomy. We have already alluded to the publication by Copernicus of his hypothesis. The next stage in its development was due to Kepler (1571-1630). He served under Tycho Brahe, one of the most skilful observers of his time, and making use of Brahe's observations succeeded, after many and laborious efforts, in reducing the planetary motions to three comparatively simple laws. The first two were published in 1609, and stated that the planets describe ellipses round the sun, the sun being in a focus; and that the line joining the sun to any planet sweeps over equal areas in equal times. The third was published in 1619, and stated that the squares of the periodic times of the planets are proportional to the cubes of the major axes of their orbits. The laws were deduced from observations on the motions of Mars and the earth, and were extended by analogy to the other planets. These laws pointed to the fact that the sun and not the earth should be regarded as the centre of the solar system. We may add that Kepler attempted to explain why these motions took place by a hypothesis which is somewhat like Descartes' theory of vortices described below. He also suggested that the tides were due to the attraction of the moon.

The invention of the telescope at the beginning of the seventeenth century facilitated observations of the nearer planets. The earliest discoveries with its aid were made by Galileo. In the spring of 1609 he heard that an optician of Middelburg had made a tube containing lenses which served to magnify objects seen through it. This gave him the clue, and he constructed a telescope of the kind which still bears his name, and of which an ordinary opera-glass is an example. The instrument magnified three diameters—that is, made objects appear as though only at one-third of their real distance. Encouraged by this success, he constructed a larger instrument of thirty-two diameters' power which magnified an object more than a thousand times. Intense interest was excited by these discoveries. He placed one of his instruments on a church tower at Venice, and, to the amazement of the merchants, showed them their ships approaching the harbour hours before any details could be detected by the eye. Turning his instrument to the heavens, he saw the lunar mountains, Jupiter's satellites, the phases of Venus, Saturn's ring, and the solar spots; from the motion of the latter he concluded that the sun rotates on its axis. In 1611, he exhibited in the garden of the Quirinal the wonders of the new worlds revealed by the telescope.

At first honours were showered upon him; but theological opposition arose so soon as it was realised that the observations tended to confirm

the Copernican theory. If that theory were true, some of the statements in the Bible could not be literally exact. Accordingly it was argued that, while the telescope might be a trustworthy instrument for terrestrial objects, it was not fitted to explore the heavens. In February, 1616, the Inquisition settled the matter, and declared that to suppose the sun the centre of the solar system was false, and contrary to Holy Scripture; and they embodied this assertion in an edict of March 5, 1616, which has never been repealed. For the time, Galileo bowed to the storm. In 1632, however, he published some dialogues on the system of the world, in which he clearly expounded the Copernican theory, and showed that mechanical principles would account for the fact that a stone thrown straight up into the air would fall again to the place from which it was thrown—a fact which previously had been one of the chief difficulties in accepting the view that the earth was in motion. The book was approved by the papal censor before publication; but none the less Galileo was summoned to Rome, forced to recant and do penance, and released only on promise of obedience to the edict of 1616.

The dramatic persecution of Galileo has concentrated public attention on his work. But it should be noted that other mathematicians were also using the telescope to good advantage. In England Harriot had a large telescope through which he observed the satellites of Jupiter in 1610. Kepler also made various observations, and suggested that the eye-glass should be a convex lens. The transit of Venus was observed by Jeremiah Horrocks in Lancashire in 1639.

The acceptance of the Copernican system brought into prominence the problem of explaining the cause of the planetary motions. Descartes suggested in his *Principia* that space was filled with ether moving in whirlpools of varying sizes and under varying physical conditions. He supposed that the sun was the centre of a vortex in which the planets are swept round. Each planet was again the centre of another vortex in which its moons are swept round. He explained gravity by the action of these vortices, and suggested that smaller vortices round the molecules of bodies would account for cohesion. This suggestion was widely accepted, and is interesting as a genuine attempt to explain the phenomena of the universe by mechanical laws. But Descartes' assumptions were arbitrary, and unsupported by investigation. It is not difficult to prove that on his hypothesis the sun would be in the centre of these ellipses and not at a focus (as Kepler had shown was the case), and that the weight of a body at every place on the surface of the earth except the equator would act in a direction which was not vertical. It will be sufficient here to say that Newton considered the theory in detail, and showed that its consequences are not only inconsistent with each of Kepler's laws and with the fundamental laws of Mechanics, but also at variance with the laws of nature assumed by Descartes.

The invention of the telescope and the almost simultaneous invention

of the microscope naturally attracted attention to the subject of Optics, and especially to the law of refraction. Kepler asserted in 1611 that for small angles of incidence the angle of incidence was proportional to the angle of refraction, and, applying this, he was able to give in general outline the theory of the telescope. The correct law of refraction was discovered by Willebrod Snell (1591–1626), professor of Mechanics at Leyden. It was stated again, and perhaps discovered independently, by Descartes in 1637. The latter gave a theoretical proof resting on inaccurate assumptions; but Fermat deduced the laws both of reflexion and refraction from the assumption that light travels from a point in one medium to a point in another in the least time, and that the velocity of light decreases as the density of the medium increases.

The view that the velocity of light was finite, so boldly assumed by Fermat, had originated in the seventeenth century. Galileo made experiments on the subject, but was unable to arrive at a definite result, though he and the leading physicists seem to have supposed that the view was correct. It was not until 1676 that it was proved. This was done by Olaus Römer (1644–1710), a young Dane then living in Paris, by observations of the eclipses of Jupiter's moons. The theories of physical optics current at this time will be considered later.

Hydrostatics also received considerable attention during the earlier years of the seventeenth century. Here too the earliest experiments seem to have been made by Galileo, who showed that the air has weight, estimated its pressure by the height of the water column it could sustain, and definitely refuted the Aristotelian view that a vacuum could not exist. He also described his experiments on various physical subjects, notably on fluids. These investigations fairly entitle him to be termed the founder of modern Physics.

Galileo's work was carried on by his pupil Evangelista Torricelli of Florence (1608–47) who constructed a barometer. The description given of it was vague, but it suggested ideas to Pascal which led not only to his barometric experiments, but to proofs of the more elementary propositions relating to the pressure exerted by fluids. Later investigations were facilitated by the invention of the air-pump by Otto von Guericke of Magdeburg (1602–86). In England the subject was taken up by Robert Boyle (1627–91). His name is associated with the law which he discovered that the pressure exercised by a given quantity of a gas is proportional to its density. The law was re-discovered independently fourteen years later by Edme Mariotte (1620–81) in France, who did a great deal to popularise physical investigations in France, and was one of the founders of the French *Académie des Sciences*. The beginnings of experimental investigations on Heat were also indebted to the labours of Galileo, who invented a thermometer, though of an imperfect type; but it was nearly a century later before the subject was taken up systematically.

Another branch of Physics originated at this time was that connected with Electricity and Magnetism. Although there had been a few previous observations on the subject by Cardan, Mercator, and Porta, it may be said to have commenced with the work of William Gilbert (1540-1603), physician in ordinary to Queen Elizabeth. His experiments were published in 1600.

The necessity of an experimental foundation for science was in the course of this period advocated with considerable effect by Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in his *Novum Organum*, published in 1620. Here he laid down the principles which should guide those making experiments in any branch of Physics, and gave rules by which the results of induction could be tested. Bacon's book appealed to men of education, and helped to secure recognition for the proposition that experiment and observation are necessary preludes to the formation of scientific theories. For practical purposes, however, it was of but little use. Bacon thought that investigations could be made by rule, and did not realise that the creation of scientific hypotheses was impossible without imagination. The book had more influence among philosophers and men of letters than among scientific students.

Towards the middle of the seventeenth century the progress of scientific learning received a great stimulus, especially in England and France, from the foundation of academies or societies, created for the purpose of encouraging scientific investigations and providing a common meeting-place where those engaged in it could interchange ideas. Some account of these associations and of the part which they played in the history of science will be found in another section of this chapter.

Great as was the advance in knowledge made during the first half of the seventeenth century, that from 1660 to 1730 was even more marked.

In the branches of Pure Mathematics previously mentioned it will suffice to say that Algebra and Trigonometry became more analytical, and that Newton's discovery of the binomial theorem and his work on the theory of equations were especially notable. Towards the end of the period the extension of Trigonometry to imaginary quantities was made by Abraham Demoivre of London (1667-1754) whose name is associated with the fundamental theorem on the subject. No new developments of Pure Geometry took place during this period; but the classical methods were applied to various problems with extraordinary ingenuity by Newton in the first book of the *Principia*. The methods of Analytical Geometry were also developed and it became a familiar tool in the hands of mathematicians.

A novel and potent instrument of research was developed in the infinitesimal calculus. This method of analysis, expressed in the notation of fluxions and fluents, was used by Newton (1642-1727) in or before 1666; but no account of it was published until 1692, though its

general outline was known by his friends and pupils long anterior to that year. The notation of the fluxional calculus is for most purposes less convenient than that of the differential calculus. The latter notation was invented by Leibniz (1646-1716), probably in 1675, and was published in 1684.

The idea of a fluxion or differential coefficient, as treated in this period, is simple. When two quantities—for instance, the radius of a sphere and its volume—are so related that a change in one causes a change in the other, the one is said to be a function of the other. The ratio of the rates at which they change is termed the differential coefficient or fluxion of the one with regard to the other, and the process by which this ratio is determined is known as differentiation. Knowing the differential coefficient and one set of corresponding values of the two quantities, we are able by summation to determine the relation between them; but often the process is difficult. If however we can reverse the process of differentiation, we can obtain this result directly. This process of reversal is termed integration, and was first employed by Newton and Leibniz. It was at once seen that problems connected with the quadrature of curves, and the determination of volumes (which were soluble by summation, as had been shown by the employment of indivisibles) were reducible to integration. In Mechanics also, by integration, velocities could be deduced from known accelerations, and distances traversed from known velocities. In short, wherever things change according to known laws, here was a possible method of finding the relation between them. It is true that, when we try to express observed phenomena in the language of the calculus, we usually obtain an equation involving the variables, and their differential coefficients—and possibly the solution may be beyond our powers. Even so, the method is often fruitful and its use marked a real advance in thought and power.

With the various applications—important though they were—of the calculus to Geometry and Mechanics we need not concern ourselves, but one application is sufficiently important to demand a word in passing. This was the discovery in 1712 by Brook Taylor (1685-1731) of the well-known theorem by which a function of a single variable can be expanded in powers of it. It was published in 1715, though no satisfactory proof was given at the time.

The ideas of the infinitesimal calculus can be expressed either in the notation of fluxions or in that of differentials. There is no doubt that the differential notation is due to Leibniz; but an acute controversy arose as to whether the general idea of the calculus was taken by him from a manuscript by Newton, to which it was supposed he had had access, or whether it was discovered independently. During the eighteenth century the prevalent opinion was against Leibniz; but to-day the majority of judges think it more likely that the inventions were independent. The controversy was complicated by bitter personalities. It was natural,

though unfortunate, that British mathematicians were thus led to confine themselves to the methods used by Newton. The consequence was that, shortly after Newton's death, the British school fell out of touch with the great continental mathematicians of the eighteenth century, and it was not until about 1820, when the value of analytical methods was recognised, that Newton's countrymen again took any considerable share in the development of Mathematics.

Leibniz was a man of extraordinary versatility; and, in addition to his diplomatic activity, played a prominent part in the literary and philosophical history of his time. Mathematics were not his main interest, and he produced very little mathematical work of importance besides his papers on the calculus; his reputation in this subject rests largely on the attention which he drew to it. In 1686 and 1694 he wrote papers on the principles of the new calculus. In these, his statements of the objects and methods of the infinitesimal calculus are somewhat obscure, and his attempt to place the subject on a metaphysical basis did not tend to clearness; but the fact that all the results of modern Mathematics are expressed in the language invented by him has proved the best monument of his work.

Newton elaborated the calculus more completely than Leibniz, but his methods were buried in note-books inaccessible to all save a few friends; and the general adoption of Leibniz' notation was largely due to the fact that, through a text-book published in 1696 by the Marquis de L'Hospital of Paris, it was at once made known to all interested in the subject. It was also regularly used by Peter Varignon (1654-1722), the most eminent French mathematician of the time, and by the brothers James Bernoulli (1654-1705) and John Bernoulli (1667-1748)—men of remarkable ability who applied the new calculus to solve numerous problems. The Bernoullis were the most prominent continental teachers of this period and their influence was exceptionally potent. The accounts at first given of Newton's method of fluxions were less complete; and more than a generation passed after the production of L'Hospital's work, before Colson in 1736, and Maclaurin in 1742, published systematic expositions of the fluxional method.

We turn next to the subject of Mechanics, which was placed on a scientific basis through the researches of Newton. The investigations by Galileo on the fall of heavy bodies, and the theory of pendulums, were completed by Huygens (1629-95) in his *Horologium Oscillatorium*, published at Paris in 1673. In this work he determined the centrifugal force on a body moving in a circle with uniform velocity; he also considered the motion of bodies of finite size and not merely of particles. Newton's investigations on Mechanics are included in his *Principia*. It will suffice here to say that he based the subject on three laws of motion, and he applied the principles to the statics and dynamics of rigid bodies and fluids; probably he carried the investigations as far as was possible

with the analysis at his command. He distinguished between mass and weight, and this was an important point. He also created the theory of attractions, which will be more naturally noted in connexion with his theory of gravitation.

The fundamental principles of Newton's theory of gravitation seem to have occurred to him shortly after he had taken his degree at Cambridge. His reasoning at this time, 1666, appears to have been as follows. He knew that gravity extended to the tops of the highest hills; and he conjectured that it might extend as far as the moon, and be the force which retained it in its orbit about the earth. This hypothesis he verified by the following argument. If a stone is allowed to fall near the surface of the earth, the attraction of the earth causes it to move through sixteen feet in one second. Now Newton, as also other mathematicians, had suspected from Kepler's law that the attraction of the earth on a body would be found to decrease as the body was removed further away from the earth, inversely as the square of the distance from the centre of the earth. He knew the radius of the earth and the distance of the moon, and therefore on this hypothesis could find the magnitude of the earth's attraction at the distance of the moon. Further, assuming that the moon moved in a circle, he could calculate the force that was necessary to retain it in its orbit. In 1666, his estimate of the radius of the earth was inaccurate, and, when he made the calculation, he found that this force was rather greater than the earth's attraction on the moon. This discrepancy did not shake his faith in the belief that gravity extended to the moon and varied inversely as the square of the distance; but he conjectured that some other force—such, for example, as Descartes' vortices—acted on the moon as well as gravity.

In 1679 Newton repeated his calculations on the lunar orbit; and, using a correct value of the radius of the earth, he found the verification of his former hypothesis was complete. He then proceeded to the general theory of the motion of a particle under a centripetal force—that is, one directed to a fixed point—and showed that the vector to the particle would sweep over equal areas in equal times. He also proved that, if a particle describes an ellipse under a centripetal force to a focus, the law must be that of the inverse square of the distance from the focus; and, conversely, that the orbit of a particle projected under the influence of such a force would be a conic. In 1684 Halley asked Newton what the orbit of a planet would be, if the law of attraction were that of the inverse square, as was commonly suspected to be approximately the case. Newton asserted that it was an ellipse, and sent the demonstration which he had discovered in 1679. Halley, at once recognising the importance of the communication, induced Newton to undertake the investigation of the whole problem of gravitation, and to publish his results.

It would seem that Newton had long believed that every particle of

matter attracts every other particle, and suspected that the attraction varied as the product of their masses, and inversely as the square of the distance between them; but it is certain that he did not then know what the attraction of a spherical mass on any external point would be, and did not think it likely that a particle would be attracted by the earth as if the latter were concentrated into a single particle at its centre. Hence he must have thought that his discoveries of 1679 were only approximately true when applied to the solar system. His mathematical analysis, however, now showed that the sun and planets, regarded as spheres, exerted their attractions as if their masses were collected at their centres; and thus his former results were absolutely true of the solar system, save only for a correction caused by the slight deviation of the sun, earth, and planets, from a perfectly spherical form.

The first book of the *Principia* is given up to the consideration of the motion of particles or bodies in free space either in known orbits, or under the action of known forces, or under their mutual attraction. It is prefaced by an introduction on the science of Dynamics; it also contains geometrical investigations of various properties of conic sections. The second book treats of motion in a resisting medium. The theory of Hydrodynamics was here created, and it was applied to the phenomena of waves, tides, and acoustics. In the third book, the theorems of the first are applied to the chief phenomena of the solar system; and the masses and distances of the planets and (when sufficient data exist) of their satellites are determined. In particular, the motion of the moon, with its various inequalities, and the theory of the tides, are worked out in detail, and as fully as was then possible. Newton also investigated the theory of comets, showed that they belonged to the solar system, and illustrated his results by considering certain special comets. The complete work was published in 1687. A second edition was brought out in 1713 by Roger Cotes of Cambridge (1682-1716) under Newton's direction. The demonstrations throughout are geometrical, but are rendered unnecessarily difficult by their conciseness, and by the absence of any clue to the method by which they were obtained. The reason why the arguments were presented in a geometrical form appears to have been that the infinitesimal calculus was then unknown; and, had Newton used it to demonstrate results which were in themselves opposed to the prevalent philosophy of the time, the controversy as to the truth of his results would have been hampered by a dispute concerning the validity of the methods used in proving them.

The publication of the *Principia* is one of the landmarks in the history of Mathematics. In it the phenomena of the solar system were shown to be deducible from laws which experience proved to be true on the earth, and thus it brought new worlds within the scope of man's investigations. The conclusions were generally accepted by the leading thinkers of the time; but a generation or so had to pass before

their validity was universally admitted; henceforth, few doubted that the reign of law extended throughout the universe of non-organic matter. Newton further considered the question whether it was possible to explain gravitation as the result of other laws. He could not frame a satisfactory hypothesis, and the problem is still unsolved.

It should be noted that Newton's conclusions could not have been reached, had not observational Astronomy also developed. This was largely due to the excellent work done at Greenwich under Flamsteed (1646-1719), Halley (1656-1742), and Bradley (1692-1762), who successively occupied the position of Astronomer Royal. The last-named explained the aberration of light (1727), and thus obtained an independent determination of the velocity of light.

The achievements of the seventeenth century in Astronomy and Mechanics were so great that they have thrown some of the other work of the time into comparative obscurity. The investigations in Physical Optics were, however, of singular interest. Here again Newton played the leading part. When, in 1669, he was appointed to a professorship at Cambridge, he at first chose Optics for the subject of his lectures and researches; and before the end of that year he had worked out the details of his discovery of the decomposition of a ray of white light into rays of different colours by means of a prism, from which the explanation of the phenomenon of the rainbow followed. In consequence of a chapter of accidents he failed to correct the chromatic aberration of two colours by means of a couple of prisms; hence he abandoned the hope of making a refracting telescope which should be achromatic, and, instead, designed a reflecting telescope, which is of a somewhat different design from those suggested by James Gregory and N. Cassegrain.

We have already explained how Newton deduced the motions of the solar system from the one assumption of universal gravitation. The similar problem in Optics was the possibility of making a single hypothesis from which all the known optical phenomena could be deduced. Two plausible theories of this kind had been already suggested. In one, known as the "corpuscular" or "emission" theory, it is assumed that a luminous object emits corpuscles which hit or affect the eye. In the other, known as the wave or undulatory theory, it is assumed that light is caused by a series of waves in an ether which fills space, the waves being set in motion by pulsations of the luminous body. It would seem that at one time Newton deemed the latter the more probable hypothesis; but, though he could thus account for the phenomena of reflexion, refraction, and colours, it failed (as then propounded) to explain the rectilinear propagation of light; and this he considered fatal to its claims. He accordingly turned to the corpuscular theory, and from it deduced the phenomena of reflexion, refraction, colours, and diffraction. To do this, however, he was obliged to add a somewhat artificial rider, that the corpuscles had alternating fits of easy

reflexion and easy refraction, communicated to them by an ether which filled space. His various researches on the subject were embodied in his *Optics* published in 1704.

The wave theory had been roughly outlined in 1665 by Robert Hooke. It was elaborated in a paper by Huygens in 1678, and expounded at greater length in his *Traité de la Lumière*, published in 1690. From it Huygens deduced the laws of reflexion, refraction, and double refraction. He was acquainted with the phenomena of polarisation; but he was unable to explain them since he assumed the vibrations in the ether to be longitudinal. It was not until the nineteenth century, when Fresnel worked out the theory on the hypothesis that the vibrations were transverse, that it was put on a satisfactory basis. Huygens was among the most illustrious mathematicians of his age, and the wave theory may be fairly deemed to be due to him. The immense reputation of Newton induced a general acceptance at the time of the corpuscular theory as enunciated by him—an unfortunate result of his extraordinary achievements, and the more curious because his writings show that on some grounds he deemed the wave theory the more probable. In science, as in other subjects, too much reliance should not be placed on individual authority.

The theory of Hydrodynamics, including therein Sound and vibrations of fluids, may be said to have been created by Newton in the second book of his *Principia*. He determined experimentally the velocity of sound in air and other media. The difficulties of mathematical analysis involved are great, and he was not able to carry the theory very far. In connexion with the theory of Sound, may also be mentioned the names of Brook Taylor, who gave the theory of the transverse vibrations of strings, Joseph Sauveur (1653–1715), and Francis Hauksbee (1650–1713).

As to other physical subjects, we may say that in all of them, at this time, there was intelligent observation and experiment. In particular the subject of Heat was attacked on the right lines by Boyle, Hooke, Newton and others, though the experimental data available were but slight. So, too, as to the work of the time in Electricity, which attracted the attention of Boyle, Halley, Newton, Picard, and Hauksbee.

The death of Newton and the separation of the British school of mathematicians from their continental contemporaries may be taken as marking the close of an epoch. At the beginning of the seventeenth century Mathematics were only just breaking free from their medieval trammels, and Physics in the modern sense were non-existent. In but little more than a century Mathematics had been developed into an instrument of great power; the value of the calculus had been recognised, and the foundations of modern analysis laid; the theories of Mechanics and gravitation had been established; and the problems of Physical Optics had been subjected to mathematical processes. In this extraordinary extension of knowledge all the leading nations of Europe had

taken part. Galileo, Descartes, Fermat, Huygens, Leibniz, and above all, Newton, form a group of workers which will be ever memorable in the history of science; and the fabric of modern Mathematics and Physics is but the superstructure erected on the foundations which they laid.

(2) OTHER BRANCHES OF SCIENCE.

The seventeenth century may, in a broad way, be spoken of as the period during which the Natural Sciences—according to our modern classification of them—Botany, Zoology, Anatomy, Physiology, Geology, and, we may add Chemistry, took definite shape, and began to be built up, each in its own way, as an independent branch of knowledge. The labours of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were, in their turn, largely directed towards carrying forward what had then been begun. But the impulse which led to this great development is to be found in the preceding century, or even earlier: in the revolt against the scholastic spirit which formed so large a part of the Renaissance.

The sciences in question, though having their birth partly in mere natural curiosity, sprang largely from the Art of Medicine. The treatment of disease led to enquiry into the structure and action of the body of man, and this in turn to the study of animals. The use of herbs as remedies moved men to observe the features and qualities of plants; and the science of Chemistry, though it began as Alchemy in the search for the transmutation of metals, and continued to be supported by the needs of industrial life, was in the main developed by the desire to find substances which should cure diseases. In the sixteenth century, and long afterwards, the men who were building up the several natural sciences were to be found among the teachers of the medical schools.

Hence it is not wonderful that the first great triumph of the revolt against the scholastic spirit, though it was won in a limited and strictly medical branch of knowledge, namely Human Anatomy, served as a bright example to nearly all the branches of natural knowledge, and exerted a powerful influence upon them.

In Human Anatomy the scholastic spirit remained supreme up to the middle of the sixteenth century. The far-reaching, almost inspired labours of Galen had in quite early times produced a system of doctrines touching the structure and functions of the body of man so complete and consistent that it seemed to supply all that was needed to be known; the study of these things came to mean the study of Galen, the written page was the authority, and enquiry was narrowed to interpretation. In 1543 Andreas Vesalius (1514–64), a young professor at Padua, published a book on the structure of the human body, based, not on what Galen taught, but on what Vesalius had himself seen, and what anybody might

see who looked with adequate care. This was a powerful exemplar of the new method of appealing to nature—to things as they are, instead of to authority. Others in modern times had dissected human bodies and appealed to these dissections as tests of truth—notably Mundinus, Carpi and Leonardo da Vinci—but none of them had produced a work so complete and so convincing as that of Vesalius. So convincing, indeed, was it that it may truly be said to have almost at one blow freed Human Anatomy from the old scholastic bonds and set it up as a striking model of the new system. The success of the work was largely due to the nature of the study. To prove his statements, to show that in this or that Galen was wrong, Vesalius had no need to use elaborate arguments or to appeal to carefully devised experiments; he had only to lay bare the structure with his scalpel, and to ask his pupils to use their eyes. The path opened up by Vesalius was followed by his pupils Fallopius, Fabricius and others; by the end of the century, the student of Human Anatomy in every medical school had ceased to ask what Galen had written, and only cared to know what his own eyes could teach him.

The brilliant success thus gained by the new method applied to Human Anatomy could not fail to have an influence on other branches of learning, supported as that influence soon was by the striking results of the same new method in Mechanics and Physics. How completely this new method had laid hold of men's minds is shown by the brilliant exposition of it given by Francis Bacon (1560–1626). Though his published works belong to the seventeenth century, the *Proficience and Advancement of Learning* appearing in 1605 and the *Novum Organum* in 1620, Bacon's main ideas had come to him in the closing years of the preceding century. In the two works just mentioned, and in others, some published in his lifetime, and others at various times after his death, he elaborated in a formal exposition the principles of the method of investigating nature—the new method which, as we have just said, was being adopted by enquirers everywhere in all branches of natural knowledge. He went further: he drew up the outlines, and laboured to the time of his death to fill in the details, of a plan for the scientific work of the future, a programme of the steps to be taken in all branches of science in order to gather in with the least waste of time and labour, and in the most effective manner, the fruits of scientific enquiry. He made no notable contribution of his own to the advancement of natural knowledge; there is no evidence that the men who in his own time and in the times immediately following were actively and effectively engaged in advancing natural knowledge were in any special way influenced by his writings; indeed one of the greatest of these enquirers spoke slightly of them. "He philosophises," said Harvey, "like a Lord Chancellor." And not only was no effort made by subsequent enquirers to carry out Bacon's programme, but the history of scientific discovery has shown that his forecast of how scientific work ought to be

carried on was in many respects wrong—as, for instance, his idea that the collection of facts should be allotted to one set of men, and the drawing conclusions from the facts to another. In the great majority of cases, the discoverer of a new law of nature has to find his facts for himself. Nevertheless, Bacon's works gave a great impulse to the new method. Even those who had made discoveries without knowing anything of what Bacon had written were gratified and encouraged by learning from his works that they had, without distinct consciousness of it, been treading in the path of true philosophy; while all scientific workers were helped by being able to quote in support of their methods of enquiry his incisive and illuminating words.

In spite of its success in the case of Anatomy, the new method was slow in laying hold of Physiology. More than half a century passed before it did so; but, when in 1628 William Harvey (1578–1657), by the publication of his *Exercitatio de Motu Cordis*, shattered the Galenic Physiology as completely as Vesalius had put an end to the Galenic Anatomy, the effects were profound and far-reaching.

According to Galen, the crude venous blood, enriched in the liver by the food brought from the alimentary canal and endowed with the nutritive qualities spoken of as the “natural spirits,” flows from the heart to all parts of the body along the veins, and returns back to the heart along the same channels. Some of this blood, passing from the right side of the heart to the left by minute pores in the septum of the ventricles, invisible to the eye of man, mixes there with air sucked in through the lungs by the action of the heart. This mixture is by the innate heat of the heart “concocted” into arterial blood, endowed with “vital spirits” which flows from the heart along the arteries to all parts of the body, returning by the same channels. When it reaches the ventricles of the brain, the arterial blood, by the help of air drawn in through the pores of the ethmoid, or sieve-like, bone, gives rise to “animal spirits,” and, flowing as a pure spirit along the nerves, carries out sensation and movement.

Long before Harvey, Michael Servetus (1511–53), in his *Restitutio Christianismi*, published in 1553, but written long before, used words showing that he rejected wholly the supposed passage of some blood through the septum, as to which Vesalius had simply hinted his doubts, and, further, that he had grasped the true features of the pulmonary circulation, the passage of all the blood from the right side of the heart through the lungs to the left side. The same truth was taught by Colombus (1516–59), Vesalius' pupil and successor at Padua; but there are some reasons for thinking that he had read Servetus' book. Andreas Caesalpinus (1519–1603), botanist, physician, and polemic philosopher, more than anatomist or physiologist, also enunciated views which, at all events, show that he grasped the truths both of the systemic and pulmonary circulations, the flow to the tissues along the arteries,

the return from the tissues to the heart by the veins, and the passage of blood through the lungs from the right to the left side of the heart.

Thus the doctrines of Galen had been attacked before Harvey's time; but how little effect had been produced by these attacks is shown by the teachings of Fabricius of Aquapendente (1537-1619), who, at the close of the sixteenth century, in the chair at Padua once held by Vesalius, was, by the fame of his learning, drawing students from all parts of the world, among them William Harvey. Although Fabricius did more than anyone after Vesalius to advance Anatomy, to the end of his days he taught almost pure Galenic doctrines of the circulation, ignoring what Servetus and Caesalpinus had written, and refusing to see the real meaning of his own great discovery of the valves in the veins. It was a mixed teaching, then, of new Anatomy and old Physiology which Harvey got from Fabricius at Padua, while he studied there from 1597 to 1602. But he probably learnt much outside the anatomical theatre; for during those years Galileo Galilei was working at and teaching the new Mechanics and Physics in Padua. It was perhaps partly at least through Galileo's influence that Harvey was led to apply the experimental method to Physiology, and to "give his mind to vivisections."

His first observations, as happens in many a progress, led him into a slough of despond; he began to think that "the motion of the heart was only to be comprehended by God." But the patient study of that motion in the hearts of many living animals convinced him that Galen was wrong in regarding the heart as mainly an organ of suction, and that it was, on the contrary, essentially an organ of propulsion, inasmuch as its work consisted, not in sucking air from the lungs, but in driving blood by its contractile power through the body. This new view—dimly, but only dimly, seen by Caesalpinus—led Harvey at once to a true conception of the work of the auricles and ventricles with their respective valves, and thus to the wholly new idea that all, and not some only, of the contents of the right ventricle were discharged into the lungs and so found their way to the left side of the heart. This step led to another. Making observations to determine the quantity of blood discharged at each beat from the left ventricle, and noting the frequency of the beats, he saw that the blood driven along the arteries must find its way somehow into the veins and so return to the right side of the heart. Thus, by experiments and quantitative observations, working not after the manner of Fabricius but after that of Galileo, he reached a new view of the circulation of the blood, "of a motion as it were in a circle." And all his further observations confirmed this view, which, once fairly grasped, rendered intelligible various phenomena of the heart and blood vessels, as indeed of the body at large, hitherto obscure, and made plain the uses of those valves of the veins over which Fabricius had stumbled. It is worthy of notice that Harvey says nothing about the "spirits," so prominent in the

old Galenic doctrines. In an early passage he incidentally refers to them and dismisses them as irrelevant; and, indeed, though the names were used long afterwards, his teaching was their death-blow. The new conception of the same blood flowing continuously through the whole body, undergoing changes all along the circle, did away with any need for them, and at the same time rendered possible true ideas of the nutrition of the body.

Freed, as it were, by the work of Harvey from the bonds of the Galenic doctrines, Physiology expanded rapidly in the succeeding years, developing in several more or less independent directions. Its progress was greatly helped by three things: by the rapid advance of mechanical and physical learning, by the invention of the compound microscope, and, somewhat later, by the growth of a serious, no longer fantastical, Chemistry. Harvey himself, though as we have seen he seems to have been guided by the methods of the Italian physicists, made little direct use of their results. He had no microscope to help him, and his unassisted eye failed to learn how the blood passed from the small visible arteries to the small visible veins in the lungs and in the rest of the body; he could only say, it passed "somehow." There is in his books hardly a word of Chemistry, and, in his much later treatise on generation, such Chemistry as he makes use of is of the ancient kind. "He did not care for chemists," says Aubrey, "and was wont to speak against them with an undervalue."

His successors, however, fruitfully availed themselves of these aids. The compound microscope and the new Mechanics were soon made use of. In 1661, in a letter to Borelli on the structure of the lungs studied with the help of the compound microscope, Marcello Malpighi (1628-94) announced his discovery of minute channels, the capillaries, joining the ends of the pulmonary arteries to the beginnings of the pulmonary veins. These were more clearly seen by John Swammerdam (1637-80), and, even still more clearly, in the tail of the tadpole by Antony Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723); and, in a short time, this closed mode of junction of arteries and veins was found to obtain all over the body. Swammerdam, moreover, in 1658, and Leeuwenhoek in 1668, had discovered the red blood corpuscles, observed also, but at first not understood, by Malpighi.

Richard Lower (1631-91) and Giovanni Alfonso Borelli (1608-97) applied to the physical problems of the circulation—such as the work done by the heart, the velocity of the flow in the blood vessels, and the pressure exerted on the vascular walls—the new exact mechanical and physical learning in so complete a manner as to bring the knowledge of the subject very much to the condition in which it was when, nearly two centuries later, Poyseuille and Weber took up the same problems again. And Jean Pecquet's (1624-74) discovery, in 1651, of the thoracic duct discharging its contents into the veins of the neck, and his proof that the lacteals, discovered in 1622 by Gaspar Aselli, passed, not—as Aselli

thought and as suited Galenic doctrines—to the liver, but to the *receptaculum chyli*, and so to the thoracic duct and the venous system, together with the descriptions by Olaus Rudbeck in 1653, and by others, of the *vasa serosa* or *aquosa*, that is of the general lymphatic system of the body, seemed to make the story of the flow of nutritive fluids in the body for the time complete.

In the Galenic doctrines, the use of the air in breathing was to temper the great innate heat of the heart and to provide for the escape of the “fuliginous vapours” generated during the formation of the vital spirits. Fabricius, who making use of the new mechanical learning was able to give a fairly good and correct account of the mechanics of breathing, still held to the old Galenic idea as to the use of the inspired air. The acceptance of the Harveian teaching entailed some change in this old idea, but Harvey himself was silent about it. The first step towards the truth was taken by Robert Boyle (1627–91), who, unlike Harvey, had attached himself with zeal to the rising chemical learning. In his *New Experiments Physico-Mechanical touching the Air* (1660), he showed that in air rarefied by the air-pump flame was extinguished and at the same time life (the life of a mouse) came to an end; thus proving that the action of the air in breathing, so far from being a tempering of heat, was on the contrary to be compared to a favouring of combustion as the source of heat. Then Robert Hooke (1635–1702) in 1667, in an experiment made before the Royal Society, showed that an animal, a dog, could be kept alive, in the absence of all movements of the chest or indeed of the lungs, by artificial respiration. He thus proved the essential feature of breathing to be the exposure of the venous blood brought by the pulmonary artery to fresh air, and that the movements of the chest were merely the means of providing repeated supplies of fresh air. This important conclusion was followed up by Lower, who in 1669 showed that the difference between venous and arterial blood, as indicated by the difference in colour, was not profound, as the Galenic doctrine supposed, but transitory, and due to the mere exposure of the venous blood to the fresh air, and to the taking-up by the blood of some of the air during the exposure; thus he was able, by giving air, to turn the purple venous blood into bright red arterial blood, and, by keeping air away, to effect the converse change.

Neither Lower nor Borelli, who had treated very fully of breathing and had also come to the conclusion that air is taken up by the blood in the lungs, nor, again, Hooke, refers to the possibility of a part of the air only being taken up. John Mayow (1643–79), who busied himself much with chemical matters, had in 1688 come to the conclusion that the air consists in part “of a certain vital, fiery, and in the highest degree fermentative spirit” which he called *spiritus nitro-aëreus* or *igneo-aëreus*. It is clear that in his *spiritus nitro-aëreus* Mayow had formed a conception of what more than a hundred years afterwards came to be called oxygen.

And in a tract on respiration, besides giving an admirable account of the mechanics of respiration, he showed that the air which is taken up by the venous blood in the lungs during its change into arterial blood is not the whole air, but the nitro-aerial part of it, that is the oxygen. Thus building on the foundation laid by their countryman Harvey, a small knot of Englishmen constructed almost the whole edifice of the theory of breathing.

One effect of Harvey's new teaching was a demand for more exact knowledge of the finer structure and nature of the parts through which the blood was continually flowing; for the views of the older anatomists on this matter were very vague: what was not visible fibre and blood vessels they were content to call *parenchyma*, and any small soft part they spoke of as a gland. This demand Malpighi was, with the help of the microscope, one of the first and one of the most successful to supply. By a series of remarkable researches on the viscera, he laid the foundation of that knowledge of the tissues which forms so large a part of modern physiology. Making use of the discoveries of the ducts of pancreatic and salivary glands by Wirsung, Wharton and Stensen, and the works of Sylvius on the features of glands, he studied the kidney, the liver and the spleen. He expounded the structure of the kidney, going far beyond the initial discovery by Bellini of the uriniferous tubules. He showed that the substance of the liver was not, as Glisson had taught, a uniform *parenchyma* disposed irregularly between the blood vessels, but was arranged in minute masses, which he called *acini*, after the fashion of the salivary and other glands; that the liver was, in fact, a huge secreting gland, secreting bile through the gall duct. And he proved that the spleen was not a gland at all but a contractile vascular organ. Thus incidentally, at one stroke, he demolished the old idea of the liver concocting two kinds of bile, the lighter yellow, and the heavier black bile, the scum and *faex* as it were of fermentation, the former being discharged into the intestine and the latter going to the spleen. He turned his microscope also to other parts of the body, to the skin, the tongue, the *uterus*, the brain, horns, hairs, bones, and the scattered lymphatic glands; he showed that each part had a definite texture or structure, special to itself; and, though the idea of "the tissues" did not come into use until long afterwards, he was on its track. He complained that the *acini* of the liver were so minute that their finer "structure" could not be laid bare by the very best microscope. One cannot help fancying that, with a more powerful instrument at his command, he might have been led to a knowledge of the hepatic cell and so to the cellular constitution of the organs which he studied. Other observers also, notably Leeuwenhoek, applied the microscope to the study of the structure of parts of the body; but none went so far as Malpighi.

The progress of Physiology in another direction is so closely inter-

woven with the progress of Chemistry that it will be better to consider the two together. During the latter part of the sixteenth and earlier part of the seventeenth century, though the day of alchemy was past, there was great activity in the preparation of new chemical substances; this was due partly to natural curiosity, partly to the demand for new remedies and for new industrial materials. And these preparations were conducted to a very large extent by the method of exact measurement which in Physics was proving so fruitful. But there was no corresponding progress in chemical theory; "chemists," said Boyle, "have been much more happy in finding experiments than the causes of them, or in assigning the principles by which they may best be explained." Chemists continued to accept the three "elements" or "principles" of Paracelsus, or rather of Valentine, namely, sulphur, mercury, and salt—that is to say, the classification of substances into those which were combustible and were lost by combustion, those which were volatile and recovered after combustion, and those which remained after combustion. Nicolas Lefèvre (d. 1674) and others, it is true, speaking of "oil" instead of sulphur, of "spirit" instead of mercury, added to the three active two passive principles—"water" or "phlegm" and "earth"; but this implied no great change.

Later in the seventeenth century, Boyle laid the foundations of modern Chemistry by severely criticising in his *Sceptical Chemist* (1661) those "principles" or "elements," and propounding the pregnant idea, that all matter was made up of minute "corpuscles" capable of arranging themselves in groups, small and simple, or large and complex; that each such group constituted a chemical substance; and that chemical change was a rearrangement of groups, a chemical compound being a union of the constituents and capable of differing in qualities from either of them; and he attained to far-seeing views as to the part played by heat in determining the arrangement of the corpuscles. But his conceptions were slow in making way.

Two other men had a much more immediate effect on the chemical learning of the century. Jean-Baptiste van Helmont (1577–1644), in whom the exact quantitative observer and experimentalist was strangely joined to the visionary, besides discovering many new chemical substances, laid hold of some important truths. He introduced the idea of "gas" as something distinct from either air or vapour, and recognised as *gas sylvestre* what we now know as carbonic acid gas. He developed in detail a doctrine of fermentations, and applied it to Physiology. His description of the chemical processes of the living body as a series of six "fermentative concoctions," by which the dead food is converted into blood, first venous, then arterial, and subsequently into the living active tissues—though marred by his spiritualistic ideas and his ignoring all that Harvey had done—contains much that is interesting.

A very different man was Francis Sylvius (de La Boë) (1614–72), a zealous exponent of Harvey's teaching, and of all the new views in

Physiology and in Physics, who, while vigorously endeavouring to extend purely chemical knowledge (he was the first to have a *Laboratorium*), strove also to apply it to the problems of living beings and so became at the same time the great teacher of the day in both Chemistry and Medicine. Taking up the work of Johann Rudolf Glauber (1603-68), who in discovering his *sal mirabile*, sodium sulphate, since and even still known as "Glauber's salt," had considered it to be a compound of an acid with an alkali; and, assisted by the labours of his pupil Otto Tachenius (d. 1670 c.), who even more clearly recognised that all salts were similarly compounds of acids and bases, and who thus gained a general conception of chemical affinity, Sylvius drew the distinction between *acidum* and *lixivium* or *alkalinum*—the basis of a classification of chemical substances; he strove, indeed, to explain many if not all chemical phenomena, both in the living body and elsewhere, as the results of the actions of acids and alkalis. The bubbles rising up in the fermenting vat were according to him brought about in the same way as the bubbles which came when oil of vitriol was thrown upon chalk; fermentation was to him the same thing as effervescence. He used the two terms indifferently and strove to explain, not only digestion in which the discoveries of Stensen, Wharton, and his own pupil Regnier de Graaf (1641-73), led him to attach great importance to saliva and pancreatic juice, the one in his view being alkaline, the other acid, but most of the changes in the body as a series of "effervescences," aided by "precipitations." Nowhere did he find need to appeal to any spiritualistic forces; chemical action was adequate to explain all the phenomena of the living body; and the chemical actions met with there he regarded as identical with the chemical actions seen in the beakers and retorts of the laboratory. Thus he became the chief exponent of what was called the "iatro-chemical" school.

Meanwhile, Borelli was in like manner explaining everything from a mechanical-physical standpoint, teaching, for instance, that digestion in the stomach was a mere mechanical crushing of the food by muscular action into minutest fragments, and that secretion was a sifting through the sieve of the secreting organ of particles whose size and shape allowed them to pass through adaptive minute pores. Thus he in turn became the founder of the "iatro-physical" school.

Both schools did much, and the English school previously mentioned perhaps even more, to advance knowledge; but the close of the century witnessed a remarkable development of chemical conceptions, which turned biological doctrines aside from the line which they had seemed to be taking. The exact part played by heat or fire in chemical actions had from quite early times been the subject of great discussion, Boyle (as we have seen) having had much to say about it; and now a wholly new notion was started. Johann Joachim Becher (1635-82) in attempting to revive Valentine's old "elements" in the form that all things consisted of three earths, "*terra lapidea*, improperly called salt, *terra fluida*,

improperly called mercury, and *terra pinguis*, improperly called sulphur," maintained that, when a substance was burnt, the *terra pinguis* previously contained in it escaped; indeed that this escape of *terra pinguis* was the essential feature of combustion. Taking up this idea, George Ernest Stahl (1660-1734) developed it more fully into what became known as the *phlogiston* theory. By *phlogiston* Stahl meant, not fire itself, but "the material and principle of fire"; and this he regarded as a material substance working in the following way. Everything which can burn does so by virtue of its holding *phlogiston*, and the act of burning is the giving out or loss of it. That which holds no *phlogiston* cannot of itself burn; but it may support combustion by taking in the *phlogiston* given out by the burning body. Thus, air which is to a large extent free from *phlogiston* is a great supporter of combustion; and many other things also free from it can bring about combustion.

The *phlogiston* theory was so powerfully advocated and proved so attractive that—though it argued burning to be a loss, and though it was thus in direct contradiction to the teaching of Boyle and Mayow—who showed that certain things, metals for instance, increased in weight by burning—the theory not only gained immediate and general acceptance, but also remained dominant during the whole of the century.

Stahl by his *phlogiston* theory not only profoundly influenced Chemistry and thus indirectly Physiology, but also exercised a most powerful effect on all biological enquiry by his earnest advocacy of spiritualistic conceptions. He put forward and brilliantly maintained the conception that all the chemical events of the living body, even though they might superficially resemble them, were at the bottom wholly different from the chemical changes taking place in the laboratory, since in the living body all chemical changes were directly governed by the sensitive soul (*anima sensitiva*) which pervaded all parts and presided over all events. The pendulum swung back from the somewhat crude materialism of Sylvius; in the views of the eighteenth century Stahl's "sensitive soul" was dominant, and under the weaker title of "vital force" is powerful even at the present day.

In the seventeenth century some at least of the modern doctrines of the nervous system began also to take shape. In the Galenic teaching the "animal spirits" were concocted in the ventricles of the brain by a mingling of the vital spirits, brought by the arterial blood, with air drawn in directly from without through the pores of the ethmoid bone. Within the several ventricles these animal spirits carried out the various functions of the soul, which they supplied with sensations by flowing upwards along the nerves. Flowing downward along the nerves, they entered the fibres, the tendinous part of a muscle, and, by swelling these up, brought about enlargement or contraction of the muscle, the fleshy part of which played a wholly passive part, and so gave rise to movement.

Nicolaus Stensen was the first to show, in 1664, that the fleshy part of

the muscle—the fleshy fibres, and not the tendinous part—was the active contracting part, the contraction of the whole muscle being the result of the contraction of the individual fibres; and he came very near to quite recent views of the essential nature of muscular contraction. Borelli, profiting by Stensen's discoveries and applying to the subject his exact Mechanics and Physics, brought, at one stride as it were, the knowledge of muscular mechanics almost up to the knowledge of to-day. On one point he failed to free himself from the old Galenic views; he maintained that contraction was essentially an inflation, an increase in bulk. The nerves in his view were occupied not by animal spirits, but by a fluid, the *succus nervus*, a "highly subtle and spirituous," yet still a strictly physical, fluid, incapable of acting at a distance. Sensation and movement were, according to him, brought about not by this *succus* flowing to and fro, but by means of "concussions" passing along it. He admitted that the mere advent of a concussion to the substance of a muscle could not of itself cause an inflation and contraction; he supposed that it excited in the muscle some change possibly of a "fermentative," that is to say, of a chemical, nature.

An important advance was made by Francis Glisson (1597–1677), who on the one hand introduced the idea and the word "irritability," as applied to muscular and other tissues, to denote the faculty of being irritated—a conception destined to play so important a part in physiology and pathology, and on the other hand made and described the experiment which still remains as a classic lecture experiment, that a muscle in contracting does not displace water, showing that contraction is a change of form only, not of bulk. In this experiment the old Galenic teaching received its last and fatal blow.

While this remarkable progress was taking place in the so to speak lower regions of Nervous Physiology, there was no corresponding advance in the higher regions. Solid additions to our knowledge of the anatomy of the brain were, it is true, furnished by Thomas Willis (1621–75), the chief merit of whose work rumours of the time however attributed to Richard Lower, who assisted him in it; but, when we turn to the functions of the brain, we find nothing much beyond fanciful speculations. Descartes, ignoring Harvey's work and making use of the old Galenic doctrines, expounded the body of man, including the nervous system, as a machine capable of being explained by the new mechanical-physical learning with the help of various assumptions, as, for instance, that the nerves were tubes along which the flow of animal spirits was regulated by valves; this body however, though capable of doing much by itself, especially by what we now call reflex actions, was governed by the "rational soul" hovering around the pineal gland. Van Helmont taught the existence of an *anima sensitiva motivaque*, which, though residing in the *pylorus* of the stomach, carried out by means of the brain and nervous system the psychical work as well as the sensations and movements of

the body; this soul however was mortal, though it contained within itself, after the fashion of a kernel, the "immortal mind." Stahl, as we have seen, carried on van Helmont's idea of *anima sensitiva*, though stripped of its fanciful wrappings. And Willis, though his experience as a physician led him to associate the *corpora striata* with movement and sensation, and the optic *thalami* with vision, both however acting as instruments of the higher *cortex*, revelled in conceptions at least as fanciful as those just mentioned. He likened the vital spirits in the blood to flame, and the animal spirits in the nervous system to light; and, while he explained all the actions of the nervous system as the functions of a corporeal and mortal soul present in brutes no less than in man, he claimed for man the possession also of a rational immortal soul, which performed all the higher psychical functions.

About all these higher functions of the nervous system and the nature of the soul the exact observers Malpighi, Borelli, Lower, Sylvius and the rest were silent. Only one of these spoke on the subject, and then with a few words, mostly negative. In a lecture delivered at Paris on the anatomy of the brain (1669), Stensen, after criticising severely the views of Descartes and of Willis, on the ground that it is impossible to explain the movements of a machine, so long as we remain ignorant of the structure of its parts, and after explaining the great difficulties met with in studying the structure of the brain, anticipated modern discoveries by the suggestion that its fibres were arranged "according to some definite pattern, on which doubtless depends the diversity of sensations and movements."

Partly owing to the use of herbs as remedies, partly to natural curiosity and the love of beautiful flowers, the sixteenth century was very active in the recognition and description of plants. From the middle of the century onwards Botanic Gardens were established at Padua, Pisa, Bologna, Leyden, and elsewhere; and during the latter half of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century a number of elaborate, sometimes highly illustrated descriptions of plants, often known as "herbals," were published by men, many of whose names are in common use as names of plants, such as Fuchs, Gesner, Dodoens, de L'Écluse (Clusius), de L'Obel (Lobelius), and Bauhin. These descriptions naturally implied a study of the organs of plants, and various methods of naming them, as well as attempts at classification. The most important, perhaps, and one of the earliest of such classifications was that by Caesalpinus (1583), drawn up however more from an *à priori* philosophical than from a direct natural history point of view. A classification introduced later by Joachim Jung (1587–1657) published after his death in 1678, as well as one by Robert Morison (1620–83), appear to have been used. John Ray (1628–1705), who in his *Historia Plantarum*, published between 1686 and 1704, proposed an arrangement

which, though continuing the fundamentally false distinction between trees and herbs laid down by Caesalpinus, separated monocotyledons from dicotyledons, and may be regarded as the most notable approach to the natural system.

These various descriptive works contained of course many references to, and discussions on, the structure and uses of the parts of plants; but they were for the most part fragmentary, and in some cases erroneous. In the latter part of the seventeenth century a remarkable advance was marked by the almost simultaneous production, in 1671, of preliminary accounts of the structure of plants by Malpighi and Nehemiah Grew, followed by the fuller work of Malpighi in 1674, and of Grew in 1682. These works cover very much the same ground and in many cases announce the same discoveries arrived at independently, though Grew in his later work had the advantage of knowing what Malpighi had written. The two, at one bound, brought up the knowledge of the anatomy, and especially the finer anatomy, of plants, from a mere collection of scattered and more or less dubious observations to a solid and compact body of exact doctrine. They showed—Malpighi writing with the greater lucidity and pointedness, and Grew with more copious details—that the elements of the structure of a plant were woody fibres, spiral vessels, and the cells of the parenchymatous parts with the addition of the less general lactiferous vessels. They further showed how these elements were built up in the stem, with its bark, wood and pith and medullary rays, in the roots, leaves, flowers, fruits and seeds; and how the elements, forming the roots, were first gathered up into the stem and then separated again into the branches, thus establishing the continuity of all parts. They thus laid the foundation of the Histology of Plants, to which Robert Hooke and Leeuwenhoek made some slight additions, but which otherwise remained untouched for more than a hundred years.

In describing structure, both Malpighi and Grew in their works introduced considerations of function, the former more happily than the latter. Looking upon the woody fibres as organs for conducting fluid or sap, the spiral vessels or *tracheae*, as he called them, as air passages, and the lactiferous vessels as channels for special juices, Malpighi was led by the study of the young cotyledons of germinating seeds (which he recognised as leaves) to the important view, that the crude sap carried upwards from the roots was in the leaves, under the influence of the sun's rays, elaborated into more perfect sap; and that this, descending again, was carried to growing parts or stored up in various places. And Ray, who treats of Vegetable Physiology incidentally only, had independently arrived at the same conclusion. As in his researches on the animal body, so in his study of plants, Malpighi does not attack the chemical side of the problem of nutrition; and Grew, who did attempt it, was not very successful. Except for this want of chemical truth, Malpighi and Grew may be said to have laid some of the

foundations of Vegetable Physiology as well as those of Vegetable Histology.

One other important advance was made in the seventeenth century. Although from quite early times botanists had recognised that some plants might be spoken of as fruit-bearing and female and others as not fruit-bearing and male, and Theophrastus had called attention to the fact that the female date-palm only produces fruit when the dust of the male is shaken over it, the view that the influence of a male element was necessary for the full development of a female organ into fruit was rarely expressed, and then in most cases obscurely. Some botanists, for instance Caesalpinus, held that no such influence was necessary; and Malpighi in his very careful account of the development of seed and of the earlier stages of the growth of the embryo refers nowhere to any influence of the pollen, which he otherwise carefully described; he seems to have regarded the seed as merely a kind of bud. Grew ascribed some subtle influence to the anthers, but his account is most obscure; and even Ray, who seems after some hesitation to have finally accepted the doctrine of sexuality, never attempted to obtain proof of the matter by experiment. In 1691, however, and more fully in 1694, Rudolf Jacob Camerarius (1665–1721) gave the direct experimental proof—namely, by removing them—that the anthers were essential to fertilisation, and showed by his careful account that he had fully grasped the importance of his discovery.

The study of animals made marked progress in the seventeenth century in two directions, affording in this respect a parallel to the study of plants. In the preceding century and even earlier the spirit of the new method of research had led men to be no longer content with the study of Aristotle's writings and the fabulous stories of travellers, but to observe for themselves, to describe the features and habits of such animals as came within their notice, and even to attempt a classification. As the zeal for travel, which was one of the marks of the age, brought back to Europe not only accounts but actual specimens of creatures hitherto unknown, and collections began to be made in the form of museums, both private and public, as well as of zoological gardens (the date of the earliest of these it seems difficult to fix), a body of exact zoological knowledge gradually grew up, expounded in such works as those of Conrad Gesner (1516–65) and of Aldrovandus (1527–1605).

This study of the Natural History of Animals, pursued mainly out of natural curiosity, and not for its use in Medicine or otherwise, continuing to make great progress in the seventeenth century, found a brilliant expositor in the man of science who was doing a like service for Botany—namely, John Ray. Francis Willughby (1635–72), first the pupil, and then the intimate friend of Ray, had studied animals while Ray was chiefly studying plants, the two carrying out their studies in close concert; but he died early without having published any important

part of the abundant material, especially on fishes and birds, which he had gathered together. This work of Willughby, Ray, who had himself a large share in it, brought out after the former's death. He himself produced a large work on quadrupeds and reptiles; and a like work of his on insects, was published after his death. Thus Ray, making use of Willughby's labours, gave a full account of the greater part of the animal kingdom; and the classification which he adopted was not only accepted at the time, but has remained, with changes and extensions, the basis of the classification in use to the present day. Ray in fact may be regarded as the founder of Systematic Zoology.

The systematic zoologists paid more attention to external features than to internal structure; but it was only natural that the enquirers who found the actual dissection of the human body so fruitful of new truths and new ideas should turn to the dissection of the bodies of animals; and, indeed, many of the anatomists, notably Fabricius, following the example of Galen, did, in a more or less desultory fashion, examine and describe the structure of various animals. In the middle of the seventeenth century, however, two men took up this work in a more thorough fashion, being therein greatly assisted by the introduction of the microscope. Malpighi's account of the anatomy of the silk-worm (1669) was the pioneer of exact Comparative Anatomy and Histology in respect to animals, doing for them what his *Anatome Plantarum* did for plants. About the same time, Swammerdam was applying the same methods, in a still more thorough and extensive way, not only to various kinds of insects in their several stages of metamorphosis, but to other animals as well, such as the snail and the frog. A few only of Swammerdam's results were published in his lifetime; the greater part did not see the light until long after his death, when in 1737 Boerhaave published under the title of *Biblia Naturae* the writings which he had left behind. These two men, Malpighi and Swammerdam, may be said to have created the science of Comparative Anatomy. The same century saw, however, other important works. Leeuwenhoek, applying the microscope in all directions, discovered spermatozoa, made known infusoria and rotifera, and studied *hydra* and *aphthis*. Malpighi, carrying the study of the formation of the chick in the egg far beyond the rough attempts of Fabricius, laid the foundations of Embryology. Francesco Redi (1670), in proving that maggots were not bred out of mere corruption, since they did not appear in rotting flesh if the access of flies was prevented, not only dealt a heavy blow at the widely accepted theory of spontaneous generation, but introduced a new and fruitful method of Experimental Biology. Of less, perhaps, but still great value, were Redi's works (1684) on the structure and economy of parasitic animals, and (1664) on vipers, in which he gave an admirable account of the poison mechanism, and incidentally showed that the poison was not absorbed by the alimentary canal. He also wrote on the

torpedo. Stensen carefully described the anatomy of the ray; and Frederik Ruysch (1638–1731), by the singular skill with which he developed the art of injecting blood vessels and other channels with coloured materials, assisted largely the progress not only of human but also of comparative anatomy.

In the sixteenth century, and even earlier, the new spirit of observation and enquiry did not fail to turn men's minds to the phenomena of the earth, especially as disclosed by mining operations. It led George Bauer (Georgius Agricola, 1494–1555), who lived near the mines of the Erzgebirge, to a very extensive study of metals and other minerals, and he may be said to have laid the foundations of Mineralogy. Among the objects of which he spoke as *fossilia* he included the remains of extinct animals; but he did not recognise these as such; he made no distinction between them and minerals possessing definite forms, and thought that they all arose in the same way—that all were the products of natural forces.

While minerals were thus being studied from the mining point of view, it was natural that the men who had been led to study animals and plants, and especially those who gathered collections of these and formed museums, should also turn their attention to minerals, precious stones and fossils. Thus Caesalpinus, Conrad Gesner, Aldrovandus and others treated of these as well as of plants and animals. But they, or at least the majority of them, failed to distinguish between ordinary minerals and the mineralised remains of extinct animals; they spoke of the latter as “sculptured minerals,” *lapides figurati*, and regarded them as *lusus naturae*, as the products of a mysterious *vis plastica* or *lapidifica*. This view, however, was not accepted by all. Even in the fifteenth and, later, in the sixteenth century both those remarkable men, Leonardo da Vinci and Bernard Palissy, “the Potter,” (1499–1589), had argued forcibly that these fossils must be the remains of animals and plants which were once living. Yet it held its ground in a remarkable manner far on into the seventeenth century, and did not wholly disappear until the end of that century or even the beginning of the next. Hence, though many collections of fossil plants and animals were made, and many specimens carefully described, little use was made of them to interpret the history of the earth.

In the seventeenth century the labours of John Woodward (1665–1728), who made large collections of fossils and minerals and most carefully studied and described them, were perhaps the most effective in establishing the truth that fossils were really the remains of plants and animals which were once alive; and in this he was vigorously supported later by Jean-Jacques Scheuchzer (1672–1733) and others. But Woodward and the rest were content with the explanation that the distribution of these fossils at different places and at different depths from the surface was

simply a result of the Mosaic deluge. And indeed, though Athanasius Kircher (1602–80) studied and carefully described volcanoes, and though a posthumous work by Robert Hooke on earthquakes shows that he had grasped the idea that fossils might be used as helps to tell the tale of the earth, most of the attempts of the century to explain how the earth had gained its present features were either fantastic developments of the biblical history or speculative cosmogonies like those of Descartes and Leibniz.

One man only followed in the path begun by Da Vinci, who had not only contended that fossils were the remains of once living plants and animals, but had also suggested how their presence in various places and at various depths could be explained by the action of water. That singular man, Nicolaus Stensen, in a little tract, *De solido intra solidum*, published in 1669, a brief preliminary statement (intended to be followed by a larger and fuller work which, however, never saw the light), after showing that fossils were really the remains of plants and animals, went on to infer from the features of the soil in which they were embedded, and from the other circumstances of their occurrence, the changes which had taken place leading to their deposition. The little work was in fact a remarkable anticipation of modern geological doctrines; but it produced no lasting effect and was soon forgotten. The seventeenth century passed away without any advance on the beginning thus made.

The story of the progress of science in the seventeenth century would not be complete without a reference to the scientific societies which were tokens of the scientific activity of the time, and powerfully promoted the advance of scientific knowledge.

During the fifteenth century the friends of the new studies began to form, in various cities of Italy, clubs or societies, the members of which, meeting together under the protection and very frequently at the house of some great or wealthy personage, used to discuss and take measures to promote the new ideas which were stirring them. A society of this kind, founded at Florence by Cosimo de' Medici, which devoted itself to the study of the writings of Plato, thought to emphasise its platonic character by calling itself an *Accademia*; and the name after a while came to be adopted by similar societies. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries these societies, or Academies, multiplied rapidly; they became the fashion, so that nearly every large city in Italy had at least one, and the chief cities several. Most of the Academies busied themselves with letters or with art; they assumed fantastic names; they were in many cases short-lived, some of them being put down by the Church, or remaining insignificant.

Towards the middle of the seventeenth century the progress of scientific learning in its various branches received a great stimulus, in several European countries, from the foundation of Academies or

Societies created for the purpose of encouraging scientific investigation, and providing a common meeting-place for the interchange of ideas.

The first society for the prosecution of physical science was established at Naples in 1560, under the name of *Accademia Secretorum Naturae*, and under the presidency of Baptista Porta. In the course of the seventeenth century two of the Italian Academies which devoted themselves to science became famous. At Florence, a society, begun informally in 1651, under the patronage of Ferdinand II, was formally established in 1657, under the name of the *Accademia del Cimento*, by Prince Leopold, at whose palace it met, and who gave it unstinted help. It devoted itself mainly to mathematical and physical science; many, if not most, of the greater scientific men of the time were among its members; it discussed, devised and carried out experimental researches, and in 1667 published an account of its labours under the title of *Saggi di naturali esperienze fatte nell'Accademia del Cimento*. In 1667, however, Leopold's energies being withdrawn from it on his being created a Cardinal, and several of its active members, such as Borelli, having left Florence, the Academy came to an end.

At Rome, at even an earlier date, in 1603, a similar society was founded by Prince Federigo Cesi under the name of the *Accademia dei Lincei*, which devoted itself mainly to the natural sciences. Like its sister at Florence, it authorised publications, and like its sister it had a short life only, coming to an end in 1630, upon the early death of its founder. Long afterwards—in 1784—the name was revived in the present *Reale Accademia dei Lincei*. An *Accademia fisico-matematica* was founded at Rome by Giovanni Giustino Ciampini in 1677. The scientific Academy at Naples had been suppressed by Philip II, and was succeeded by another Academy of Sciences in 1695.

In England a society, similar to the Italian Academies, was established in 1645 at London, meeting at Gresham College or elsewhere, under the private name of the "Invisible College." In 1648 the society was divided, some members continuing to meet, fitfully owing to the troubles of the time, in London, but most of them at Oxford. In 1660 the meetings in London were revived with success, and on July 15, 1662, the society was formally incorporated by charter as the "Royal Society of London," a second charter being granted in 1663. It is known how keen and useful an interest was taken by John Evelyn in the early progress of the Royal Society; his project of a Mathematical College, like his friend Abraham Cowley's Philosophical College, remained, however, unaccomplished. William Molyneux is regarded as the founder of the Dublin Philosophical Society (1684). In France, at Paris, a similar society, about the middle of the seventeenth century, met at the house of Melchisedec Thevenot, a man distinguished by his travels and his interest in science; it was before this society that Stensen gave his remarkable lecture on the brain, attacking the teaching

of Descartes and others. And there seem to have been other like societies or Academies at Paris. In 1666 (the *Académie Française* having been founded earlier, in 1635), the place of these informal Academies was taken by the *Académie des Sciences*, established by Louis XIV, on the advice of Colbert. In 1699 it was reorganised and began to issue publications. In Germany, a society similar to the Italian Academies was established by Johann Lorenz Bausch, a physician of Schweinfurt, in 1662; it was familiarly known as "the Argonauts" but more formally as the *Academia naturae curiosorum*. Under this latter name it was, in 1687, definitely established under statutes, at Vienna, with privileges granted by the Emperor Leopold. Leibniz, who was a member of the Royal Society (from 1673) and of Ciampini's Roman Physical and Mathematical Academy, induced the Elector Frederick III (soon to become King Frederick I of Prussia) through the influence of his consort the Hanoverian Sophia Charlotte to establish a Society of Sciences, of which Leibniz himself was made the first president, and which in 1711 became the "Academy of Sciences." His efforts, however, to bring about the establishment of a general Academy of Sciences at Vienna were unsuccessful. At one time they had nearly approached realisation; and he put forth in both Latin and German schemes for the proposed *Societas Imperialis Germanica*, and drafted statutes for it. But the project was in the end defeated (about 1714) by Jesuit opposition and by lack of funds. In Russia, as has been seen in a previous chapter, an Academy of Sciences was founded at Moscow by the Tsar Theodore III so early as 1681. But this institution, into the foundation of which religious purposes largely entered, was superseded by the Academy of Sciences founded by Peter the Great at St Petersburg in 1724, designed as a general centre of education and learning.

The Academies belonging to other European countries were founded at later dates.

CHAPTER XXIV.

LATITUDINARIANISM AND PIETISM.

Two tendencies impeded the peaceful and progressive development of the Reformation in the latter half of the seventeenth century—the spirit of growing insubordination, or excessive use of the right of free enquiry, and the lapse, on the other hand, into a hardened dogmatism, limiting the area of free debate in utter contradiction of this principle, the right of private judgment, which is the *raison d'être* of Protestantism. The dialectical process involved in these antagonistic tendencies became a disintegrating force, threatening internal dissolution. In England, the strife of political parties, closely connected with the conflict between the sacerdotal theory of ecclesiasticism and the Puritanical theory of doctrinal exclusiveness, intensified religious passions. In Germany, the prostration which followed the Thirty Years' War together with the stifling effects of governmental repression—a strict application of the *jus reformandi* of the territorial sovereign (*Landesherr*)—often in league with clerical domination, retarded the progress of intellectual and spiritual religion. Two movements, both taking their rise in Holland, then the home of a virile and tolerant Protestantism, came into existence to counteract these two tendencies—Latitudinarianism in England, and Pietism in Germany.

The former was an attempt to bring about agreement in essentials, while dealing gently with, or passing over, minor differences. The latter sought to rouse the religious world from lethargy and the torpor of formalism. Previous attempts of Roman Catholic and Protestant divines to define doctrine with a view to putting an end to controversy, at the Council of Trent and at the Synod of Dort, in the *Formula Concordiae*, and in the Thirty-nine Articles, conceived as “articles of peace,” and in the Westminster and Helvetic Confessions of Faith, had failed in their object. It was then that a small number of divines and laymen, wearied and saddened by the deadening effects of the new scholasticism, tried to introduce “sweet reasonableness” into theological discussion; while others thought they had found a more excellent way in the intuitive religion of the heart, and in the simplest and most primitive

forms of faith, more or less independent of external ordinances and a "form of words." These, an inconsiderable body as to numbers, but conscious of the support of many inarticulate sympathisers, tried to lessen the virulence of the *rabies theologorum*—Lutherans and Reformers, Jansenists and Jesuits, Calvinists and Arminians, Puritans and Anglicans—all fiercely contending with one another. At the same time efforts were made by authority, as for example in the "Charitable Conference" at Thorn (1645), convened by Wladislaw, King of Poland, in the Synod of Charenton (1631), suggested by Louis XIV, and through the "Peace of the Church," brought about by Clement IX in order to put an end to the Jansenist trouble. Other, but equally futile, attempts at reunion were also made by eminent churchmen and statesmen such as Richelieu and Bossuet, or initiated by Princes such as Landgrave William VI of Hesse, who arranged for a friendly discussion between Lutherans and Reformers at Cassel (1661); or, earlier still, by James I, who attempted, through the instrumentality of Peter du Moulin, a divine renowned among the French Reformers, and at the Hampton Court Conference (1604), to bring about a compromise between Puritans and Episcopalians. The same fate attended the efforts of the broad-minded Elector John Sigismund of Brandenburg, who granted full liberty of conscience to his subjects, and later by the Great Elector, who also tried to put an end to the mutual recriminations of Lutherans and Calvinists.

Religious equality and the toleration of minorities were not fully secured by the Peace of Westphalia; and the rights acquired by the Protestants were often abridged by the arbitrary acts of Catholic Princes, who aided and abetted the efforts of the Jesuits to bring about conversions, often by methods of persuasion, which differed little from persecution. In the Palatinate, where a Catholic dynasty had succeeded, the persecution of the Protestants was only averted by threats of reprisals on the part of Prussia. In Electoral Saxony, where Frederick Augustus became a convert to Rome with a view to obtaining the Crown of Poland, it would have led to similar results, but for the determination of his Lutheran subjects. In Salzburg the Archbishop, Count Firmian, in 1729, attempted a forced reconversion of the body of loyal "Evangelical Catholics." Thereupon a hundred of their elders, at dawn one Sunday morning in a defile of the Schwarzach, took an oath on the Host and on consecrated salt, vowing in the name of the Holy Trinity that they would stand by each other in sorrow and misfortune and remain true to the Evangelical faith. In defiance of the *Corpus Evangelicorum* (the body of Protestant representatives at the permanent Diet of Ratisbon who were responsible for the upholding of Protestant rights and privileges) might often prevailed over right; and in this particular case the sufferers only escaped by a patent of emigration. In Hungary few of the magnates were able to resist the temptation of retaining their court and state appointments as the price of returning to the dominant religion, and

the ordinary Protestant citizens were exposed to innumerable vexations; while in other parts of the Habsburg dominions the persecuted Protestants found it necessary to seek an asylum from persecution in Transylvania.

Throughout the German Empire, moreover, many nobles and men of superior culture began to be captivated by the zeal and by the controversial skill of the Roman emissaries, to whom the progress of historical and patristic studies had given a temporary advantage. Some potentates, like Henry IV in France, would not lose a crown for a mass and became Catholics from wise policy, or cunning statecraft. Others again, like the accomplished Queen Christina of Sweden, the daughter of Gustavus Adolphus, the patron and disciple of Descartes, the correspondent of Pascal and Spinoza, turned away from the narrow-minded bigotry of her Protestant court-preachers to seek refuge in the Roman communion, as the more flexible, if not the more liberal, system of religion. John Frederick of Hanover, intellectually the most distinguished of the Brunswick-Lüneburg Dukes, and the first among them to patronise Leibniz, was converted to Romanism through the enthusiasm of Count Rantzau, himself a distinguished convert. The conversion of his kinsman, Antony Ulric of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, belongs to a later date (1710), and followed on that of his niece, who became the consort of the future Emperor Charles VI. Not a few Princes were drawn towards Rome by the natural affinity between state absolutism and ecclesiastical concentration, agreeing with the Jesuits that obedience is the only remedy against dissidence and insubordination to authority in Church and State. The main cause of the defection of the mass of the people in Protestant countries was the moral decadence and mental decrepitude of the clergy, together with the repellent effect of their dry disquisitions in the pulpit, accompanied by frigid forms of worship. The primary object of the Pietists, therefore, was to infuse a fresh spirit of religious fervour, and to bring into use forms of faith and worship better calculated to satisfy the craving for *Innerlichkeit* (depth of soul) in devotion and the desire to face the profounder questions which gather round religion. Thus it was that mystic Pietism found its way from the Netherlands into Germany, its carriers being the German students frequenting the then famous Dutch Universities, while the University of Helmstedt, the solitary oasis of intellectual freedom in Germany at this time, produced in Calixtus (who died in 1656), the noble-minded precursor of a new era, whose effort, however, to liberalise theology only produced fierce opposition, though it paved the way for the work of later reformers.

In England, also, the liberalising influence of the Dutch Remonstrants had its effect on the Latitudinarians. John Hales had heard with admiration the defence of Episcopius at the Synod of Dort. But the movement in England formed part of the general progress of thought, and was accompanied by a determined national resistance to the advances of

resurgent Romanism and the general dislike of hierarchical pretensions in the Anglican Church. Here much need existed for the moderating influence of a middle party like that of the Latitudinarians, who, though they with the rest regarded theology as the "empress of the sciences," were under the influence of the philosophical speculations of the time, and formed their own opinions on a broader basis, able to stand aside and view with impartial calm the storm of religious disputation, then at its full height. They tried to find a middle way between extreme Anglicanism and intolerant Puritanism, between the advocates of repressive tyranny and revolutionary fanaticism, between the retrograde advocates of authority and the clamorous partisans of independence, each side appealing to Scripture and antiquity, and neither willing to grant to others the right they claimed for themselves. The Latitudinarians addressed themselves to the task of pacification by lifting up the still, small voice of reason to quell the storm of religious passions. Bound together by similar views and sentiments, but working independently of each other, they took their stand on the ground of rational theology. They dwelt on the claims of Christian morality rather than on the importance of purity of doctrine; they preferred the evidence of righteous conduct to the test of correct convictions, asserting the supremacy of reason, yet without impugning the claims of revelation. Their principal aim was a larger comprehension in the charitable spirit of enlightened, though cautious, moderation.

Their first leader was Lord Falkland, the honoured friend of Clarendon, the associate of Ben Jonson, Cowley, D'Avenant, Carew and Suckling. He was also the presiding genius of the "*Convivium theologicum*"; and some of its members, meeting under his hospitable roof, at a subsequent period became the leaders of the Latitudinarian school of divines. Born of a mother who had been under Jesuit influence, but educated at Trinity College, Dublin, then under the provostship of Ussher, he owed his Protestant views to the spirit of ecclesiastical liberalism prevailing there at this time. After a short stay in Holland, where he met Grotius, and a somewhat chequered career, he returned and settled down in his own country seat at Great Tew, to give himself up to learned leisure and his favourite literary pursuits. It was here that Chillingworth wrote his chief work, in consultation with his friends, and, it has been even surmised, in cooperation with Falkland himself. When the war between the King and Parliament broke out, Falkland, from a romantic sense of loyalty, took side with his royal master, and joined the army as a volunteer against the Earl of Essex. We are told by Clarendon, that "from the entrance into this unnatural war his natural cheerfulness and vivacity grew clouded, and a kind of sadness and dejection of spirit stole over him which he had never been used to." Equally distasteful to his mind were the contentions in Parliament, where he was equally opposed to the "root and branch" party, who tried to exclude the Bishops from the House

of Lords or abolish the Order altogether, and to the exaggerated view of its sacredness entertained by its extreme defenders. Throughout his parliamentary career his plea was for justice tempered by mercy, with reverence for the law and unwillingness to permit any breach of it for reasons of State. He hazarded his life in a war which he abhorred, and fell in battle when he was only thirty-four years old. Thus this "little man" with a great soul passed away prematurely, "the martyr of lucidity of mind and largeness of temper," leaving behind him as a legacy the example of a true Catholicity avoiding the falsehood of extremes, firmly holding on to faith without abjuring reason, and thus opening a new era in religious thought.

The "immortal" Chillingworth had, like his friend Falkland, been under Jesuit influence; he had, moreover, been brought into personal contact with members of the Order, and had succumbed to their superior skill of fence. Himself considered "the readiest and nimblest disputant" at the University, he met his match in one John Fisher (whose real name was Perse or Percy), one of the seminary priests, who worked with much zeal among Oxford undergraduates at this time, and was by him induced to enter the Church of Rome. But, on being sent for further instruction to the college at Douay, he there became a "doubting papist," and, partly through the persuasion of Laud, his godfather, returned to the English Church. Chillingworth reentered the University to complete a work on free enquiry into religion, and later resorted to the library at Tew, rich in patristic and controversial divinity, to collect materials. Thus equipped, he wrote his well-known treatise entitled *The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation; or an Answer to a Book entitled "Mercy and Truth, or Charity maintained by Catholics."* It met with the full approval of the King and Laud, but with little favour from the Puritans. For, though a defender of Protestantism, Chillingworth had little in common with them, as, by natural disposition or by training, he was entirely opposed to their intolerant conceptions of religion. He was one of the earliest objectors to the "damnatory clauses" of the Athanasian Creed, and considered subscription to the Articles of Religion "an imposition on men's conscience," though ultimately he accepted them as "articles of peace." Attached to the royal cause, he joined the King's forces and was present at the siege of Gloucester, where he invented some engines for storming the place. He followed Lord Hopton into Sussex, where he was shut up with the garrison in Arundel Castle. Here, out of health and spirits, he was taken prisoner and conveyed to Chichester, partly through the kind intervention of Francis Cheynell, a former Fellow of Merton, and a "rigid, zealous, Presbyterian," who, in his eagerness to convert Chillingworth, embittered his last moments by his importunate visits. At Chichester, Chillingworth died, and was buried in the cloisters of the cathedral by men of

his own persuasion; for it was only just "that malignants should carry malignants to their graves," to use the words of Cheynell, who met them "with Master Chillingworth's book in my hand," and cast it into the grave, with a commendatory prayer, of which it will suffice to quote part: "Get thee gone, thou cursed book, which hast seduced so many precious souls! Get thee gone, thou corrupt rotten book! Earth to Earth, and dust to dust!"

But his work has survived by the elevated dignity of its style, as the outcome of a singularly bright and massive intellect possessed of a firm grasp of the subject and a forceful firmness in conducting the argument from beginning to end. Chillingworth is fair, even magnanimous, towards his opponents, and in the statement of his own case lucid, though, by reason of his eager impetuosity, his sentences are at times involved. A manly naturalness irradiating its pages raises the book far above the average of similar controversial writings of that day. Briefly stated, the argument rests on the infallibility of the Bible as against the infallibility of the Church, and on the right of each individual reader to interpret it independently of ecclesiastical authority, the book being in the end its own interpreter. Thus, amid the clatter of controversies and the tumult raised by the "warrior with confused noise and garments rolled in blood," a voice is here raised, calm and clear in its declaration that "Protestants are inexcusable if they did offer violence to other men's consciences."

"The ever memorable John Hales of Eton" differed from his two younger friends by not taking a prominent part in public affairs. He was a retiring scholar, a student of Shakespeare, taking an honoured place in Suckling's "session of poets," renowned as a "subtle disputer" and eloquent preacher, and, as such, selected to pronounce the funeral oration on the founder of the Bodleian Library. A man of well-balanced judgment, not tied to any party views, a lover of peace detesting "the brawls grown from religion," John Hales is a typical Latitudinarian, gifted with acuteness of intellect, a most delicate perception of the proportion of things, and a profound spiritual insight, viewing the current of religious partisanship from the elevated standpoint of a candid observer rather than from that of a chief actor in the turmoil of political and religious warfare. As a royalist, he suffered with the rest and was deprived of his emoluments, severed from his friends and books, and exposed to indigence in his old age. Yet he remained throughout unsoured by misfortune, retaining a genial and humane kindliness, full of charity towards others. He "would often say that he would renounce the religion of the Church of England tomorrow, if it obliged him to believe that any other Christian should be damned; and that nobody would conclude another man to be damned who did not wish him so." He shows that pride and passion rather than conscience are the cause of religious antagonism, that heresy and schism are scarecrows to frighten the

unwary, while sectaries are reminded that "communion" is "the strength and good of all society, sacred and civil." Hales is quick in detecting the weak points in an argument and the flaws in hasty assumptions. As to the claims of antiquity, he justly points out that the age of opinions does not add to their value. As to the plea of the universal acceptance of truth, *quod ab omnibus*, he shows, like his contemporary Pascal, that the power of majorities consists in their number, not their reason—"there are more which run against the truth than with it." In short, John Hales is a religious critic, devout, but not dogmatic; rational, but without rashness; liberal, but opposed to licence; a lover of simplicity in religious belief, yet at the same time a rare example of philosophical breadth; in his mental attitude maintaining a singularly calm steadfastness in the whirlpool of theological and political unrest.

Ten years lie between the publication of Chillingworth's work and *The Liberty of Prophesying*, by Jeremy Taylor; and many and far-reaching events had occurred in the interval which account for the differences in their style and method, apart from differences in personal disposition and mental characteristics. The triumph of Puritanism, its split into two parties, the submergence of the moderate section by the violence of the revolutionary current, the displacement of the Presbyterians by the Independents, and the multiplication of sects, leading to greater diversity of religious opinion, furnished the psychological moment for the appearance of such a work as Taylor's, which was intended to secure intellectual freedom from spiritual tyranny. He takes up the same ground as his two predecessors, but rests his argument, not only on the uncertainty of tradition and the inconsistency of the Fathers, as weakening their authority, but also on the fallibility of reason in the interpretation of the Bible, thence deducing the duty of agreeing to differ. His aim is not only reconciliation, but reconstruction on a wider basis. His position is near to that of a sceptical eclectic; hence the dread with which the saintly Saunderson regards his "novelties." Jeremy Taylor is not a controversialist pure and simple; he is a casuist in his *Ductor Dubitantium*, with its "subtilties and spinosities," a rhetorician rather than a reasoner: for his style is full of redundancy and prolixity, though less so in this work than in some of his other writings. He is a Pictist in his several collections of meditations, especially in *The Golden Grove*, so called in honour of his friend, the Earl of Carbery, at whose seat bearing this name he found hospitality. He is a promoter of saintly living and dying, a guide of souls, turning them away from arid disputation to mystical communion with God; "there is no cure for us, but piety and charity." He is a literary churchman rather than a logical divine. His chivalrous defence of episcopacy and somewhat inconclusive dissuasion from Romanism are ineffective, but not so much as has been surmised, on account of a sense of insecurity as to his own standpoint, or of his "critical insensibility." He is less uncompromising than

his predecessors, because he is more humanly sympathetic in his attitude towards those in error. While unanimity is impossible, and doctrinal uniformity has proved ineffective, and "no man is a heretic against his will," the unity of the spirit is insisted upon as essential, and Taylor could unite all in the bond of peace and of all virtues. "I thought it might not misbecome my duty and endeavours to plead for peace and charity and forgiveness and permissions mutual; although I had reason to believe that such is the iniquity of men, and they so indisposed to receive such impresses, that I had as good plough the sands, or till the air."

A very different mind from Jeremy Taylor's was that of Edward Stillingfleet, though they are frequently mentioned together as men of similar views and aims. Both are animated by the same catholicity of spirit; but, whereas Stillingfleet is distinguished by greater intellectual penetration and polemical adroitness, Jeremy Taylor excels by the ardour of his earnest affectionateness and meditative mental detachment. He also shows greater consistency in adhering to his liberal principles with the changing times. But, with the development of events in the Restoration period, both alike display the same tendency to lean on the State for the restraint of sectarian fanaticism and ecclesiastical intolerance. The *Irenicon* was published in 1659 and republished in 1662, the year in which the Act of Uniformity was passed, with the first motto on its title-page, "Let your moderation be known to all men." At this time, and more especially among the younger clergy, an earnest desire was felt for a compromise between the religious parties; and Stillingfleet was still a young man when he wrote the book. In it he builds up an argument on the basis of the insecurity of tradition and authority like his predecessors, but takes a step further in the direction of Latitudinarianism by emphasising the indifference of forms, maintaining "that the form of church government is a mere matter of prudence, regulated by the word of God." From the composing effects of Christian prudence in the rulers of the Church he expects a termination "of our strange divisions and unchristian animosities, while we pretend to serve the Prince of Peace." He lived to alter his tone when he had attained to episcopal rank after the Restoration. Then he became the special pleader of his own Church and Order; yet the *Irenicon* is the sincere expression of those principles which had been instilled into his mind by the band of Cambridge Latitudinarian divines known as the Cambridge Platonists.

These were so called because they were given to the study of Plato and Neoplatonism. With the idealist philosopher, they saw the spiritual realities behind the phenomenal world; and, imbued with the new spirit of speculation as the century advanced, they endeavoured to supply the need felt for bringing religious thought into relation with the thought of the time. Most of them were members of the Puritan College of Emmanuel, where dogmatic rigidity naturally produced a reaction.

Their leader, Benjamin Whichcote, was utterly unlike "the stiff and narrow" divines who had filled the highest places in the University during the ascendancy of the Puritan party. Burnet speaks of him as "a man of rare temper, very mild and obliging; being disgusted with the dry systematical way of those times, he studied to raise those who conversed with him to a nobler set of thoughts, and to consider religion as a seed of a deiform nature." In contrast with the "sourness and severity" of the Puritan doctrine he held up "a kind of moral divinity"; so one of its representatives, his former tutor Tuckney, complains. Two of his most distinguished pupils, Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, were well acquainted with the new philosophy and in direct correspondence with Descartes. They and others followed the prevailing tendency of the day to reconsider the criterion of truth, to seek for some new principle of certitude amid the decay of antiquated systems. From the first, they exercised considerable influence on the affairs of national life. Whichcote was in the confidence of some of the leading men of the Commonwealth, and as Provost of King's and afternoon lecturer at Trinity Church his chief power was felt in the lecture room and the pulpit, mainly among the youth of the University, in expanding religious thought by showing its affinity with all that is noble and pure in human nature. As to religious controversy, he reminds his contemporaries that "the maintenance of truth is rather God's charge and the continuance of charity ours"; that the "vitals of religion" are few; that "there is nothing more unnatural to religion than contentions about it." He admits unreservedly the claims of reason: "Reason is the Divine Governor of man's life; it is the very voice of God."

John Smith, also a pupil of Whichcote, was a Platonist in the best sense of the word, a man of philosophic breadth, rich in thought, and possessing a marked distinction of style. For him Divinity is "the true efflux of the eternal light"—so far he platonises with Plato. "Divinity is not so well perceived by a subtile wit as by a purified sense"; here he follows Plotinus. Smith's was a lofty and intellectual nature, passionate in its ardent love for truth, even impetuous, but kept in check by humility, patience, and "the philosophic mind." His *Select Discourses* (1661) are perhaps the most important work of this Cambridge school; they are "impregnated with Divine notions." In an age still under the sense of religious terror, his piety was free from all servile fear, and the "sour and ghastly apprehension of God." He was equally free from that unbecoming assumption of familiarity with the Deity which was the weakness of the Pictists. They imagine, as he puts it, "that we are become heaven's darlings as much as we are our own." He discards a verbal basis of belief, "subtle niceties," in formulating religious truth. The latter, he says, is better understood by unfolding itself in the purity of men's hearts and lives, but is divinely imparted, as a revelation, by "the free influx of the divine mind upon our minds and understandings."

Henry More, in his *Divine Dialogues* and poems, is the type of the devout mystic—a recluse who refused the most tempting offers of preferment in favour of contemplative seclusion. His personality was singularly attractive; he was a pure idealist, regarding Christianity as “the deepest and choicest piece of philosophy.” He followed reason, but knew its limitations and fell back upon “Divine sagacity”—spiritual illumination—as antecedent to rational apprehension. He pointed out the importance of inwardness in religion, and looked on holiness as the portal admitting to divine knowledge. “God reserves his choicest secrets to the purest minds.” He was a transcendentalist, who had his occasional raptures, in contact with the spiritual world. William Law, a kindred spirit of that age, speaks of him as a Babylonish philosopher, but is deeply impressed by his profound piety. Even Hobbes, with whom he maintained friendly relations in spite of their differences of opinion, could say that, if ever he found his own opinions untenable, “he would embrace the philosophy of Dr More.”

Ralph Cudworth, as a thinker and a moralist, occupied a preeminent position among the Cambridge Platonists. In the sermon preached before Parliament in 1647 he was bold enough to remind his hearers that many who pull down idols in churches set them up in their own hearts, and, while they quarrelled with painted glass, made no scruple at all of entertaining many foul lusts, and committing continual idolatry with them. In the *Intellectual System*, a monument of massive learning and strenuous thought, he, like Henry More, attacked the materialism and fatalistic tendencies of the *Leviathan*, and became the advocate of a spiritual philosophy; while in his treatise on morality on “a rational basis” he sought to vindicate the immutable and eternal laws of ethics, as against the opinion of Hobbes that they are the decrees of the legislator enforced by the magistrate. He was opposed alike to the opinionative zeal of the religious bigot and to that of the scientific dogmatist. If the Cambridge Platonists “cried up reason,” as their orthodox opponents complain, More and Cudworth did so, at least, as apologists for Christianity, setting forth its reasonableness in an age of scientific discovery and free enquiry. They were philosophers in the interest of religion. Cudworth thus controverted the monism of Hobbes, the doctrine that all mutation is motion, thought included, and that motion can have no cause except motion. To this he opposed the philosophical dualism of his *Intellectual System*. The modern identification of the cosmos and its moving cause was still an unfamiliar idea; hence Cudworth, in his defence of theism, opposed what he considered atheism in Hobbes. It is significant of the growing antagonism to religion in the upper ranks of society at the time, that the courtiers of Charles II did all they could in the first instance to delay the issue of the *Intellectual System* and to destroy its reputation after it was published. The King’s patronage of Hobbes and science generally, it has been suggested, arose from the idea that these “scientific

nonconformists" tended to lessen the power and authority of religion as a dominating factor in political life. In the same way his counsellors, *le ministère des roués*, looked upon unbridled speculation as an encouragement to moral licence.

On the other hand the progress of science had its salutary effect in aiding the efforts of the Latitudinarian divines as pioneers of scientific theology—notably so in the case of Joseph Glanvill, who, though a firm believer in witchcraft, was one of the earliest members of the Royal Society. He was not one of the Cambridge Platonists, and lamented the fact of not having lived near them; but he was in full sympathy with their aims. In his work on the *Vanity of Dogmatising*, republished under the title *Scep̄sis Scientifica* in a considerably altered form, he speaks of opinions as "the rattles of immature intellects." He dwells on the difficulty of finding truth, though he says also, "A good will, help'd by a good wit, can find truth anywhere." He is in full accord with the intellectual movement of the times, speaks of Descartes as the "grand secretary of nature," and is one of the first propounders of philosophic doubt in England. At the same time, he denies that there is any antagonism between faith and science. "To say reason opposes faith, is to scandalise both." As to divine truths that were contained in Christ's teaching, they "were most pure in their source, and Time could not perfect what Eternity began." Nathanael Culverwell, the most distinguished among the lesser lights of the movement, deserves special mention as one of the earliest expositors of "physical ethics." Quoting Lord Bacon's saying that "all morality is nothing but a collection and bundling up of natural precepts," he adds that moralists only "enlarge the fringe of nature's garments." In his conception of ethnic morality he was far in advance of his time.

Thus the way was prepared for the later Latitudinarians. These applied the principles of their predecessors to practical politics in Church and State. The most prominent among the Latitudinarians of the Revolution is Burnet, whose sincere piety, large-hearted sympathy, common sense, and courage, notwithstanding some faults, well fitted him for the task of extending liberty of thought in the Church and conciliating Nonconformity so far as possible, though political necessity compelled him to enforce strictly the laws against Roman Catholics. The appointment of Latitudinarian Bishops was the direct result of the hostile attitude of the Non-jurors. Though holding fast to episcopacy and the liturgy, the Latitudinarians were willing to tolerate other forms and some modification of subscription. Always ready to minimise the importance of differences in ceremonial, they aimed at keeping the doors of the Church "wider open," and thought that nothing should be considered absolutely divine and unalterable in the external ordering of her system. Among them was Tillotson, conciliatory and circumspect, a pattern of "sweet reasonableness"; Bishop Fowler, the author of the *Free Discourse between two Intimate Friends*, in which he says that the "design

of the Gospel is to make men good, not to intoxicate their brains with notions"; Bishop Patrick, a practical divine with a touch of mysticism, the author of *A Brief Account of the new sect of Latitude Men*, which contains a vivid description of the movement; Sheldon, one of the survivors of Falkland's circle, considered from the first as one "born and bred" to become Archbishop of Canterbury; the laborious Tenison, a disciple, like Tillotson, of Cudworth, and, like him, one of the great preachers of the day; and Cumberland, the defender of the innate law of nature against the utilitarianism of Hobbes. All these adopted moderation as a principle of action. Their accommodation to the circumstances of the times might incur the reproach of political expediency with a touch of worldly liberalism. As the disciples of the Cambridge Platonists they failed, perhaps, in reaching the same high level of spirituality, or the same depth of intellectual penetration—they were statesmen rather than Christian philosophers. But, on the other hand, their minds were more completely emancipated from theological prepossessions, and their chief characteristic was sobriety of judgment. Their style, too, bore traces of a change under the influence of the literary movement of the times towards greater clearness, conciseness, dignity, delicacy of taste, and freedom from the last traces of controversial invective. Stating their opinions with the quiet force of moral conviction, with no less earnestness, though with greater calm and caution, they were instrumental at a critical moment of constitutional development in helping to regulate and to moderate the progress of national life in England.

Pietism in Germany preceded the later Rationalism, whereas in England the Pietism of the Evangelical Revival succeeded Latitudinarianism. Pietism, taking its rise among the Calvinists in the Netherlands, where stirring political events and dangers had intensified religious excitement, thence found its way first into the adjacent countries of Germany lying between Rhine and Weser. Thence it spread in a southerly direction to the territories near the Neckar and the Main, many of the younger clergy in those parts resorting to the then famous universities in Holland. Francis Rous, the mystical Provost of Eton, had graduated in the University of Leyden; Gisbert Voet, a native of Heusden in Holland, a delegate at the Synod of Dort, and professor of theology at Utrecht from 1634 to 1676, exercised considerable influence in this way. Voet was a man of great learning, both classical and patristic, and was well versed in medieval theology. He has been called the "patron of conventicles," that is, private assemblies for the cultivation of greater piety, and was himself a man of intense earnestness and irreproachable character. As a strict puritan, he was a severe censor of the drama, a determined opponent of gambling and all forms of amusement tending to self-indulgence. For the pleasures of the table, for

example, he proposed to substitute intellectual conversation at meals on subjects connected with religion, philosophy and history. He spoke of the Church as standing in need of reforms "*circa praxin pietatis et bonorum operum*"; and like the mystic Wilhelm Teelinck, whom he much admired, he tried to stem the tide of secularising ethics, and to rouse the people from the torpor of religious formalism and indifference. Johann Cocceius (Koch), a native of Bremen, professor and rector at the University of Leyden, which he quitted in 1660, was not like Voet, a Calvinistic "precisian," but one of the earliest representatives of the higher criticism, regarding an improved method of biblical interpretation as the first requisite of any system of religious reform. Though a man of immense erudition, he puts *Leben* (life) above *Lehre* (doctrine) and emphasises the superior importance of attending to conduct rather than correct opinions in matters of religion. He is the distinguished founder of the so-called "party of aristocratic (theological) science" (*Partei der vornehmen Wissenschaft*). Cocceius, in his friendly attitude towards the Cartesian philosophy, differed from Voet, who violently opposed the teaching of Descartes during his residence at Utrecht. This led to an unseemly controversy between the Voetians and Cocceians, and serves to show the close connexion between philosophy and religion at this time.

The intellectual atmosphere of the age was impregnated by the spirit of Grotius and Spinoza, the inaugurators of the new historical method and of a naturalistic conception of cosmic law. There was a great deal, moreover, in the philosophy of Spinoza on its mystical side which attracted Pietists generally. He counted among his followers Pontiaan van Hattem of Bergen-op-Zoom and Jacob Vershoor of Flushing. There was a close connexion between his "*amor intellectualis*" and the "*laetitia spiritualis*" of the orthodox pietistic school; and he had many friends among the "Collegiants," a small community of Remonstrant dissenters. Thus, after his excommunication by the Synagogue, it was among these that he found an asylum; and in a house occupied by them at this time some of his unpublished letters have been discovered. The common ground of Spinozism and Pietism is their cheerful quietism—the imperturbable tranquillity of the mind in its complete union with God. In this the English mystic Henry More agrees with the Dutch Pietists and Spinoza; between whom and England there are other points of connexion. He was born in the same year as Locke; one of his tutors was sent to plead the cause of the Jews in England with the great Protector; and his friend, Henry Oldenburg, a learned German, during his official residence in England became the first secretary of the Royal Society. There are also signs of the influence of Hobbes in Spinoza's theory of civil government. The doctrine of religious liberty he had seen applied in Holland; but his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* is the first comprehensive plea for toleration published in modern Europe. He points out that no opinions can be tolerated which are subversive of the

safety of the State; but that in all other cases the State has no right to interfere with the opinions of private individuals. He was an admirer of the de Witts and the intellectual supporter of their policy. When a call came to him from the Elector Palatine Charles Lewis, brother of the Princess Elizabeth, the correspondent of Descartes, to a professorship of philosophy at Heidelberg, he refused to accept it as likely to interfere with the tranquillity of a scholar's life—and other illustrations might be added of the independence of his noble character. In religion Spinoza is the precursor of naturalistic theism, or mystical pantheism, which identifies God with the universe; and in his attempt to spiritualise nature by his theory of the Divine immanence he provides modern scientific monism with a creed. Spinoza's intellectual love of God springs from his monotheistic conception of the Divine substance, as containing all things; and from the merging of the human with the Divine mind and will he deduces the theory of moral liberty, as the practical outcome of his philosophy of religion. From him Goethe professed to have learned the lesson of renunciation at the call of duty; and the eclectic Pietism of Holland and Germany in its more philosophical aspects is traceable, in part at least, to the same source.

Both Voet and Cocceius had for their pupil Jodocus van Lodenstein, who has been called the first Pietist, because he gave the first impact to the movement, as a distinct form of religious life and a development of Calvinism. Its representatives were proud of the title "*die Ernstigen*" (the intense), or "*die Feinen*" (the refined), making it their aim to displace by earnestness and devotion the existing formalism and indifferentism in the Church. They tried to rekindle the fire of holy emotion and by the spirit of self-sacrifice and austere self-immolation to restore the mystical union of the soul with God. Lodenstein, who is described as a man of great dignity and modesty, goes back to Tauler and Thomas à Kempis in his attempt to effect a union between the *via illuminativa* and the *via purgativa sive perfectiva*, that is, intellectual enlightenment with moral perfection. He remained a loyal churchman to the end and served several cures with scrupulous attention to his duties, differing in this respect from Labadie, who in his person seems to have passed biogenetically (to use a scientific phrase) through all the stages of pietistic evolution, beginning his career as a devout Romanist, and ending by becoming a Protestant schismatic.

Jean de Labadie, born in 1610, the son of a Governor of Guienne, was educated by the Jesuits, and in his seventeenth year entered their Order as a novice, in opposition to his father's wish. After a time, and in consequence of a diligent study of the Bible and the writings of St Augustine and St Bernard, he quitted the Society "by mutual consent," and became a secular priest working under the Archbishop of Bordeaux. His talent and successes drew on himself the attention of the General of the Oratorians, and he was called to Paris as a member of this Congregation. Compelled by Jesuit intrigues to leave,

he followed the invitation of the Bishop of Amiens, who appointed him to a canonry. Here, as elsewhere, he earnestly exhorted the people to study the Scriptures and to take the early Christian Church for their model. He refused to join the Jansenists; yet, again, he incurred the hostility of the Jesuits, and at their instigation Mazarin persuaded him to return to his own native province. Thither he resorted, accompanied by his associates, as St Francis was by his confraternity, and like him possessing the peculiar charm of personal attraction. After a while his position here, too, became insecure, and he found an asylum in the castle of the Vicomte de Cartets, a member of the Reformed Church. Here he applied himself to a severe study of Calvinism. He joined the Church at Montauban, and was appointed as a Protestant minister. But, becoming obnoxious to the Roman Catholics, and even to some of his congregation by reason of the rigour of his teaching, he retired temporarily to Orange. On his way to follow a call to the French Church in London, he arrived at Geneva (1659); and here he was persuaded to stay seven years, continuing his agitation against worldliness, and in his tract *L'église à part* advocating the utter separation of the Church from the world. By degrees his position here, too, became untenable; and he followed a call of the Walloon Church at Middelburg in Zeeland, partly at the instigation of Anna Maria von Schuurman, "the Minerva of the seventeenth century," a learned lady born at Cologne and settled at Utrecht, who entertained pietistic sentiments similar to his own. But the same causes which brought him into conflict with the ecclesiastical authorities elsewhere again operated here. His critical aggressiveness and impatience under discipline at last brought about what he calls his "*séparation heureuse*," when with about one-third of his congregation he set up the first schismatic communion in the Reformed Church. Labadie never was in want of adherents, male and female, ladies of position in particular, fascinated by his passionate eloquence, his self-confidence, the charm of his manners, and the ease and suppleness acquired in his early Jesuit training. He was followed by them from place to place, first to Herford, where they were welcomed by the Abbess, the Princess Palatine Elizabeth; and thence to Altona, where he died. His followers settled at Wieuwerd, near Leeuwarden, in Friesland; and a remnant of them seems to have ultimately found a refuge in Maryland.

In several localities where Labadie and his followers settled they were called Quakers: partly on account of the similarity of the views and practices of the two sects, partly because Penn during his visit to Herford to the Princess Elizabeth, over whom he exercised some influence, entered into friendly relations with Labadie, with whose religious sensationalism and morose Pietism the sobriety and simplicity of Penn were, however, in strange contrast.

Some resemblances no doubt existed between Quakerism and Labadism, but there were still greater differences. The followers of both believed in

the theory stated by Barclay "that the best and most certain knowledge of God, is not that which is attained by premises premised and conclusions deduced; but that which is enjoyed by conjunction of the mind of man with the Supreme Intellect." Both were "fighters," though the Labadists could never become a political power as did the early Quakers in England. Both were opposed to priestly assumption and ceremonial formalism; but, while the Quakers displayed considerable acuteness in temporal concerns and political sagacity (as, for example, in their relation with James II), skilfully adapted themselves to their surroundings, gradually sobered down, and therefore survived, the Labadists, from their lack of these powers, and for other reasons already stated, died out.

The Pietism of the Reformed Church in Germany differed little from the Calvinistic Pietism in Holland, from which it was derived. Theodor Untereyk at Mühlheim in the duchy of Berg speaks of himself as ploughing with the oxen of Cocceius. In his *Hallelujah* and other writings he approached Labadie in his views on the antagonism between God and the world. Allardin, a native of Bremen, and minister at Emden in East Friesland from 1666 to 1707, followed on the same lines. Joachim Neander, rector of the Latin school under the Reformed Church at Düsseldorf, the hymnologist of the movement, in his *Bundeslieder*, dedicated to the merchants of Frankfort, and Nethenus, its weeping prophet, bewailing the corruptions of the Church in his *Seufzendes Turteltäubchen und Zion's Thränenflagge* (1676), expressed the same views. What is peculiar to this form of derived Pietism is its tendency to sectarian dissidency, because, in being transplanted from a more to a less congenial soil, it came into collision with the order and discipline of the Reformed Church of Germany, and the authority of the "godly prince" as "*summus Episcopus*." Friedrich Adolf Lampe, however, the solid and scholarly disciple of Voet and Cocceius, is an exception. He was a voluminous writer; and, although, like the rest, severe in his animadversions against "*bürgerliches Christenthum*" (middle-class Christianity); he loved to dwell on the more attractive aspects of Christianity, on the love, rather than the sovereignty, of God, and on filial affection as contrasted with the "*timor filialis*" of Calvinistic theology. Of Calvinistic Pietism generally it must be said that in its appeals to the imagination, the emotions, and the will, rather than to reason, in its chiliastic dreams, and in its comparative neglect of the practical aspects of religion, it failed to produce results in proportion to its efforts; much force was dissipated in negative criticism of the existing conditions in the Church and the world, which lessened its reforming influence, while from lack of cohesion among its members it failed to secure its own continuity.

In the Lutheran Church, where the feeling of corporate union was stronger, Pietism was kept more strictly within the bounds of orthodoxy and the *Formula Concordiae*. Here lay influence and the feminine

elements were weaker, and clericalism was proportionately stronger. Here, too, we note a more pronounced tendency to return to the theosophical mysticism of Jacob Boehme as well as to the asceticism of St Bernard. Thus Pretorius, an orthodox Lutheran ecclesiastic, compares the Pietist meditating in retirement to the lily of the valley. In this development of contemplative Pietism we see Lutheran Church reformers like Johann Arndt, with the pietistic hymnologists under his influence, and the Jesuit Friedrich von Spee (or Spe), approaching each other. This remarkable man was one of the few, who, after the horrors of the Thirty Years' War, helped to resuscitate the intellectual and moral life of Germany. Living as he did when the rage against witches was at its height (900 of them were burned by the orders of Bishop Philip Adolf of Würzburg between 1627 and 1629) he published a book against *Hexenprozesse* (trials of witches)—*Cautio Criminalis* (1631)—for which he is highly commended by the broad-minded Thomasius. As professor of moral philosophy at Paderborn, Spee had a great influence over the students, incurring the displeasure and suspicion of his superiors on account of his supposed dangerously liberal views. The *Guldene Tugendbuch* (Golden Book of Virtue) is called by Leibniz an altogether divine book, which, he says, should be in everybody's hand. But Spee's fame mainly rests on his poetry, the collection of poems named *Trutz-Nachtigall*, composed amid the solitude of hill and forest in a cloister almost changed into a ruin by the war, and bearing the impress of a deep and fervent spirit, purity of feeling, and an intense love for nature, while spiritual joyousness alternates in them with melancholy sweetness. Spee, like some of the French Quietists of the time, was "*enivré de l'amour de Dieu*." But, though his language is at times soft and sensuous, even fantastic, nevertheless his poems, as a rule, are free from that irreverent tone of familiarity with the Deity which so frequently characterises pietistic poetry. He is a follower of the earlier Mystics, such as Suso; yet his own outlook on the world is not sombre, but clear and bright, with a child's simplicity and a manly courage, with humanistic breadth and spiritual ardour, and with an earnest yearning for peace and goodwill.

In the same spirit, but from a somewhat different standpoint, Johann Arndt, the German Fénelon, in his *Four Books on the True Christianity* (1605), declared war against verbal professions of faith—*Maulchristenthum*—in the Lutheran Church. By his *Paradisgärtlein* (little Eden), which, like the *Imitation*, still maintains its place as a book of devotion in Germany, Arndt became a light and guide in those dark days. His works and the hymns of the period (Paul Gerhardt alone wrote one hundred and twenty, some of which are still among the most popular in use) express the yearning after a greater spirituality amid the arid controversies and deadness of religion at the time. Arndt was the first among Lutherans who showed the way back to medieval devotion, adopting the language of the Canticles in describing the union

of the soul with the Divine Bridegroom. This sentiment, and more than this, finds its counterpart in such hymns as that entitled *Ein Liebeslied des seufzenden Turteltäubchens*, which contains apostrophes like "*Mein Jesulein, mein Herzelein, mein Schätzlein, mein Brüderlein, du bist ja mein,*" etc., etc., full of the bitter-sweet ecstatic emotionalism which marks the *sancta amatoria* of the period. They express a sensuous delight in dwelling on Christ's sufferings and the agonies of the Cross, as in the well-known hymn *O Haupt voll Blut und Wunden*. Whatever their faults in the way of lack of reverence or dignified reticence, they reflect the higher aims and aspirations of noble souls, and form a comment on the spiritual exhaustion from which they strive to escape at a time when the spiritual life in Germany was at its lowest ebb. Blended with this is the mystical straining after spiritual perfection exemplified by Boehme and his predecessor Valentin Weigel, who thus protests against dead formalism: "Barren are the schools; barren are all forms; barren—worse than barren, these exclusive creeds, this deadly polemical letter." A faithful follower of Lutheranism and free from the sickly sentimentalism of the pietistic poetasters, the mystical shoemaker of Görlitz displays the freshness of a vigorous and ingenious mind cast in a speculative mould; but, undisciplined by literary culture—he only read the Bible and Paracelsus—he loses himself in confusion of thought and incoherence of expression. In his *Aurora*—where, as the name suggests, Boehme describes the dawn of his inner illumination—he represents life as a fuliginous striving after perfection, a warfare between light and darkness, and between good and evil: God himself is a manifestation of these opposites. William Law, the scholarly mystic, was also a follower of Boehme; and his influence on the Wesleys formed a connecting link between the religious revivalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The most prominent promoter of Pietism in the Lutheran Church was Philip Jacob Spener, whose plastic nature, wide sympathies, and power of assimilation specially fitted him for the task. Occupying a leading position as a preacher in Frankfort, Leipzig, and Berlin successively, he maintained throughout the sober-minded and correct attitude of a loyal churchman. At the same time he was lenient, perhaps too lenient, towards those whose enthusiasm carried them too far. An admirer, if not a follower, of Arndt, he dwells in his *Pia desideria* on the unsatisfactory state of the Church; but, as a Church reformer, he avoids the opposite extremes of worldliness and escape from the world (*Weltflucht*), and tries to raise the moral tone of Christian society by educational methods. In his *Klagen über das verdorbene Christenthum, Missbrauch und Gebrauch* (1684) he dwells on the weaker side of Church life in his day, but objects to the epithet "Babylon" as by some applied to it. He favours the establishment of *Collegia pietatis*, *Erbauungsstunden* (*lessons of edification*), and similar efforts for the cultivation of

Christian studies, as means of self-improvement supplementary to the ordinary ministrations. He treats in the same way the *Collegia philobiblica* for Divinity students in the University of Leipzig as a preparatory institution to promote efficiency in their future ministerial work. If separatist tendencies resulted from all this, it was contrary to the spirit and intention of Spener, whose sole aim was a return to apostolical piety and simplicity. These *ecclesiolae* were to be aids, not substitutes, for the *Ecclesia*. Towards Boehme and his disciple Gottfried Arnold, whose *Church History* inspired Mosheim to emulation, Spener maintained an attitude of benevolent neutrality. Gifted with a mild temperament rather than great force of will, possessing the tact acquired by constant intercourse with the cultured classes, and therefore apt to treat with gentle tolerance the extravagant vagaries of earnest though somewhat vulgar enthusiasts, he incurred the charge of facile self-accommodation, vagueness, and indiscriminate comprehensiveness, calculated, as was thought, to prepare the way for the indifferentism of the *Aufklärung*. It was left for the more powerful personality of August Hermann Francke to correct this tendency of his friend and fellow-worker.

Francke was a man of great force of character and determination, revered for his unflinching faith and practical piety. He was the founder of the first orphanage in Germany and also one of the eight "*Magisters*" in Leipzig who, under Spener, were engaged in the work of academic revivalism by means of *oratio, meditatio, tentatio*; with a view to developing model Christians rather than sound theologians. Francke himself had passed, in a season of spiritual conflict, from doubt to faith, and set a high value on individual conversion. By natural disposition domineering, he was severe in his ascetical demands, more contentious and less compromising than Spener. Driven with Thomasius from Leipzig by the defenders of scholastic pedantry and religious formalism, he joined him in exercising a great influence upon the beginnings of the University of Halle, of which both were original professors, and imparted his own spirit to the Pietism of the Halle school. This movement in many respects resembles the Methodist revival at Oxford, as the *Kothen Lieder* proceeding from it correspond to the hymns of the two Wesleys. Much opposed by the orthodox party, notably by Valentin Ernst Löschner, who in his strictures speaks of Pietism as "*malum pietisticum*," this form of Pietism after a struggle of existence for thirty years in the Lutheran Church became at last a social power among the nobility and gentry and even among a few of the reigning Princes. This temporary alliance between Pietism and despotism unhappily led to the lamentable episode of the expulsion of Christian Wolff from Halle by Frederick William I of Prussia through the instrumentality of Francke and his school. In this effort to protect the youth of the University from what they considered the baneful teaching of the Wolffian philosophy (which in the main coincided with that of Leibniz)—its determinism, and tendency to divorce

morality from religion—they were ready to undo their own work of emancipating philosophical speculation from the dogmatism of the schools. It should be added, however, that they deeply regretted the success of their agitation, when they found that it led to the forcible removal of their victims from the University. Johann Conrad Dippel, "the Christian Democritus," is one of the few among those involved in these discussions who in his writings displays the saving grace of humour. He was a man of the world, with varied experiences, and many-sided literary activities. For some time under Arnold's influence and moving in pietistic circles, he afterwards took up an independent attitude and became a "free-thinker among the Pietists"—a radical Pietist. As such, he castigated with much critical acumen and in a piquant style both the solemn obtuseness of some of the Pietists and the unyielding pedantry of their orthodox opponents, charging both with neglecting the moral factor of religion in their disputes. In his own views he leaned towards Latitudinarianism; he was one of the earliest of his time to hold the view that the heathen may ultimately be saved, though instances of an approach to universalism are not altogether wanting among the Quietists of the seventeenth century in France and Germany. His satirical disposition entailed upon him litigation and imprisonment, and he ended as a solitary.

Among the literary productions of the movement in its later developments was the *Berleburg Bible*, published under the patronage of Count Casimir von Berleburg, who with his mother made their seat the centre of union for every shade of independent Pietism. This Bible in its annotations follows on the lines of Madame Guyon in a similar enterprise and dwells mainly on the conditions of the spiritual life, the soul's illumination and purification by immediate communion with God. Another publication was the journal called the *Geistliche Fama*, the organ of the movement, which addressed itself to the varied crowd of Pietists, now spread in different directions, which counted among its contributors individuals belonging to every section of society: lawyers and professors, medical men—one of this profession became its editor—teachers in elementary schools, masters and journeymen of various trades, ambassadors, generals, civil servants, political agents, and peasants—just as in England the name of the Latitude men was "daily exagitated among us," as one of them says, "in taverns and pulpits." But what held together this body of Pietists of various denominations in Germany was a community of thought and similarity of aims, rather than anything approaching to identity of opinion; small groups, like the "*Inspirations-gemeinden*" ("Congregations of Inspiration") were not even attached to any particular Church, but indulged in a kind of "*Jesuscultus*" of their own, while some individuals, like Johann Tennhart, who called himself "God's chancellor," took up a standpoint of individual independence, and all of them exhibited a strong tendency to abstain partially, or entirely,

from the use of Church services and sacraments, and exhibited a studied indifference to ecclesiastical forms and ceremonies. This attitude produced an edict in Württemberg in 1694 warning the authorities against permitting the introduction of the writings of Poiret, Antoinette de Bourignon, Mrs Leade, Arnold, and the Petersens, members of the extreme left of pietistic enthusiasts. This was followed by another edict in 1707 designed to stop private religious meetings and compel some of the recalcitrant Pietists to quit the country. A further rescript contains prophylactic measures directed against the disintegrating influences of all such sectarian innovations and irregularities.

Württemberg was called by some of the Pietists the "*Augapfel Gottes*" on account of its privileged position, as compared with the rest of Germany, after the Thirty Years' War. For the duchy possessed a constitution; and the *Cynosura Ecclesiastica*, which formed part of it, secured coordinate rights for the Church in the Diet. The latter had considerable power in limiting the ducal authority. Here, then, constitutionalism and Pietism, introduced by Spener during his stay at Stuttgart and Tübingen (1662), were often united in opposing autocratic excesses—a union of democracy and Puritanism on a minor scale. The chief representatives of this Pietism are Beata Sturm, the *Mère Angélique* of Protestant Pietism—some compare her to the poor Armella of the Catholic hagiology in the seventeenth century; the noble Johann Jacob Moser, a pietist statesman, who suffered for conscience' sake in prison, and the genial theologian Friedrich Christoph Oetinger, who, in his love of metaphysics, came into close contact with the Wolff-Leibnizian philosophy. Brought under the influence of August Gottlieb Spangenberg at Jena and Count Zinzendorf on a visit to Herrnhut, he tried here to introduce his *philosophia sacra*, which represents Christ as the author of the *Physicum verum*. His aim was to combine science with revelation, and chemistry with religion; and in so doing Oetinger lost himself in a cloud of theosophy and mysticism after the manner of Boehme and Swedenborg. In his closing days he became a legendary figure in the history of Pietism, itself then approaching the stage of spiritual exhaustion. It now deteriorated into a kind of effeminate sentimentalism, producing among its members a feeling of morbid self-depreciation, or lachrymose self-complacency, mainly expressed in religious verse, voluminous as to quantity and feeble in quality—Karl Heinrich von Bogatzky alone published three hundred and sixty-two hymns in his sixtieth year—the swan-song of Pietism in the Lutheran Church.

What little remained of force in the movement was to some extent absorbed in the Pietism of the Moravian community, which had in 1722 found an asylum in Herrnhut from religious persecution in the Austrian dominions. Its members were living under strict discipline in a kind of common life, which, in its protest against the corruptions of social life and religious decadence, revived the idea of Christian socialism. Nothing

resembling a community of goods existed in the Moravian settlement; but it was expected "that all inhabitants would take a voluntary share, according to their ability, in defraying the necessary public expenses, and as good citizens conform to the municipal regulations of the settlement." It thus marks a new departure from a purely pietistic egoism to altruistic endeavour, from self-conscious and self-introspective mysticism to practical self-surrender, thus preparing the way for the secularisation of Pietism in the eighteenth century.

Thus, in tracing the two movements of Latitudinarianism and Pietism to a common source, and following their course, as determined by national character and local environment, and augmented by tributaries of thought arising out of the peculiar circumstances of the time, we perceive in their ultimate results corresponding differences. In England the effect of Latitudinarianism was a broadening of the current of thought, which broke the power of ecclesiastical tyranny, and, with a "depression of theology," produced a gradual liberation of the mind, while at the same time favourably affecting the growth of political freedom and promoting a soberly ordered social life. In Germany, where governmental repression and narrow particularism hampered free development, forcing the mind to prey on itself, Pietism favoured the growth of intellectual concentration, led on to critical enquiry and religious speculation, and gradually freed itself from the trammels of Protestant scholasticism. This had the effect of quickening the sensibility of the soul-life and intensifying inward piety, producing at the same time indifference to creeds and forms of worship, and ending in *Gefühlsreligion* (the religion of feeling), or in romantic mysticism, such as that of Goethe's "Beautiful Soul," an idealised picture of *Fräulein von Klettenberg*.

In their combined effect, Latitudinarianism in England and the English-speaking countries overseas, on the one hand, and Pietism in Germany and the neighbouring countries in northern and central Europe, influenced by German thought, on the other, appear as mutually supplementary movements, the one more practically, the other more ideally, affecting the course of European thought and life. Thus they succeeded in establishing the supremacy of reason and the complete autonomy of conscience, and brought about a partial recovery from religious lethargy and moral enervation. To measure accurately the force and extent of this dual movement in its ultimate effects and to assign to each its proper share is beyond our power. Streams, however deep or broad, are merged at last in the sea, blending with it and thus losing their own distinctive colouring. So it is with the two streams or tendencies discussed in the foregoing pages. They entered the ocean of general thought and feeling. They left their effect in broadening and deepening the current, as well as in raising the level and changing the complexion, of European thought and its translation into action; and their impress thus remains on that transition period which began in the latter half of the seventeenth century.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

OF

LEADING EVENTS MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME.

- 1133 The Saxon North Mark (Brandenburg) conferred upon Albert the Bear.
- 1147 Foundation of Moscow.
- 1186 The Brandenburg Margraves establish a claim on Pomerania.
- 1226 The Margraves of Brandenburg acquire the Spree district.—Foundation of Berlin follows.
The Culm lands given to Hermann of Salza and the German Order.
- 1255 Building of Königsberg.
- 1311 The German Order secures Danzig.
- 1324-73 The Mark Brandenburg subject to the House of Wittelsbach.
- 1343 Peace of Kalisch between the German Order and Poland.
- 1374 The Mark Brandenburg united to the Bohemian Crown.
- 1385-8 Brandenburg mortgaged to the Margraves of Moravia.
- 1410 Polish victory over the German Knights at Tannenberg.
- 1411 First Peace of Thorn between Poland and the German Order.
- 1417 Investment of Frederick of Hohenzollern with the margravate of Brandenburg.
- 1466 The Second or Perpetual Peace of Thorn between Poland and the German Order.
- 1472 Marriage of Ivan III of Russia and the Greek Princess Sophia.
- 1473 February. The Brandenburg *Dispositio Achillea*.
- 1525 Albert of Hohenzollern, formerly High Master of the German Order, invested with the secularised duchy of Prussia.
Giovio's *Muscovy*.
- 1533 Accession of Ivan IV, afterwards crowned Tsar (1547).
- 1543 Vesalius on Human Anatomy.
- 1550 Ivan IV summons the *Sobor*.
- 1552 Russian annexation of Kazan.
- 1553 Sir Hugh Willoughby's expedition for the discovery of the Northern Passage. Foundation of the English "Muscovy Company."
- 1554 Russian annexation of Astrakhan.
- 1558-78 Gregory Stroganoff carries Russian colonisation beyond the Ural Mountains.
- 1560 The *Academia Secretorum Naturæ* founded at Naples.
- 1561 Gottfried Kettler, last High Master of the German Order in Livonia, becomes Duke of Courland.
- 1566 Administration of the see of Magdeburg secured to Joachim Frederick of Brandenburg.

- 1569 Union of Poland and Lithuania at Lublin.
- 1582-4 The Cossack Ermak Timotheevich captures Sibir.—Russian subjugation of Siberia follows.
- 1589 Foundation of Patriarchate of Moscow.
- 1589-91 Galileo at Pisa lays foundation of the science of Dynamics.
- 1591 Francis Vieta publishes his algebraic work.
- 1595 May. Peace of Teusin between Russia, Sweden, and Poland.
- 1605 Joachim Frederick of Brandenburg obtains administratorship of ducal Prussia. Bacon's *Advancement of Learning*. Arndt's *Four Books*.
- 1605-6 Rule of Dimitri the Pretender at Moscow.
- 1608 French colony at Quebec founded by Champlain.
- 1609 Invasion of Russia by King Sigismund of Poland. Kepler publishes his development of the Copernican system of astronomy.
- 1612 Jacob Boehme's *Aurora*.
- 1613 Michael Romanoff elected Tsar.
- 1614 Treaty of Xanten regulates Brandenburg and Neuburg claims to Jülich-Cleves-Berg inheritance. Napier of Merchistoun on logarithms.
- 1616 Edict of Inquisition against Galileo's teaching of astronomy.
- 1617 Peace of Stolbova between Sweden and Russia.
- 1618 Union of the duchy of Prussia with Brandenburg.
- 1620 Bacon's *Novum Organum*.
- 1628 Harvey's *Exercitatio de Motu Cordis*.
- 1632 War between Poland and Russia. Galileo's dialogues on the Copernican theory of astronomy.
- 1634 Treaty of Polianovka between Poland and Russia.
- 1635 Truce of Stuhmsdorf between Sweden and Poland (including Prussia).
- 1637 Death of Bogislav XIV of Pomerania. Swedes remain in possession of duchy. Descartes' *Discours*. Milton's *Lycidas* written.
- 1638 Death of Cornelius Jansen. Publication of Chillingworth's *Religion of Protestants*.
- 1640 Death of George William of Brandenburg and accession of Frederick William (the Great Elector). Posthumous publication of Jansen's treatise on the theology of St Augustine.
- 1641 Truce of Stockholm between Brandenburg and Sweden. Milton's first pamphlet *Of Reformation touching Church discipline in England*.
- 1642 English commercial treaty with Portugal. Hales' *Schism and Schismatics*.
- 1644 Portuguese rising in Brazil.
- 1645 Accession of the Tsar Alexis Romanoff.
- 1646 Jeremy Taylor's *Liberty of Prophesying*.—*Travels of Olearius*.
- 1648 War between Venice and the Turks. Beginning of siege of Candia. Accession of Mohammad IV. Bishopricks of Halberstadt and Minden secured by Brandenburg. The Russian *Sobor* draws up a new Code of Laws (*Ulozhenie*).
- 1649 Portuguese Brazil Company established. Condemnation by the Sorbonne of five propositions from Jansen's *Augustinus*.
- 1650-63 Portuguese thrown back by Dutch in Ceylon and Malabar.
- 1651 English Navigation Act. English factory established at Hooghley. Hobbes' *Leviathan*.
- 1652 Abdication of Christina of Sweden and accession of Charles Gustavus. Dutch East India Company form a settlement at the Cape of Good Hope.
- 1653 John de Witt Grand Pensionary of Holland.

- 1653 Eastern Pomerania secured by Brandenburg.
Innocent X declares the five Jansenist propositions heretical.
- 1654 The Prussian League renounces its allegiance to the German Order.
The Dutch expelled from Brazil.
- 1654-6 Liturgical reforms of Nikon, Patriarch of Moscow.
- 1655 British capture of Jamaica.
- 1656 Mohammad Kiuprili Grand Vezir. Revival of the Ottoman Power.
Harrington's *Oceana*. John Wallis' *Arithmetica Infinitorum*.
- 1656-7 Pascal's *Provincial Letters*.
- 1657 War between the United Provinces and Portugal.
- 1658 Peace of Roeskilde between Sweden and Denmark.
- 1659 Stilliugfleet's *Irenicon*.
- 1660 February. Death of Charles Gustavus of Sweden.
April-May. The Stewart Restoration.
May. Peace of Copenhagen between Sweden and Denmark.
October. Establishment of hereditary monarchy in Denmark in the House of Frederick III. Growth of absolutism in Denmark and Norway.
Peace of Oliva. Independence of East Prussia recognised.
- 1660-73 James, Duke of York, Lord High Admiral of England.
- 1661 January. John Keményi Prince of Transylvania. Despatch of Imperial force under Montecuculi against the Turks.
April-May. Savoy Conference.
June. Bombay ceded by Portugal to England.
August. Peace between the United Provinces and Portugal.
September. Reestablishment of the Episcopal Church of Scotland decreed.
November. Ormond appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.
Death of Mazarin. Beginning of the personal rule of Louis XIV.
Defensive alliance and commercial treaty between England and Brandenburg.
Ahmad Kiuprili Grand Vezir.
New Charter granted to English East India Company.
The Scottish Rescissory Act. English Disciplinary Naval Statute.
Boyle's *Sceptical Chemist*.
- 1662 January. Death of John Keményi.
May. English Act of Uniformity.
„ Restoration of the Scottish Bishops.
June. Reinstitution of lay patronage in Scotland.
August. Secession of St Bartholomew's Day.
September. Bill for the Settlement of Ireland.
December. Treaty between Portugal and the United Provinces.
The English Company of Royal Adventurers trading to Africa (third Guinea Company) incorporated.
The Royal Society of London incorporated by charter.
- 1663 October. Settlement between Prussian Estates and the Great Elector.
„ English expedition to Guinea Coast.
The Turks under Ahmad Kiuprili advance upon western Hungary.
Milton finishes *Paradise Lost*.
- 1663-8 Butler's *Hudibras*.
- 1664 February. English seizure of Dutch possessions on the west coast of Africa.
Aug. Defeat of the Turks by Montecuculi at St Gothard. Peace of Vasvár.
English capture of New Amsterdam (New York).
First French Company trading with India founded. Colbert's First Tariff.
First Conventicle Act passed.
- 1665 January. De Ruyter recovers Goree from English occupation.
March. War between England and the United Provinces.

- 1665 June. Battle of Lowestoft.
 September. Death of Philip IV of Spain. Accession of Charles II.
 " Bishop of Münster declares war against United Provinces.
 December. Bill for Explanation of the Act of Settlement of Ireland.
 Five Mile Act passed. The Plague in London. Dryden's *Essay of Dramatic Poesy*.
- 1665-6 Newton's discoveries in mathematics, and as to the law of Universal Gravitation.
- 1666 January. France declares war against England.
 June. The "Four Days' Battle" between the English and Dutch.
 September. The Great Fire of London.
 October. "Quadruple Alliance" of Holland, Denmark, Brandenburg and Brunswick-Lüneburg.
 Treaty of Cleves. Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg secured by Brandenburg.
 Religious rising in Scotland put down at Rullion Green.
- 1666-7 The *Raskol* (great schism) in the Russian Church breaks out.
- 1667 February. Dutch conquest of Tobago.
 March. Secret treaty between Charles II and Louis XIV.
 May. War of Devolution between Louis XIV and the Spanish Netherlands.
 June. Dutch fleet in the Medway.
 July. Peace of Breda between England and the United Provinces.
 August. Fall of Clarendon.
 Treaty of Andrusovó between Poland and Russia.
 Colbert issues his increased tariff.
- 1668 January. Secret treaty between Louis XIV and the Emperor Leopold.
 Triplo Alliance of England, United Provinces, and Sweden, against France.
 February. French conquest of Franche Comté.
 May. Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle between the Allies and France.
 Peace between Spain and Portugal. Spanish surrender of Portugal.
 Bombay handed over to the English East India Company.
- 1669 Fall of Candia, followed by the cession of Crete to the Turks.
 Abdication of John Casimir of Poland; election of Michael Wisniowiecki.
 The "Peace of Clement IX" accorded to the Jansenists.
 Stensen lectures at Paris on the Anatomy of the Brain.
- 1670 February. Accession of Christian V in Denmark and Norway. Administration of Griffonfeld.
 May-June. Secret Treaty of Dover between Louis XIV and Charles II.
 British capture of Jamaica recognised by Spain.
 Second Conventicle Act passed.
 Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. Bossuet's *Exposition de la Doctrine Catholique*.
- 1671 John Sobieski elected King of Poland.
 Administration of the Leeward and Windward Islands settled by the English Government.
Paradise Regained and *Samson Agonistes*. Quesnel's *Réflexions Morales sur le Nouveau Testament*. Malpighi and Grew on Structural Botany.
- 1672 February. William III of Orange Captain-General of the Dutch Union.
 March. Charles II's Declaration of Indulgence.
 " War between England and the United Provinces.
 April. War between France and the United Provinces.
 May. Treaty between Louis XIV and Sweden.
 " Invasion of the United Provinces by Louis XIV.
 " Anglo-French naval defeat in Southwold Bay.

- 1672 June-October. Coalition of the Hague between the Emperor, Brandenburg, and Holland.
 July. William of Orange proclaimed Stadholder of Holland and Zeeland.
 August. Murder of John and Cornelius de Witt at the Hague.
 October. Treaty of Buczác between Poland and Turkey.
 Third Guinea Company merged in Royal African Company.
 Leibniz' *Concilium Aegyptiacum*.
- 1672-8 War between Turkey and Poland.
- 1673 March. Charles' Declaration of Indulgence cancelled. Test Act passed.
 June. Dutch naval successes at Schooneveld. French take Maestricht.
 August. Battle of the Texel.
 November. The Turks defeated by John Sobieski at Khoczim.
- 1673-4 Spread of the Second Imperial Coalition against France.
- 1674 February. Treaty of London between England and the United Provinces.
 August. Indecisive battle of Seneff between William of Orange and Condé.
 December. War between Sweden and Brandenburg.
- 1675 January. Defeat of the Great Elector at Colmar.
 " Swedish invasion of Brandenburg.
 April. Dutch victory off Messina. Death of de Ruyter.
 June. Treaty between France and Poland.
 " Victory of the Great Elector over the Swedes at Fehrbellin.
 July. Death of Turenne.
 August. Sobieski defeats the Turks at Lemberg.
 Committee of the Privy Council supersedes Council of Trade and Plantations.
 Bishop Croft's *Naked Truth*. Dryden's *Aurengzebe* produced.
- 1675-9 War of Scania between Denmark and Sweden.
- 1676 Juno. Danish-Dutch naval victory over the Swedes at Öland.
 October. Treaty of Zurawna between Poland and Turkey.
 December. Swedish victory at Lund.
 Accession of the Tsar Theodore III.
 Death of the Grand Vezir Ahmad Kiuprili; succession of Kara Mustafa.
- 1677 April. Defeat of Orange at Montcassel.
 July. Victory of Charles XI of Sweden at Landskrona.
 November. Marriage of William of Orange with Princess Mary of England.
 War between Russia and Turkey.
- 1678 August. First denunciation of the Popish Plot.
 " (to February, 1679). Peace of Nymegen.
 Emeric Tökölyi becomes the Hungarian national leader.
 The French obtain the cession of Goree.
 Cudworth's *Intellectual System*. Dryden's *All for Love* produced.
- 1679 May. Introduction of the Exclusion Bill.
 June. Treaty of St Germain-en-Laye between Brandenburg and Sweden.
 " Suppression of the Scottish Covenanting revolt at Bothwell Brigg.
 Treaty of Lund between Denmark and Sweden.
 The Habeas Corpus Act passed.
- 1680 Treaty of Bakchi-serai between Russia and Turkey.
 Archbishopric of Magdeburg incorporated with Brandenburg.
 Declaration of Sanquhar.
 The Exclusion Bill thrown out.
- 1681 September. French seizure of Strassburg and Casalo.
 October. Assembly of Gallican Clergy.
 Peace between Russia and Turkey.
 Filmer's *Patriarcha*. Dryden's *Spanish Friar* and *Absalom and Achitophel*.
- 1682 March. The French Assembly of Clergy defines liberties of Gallican Church.

- 1682 Accession of Peter the Great. The Tsarevna Sophia Regent.
Outbreak of war between Austria and the Turks.
Brandenburg African Trading Company established at Königsberg.
Privileges of City of London and other towns attacked by the Crown.
- 1682-90 Sir John Child Governor of Bombay.
- 1683 February. Association against France formed at the Hague.
June. Rye House plot discovered. Execution of Russell and Sidney.
July. Siege of Vienna by the Turks begun.
September. Relief of Vienna by John Sobieski.
" Death of Colbert.
December. War between France and Spain.
- 1684 March. The Holy League between Austria, Poland, and Venice, against the Turks.
August. Truce of Ratisbon between France and the Empire.
The Apologetical Declaration of the Scottish recusants.
Spencer's *Klagen*.
- 1685 February. Death of Charles II of England and accession of James II.
June. Risings of Monmouth and Argyll.
July. Monmouth defeated at Sedgemoor and executed.
August. Treaty of alliance between Great Elector and United Provinces.
" Recapturo of Neuhausel from the Turks.
October. Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.
November. Edict of Potsdam.
- 1685-8 Reforms in English naval administration.
- 1686 March. Treaty of alliance between the Emperor and the Great Elector.
July. Formation of the Augsburg Alliance.
September. Buda recovered from the Turks.
Leibniz' on the Calculus.
- 1687 January. Tyrconnel made Viceroy in Ireland.
Feb.-May. Diplomatic mission of Dykvelt in England.
April. The Declaration of Indulgence issued.
August. Turkish overthrow at Harkány, near Mohács.
" Halifax' *Letter to a Dissenter*.
September. Venetian siege and conquest of Athens.
November. Fagel's letter on Declaration of Indulgence.
December. Restoration of Austrian ascendancy in Hungary. Coronation of Archduke Joseph.
Deposition of Mohammad IV and accession of Solyman II.
Newton's *Principia*. Pufendorf's *De habitu religionis ad vitam civilem*.
Dryden's *Hind and Panther*.
- 1688 May. Death of the Great Elector.
" Declaration of Indulgence ordered to be read in churches.
" Petition of the Seven Bishops against reading of Declaration.
June. Birth of Prince James Edward (afterwards the "Old Pretender").
" Trial and acquittal of the Seven Bishops. Invitation to William, Prince of Orange.
September. The Emperor takes Belgrade.
" Army of Louis XIV advances on the middle Rhine.
November. Landing of William of Orange at Torbay.
December. William of Orange enters London. Flight of James II, and fall of the House of Stewart.
Bossuet's *Histoire des Variations des Églises Protestantes*.
- 1689 February. Declaration of Right.
" William and Mary proclaimed King and Queen of England.

- 1689 March. Rout of the Irish Protestants at Dromore.
 „ James enters Dublin.
 April. Outbreak of war between France and Spain.
 „ The siege of Derry begun.
 „ The Scottish Convention issues Declaration offering the crown to William and Mary.
 May. The Grand Alliance formed.
 „ Parliament summoned by James meets at Dublin.
 „ The Toleration Act passed.
 July. Relief of Derry. Defeat of James' troops at Newtown Butler
 „ Highland rising under Dundee put down at Killiecrankie.
 October. Bill of Rights passed.
 Mustafa Kiuprili Grand Vezir.
 Locke's *Two Treatises on Government*.
- 1690 July. French victory at Fleurus.
 „ Defeat of Anglo-Dutch fleet off Beachy Head.
 „ Battle of the Boyne. Second flight of James to France.
 Presbyterianism established in national Church of Scotland.
 Turkish reconquest of Servia, Widdin, and Belgrado.
 Permanent establishment of the English factory at Calcutta.
- 1691 April. French capture of Mons.
 July. Capture of Athlone by William's forces. Battle of Aughrim.
 August. Victory of Lewis of Baden at Szalankemen. Death of Mustafa Kiuprili.
 October. Treaties of Limerick.
- 1692 February. Massacre of Glencoe.
 May. Anglo-Dutch naval victory of La Hogue.
 June. French capture of Namur.
 August. William III defeated at Steinkirke. British repulse at St Malo.
 Invasion of Dauphiné by Victor Amadeus of Savoy.
- 1693 Defeat of William at Neerwinden.
 French victory of Marsaglia and invasion of Piedmont.
- 1693-4 Foundation of the National Debt and of the Bank of England.
- 1694 December. Death of Mary, Queen of England.
 Foundation of University of Halle.
 The Triennial Act passed.
- 1695 William recaptures Namur.
 Accession of the Sultan Mustafa II.
 Press Licensing Act dropped. Freedom of the Press established.
- 1695-1700 Initiation and ultimate failure of the Darien scheme.
- 1696 January. The Recoinage Act passed.
 February. English "Assassination Plot" discovered.
 August. The Duke of Savoy goes over to France.
 Death of John Sobieski of Poland.
 Conquest of Azoff by Peter the Great.
- 1697 September. Defeat of the Turks at Zenta by Prince Eugene.
 „ Peace of Ryswyk.
 Death of Charles XI of Sweden and accession of Charles XII.
 Accession of Augustus II of Poland.
 The Muscovite Embassy to the West.
 Fenclon's *Explanation of the Maxims of the Saints*. Dryden's *Alexander's Feast*.
- 1698 June. Revolt of the Russian Strictzy.
 October. First Treaty of Partition.
 New English East India Company (General Society) incorporated.

- 1698 British African trade thrown open.
J. Collier's *Short View of the Profaneness and Immorality of the English Stage*.
- 1699 January. Peace of Carlowitz.
February. Death of Electoral Prince Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria.
August. Accession of Frederick IV of Denmark and Norway.
September. Alliance between Denmark and Poland against Sweden.
November. Russia joins the coalition against Sweden.
Beginning of the great administrative reforms of Peter the Great.
- 1700 April. Act of Resumption of Irish grants.
May. Second Treaty of Partition.
August. Peace of Traventhal between Sweden and Denmark.
November. Death of Charles II of Spain.
" Battle of Narva.
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- 1701 January. Coronation of Elector Frederick III of Brandenburg as Frederick I, King in Prussia.
February. Dutch Barrier fortresses occupied by French troops.
July. Outbreak of the War in Italy.
September. The Grand Alliance formed.
" Death of James II. Recognition of his son as King by Louis.
The Act of Settlement passed.
Brandenburg-Prussia gains the *privilegium de non appellando*.
Defoe's *True-born Englishman*.
- 1702 February. Prince Eugene's raid on Cremona.
March. Death of William III. Accession of Anne.
May. Charles XII in Warsaw.
July. Victory of Charles XII at Klissow. Capture of Cracow.
August. Failure of the English expedition against Cadiz.
September. Marlborough reduces Venloo.
October. Marlborough reduces Ruremonde and Liège. Rooke's capture of the Plate fleet.
Godolphin and Marlborough's Tory Ministry formed.
- 1702-5 Rising in the Cevennes.
- 1703 April. Victory of Charles XII at Pultusk.
May. Portugal joins the Grand Alliance. Vienna threatened by Villars.
September. French victory at Höchstädt.
December. The Methuen Treaty between England and Portugal.
Act of Security passed by the Scottish Parliament.
- 1704 January. Deposition of Augustus of Poland.
May-June. Marlborough's march to the Danube.
July. Stanislaus Leszczyński elected King of Poland.
August. Capture of Gibraltar, and naval battle off Velez Malaga.
" Battle of Blenheim.
November. Convention of Ilbersheim.
The English Alien Act passed.
- 1704-5 Resignation of Tory Ministers. Whig additions to the Government.
- 1705 June. Swedish victory at Gemaurhof.
October. Peterborough's reduction of Barcelona. Catalonia and Valencia adopt the Habsburg cause.
- 1706 February. Swedish victory at Fraustadt. Russian retreat.
May. Battle of Ramillies.
August. First negotiations for peace opened by Louis.
September. Eugene's victory at Turin. French evacuation of Piedmont.

- 1706 October. Swedish defeat at Kalisch.
 „ Peace of Altranstädt between Sweden and Augustus of Saxony.
- 1707 March. Convention of Milan. The French abandon northern Italy.
 „ Act of Union between England and Scotland passed.
 April. Defeat of the Allies at Almanza.
 August. "Perpetual Alliance" between Sweden and Prussia.
 „ Failure of Eugene's attempt on Toulon.
 Prussia acquires Tecklenburg, Neuchâtel, and Valengin.
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- 1708 July. Battle of Oudenarde.
 „ Victory of Charles XII at Holowczyn.
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 „ English capture of Minorca.
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- 1708-9 Oct.-Feb. March of Charles XII through Severia and the Ukraine.
- 1708-10 Civil war in San Paulo. Portuguese organisation of district.
- 1709 May. Peace negotiations. The "Preliminaries" rejected by Louis.
 „ Charles XII lays siege to Poltawa.
 June. Battle of Poltawa. Revival of the northern league against Sweden.
 September. Battle of Malplaquet.
 October. Alliance between Russia and Denmark against Sweden.
 „ First Dutch Barrier Treaty.
- 1709-14 Charles XII in Turkey.
- 1710 March. Negotiations at Gertruydenberg.
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 August. Victory of the Allies at Saragossa.
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 „ Indecisive battle of Villa Vieiosa.
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- 1711 March. War between Russia and Turkey.
 April. Death of the Emperor Joseph I.
 August. Peace of the Pruth between Russia and Turkey.
 October. Election of the Emperor Charles VI.
 December. Dismissal of Marlborough.
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- 1712 January. Opening of peace negotiations at Utrecht.
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 March. Death of the Duke of Brittany.
 July. Separate armistice between England and France.
 „ French victory at Denain.
 December. Swedish victory over the Danes at Gadebuseh.
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- 1713 January. Second Dutch Barrier Treaty.
 February. Death of Frederick I of Prussia.
 April. Peace of Utrecht.
 May. Swedish capitulation at Oldensworth.
 July. Peace of Adrianople.
 Issu of the Bull *Unigenitus*.
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- 1714 March. Peace of Rastatt.
 „ Battle of Storkyro. Russia overruns Finland.
 May. The Schism Act.

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- 1714 August. Death of Queen Anne. Accession of George I.
September. Peace of Baden.
- 1715 February. Peace between Spain and Portugal.
May-June. Third Coalition against Sweden between Great Britain (Hanover), Denmark, and Prussia.
September. Death of Louis XIV.
November. Third Dutch Barrier Treaty.
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- 1716 Treaty of Danzig between Russia and Mecklenburg-Schwerin.
- 1716-7 Russian expedition into Central Asia.
- 1718 December. Death of Charles XII of Sweden.
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- 1719 First Russian envoy in Pekin.
- 1719-20 Nov.-Feb. Treaties of Stockholm.
- 1720 July. Peace of Frederiksborg between Sweden and Denmark.
- 1721 August. Peace of Nystad between Sweden and Russia.
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- 1722 Russian expansion in the Caspian provinces of Persia.
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- 1724 February. Treaty of Stockholm between Russia and Sweden.
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- 1725 January. Death of Peter the Great.
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- 1726 August. Russia joins Austro-Spanish League.
- 1727 April. Treaty of Copenhagen between Denmark, England, and France.
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